By Stijn Mitzer and Joost Oliemans

Following local experiments with spaced and slat armour on T-72AVs and BMP-2s, the 4th Armoured Division initiated a small-scale upgrade programme for its armour in the summer of 2014. After upgrading several of its T-72M1s and bulldozers with additional armour, the 4th Armoured Division is now also operating at least one ZSU-23-4 self-propelled anti-aircraft gun (SPAAG) upgraded in the same fashion.

The goal of the upgrade programme was to increase the chances of survivability of armoured fighting vehicles by adding additional armour, which consists of spaced and slat armour, further reinforced by metal chaines. Altogether, it provides an impressive 360 degree coverage against regular RPGs.Heavier RPGs like the RPG-29, the M79 Osa or later generation RPG-7 warheads have less trouble penetrating such armour however.

The first vehicles upgraded as part of this programme were several T-72M1s, which were then deployed to Jobar in order to test the actual combat value of the new armour package. These first missions did not end well as one of the upgraded T-72M1s got stuck and was subsequently abandoned by its crew, while another was completely destroyed after entering Jobar: a tragic start for the ambitious programme.^[1][2]

This however did not deter the 4th Armoured Division from pressing on with the upgrade programme, and several upgraded T-72M1s continued to join units in Jobar, Eastern Ghouta and even Aleppo in the months that followed. The factory responsible for the programme is located in Adra, north of Damascus.




A similar armour package, developed and produced by the same factory, was applied on bulldozers in use by the 4th Armoured Division.

The bulldozer earned its position in most of the offensives taking place in the neighbourhoods of Damascus and Eastern Ghouta where they're used to transport soldiers to the frontline, clear obstacles, raise sand barriers to cover infantry and tanks and clear suspected minefields. When they were still operating without these armour packages, they were an easy prey for the rebels' anti-tank teams, anti-materiel rifles and even machine gun fire, even when equipped with locally applied DIY armour.

Apart from small factory differences or minor field modifications, two variations are known to exist. These variations give a clear indication of how the designs and production of these armour packages have progressed over time.

The example below was active in Jobar, where it was mainly used to transport troops and clear minefields. It was destroyed in late December 2014 after being caught in the open by fighters of Failaq al-Rahman, also known as the Rahman corps, while supposedly trying to clear a minefield.

The bulldozer was only immobilized after receiving multiple hits from an RPG-7 and being fired upon by an anti-materiel rifle. Failaq al-Rahman then dug a tunnel to the abandoned bulldozer, and placed a satchel charge underneath it to prevent the recovery of the vehicle. The subsequent explosion breached its hull and started a fire, rendering it useless for future use.^[3][4]









The next vehicle to receive the armour upgrade was the ZSU-23-4. Combat experience gained in Darayya showed the need for a vehicle capable of engaging high-located rebel positions in flats and apartments, almost always out of reach of the T-72s.

Following the lead of several other nations in the past, Syria began to use its large fleet of ZSU-23-4s to support tanks and infantry. The biggest weakness of the ZSU-23-4 in this role is its weak armour. Originally designed to engage aircraft and helicopters while operating behind tanks and infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs) on the plains of Europe, the armour of the vehicle is anything but well suited for engaging enemy hideouts from up close. The recent capture of Brigade 82 near Sheikh Miskin serves as a heavy-handed reminder of this fact.^[5]

The installation of the armour package will largely address the ZSU-23-4's vulnerability to a range of small arms and RPGs, and will allow the vehicle to provide fire-support closer to the battle than before. With its extremely high rate of fire, large calibre and a range of elevation that covers any potential target, it is the ideal city conquest support vehicle made perfect; a warmachine completely adapted to the hostile environment that has made up the Syrian battlefield for close to four years.







After the metal chaines on the front of the T-72M1s proved to be incapable of stopping RPGs, most of the upgraded T-72M1s saw their metal chaines replaced by additional spaced armour or simply a piece of metal. These conversions were done in the T-72's operational area, as the factory responsible for the armour packages strangely enough still produces them with metal chains on front of the T-72.

Since the active conflict provides a myriad of combat reports on weaknesses and strenths of various types of equipment, it is likely subsequent variants of the upgraded armour will address these issues and thus become increasingly effective.








The combat value of the armour package was believed to be minimal after two of the upgraded T-72M1s were destroyed in Jobar. This however is in no way representative of the actual combat performance of the new armour. It is possible that the new armour package gave crews a feeling of invincibility, leading to the crews taking larger risks than normal and thus resulting in their vehicles being destroyed. One image from Eastern Ghouta confirms its effectiveness in combat however, showing one upgraded T-72M1s still intact after receiving several hits from an RPG.

While it is clear that single instances of the new armour pitted against unknown types of anti-tank weaponry hardly make a case for the up- and downsides of the armour package, it is obvious the 4th Armoured Divisiondeems it effective enough to allocate significant resources to it.




The upgrades performed on these vehicles prove the 4th Armoured Division are not running out of steam just yet. Although the installation of this armour package is impossible on T-72 'Urals' due to the location of its rangefinder, it is expected more and more armoured fighting vehicles will be upgraded in the same way.

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Onwards to the front, Syria's BMPs
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By Stijn Mitzer and Joost Oliemans

The Islamic State's offensive in Central Syria has not only allowed the fighters of the Islamic State to expand their operations into areas previously out of reach, but it now also threatens the regime's gas supplies, its presence on numerous fronts, its control over the only road leading to the vitally important T4 airbase and the airbase itself, the largest of its kind in Syria.

T4, sharing its name with the nearby pumping station, is more commonly (yet incorrectly) known as Tiyas and a whole host of other names. After the fall of Tadmur airbase, it is now one of sixteen operational airbases under control of the Syrian Arab Air Force (SyAAF), and its defence is essential to the SyAAF's ability to exercise control over the Syrian skies. No less than three fighter-bomber squadrons and one helicopter squadron are currently operating out of T4, including the pride of the SyAAF: its Su-24M2s. The airbase is also home to the now decommissioned MiG-25 fleet, largely phased out in the previous decade. Despite being Syria's largest airbase, T4 only has one runway, making the airbase extremely vulnerable in case this single runway gets taken out.

In anticipation of an Islamic State offensive on T4 after their lightning advance throughout Central and Eastern Syria in mid and late 2014, the airbase's assets were heavily reinforced by a temporarily detachment of L-39s, formerly deployed to the then recently overrun Tabqa airbase and by one detachment of at least four Mi-8/17s.

Fully aware of the high military value of T4, the regime has made extensive efforts to defend the airbase, making it come close to being an impenetrable fortress. 'Fortress T4' also serves as a barrier between the now Islamic State controlled Tadmur, and regime controlled Homs, further adding to its importance. The regime forces defending T4 have clashed with the fighters of the Islamic State on numerous occasions throughout the past year, with the latest offensive coming close to the officer's housing and T4 pumping station. According to various reports by Islamic State related Twitter accounts, T4 was targeted with artillery in late May 2015, although it remains unknown if this caused any damage to the airbase.

While the airbase itself is not in imminent danger of falling to the fighters of the Islamic State, the control over the only road leading to T4 is disputed, and will likely completely be under the control of the Islamic State if they continue their push towards Homs. This would isolate T4 and make access by road impossible, leading to significant problems in the long run. Resupplying the airbase would then be in the hands of the SyAAF's transport aircraft and helicopters, but such an airlift would have serious drawbacks as it would be unable to bring in any heavy weaponry and fuel, not to mention the fact that it would also cost the regime loads of precious resources.



The resident fleet of aircraft and helicopters has the potential of being a major eyesore to the fighters of the Islamic State, and has the ability to thwart the Islamic State in any of its future offensives undertaken in the Homs Governorate. But as the SyAAF remains largely unable to respond to actual developments, and often only joins the fray after the battle on the ground has been fought, better coordination between regime forces on the ground and SyAAF aircraft and helicopters in the sky is required to fully optimise the assests available at T4. Furthermore, the desperate revenge strikes flown by the SyAAF on recently lost towns could be stopped to spare not only the life of the many innocent civilians killed during these sorties, but also the precious airframes used in these useless sorties, with the wasted flight-hours instead allocated to supporting the regime's ground forces.

For example, only one symbolic sortie from T4 was flown in aid of the defenders of Hulayhilah, while the defenders of al-Sukhna, al-Hail, Arak and the numerous other towns and gasfields recently captured by the fighters of the Islamic State received no aerial support whatsoever. The SyAAF also largely stood by when Tadmur was captured, only flying some aimless sorties to boost moral of the regime forces on the ground. The town was heavily hit only after it was captured by the Islamic State, with the ordnance used randomly dropped on residential areas.

The huge weapons depots and airbase present at Tadmur provided the fighters of the Islamic State with large amounts of weaponry and associated ammunition, a logical target for the SyAAF's fighter-bombers, which can be equipped with sophisticated precision guided weaponry. However, none of the depots were targeted by the SyAAF, and it was the US-led coalition that had to step in to destroy six anti-aircraft guns captured at Tadmur.^[1] This while the majority of the aircraft capable of deploying precision guided munitions is stationed at T4, located only sixty kilometers from Tadmur.

While extensive in terms of types, Syria's numerically limited stock of precision guided missiles has seen little use throughout the Civil War, making it likely that the majority is still being withheld for a possible future conflict with the U.S. or Israel. But as the war has now entered its fourth year, one would question if such weaponry wouldn't be better off used in this conflict instead. While the SyAAF's current arsenal of precision guided weaponry would be quickly depleted, it could be quickly replenished by Russia; the continuous flow of Russian-made weaponry that reaches Syria on a regular basis is a testament to that fact.

When examining T4 using the latest (public) satellite imageryavailable one can spot a large number of seemingly inoperational aircraft spread around the airbase, with as much as thirty-two decommissioned MiG-25s visible at T4 in October 2014. While certainly an impressive sight, it marks the end of an era for the once mighty 'Foxbat' fleet. The fleet of MiG-25s was slowly decommissioned throughout the previous decade, with only a few examples remaining operational by the turn of the century.

The exact number of MiG-25s Syria received is thought to be around forty. Versions are believed to include MiG-25P (later upgraded to MiG-25PDS) and MiG-25PD interceptors, MiG-25R and RB reconnaissance aircraft and MiG-25PU conversion trainers. A reason for the retirement of the MiG-25 fleet might not only be its age and the increasing costs to keep the aircraft operational that come with it, but also the type's vulnerability to Israeli jamming.

The career of some MiG-25s appeared to have been revived on several occasions throughout the Syrian Civil War; the last confirmed sorties were flown in March and April 2014, during which a MiG-25PD(S) launched R-40 air-to-air missiles at ground targets. These sorties, to no one's surprise, yielded no beneficial results.

The last to operate the MiG-25s was an unknown squadron at Tadmur, sporting three MiG-25PD(S) and one MiG-25PU in its ranks until late 2013. These aircraft were then likely flown to T4, where they joined the remainder of the MiG-25 fleet already stored here.




The majority of the active aircraft operating out of T4 are housed in the airbase's fifty-eight Hardened Aircraft Shelters (HAS), including the SyAAF's Su-24M2s. T4 has traditionally been the home of Syria's Su-24s, with most located in the South-Eastern part of the airbase. A few examples are also detached to Seen at any given time. The Su-24s are undoubtedly the most important assets of the SyAAF, and have seen heavy usage in the past four years.

Although T4 is located closely to Islamic State held territory, 819 Squadron flying the Su-24s rarely participates in sorties flown against the fighters of the Islamic State. Instead, the Su-24 serves as the SyAAF's long arm, mostly striking villages throughout all of Syria. From Deir ez-Zor to Quneitra and even testing the reaction time of the Royal Air Force based at Akrotiri, Cyprus, the Su-24s done it all.

Contrary to earlier reports, the transfer of one Su-24MK and one Su-24MR by Libya to Syria in the mid 1990s might have not taken place, and has been disclaimed by several SyAAF pilots and the former base commander of T4. This means that the number of Su-24s Syria received stands at just twenty. However, nineteen of these Su-24MKs were upgraded to M2 standard by the 514 ARZ Aircraft Repair Plant in Rzhev in Russia between 2010 and 2013. Just in time to participate in the Civil War, all aircraft returned to Syria relatively unnoticed.



The upgrade provides for improved targeting, navigation and fire control systems by replacing the plane's old control systems. The plane is also made compatible with newer versions of the KAB-500/1500 and with Kh-31As, Kh-31Ps, Kh-59s and R-73s, adding to theFAB, OFAB and RBK bombs, Kh-25s, Kh-28s, Kh-29Ls, Kh-29Ts and Kh-58s guided missiles, KAB-500s and KAB-1500s guided bombs, S-24 and S-25 air to ground rockets, rocket pods and R-60 air-to-air missiles it can already carry. In Syrian service, all but the R-73 are available to the Su-24M2s, which are reserved for the SyAAF's MiG-29SMs instead.








Out of the twenty Su-24s originally acquired by the SyAAF, eleven examples remain operational as of June 2015. All but one loss incurred during the Civil War, with one airframe damaged beyond repair after suffering an accident before it had commenced. One was shot down with a MANPADS by the Free Syrian Army above Daret Izzah on the 28th of November 2012, another was shot down by an Israeli Patriot surface-to-air missile (SAM) after having strayed into the airspace over the Golan Heights on the 23th of September 2014 and another fell near Nahtah on the 11th of June 2015, likely due to premature detonation of its ordnance. One Su-24M2 was heavily damaged by anti-aircraft fire in May 2015, after which its pilot managed to guide the airframe to T4 despite the condition it was in. However, it crashed while on approach to the runway after it became apparent that the damage done to the aircraft would prevent a safe landing. Both the pilot and navigator ejected safely. An additional two Su-24s were believed to have been destroyed in an accident on the 28th of May 2015, during which an explosion occured while both aircraft were being rearmed for another sortie, resulting in the death of at least five and wounding another dozen. Additionally, two Su-24s are out of service after having been hit by ground fire. While the damage on both of these aircraft is minimal and can be repaired, the SyAAF currently lacks the resources to do so. The fleet of available airframes has thus almost been cut in half, and each loss is a heavy blow to the SyAAF.


A second fighter-bomber squadron based at T4 operates the Su-22M4, all of which are located in the North-Western and South-Western part of the airbase. 827 Squadron has seen heavy use against the fighters of the Islamic State in the past year, mainly flying in support of Suqour al-Sahraa' (Desert Falcons) units patrolling the Syrian desert.

The Su-22M4 is outfitted for the carriage of S-24 and S-25 air-to-ground rockets, unguided rocket pods, FAB, OFAB and RBK bombs, KMGU-2 munitions dispensers, Kh-25, Kh-28, Kh-29L, Kh-29T and Kh-58 air-to-ground missiles and R-60 air-to-air missiles. The Su-22M4 has almost exclusively been used to deliver unguided weaponry in the Syrian Civil War: its potential to deliver guided weaponry again being ignored.


Although its Su-22s are often targeted by anti-aircraft guns of the Islamic State, 827 Squadron has suffered relatively light losses in the past four years, with only one Su-22M4 shot down by the fighters of the Islamic State near the Shaer gas field on the 30th of November 2014. As seen with the Su-24M2s, a couple of airframes are awaiting repair after having suffered some form of combat damage.

In the mid to end of 2014, T4's aerial assests were further strengthened by the deployment of a detachment of L-39s. Although nowadays rarely sighted in Syria's skies, the remainder of the SyAAF's L-39 fleet remains active on nearly every front, the L-39ZOs and L-39ZAs almost exclusively flying their sorties in the night in the Aleppo and Damascus region.

The L-39s based at T4 were among the examples overhauled at 'The Factory', the SyAAF's repair and maintenance center located at Neyrab/Aleppo International Airport. The overhauled examples were distributed between Syria's remaining operational airbases, including Tabqa before it fell to the fighters of the Islamic State on the 24th of August 2014. The L-39s now present at T4 are believed to have been formerly based at Tabqa. These aircraft have thus followed the fighters of the Islamic State as they carried out their offensives in Syria.

In an effort to boost the firepower of the L-39s, all of the overhauled airframes were rewired for the carriage of 80mm B-8 rocket pods, a weapon originally not destined to be used on the L-39. A B-8 equipped L-39ZO now stationed at T4 airbase can be seen below. The carriage of B-8 rocket pods greatly enchances the L-39's capabilities, which previously could only be armed with 57mm rocket pods and bombs.



Recent satellite imagery of T4 shows the presence of at least five L-39s at any given time, most sitting on the tarmac formerly used by the SyAAF's MiG-25s or by the double HAS, now acting as a support facility for the L-39s.



A detachment of Mi-8/17s now based at T4 act in support of the remaining regime forces in the region, and as a liaison between the airbase and the rest of regime-controlled Syria.

Four Mi-8/17s can be spotted on recent satellite imagery, stationed right next to the L-39s.




Many of the HAS's now empty after the decommissioning of the MiG-25 fleet have been turned into barracks, weapon depots and defensive strongholds. Two HAS's located on the North-Eastern side of the airbase and one HAS located on the South-Eastern part of the airbase have seen specifically much activity around them, with several trucks present in or near the HAS's at any given time.





A tank company, now stationed in the centre of T4, further strengthens the airbase's defences.




Satellite imagery also shows the many destroyed buildings in the officer's housing quarters located East of the airbase. This location was the scene of heavy fighting back in November 2014, which also spread to the nearby T4 pumping station. The defenders succesfully managed to push the fighters of the Islamic State back from both locations however.



Russian contractors from the Slavonic Corps, sent to protect the oilfields around Deir ez-Zor, also passed by T4 on their journey to the city. The contractors, apparantly spending more time posing for photos than actually fighting, were routed after being ambushed by rebel forces near the town of al-Sukhna on the way to Deir ez-Zor, and swiftly returned to Russia afterwards, where the owners of the Slavonic Corps was subsequently imprisoned by the Federal Security Service (FSB) because the operation was deemed illegal by the Russian government. Five contractors together with Su-24M2 '2514' can be seen below.



The two S-75 and three S-125 surface-to-air missile (SAM) sites surrounding the airbase remain active, and regularly change positions to throw off their adversaries. Although they are unlikely to be of much use during a potential Coalition air campaign against the Assad-regime due to their outdated nature, they would force the flight ceiling of coalition aircraft up in the early stages of such a campaign and might deter stand-alone strikes by other parties. The systems tasked with directing these SAMs to their targets are two P-18 ''Spoon Rest D'' and two P-35/37 ''Bar Lock'' radars, which are responsible for detecting any plane flying in this part of Central Syria, a crucial task now that Tadmur airbase and its many radars have been captured by the Islamic State. One RSP-7 radar and one Parol Identification friend or foe (IFF) system also present at T4 guide the aircraft that are coming in to land.

The latest offensive of the Islamic State on this vital airbase has once again been stopped before reaching the airbase, and with the recent setbacks for the Islamic State, this might have been their last chance to take it. Fortress T4, as large as it is important, will indubitably continue to serve as a major hub for the Syrian Arab Air Force.



Written in collaboration with R.S from Luftwaffe A.S. Satellite imagery by finriswolf.

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The Syrian Arab Air Force, beware of its wings

By Stijn Mitzer and Joost Oliemans

Subject to severe sanctions for almost a decade, the proliferation of North Korean conventional armament on the international arms market is an often underreported topic, and many arms deals of the past are completely undocumented. Nonetheless, the traces of these deals still mark many of the world's conflict areas, and every once in a while new footage confirms North Korea's involvement in the international arms trade.

Alongside main battle tanks upgraded by the DPRK, various types of artillery, anti-tank guided missiles (ATGMs) and light machine guns (LMGs) already present in today's conflict hotspots, analysis of imagery of weaponry used in the Syrian Civil War shows the presence of North Korean man-portable air-defence systems (MANPADS) amongst various factions opposing the regime of president Bashar al-Assad. The sighting of this system has become common enough to suggest the scale of their initial delivery to the Assad regime was sizeable, although the fact that they are consistently identified as the similar Soviet Igla-1E (SA-16) system also used in Syria means they have largely remained unnoticed to this date.

A single example was first identified in August 2014 in the hands of a fighter of the Islamic State at Ksesh (which was captured from Jaish al-Islam in the summer of 2014), but further research has unveiled an entire batch of at least 18 launchers and their associated systems was captured by the Free Syrian Army and Kateeba al-Kawthar (originally an al-Qaeda-linked group) at Brigade 80 in Aleppo in February 2013. While no aircraft or helicopters are explicitely known to have been shot down by these missiles, their continued presence on the battlefield, most recently in the heavily embattled Lattakia Governorate suggests they are still functional.

North Korean HT-16PGJ MANPADS with cap removed at Ksesh airbase, August 2014.

Stash of North Korean HT-16PGJ MANPADS captured in Aleppo, February 2013.

Although MANPADS in general appear to be referred to as Hwaseong-Chong (Arquebus) in North Korea, it is thought the specific type exported to Syria is of their third or fourth indigenously developed generation. Early types copied from the Soviet 9K32 Strela-2 (SA-7) MANPADS (which might have donned the designation PGLM or CSA-3A) were likely developed in the 1980s, and what appears to have been an indigenous variant of the 9K34 Strela-3 (SA-14) was spotted as early as 1992. Development has ultimately resulted in a system which has only been identified in recent years, and which seems to have been derived from the Russian 9K38 Igla (SA-18). However, the MANPADS currently seen in Syria shares the most resemblance with the older 9K310 Igla-1 (SA-16) system, but with the characteristic tricone nose mounted on the missile replaced with the more modern aerodynamic spike also seen on the 9K38 Igla (SA-18) and 9K338 Igla-S (SA-24) systems it is likely its performance has been improved. The most significant other difference that allows the North Korean system to be discerned from it Soviet/Russian counterparts is the foreward placement of the thermal battery which powers the MANPADS. This component also determines whether the system is still operable; its depletion means the MANPADS has become useless, leading to several cases where factions desperate for anti-air defence have attempted to jury-rig their own batteries.

North Korean HT-16PGJ MANPADS in Lattakia, 26th of November 2015. Right: The same MANPADS seen in a North Korean military parade.

Further imagery analysis reveals that the North Korean system spotted in Syria carries the designator
HT-16PGJ (the missiles alone HG-16), and that the specific examples captured at Brigade 80 were part of a contract dated the 1st of January 2004, meaning it is unlikely the shelf-life of the thermal batteries has yet run out. It is possible reports based on Western intelligence of a 2003 delivery by an unknown supplier (said to be Belarus) concerning some 300 Igla MANPADS actually refer to a deal surrounding the North Korean system, especially since the Igla has not yet been seen in Syria. If this is the case, it is likely even more MANPADS were acquired than reported as deliveries would have continued into the start of 2004. Indeed, careful study of the box containing the missiles reveals that no less than three-hundred boxes were delivered, containing two missiles each for a total of 600 HT-16PGJ MANPADS.

Despite the fact that the Syrian War has seen its fair share of MANPADS variants, ranging from Soviet-legacy Strela-2M, Strela-3s and Igla-1s to Chinese FN-6s supplied by Qatar through Sudan and Russian Igla-S' provided a few years before the start of the conflict, anti-air defence from the multitude of factions currently roaming the Syrian skies remains scarce. This has forced certain parties to go to extreme lengths to improvise some semblance of anti-air capabilities, and any MANPADS is to be considered a precious asset. Due to the capabilities of these systems, the West was reluctant to provide them to moderate Syrian rebels earlier in the war, fearing they might be smuggled out of the country and used to shoot down commercial airliners. Although such aircraft usually cruise at higher altitudes than can be reached by most MANPADS, a missile fired shortly after takeoff or before landing has shown to be a genuine threat in the past.

Although unlikely to be the most capable MANPADS system currently to be found on the Syrian battlegrounds (a title which belongs to the Russian Igla-S system), it is certainly more effective than the older Strela-2, Strela-3 and Igla-1 systems, and possibly even the Chinese FN-6, which was found to be unreliable by the rebels that used them. As the Russian Air Force continues to remain at the forefront of the aerial campaign against Assad's opponents throughout Syria, including the Lattakia governorate, any type of air-defence systems will be gladly embraced by rebel groups, no matter what their origins are. Whether more of these systems will pop up in the future of course remains to be seen, although the full extent of North Korean exports to nations across the world has likely to only just have begun to unravel, and development of new weaponry including MANPADS that could one day end up on the illegal arms trafficking market is still in progress.

MANPADS' in use with the Korean People's Army. First three MANPADS from the left: Igla-1, North Korean HT-16PGJ also seen in Syria, Strela-3.

Special thanks to 'BM-21 Grad'.

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The regime's recent offensive against the Islamic State aimed at clearing large parts of desert in Syria's Raqqa Governorate of Islamic State presence took a drastic turn when a counter-attack spread chaos and fear among the forces spearheading the offensive. Completely misjudging the impending danger and incapable of properly anticipating the Islamic State's counter-attack, the offensive collapsed and instead of capturing large swaths of territory, the remaining regime forces were forced on the defensive, eventually being beaten all the way back to their starting point. The outcome of the offensive came as a surprise to many, not in the least because its exact goals remained unclear for some.

While some were quick to state the offensive was an attempt to capture the Islamic State's capital Raqqa or even to reach the besieged garrison in Deir ez-Zor, the actual goal of the offensive was to capture Tabqa airbase and from there to move on to the actual town of Tabqa itself. Much of the confusion originated from the unofficial name tied to the offensive: ''To Raqqa'', which actually meant this offensive was only the beginning of regime operations in the Governorate of Raqqa rather than directly capturing Raqqa itself. If the attempt at capturing Tabqa would have proved successful, this would have completely cut off the remaining road connections to the Islamic State from the outside world, and allowed the regime to use Tabqa as a staging base for future operations into the Islamic State's heartland. Thanks to the ambitious nature of the offensive, it could be seen as a gauge indicating the measure to which regime forces are capable of coordinating after the severe transformations it has been forced to undergo in the previous years. This is especially true after President Bashar al-Assad vowed to liberate 'Every Inch of Syria from Terrorism' in a speech adressed to Syria's parliament on the 7th of June, five days after the offensive had started.

The offensive appeared to have been timed perfectly to coincide with another major operation taking place against the Islamic State in Northern Syria. This offensive, carried out by the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), was aimed at capturing the town of Manbij and the nearby Manbij Pocket. Holding this region is absolutely crucial for the Islamic State, as losing it could also result in losing the last remaining road connection to Turkey. It was previously thought that the Islamic State would prove unable to commit sufficient forces to two entire different fronts so close to each other, but time would eventually show just how false this belief was.

While a successful conclusion of the offensive thus would have seriously hampered the Islamic State's capabilities to bring in supplies and foreign fighters via Turkey, not to mention the fact that cutting off the Islamic State's sole remaining road connection to Turkey in general would be a major propaganda victory for the regime, neither the current military situation on the ground nor the state of the regime's military allowed for such a zealous undertaking. In fact, one could argue that the very existence of this offensive in the first place rather than its catrastophic outcome is representative of the poor state of the regime and its armed forces.


The regime's intentions of taking the fight to the Islamic State rather than repelling and counter-attacking Islamic State offensives throughout Syria first became clear in early 2016, when the National Defence Force's (NDF) Golan Regiment arrived in the town of Ithiriya, from where the offensive would later be launched. The area around the town would see sporadic engagements aimed at testing the Islamic State's capabilities and willingness to defend this area in the months that followed. This would later prove a catrastophic miscalculation, as the initial situation encountered around Ithiriya was in no way representative of the Islamic State's true strength and willingness to defend this important location.

Due to the sheer length of the front the Islamic State currently has to defend against a variety of factions, it can't commit large numbers of fighters to a particular location. This is especially true for the area around Ithiriya, which due to the flat terrain and lack of easily defended obstacles (such as towns and oilfields) is nigh on impossible to defend. Concentrating large numbers of Islamic State fighters here would be senseless, as they wouldn't have any location to fall back to when routed, forcing them to flee into the open desert as easy targets for chasing regime forces.

Instead, the garrison deployed around Ithiriya, defending the crucial Ithiriya-Raqqa highway, only consisted of a small contingent of Islamic State fighters. This contingent was beaten back by the regime's first 'probing offensive' in February and March, which was halted after the Islamic State launched a diversionary attack near Khanasir. As the Syrian Arab Army (SyAA), National Defence Force and Shiite militias stationed here proved incapable of handling Khanasir alone, all effort went into defending and later recapturing lost positions around Khanasir, effectively ending operations near Ithiriya.



It was only during May 2016 when large numbers of regime forces started arriving in Ithiriya, ultimately said to be totalling up to 5000 soldiers, although the actual number is believed to be slightly lower. This is when the first major problem came into being. As the five-year long war has starved the regime's military of equipment, supplies but foremost manpower, gathering such a large amount of soldiers can nowadays only be achieved by pulling several brigades, regiments and militias together. These are then supposed to act as a unified army, but the past five years have shown us that such 'unified' formations are usually extremely inefficient in their operations.

This is only worsened by the decentralisation of the Syrian military into the National Defence Force (NDF) and dozens of other large and small militias nowadays responsible for regime operations throughout the country. The large numbers of soldiers that defected from the Syrian Arab Army (SyAA) and the sheer ineffectiveness of what remained led to the partial dissolvement of the SyAA. Although the SyAA remained in control of the many bases littered throughout Syria, much of its remaining offensive capabilities were stripped and subsequently handed over to the various militias, with the NDF receiving much of the manpower and equipment. This practically meant the end for Syria's once prestigious mechanised brigades, previously boasting up to 2500 tanks.

While transferring manpower and equipment to various militias that were deemed more trustworthy and loyal to the regime appeared logical at the time, it ended up creating a whole host of major problems that could potentially spiral out control in the future. While the move was absolutely necessary for the survival of the regime, it showed that the army that was once estimated to be one of the most powerful in the Middle East was actually completely dysfunctional. The results of decades of sectarianism, corruption and bad management on every level became painfully clear, and had simply eroded the SyAA to the point of total inoperability.





While the creation of numerous small militias proved to be extremely successful, spawning various highly-motivated regiments standing their ground in most fights, the expansion of the NDF recreated the problems encountered with the SyAA on several occasions, and sometimes actually worsened them. The NDF was originally established with the aim of raising up units willing to defend their town or neighbourhood against incursions by rebels. Such NDF units were composed of armed locals tasked with manning checkpoints and patrolling their neighbourhood or town. In essence, it obeyed the pure definition of a militia in its founding days. With the partial dissolvement of the SyAA, the NDF further expanded and partially replaced the SyAA as the regime's army. New units were erected and existing ones expanded, now including everything from convictees, men that solely enlisted for money and soldiers using the original equipment from what was once the SyAA.

This meant that a militia once comprised of local volunteers now inherited soldiers and equipment from various SyAA units, and saw its tasks expanding from guarding neighbourhoods to undertaking offensives elsewhere and guarding towns, gasfields and other strategic installations on the other side of Syria. This meant that once highly-motivated men that enlisted to defend their neighbourhood against Sunni rebels could now be manning checkpoints in Sunni-dominated towns. As these men often enlisted with the sole reason of protecting their minority neighbourhood, they have zero interest in defending a Sunni-dominated town from rebels, leading to a situation that is very prevalant in Syria, where defending regime forces flee instead of defending their designated town because they see no personal benefit in holding it. This is why countries ordinarily employ armies composed of professional soldiers, which when undertaking operations don't base their actions on their private reasoning, but on the reasoning on the state it serves. These soldiers defend gasfields because they're ordered to, knowing that the continuing flow of gas generates income for the country, which will eventually help it win the war.

While this already renders large parts of NDF units combat ineffective for anything but manning checkpoints, the Syrian High Command made the crucial mistake of individually attaching armoured fighting vehicles (AFVs) to militias instead of letting them operate in pre-existing armoured formations, albeit attached to the NDF. This results in some NDF regiments consisting solely of individual components rather than a well-oiled machine of interconnecting units.




But perhaps the most serious problem with the different forces fighting for the regime is that some units have become so powerful that these are now essentially private armies. Many of these elite units consist mainly of Alawites originating from Syria's coastal region or minorities (mostly Druzes) and are extremely sectarian as a result. These units make up much of the regime's offensive capabilities, and received the largest share of Russian-supplied weaponry in the past year, including T-90s. The now infamous Tiger Forces, led by Suheil 'The Tiger' al-Hassan and Suqour al-Sahraa' (The Desert Falcons) are the best-known examples of these private armies, and appear to be neither under SyAA or NDF command, but rather taking orders straight from the Syrian High Command or President Bashar al-Assad. This means that if one of these two units operate alongside SyAA or NDF units, different commanders from different branches of the regime's military are issuing different orders while both pursuing the exact same objective. It does occasionally happen that either of the two units take command and issues orders to forces of other branches, but this creates a whole host of other problems as many of the (semi-)independent militias are anything but keen to receive orders from a different branch (which was indeed a common complaint heard during the offensive on Tabqa). This proved to be less of a problem at Tadmur, where the Russian Armed Forces had considerable influence upon the whole operation.

Another not unimportant shortcoming in the regime's tactics is the fact that it constantly moves its most capable units (Suqour al-Sahraa' and the Tiger Forces) throughout Syria when another position is about to run over or has been run over, forcing either of the two units to abandon their current operations. This has led to a string of unfinished offensives costing precious fuel, equipment and manpower. This also applies to the capture of Tadmur (Palmyra), the capture of which would have been justified if it had been taken with the aim of further advancing towards the besieged town of Deir ez-Zor. But instead of chasing the Islamic State all the way to the gates of Deir ez-Zor, which would have proved to be relatively easy as there were no major Islamic State strongholds between Tadmur and Deir ez-Zor, the regime halted its operations after seizing Tadmur. As the town of Tadmur and its archaeological remains had little military value to the regime, its capture turned out to mostly part of a PR-stunt likely aimed at showing the world the Syrian regime and Russia were defeating terrorism in Syria.



While the SyAA and NDF have recently begun advancing in the direction of al-Sukhna, located in between Tadmur and Deir ez-Zor, the units participating in these assaults consist of poorly trained units operating a hodgepodge of equipment and arms. Although supported by the Russian Army, it recently took huge losses when an Islamic State vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED) managed to reach their positions, resulting in the death of a Russian serviceman and large numbers of regime fighters. The large amount of time between the capture of Tadmur and renewed operations in this region gave the Islamic State plenty of time to construct defensive fortifications, and any serious offensive aimed at overtaking them would require the deployment of either the Tiger Forces or Suqour al-Sahraa'. Had regime forces advanced immediately they could've taken advantage of the fact that IS forces were routing with little order or coordination, and possibly break open the road towards Deir ez-Zor in one fell swoop.

This brings us back to the Tabqa offensive, where all of the points mentioned above in combination with a gross underestimation of the Islamic State's capabilities, poor planning, greatly exposed flanks and a lack of Russian support which was desperately needed to make such an operation succeed led to a veritable disaster.

The force tasked with capturing Tabqa airbase and the town of Tabqa itself consisted of no less than eleven different branches and factions out of three (technically four) different countries, comprising Suqour al-Sahraa', the Syrian Arab Army (further divided into at least two regiments, at least believed to have been part of the 4th Armoured Division), the Syrian Arab Air Force, the National Defence Force (further divided into the Golan Regiment and several smaller regiments), the Syrian Social Nationalist Party (SSNP), the Ba'ath Brigades, the Arab Nationalist Guard, the Republican Guard, Hizbullah, the Russian Army and the Russian Air Force, each operating its own tanks and equipment. In addition, the Syrian Navy Seals also took part in the operation, although it remains unknown under what branch this unit serves. No Shiite militias are believed to have taken part in the fighting, likely due to their preoccupation with holding the front in Southern Aleppo.


This force could call upon large numbers of tanks, artillery, multiple rocket launchers (MRLs), the Syrian Arab Air Force's (SyAAF) assets, including fighter-bombers and attack helicopers, the Russian Army's 291th artillery brigade operating 152mm 2A65 Msta-Bs and the Russian Air Force's (RuAF) Mi-24s forward deployed at Kweres airbase. The composition of tanks used by the various branches and factions involved in the conflict give a clear image of the current state of the regime's military and the logistical nightmare in equipping each and every tank with the right type of ammunition and spare parts. Participating in the offensive were: T-90s, T-72Bs, T-72AVs, a T-72AV 'TURMS-T', T-72M1s, T-62 Model 1967s and T-62 Model 1972s, T-55As, T-55Ms and T-55(A)MVs and BMP-1s. Artillery support was in the hands of truck-mounted anti-aircraft guns, Syrian-manned 122mm D-30 howitzers and 130mm M-46 field-guns and truck-mounted 107mm MRLs, 122mm BM-21s, IRAMs and 220mm BM-27s. The Russian Army provided one battery of 152mm 2A65 Msta-B howitzers. Surprisingly, the Russian Air Force limited its support to several Mi-24s, leaving the SyAAF to provide fast jets for aerial support to the advancing troops. The SyAAF however remains incapable of providing the same degree of air support as the RuAF has been doing over the past year. The SyAAF's SA-342 and Mi-25 attack helicopters also made an appearance over the battlefield, but ended up seeing almost no use during the offensive. Whether this was due to a lack of coordination between the SyAAF and the forces on the ground or due to a lack of sufficient operational airframes in the area remains unknown.




Altogether, these units posed an impressive force on paper. While the aerial support provided by the RuAF and the SyAAF was not up to the same standards seen during the offensive on Tadmur, the largely flat terrain around Tabqa was a huge advantage to the regime, sharply contrasting the mountainous area surrounding Tadmur. The force was mobilised for the upcoming offensive on the 1st of June, which was launched a day later. Spearheading the offensive was Suqour al-Sahraa', which deployed its Russian-delivered T-90s, T-72Bs, GAZ Tigers, Iveco LMs and armoured Ural-4320s, along with Russian advisors. Behind Suqour al-Sahraa' came the rest of the force, with the more experienced units operating closer to Suqour al-Sahraa' than the poorly trained units operating in the back and flanks. This immediately proved to be a problem however, as communication between such large numbers of units taking part has to be excellent in order to advance at the same time, inform other units about possible incoming attacks and to coordinate a possible retreat. Communication between all units was completely inadequate however, which would eventually result in the catastrophic defeat.

Another major issue was the location of the offensive, which cut right through Islamic State-held territory alongside the Ithiriya-Raqqa highway. This left the main force exposed on two sides, leaving them extremely vulnerable to counterattacks. Additionally, the forces designated to protect these flanks were poorly trained and equipped. Although this was indeed a potential recipe for disaster, and source of worry for many following the offensive over the past weeks, the Islamic State efforts at flanking regime forces proved problematic, but ultimately not the reason for its actual defeat.

The offensive, launched on the 2nd of June 2016, made its way from Ithiriya through territory previously captured during February. The Islamic State had mined the road plentiful before the start of offensive, which would prove a nuisance for the regime forces early on, but grow perpetually more problematic over time. While some IEDs were carefully camouflaged or even disguised as rocks, the placement of mines often left much to desire. A map showing the strategic situation before the offensive can be seen below, including the territory previously captured East of Ithiriya back in February 2016. All maps by Peto Lucem, click on them to enlarge.

The offensive had only been going on for two days before it was already hailed as a major success. Namely, it had managed to enter Raqqa Governorate, of high symbolic value for any major party fighting in the Syrian Civil War. Elements of the Syrian Arab Army (SyAA) and Syrian Arab Air Force (SyAAF) were kicked out of Raqqa Governorate just under two years ago, when fighters of the Islamic State captured Division 17, Brigade 93 and Tabqa airbase, thereby completely ending the regime's presence in this part of the country.

The regime forces encountered only sporadic resistance in the first days, allowing it to further advance towards Tabqa airbase with relative ease. This has much to do with the terrain, which due to a lack of prominent terrain features or towns was extremely difficult to defend. The Islamic State deployed several T-55s, technicals, truck-based VBIEDs and artillery to counter or at least slow down the regime's advances, but these lone units made easy targets for the regime's superior firepower. The resulting battles saw the destruction of one T-55, another example captured intact, one 122mm BM-21 captured (originally captured at Shaer back in July 2014) alongside a single 122mm D-30 howitzer, one seizure of a truck-based VBIED, one BMP-based VBIED and several technicals. Interestingly, the Islamic State also deployed several UAVs to the theatre, at least two of which were shot down by the use of 14.5mm ZPU-4s and 23mm ZU-23s.^[1][2]

The contingent spearheading the offensive meanwhile captured the small settlement of Abu al-Elaj on the 4th of June. This is where the Islamic State made its first true stand and even attempted a counter-attack to take the village back after losing it. This would have cut the the road between Ithiriya and the contingent speadheading the offensive, showing how vulnerable the whole operation was. In spite of their efforts, Abu al-Elaj and its surroundings remained in regime control during the offensive.


The sighting of the first BMP-based VBIED on the 3rd of June, the driver of which was killed before coming in a range close enough to detonate its deadly payload, revealed a now familiar identification marking. This black square reads: الدولة الإسلامية - 'Islamic State', جيش الخلافة - 'The Caliphate Army' (Jaish al-Khilafa) followed by a unique serial number. While many thought this black square referred to the particular tank or VBIED being in service of an Islamic State unit called 'Jaish al-Khilafa', the black square is actually applied on any armoured fighting vehicle (AFV), including VBIEDs, overhauled by the Islamic State's armour workshop in Raqqa, whose conversions will be covered in a future article.


At least three BMP-based VBIEDs would be sent off against advancing regime forces during the course of the offensive. Remarkably, not one managed to actually detonate its payload, and all three were captured intact, comprisingvehicles with serial numbers '212', '202' and '222'. Only '222' was immobilised after being hit, which severely damaged the vehicle and blew off its tracks.


While some might find using the BMP-1 as an VBIED an absolute waste of a precious AFV, this has proved to be an extremely popular conversion in the Islamic State. Not only is the vehicle perfectly suited for this role due to the spaciousness of its troop compartment, the BMP-1's 73mm 2A28 Grom main gun is next to useless in long range engagements so often seen in the Syrian desert anyway, often reducing the vehicle's role to a mere battle taxi when used conventionally. This effectively means that the Islamic State immediately converts captured BMPs to VBIEDs in desert areas, while continuing to operate them as an AFV in urban areas.

After having cleared Abu al-Elaj and its surroundings, the contingent spearheading the offensive further advanced along the Ithiriya-Raqqa highway, securing several other small settlements along the road. Traces of previous fighting when the Islamic State first captured this area were evident throughout the offensive. Most of these settlements were then fortified to prepare for a potential surprise attack by the Islamic State. Footage showing the chaotic advance of regime forces along the highway gave the impression of an immense and well-equipped militia rather than that of a true army.

Despite this, regime forces reached and cleared the crucial Safiya crossroad and the nearby Sufyan oilfield just over a week after launching the offensive. The main contingent was now to leave the highway leading to Raqqa and head North to Tabqa airbase. But instead of continuing the offensive and thus giving the Islamic State no time to strenghten their positions along the road heading to Tabqa and Tabqa airbase itself, the whole offensive came to a grinding halt. While this also gave regime forces time to fortify their previous gains and further secure the highway, it would ultimately prove to be a fatal mistake. Namely, while this short lull might have been an attractive choice for a variety of reasons, it allowed the Islamic State to gather forces for a counter-attack, which is exactly what occurred. Fighters and vehicles from Raqqa immediately began arriving in Tabqa, where they joined units already present here. Largely consisting of foreign fighters, these well-equipped forces would prove to be determined enough to be capable of stopping the offensive dead in its tracks.

Although deeply infiltrated in most other major rebel forces, the Syrian regime has so far proved incapable of infiltrating in the Islamic State on a large scale. While the lack of intelligence could be countered by the regime's aircraft, helicopters and UAVs by conducting aerial reconnaissance between Raqqa and Tabqa, these sorties were never flown and thus this build-up of troops remained unnoticed to the regime forces.


With only limited resistance encountered during the previous weeks, a large part of the contingent spearheading the offensive was pulled out of the theatre for deployment elsewhere, leaving behind well trained troops with only light equipment and poorly trained troops with heavy equipment. The force that stayed behind was apparently deemed capable of reaching the operation's intended objectives with consideration of the limited resistance encountered so far. This analysis excluded the newly arrived Islamic State forces from Raqqa however, which despite its small size compared to the thousands of regime fighters previously present here, boasted not only armoured fighting vehicles, but also plenty of U.S. arms and equipment originally captured in Mosul back in the summer of 2014. This force would prove to be more than capable of reversing the regime's gains it made in the weeks prior.

Unaware of the impending danger, the Syrian Navy Seals made their way to Thawra oilfield on the 18th of June. Being not particularly well defended, Thawra was captured shortly after. Although now only around fourteen kilometers away from Tabqa airbase, this would prove to be the last advance of regime forces during this offensive.

Although capturing Thawra oilfield with relative ease, the Syrian Navy Seals soon clashed with the vanguard of the newly-arrived Islamic State unit from Raqqa, leading to fierce fighting on the outskirts of Thawra. In no position to defend the oilfield, the Syrian Navy Seals then retreated and called in fire support, which came in the form of a barrage of artillery shells as well as cluster bombs delivered by the SyAAF raining down on the fighters of the Islamic State. Completely clueless about what kind of unit they just had run into to, the Syrian Navy Seals made another attempt at advancing, only to find themselves ambushed by the Islamic State, which responded with ATGM strikes against the Syrian Navy Seals' technicals and trucks. These strikes resulted in the destruction of several vehicles, including a Russian-delivered armoured Ural-4320. Although the partial remains of two T-72M1s were encountered at Thawra, these were likely present since the Islamic State first took over the oilfield, once again showing how mere visual observation of wreckage from available footage does not provide an entirely accurate picture of losses.








Graffiti on a wall inside the compound Thawra oilfield of reading صقور الصحراء - 'The Desert Hawks', a limited number of which were still believed to have been present during the assault.

Outmanoeuvred and outgunned, the Syrian Navy Seals then quickly retreated to the Safiya crossroad and the nearby Sufyan oilfield, where instead of anticipating and preparing for the impending assault, most regime forces simply fled. Although it remains unknown what triggered the regime forces to flee, the whole situation was reminiscent of the total collapse of regime forces in al-Sukhna, T3 pumping station, Arak, Hulayhilah, and Tadmur in May 2015. Within hours, the remaining regime forces packed their gear and fled along the same road it had advanced on in the previous weeks, in what was described by regime sources as an ''organised retreat''. Although part of the retreat indeed gave the impression of being relatively well organised, the mere fact that it did not actually include all forces stationed here is a testament to the poor communication between units within the offensive. The bewildered part of the contingent that was left behind was quickly overwhelmed by the superior Islamic State forces.



Images showing vehicles and equipment used by fighters of the Islamic State near the Safiya crossroad. The T-72M1 has been upgraded with additional armour on the front of the turret and additional side skirts on both sides of the tank. A U.S. M1114 from Iraq can be seen in the second image, although it remains unknown if it was used by or instead captured by the Islamic State. The latter seems more likely as it appears to have been abandoned and faces towards Islamic State held territory rather than the other way around.



After securing the Safiya crossroad, the fighters of the Islamic State began advancing along the same road the regime forces had previously fought for. This convoy moved through the open desert at high speed, completely untouched by the Syrian Arab Air Force. According to several regime sources, this was the case due to a sandstorm which prevented the SyAAF from striking the advancing fighters of the Islamic State. The images below however show no such no sandstorm taking place during the Islamic State's advance from Safiya along the Ithiriya-Raqqa highway.


While having captured several armoured fighting vehicles and a 122mm BM-21 Grad MRL weeks before, the regime forces now left behind more than they had originally captured from the Islamic State. These forces here must have left in a hurry, as one abandonded BM-21 suffered only from a flat tire, which could simply have been ignored or replaced by the spare tyre located at the back of the truck's cabin.










The remains of several vehicles hit early on during the regime's offensive were also found alongside the road. The T-62 below fell victim to an ATGM strike while the technical got hit by an IED. The blast responsible for taking it out was so powerful that it not only blew the front of the vehicle away, but also activated the airbags of the driver and passenger seats.






Interestingly, these vehicles also included the remains of a Russian KAMAZ-63501AT artillery towing truck used by the 291th artillery brigade deployed to the theatre in support of the regime's forces. One of the trucks drove over an IED during the initial stages of the offensive, resulting in its destruction. Although the Islamic State claimed this led to the death of three Russian servicemen, this claim couldn't be independently verified.

With no serious opposition encountered until this point, the Islamic State then pressed on to the settlement of Abu al-Elaj and the SyriaTel towers along the Ithiriya-Raqqa highway. Such isolated positions, while often overstocked with arms, have proven to be extremely vulnerable to rebel and Islamic State attacks during the course of the war. Along the highway, these outposts were defended by relatively poorly trained troops, which were in no way capable of stopping the more experienced fighters of the Islamic State.




An Islamic State convoy leaving the highway for the SyriaTel towers. Even though they represented easy targets for the Syrian Arab Air Force, the SyAAF was nowhere to be found after initially striking the fighters of the Islamic State when capturing Thawra oilfield and the Safiya crossroads.




Several vehicles were destroyed near the SyriaTel towers. Although heavy usage of VBIEDs by the Islamic State was reported during their counter-attack, these were not seen in footage shot by the Amaq News Agency covering the offensive.


Ghaneema (spoils of war) from the regime's positions near the SyriaTel towers included one BMP-1, multiple trucks, ATGMs, small arms and the equipment such as the tents the contingent defending the positions were sleeping in. At least two regime soldiers were captured alive, although their final fate remains unknown.










And as such it happened to be that a small group of Islamic State fighters along with associated vehicles and just two tanks had completely reversed an offensive undertaken by thousands of men with dozens of tanks, artillery and air support. Not only did they manage to take back all the territory the Islamic State had lost during the regime's offensive,the fighters of the Islamic State even gained new territory and is now marching on the town of Ithiriya. Of course, it is unlikely that they will be capable of actually taking Ithiriya for now, but the mere fact that it is now being threatened shows the degree to which the once daring offensive has now backfired.

In an effort to defend the catastrophe of Tabqa, the regime and its supporters went to entirely new lengths to put the blame on anything but the military's incompetence. Some argued the offensive was nothing more than a probing attack, to see what the Islamic State's military response would be like. Russia was blamed for not providing the much-needed air support, although the extent to which it would be participating was already known to the regime before launching the offensive. The whole undertaking was said to be an idea of Russia, in which the regime was forced to take part. Others claimed weather conditions had supposedly prevented the SyAAF from striking the Islamic State, despite the fact that the weather was in favour of the regime during the entirety of offensive. Some even claimed the Islamic State's ''hundreds of VBIEDs'' simply proved too much for the forces taking part in the offensive, attributing the failure purely to the suicidal nature of the Islamic State's tactics.But worst of all, the various branches of the regime's military blamed each other for the failed offensive. Suqour al-Sahraa' blamed the SyAA and militias taking part in the offensive for not actually taking part in the offensive, while the SyAA and militias blamed Suqour al-Sahraa' for taking part in the offensive and then suddenly not taking part in the offensive anymore, leaving poorly trained troops to fight for themselves.

The catastrophic outcome of the regime's attempt at directly challenging the Islamic State's heartland must have not only amazed those following the offensive, but also the regime's military itself. Once thought to be amongst the most powerful armies of the Middle East, the biggest enemy of the Syrian Arab Army didn't prove to be Israel or Ba'athist Iraq, but the Syrian regime itself. The sectarianism, corruption and complete denial of reality so deeply embedded in its way of governing not only contributed to dragging Syria into an endless Civil War, but also completely debilitated the Syrian Armed Forces as an effective fighting force. In the past five years of conflict the regime's military has so far proven to be entirely incapable of adapting to the type of warfare necessary to operate in the Syrian Civil War. As the core issues of the Syrian Arab Republic have only worsened over the past five years, it appears unlikely that the Syrian Arab Army will ever manage to present itself as a properly functioning military as long as the Ba'ath Party remains in power.

The failure atTabqa plunged the Syrian Arab Army into an all time low, not only because it was made painfully clear that President Bashar al-Assad's vision of bringing back 'Every Inch of Syria' under its control is currently a completely absurd notion, but also because it increased hostilities between the various forces participating in the offensive. With the regime's military proven to be an unreliable partner for Russia, and with Syria's role as a weapons depot and supply line for Hizbullah well secured for Iran and Hizbullah, it is not unlikely that the regime's inability to conquer and secure more territory will lead to increased calls and pressure to allow for self-governing of certain parts of Syria. In any case, the needless waste of manpower, equipment and perhaps most of all morale shines a poignant light on the fact that there's still no end in sight for Syria's devastating war.

This list only includes captured vehicles and equipment of which photo or videographic evidence is available. Therefore, the amount of equipment captured and destroyed by the Islamic State is undoubtedly higher than recorded here. Civilian vehicles such as Toyota Hilux pickup trucks are not included in this list.

For more recent updates on armour losses in Iraq please see Lost Armour.

Tanks (35, of which destroyed: 14)

• 6 T-55: (1)(2)(3)(4, destroyed)(5, destroyed)(6, destroyed)
• 1 T-72M: (1)
• 19 Type 69: (1, 2, 3, 4 and 5)(6, 7 and 8)(9, 10 and 11)(12)(13)(14)(15)(16)(17)(18, captured, later destroyed)(19, destroyed)
• 9 M1A1 Abrams: (1, captured, later destroyed)(2, captured, later destroyed)(3, destroyed)(4, destroyed)(5, destroyed)(6, destroyed)(7, destroyed)(8, destroyed)(9, destroyed)

 

Armoured fighting vehicles (33, of which destroyed: 12)

• 12 MT-LB: (1)(2)(3)(4)(5)(6)(7, 8, 9 and 10, later destroyed)(11, destroyed)(12, destroyed) (At least two transferred to Syria)
• 21 M1117 ASV: (1, 2 and 3)(4)(5)(6)(7 and 8)(9)(10)(11)(12 and 13)(14)(15)(16, captured, later destroyed)(17, destroyed)(18, destroyed)(19, destroyed)(20, destroyed)(21, destroyed)

 

Infantry fighting vehicles (4, of which destroyed: 3)

• 4 BMP-1: (1)(2, later destroyed)(3, destroyed)(4, destroyed)

 

Armoured personnel carriers (79, of which destroyed: 23)

• 4 BTR-80UP: (1)(2, destroyed)(3 and 4, destroyed)
• 2 BTR-4: (1 and 2)
• 73 M113: (1, 2 and 3)(4 and 5)(6)(7)(8)(9)(10)(11)(12)(13 and 14)(15)(16)(17)(18 and 19)(20)(21)(22)(23)(24)(25)(26)(27)(28)(29 and 30)(31 and 32)(33)(34)(35, 36 and 37)(38 and 39)(40)(41)(42 and 43)(44)(45)(46)(47)(48)(49, used as VBIED)(50, used as VBIED) (51, destroyed)(52, destroyed)(53 and 54, destroyed)(55, destroyed)(56, destroyed)(57, destroyed)(58, destroyed)(59, 60, 61, 62 and 63 destroyed)(64, 65, 66, 67 and 68, destroyed)(69, destroyed)(70, destroyed)(71, destroyed)(72, destroyed)(73, destroyed)

 

Military engineering vehicles (6)

• 1 Type 653: (1)
• 3 WZT-2: (1 and 2)(3)
• 1 BTS-5B: (1)
• 1 M88A1: (1)

 

Command vehicles (3, of which destroyed: 3)

• 3 M577: (1, destroyed)(2, destroyed)(3, destroyed)

 

Trucks (228, of which destroyed: 23)

• 9 Ural-4320:(1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9)
• 10 KrAZ-6322: (1)(2 and 3)(4)(5, transferred to Syria)(6, 7, 8 and 9, destroyed)(10, destroyed)
• 1 Ford 3530: (1)
• 46 M35: (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8)(9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23 and 24)(25)(26)(27)(28)(29)(30)(31 and 32)(33, 34, 35, 36, 37 and 38)(39, 40, 41 and 42)(43, captured, later destroyed)(44, destroyed)(45, destroyed)(46, destroyed) (At least five transferred to Syria)
• 119 Navistar International 7000 series: (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22 and 23)(24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36 and 37)(38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48 and 49)(50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63 and 64)(65 and 66)(67)(68)(69)(70)(71)(72)(73)(74)(75)(76)(77)(78)(79)(80)(81 and 82)(83)(84)(85)(86)(87)(88 and 89)(90 and 91)(92 and 93)(94, 95, 96 and 97)(98 and 99)(100, 101 and 102)(103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113)(114)(115, destroyed)(116, destroyed)(117 and 118, destroyed)(119, destroyed) (At least three transferred to Syria)
• 7 MTVR: (1, 2 and 3)(4, 5 and 6)(7, used as VBIED) (At least three transferred to Syria)
• 2 M-548: (1)(2)
• 11 Ashok Leyland: (1 and 2)(3)(4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 and 11, destroyed)
• 1 Mercedes-Benz Atego: (1)
• 11 Daewoo Novus: (1)(2, 3, 4 and 5)(6, 7, 8, 9 and 10)(11)
• 2 Armoured trucks: (1)(2)
• 3 Armoured bulldozers: (1)(2, destroyed)(3, destroyed)

 

Jeeps (648, of which destroyed: 232)

• 10 UAZ-469: (1 and 2)(3)(4)(5 and 6)(7, transferred to Syria)(8, transferred to Syria)(9, destroyed)(10, destroyed)
• 338 M-1114: (1)(2)(3)(4)(5)(6)(7)(8)(9 and 10)(11 and 12)(13)(14)(15)(16)(17 and 18)(19 and 20)(21)(22)(23)(24 and 25)(26 and 27)(28, 29 and 30)(31)(32)(33)(34)(35)(36)(37)(38 and 39)(40, 41 and 42)(43)(44)(45)(46)(47)(48)(49)(50)(51)(52)(53)(54, 55 and 56)(57)(58)(59)(60)(61, 62 and 63)(64)(65)(66 and 67)(68)(69 and 70)(71 and 72)(73)(74, 75, 76 and 77)(78 and 79)(80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86 and 87)(88, 89, 90, 91 and 92)(93)(94)(95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100)(101)(102, 103, 104, 105 and 106)(107)(108)(109)(110, 111 and 112)(113)(114)(115, 116, 117)(118)(119)(120 and 121)(122)(123 and 124)(125)(126) (127, 128 and 129)(130, 131, 132, 133 and 134)(135, 136 and 137)(138, 139 and 140)(141) (142)(143)(144)(145)(146)(147 and 148)(149)(150)(151)(152 and 153)(154)(155)(156)(157)(158)(159)(160)(161)(162)(163)(164, used as VBIED)(165, later destroyed)(166, later destroyed)(167, later destroyed)(168 and 169, later destroyed)(170 and 171, later destroyed)(172, later destroyed)(173 and 174, destroyed)(175, destroyed)(176, destroyed)  (177, destroyed)(178, destroyed)  (179, destroyed)(180, destroyed)(181, destroyed)(182, destroyed)(183, destroyed)(184, destroyed)(185, destroyed)(186, destroyed)(187, destroyed)(188, destroyed)(189, destroyed)(190, destroyed)(191, destroyed)(192, destroyed)(193 and 194, destroyed)(195, destroyed)(196, destroyed)(197, destroyed)(198, destroyed)(199, destroyed)(200, destroyed)(201, destroyed)(202, destroyed)(203, destroyed)(204, destroyed)(205, 206, 207, 208, 209, 210, 211, 212, 213 and 214, destroyed)(215, destroyed)(216 and 217, destroyed)(218, destroyed)(219 and 220, destroyed)(221, 222, 223 and 224 destroyed)(225, destroyed)(226, destroyed)(227, 228, 229, 230, 231, 232 and 233, destroyed)(234, destroyed)(235, destroyed)(236, destroyed)(237, destroyed)(238, destroyed)(239, destroyed)(240, destroyed)(241, destroyed)(242, destroyed)(243, destroyed)(244 and 245 destroyed)(246, destroyed)(247, destroyed)(248, destroyed)(249, destroyed)(250, destroyed)(251, destroyed)(252, destroyed)(253, destroyed)(254, destroyed)(255 and 256, destroyed)(257, destroyed)(258, destroyed)(259, destroyed)(260, destroyed)(261, 262, 263, 264 and 265, destroyed)(266, destroyed)(267, destroyed)(268, destroyed)(269, destroyed)(270, destroyed)(271, destroyed)(272 and 273, destroyed)(274 and 275, destroyed)(276, destroyed)(277, destroyed)(278, destroyed)(279, destroyed)(280, destroyed)(281, destroyed)(282, destroyed)(283, destroyed)(284, destroyed)(285, destroyed)(286, destroyed)(287, destroyed)(288, 289, 290 and 291 destroyed)(292, destroyed)(293, destroyed)(294, destroyed)(295 and 296 destroyed)(297, destroyed)(298, destroyed)(299, destroyed)(300, destroyed)(301, 302 and 303 destroyed)(304 destroyed)(305 and 306, destroyed)(307, destroyed)(308, destroyed)(309, destroyed)(310, destroyed)(311, destroyed)(312 and 13, destroyed)(314, destroyed)(315, destroyed)(316, destroyed)(317, destroyed)(318, destroyed)(319, destroyed)(320, destroyed)(321, destroyed)(322, destroyed)(323, destroyed)(324, destroyed)(325, destroyed)(326 and 327 destroyed)(328, destroyed)(329, destroyed)(330, destroyed)(331, destroyed)(332 and 333, destroyed)(334, destroyed)(335, destroyed)(336)(337)(338, used as VBIED) (At least thirty-four transferred to Syria: (1, 2 and 3)(4, 5, 6 and 7)(8 and 9)(10 and 11)(12 and 13)(14 and 15)(16)(17)(18)(19)(20)(21)(22)(23)(24)(25)(26 and 27)(28)(29)(30 and 31)(32)(33)(34))   
• 1 M-1152: (1, transferred to Syria)
• 4 Ground Mobility Vehicle: (1 and 2)(3)(4)
• 2 Ford F-150: (1)(2)
• 192 Ford F-350: (1)(2)(3)(4, 5, 6, 7 and 8)(9)(10)(11)(12)(13)(14)(15)(16)(17, 18 and 19)(20)(21 and 22)(23)(24)(25 and 26)(27)(28)(29)(30 and 31)(32)(33)(34 and 35)(36)(37)(38 and 39)(40)(41, 42 and 43)(44 and 45)(46)(47)(48)(49)(50)(51)(52)(53)(54)(55, 56 and 57)(58)(59)(60 and 61)(62, 63, 64, 65, 66 and 67)(68)(69, 70 and 71)(72)(73)(74)(75)(76 and 77)(78)(79)(80)(81)(82)(83 and 84)(85)(86)(87 and 88)(89)(90)(91)(92)(93)(94)(95)(96)(97)(98)(99)(100 and 101)(102)(103)(104 and 105)(106)(107)(108 and 109)(110)(111)(112, 113, 114, 115, 116, 117, 118, 119, 120, 121, 122, 123)(124)(125 and 126)(127 and 128)(129, 130 and 131)(132)(133)(134)(135)(136)(137)(138)(139)(140)(141)(142)(143)(144)(145)(146)(147)(148)(149)(150, captured, later destroyed)(154, captured, later destroyed)(155, 156, 157, 158, 159 and 160, destroyed)(161, 162, 163 and 164, destroyed)(165, destroyed)(166, destroyed)(167, destroyed)(168, destroyed)(169, destroyed)(170, destroyed)(171, destroyed)(172, destroyed)(173, destroyed)(174, destroyed)(175 and 176, destroyed)(177, destroyed)(178, destroyed)(179, destroyed)(180, destroyed)(181, destroyed)(182, destroyed)(183, destroyed)(184, destroyed)(185, destroyed)(186, destroyed)(187, destroyed)(188, destroyed)(189, destroyed)(190, destroyed)(191, destroyed)(192, destroyed)
• 21 Chevrolet Silverado: (1)(2)(3)(4)(5)(6)(7)(8)(9)(10 and 11)(12)(13)(14)(15)(16)(17)(18)(19)(20, destroyed)(21, destroyed)
• 20 Badger ILAV: (1)(2)(3)(4 and 5)(6)(7, later destroyed)(8, destroyed)(9, destroyed)(10, destroyed)(11, destroyed)(12, destroyed)(13, destroyed)(14, destroyed)(15 and 16, destroyed)(17, destroyed)(18, destroyed)(19, destroyed)(20, destroyed) 
• 3 Range Rover: (1 and 2)(3)
• 19 Otokar Akrep: (1 and 2)(3)(4)(5)(6)(7)(8)(9)(10)(11)(12)(13, used as VBIED)(14, destroyed)(15, 16 and 17, destroyed)(18, destroyed)(19, destroyed)
• 2 Reva: (1, destroyed)(2, destroyed)
• 6 Dzik 3 ''Ain Jaria 1'': (1)(2)(3, destroyed)(4 and 5, destroyed)(6, destroyed)  
• 30 Toyota Land Cruiser: (1)(2)(3)(4, 5 and 6)(7)(8)(9)(10)(11)(12)(13)(14)(15)(16)(17)(18)(19)(20)(21)(22)(23)(24)(25)(26)(27 and 28)(29)(30, destroyed)

 

Recoilless rifles (12)

• 11 73mm SPG-9: (1)(2)(3)(4)(5)(6)(7)(8)(9)(10)(11)
• 1 105mm M40: (1)

 

Anti-tank missiles (4)

• 3 9M17 Skorpion: (1, 2 and 3, associated launch platforms not captured)
• 1 9M133 Kornet: (1, transferred from Syria)

 

Towed artillery (12)

• 6 122mm (D-74) Field Gun: (1, 2 and 3)(4)(5)(6) (At least one transferred to Syria)
• 6 155mm M198 Howitzer: (1, 2 and 3)(4, 5 and 6) (At least three transferred to Syria)

Multiple rocket launchers (41

• 2 107mm Type 63: (1)(2)
• 37 107mm Fath: (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 14, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33 and 34)(35 and 36)(37)
• 2 122mm rocket: (1)(2)

 

Anti-aircraft guns (110)

• 74 14.5mm KPV: (1)(2)(3)(4)(5)(6)(7)(8)(9)(10)(11)(12)(13)(14)(15)(16)(17)(18 and 19)(20 and 21)(22)(23)(24)(25 and 26)(27)(28)(29)(30)(31)(32)(33)(34)(35)(36)(37)(38)(39)(40)(41)(42)(43)(44)(45)(46, 47 and 48)(49)(50)(51 and 52)(53)(54)(55)(56)(57, 58 and 59)(60)(61)(62)(63)(64)(65)(66)(67)(68 and 69)(70)(71)(72)(73)(74)
• 7 14.5mm ZPU-1: (1)(2)(3)(4)(5)(6)(7)
• 25 23mm ZU-23: (1 and 2)(3)(4)(5)(6)(7)(8)(9)(10)(11)(12)(13)(14)(15)(16)(17)(18)(19)(20)(21)(22)(23)(24)(25)
• 1 37mm M-1939 (61-K): (1)
• 2 37mm Type 65: (1)(2)
• 1 57mm AZP S-60: (1)

 

MANPADS (4)

• 3 9K32 Strela-2 ''SA-7'': (1)(2)(3, all transferred from Syria)
• 1 FN-6: (1, transferred from Syria)

 

Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) (4, of which destroyed: 3)

• 1 Phantom FC40: (1)
• 3 Mohajer-4: (1, destroyed)(2, destroyed)(3, destroyed)

Helicopters (4, of which destroyed: 4)

• 1 Mi-17V-5: (1, destroyed)
• 2 Mi-35M: (1, destroyed)(2, destroyed)
• 1 IA-407: (1, destroyed)

Aircraft (3)

• 3 MiG-21FL: (1, not operational)(2, not operational)(3, not operational)

Following several rumours concerning the delivery of new armoured fighting vehicles to the Syrian Arab Army, images coming out of the war-torn country have now confirmed such a delivery did indeed take place in the form of T-62M tanks and BMP-1 Infantry Fighting Vehicles (IFVs). These newly delivered vehicles are destined for the Syrian Arab Army's 5th Corps, which is currently engaged in heavy combat with the Islamic State in between T4 airbase and Tadmur. Indeed, images and videos covering the fighting that currently takes place here have already confirmed the vehicles are doing their part in bringing the fight back to the Islamic State.

While many expected the delivery of more T-72s or even T-90s as a follow-up to the small deliveries of these vehicles to elements of the Syrian military in late 2015, it now appears the core of the 5th Corps will be made up of battle-proven armored fighting vehicles (AFVs) such as the T-62M and BMP-1(P) instead. Although certainly less advanced than some of the more modern T-72s and BMP-2 variants employed in the Syrian theatre elsewhere, the delivery of these AFVs are still a welcome addition to the badly-depleted vehicle park of the Syrian Arab Army.

Indeed, while deprived of any active protection systems such as the Shtora found on the T-90 series of tanks, the T-62M is a vast improvement over the T-55 and earlier T-62 variants that continue to make up the majority of Syria's now battered tank fleet. The BMP-1s and BMP-1Ps delivered offer little in offensive and defensive capabilities, but are likely to serve the 5th Corps well because of the fact that they are easy to master and maintain, especially for crews with existing experience in operating these vehicles.


The 5th Corps is a newly established unit of the Syrian Arab Army, and serves as a counterweight to the increasing strength of the various militias that have largely taken over the role of the Syrian Arab Army (SyAA) in the past years. While the partial dissolvement of the SyAA and the subsequent rise of militias was necessary for the survival of the Syrian regime, it ended up creating a whole host of major problems that could potentially spiral out of control in the future. The establishment of the 5th Corps aims to address at least a part of these problems.

Russia appears to be a key driver behind the de-facto re-establishment of the Syrian Arab Army by exerting pressure on the regime to bring back control of the many militias to the army instead of continuing as independent units under the control of the Syrian High Command. While Iran's goal of keeping Syria under its sphere of influence was enacted bythe establishment of several militias, many of which foreign, Russia seeks to create a stable situation that allows for the survival of the current government by creating an unified army instead.

The lack of such an unified army has been made painfully clear during most of the regime's defeats over the past several years, the failed Tabqa offensive and losing Tadmur for a second time serving as recent examples. A project similar to that of the establishment of the 5th Corps was initiated shortly after the Russian intervention in Syria, which called for the merging of several militias, including parts of the NDF, into the 4th Corps. When the NDF largely replaced the Syrian Arab Army as the regime's primary forces, the NDF saw its tasks expanding from guarding neighbourhoods to undertaking offensives elsewhere and guarding towns, gasfields and other strategic installations throughout Syria. Thus, this initiative would have called for the return of these tasks to the SyAA, with the NDF remaining a force dedicated for local defense only. Thus far, this process appears to have been largely unsuccessful however.

In contrast to other units of the Syrian Arab Army, which consist almost exclusively of drafted personnel, the 5th Corps hopes to attract large numbers of men by offering salaries and benefits that were previously only found with militias such as Suqour al-Sahraa' (The Desert Falcons). To further strengthen its ranks, Syrian men that were previously exempted from the draft are likely to join the 5th Corps amidst sharpened rules for exclusion from mandatory service.


The now almost six-year long civil war has taken a heavy toll on the once immense Syrian tank fleet, suffering heavy losses due to the widespread profileration of rocket propelled grenades (RPGs) and anti-tank guided missiles (ATGMs). Yet it is mainly the poor tactics employed by most regime forces that have effectively degraded the tank to the role of a vulnerable static pillbox. Although the amount of armoured fighting vehicles that remain available still appears to be sufficient for current operations, the number of vehicles of the same class is too low to equip an entirely new fighting force: The 5th Corps.

In accordance with Russia's role in the establishment of the 5th Corps, it is also Russia that is responsible for equipping the new force. Although this led some to believe the new force would be equipped with a wide range of modern Russian weapon systems, Russia has so far committed to the delivery of older weaponry that is no longer in service with the Russian Army itself. Nonetheless, the delivered vehicles and weaponry are ideally suited for the Syrian Arab Army and the 5th Corps.

In addition to the delivery of small arms and a large number of Ural, GAZ, KamAZ and UAZ trucks and jeeps, deliveries to the 5th Corps so far have encompassed T-62Ms, BMP-1Ps and BMP-1s and 122mm M-1938 (M-30) howitzers. The latter are of a more modern variant than the examples already in use in Syria, with the Russian-delivered examples part of a batch that underwent modernisation during the 1970s, exchanging the original rubber foam wheels for more modern ones allowing for better mobility both on-road and off-road.

Before their appearance in Syria, some of the T-62Ms were already spotted in Russia while underway to a harbour for transport to Syria. These vehicles were then shipped onboard the 'Syria Express' towards Tartus, where the majority of vehicles and equipment has been arriving. The T-62Ms and BMP-1s were subsequently spotted in Tartus waiting for distribution to their new units, including a part of the 5th Corps currently seeing action against the Islamic State in Central Syria.


The T-62M is an upgrade programme aimed at upgrading several variants of the T-62, which by the early 1980s had become severely outmatched by their more modern Western counterparts, to a common standard. The programme aimed to adress the T-62's shortcomings in the field of firepower, protection and mobility, greatly improving the capabilities of the until then badly underperforming tank. The upgrade ran parallel to the modernisation of the T-55 and T-55A to T-55M standard, which was carried out during the same time.

The increased armour protection was achieved by the installment of BDD 'Brovi Il'icha' appliqué armour on the turret front and upper and lower glacis plates, increased armour protection against anti-tank mines, rubber side skirts and anti-radiation lining on parts of the turret. The resulting increased weight was compensated by a new V-55U diesel engine. To utilise the full potential of the powerful 115mm gun the 'Volna' fire control system module was installed, comprising the KTD laser rangefinder (LRF) and associated equipment. The tank also gained the capability to launch the tube-fired 9M117 (9K116-2) Sheksna ATGM, which is nearly identical to the 9M117 (9K116-1) Bastion in use with Syria's T-55(A)MVs. For this purpose, both the gunner and commander received new sighting systems, now also allowing for much increased efficacy during night combat. In addition to all this, the tank was equipped with a new stabiliser, a thermal sleeve for its 115mm gun, a new radio and a block of smoke grenade launchers on each side of the turret.

Despite its age, the T-62M has only just been retired by the Russian Army after decades of counter-terrorism operations in the Caucascus, a task for which it was also heavily employed in the mountainous terrain of Afghanistan during the Soviet invasion of this country. Several other nations continue to operate the T-62M, most notably Cuba, where it ironically serves as the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias' most modern tank.


While several variants such as the T-62 Obr. 1967 and T-62 Obr. 1972 were upgraded to the common T-62M standard, both are still easily discernible by the lack of the 12.7mm DShK on the T-62 Obr. 1967. Interestingly, Syria has received both Obr. 1967s and Obr. 1972s upgraded to T-62Ms. The latter has so far been featured more extensively in the footage coming out of Central Syria, and was also the first to fall victim to an Islamic State ATGM, with no casualties reported.

Most of the tanks can still be seen with the H22-0-0 rail transit markers that were applied in Russia before shipment to Syria. While not removing these markings is in this case of little significance, similar markings were also left in place on Russian tanks deployed in Ukraine, which could once again be used to confirm Russia's involvement in the war in Eastern Ukraine.


The delivery of large amounts of these albeit dated vehicles could very well end up reversing the trend of widespread attrition that has decimated Syria's fighting vehicles. Perhaps more importantly, it shows Russia remains willing and capable of supporting its ally with large amounts of military equipment, despite economic hardships and the fact that Syria is bankrupt. This initiative essentially represents the re-establishment of the SyAA in organised form, and should it succeed it is certain to have far reaching consequences for future developments in the Syrian War.

The battle for Mosul has entered its seventh month of fierce fighting for the largest city in the hands of the Islamic State, with the most difficult fight for Mosul's Old City still to be fought. Facing a much stronger opponent with a large number of armoured fighting vehicles, special forces and air support, the Islamic State employs tactics that have become so characteristic for this organisation in its fight against Iraqi forces, including the large-scale use of VBIEDs in the narrow streets of the city.

Apart from the use of proven weapons and tactics, the battle for Mosul also premiered several other weapons systems, 'Made in Islamic State', perfectly suited for the urban environment of the city and the way the Islamic State fights its battles. Arguably the best examples of this are the deployment of a new type of anti-tank rocket launcher as well as weaponised drones, both of which have widely publicised as their use intensified while the Iraqi Army captured ever more parts of the city from the entrenched Islamic State.

The latest Islamic State video release coming out of Mosul would go further into detailing some of the Islamic State's achievements in the production of weaponry and unmanned aerial and ground vehicles in the city. The video, 'We will surely guide them to Our ways', named in reference to Quran verse 29:69, would show the assembly and deployment of several weapon systems previously not seen before.

While the production of RPGs, recoilless-rifles and a homebred anti-tank rocket launcher is already a significant development, even more so is the combat debut of what appears to be a type of loitering munition, more commonly known as a 'suicide drone' (a somewhat inapt name as there is no human involved) against Iraqi forces in the city. While this threat has only received little coverage despite its potential, the drone's combat debut made painfully clear the current shortcomings of this new type of Islamic State munition.


Loitering munition is a relatively new concept that calls for flying munitions to loiter over the target area before striking a target chosen by a human operator or in some types, autonomously. This method has several advantages over conventional cruise missiles and guided rockets, which are programmed in advance to hit a set target. If no suitable target is found, the loitering munition self-destructs or in some cases can even return to base, thus allowing for much more flexibility in operations.

The Islamic State was previously reported to have utilised loitering munition in Syria on several occasions, mainly against regime forces in the besieged city of Deir ez-Zor. It however remains unknown if the unmanned aerial vehicles in question were supposed to crash themselves into regime positions with their payload of a single PG-7 rocket or wereactually designed to drop these instead.

The Islamic State is not the first to have deployed loitering munition operationally. Indeed, such weaponry has already been used by Azerbaijan, Yemen's Houthis, Israel and the U.S. in conflict, the latter even deploying them in Syria. Another operator of such "kamikaze-drones" is North Korea, which currently operates the largest of the type. Of course, the crudely constructed contraption used by the Islamic State is hardly comparable to modern munitions in use with countries that produce professional grade weaponry, but the threat remains comparably hard to counter, and has the potential significantly escalate the unabating harassment of Iraqi forces trying to weed the terrorist group out of the city.

The possible production of 'suicide drones' by the Islamic State was first hinted in a leak of documents from the Islamic State in March 2017. These documents detailed a request of a Tunisian drone developer Abu Yusra al-Tunisi for permission and funding for the development and production of multi-purpose UAVs that could loaded with 20 kilograms of explosives to be used as an air-to-surface missile. A summary in English of the Islamic State document can be found below.

Islamic State
Willayat Halab
Soldiers’ Central Office

(Summary)

Name: Abu Yusra al-Tunisi
Age: 47
Profession: Specialised in industrial electricity and electronics with some humble knowledge in the field of aviation and aeronautics. 

To those who may be concerned, I present the Ababil project. It is a multi-purpose UAV, with uses including: 

1- To recon an area 30 km in diameter.
2- Can be used as an air-to-surface missile with +20 kg payload.
3- It can be used to distract the enemy through the use of more than one UAV at night or during the day.
4- To jam the enemy aircraft.

The project will require a team composed of:
- An electro-mechanic engineer.
- A fiberglass specialist.
- An expert in AutoCAD who knows how to work on CNC.
- A metalworker 

The project will cost around 5,000 USD and will require 3 months to complete. I will show you photos of a prototype that I worked on when I worked in the field of research and development. The project was stopped for unknown reasons.

While it is unknown if Abu Yusra al-Tunisi ever received permission and funding to continue his Ababil project, it is unlikely that the drone seen in the latest Islamic State release is in fact the Ababil. Not only did Abu Yusra al-Tunisi ask for permission and funding to develop drones in Wilayat Halab (Aleppo governorate) in Syria, the supposed payload of more than 20kg of explosives seems a much too heavy load for the drone shown in Mosul.


Although the Islamic State's release only shows a glimpse of the drone's flight (which can be seen at 8:43), it reveals interesting details on the operations of the drone. Based around a metal frame (part of which held together by duct-tape) the drone is the largest type to have been produced by the Islamic State, which until thus far has mainly used quadcopters, Skywalkers and various indigenous drones for obversation purposes. Although the Islamic State has showcased weaponised Skywalkers on several occasions, no such conversion is believed to be used operationally.

The operator of the drone is seen standing left, holding a controller in his hands. It is likely that this operator was only responsible for bringing the drone into the air, after which the radio-control was taken over by another operator with access to a screen from which he could see the path of the drone due to its inbuilt camera. Despite the clear view of the drone in the video, which reveals a fuel tank half-full, no payload is visible. Whether this means it was unarmed at the time or if the payload was potentially installed closer to the engine and thus difficult to spot is uncertain.

The screen indicates the drone flew for about ten minutes at a speed of around 110 kilometres an hour before it makes its descent towards a gathering of Iraqi Army vehicles and soldiers, including a M1 Abrams. Interestingly, the footage cuts away shortly before the drone impacts. Although it is implied this is because its payload detonated, it's also entirely possible that it actually diverted at the last moment, or that it simply crashed and did not carry any payload. In the latter case, the purpose of the drone might have been aimed more at testing and propaganda uses than actually providing a workable weapon.


With the profileration of drones seen in the world of today, the use of an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) as a delivery platform of explosives to strike locations in the West is a threat to be taken seriously. The crudeness and obviously improvised nature does little to mitigate the fact that in an era where remotely controlled weaponry is increasingly easy to develop for factions such as the Islamic State it will become harder and harder to protect forces from such asymmetrical warfare tactics.


While this attempt at striking Iraqi forces with loitering munition was unlikely to be a success, the attack represents a growing threat that one day might become a widely deployed tactic in similar conflicts throughout the world.Although the Islamic State's days as a conventional force in Iraq are slowly coming to an end, more surprises are certain to await in Syria, and the conflict continues to develop in unpredictable ways that are sure to leave their mark on the way wars are fought in the future.

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The Islamic State's rise to the status of one of the most sophisticated designated terrorist groups ever to exist has been accompanied by an unprecedented level of ingenuity, especially considering the fact that most of their sites and weaponry were quickly targeted by Air Forces operating over the conflicted battlespaces of Syria and Iraq. In an attempt to address this threat the Islamic State resorted to desperate measures such as using conventional artillery as makeshift anti-aircraft guns, relying on the remote chance of achieving a direct hit on enemy aircraft flying high in the sky to bring them down.

First shown off by the Islamic State in March 2016, these truck-mounted 122mm D-30 howitzers of the Al-Farouq Platoon (of the Wilayat Ninawa Air Defence Battalion) were seen firing at U.S. Navy (E)P-3 spy planes used for signals intelligence (SIGINT) missions over Mosul. The use of this weaponry, ordinarily used as conventional artillery against ground targets only, is highly notable, and highlights the Islamic State's severe lack of means to counter the Coalition's overwhelming air assets.

The images, captured in and around Mosul, the largest city to have been captured by the Islamic State (IS), depict U.S.-made Navistar International 7000 Series and M-35 trucks that have been modified to carry the Soviet-legacy 122mm D-30 howitzer. Over a hundred Navistar 7000 series and roughly fifty M-35 trucks were captured by IS when its forces took control over Mosul in June 2014. In contrast, Syria appears to have been the source of the 122mm D-30 howitzers, where around fifty fell in Islamic State since 2014.

While most arms captured by IS were destined for use in the region or country they were captured in, the Islamic State moved large quantities of arms between the areas it controlled in Syria and Iraq. Examples of these are the transfer of large numbers of M16 assault rifles from Iraq to Syria, where they were apparently favoured over the ubiqitous AK-pattern of rifles, and the movement of Syrian T-55 tanks to Iraq, where they were employed in the defence of Mosul in 2016 and 2017.


The M-35-based howitzer (seen in the header image) appears to have been housed in a hardened aircraft shelter (HAS) at Mosul airport, only being moved outside when a potential target appears. Furthermore, the truck has been outfitted with stabilisers and a mount to lower the howitzer into travel position.


Also shown are two shots fired by the truck mounted howitzers missing their intended target: A U.S. Navy (E)P-3 Orion signals reconnaissance aircraft. These secretive aircraft are used by the Navy for intelligence gathering and electronic warfare along and over the territory of adversaries and enemies, sometimes leading to near-misses and even a collision with aircraft aiming to intercept them.

The slow-flying (E)P-3s, usually flying in a circular pattern, must have been a thorn in the eye of the Islamic State, which, in contrast with fast flying jets also used in the region, must appear as though they have a chance of shooting them down. Despite the fact that the high-powered artillery is capable of reaching the altitude at which these aircraft operate, the fact that their High Explosive (HE) munition lacks any type of proximity- or anti-aircraft fuse means they have to score a direct hit on their target in order to disable it, an almost impossible feat to accomplish.


Although this practise might appear to be a waste of time and precious munition, the Islamic State is not the first to resort to such tactics. Indeed, Mujahideen are known to have employed mortar- and RPG-fire against Soviet helicopters during the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and Iranian artillery targeted low-flying Iraqi helicopters during the Iran-Iraq War as well. Of course, neither of these cases resulted in any reported aircraft losses or even minor damage being done, as the use of such desperate tactics only results in either a complete destruction of the target or a complete miss.


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SyrianAir can look back on a turbulent six years of operations serving a country thorn apart by Civil War. Heavily impacted by the implementation of sanctions against Syria in 2012, preventing the airline from buying new aircraft and forcing it to cease its flights to countries in the European Union, SyrianAir (officially known as Syrian Arab Airlines) has had to drastically scale back its operations. This marked the start of a slow degradation process that would see SyrianAir retiring ever more aircraft as spare parts became increasingly difficult to acquire.

Although some expected the acquisition of several types of Russian-produced aircraft such as the Tu-204 or even the Il-96 to replace SyrianAir's Western fleet of Airbus and Boeing aircraft, no such deliveries occurred. A sharp decrease in the operational availability of its Airbus fleet due to a lack of spare parts and maintenance checks, further exacerbated by a mid-air collision of an A320with a Syrian Arab Air Force (SyAAF) Mi-8/17 in 2012, meant that the airline's aging Tu-134s were now increasingly utilised to replace some of the flights previously carried out by the A320s.

This struggle went on for several years, ultimately leading to the retirement of all but two of SyrianAir's A320s, which currently remain active on some of the airline's routes to the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Algeria, Egypt, Bahrain, Jordan, Qatar, Iraq, Sudan, Iran and Russia. Despite the fact that flights to several of these destinations occur infrequently, it still puts a high burden on a fleet of only two A320s and semi-active Tu-134s. With no replacements from Russia, the United States or Europe in sight, SyrianAir's future was looking increasingly grim.

The situation would only improve in 2016 after the Iranian Mahan Air wet-leased one of its Airbus A300-600R passenger jets to SyrianAir, which quietly entered service with the airline in August 2016, circumventing the sanctions implemented against Syria. The wet-lease of an Airbus A300 was only a temporarily solution to SyrianAir's problems, yet it allowed SyrianAir some much needed breathing space until a suitable replacement aircraft for the airline could be found. The search and subsequent acquisition of an Airbus A340 would involve countries like Iran, Chad and Kazakhstan in a deal that is a perfect example of successful 'Sanctions Busting', to the point that no repercussions have had to be endured by the involved countries as a whole to this date at all.


Before going into detail on the story of the A340, it is insightful to consider the events leading up to the acquisition of the aircraft. As already stated above, SyrianAir leased a single A300 from Mahan Air to relieve the two A320s that remained operational on some of the flights to the airline's remaining destinations. Although a relatively outdated aircraft by today's standards, the A300 is capable of flying longer distances while carrying considerable more passengers than the smaller A320.

The privately owned Mahan Air serves as Iran's second airline behind the flag carrier Iran Air, and operates a large fleet of mainly Airbus passenger jets to destinations in the Middle East, Asia and Europe. However, apart from ferrying passengers to destinations across Asia and Europe, Mahan Air also plays an active role in the Syrian Civil War, transporting Shiite fighters and their equipment from locations in Iran and Iraq to Syria. Mahan Air is also implicated in transporting weapons to Yemen's Houthis before and during the early stages of the Saudi-led intervention in this country.

It thus comes as no surprise that Mahan Air is sanctioned by the U.S. government, which has also put member states of the European Union under pressure to ban Mahan Air from operating to these countries, a ban which has yet to take place. Despite effectively acting as Iran's Revolutionary Guard's long-arm in the Middle East and possibly farther abroad, the airline is still permitted to fly to various destinations in the Europe and even increased the frequency of these flights during this summer season.


The A300 wet-lease deal with Mahan Air is not the first time Syria has leased an aircraft from an Iranian airline. In an effort to increase the transport capabilities of the Syrian Air Force, SyrianAir wet-leased at least one Il-76 from Pouya Air, which serves as Iran's Revolutionary Guards' cargo airline. In accordance with its status as a leased aircraft, the Airbus A300 only received the bare minimum of markings indicating that the aircraft belonged to SyrianAir during its career in Syrian service. Indeed, if one is not familiar with the logo of SyrianAir it would be impossible to discern the aircraft's operator from other airlines with similar logos. The airline's logo was applied to the engines and the tail of the plane.

During its service with SyrianAir, A300 'EP-MNM' is believed to not only have replaced A320s in flying commercial routes, but also to have regularly flown Shiite fighters from Iraq to Damascus. The aircraft would eventually return to Mahan Air in early 2017, just over half a year after having entered service with SyrianAir. During this period, a plan was worked out which called for the acquistion of a passenger jet with increased passenger capacity over SyrianAir's A320s at a favourable price for Syria. The aircraft had also be of a type common enough so that spare parts could be readily acquired on the open market or via friendly nations.


To facilitate the aquistion of a large passenger jet, Syria would seek the help of Iran, an expert in acquiring aircraft despite sanctions preventing them from doing so. Previously under sanctions that prevented the country from acquiring new aircraft on the open market, Iran initiated a programme that would see a large influx of mostly second-hand Fokker 100 and MD-80 series aircraft with Iranian airlines by acquiring them via various airlines in post-Soviet states.

The modus operandi of this elaborate scheme would be to use various small airlines in countries such as Tajikistan and Kazakhstan to purchase aircraft on behalf of Iran. When underway to any of these countries or other supposed destinations 'coincidentally' located in proximity to Iran, the aircraft would then report a malfunction in mid-air and divert to Tehran, where the aircraft would subsequently enter service with the Iranian airline that had purchased it. Unsurprisingly, this profitable business is believed to have been closely linked with Iran's Revolutionary Guards, which thus largely monopolised the acquisition of aircraft by Iranian airlines.

Apart from acquiring aircraft for various Iranian airlines, this elaborate scheme was also used to replace the Iranian government Boeing 707, which was originally acquired by the Shah in 1978 and in desperate need of replacement. Seeking the acquisition of a four-engined Airbus A340, Iran contracted Asian Express Airline, a small airline operating out of Tajikistan to various destinations in this country and Russia. Only operating smaller aircraft on its routes, Asian Express Airline suddenly had a requirement for a large A340 and acquired an aircraft that had previously been in service with Air Canada and Turkish Airlines. Of course, the aircraft never entered service with Asian Express Airline and instead arrived in Iran for its conversion to Iran's 'Air Force One'. The aircraft 'EP-AJA' is currently in service with Meraj Air, which operates the aircraft on behalf of the Iranian government.

Although the lifting of international sanctions on Iran in January 2016 meant that Iranian airlines were now able to purchase Western-made passenger aircraft directly from their manufacturer, which resulted in huge orders with Airbus and Boeing, Iran's scheme for acquiring passenger aircraft via other means apparently would be used at least once more. Indeed, Iran's largest and most ambitious aircraft haul to yet was still on the horizon.


On the 13th of April 2016, an Airbus A340-300 with the U.S. designation 'N322AK' comes in to land at Almaty International Airport, Kazakhstan. The unmarked aircraft is a surprising visitor to the city, which rarely sees landings of four-engined passenger jets. This particular aircraft had previously been in service with Cathay Pacific and SriLankan Airlines before placed into storage at Orlando Sanford International Airport in Miami. The sixteen-year-old aircraft had been phased out by SriLankan Airlines in 2015, and was awaiting a buyer in the United States before its arrival in Kazakhstan.

Reports then indicated that the A340 had been acquired by Bek Air, a Kazakh airline that operates services to several cities in the country using a fleet of eight Fokker 100s. This acquisition was highly suspicious as it was unlikely that the small airline had any requirement for a passenger jet as large as the A340 for its domestic routes to cities in Kazakhstan. It would soon be revealed that Bek Air was not destined to be the actual operator of the aircraft, and that the airline actually acted as an intermediate for an Iranian acquisition of an A340 in the same scheme as detailed above.

While the parties involved in this scheme succeeded in bringing the aircraft from the United States to Kazakhstan, it appears that bureacracy prevented the transfer of the aircraft to Iran. Namely, Kazakhstan's Civil Aviation Committee refused to register the aircraft, citing that non-flag carriers such as Bek Air were prohibited from operating large aircraft like the A340s under Kazakh law. This once again reaffirms that Bek Air never intended on operating the aircraft itself, as it would be highly unlikely that Bek Air would have acquired an aircraft it wasn't allowed to operate. Having failed to comply with Kazakh regulations, the aircraft subsequently remained grounded in Almaty.


This situation subsisted until September 2016, when Melad Herfeh, a British citizen of Iranian descent, provided documents stating that the aircraft was owned by the UAE-registered ZAK AVIATION FZE. For reasons that as of yet remain unknown, ZAK AVIATION was exempted from the rule that prevents Kazakh airlines like Bek Air from registering large aircraft, and the A340 could now be registered in Kazakhstan, receiving the designation of UP-A4001 on the 20th September 2016. It is not clear if Kazakh authorities still envisioned Bek Air as the supposed operator of the aircraft at this time, or if they expected the aircraft would enter service with an airline operating out of the UAE.

Now registred as 'UP-A4001', the crew of the Airbus A340 was then said to have detailed a flight plan to Yerevan, Armenia, where the aircraft was supposed to receive further services before re-entering service as a passenger jet. While at this point it already should have been more than clear that Kazakhstan's Civil Aviation Committee was used in a bid to circumvent the sanctions preventing Syria from acquiring passenger aircraft, the A340 eventually received permission to fly to Yerevan. Taking off on the 8th of October 2016, the aircraft instead set course for Iran and after safely landing in Tehran, 'UP-A4001' was towed to the FARS aircraft hangar (seen below) for servicing.

During this period, the A340 was removed from the Kazakh aviation register and transferred to the air operator's certificate (AOC) of the Chadian airline AirInter 1. Now operating as 'TT-WAG', the A340 departed Tehran for Damascus on the 10th of February 2017. After its arrival in Syria, the aircraft changed registration for a final time, becoming 'YK-AZA'. The A340, still registered as 'UP-A4001', can be seen at Tehran Mehrabad Airport below prior to its transfer to Syria.


While the illegal acquisition and subsequent transfer of a single A340 to Syria via Iran through Kazakh territory and law was already an unfortunate blunder for the country, this aircraft was only a  part of a much larger scheme that would eventually see the acquisition of three A340s by exploiting the exact same Kazakh laws. Contrary to the previous transfer, these two A340s would directly fly to Tehran from Athens, were both aircraft had previously been stored for eight years after the bankruptcy of their former operator Olympic Airlines.

Interestingly, while the involved parties encountered problems with registering the first A340 because of the aforementioned laws that prevented Bek Air from operating aircraft like the A340, another UAE-registered company, Bright Horizon FZE, was used during the registration of the second and third aircraft, and both A340s were subsequently registered as UP-A4002 and UP-A4003 on the 30th of December 2016. Both aircraft were still in storage at Athens International Airport at this time, and their new registration allowed the involved parties to ready themselves for their departure for 'Kazakhstan'.

Contrary to the first A340 (UP-A4001), UP-A4002 and UP-A4003 were registered by a citizen of the Republic of Kazakhstan, Kairat Temirgalievich Sarinov, whose profession as a housekeeper should in the least have raised several red flags during the registration process of two multi-million passenger jets. Investigations into Kairat Sarinov revealed that he worked for Talgat Kasenov, the former Deputy Chairman of the Civil Aviation Committee. Talgat Kasenov was forced to resign in January 2016 for having accepted bribes, just two months after his appointment. The fact that his name emerged during investigations into this deal is almost too coincidental, and his involvement in this deal is therefore very likely.

Despite losing his position as the Deputy Chairman of the Civil Aviation Committee, it appears that Talgat Kasenov's influence in this organisation still reached far enough to help facilitate the transfer of UP-A4002, UP-A4003 and possibly also UP-A4001 to Iran. UP-A4002 and UP-A4003 departed Athens on the 14th and 15th of February 2017 respectively, with the takeoff of the latter being filmed. It is likely that the aircraft's flight plan called for a direct flight to either Astana or Almaty, Kazakhstan, but unsurprisingly, both aircraft changed course while over the Caspian Sea and landed in Tehran instead.

UP-A4002 and UP-A4003, both still in their Greek Olympic Airlines livery, can be seen at Tehran Mehrabad Airport below. Although UP-A4001 was quickly flown to Damascus after servicing in Tehran, UP-A4002 and UP-A4003 still remain in in Iran, where UP-A4003 was registered by Mahan Air. As the two A340s had been in storage for more than eight years, both aircraft still have very low-flying hours and are attractive aircraft for either SyrianAir or Mahan Air. The two A340s differ slightly from UP-A4001 (later YK-AZA) by their engines, which is indicated by their designation of A340-313 (A340 300-series with CFM 56-5C4 engines).

The A340 acquired by SyrianAir is also of the 300-series, the initial variant produced by Airbus. Equipped with CFM 56-5C3 engines, the aircraft's official designation is A340-312 (A340-300 series with CFM 56-5C3 engines). The A340 has been gradually phased out by airlines around the world in favour for more fuel-efficient aircraft, which makes SyrianAir's acquisition of the type somewhat curious. The type's fuel consumption is however offset by its purchase price, which is low compared to other aircraft in the same class due to the wealth of airlines retiring the type. Alternatively, SyrianAir acquired the A340 because of a lack of other suitable aircraft types that could be acquired via similar paths.

The illegal acquisition and transfer of three A340s to Iran and Syria is currently under investigation by Kazakhstan's National Anti-Corruption Bureau. Although it remains unknown to what extent officials from Kazakhstan's Civil Aviation Committee were involved in this elaborate scheme, the U.S. embassy in Astana expressed its concern for Kazakhstan's meddling in the scheme as per Ratel KZ, whose investigations uncovered interesting details about its involvement in the transfer of the three A340s.

These investigations have meanwhile confirmed that almost every rule in the registration, deregistration and inspection of the three A340s was either grossly violated or completely ignored. The Civil Aviation Committee stated that one of its employees, a twenty-five year old woman, was responsible for the registration and that her ignorance was the culprit for the illegal  acquisition and transfer of three aircraft through Kazakh law. An unlikely explanation given the magnitude of this scheme, as well as the signatures of several officials of the Civil Aviation Committee in the documents and the likely involvement of the former Deputy Chairman Talgat Kasenov.

It is certain that several nations have some thorough investigations to do regarding the extent of their involvement in the transfer of the three A340s, be it by mistake, complete ignorance or simply corruption. The fact that a British national,Melad Herfeh, was also involved in the transfer of the first A340 but also likely the second and third aircraft will indubitably be most interesting for British authorities.


While it currently remains unknown when SyrianAir will receive any of the the two A340s that currently remain in Iran, or if such an acquistion is envisioned at all, 'YK-AZA' currently operates daily to some of SyrianAir's remaining destinations in the Gulf and Egypt. These flights were previously only carried out by the smaller A320s and the wet-leased A300, and it is highly unlikely that the A340 is fully booked on these flights. This raises the question if the flights carried out by the A340 are profitable given the aircraft's high fuel costs.


A340 'YK-AZA' would make its inaugurational flight to Dubai on the 12th of April 2017, an event not only well attended by the press, but also by various government officials such as Syria's Minister of Transport Ali Hammoud, who stated the following:

''Today Airbus 340 is taking off from Damascus International Airport to Dubai in the first flight after it was rehabilitated by the Syrian Ministry of Transport. This big achievement is an indicator of the resilience and vigor of the Syrian people and their ability to produce solutions.''

...

''Steps are underway to revamp and re-equip all facilities in the airport to allow for an increase in the number of planes and more air traffic. The economic blockade imposed on Syria had badly affected our ability to repair the equipment in the airport. However, we are working with partners to secure more equipment needed to re-operate the airport. In addition to its role in securing more revenue for the state, this step is a message to the world that the air transport sector in Syria is recovering despite the relentless war being waged on Syria.''

Footage of the inaugurational flight can be watched here.

SyrianAir's A340 seats up to 300 passengers in a two-class layout, 275 economy class seats and 25 business class seats. The seats are different from those installed in the aircraft during its service for SriLankan Airlines, and appear similar to the seats in used by Mahan Air in some of its aircraft. The same seats were also used in the A300-600 SyrianAir previously wet-leased, making it likely that the current interior was installed during the aircraft's stay in Iran. To minimise costs, none of the seats have seatback TV screens, not even in Business Class. A video covering the pre-flight and in-flight services provided for passengers of the A340 can be viewed here.

Although it has been speculated that the A340 will be used on new routes to China and Venezuela, it is unlikely that any new routes to these destinations will be launched in the foreseeable future, at least until more aircraft are received to relieve SyrianAir's current fleet of aircraft. Regular flights to cities in China could be attractive for Chinese companies seeking to invest in the rebuilding and economy of Syria in the long run, yet it remains to be seen if there is enough interest to launch these routes at the moment.


While Venezuela's flag carrier Conviasa previously operated flights between Caracas, Damascus and Tehran, supposedly to facilitate the transfer of officials, spies, drugs and weaponry between these countries (hence being dubbed the 'Terror Flight') it is also unlikely that passenger services or any the services above will see SyrianAir flying to Caracas on a regular basis. Indeed, while the introduction of the A340 will permit SyrianAir to launch flights to the few remaining friendly nations in the world, its focus is likely to be centered on countries in the Middle East for the years to come.


Although images of bombed out hospitals and schools (rightfully) continue to dominate headlines about Syria around the world, normal life goes on for many Syrians living in Damascus and the coastal region, their ordinary dealings and businesses contrasting starkly with the suffering of their less fortunate countrymen. Amidst an increasingly stable security situation in Damascus and what is by now a tight control of all its major population centres, the Syrian government can start to look at ways to stabilise and normalise the life of at least a part of the Syrian population. Although it remains unlikely that the implemented sanctions against Syria will be lifted in the foreseeable future, at least until the Assad clan leaves power, it is certain that Syria's allies will aid the country in slowly restoring its status as an at least semi-functional nation. This recent investment in its national airline, despite its illegal nature, is a testimony to this fact, showing the resilience of a government that more than once was at the brink of defeat during the unabating fury of the Syrian War.



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SyrianAir's Boeing 747SPs, A Rare Beast Disappears

Libya's aerial refuelling programme has only been rarely reported on since its inception in the late eighties, and suffered from a series of setbacks that ultimately led to the abandonment of the programme. Nonetheless, this ambitious project has definitely left its traces within the Libyan Air Force, and aircraft once playing a key role in the in-flight refuelling programme are still flying amidst the increasingly deteriorating security situation inside the country today.

The former LAAF (Libyan Arab Air Force) has been split into two air forces for several years now, each operating various types of fighter aircraft and helicopters. While a unity government is supposed to act as Libya's new government, the division of the country between several warring factions effectively continues. The internationally recognised Government of National Accord (GNA) led by Fayez al-Sarraj and supported by Turkey and Qatar, and the Libyan National Army (LNA) led by Khalifa Haftar, which receives major support from Egypt, Jordan, Russia and the United Arab Emirates are the strongest forces on the ground.

Although both mainly focused on combatting Islamic extremism such as the Islamic State, attacks and aerial bombings between the two continue at an increasing rate. This is an unfortunate result of the chaos that followed after the fall of Muammar Gaddafi, mainly caused by a greed for power on the side of Libyan factions, foreign influence by countries seeking to destabilize Libya and a lack of support on the side of international partners, which played a major role in the ousting of Gaddafi but provided inadequate support in helping Libya to develop itself into a functioning democracy.

With a limited number of operational airframes divided between two air forces, both the GNA and the LNA have scrounged the divided country for aircraft that could be made operational with relatively little effort or by cannibalising other airframes. Aircraft previously thought to have found their final resting place are now repurposed and restored to operational status and with Libya's lax rules when it comes to photographing sensitive equipment on most Libyan airbases, images of these airframes leak regularly. This peculiar situation provides the ideal footage for a review of Libya's ill-fated aerial refuelling programme, which has remained unknown to many until this date.



Libya's large surface area makes aerial refuelling tankers a coveted asset that allows aircraft to cross long distances to reach their targets without frequent stopovers or forward deployments to airbases closer to the target. This was especially true during the Gaddafi-era, when Libyan aircraft frequently struck targets in Chad, Sudan and even Tanzania in support of Libyan forces deployed to Chad and Uganda, or simply as an act of retribution.

Libya's shadow war in Chad can be seen as a defining period for the Libyan Air Force, facing off against not only the Chadians but also the French, which deployed to Chad in support of Hissène Habré fighting against the Libyans and proxies present in the country. As most Libyan airbases were located in the North of the country, the LAAF forward-deployed its aircraft to the remoteness of Southern Libya and even in Northern Chad. Both locations would prove to be extremely vulnerable to airstrikes by the French Air Force and Chadian incursions on the ground, the latter capturing Wadi Doum airbase in Chad and even raiding Maaten ar-Surra airbase in Southern Libya, leading to severe losses on the Libyan side.

It is likely that the experiences gained in Chad and monitoring the developments worldwide were decisive factors in Libya's decision to acquire aerial refuelling tankers. Although by the mid-eighties the Soviet Il-78 was already in production, Libya instead turned to the West to help set up an aerial refuelling project of its own in a similar way Iraq would. Although the reasons for this decision remain unknown, it is possible that Libya was simply not permitted to acquire the Il-78 at the time, nor did it operate any aircraft that could be refuelled from this Soviet tanker without undergoing modifications.


In 1987, Libya contracted the West German company Intec Technical Trade und Logistic (ITTL) to set up an in-flight refuelling programme in Libya itself. [1] Despite being a staunch opponent of the West, Libya had no problems contracting Western companies for all sorts of deals, including defence-related ones. On the delivering end Western companies, eager to profit from Libya's oil wealth, had no problems working for Libya either. Interestingly, ITTL began with acquiring in-flight refuelling (IFR) probes from France in addition to designing one of their own, which were subsequently installed on at least three MiG-23BNs and a single MiG-23UB.

Despite having bad experiences with the MiG-23MS, and also encountering more of the same problems with the MiG-23BN, the MiG-23BN proved to be a valuable asset for it sturdiness and weapon payload in Libyan service. Therefore, the decision to install in-flight refuelling probes on this fleet in particular so as to expand their range was not surprising. In addition to adding IFR-probes to its MiG-23BNs, the Libyan Arab Air Force could also count on the remainder of sixteen Mirage F.1ADs it had acquired from France; arguably the most capable aircraft in the Libyan inventory and already capable of being refuelled in mid-air.

ITTL proceeded with converting one of the LAAF's C-130s to the in-flight refuelling role by installing aerial-refuelling pods under both wings, which would have allowed for the refuelling of two aircraft at a time. Unfortunately,the C-130 proved less than ideal for this task when attempting to refuel the MiG-23, which was unable to adjust to the C-130's relatively slow operating speed. Although the Mirage F.1AD was capable on refuelling from the C-130, Libya already operated a far more suitable platform at this time: The Il-76.

As such, Il-76TD '5A-DNP' from Libyan Air Cargo (itself a de-facto part of the LAAF) was modified for the in-flight refuelling role by ITTL technicians. Despite their efforts, ITTL was forced to abort its operations in Libya when the affair became publicly known in the West. While their withdrawal would ultimately herald the end of this ambitious programme, it is believed that Libya continued the project for several years on its own, eventually ceasing all further efforts in the mid-nineties. Interestingly, footage of the project was documented on film and can be viewed online.


Around the same time as ITTL commenced work on Libya's in-flight refuelling programme, Libya entered negotiations with the Soviet Union to replace its fleet of Tu-22 bombers with up to 36 Su-24MKs supported by a fleet of six Il-78 tankers. This combination of Su-24s and Il-78s was to act as the LAAF's long arm, replacing the Tu-22 previously used in this role. While the Tu-22s were able to cross long distances from their base at al-Jufra, the operational career of these aircraft was coming to an end at the late eighties, and they had to be replaced.

The Su-24MK brought with it a wide array of air-to-ground missiles and guided bombs that allowed for precision strikes, a capability the Tu-22 lacked. Indeed, during a bombing sortie against a target in Tanzania, the Libyan Tu-22 crew not only missed the target, but the entire country as well, with the bombs landing across the border in Burundi instead! [2] Unfortunately for the LAAF, disagreements over payment and the UN arms embargo in effect since 1990 prevented the LAAF from receiving the desired amount of aircraft, and only six Su-24MKs and one Il-78 would eventually find their way to Libya.

It remains unknown however if this sole Il-78 was ever used in the in-flight refuelling role since its inception in 1989 or 1990, although it is certain that the aircraft spent the majority of its career as a cargo aircraft, still equipped with its three UPAZ pods aerial-refuelling pods attached. Wearing commercial Jamahiriya Air Transport (Libyan Air Cargo) titles, the Il-78 was first seen in early April 2005 coming in to land at Moscow Sheremetyevo International Airport (IAP) after having been overhauled at the 123 ARZ aircraft repair plant in Staraya Russa, Russia between 2004 and 2005.


Only rarely sighted throughout its operational career, the aircraft became even more elusive after the conlusion of the Libyan Revolution. Remaining grounded at al-Jufra airbase, Libya's sole Il-78 was thought to have met its final resting place before the aircraft resurfaced at Misrata airbase in late 2015, confirming the ill-fated aircraft had re-entered service with the Misrata-based air force.

Forgoing the sophisticated capabilities that are its raison d'être, the aircraft continues its short career in the cargo rol. In accordance with its new owners, the Gaddafi-era Jamahiriya titles in English and Arabic were painted over, and the new Libyan flag applied over the Jamahiriya green. The aircraft bears heavy traces of wear on the aircraft's windows, and the front windows have likely been replaced.


As the Libyan Civil War continues with no cessation of hostilities in sight, military equipment is brought back to operational conditions in an effort to reinforce the arsenals of the warring factions wrestling for control over Libya and its resources. Although the dreams of a dedicated aerial refuelling fleet to support a long-gone professional air force capable of undertaking international sorties have faded from memory long ago, Libya's skies remain abuzz with the remnants of this past age, as the aircraft that played a vital role in the programme are slowly consumed by the unabating demands of war.


[1] Libya’s Peculiar, Aerial-Refueling MiG-23s https://warisboring.com/libyas-peculiar-aerial-refueling-mig-23s/
[2] African MiGs Volume 2: Madagascar to Zimbabwe http://www.harpia-publishing.com/galleries/AfrM2/index.html

Special thanks to Tom Cooper from ACIG. Be sure to check out the excellent Libyan Air Wars series from Helion & Company for more on the Libyan Air Force.

This list only includes captured vehicles and equipment of which photo or videographic evidence is available. Therefore, the amount of equipment captured by the Islamic State may be higher than recorded here.

Although some of the tanks and artillery fielded by the Islamic State in recent offensives such as Kobanê were captured from Brigade 93 and Regiment 121 respectively, a great deal of effort has been put into avoiding double listings.

As most the trucks captured at the various bases in Northern Syria were already derelict years before their capture, they're not included in the list. does not include complete wrecks or gate guards and derilict MiG-17s captured at Kshesh/Jirah airbase

Be sure to check out Lost Armour for more recent updates on armour losses inside Syria.

(Click on the numbers to get a picture of each individual captured or destroyed vehicle)

Tanks (100)

• 67 T-55: (1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6)(7, 8 and 9)(10 and 11)(12 and 13)(14)(15)(16)(17)(18)(19)(20)(21)(22)(23)(24)(25)(26, 27 and 28)(29, 30, 31, 32, 33 and 34)(35, 36 and 37)(38)(39)(40 and 41)(42)(43)(44)(45)(46)(47)(48)(49)(50)(51)(52)(53)(54)(55)(56)(57)(58)(59)(60)(61)(62)(63)(64)(65)(66)(67)
• 5 T-62 Obr. 1967: (1)(2)(3)(4)(5)
• 10 T-62 Obr. 1972: (1 and 2)(3)(4)(5)(6)(7)(8)(9)(10)
• 12 T-72 Ural: (1)(2)(3)(4, 5, 6 and 7)(8)(9)(10)(11)(12)
• 6 T-72AV: (1)(2)(3)(4)(5)(6, later modernized by the addition of new mud guards, side skirts and different ERA layout)

 

Armoured fighting vehicles (9)

• 6 BRDM-2: (1)(2)(3)(4)(5)(6)
• 2 MT-LB: (1)(2, both captured in Iraq)
• 1 AMB-S: (1)

 

Infantry fighting vehicles (21)

•  21 BMP-1: (1)(2)(3)(4)(5)(6)(7)(8)(9)(10)(11)(12)(13)(14)(15 and 16)(17)(18)(19)(21)(22, modernized by the addition of a DshK HMG) 

 

Military engineering vehicles (4)

• 4 VT-55KS: (1 and 2)(3)(4)

 

Trucks (15)

• 3 MAZ-6317: (1)(2)(3)
• 1 KrAZ-6322: (1, captured in Iraq)
• 5 M35: (1, 2, 3 and 4)(5, all captured in Iraq)
• 3 MTVR: (1, 2 and 3, all captured in Iraq)
• 3 Navistar International 7000 series: (1)(2)(3, all captured in Iraq)

 

Jeeps (36)

• 1 UAZ-469: (1, captured in Iraq)
• 34 M-1114: (1, 2 and 3)(4, 5, 6 and 7)(8 and 9)(10 and 11)(12 and 13)(14 and 15)(16)(17)(18)(19)(20)(21)(22)(23)(24)(25)(26 and 27)(28)(29)(30 and 31)(32)(33)(34, all captured in Iraq)
• 1 M-1152: (1, captured in Iraq)

 

Recoilless rifles (4)

• 3 82mm B-10: (1)(2)(3)
• 1 105mm M40: (1)

 

Anti-tank missiles (24)

• 1 9M14M Malyutka-M: (1)
• 2 9M111M Faktoriya: (1 and 2)
• 2 9M113 Konkurs: (1)(2)
• 8 9K115-2 Metis-M: (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8)
• 1 9M133 Kornet: (1)
• 3 HJ-73D: (1 and 2)(3)
• 4 HOT: (1, 2, 3 and 4, associated launch platforms not captured)

Towed artillery (54)

• 1 122 mm (M-30) howitzer M-1938: (1)
• 1 122mm (D-74) Field Gun: (1, captured in Iraq)
• 18 122mm (D-30) howitzer 2A18: (1, 2 and 3)(4, 5, 6, 7 and 8)(9)(10)(11)(12)(13)(14)(15)(16)(17)(18)
• 31 130mm (M-46) field gun M-1954: (1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6)(7, 8 and 9)(10)(11)(12)(13)(14)(15)(16)(17, 18 and 19)(20)(21)(22)(23)(24)(25)(26)(27)(28)(29)(30)(31)
• 3 155mm M198 Howitzer: (1, 2 and 3, all captured in Iraq)

 

Self-propelled artillery (3)

• 3 122mm 2S1 Gvozdika: (1)(2)(3)

Multiple rocket launchers (28)

• 15 57mm UB-16: (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12)(13 and 14)(15, associated launch platforms not in use, could be mounted on pickup trucks instead)
• 2 107mm Type 63: (1)(2)
• 11 122mm BM-21: (1)(2)(3)(4)(5)(6)(7 and 8)(9)(10)(11, 122mm launcher mounted on a Navistar International 7000 series captured in Iraq)

 

Ballistic Missiles (1)

• 1 R-17 ''Scud-B'': (1, not operational)
   

Anti-aircraft guns (100)

• 29 14.5mm KPV: (1)(2)(3 and 4)(5)(6)(7)(8, 9, 10 and 11)(12)(13)(14)(15)(16)(17)(18)(19)(20)(21, 22 and 23)(24)(25)(26)(27)(28)(29)
• 1 14.5mm ZPU-1: (1)
• 5 14.5mm ZPU-2: (1)(2)(3)(4 and 5)
• 46 23mm ZU-23: (1)(2)(3)(4)(5 and 6)(7)(8)(9)(10)(11)(12)(13)(14)(15)(16)(17)(18)(19)(20)(21, 22 and 23)(24)(25)(26)(27)(28)(29)(30)(31)(32)(33)(34)(35)(36) (37)(38 and 39)(40)(41)(42)(43)(44)(45)(46)
• 1 37mm Type 65: (1)
• 18 57mm AZP S-60: (1 and 2)(3 and 4)(5)(6)(7)(8)(9)(10)(11)(12)(13)(14)(15)
• (16)(17)(18, mounted on a Navistar International 7000 series captured in Iraq)

 

Self-propelled anti-aircraft guns (2)

• 2 23mm ZSU-23-4: (1)(2)

 

MANPADS (7)

• 5 9K32 Strela-2 ''SA-7'': (1)(2)(3)(4)(5, last three transferred to Iraq)
• 1 FN-6: (1, transferred to Iraq)
• 1 HT-16PGJ: (1)

  

Static SAM systems (3)

• 3 S-125 Pechora ''SA-3'': (1)(2)(3, all operational when captured. Later abandoned)

 

Self-propelled SAM systems (1)

• 1 2K12 Kub ''SA-6'': (1, not operational. Associated missiles and radar not captured)

 

SAM missiles (14)

• 1 V-750: (1, for the S-75, not operational. Associated launch platform not captured)
• 13 V-600: (1, 2, 3 and 4)(5, 6, 7 and 8)(9, 10, 11 and 12)(13, for the S-125)

 

Radars (11)

• 1 P-12 ''Spoon Rest A'': (1)
• 1 P-14 ''Tall King'': (1)
• 2 P-15 ''Flat Face A'': (1)(2)
• 1 P-35/37 ''Bar Lock'': (1)
• 3 PRV-13 ''Odd Pair'': (1 and 2)(3)
• 1 RSP-7: (1)
• 1 SNR-125 ''Low Blow'': (1)
• 1 JY-27: (1)

Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) (1)

• 1 Phantom FC40: (1)

Aircraft (20)

• 3 L-39ZA Albatros: (1, a total of three reported) 
• 1 MiG-21M: (1, not operational)
• 8 MiG-21MF: (1, operational)(2, not operational)(3, not operational)(4, not operational)(5, 6 and 7, not operational)(8, not operational)
• 1 MiG-21bis: (1, operational)
• 7 MiG-21UM: (1, operational)(2, not operational)(3 and 4, not operational)(5, not operational)(6, not operational)(7, not operational)

Air-to-air missiles (14)

• 10 R-3S: (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 and 10, associated launch platforms not in use)
• 4 R-13M: (1, 2, 3 and 4, associated launch platforms not in use)

 
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This list only includes vehicles and equipment in service with the Yemeni Army before the Houthi takeover in Yemen in 2014/2015. Vehicles and equipment acquired and created during the ongoing conflict are not included in this list.

Because of the war currently raging in Yemen a lot of military equipment is being destroyed as well as acquired and created, meaning some entries listed here may soon no longer be appropriate. The goal of this list is to comprehensively catalogue the prewar Yemeni military as well as clarify what military equipment is currently available to Yemeni parties on the battlefield.

Transnistria, officially known as the Pridnestrovian Moldavian Republic (PMR), is a breakaway state in Eastern Europe that has remained in the shadows ever since its self-proclaimed independence as a Soviet republic in 1990 and subsequent violent breakaway from Moldova in 1992. Despite having ended armed conflict that same year, the situation in Transnistria remains extremely complicated, with the the breakaway state wishing to join Russia (which maintains a local peacekeeping mission) while continuing to remain heavily reliant on Moldova for exporting the limited produce its economy outputs. Nevertheless, Transnistria functions as a de-facto state with its own military and even air arm.

A remarkable development has been Transnistria's very own arms industry. This industry was highly active during the Moldovan Civil War, producing a variety of DIY weaponry including armoured personnel carriers (APCs) and multiple rocket launchers (MRLs) for use against the Moldovan Army. After the cessation of hostilities, the arms industry would play a vital role in upholding the operational status of the Transnistria's army, which has so far remained unable to replace its dated inventory of Soviet weaponry.

Nonetheless, a great deal has been done internally to remedy this situation, and it wasn't before long when Transnistria began producing its own armoured fighting vehicles to at least supplement the hodgepodge of vehicles currently available to its armed forces. While we already covered the BTRG-127 'Bumblebee' APC and Pribor-2 MRL in previous articles, today's vehicle is a welcome addition to this series by the virtue of its rarity and endearing looks.

Based on the elusive Soviet GT-MU multipurpose armoured vehicle, the 'Little Tank Buster That Could' combines the small size and agility of its host platform with a 73mm SPG-9 recoilless rifle (RCL). This in turn creates a platform ideally suited for fire support missions against vehicles, fortified structures and enemy troop concentrations and for laying ambushes against any unsuspecting foes. At least three of these vehicles participated in live-firing exercises along with T-64BV tanks, anti-tank guns and heavy mortars in November 2018, confirming their operational status.


The GT-MU's appearance in the world today is so rare that only few know about the existence of this elusive vehicle. It nonetheless served as the base platform for several types of highly specialized variants, including the SPR-1 mobile jammer. The SPR-1 is tasked with disabling mortar and artillery shells by jamming their proximity fuses, and entered service with the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Syria and East Germany in small quantities, with the latter acquiring just two. Well protected against small arms fire and shrapnel, the vehicle can also be notoriously difficult to spot when outfitted with camouflage netting.

How Transnistria came in the possession of its GT-MUs is a result of the composition of the Soviet 14th Army stationed in this part of Eastern Europe. When the Soviet Union dissolved, much of the personnel and their associated weaponry which once made up its military became subordinate to the newly established states they were located in. When Transnistria took over most of the weapon storage depots on the territory it controlled, it inherited large amounts of specialised vehicles while being left without any significant numbers of infantry fighting vehicles or (self-propelled) artillery.

In this way the Transnistrian Army suddenly became the owner of a large fleet of GT-MU multipurpose armoured vehicles with no apparent use for them. However, designed as a versatile platform from the onset, Transnistria set on to convert several vehicles to the role of command and observation vehicle for artillery and MRL units while others were employed as artillery tractors and now as improvised tank busters.


While the resulting vehicle is arguably less innovative than some of the other DIY projects churned out by Transnistria's defence industry, the armament of the tank buster is more than adequate to deal with the armour of the only plausible adversary Transnistria might find itself at odds with. As Moldova retired its tanks from active service years ago, the only true armour it can muster is the lightly armoured BMD-1 IFV, whose armour protection is insufficient to stop the 73mm HEAT projectiles of the SPG-9.

The 73mm SPG-9 installed on the hull top of the 'Little Tank Buster That Could' is operated by a single crewmember using one of two hatches on either side of the RCL, from where he can also load the SPG-9. In practice, a dedicated loader operating out of the infantry compartment would be required in order to sustain a reasonable fire rate. The infantry compartment itself has likely been modified to house a substantial amount of ammunition, ensuring the vehicle won't be left without a fighting chance on the battlefield.


Although certainly less capable than contemporary vehicles in the same class, the 'Little Tank Buster That Could' is nonetheless an interesting attempt at increasing Transnistria's firepower at little to no cost, a necessary measure for the self-proclaimed republic to maintain its status as a breakaway state.

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The Syrian Civil War has seen a range of major arms hauls by various parties as weapons depots get overrun and in many cases simply abandoned by retreating forces. The capture of Regiment 121, Brigade 93 and the Mahin arms depot have until now topped the list in terms of arms hauls: Regiment 121 provided the Islamic State with large numbers of field-guns and multiple rocket launchers (MRLs) while Brigade 93 saw the capture of at least thirty tanks and around a dozen howitzers. Mahin became notorious for providing its capturers (Jaish al-Islam and the Free Syrian Army) with hundreds of anti-tank guided missiles (ATGMs). For this reason, Mahin was seen as the largest and most important haul of arms during the now five-year long Civil War.

But that reputation appears to have been surpassed now that footage (WARNING: EXTREMELY GRAPHIC) showing the 20th of January capture of the Ayyash weapons depot by Islamic State forces in Deir ez-Zor has been released. The video, part of the series 'Support from God, and imminent victory' (Quran verse 61:13) is the fourth to have been released showing the Islamic State's operations in and around Deir ez-Zor. The contents of the weapon depot were supposedly removed before it was captured according to various pro-government sources. Now that the war reached its fifth year, this appears to be some language code for 'The weapon depots were completely overstocked, brace yourselves on every front'. And thus, no less than 2 million rounds of (small) arms ammunition, 9000 grenades and some hundred ATGMs were among the spoils of Ayyash, making the capture of this weapon depot the largest ever in Syria. A detailed list of captured ammunition, weaponry and vehicles can be seen below.

This is an approximate guess of the captured weapons and ammunition featured in the video and photo report of the Ayyash weapon depot, the real figures are believed to be much higher. The content of at least 2600 crates could not be identified.

Ammunition:

- 1,348,300 to 1,791,960 rounds of 7.62x39 and 7.62x54R ammunition.
- 17,140 rounds of 12.7mm ammunition.
- 158,996 rounds of 14.5mm ammunition.
- 119,768 rounds of 20mm ammunition.
- 450 rounds of 23mm ammunition.
- 223 rounds of 73mm ammunition.
- 72 rounds of 82mm ammunition.
- 2000 rounds of 85mm ammunition.
- 6 rounds of 107mm ammunition.
- 4 rounds of 120mm ammunition.
- 165 rounds of 120mm RAP ammunition.
- 576 rounds of 122mm ammunition.
- 1120 fuses for 122mm artillery rounds.
- 7 PG-2 rocket-propelled grenades.
- 10 PG-7 rocket-propelled grenades.
- 1 PG-7VL rocket-propelled grenade.
- 1 TBG-7V rocket-propelled grenade.
- 1 OG-7V rocket-propelled grenade.
- 2 PG-29V rocket-propelled grenades.
- 2 M-57 rocket-propelled grenades.
- 9025 grenades.
- 36 rifle grenades.
- 98 9M14M Malyutka ATGMs.
- 1 9M113M Konkurs ATGMs.
- 7 3M9 surface-to-air missiles.

Weaponry:

- 84 7.62mm AK(M)-47s.
- 5 7.62mm PKMs.
- 1 7.62mm RPD.
- 1 7.62mm SGM.
- 3 12.7mm DShKs.
- 11 14.5mm KPVs.
- 2 23mm ZU-23s.
- 1 RPG-2.
- 13 RPG-7s.
- 1 73mm 2A28 Grom semi-automatic gun.
- 1 106mm M40 recoilless rifle.
- 122 bayonets.
- 1 pistol.
- 1 flintlock.

Vehicles (derelict trucks not included):

- 1 T-55(A)MV.
- 2 T-55As.
- 5 BMP-1s.
- 1 ZSU-23.
- 1 BRDM-2.
- 1 BTR-152.
- 2 BREM-2 ARVs.
- 3 2P25 TEL.
- 1 SURN 1S19 radar.
- 6 ZiL-131.
- 3 GAZ-3308.
- 2 GAZ-66.
- 1 GAZ Sobol.
- 2 Tatra 148.
- 1 Tatra 815
- 1 UAZ-469
- 2 excavators.
- 1 Land Rover.
- 2 technicals.
- 3 trucks.
- 4 cars.

Figures released by the Islamic State:

- 400 killed or injured.
- 100 [pro-government militants] captured.
- 4 tanks captured.
- 10 BMPs captured.
- 3 guns captured.
- 350 tank shells captured.
- 7,000 shells and rockets captured.
- 30 rocket launchers captured.
- 100 anti-armor rockets captured.
- 410 anti-armor shells captured.
- 1,000s of hand grenades captured.
- Tons of various ammo captured.

Much of the captured ammunition was quickly taken away by trucks, presumably for distribution between the various fronts the Islamic State is fighting at. A part might also be held back for the upcoming battle for Raqqa, the capital of the Islamic State




Ayyash, located a mere ten kilometers north-west from Deir ez-Zor's city centre, was the scene of heavy fighting as fighters of the Islamic State pushed their way into the town and surrounding areas. Ayyash's perimeter was less well defended by troops not matching the performance of the soldiers stationed elsewhere in Deir ez-Zor, consisting of a mix of SyAA and NDF fighters along with personnel from the nearby surface-to-air missile site and detachments from the 104th Brigade of the Republican Guard. As the regime has to defend Deir ez-Zor with only a limited amount of personnel, it has been forced to spread its troops thinly along the perimeter, with the main bulk stationed near Deir ez-Zor's airbase, the city centre and surrounding hills. While this careful balancing of troops in Deir ez-Zor appears quite logical, it becomes less so when considering the fact that Ayyash is home to a weapons depot once built as a strategic reserve for a possible confrontation with Ba'athist Iraq, then the fourth largest army in the world. While the contents of the depot had partially been depleted in the defence of Deir ez-Zor, it was still massively overstocked with arms and ammunition.

Having so much ammunition and weaponry stationed so close to a fragile frontline is a sign of extremely incompetent military planning. This is especially true when considering the immensely large 137th Brigade's base located nearby has plenty of space to house tenfold the contents of Ayyash. This base is located much closer to the airbase and Deir ez-Zor's city centre and thus better capable of dividing the munitions between the defenders of Deir ez-Zor.

The fact that the contents of the weapons depot were left wholely intact both prior to and after the takeover (contents which could either have been destroyed beforehand or with artillery and airstrikes afterwards) indicates that the Syrian Arab Army is still incapable of dealing with such situations. While Russia claimed to have destroyed the 2K12 surface-to-air missile launchers after their capture, not targeting millions of small arms rounds and a hundred ATGMs remains a curious decision to say the least.




The largest stash of 9M14M Malyutka ATGMs at the Ayyash weapon depot, at least 90 of which are piled up here. A single 9M113M Konkurs missile was also captured.


The captured 2K12 surface-to-air missile battery, the second to have fallen in the hands of the Islamic State in the Deir ez-Zor area.


Heavy equipment now in the hands of the Islamic State: The T-55(A)MV is the second example to have been captured by fighters of the Islamic State in Deir ez-Zor. A limited number of T-55(A)MVs are believed to have been brought to Deir ez-Zor along with a small number of T-72 'Urals', T-72M1s and T-72AVs before the supply route was closed when IS captured the town of al-Sukhna on the 13th of May 2015. One of the two T-55s is one of several hundred examples upgraded by North Korea in the late 70s and early 80s and can be seen with a laser-range finder and 14.5mm heavy machine gun 'Made in DPRK'. As most of the 14.5mm KPV-equipped T-55s gradually lost their machine gun mount as this was deemed to be of more use mounted on technicals, this configuration has become a rare sight nowadays.

Interestingly, one of the BMP-1s sports Kontakt-1 explosive reactive armour (ERA) (presumably taken from a T-72AV) on its turret in a bid to enhance the poor armour protection of the vehicle. It is expected that vehicles such as the BRDM-2, BTR-152 and the two BREM-2s will be used as vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (VBIEDs), the Islamic State having no use for them in their originally intended role.


This article was written in collaboration with MENA_Conflict.

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Just over a year after capturing Deir ez-Zor's Ayyash weapon depot in the largest arms haul of the Syrian Civil War, the Islamic State has once again got its hands on massive quantities of ammunition captured from a storage depot in Deir ez-Zor.This arms hauljoins the list of other major instances where vast amounts of weaponry and munitions traded ownerssuch as thecapture of the aforementioned Ayyash weapon depot, Regiment 121, Brigade 93 and the Mahin arms depot, all but the last of which were at the hands of the Islamic State. Each of these depots provided its capturers with a wide array of weaponry, vehicles and ammunition that could immediately be used against their former owners, a major blow to other factions fighting for control over Syria.

A propaganda video released by the Islamic State, showing its fighters on the offensive in Deir ez-Zor, was the only footage released of the capture of the depot. The video, على أبواب الملاحم - 'At the Doors of Epics [Battles]', details the Islamic State's efforts towards splitting the regime-held territory in two, which they succeeded in doing so in February 2017. This means that the airbase and Brigade 137 are now completely isolated, further complicating efforts to supply both pockets and drastically increasing the vulnerability of the airbase. Despite the growing threat, it remains unlikely that the Islamic State will be able to capture either pocket before its demise as a conventional military force. However, the capture of significant quantities of ammunition, including up to three million rounds of small arms rounds will surely allow the Islamic State to prolong its fight for survival.

This is an estimate of the ammunition captured, the real figures are believed to be higher. The contents of at least 652 crates could not be identified. Small arms are not included in this list due to the small quantities captured.

Ammunition:

˜ 3,320,600 rounds of 7.62x39, 7.62x54R, 12.7mm and 14.5mm ammunition.
- 2,310 rounds of 85mm ammunition.
- 693 rounds of 100mm ammunition.
- 13 rounds of 125mm ammunition.
- 120 rounds of 120mm ammunition.
- 68 rounds of 122mm rocket ammunition.
- 15 TM-62 anti-tank mines.

Vehicles:

- 1 T-72M1 TURMS-T.
- 3 T-72M1s.
- 1 AMB-S.
- 1 Tatra 148.
- 1 UAZ-469.
- 5 cars.

Although assessing the exact contents of each spam can of small arms munition is impossible, by volume the total amount would equal roughly 3.32 million rounds of 7.62x39mm, or a slightly smaller numer distributed of larger calibres such as 12.7mm and 14.5mm. Regardless, truly a tremendous amount of small arms ammunition was captured indeed.


An immense quantity of 85mm UBR-365P AP rounds was also discovered in the arms depot. While certainly an impressive sight, these rounds are next to useless to the Islamic State. The 85mm D-44 anti-tank cannon currently is the only weapon in the Syrian arsenal capable of firing these rounds, but only a small number of these are active on the battlefield. In fact, the Islamic State is currently believed to be in the possession of just one!


At least 693 rounds of 100mm tank ammunition were also found stored in two seperate rooms. This quantity far exceeds the need of the Islamic State in the city of Deir ez-Zor as it only operates several T-55 tanks that use these shells here. It is thus extremely likely that at least a part was transported to Raqqa for further distribution among Islamic State units elsewhere.


Several Iranian ammunition crates dated the 5th of May 2015 were also encountered in one of the depots. These crates likely arrived onboard one of the SyAAF's Il-76 strategic airlifers that maintained the lifeline between Deir ez-Zor and other regime-held parts of Syria when it was still possible for these aircraft to land at the airbase. This has meanwhile become impossible due to the close proximity of Islamic State forces to the runway from the Eastern and Southern side, a fact that was made painfully clear by the destruction of two L-39s in their Hardened Aircraft Shelter (HAS).


Much of the ammunition was quickly loaded onto trucks and cars, and was likely distributed among Islamic State units located throughout Syria. The targeting of these stockpiles before would prevent this from happening, and limit the Islamic State's ability to continue replenishing its stocks. Nonetheless, such action has time and again not been undertaken by either the SyAAF or Russian Air Force, which combined with the lack of timely evacuation or sabotage of such depots by government forces in the first place has been a major boon to opposing parties during the Syrian War.


The Islamic State also captured two airdrops intended for government forces in the city, one of which was already (partially) emptied of its contents before the Islamic State got their hands on it. It is entirerly plausible that the ammunition from these crates was later encountered in one of the captured depots however. Several airdrops have so far ended up in the wrong hands after landing in Islamic State controlled territory, which includes the two pallets below.

While a less than ideal situation, these airdrops are meanwhile the only way to supply the city and its inhabitants after the complete encirclement of Deir ez-Zor in May 2015. Both the United Nations and Russian Air Force have actively participated in dropping humanitarian aid to the starving population living in government-held parts of the city, while Il-76s of the SyAAF are employed for the purpose of supplying weaponry, ammunition and fuel to the remaining regime forces held up in the besieged city.


In addition to capturing huge amounts of small arms ammunition, the offensive also provided the Islamic State with four more T-72M1s, including a single T-72M1 equipped with the Italian TURMS-T (Tank Universal Reconfiguration Modular System T-series) fire-control system, amounting the first T-72 TURMS-T to have been captured by the Islamic State.

Interestingly, two of the T-72M1s feature protective covers around their TPN-1-49 gunner sights, a modification that is slowly being applied across what remains of Syria's battered T-72 fleet. A single Czechoslovak AMB-S armoured utility vehicle was also captured, which will likely end up employed as a VBIED similar to the two BREM-2 armoured recovery vehicles captured near the Ayyash weapon depots.


This article was written in collaboration with MENA_Conflict.

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Cuba is well known for its former leader Fidel Castro, communism and its renowned cigars, exporting the latter two to numerous countries throughout the world. In contrast, its role as an arms exporter remains much more elusive. While Cuba has begun converting and manufacturing a wide range of arms-related equipment in recent years, this industry has so far mostly been serving the needs of Cuba's own Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias (FAR). The presence of Cuban 'David' infantry mobility vehicles (IMVs) in service with the Forças Armadas Angolanas is thus highly notable.

The strong relationship between Angola and Cuba, established during the former's freedom struggle against Portuguese colonial rule of the country, has had a significant influence on Angola and its armed forces, but was not known to have materialised in the delivery of military equipment to Angola over the past decades. The bond between the countries was once again reaffirmed by recent meetings of Angolan and Cuban officials, where ministers stated their willingness to continue and even strengthen cooperation in the military field. [1]

The David IMV was first spotted in service with the Angolan Army during the Southern African Development Community's (SADC) multinational exercise 'Vale do Keve 2014', where it carried out simulated missions alongside Namibian Casspir MRAP (Mine-Resistant Ambush Protected) vehicles. The David had been sighted in Cuba several years earlier, taking part in the 50th Anniversary of Playa Giron's Victory parade (as seen in the image below) in 2011 in commemoration of the failed Bay of Pigs Invasion of 1961.


Although sometimes designated as an MRAP, the David can best be classified as an infantry mobility vehicle (IMV). Owing to the Do-It-Yourself nature of the project, the vehicle represents an interesting mix of parts mostly cannibalised from different types of military vehicles. The chassis is that of a Soviet GAZ-66 truck, on which an armoured body was installed. Although the armour values of the vehicle are unknown, the all-round protection is likely sufficient against small-arms fire and explosive fragments.

The armament of the vehicle consists of a single 7.62mm PKT light machine gun taken from the turrets of BTR-60 APCs or BRDM-2 patrol cars that have been converted to serve in different roles, losing their turret in the process. These vehicles are also the source of the roof hatches, up to four of which are present on the David. Two variants are known to exist, one with no such hatches and one with four of them, which is the variant in service with Angola. Three viewing ports with associated firing ports (also taken from BTR-60s) are located on each side of the vehicle.


The David IMV, also known as 'Iguana' (for the lizards species native to Cuba), is a direct result of Cuba's inability to replace its dated inventory of mostly Soviet-made weaponry by acquiring more modern weaponry from abroad. The sheer build-up of the FAR that took place throughout much of the Cold War solely relied upon a mass influx of Soviet weapon systems provided free of charge, or in exchange for Cuban participation in a number of conflicts in Africa and the Middle East. Thus, unsurprisingly, Cuba was hit hard by the dissolution of the Soviet Union and lack of support of the Russian Federation that emerged from it.

With its traditional (and only) supplier of weaponry gone, the FAR now found itself forced to find an indigenous solution for the decreasing flow of spare parts and increasing obsolescence of its weapon systems, a situation which became increasingly evident throughout the 90s and early 2000s. Any solution had to be carried out within the technological capabilities of the Cuban industry and more importantly, within the limited budget available.

Prior to the production of the David IMV, Cuba already had limited experience in the manufacturing and conversion of several types of vehicles by replacing weaponry or adding additional armour for increased protection on the battlefield. At least some of these vehicles were subsequently used in Angola, where elements of the Cuban Army and Air Force were fighting in support of the MPLA against UNITA, the FNLA, the FLEC and the South African Defence Force (SADF) in the 1970s and 1980s.

While the Cuban contingent deployed to Angola mostly served as advisors or in counter-insurgency operations, they frequently engaged in direct combat with the SADF as well. Although often credited for defeating the SADF, causing the latter to pull out of the Angolan conflict and grant South West Africa independence (becoming Namibia in 1990), the Cubans suffered a string of defeats at the hands of the SADF. However, they ultimately convinced the SADF that this conflict could not be won without a significant increase in commitment and resources, thus essentially gaining the Cubans a political victory through their presence in Angola rather than a military one.


While the returning Cuban contingent was hailed as victorers over Apartheid South Africa, Cuba would soon find itself in major problems at home. Largely reliant on the Soviet Union for its trade, the dissolution of the Soviet Union had a devastating effect on the Cuban economy. The Cuban military was also hit hard, and was soon faced with a shortage of fuel and expensive spare parts. As a result, large numbers of armoured fighting vehicles and aircraft were put into storage and large naval vessels and submarines were laid off.

In more recent years several types of otherwise redundant vehicles and equipment were taken out of storage for conversion to new roles in an effort to increase the Cuban military's fighting capabilities, sometimes leading to dubious contraptions with little fighting value in case of war but also leading to more realistic projects such as the David IMV. Other examples of these conversions include the mating of surface-to-air (SAM) launchers onto the chassis of T-55 tanks, and the installment of anti-tank guns, anti-aircraft guns, and artillery on the chassis of BMP-1s, T-55s and even World War II-era T-34/85s.


While the prospect of more Cuban weaponry showing up in countries throughout the world is not very likely, the sighting of such an exotic vehicle in Africa once again shows the complexity of the international arms market, necessitating accurate analysis to keep track of the way armament proliferates. This particular vehicle serves as an excellent illustration of this fact, adding to an armed forces' arsenal of extremely diverse fighting vehicles, many of which originated from unconventional sources including even North Korea.

[1] Cuba and Angola will grow their military cooperation between the two armies https://www.armyrecognition.com/august_2011_news_defense_army_military_industry_uk/cuba_and_angola_will_grow_their_military_cooperation_between_the_two_armies_1009111.html

A video obtained by Jake Hanrahan and uploaded by VICE News on the 27th of April 2016 shows off spectacular footage taken by the headcam of an Islamic State fighter as he and his comrades fight their way to Peshmerga positions near Naweran while under heavy enemy fire. The attack, which took place North of Mosul, clearly shows the panic and chaos that occur while on the battlefield, a completely different picture from the one presented in the propaganda videos published by the Islamic State's media department, which almost exclusively shows well-trained and motivated fighters of the Islamic State defeating their opponents without any fear or regard to their own safety.

The footage offers a rare glimpse into the attacks that Peshmerga forces have been facing ever since the fall of Mosul to IS, but now from the perspective of the Islamic State. This video doesn't offer the whole story however, and because this attack has been documented extremely well by both the Islamic State and Peshmerga, we will attempt to break down the footage and images released by both parties and paint a clearer picture of this attack conducted by the Islamic State.

While VICE News was wrongly informed that the footage was taken in March 2016, the depicted offensive actually occurred several months earlier, on the 16th of December 2015 to be precise. But before going into detail about the actual battle itself, it is important to understand the background of similar Islamic State offensives involving the use of armoured fighting vehicles (AFVs) taking place around Mosul. Being the largest city captured by the Islamic State, Mosul served as the capital of Ninawa Wilayat (Governorate).


When it was overrun by the Islamic State, Mosul was overstocked with weaponry and vehicles intended for use with the Iraqi Army and Police, which left most of their equipment behind before fleeing the city. While large parts of this huge arsenal were quickly distributed over the various fronts the Islamic State was fighting on, including Syria, some of AFVs that remained behind would later form the core of the Islamic State's first armoured formations. Before the establishment of these formations, the use of AFVs by the Islamic State in Iraq was disorganised, and captured tanks would often be destroyed rather than operated simply because they weren't deemed to be of use in the lightning attacks conducted by the Islamic State in Iraq. For example, while the Islamic State would go on to capture several U.S. M1 Abrams tanks intact, they were all deliberately demolished instead of used.

While these armoured formations were in the process of being set up, many of the captured vehicles were sent to workshops in Mosul for conversion into weapons platforms adapted to the Islamic State's needs. Several of these vehicles had already been sighted prior to the offensive, including two contraptions based on the BTS-5B armoured recovery vehicle (ARV), an otherwise useless vehicle for the Islamic State. The vehicles used in the December attacks on Peshmerga positions likely came from the same workshops, and their DIY armour certainly has the same improvisational tone to it as that seen on earlier Islamic State AFVs.


Although details remain murky, at least three armoured formations are believed to have been set up in Mosul, comprising the 'al-Farouq Armoured Brigade', which can be further divided into the 1st, 2nd, 3rd and possibly more battalions, the 'Shield Battalion', which has most of its vehicles painted in black, and the 'Storming Battalion'. In addition to these three, a fourth formation called the 'Suicide Battalion' also operates a host of up-armoured vehicles as vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (VBIEDs). But contrary to regular VBIED attacks so often used by the Islamic State, the 'Suicide Battalion' usually accompanies either of the three armoured formations as they are sent to the battlefield. VBIEDs of the 'Suicide Battalion' are to clear the way for the following armoured formations and can be seen as the Islamic State's version of air support. During this attack, both the 'Storming Battalion' and the 'Suicide Battalion' took part.

Each battalion has its own seal. For example, the seal seen below is used by the 3rd al-Farouq Armoured Brigade. It reads: ولاية نينوى - الجند (?) لواء الفاروق المدرع الثالث - 'Wilayat Ninawa - Soldiers (?) - al-Farouq Armoured Brigade - 3rd'. The second part of the Shahada: محمد رسول الله - 'Muhammed is Allah's prophet' is seen on the right. This can sometimes be seen on Islamic State operated vehicles and is believed to be applied for decorative purposes only. While the seal is usually applied on vehicles in the form of a sticker, it is sometimes simply painted on vehicles, such as on this up-armoured M1114 (formerly) operated by the 'Storming Battalion'.


While the Islamic State has proved to be more than capable of handling armour in Syria, its use of armoured fighting vehicles in Iraq leaves much to desire. At the core of this failure to properly field AFVs are the armoured formations based in Mosul, which apparently feel so comfortable knowing that every loss can simply be replaced by just another vehicle originally captured at Mosul when the city was overrun, that it keeps sending its AFVs against well-fortified Peshmerga positions to little effect. The first recorded example of such a large scale attack occurred in January 2015 near Shekhan, when several M1114s, Badger ILAVs, a M1117 ASV and DIY AFVs took on a fortified Peshmerga position before getting obliterated. This loss did not deter the Islamic State from trying again however, as it would continue to send armoured formations to the frontline, resulting in the same outcome every time. As the Peshmerga holds the high ground, and has had nearly two years to fortify their postions, even well-coordinated attacks are unlikely to succeed here, especially after the Peshmerga took delivery of (MILAN) anti-tank guided missiles (ATGMs) delivered by Germany.

This leads us to the attack depicted in the video released by VICE News, one in the series that ended up resulting in high losses for the Islamic State (said to have included the death of seventy fighters alone) and literally no gains made. [1] Although the offensive resulted in failure, the Islamic State published the photos taken both before and during the offensive anyway. Ironically, these images were uploaded only after the TV channel Kurdistan24 had already shown the aftermath of the failed offensive, including the still burning remains of the Islamic State vehicles involved. The photo report released by the Islamic State a day later would show these exact same vehicles still in pristine condition just hours before the attack took place. Bad timing set aside, the photo report gives us a great insight into the development of the attack and even reveals some of the names of the fighters involved.

The footage released by VICE News starts at 0:46, when the cameraman (Abu Ridhwan) records the final words of a suicide bomber of the 'Suicide Battalion' before he will attempt to blow his vehicle up. He is accompanied by two younger fighters, which were not seen during the attack and likely didn't participate. Although the presence of a camera hints that this video was to be released by the media department of Wilayat Ninawa if the attack would have succeeded, the presence of two children next to the suicide bomber leave a rather awkward impression, and would likely not have made the final cut.


The next shot, starting at 1:11, shows the suicide bomber in his VBIED before speeding off to his target. In a bizarre farewell to his comrades once doesn't often get to see in Islamic State propaganda, he says his final words to Abu Ridhwan and sends his regards to his mother. Hidden under the plastic tarp is the load of explosives His up-armoured vehicle has been serialled '502', which is common practice with VBIEDs of the 'Suicide Battalion'.


It is believed that the 'Suicide Battalion' used a total of four VBIEDs during this offensive, another two of which can be seen below. The monstrosity on the left is clearly marked as a vehicle of the 'Suicide Battalion', carrying the serial '1000'. This truck is well-armoured, with thick panels installed on the front and side of the vehicle to protect its wheels. Its deadly payload, also covered by a plastic tarp, can be seen on the back of the vehicle, which has been 'camouflaged' by the addition of several tree branches. The black painted VBIED on the right received slat armour on the front of the vehicle in addition to plated armour elsewhere. Four headlights have been mounted somewhat clumsily on the front row of the slat armour. In fact, although attacking in broad daylight, almost all vehicles can be seen with headlights, likely because movement to the operational zone happens by night. An armoured bulldozer can be seen behind the two VBIEDs, which would also feature in the attack.


Next at 1:31 is the departure of Abu Ridhwan's up-armoured M1114, which has been converted to hold an armoured cabin over its original body. This cabin is large enough to hold three occupants, their weaponry and ammunition and a pintle-mounted machine gun. Two of such converted vehicles would take part in the attack. Although the other vehicle boasts a Chinese 12.7mm W85 heavy machine gun, the vehicle of Abu Ridhwan is not equipped with a heavy machine gun, and has to do with a German 7.62mm MG3, which is manned by Abu Hajaar, seen on the right in the image below. Abu Ridhwan's M1114 is crewed by a total of five people including: Khattab (driver), Abu Hajaar (MG3 gunner), Abu Abdullah (RPG gunner), Abu Ridhwan (commander, reloader and 7.62mm 'al-Quds' RPK gunner) and Walid (AKM gunner) occupying the front seat.

As an armoured panel blocks our view of the front seats, the faces of Khattab and Walid aren't seen throughout the video. Out of the three Islamic State fighters occupying the armoured cabin, only Abu Ridhwan appears to have any kind of combat experience. Both Abu Hajaar and Abu Abdullah's performance is rather unimpressive, and in a certain sense almost comedic.


The new cabin of the M1114 was well protected by its slat armour and additional metal plating in combined with the vehicle's original armour. To allow the cabin crew of three to sit during the ride to the battlefield, the cabin has been covered with foam and seatbelts were installed.


The other M1114 almost identical to that of Abu Ridhwan but armed with a Chinese 12.7mm W85. This vehicle is not armed with slat armour however, and relies on its orginal armour and the somewhat peculiar additional metal plating. An access panel has been carved out in the metal plating at the front of the vehicle, the purpose of which is unknown however.


At 1:43 Abu Ridhwan's GoPro records some of the unguided rockets that would be fired in advance of their attack. The impressive amount of 45 unguided rockets of indigenous design patterned after the ubiquitous Chinese 107mm rocket (albeit with less impressive accuracy and destruction power) supplemented by at least a single 120mm mortar would be used to pound Peshmerga positions.


1:52 begins with the 'Storming Battalion's' march to the combat zone. It is likely that all four VBIEDs had already made their way to their targets by this time, of which at least two were destroyed before reaching their targets. Abu Ridhwan's vehicle is encircled in the second image below.


Apart from the two converted M1114s, the 'Storming Battalion' used several other converted vehicles in this battle, including another M1114, one U.S. M1117 ASV, one up-armoured bulldozer equipped with a heavy machine gun cupola, one up-armoured behemoth with an armoured cabin and a heavy machine gun cupola and several technicals with various amounts of DIY armour equipped with a range of different guns.


The battalion first starts to take fire at 2:00, when an RPG shot bounces off the ground in front the other up-armoured M1114. Only seconds later, Abu Ridhwan optimistically begins to engage the entrenched Peshmerga with his 7.62mm al-Quds light machine gun from afar. After he's emptied his first magazine (and struggles to find a new one), Abu Hajaar then begins engaging the enemy with his 7.62mm MG3. This is where the first problems for the crew start to arise. As RPGs are designed to be operated right-handed, Abu Abdullah is standing on the right side of armoured cabin, with Abu Hajaar on the left and Abu Ridhwan in the back. Although Abu Hajaar's MG3 empties its shell casings to the bottom, Abu Abdullah complains of getting hit by these hot casings flying through the cabin. He attempts to warn Abu Hajaar of this effect, which can only be stopped if he ceases firing the MG3 or turns it sideways, after to which he can no longer aim.


As the vehicle is closing in on Peshermerga positions, Abu Ridhwan and Abu Hajaar begin to engage a position on their left side. Abu Hajaar's MG3 is leaning on a thin piece of metal of the front of the cabin, which due to the blocking unfolded bipod gives little support to the MG3. Unsurprisingly given the poor support of the gun and bad handling by Abu Hajaar, his MG3 then falls off the railing and begins firing into the plating just below, causing bullets to fly through the cabin. Abu Ridhwan and Abu Abdullah then begin screaming 'Abu Hajaar' again, who continues firing in the meantime.


This is also when we receive the first glimpse of Abu Abdullah's RPG-7, for which he used both 85mm PG-7V anti-tank grenades and 40mm OG-7V fragmentation grenades for use against personnel. Indeed, all occupants are extremely well armed and equipped, carrying several magazines and reloads each. Furthermore, plenty of food and water is stored in the vehicle.


The next shot at 2:30 shows the up-armoured behemoth and the other up-armoured M1114 that was nearly hit only a minute before. One RPG gunner stands in the armoured cabin of the truck to aim his next shot.


This is also when Abu Abdullah has just fired his first OG-7V and asks for a reload, but forgets to mention whether he wants an AP or fragmentation round next and then begins looking towards the enemy positions again. Abu Ridhwan randomly grabs a round and gives it to Abu Abdullah, which fails to notice a round is being handed to him, leading to further frustation from Abu Ridhwan.


Abu Abdullah then makes the crucial mistake of asking Abu Hajaar to cover him while reloading, which unsurprisingly leads to another stream of hot shell casings hitting Abu Abdullah, which then bursts into anger with Abu Hajaar for not looking out.


Sensing the impending danger of Abu Abdullah firing off an RPG grenade, Abu Ridhwan warns him to watch out, followed by an instruction to change his position not to allow the backblast to fly into the small compartment. While he does change his position, the adjustment is not enough and the subsequent backblast damages Abu Ridhwan's camera.


The next shot shows one of the other up-armoured M1114s having been hit, disabled and set on fire,Abu Hajaar then continues firing towards the enemy positions and manages to fire into the cabin for a second time.


A specially modified Zavasta M70 is then used to fire rifle grenades towards Peshermerga positions as the crew gets closer to their entrenched position. The first two rifle grenades are deemed to be too tight a fit by Abu Abdullah, a result of their crude DIY design, and while the third fits more readily, the slow fuse won't ignite. In the end, Abu Ridhwan attempts to light it again himself, but it seems doubtful the rifle grenade will have functioned properly.


In the theme of the 16th of December clearly not being Abu Hajaar's day, he almost gets hit by Abu Ridhwan's rifle grenade as he fires it towards the Peshmerga.


Abu Ridhwan and Abu Abdullah then have trouble agreeing on what RPG round to take, with Abu Abdullah insisting he needs a fragmentation round. Abu Ridhwan then gives him an AT round, which he attempts to launch with the safety cap still on. The vehicle has meanwhile stopped driving (possibly because Khattab the driver has been shot), providing an easy target for the Peshmerga forces.


Indeed, before having the chance to fire his RPG, the vehicle gets hit by (presumably) an RPG itself, and if the driver was still alive until this point, moments later he certainly is not. While escaping the vehicle through the back, a fourth person can be seen laying on the ground, likely Walid which sat next to Khattab. Abu Ridhwan continues firing on the Peshmerga with his al-Quds light machine gun, taking cover behind the now disabled M1114.


A disorganised retreat ensues. While Abu Abdullah and Abu Hajaar make their way across the open fields by rolling sideways through the dirt in order to maintain a low profile, Abu Ridhwan makes a run for it and is shot after stopping for a moment. The four remaining fighters attempt to return fire for a while, and Abu Abdullah is seen running back to the M1114 whilst firing at random in a suicidal last ditch effort to make something of the situation. Abu Ridhwan and Abu Hajaar continue retreating (this time adopting the sideways roll employed by his fellow fighters) but are ultimately killed nonetheless.


The footage shot by Kurdistan24 shows the aftermath of the attack, including much of the destroyed armour after having being towed closer to Peshmerga positions by an armoured bulldozer. First off is one of the VBIEDs, which has been disabled before being able to detonate its deadly load.


More interesting however is the vehicle parked behind this VBIED, as this up-armoured M1114 was in fact the vehicle of Abu Hajaar.


Also seen again is the armoured bulldozer, which apparently got stuck in the ditch that would have prevented vehicles of the Islamic State from ever reaching Peshmerga positions in the first place. The armoured cabin of the bulldozer appears to have been hit, after which the vehicle was rendered inoperable or simply abandoned by its operators.


Although not seen during the attack itself, the remains of a U.S. M1117 Armoured Security Vehicle (ASV) can also be seen. This vehicle, armed with a single 40mm Mk.19 grenade launcher and 12.7mm M2 Browning heavy machine gun, has been completely obliterated by Peshmerga fire or perhaps an airstrike, tearing the hull to shreds and leaving little more than a carcass behind.The remains of another unidentified vehicle can be seen shortly after.


Another truck-based behemoth used during the assault (visible in VICE's video at 2:31) can be seen below, carrying the serial number '201' and the seal of 'Storming Battalion'. Note the ladders mounted on the side of the vehicle, likely there for scaling the trenches or climbing up fortified Peshmerga positions.


In the end, the attack paints a clear picture of the result any poorly planned offensive against a dug in adversary will attain. No amount of DIY monstrosities or VBIEDs will make up for this strategic disadvantage, and the stumbling and fumbling of the unexperienced Islamic State fighters before their inevitable death should be a clear sign these tactics will accomplish little.

[1] ''Iraq Kurds repel major ISIS offensive''http://english.alarabiya.net/en/News/middle-east/2015/12/17/Iraq-Kurds-repel-major-ISIS-offensive.html

Recommended Articles

Armour in the Islamic State, the Story of 'The Workshop'
Armour in the Islamic State, the DIY works of Wilayat al-Khayr

Notes:

- Click on the equipment to get a picture of them in Cuban service.

- If several configurations of a vehicle with one designation are known, they are added as such.

Abbrevations:

- CBAF (Carro Blindado de Apoyo de Fuego) = Armoured Fire-Support Vehicle.

- CBE (Carro Blindado de Exploración) = Armoured Reconnaissance Vehicle.

- CBI (Carro Blindado de Infantería) = Armoured Infantry Vehicle.

- C-AP (Cañón Autopropulsado) = Self-propelled Artillery.

- C-AP-AT (Cañon Autopropulsado Anti-Tanque) = Self-propelled Anti-Tank Cannon.

- C-AP-MP (Cañon Autopropulsado Multipropósito) = Self-Propelled Artillery Multi-Purpose.

Copying the list, or certain edited photos in the list is strictly forbidden without naming Oryx Blog as the source.

Special thanks to Foro Militar General and Sahureka.

(Last updated on 22/08/2019)

Tanks

•  T-34/85 Obr. 1945 (Likely to have been decomissioned. Some used as platform for artillery)
•  T-55 (Some used as platform for SAMs) 
•  T-55A
•  T-55M 
•  T-55AM
•  T-62 Obr. 1967
•  T-62 Obr. 1972 
•  T-62M
•  IS-2M (Likely to have been decommissioned. One used as a diving attraction)
•  PT-76B (Likely to have been decommissioned. Some used as transporter-loader for the S-125 SAM)

 

Armoured Fighting Vehicles

•  BRDM-2 ''CBE-14.5''
•  BRDM-2 (Modified) ''CBE-14.5M''
•  BTR-100 ''CBAF-100'' Two configurations: (2)
•  BTR-115 ''CBAF-115''

 

Fast Attack Vehicles

• UAZ-469
• Fiero Twoconfigurations: (2)
• Paquito Three configurations: (2)(3)

Infantry Fighting Vehicles

•  BMP-1 (Some used as unarmed driver training 'tank')
•  BMP-1P
•  BMD-1 (One used as a diving attraction)
•  BTR-60-73M ''CBI-73M''

 

Armoured Personnel Carriers

•  BTR-152 Two configurations: (2)
•  BTR-50 
•  BTR-60P (Most converted to other roles. One used as a diving attraction)
•  BTR-60PB
•  BTR-70M

 

Infantry Mobility Vehicles

•  David ''Iguana'' Two configurations: (2) (Some exported to Angola)

 

Command Vehicles

•  R-145 ''BTR-R-145''
•  BTR-60PU-12 (Not yet seen)

Military Engineering Vehicles

•  BTS-4
•  PTS-M
•  T-62 Obr. 1967 CEV Two configurations: (2)
•  IMR (Not yet seen in original configuration. Several converted to a yet unknown role)

 

Tank Destroyers

•  SU-100 ''SAU-100'' (Likely to have been decomissioned. One used as a diving attraction)
•  2P32 'Falanga' (Likely to have been decomissioned. One used as a diving attraction)
•  9P133 'Malyutka' (Unknown if still serving in original role)
•  BTR-40 Jabali (Documented by a few sources, not yet seen)

Towed Artillery

•  57mm (ZiS-2) anti-tank gun M-1943
•  76mm (ZiS-3) anti-tank gun (Not yet seen)
•  85mm (D-44) anti-tank gun
•  100mm (BS-3) field gun M-1944 (Documented by a few sources, not yet seen)
•  100mm (T-12) anti-tank gun (Some mounted on BMPs)
•  122mm (A-19) field gun M1931/37 (Some mounted on trucks)
•  122mm (M-30) howitzer M-1938 (Some used as ceremonial guns)
•  122mm (D-30) howitzer 2A18 (Some mounted on trucks and BMPs)
•  130mm (M-46) field gun M-1954 (Some mounted on trucks and tanks)
•  152mm (ML-20) howitzer-gun M-1937 (Not yet seen in original configuration. Some mounted on tanks)
•  152mm (D-20) howitzer-gun M-1955 (Documented by a few sources, not yet seen)

 

Self-Propelled Artillery

•  100mm C-AP-BTR-100
•  100mm C-AP-T-100 Two configurations: (2)
•  100mm C-AP-BMP-100
•  120mm M-AP-BRDM-120 ''M-AP-CBE-120'' Two configurations: (2)
•  122mm 2S1 Gvozdika
•  122mm C-AP-T-122 Two configurations: (2)
•  122mm C-AP-BMP-122'
•  122mm OBÚS-AP Jupiter (?)
•  122mm C-AP Jupiter III
•  130mm C-AP-T-130
•  130mm Jupiter I Prototype: (1)
•  152mm 2S3 Akatsiya
•  152mm C-AP-T-152

Multiple Rocket Launchers

•  55mm MRG-1
•  57mm Canimar-57
•  122mm BM-21 Two configurations: (2) 
•  130mm RM-51 (Likely to have been decomissioned)
•  213mm RBU-6000 'Frontera'
•  240mm BM-24 (Likely to have been decomissioned)
•  Unknown MRL (1)
•  Unknown MRL (2)
•  Unknown MRL (3)

 

Towed Anti-Aircraft Guns

•  12.7mm DShK
•  12.7mm M-53
•  14.5mm ZPU-1
•  14.5mm ZPU-2 (Not yet seen)
•  14.5mm ZPU-4
•  23mm ZU-23
•  30mm Vz.53/59 (Likely to have been decomissioned)
•  37mm M-1939 (61-K)
•  57mm AZP S-60
•  100mm KS-19 (Some mounted on trucks as artillery. One used as a diving attraction)

 

Self-Propelled Anti-Aircraft Guns

•  23mm ZSU-23-4 (Can be armed with MANPADS) (Some equipped with PKT MGs for training purposes)
•  57mm ZSU-57-2
•  23mm BTR-152-23-2 ''BTR-152-ZU-23 or Yatare-23'' Two configurations: (2)
•  23mm BTR-60-23-2 ''BTR-60-ZU-23 or BTR-23''
•  30mm BTR-60-30-2 (Likely to have been decomissioned)
•  37mm BTR-60-37-2 ''Duplex-BTR-37'' Two configurations: (2)
•  57mm T-54-57-2 ''Duplex-T-57''
   

Self-Propelled SAM Systems

•  9K12 Kub
•  9K33 Osa (Some equipped with 4K33 Osa-M missiles)
•  9K31 Strela-1 (Not yet seen in original configuration) Someequipped with R-13M AAMs)
•  9K35 Strela-10 Two configurations: Some equipped with 9M31s, MANPADS R-13M and R-60MK AAMs)
•  Mobile S-75 on a T-55(A) Two configurations: (2)
•  Mobile S-125 on a T-55A Two configurations: (2)

 

Static SAM Systems

•  S-75 Dvina "SA-2" (Most mounted on tanks. Others sold to North Korea)
•  S-125 Pechora quadruple launcher "SA-3" (Most mounted on tanks. Others sold to North Korea)

 

Coastal Defence Systems

•  4K51 Rubezh
•  Bandera VI-M 'Remulgadas Two configurations: (2)

 

Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs)

•  Sterkh-BM (Documented by a few sources, not yet seen)
• Unknown UAV (1)

 

Radars

•  P-10 ''Knife Rest B'' (Documented by a few sources, not yet seen)
•  P-12 ''Spoon Rest A'' (For the S-75)
•  P-14 ''Tall King'' (Satellite imagery available)
•  P-18 ''Spoon Rest D''
•  P-19 "Flat Face B"
• Indigenous phased array antenna for P-19 ''Flat Face B'' (For the S-125) 
•  P-35/37 ''Bar Lock''
•  SNR-75 ''Fan Song'' (For the S-75) Two configurations: (2) (Most mounted on tanks or trailers)
•  SNR-125 ''Low Blow'' (For the S-125) Two configurations: (2) (Most mounted on tanks)
•  RSP-7
•  SURN 1S91 (For the 2K12 Kub)
•  PRV-9 ''Thin Skin'' (Documented by a few sources, not yet seen)
•  PRV-11 ''Side Net''
•  PRV-13 ''Odd Pair'' (Documented by a few sources, not yet seen)
•  SON-9A "Fire Can" (Not yet seen) 
•  58N7 "Back Trap" (Documented by a few sources, not yet seen)
•  R-410M ''Twin Plate'' troposcatter
•  Mys coastal radar
•  Mys coastal radar
• RPK-2 "Tobol" (For SPAAGs and 57mm AZP S-60)
•  Unknown radar (1)

Recommended Articles

Pre-war Yemeni fighting vehicles

This list only includes equipment confirmed to be in service with Houthi militants in Yemen or interdicted on the way to Yemen. The goal of this list is to comprehensively catalogue the current inventory of drones, rockets and missiles of the Houthi militants as well as clarify their origin.

Notes:

- If several configurations of a vehicle with one designation are known, they are added as such.

- When the origin of a piece of equipment is unknown, it is indicated as such.

(Click on the equipment to get a picture of them in Yemeni service.)

Surveillance Unmanned Aerial Vehicles

• Hudhud-1 (Origin unknown)
• Rased (Commercially obtainable Skywalker X8 UAV)
• Raqeep (U.S. Raven RQ-11 inherited from pre-war Yemeni Army stocks)
• Samad-1 (Supplied by Iran. Previously sighted in Iran. Also supplied to Hizbullah in Lebanon)

 

Loitering Munitions

• Qasef-1 (Supplied by Iran. Based on the Ababil-2T UAV. Similar type wassupplied to Hizbullah)
• Qasef-2K(Supplied by Iran. Based on the Ababil-2T UAV)
• Samad-2 ''UAV-X'' (Supplied by Iran) 
• Samad-3 (Supplied by Iran) 

 

Ballistic Missiles

• OTR-21 Tochka (Inventory likely depleted. Inherited from pre-war Yemeni Army stocks)
• R-17 Elbrus "Scud-B" (Most converted to Borkans. Inherited from pre-war Yemeni Army stocks)
• Hwasŏng-5/6 "Scud-B/C''(Most converted to Borkans. Inherited from pre-war Yemeni Army stocks) 
• Borkan-1 (Modified Scud/Hwasŏng missile inherited from pre-war Yemeni Army stocks) 
• Borkan-2(Modified Scud/Hwasŏng missile inherited from pre-war Yemeni Army stocks) 
• Borkan-H2 ([Components] supplied by Iran. Based on the Qiam ballistic missile)  
• Borkan-3([Components] supplied by Iran. Based on the Qiam ballistic missile)   
• Qaher-1 (Repurposed Soviet V-750 missile of S-75 SAM inherited from pre-war Yemeni Army stocks) 
• Qaher-M2 (Modified Soviet V-750 missile of S-75 SAM inherited from pre-war Yemeni Army stocks) 
• Badr-F (Origin unknown)

 

Cruise Missiles

• Quds (Supplied by Iran. Variant of the Soumar family of cruise missiles)

 

Multiple Rocket Launchers

• Al-Najim al-Thaqib 1 (Origin unknown. Superseded by the Badr-series of rockets) 
• Al-Najim al-Thaqib 2(Origin unknown. Superseded by the Badr-series of rockets)
• Al-Sarkha-1 (Documented by a few sources, not yet seen. Superseded by the Badr-series of rockets)
• Al-Sarkha-2 (Documented by a few sources, not yet seen. Superseded by the Badr-series of rockets)
• Al-Sarkha-3(Origin unknown. Superseded by the Badr-series of rockets)
• Badr-1 (Origin unknown) Three configurations: (1, truck-based)(2, truck-based)(3, underground)
• Badr-1P (Iranian Fajr-5B) (Mockup)
• Samood (Cannibalized 9M21 rocket of 9K52 Luna-M system inherited from pre-war Yemeni Army stocks)
• Zelzal-1 (Collective designation for IRAMs) Four configurations: (2)(3)(4)
• Zelzal-2 (Soviet S-24 air-launched rocket inherited from pre-war Yemeni Air Force stocks)
• Zelzal-3(Cannibalized 9M21 rocket of 9K52 Luna-M system inherited from pre-war Yemeni Army stocks)
• 107mm Type 63(Inherited from pre-war Yemeni Army stocks)
• 122mm Sakr '6' (Inherited from pre-war Yemeni Army stocks)
• 122mm Sakr '40' (Inventory likely depleted. Inherited from pre-war Yemeni Army stocks)
• 122mm BM-21 'Grad'(Inherited from pre-war Yemeni Army stocks)
• 122mm Grad single tube launcher(Converted from BM-21s inherited from pre-war Yemeni Army stocks)
• 122mm Grad dual tube launcher(Converted from BM-21s inherited from pre-war Yemeni Army stocks)
• 132mm M13 'Katyusha' (Inventory likely depleted. Inherited from pre-war Yemeni Army stocks)
• 220mm BM-27 'Uragan' (Inventory likely depleted. Inherited from pre-war Yemeni Army stocks)
• 220mm BM-27 on Star 1466 (Inventory likely depleted. Converted from BM-27s)
• 220mm Uragan single tube launcher (Inventory likely depleted. Converted from BM-27s)

 

Coastal Defence Missile Systems

• Al-Mandab-1 (Chinese C-801 AShM inherited from pre-war Yemeni Navy stocks)

Anti-Tank Guided Missiles

• 9M14 Malyutka (Inherited from pre-war Yemeni Army stocks)
• 9K111 Fagot (Inherited from pre-war Yemeni Army stocks)
• 9K115 Metis (Inherited from pre-war Yemeni Army stocks)
• 9M133 Kornet(Supplied by Iran. Several interdicted by Coalition forces on the way to Yemen)
• Towsan-1(Supplied by Iran. Several interdicted by Coalition forces on the way to Yemen)
• Dehlavieh(Supplied by Iran. Several interdicted by Coalition forces on the way to Yemen)
• Saeghe(Supplied by Iran)
• Toophan(Supplied by Iran. Several interdicted by Coalition forces on the way to Yemen)

 

Man-Portable Air-Defence Systems

• 9K32 Strela-2 (Inherited from pre-war Yemeni Army stocks)
• 9K338 Igla-S (Origin unknown. At least one captured from Houthi militants by Coalition forces)
• QW-1M (Supplied by Iran. Several interdicted on the way to Yemen. Also supplied to Hizbullah in Iraq)
• Iranian modified Strela-2 (Usage reported by USCENTCOM)

 

Surface-to-air missiles (SAMs)

• S-75 (Usage documented once. Most converted to Qahers. Inherited from pre-war Yemeni Air  stocks)
• 9K31 Strela-1 (Usage documented in early 2019. Inherited from pre-war Yemeni Army stocks)
• R-27T(AAM modified for SAM role. Inherited from pre-war Yemeni Air Force stocks)
• R-60M(AAM modified for SAM role. Inherited from pre-war Yemeni Air Force stocks)
• R-73(AAM modified for SAM role. Inherited from pre-war Yemeni Air Force stocks)
• Fater-1 (Soviet 9M336 missile of 2K12 Kub SAM system inherited from pre-war Yemeni Army stocks)
• Sayyad-2C (At least one interdicted by Saudi Arabia in early 2018 on the way to Yemen)

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Pre-war Yemeni fighting vehicles