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Hide and Peek, Syria's BRDM-2s

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By Stijn Mitzer and Joost Oliemans

The Boyevaya Razvedyvatelnaya Dozornaya Mashina, literally 'Combat Reconnaissance Patrol Vehicle', better known as BRDM, is an iconic vehicle that has largely been absent from the nearly seven-year long Syrian Civil War. While some analysts following the war continue to expect the BRDM to show up in large numbers at some point in the future, the fate of the vehicle had effectively been sealed after the Syrian Arab Army retired the majority of its BRDM-2s shortly before the start of the Syrian Revolution. Operating vast numbers of armoured fighting vehicles far more suitable for use in the Civil War that followed, only small numbers of BRDM-2s remained in use in recent years, most notably with the Russian Private Military Company 'Wagner' operating throughout Syria.

Despite the elusive nature of the vehicle during most of the Syrian Civil War, the BRDM-2 was one of the first armoured fighting vehicles (AFVs) encountered by protesters in the early stages of the revolution. The Syrian Police had previously received small numbers of BRDM-2s and BTR-152s from the Syrian Arab Army (SyAA), and modified some of these with additional armour and a distinct blue camouflage pattern while retaining the 14.5mm KPV and 7.62mm PKT machine guns. These BRDM-2s were deployed in the cities of Homs and Idlib during the early stages of the revolution, resulting in the capture and destruction of several vehicles.

Sporadic sightings of the BRDM-2 in use with the Syrian Arab Army continued in the period that followed, eventually dwindling down to the almost complete dissapearance of the vehicle on the Syrian battlefield. Several BRDM-2s could however seen in footage of captured SyAA bases, where some were used as static pillboxes by the defenders or simply left abandoned in various corners of the base. Repairing these vehicles, almost all suffering from flat tires, was apparently not worth the effort in the eyes of many of their capturers, and most were left to rot in place.

Dedicated variants of the BRDM-2 were slightly better off than the original vehicle they were based on, as the majority of these dedicated vehicles, including BRDM-2RKh radiological-chemical reconnaissance vehicles, 9P122 and 9P148 anti-tank guided missile carriers and 9K31 Strela-1 mobile SAM systems, were still in active service during the outbreak of the Civil War. Nonetheless, finding a use for these specialised variants in the Syrian Civil War proved challenging, and government forces only began to employ some of its BRDM-2 9P148 anti-tank guided missile (ATGM) vehicles against enemy hardened structures in 2014. This usage appeared to have been limited however to a few vehicles however, and most dedicated BRDM-2 variants remain in storage today.



Although the number of BRDMs delivered to Syria remains somewhat of a mystery, and like all deliveries of armoured fighting vehicles to Syria have been subject to high inflation, the amount is believed to be limited to a few hundred, including the various specialized variants delivered over the years. Attrition might not have spared the BRDM-2 as much as it did other vehicles in SyAA service, with only limited numbers still in active service in the late 2000s. Despite having entered service with several neighbouring countries, reports detailing the usage of earlier BRDM-1 variants by Syria are believed to be incorrect.

Syria first used its BRDM-2s and 9P122s ATGM carriers during the 1973 October War (known in Israel as the Yom Kippur War), facing off against the Israeli Army entrenched in the occupied Golan Heights. Several were lost or captured to the Israeli Defense Force, which eventually got hold of enough BRDM-2s and 9P122s to employ and modify these vehicles for their own use. Ironically, some of these BRDM-2s were then employed against their former owner in Lebanon during the 1982 war, which also saw the widespread usage of BRDM-2s by the SyAA and allied forces.

Having already occupied large parts of Lebanon by 1976, the BRDM-2 would eventually turn out to be better suited to the SyAA during its occupation of Lebanon than it did during the 1973 October War. Armed with large and small calibre machine guns and protected against rocks and small arms fire, the wheeled BRDM-2 lend itself well for armed patrols and other operations disfavouring the usage of heavier (tracked) vehicles. The BRDM-2 also lacked the aggressive looks tracked vehicles are often associated with in what was increasingly seen as a foreign meddling and occupation of a sovereign country. Unsurprisingly, Syria was eventually forced to withadraw from Lebanon in 2005 after the passing of the United Nations Resolution 1559, calling for free elections to be held and the withdraw of remaining foreign forces still present inside Lebanon



At the turn of the century, the useful career of most BRDM-2s had effectively ended. Lacking the modern sighting systems and heavier armament reconnaisance vehicles are nowadays associated with, the BRDM-2 was hopelessly outdated in for the original role it was designed for. While many African countries continue to operate the BRDM-2 as a light armoured fighting vehicle, the usefullness of such a vehicle against Israel, undoubtedly the only possible enemy for Syria till the start of the Civil War, was deemed very low. Unsurprisingly, most vehicles that remained in service were retired by the SyAA's mechanized units that continued to operate the type.

However, the fate of a limited number of vehicles would eventually be ressurected by after being transferred to the police along with even older BTR-152 armoured personnel carriers (APC). While the BRDM-2 has the potential to be quite effective in this role, and was modified by several police forces around the world as succesfull anti-riot vehicle, Syrian modifications quickly proved to be entirely inadequete as peaceful protests quickly turned into a Civil War that still spans on today. Completely inadequate for peaceful riot control with its heavy armament, and often resorting to the use of its machine guns, the remaining vehicles were withdrawn after miltary forces took over the remaining operations of police forces. The plaquette on the side of the BRDM-2 reads: قوات حفظ الأمن والنظام - 'Forces of maintaining of order and security'.


With the Syrian Arab Army now in control of quelling the revolution, still often contained in large cities such as Homs, the presence of heavier armoured fighting vehicles on the frontlines increased, including several BRDM-2s mostly placed at checkpoints around rebel hotspots. However, being prepared against to fight a conventional war with Israel, and proving completely inapt at adapting to the rapidly changing battlefield in Syria, the SyAA's tanks did little to reinforce the government's rule in urban centers. With the fighting expanding to much of Syria, so did the intensity of the conflict. Rebel groups, now armed with ATGMs and RPGs captured from SyAA stocks or received from abroad, wrecked havoc on SyAA armour.

While armour losses of the Syrian Arab Army increased to numbers far surpassing the fleet of tanks operated by most countries in the world, the SyAA, being prepared to fight a conventional ground war against Israel, could still rely on large numbers of armoured fighting vehicles to replace its huge losses for much of the war. The fact that large numbers of T-62Ms and other AFVs to replenish some of the SyAA's lost inventory only began to arrive by early 2017 is a testimony to Syria's well-stocked armories.

This however also meant that there was no real reason to reactive and employ lightly armed and lightly armoured AFVs like the BTR-60 and BRDM-2 that had been rotting away on SyAA bases since years. Often still armoured with a 14.5mm heavy machine gun and providing protection against small arms at best, some BRDM-2s were instead employed as static pillboxes by (besieged) army bases facing to be overrun. Several of these were then captured after the fall of these bases, most notably by the Islamic State during its conquest of SyAA military garrisons in 2014, such as the derelict BRDM-2RKh captured at Raqqa's Division 17 and another regular BRDM-2 near Deir ez-Zor.




Fearing better slightly better than the regular BRDM-2 was the SyAA's fleet of anti-tank guided missile (ATGM) carriers based on the ubiquitous BRDM-2 chassis, which due to the heavy profileration and usage of ATGMs in the Syrian Civil War could have ended up as a force multiplier during the many government offensives throughout Syria. Although orginally designed to be used against AFVs, ATGMs have seen widespread usage as a precision weapons against hardened structures such as defensive emplacements in buildings.

While unable to set up positions in stealthy locations like a regular ATGM launcher can, the major advantage of the BRDM-2 based ATGM carriers is ability to fire five or six ATGMs (depending on the type of vehicle) before having to reload all while the crew remains in cover inside the vehicle. This ability could have been of great benefit regime's push through Islamic State-territory in Syria's desert region, where the Islamic State made heavy use of both non-armoured and armoured vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (VBIEDs). Several of these managed to succesully sneak up on SyAA positions and troop concentrations, which could likely have been prevented by a mobile BRDM-2 based ATGM carrier in overwatch position.



Having received both the 9P122 and the more modern 9P148 ATGM launchers, it can be argued that only the 9P148 still has capabilities of use in a modern conflict. The 9P148 can fire both the 9M113 'Konkurs' and the older 9M111 'Fagot' and is a considerable improvement over the older 9P122, still firing the older generation Malyutka ATGM. Although small numbers of the 9P148 were employed during the Civil War and are still believed to see limited service, all 9P122s remain in long-term storage. In their intended role of striking Israeli Merkava tanks on the Golan Heights, the 9P122 and its Malyutka ATGMs would not have feared well anyway.

Although most 9P122s remain hidden from sight sitting in SyAA army bases, several would be captured by over the course of the Syrian Civil War, most notably a total of seven 9P122s captured in the Artillery Academy during the rebel's attempt to lift the siege on Aleppo, which they succeeded in early August. Despite their repeated attempts at maintaing a life line vital to rebel-held Aleppo, renewed regime offensives reinistated the siege in early September 2016 while taking control of the whole city several months later in December 2016.

Interestingly, only the Islamic State would attempt to make use of its captured 9P122s. However, instead of employing the vehicle in its intended role, it is likely that the Islamic State converted these vehicles either to an APC or a VBIED before 9P122 '100' and '106' were captured by regime forces near Ayyash, Deir ez-Zor. Both 9P122s captured had black square markings reading: الدولة الإسلامية - 'Islamic State', جيش الخلافة - 'The Caliphate Army' (Jaish al-Khilafa), indicating the vehicle had been overhauled by the Islamic State's 'The Workshop' armour repair center or one if its satellite workshops. As each vehicle category received its own first digit, the capture of 9P122 '106' indicates that at least six BRDM-2, its derivatives or other wheeled AFVs were overhauled by 'The Workshop'.




A similar fate of most other 9P1222s was also bestowed on the 9K31 Strela-1, a short-range surface-to-air missile (SAM) system based on the chassis of the BRDM-2. In essence providing the same capabilities as an older generation MANPADS on a mobile platform with four missiles, the 9K31 Strela-1 would likely have been completely outmatched by current countermeasures against IR-missiles in today's conflict. Having received more modern Pantsir-S, Buk M2 and upgraded S-125s (Pechora-2M), themselves already outmatched by the Israeli Air Force, Syria appears to have retired most of its its 9K31 Strela-1s in the late 2000s or early 2010s.


While most dedicated variants of the BRDM-2 continue to remain in storage, the occassional appearance of BRDM-2s continues until this day, yet almost always of a single vehicle in use by either the government-linked forces or one of the factions fighting against it. Tellingly, most of these sightings were of BRDM-2s operated by factions fighting against the Syrian regime and its allies, most notably by the Islamic State, which used several BRDM-2s during its operations against the isolated Syrian Arab Army bases in Northern Syria. It appears that most active BRDM-2s operating on the side of the government were reactived on the initative of the unit operating them, and not as part of a wider programme to reactive a larger portion of the BRDM-2 fleet in one of the regime's armour repair workshops.

On the other end of the spectrum, factions like the YPG relied on reactivating vehicles like the BRDM-2 to give its forces at least some form of armoured support. Historically being the least rich in armour of all major factions fighting for control over Syria, the YPG made use of any vehicle they could get their hands on in order to supplement their hodgepodge of DIY armoured tractors and other monstrosities. This led the YPG to reactive several BRDM-2s along with BTR-60s previously abandoned by regime forces or other factions throughout Northern Syria.


More recent sighting included one BRDM-2 formerly operated by Jaish al-Islam in Eastern Qalamoun before being handed over to regime forces intact along with roughly 40 tanks and AFVs in April 2018. Interestingly, although having established its own air force during the initial stages of the war, operating several 9K33 Osa SAM systems in Eastern Ghouta, having collected the largest concentrated force of armour in Syria and being in the possession of more than twenty Iranian Zelzal-2 'Maysalun' artillery rockets with a range over 200km, Jaish al-Islam never used its assets to their full potential. Instead, Jaish al-Islam appeared to have used its captured equipment mainly as a deterrent rather than utilising their full potential in the Civil War, ultimately failing to reap the benefits of both. While several of the tanks handed over to regime forces by Jaish al-Islam were later seen taking part in the Daraa offensive several months after being handed over to them, it remains unknown if the BRDM-2 will see any future use as well.




Other users that actually intended on deploying its BRDM-2s to the battlefield would also modify their vehicles, mainly seeking to increase the protection of the vulnerable wheels to enemy small arms fire similar to the modifications applied to the BRDM-2s operated by the Syrian police. These often relatively simple modifications would do little to protect the vehicle against anything other than bullets, but this was likely considered adequate for the limited roles the BRDM-2 would often be tasked with.

Typical modifications applied to such BRDM-2s can be seen below, vehicle) heading off to a VBIED attack. The text bar reads: انطلاق الأخ الاستشهادي أبو البراء الحلبي -تقبله الله - نحو مرتدي الأكراد جنوبي جبل عبدالعزيز -''Martyrdom-seeking brother Abu al-Baraa' al-Halabi -may Allah accept him - moving towards the apostate Kurds south of Abdulaziz Mountain.'' While slat armour would have significantly increased the vehicle's chances against rocket propelled grenades (RPGs), this was likely deemed not worth the effort by its operators. Indeed, only a relatively small amount of AFVs have received this form of armour protection throughout the Syrian Civil War, most notably the AFVs operated by the 4th Armoured Division.



Relatively few BRDM-2s received increased armour protection offering at least a chance against heavier weaponry such as RPGs and ATGMs, which would otherwise go right through the armour of a BRDM-2. One such example in Daraa can be seen below, where this particular vehicle was captured by the regime forces. This particular vehicle was modified with a new turret extension on top of the BRDM-2's already existing turret and armour plates presumably filled with rocks or sandbags bolted onto the side of the vehicle for increased armour protection.

Another example operated by the Islamic State spotted an armoured shell neatly fitted around the BRDM-2's body, including coverage of the turret. Although the armour was presumably quite time-consuming to produce and install on the BRDM-2, the vehicle would ultimately be expended as a VBIED in Syria's central Homs Governorate. The text bar reads: عربة الأخ أبو مصعب (تقبله الله) المفخخة -''The bomb vehicle of brother Abu Musab, may Allah accept him.''



Not all AFVs captured on the battlefield are completely salvageable however. A damaged turret or a lack of traditional means to replace defective parts can result in a tank that is still able to either drive or shoot, yet is completely useless in its intended role due to its defective armament or engine. While in Syria this more than often means that the AFV will be written off, the YPG generally refuses to let these scarce armoured platforms go to waste, and DIY AFVs on the basis of another AFV are a common sight. In true YPG fashion, at least one BRDM-2 was used as the basis for a new AFV and extensively rebuilt. Although clearly based on the BRDM-2, its reincarnation differs from the original vehicle in almost every aspect.

Most YPG conversions would be more conventional however. The first upgrade consists of armour plates fitted around the wheels, which appear to vary between each vehicle modified vehicle, likely indicating that each BRDM-2 was upgraded by a different armour repair workshop. This vehicle also had a new muzzle brake installed on its 14.5mm KPV. Another BRDM-2 had its turret replaced by one more reminiscent of the one installed on the M1114 Humvee while retaining its 14.5mm KPV. Additional armour protection and a desert camouflage pattern completes the upgrade.




The most intensive upgrades performed on BRDM-2s in Syria would however not be done by any local faction, but instead by the Russian private military company Wagner. Although supposedly a private military company, Wagner has acted as the Russian Ministry of Defense's unofficial comventional force on the ground, and has received extensive support from the official Russian military in Syria. In turn, it has played crucial roles during several regime offensives, acting as shock troops and doing much of the fighting, only to disappear again when cameras in the newly conquered areas start rolling.

Although the origin of Wagner's BRDM-2s is unknown, it is possible that they came from SyAA stocks and were modified by their new operators in Syria, or that they were simply acquired from Russian Army stocks and modified in Russia. Three variants are known so far, with several subvariants each, which have showed up in most corners of Syria, including Aleppo, Tadmur and Deir ez-Zor, where at least one was destroyed by the Islamic State. Also note the camera-shy Wagner soldiers in the image below.

The first conversion included the removal of the BRDM-2's turret and a remotely controlled 23mm ZU-23 was installed instead, for which a camera was placed on top of the ZU-23. To allow the vehicle to fire for longer periods of time before reloading, larger magazines were installed, likely allowing for more the double of ammunition for roughly 100 rounds per gun (although not all BRDM-2s with ZU-23s appear to use such magazines). The vehicle is also protected by newly installed slat armour around the body and turret. The wide gap between the slat armour and vehicle also allows for the fitting of numerous sandbags, further increasing the chance to deform incoming warheads.



Another version had its 14.5mm KPV turret replaced by a homegrown replacement ne containing a 12.7mm NSV and 30mm AGS-17 automatic grenade launcher. This vehicle is also equipped with slat armour, albeit installed slightly different than on the example seen above.



Another modification fielded looks much like the previous variant, but features some small differences. Most notably, it doesn't feature an enclosed turret, with an open cupola housing the main armament instead, which however remains unchanged from the variant with an enclosed turret. The vehicle, along with most other Wagner BRDM-2s, also comes with a camera installed on the front of the vehicle, which provides the driver with an increased field of viewas his view is largely obstructed by the newly installed slat armour bars.





The overhaul of these BRDM-2s turn an otherwise mediocre armoured fighting vehicle into a potent AFV well-suited to travel and patrol Syria's desert regions. It depends on the willingness of the Syrian Arab Army and its allies to make such modifications themselves, and that decision will have a large impact on the BRDM-2's future in Syria.



The BRDM-2, despite its numerous weaknesses, can still turn out to be valuable asset in the Syrian Civil War: upgrading them along the lines of Wagner's upgrades will turn them into effective patrol vehicles and fire-support vehicles. As the Syrian government is slowly mopping up what's left of the rebel presence inside Syria and its neighbourhoods, it will undoubtedly set it eyes on territories not yet under its control. Future operations undertaken will likely continue to see the involvement of vehicles once presumed to have found their final resting place that are now being refurbished to fight once more.

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Dear reader,

You are sure to have noticed a lack of content this past year. This is because we were fully committed to finishing our book on the North Korean military by the title of The Armed Forces of North Korea, on the path of Songun, which deprived us of most of the time normally spent on writing articles for Oryx Blog. Regular posting is expected to resume this month. We thank you for your patience, and look forward to finally releasing the culmination of years of extensive study of the DPRK and its armed forces.

Kind regards,

Stijn Mitzer and Joost Oliemans

''North Korea’s Armed Forces: On the path of Songun seeks to bring order and coherence to the chaotic state of affairs in the intelligence community of North Korea-watchers, as well as to disprove the much-echoed stance that there is little to fear from the DPRK by providing information on a plethora of never-before described weapons systems and modernisation programmes.

North Korea’s Armed Forces maps the most important events from the inconclusive ceasefire struck at the end of the Korean War, throughout the Cold War until modern day, and an especially heavy emphasis is placed on the current status of the Korean People's Army branches by examining their wealth of indigenously designed weaponry. In the course of the book not only will many of the Korean People's Army’s projects and tactics be unveiled, but also new light will be shed on the deadly flare-ups between the North and the South, and novel evidence on tragic incidents such as the Cheonan sinking and Yeongpyeong bombing of 2010 is brought forth. Moreover, an up-to-date, comprehensive listing of the equipment holdings of several branches of the Korean People's Army is included, offering a numerical assessment of its naval and aerial capabilities. From the recently introduced stealth missile boats, ballistic missile submarines and main battle tank families to their often-ignored indigenous aircraft industry, virtually all indigenous weapons systems are discussed extensively.

This exclusive content is illustrated by over seventy detailed color artworks and various maps put together through exhaustive research and analysis, as well as around 170 unique images, many of which have never before been seen by the general public. Through scrutiny of satellite footage, the observation of North Korean propaganda outlets and by carefully examining information from the United States Department of Defense, the DPRK's advances in each of the Korean People's Army's respective branches are uncovered. Nearly all of the ’hermit kingdom’s’ military exploits are included and an accurate picture of the North's capabilities in both symmetrical and asymmetrical warfare is provided. This book was written specifically for anyone interested in North Korea's military capabilities or looking to find answers to many questions raised by the minefield of contradictory statements and misinformation that make up current intelligence about this reclusive nation.''

Flying under the radar, Syria's 'Special Purpose' Mi-17s

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The Syrian Arab Air Force's Hip fleet is perhaps best known for its leading role in the indiscriminate bombing of civilian areas across Syria with what have popularly become known as barrel bombs, an act that has defined the usage of aerial assets during the Syrian Civil War. While the role of makeshift bomber currently remains one of the main tasks of Syria's Mi-8/17s, other roles the Hip fleet has carried out during the past six years of brutal war have been largely underreported.

Perhaps the most significant role of the Hip fleet is that it represented a lifeline between regime-held Syria and besieged army garrisons across Syria, which had been completely cut off by road for sometimes up to several years. The Mi-8/17s could, contrary to transport aircraft, land to bring in reinforcements or transport the wounded to hospitals. Indeed, the city of Deir ez-Zor was at one time completely dependant on Syria's fleet of Hips for bringing in reinforcements and evacuation of the wounded and civilians.

In addition to its role as a transport helicopter and makeshift bomber, several of Syria's Hips have been upgraded for tasks that remain largely unknown to the general public. While it is unclear if some of these helicopters continue to see service in their new configuration, it is certain that they represent an interesting albeit underreported chapter of the Syrian Arab Air Force (SyAAF), which will be the subject of this article.

Before going into detail on Syria's upgraded Mi-17s, it is of interest to mention that the first 'Special Purpose' Hips had already arrived in Syria in the early 1980s, shortly after the conclusion of the main phase of the 1982 Lebanon War. The SyAAF and Syrian Arab Air Defence Force (SyAADF) had suffered severe losses to the Israeli Air Force during aerial combat over the skies above Lebanon, where Israel fully exploited its superiority in electronic warfare. Unable to respond in a similar fashion with any of the equipment Syria then operated, Hafez al-Assad turned to the Soviet Union for assistance.

Eager to test its Mi-8 electronic warfare variants, the Soviet Union subsequently deployed up to eight Mi-8PPAs, Mi-8MTP/Us and Mi-8SMVs to Syria, where they were based at T4 airbase with regular detachments to Mezze airbase, located closer to the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights. These helicopters were tasked with jamming the guidance radars of enemy surface-to-air missile systems (SAMs), and might have been pitted against Israeli MIM-23 'Hawk' SAM sites during peacetime before they returned to the Soviet Union at the end of the eighties, ultimately ending up in a helicopter boneyard.



Back to Syria, where the vast majority of the SyAAF's Mi-8s and Mi-17s continue to operate in their original configuration, often with their rear doors removed to allow for easy loading and dropping of so-called barrel bombs (which by today's standards actually consist of more sophisticated designs that have little to do with barrels). The fact that several of the SyAAF's Hips had been upgraded was first hinted at shortly after the capture of Taftanaz airbase on the 11th of January 2013, resulting in the loss of more than a dozen Mi-8/17s and Mi-25s.

Taftanaz was the second heliport to be overrun by the rebels, following the capture of Marj as-Sultan heliport on the 25th of November 2012. Despite frantic efforts for a last ditch evacuation with some of the helicopters located here, the loss of Taftanaz represented the first major blow to the SyAAF, losing almost as many Mi-8/17s as there are operational airframes today.

Careful examination of the airframes captured here revealed the addition of an electro-optical system under the fuselage of one of the Mi-17s. Later footage from Taftanaz would also show a dismounted electro-optical system and its associated control panel. Another image taken in 2013 at Mezze airbase would also give us the first good view of the armoured panels protecting each side of the cockpit. Interestingly, this relatively simple addition aimed at increasing crew survival has only been applied to a small number of helicopters.

As these upgraded helicopters have only been sporadically sighted during more than six years of war, it is likely that only a few Mi-17s were upgraded to this new standard before the outbreak of the Civil War. Differentiating these upgraded Mi-17s from other non-upgraded Mi-17s helicopters remains difficult however, as is witnessed by this example. It might be easy to mistake this helicopter for one of the regular Mi-17s in use with the SyAAF's helicopter forces, but the hardly visible armoured panels on the cockpit and electro-optical turret serve to differentiate it as one of the upgraded examples.

While Syria's Mi-17 already come equipped with three hardpoints on either side of the fuselage, allowing for the installment of rocket pods, bombs or as in the case above, a 23mm UPK-23 gun pod, the addition of an electro-optical system would significantly increase the helicopter's capabilities in target acquisition and threat identification. In turn, the armoured panels installed around of the cockpit increase the survivability of the helicopter crew, a welcome addition to the anti-aircraft weapon rich environment of Syria.

It is highly likely that these upgrades were carried out by the SyAAF's overhaul and maintenance facility 'The Factory' at Neyrab/Aleppo IAP, which has also been responsible for the design and production of the indigenous chaff/flare launchers mounted on nearly all of the SyAAF's Mi-8s and Mi-17s. The electro-optical system seen in detail below and the armoured panels are believed to have been acquired from Iran, which has carried out similar upgrades on its helicopters.








Other specialised Mi-17s have been used for less lethal tasks, such as the transportation of very important persons (VIPs) across the war-thorn country. As movement from one side of Syria to the other by road has meanwhile become impossible or too time consuming to allow for rapid deployment across the country, Brigadier General Suheil 'The Tiger' al-Hassan has often made use of a Mi-17 configured as a VIP transport to allow him to swiftly cross long distances.

The SyAAF already operated several Mi-8Ps (identifiable by the rectangular/square windows instead of the round windows found on normal Mi-8/17s) for VIP transport, but had already retired these before the outbreak of the Syrian Civil War. President Bashar al-Assad makes use of two VIP helicopters of his own, which will be covered on this site in a later article alongside his other VIP aircraft.
 


While the tasks of the aforementioned helicopters are relatively straightforward, the SyAAF also operates at least two Mi-17s airborne jamming platforms for the jamming of enemy air defence radars. First seen during a large-scale Syrian Arab Air Force exercise in July 2012, the first type was seen equipped with two oddly shaped containers installed on either side of the fuselage. While the exact purpose of these containers remain unknown, it is now believed that they are part of the North Korean TACAN electronic jamming system installed onboard at least one SyAAF Mi-17.

The TACAN electronic jamming system was reportedly used against a Russian crewed SyAADF Pantsir-S1 self-propelled anti-aircraft system in a series of test taking place in early 2012. This test came after Syrian complaints regarding the Pantsir-S1's ability to cope with electronic countermeasures, which are heavily employed by the Israeli Air Force during their raids against Syrian military installations. While the Soviet Union's and Russia's standard response to criticism on its military hardware has been to blame the operators and not the quality of the hardware itself, the Russians suffered a serious blow when the TACAN electronic jamming system successfully managed to jam the Pantsir-S1 during the 2012 test. Despite the Pantsir-S1's supposed ability to deal with heavy electronic countermeasures, the Russian crew's efforts to evade the jamming were in vain.




Arguably the most interesting helicopter to serve in Syria is also the most mysterious; just one example is believed to have entered service with the SyAAF. This Mi-8MT (Russian military designation for the Mi-17)  '2981' was only seen once: General Ali Abdullah Ayyoub, the Chief of the General Staff of the Syrian Arab Army, examined it during a visit to Bley airbase in July 2015. The Mi-17 stands out because of its newly applied camouflage pattern, which has not been seen on any other Mi-8/17 in Syrian service. The green square on the right side of the fuselage would provide the first major clue to the origin and mision profile of the helicopter.

Mi-17  '2981' actually constitutes the SyAAF's sole Mi-8MTPR1 airborne jamming platform, delivered to Syria in 2013 as 'Mi-8MT with L187AE'. The Mi-8MTPR1 is equipped with the L187A Rychag-AV jammer for jamming air defence radars and is one of the most advanced Russian airborne jamming platforms on the market. However, with a future air war against Israel becoming increasingly unlikely, and of little use in a Civil War that has seen no real threat of jammable enemy air defence systems, the Mi-8MTPR1 has effectively been relegated to the status of white elephant in the SyAAF fleet.

As the Syrian Civil War has entered its seventh year, the SyAAF's Mi-8/17s Hip fleet remains at the forefront of the regime's aerial campaign against its opponents. While the effectiveness of these helicopters as makeshift bombers can be questioned, the Hip has once again proved to be the reliable workhorse it is well known for. Although the number of operational airframes continues to shrink through attrition, the adaptability and multifunctionality of the Mi-8/17 airframe ensures it will remain in use until the very end, undoubtedly even outlasting the Syrian War.

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Dear reader,

You are sure to have noticed a lack of content this past year. This is because we were fully committed to finishing our book on the North Korean military by the title of The Armed Forces of North Korea, on the path of Songun, which deprived us of most of the time normally spent on writing articles for Oryx Blog. Regular posting is expected to resume this month. We thank you for your patience, and look forward to finally releasing the culmination of years of extensive study of the DPRK and its armed forces.

Kind regards,

Stijn Mitzer and Joost Oliemans

''North Korea’s Armed Forces: On the path of Songun seeks to bring order and coherence to the chaotic state of affairs in the intelligence community of North Korea-watchers, as well as to disprove the much-echoed stance that there is little to fear from the DPRK by providing information on a plethora of never-before described weapons systems and modernisation programmes.

North Korea’s Armed Forces maps the most important events from the inconclusive ceasefire struck at the end of the Korean War, throughout the Cold War until modern day, and an especially heavy emphasis is placed on the current status of the Korean People's Army branches by examining their wealth of indigenously designed weaponry. In the course of the book not only will many of the Korean People's Army’s projects and tactics be unveiled, but also new light will be shed on the deadly flare-ups between the North and the South, and novel evidence on tragic incidents such as the Cheonan sinking and Yeongpyeong bombing of 2010 is brought forth. Moreover, an up-to-date, comprehensive listing of the equipment holdings of several branches of the Korean People's Army is included, offering a numerical assessment of its naval and aerial capabilities. From the recently introduced stealth missile boats, ballistic missile submarines and main battle tank families to their often-ignored indigenous aircraft industry, virtually all indigenous weapons systems are discussed extensively.

This exclusive content is illustrated by over seventy detailed color artworks and various maps put together through exhaustive research and analysis, as well as around 170 unique images, many of which have never before been seen by the general public. Through scrutiny of satellite footage, the observation of North Korean propaganda outlets and by carefully examining information from the United States Department of Defense, the DPRK's advances in each of the Korean People's Army's respective branches are uncovered. Nearly all of the ’hermit kingdom’s’ military exploits are included and an accurate picture of the North's capabilities in both symmetrical and asymmetrical warfare is provided. This book was written specifically for anyone interested in North Korea's military capabilities or looking to find answers to many questions raised by the minefield of contradictory statements and misinformation that make up current intelligence about this reclusive nation.''

North Korean Helical AK Magazines

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By Stijn Mitzer and Joost Oliemans 

Several new developments in North Korean armaments can be witnessed amongst the recent flow of propaganda released by Pyongyang after Kim Jong-un’s ascension to power.  One such development is what appears to be a new magazine model for the North Korean copy of the AK-74, the Type 88. This new magazine uses a staggered helix design, which allows for a high number of 5.45 x 39 mm cartridges to be carried without the notable increases in size and unwieldiness that characterise many other high capacity magazines. So far the only users of this helical magazine appear to be Kim Jong Un’s (and formerly Kim Jong Il’s) personal bodyguards. While in the picture above each bodyguard appears to be carrying only one magazine (which, given their high capacity, isn’t that surprising), other, earlier, footage shows a loadout of two spare magazines for each bodyguard, as seen below. The magazines appear to have been in service since 2010, and possibly earlier.

The North Korean Type 88 is usually seen issued with standard 30 round magazines and, aside from the standard wooden or synthetic fixed stock, a side-folding or top-folding stock (pictured). Two notable distinctions differentiate the North Korean helical design from other helical magazines that have been developed. First, and perhaps most obviously, this magazines was developed for a larger, more powerful rifle calibre than existing designs. Existing helical magazines have typically been developed for pistol calibre weapons, with designs having been produced in calibres such as 7.62 x 25, 9 x 17SR (.380 ACP), 9 x 18, and 9 x 19 mm. Secondly, whereas other helical magazines have typically been developed in conjunction with the firearms intended to make use of them, the recent North Korean example was instead produced for use with an existing weapon, appearing to make use of the bayonet lug for mounting. The top-folding stock, another North Korean innovation, allows the stock to be folded with the magazine inserted, which would not be possible with typical side-folding or under-folding AK stocks. Whilst there are persistent rumours of both Russian and Chinese developments of helical magazines for AK pattern weapons, no documentary evidence has emerged to date.

The nature of the post-production design and the inherent complexity of helical magazines (when compared to standard removable box magazines) suggest that while these magazines offer a greatly increased cartridge capacity, they may render the weapon more prone to malfunctions and misfires. It is unknown if similar magazines have been developed for other calibres, or to what extent the helical magazine has been integrated into the Korean People’s Army.

Magazine specifications:

The following specifications are estimated based upon measurements extrapolated from known dimensions, as well as a comparison with existing helical magazines. They represent the author’s ‘best guess’ at present. 

Calibre: 5.45 x 39 mm
Capacity: 100 to 150 cartridges
Weight: Approximately 2 kg
Length: Approximately 370 mm
Diameter: Approximately 85 mm



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North Korean Kh-35 anti-ship missiles shed light on a modernizing navy

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By Stijn Mitzer and Joost Oliemans

Even though a lot of categories of equipment of the Korean People's Army are known quite well due to satellite imagery and propaganda videos, the rare aspect of the Korean People's Navy (KPN) is often overlooked. Considering the scarcity of footage and high-quality satellite footage of KPN naval ships, this is hardly surprising. However, as is illustrated by the sheer amount of ships being produced over the years, the Korean People's Navy still does play an important role in the current day North Korean military.

The most recent developments of this secretive branch has been the introduction of so-called Surface Effect Ships (SES), stealth technology and even domestically produced Kh-35 missiles. The latter, a true game changer in the Korean peninsula, signifies the start of a new dawn for the Korean People's Navy.

 A North Korean Kh-35 launched from Surface Effect Ship. Note the 76mm OTO Melara copy in the lower left in the second shot.

The Korean People's Navy, commonly known to be solely operating ageing P-15 Termit (Styx), HY-2 (Sillkworm) and indigenous KN-01 anti-ship missiles, received two types of anti-ship missiles since the dissolution of the Soviet Union: Chinese made C-802s were supplied to North Korea from Iran in 1999 to help Iran producing this missile for its own navyand Kh-35s (also known as 3M-24) were received from Russia in the 90s.

The missile, the Korean designation of which is currently unknown, was also exported to Myanmar. Relations between North Korea and Myanmar reached a peak in the mid 2000s, and also seems to have led to the export of sophisticated weaponry to Myanmar. The Navy of Myanmar, along with other North Korean naval weaponry, installed the missiles on the frigate F11 Aung Zeya.

North Korean Kh-35 canisters aboard the F-11 Aung Zeya.

The import of Kh-35s was first unveiled in early 2012, when imagery of a North Korean SES was released as part of a military documentary, showing racks used to mount four Kh-35 canisters. The recent surfacing of imagery of the Myanmarian F11 Aung Zeya class frigate confirmed that the missiles are produced by North Korea and actively exported to friendly nations, along with other naval assets.

Originally developed by the Tactical Missiles Corporation, the North Korean missile differs in a few areas compared to the original Russian Kh-35. Most notably, the canisters have been extensively modified compared to the original Uran-E launcher. The number of mounts for the stowage of additional missiles has been increased to three and the canister has a much cleaner look compared to the Russian canister. It also appears the engine was modified, as is shown by the cone-shaped exhaust nozzle which appears to be unique to the North Korea design. Lastely North Korea appears to manufacture their own distinctly shaped mounting rack.


Kim Jong-un walking in front of a quadruple mounting rack on one of the Surface Effect Ships.


It is unknown if the indigenous Kh-35 constitutes an up- or downgrade over the original design. The
original Kh-35E is capable of destroying ships up to five-thousand tonnes at a maximum range of one hundred and thirty kilometres while under heavy electronic countermeasures. The missile enjoys a low signature due to its small size, sophisticated radar, sea-skimming capability and capability to resist the strongest of electronic countermeasures.

The indigenous Kh-35 missile, the Russian base variant of which is often regarded as the most cost-effective anti-ship missile in existence, is a huge improvement over other North Korean anti-ship missiles, and poses a massive threat to the navies of both South Korea and the United States due to its large range and countermeasure-defeating properties. While the measure to which it is deployed by the Korean People's Navy is as of yet unknown, the missile is likely used on a variety of newly produced naval platforms. This is certain to present a great challenge to opposing forces, and will definitely have serious implications on naval balance in the area.

Although it has only just been publicly confirmed the Kh-35 is in use by North Korea, their first usage by the DPRK dates back to the 90s, a testimony to the capability of the secretive state to keep prying eyes away from military projects.

The domestically produced Kh-35 is to form the spearhead of the Korean People's Navy striking power for years to come.

North Korean anti-tank missiles in the Middle East

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North Korea, well known for its ballistic missile programme, depends on its foreign relations to provide currency that allows the regime to maintain control over the country. Exports of ballistic missile and even nuclear technology to countries such as Egypt, Syria, Iran and Myanmar have been much reported and draw a lot of attention from international observers. However, aside from delivering both conventional and strategic weaponry to sovereign states around the world, it appears North Korean anti-tank guided missiles (ATGMs) are now also showing up in the hands of what have been branded as terrorist organizations by the USA, a development which shows a broadening involvement of the DPRK in the arms trafficking market.


Imagery of a fighter loyal to the Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades, the military wing of Hamas, shows him operating an indigenous variant of the 9K111 Fagot, designated the Bulsae-2 in North Korean service. The al-Qassam Brigades is likely to have received the missiles from North Korea via Iran through an elaborate network of smugglers and backdoor channels ranging from Sudan to the Gaza Strip. This likely happens in a similar fashion to how this is done with other transports: after delivery to Port Sudan, the weaponry is transported overland to the Gaza Strip via Egypt, as was supposed to be done with the the delivery onboard the Klos C, which was intercepted by the Israeli navy near the coast of Sudan in the Red Sea.

More launchers and missiles have popped up in the inventory of the Al-Nasser Salah al-Deen Brigades, which seceded from Hamas because of political differences. It is unknown whether other conventional armament was delivered alongside the ATGMs, but North Korea is also known as a major producer of MANPADS and rocket-propelled grenades, making it plausible some of these were exported as well.



To further support this theory: in December 2009, a North Korean arms shipment aboard an Ilyushin Il-76 cargo plane was discovered and seized by the Thai authorities immediately after landing in Bangkok. The cargo, which was marked as consisting of oil-drilling equipment, contained thirty-five tons worth of rockets, surface-to-air missiles (MANPADS), explosives, rocket-propelled grenades and other weaponry. Another similar shipment was impounded in the United Arab Emirates a few months earlier (July 2009). A large quantity of shipments to both Hamas and Hizbullah is believed to have been transferred unnoticed. With North Korea being a lead player in the arms trafficking business, ways of transport and smuggle routes are always evolving.


North Korea’s role is thus limited to being the manufacturer of the systems. Yet, even though both Iran and North Korea maintain the ‘don’t ask don’t tell’ policy, it can be assumed North Korea has full knowledge of the destination of the Bulsae-2s. But with North Korea’s sole interest in this deal being the money, that shouldn’t be a problem.

The 9M111 wire-guided missile uses semi-automatic command to line of sight (SACLOS) to make its way to the target and can penetrate up to 460mm of armour, depending on the variant and target. Upgraded variants, including the 9M113 missile used by the 9K111-1 Konkurs system, can also be fired by the same launcher (with the exception of the earliest variant), providing cross-platform compatibility for both the 9M111 and 9M113 missile series. The DPRK is known to have received the 9K111 system from the Soviet Union first in 1988, a deal which supposedly continued with the Russian Federation until 2010 and entailed the delivery of some 4500 systems. Due to the interchangeable nature of the missiles, it can’t be said for certain whether or not only the 9K111 Fagot or also the 9K111-1 Konkurs was delivered. However, there is no known Korean designation for the 9K111-1 Konkurs, and the Bulsae-3 is most likely an unrelated system.


The North Korean launchers differ in a few key areas. Most notably, the optics have been extensively modified. While the operator’s scope of the 9P135 (the lower scope in above picture) is similar to the operator’s scope on the Bulsae-2, the scope auto-tracking the missile (the upper scope in above picture) has been swapped for two separate smaller optics. The way this works is unknown, as is whether or not it constitutes an up- or downgrade over the original design. Lastely North Korea appears to manufacture their own distinctly shaped batteries, which likely does not affect the quality of the system.



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The 4th Armoured Division's armour upgrades: Products of a Four Year War

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By Stijn Mitzer and Joost Oliemans

Following local experiments with spaced and slat armour on T-72AVs and BMP-2s, the 4th Armoured Division initiated a small-scale upgrade programme for its armour in the summer of 2014. After upgrading several of its T-72M1s and bulldozers with additional armour, the 4th Armoured Division is now also operating at least one ZSU-23-4 self-propelled anti-aircraft gun (SPAAG) upgraded in the same fashion.

The goal of the upgrade programme was to increase the chances of survivability of armoured fighting vehicles by adding additional armour, which consists of spaced and slat armour, further reinforced by metal chaines. Altogether, it provides an impressive 360 degree coverage against regular RPGs.Heavier RPGs like the RPG-29, the M79 Osa or later generation RPG-7 warheads have less trouble penetrating such armour however.

The first vehicles upgraded as part of this programme were several T-72M1s, which were then deployed to Jobar in order to test the actual combat value of the new armour package. These first missions did not end well as one of the upgraded T-72M1s got stuck and was subsequently abandoned by its crew, while another was completely destroyed after entering Jobar: a tragic start for the ambitious programme.[1][2]

This however did not deter the 4th Armoured Division from pressing on with the upgrade programme, and several upgraded T-72M1s continued to join units in Jobar, Eastern Ghouta and even Aleppo in the months that followed. The factory responsible for the programme is located in Adra, north of Damascus.




A similar armour package, developed and produced by the same factory, was applied on bulldozers in use by the 4th Armoured Division.

The bulldozer earned its position in most of the offensives taking place in the neighbourhoods of Damascus and Eastern Ghouta where they're used to transport soldiers to the frontline, clear obstacles, raise sand barriers to cover infantry and tanks and clear suspected minefields. When they were still operating without these armour packages, they were an easy prey for the rebels' anti-tank teams, anti-materiel rifles and even machine gun fire, even when equipped with locally applied DIY armour.

Apart from small factory differences or minor field modifications, two variations are known to exist. These variations give a clear indication of how the designs and production of these armour packages have progressed over time.

The example below was active in Jobar, where it was mainly used to transport troops and clear minefields. It was destroyed in late December 2014 after being caught in the open by fighters of Failaq al-Rahman, also known as the Rahman corps, while supposedly trying to clear a minefield.

The bulldozer was only immobilized after receiving multiple hits from an RPG-7 and being fired upon by an anti-materiel rifle. Failaq al-Rahman then dug a tunnel to the abandoned bulldozer, and placed a satchel charge underneath it to prevent the recovery of the vehicle. The subsequent explosion breached its hull and started a fire, rendering it useless for future use.[3][4]









The next vehicle to receive the armour upgrade was the ZSU-23-4. Combat experience gained in Darayya showed the need for a vehicle capable of engaging high-located rebel positions in flats and apartments, almost always out of reach of the T-72s.

Following the lead of several other nations in the past, Syria began to use its large fleet of ZSU-23-4s to support tanks and infantry. The biggest weakness of the ZSU-23-4 in this role is its weak armour. Originally designed to engage aircraft and helicopters while operating behind tanks and infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs) on the plains of Europe, the armour of the vehicle is anything but well suited for engaging enemy hideouts from up close. The recent capture of Brigade 82 near Sheikh Miskin serves as a heavy-handed reminder of this fact.[5]

The installation of the armour package will largely address the ZSU-23-4's vulnerability to a range of small arms and RPGs, and will allow the vehicle to provide fire-support closer to the battle than before. With its extremely high rate of fire, large calibre and a range of elevation that covers any potential target, it is the ideal city conquest support vehicle made perfect; a warmachine completely adapted to the hostile environment that has made up the Syrian battlefield for close to four years.







After the metal chaines on the front of the T-72M1s proved to be incapable of stopping RPGs, most of the upgraded T-72M1s saw their metal chaines replaced by additional spaced armour or simply a piece of metal. These conversions were done in the T-72's operational area, as the factory responsible for the armour packages strangely enough still produces them with metal chains on front of the T-72.

Since the active conflict provides a myriad of combat reports on weaknesses and strenths of various types of equipment, it is likely subsequent variants of the upgraded armour will address these issues and thus become increasingly effective.








The combat value of the armour package was believed to be minimal after two of the upgraded T-72M1s were destroyed in Jobar. This however is in no way representative of the actual combat performance of the new armour. It is possible that the new armour package gave crews a feeling of invincibility, leading to the crews taking larger risks than normal and thus resulting in their vehicles being destroyed. One image from Eastern Ghouta confirms its effectiveness in combat however, showing one upgraded T-72M1s still intact after receiving several hits from an RPG.

While it is clear that single instances of the new armour pitted against unknown types of anti-tank weaponry hardly make a case for the up- and downsides of the armour package, it is obvious the 4th Armoured Divisiondeems it effective enough to allocate significant resources to it.




The upgrades performed on these vehicles prove the 4th Armoured Division are not running out of steam just yet. Although the installation of this armour package is impossible on T-72 'Urals' due to the location of its rangefinder, it is expected more and more armoured fighting vehicles will be upgraded in the same way.

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North Korean HT-16PGJ MANPADS in Syria

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By Stijn Mitzer and Joost Oliemans

Subject to severe sanctions for almost a decade, the proliferation of North Korean conventional armament on the international arms market is an often underreported topic, and many arms deals of the past are completely undocumented. Nonetheless, the traces of these deals still mark many of the world's conflict areas, and every once in a while new footage confirms North Korea's involvement in the international arms trade.

Alongside main battle tanks upgraded by the DPRK, various types of artillery, anti-tank guided missiles (ATGMs) and light machine guns (LMGs) already present in today's conflict hotspots, analysis of imagery of weaponry used in the Syrian Civil War shows the presence of North Korean man-portable air-defence systems (MANPADS) amongst various factions opposing the regime of president Bashar al-Assad. The sighting of this system has become common enough to suggest the scale of their initial delivery to the Assad regime was sizeable, although the fact that they are consistently identified as the similar Soviet Igla-1E (SA-16) system also used in Syria means they have largely remained unnoticed to this date.

A single example was first identified in August 2014 in the hands of a fighter of the Islamic State at Ksesh (which was captured from Jaish al-Islam in the summer of 2014), but further research has unveiled an entire batch of at least 18 launchers and their associated systems was captured by the Free Syrian Army and Kateeba al-Kawthar (originally an al-Qaeda-linked group) at Brigade 80 in Aleppo in February 2013. While no aircraft or helicopters are explicitely known to have been shot down by these missiles, their continued presence on the battlefield, most recently in the heavily embattled Lattakia Governorate suggests they are still functional.

North Korean HT-16PGJ MANPADS with cap removed at Ksesh airbase, August 2014.


Stash of North Korean HT-16PGJ MANPADS captured in Aleppo, February 2013.



















































Although MANPADS in general appear to be referred to as Hwaseong-Chong (Arquebus) in North Korea, it is thought the specific type exported to Syria is of their third or fourth indigenously developed generation. Early types copied from the Soviet 9K32 Strela-2 (SA-7) MANPADS (which might have donned the designation PGLM or CSA-3A) were likely developed in the 1980s, and what appears to have been an indigenous variant of the 9K34 Strela-3 (SA-14) was spotted as early as 1992. Development has ultimately resulted in a system which has only been identified in recent years, and which seems to have been derived from the Russian 9K38 Igla (SA-18). However, the MANPADS currently seen in Syria shares the most resemblance with the older 9K310 Igla-1 (SA-16) system, but with the characteristic tricone nose mounted on the missile replaced with the more modern aerodynamic spike also seen on the 9K38 Igla (SA-18) and 9K338 Igla-S (SA-24) systems it is likely its performance has been improved. The most significant other difference that allows the North Korean system to be discerned from it Soviet/Russian counterparts is the foreward placement of the thermal battery which powers the MANPADS. This component also determines whether the system is still operable; its depletion means the MANPADS has become useless, leading to several cases where factions desperate for anti-air defence have attempted to jury-rig their own batteries.

North Korean HT-16PGJ MANPADS in Lattakia, 26th of November 2015. Right: The same MANPADS seen in a North Korean military parade.

Further imagery analysis reveals that the North Korean system spotted in Syria carries the designator
HT-16PGJ (the missiles alone HG-16), and that the specific examples captured at Brigade 80 were part of a contract dated the 1st of January 2004, meaning it is unlikely the shelf-life of the thermal batteries has yet run out. It is possible reports based on Western intelligence of a 2003 delivery by an unknown supplier (said to be Belarus) concerning some 300 Igla MANPADS actually refer to a deal surrounding the North Korean system, especially since the Igla has not yet been seen in Syria. If this is the case, it is likely even more MANPADS were acquired than reported as deliveries would have continued into the start of 2004. Indeed, careful study of the box containing the missiles reveals that no less than three-hundred boxes were delivered, containing two missiles each for a total of 600 HT-16PGJ MANPADS.

Despite the fact that the Syrian War has seen its fair share of MANPADS variants, ranging from Soviet-legacy Strela-2M, Strela-3s and Igla-1s to Chinese FN-6s supplied by Qatar through Sudan and Russian Igla-S' provided a few years before the start of the conflict, anti-air defence from the multitude of factions currently roaming the Syrian skies remains scarce. This has forced certain parties to go to extreme lengths to improvise some semblance of anti-air capabilities, and any MANPADS is to be considered a precious asset. Due to the capabilities of these systems, the West was reluctant to provide them to moderate Syrian rebels earlier in the war, fearing they might be smuggled out of the country and used to shoot down commercial airliners. Although such aircraft usually cruise at higher altitudes than can be reached by most MANPADS, a missile fired shortly after takeoff or before landing has shown to be a genuine threat in the past.

Although unlikely to be the most capable MANPADS system currently to be found on the Syrian battlegrounds (a title which belongs to the Russian Igla-S system), it is certainly more effective than the older Strela-2, Strela-3 and Igla-1 systems, and possibly even the Chinese FN-6, which was found to be unreliable by the rebels that used them. As the Russian Air Force continues to remain at the forefront of the aerial campaign against Assad's opponents throughout Syria, including the Lattakia governorate, any type of air-defence systems will be gladly embraced by rebel groups, no matter what their origins are. Whether more of these systems will pop up in the future of course remains to be seen, although the full extent of North Korean exports to nations across the world has likely to only just have begun to unravel, and development of new weaponry including MANPADS that could one day end up on the illegal arms trafficking market is still in progress.

MANPADS' in use with the Korean People's Army. First three MANPADS from the left: Igla-1, North Korean HT-16PGJ also seen in Syria, Strela-3.


Special thanks to 'BM-21 Grad'.

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Back from retirement, Sudan's BO-105s take to the skies

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By Stijn Mitzer and Joost Oliemans

The Sudanese Air Force has had a turbulent history ever since its founding in January 1956, the year that the Sudan gained independence from the British. Originally trained and equipped by Egyptians and the British, it acquired aircraft and helicopters from the Soviet Union in the late 1960s, followed by Chinese examples several years later. The Sudanese Air Force (SuAF) then sought to purchase aircraft from France, but ended up acquiring U.S. F-5Es and C-130s. In the late 1980s it began receiving military aid in the form of aircraft and helicopters from Libya, followed by the delivery of more Chinese aircraft shortly after, which would continue to deliver aircraft in the last two decades. In more recent years the SuAF's core is made up by aircraft acquired from Belarus, Russia and unsurprisingly, China. This is not all however, as the SuAF also operates or used to operate aircraft sourced from a variety of countries such as Germany, Switzerland, the Netherlands and Canada.

While operating such a diverse fleet of aircraft ranging from several sources is already a logistical and financial nightmare, the political instability in Sudan during the 1960s to the early 1990s meant that Sudan frequently switched governments, all with different political orientations and thus different foreign policies. This meant the SuAF was unable to acquire spare parts for aircraft it had only recently acquired, resulting in decreased operational capability and eventually even the grounding of much of its fleet since its founding in 1956.

The Sudan has in recent decades enjoyed a more stable political and economical landscape, largely due to the discovery and large-scale exploitation of large oil reserves, allowing the country to purchase more advanced aircraft and equipment for the SuAF. Sudan also succeeded in establishing a facility that would allow it to overhaul certain types of aircraft and helicopters in the country itself with the aid of China, Iran, Russia and companies based in the United Arab Emirates (UAE). The Safat Maintenance Center (more commonly known as the Safat Aviaton Complex, part of the larger Safat Aviation Group) was first opened in 2004, and began work on overhauling its first aircraft in 2006.


While SAFAT initially almost exclusively relied on foreigners to perform overhauls on mainly Soviet aircraft and helicopters, increasing numbers of Sudanese have largely replaced other nationalities. Although SAFAT is now capable of independently overhauling several types of aircraft and helicopers, it still relies on the assistance of foreigners on most (major) projects however. The overhaul of Chinese aircraft sees heavy involvement of Chinese technicians, the overhaul and maintenance of Soviet-era aircraft is done with the assistance of mainly Russians and Ukrainians while Iran provides personnel and expertise on most other projects. In agreement with Ethiopia's Dejen Aviation Industry (Formerly known as DAVEC, Dejen Aviation Engineering Complex), Ethiopians aided SAFAT with overhauling its Soviet-era helicopters, transport aircraft and even MiG-23s, both in the Sudan and in Ethiopia. Nonetheless, the SuAF continues to send some of its aircraft and helicopters abroad for overhaul, indicating SAFAT is not yet able to cope with the demands of the SuAF. The images below provide a look into the helicopter maintenance hangar of SAFAT, showing Mi-24P '912' as well as four BO-105s in the background.









The sighting of these four BO-105s was the first indication the Sudan was working on bringing several examples of the type back to operational condition after years of being stored. Sudan had originally ordered twenty BO-105s from West Germany in 1977, which were all believed to have been delivered just a year later. At least twelve of these helicopters were destined for the Sudanese Police Force, with the other eight going to the SuAF at some point during their career. The examples operated by the police can easily be identified by their civilian paintjob, while BO-105s operated by the SuAF wore a camouflage pattern more adaptive to the Sudanese terrain.







While the BO-105s were brand new at the time of delivery, the Sudan plunged into an even deeper crisis in the early eighties, which began to take its toll on the SuAF and Sudanese military as a whole. The social unrest, the back-to-back wars and the political instability of the country would eventually result in another coup, bringing the current President Omar al-Bashir into power, which was quick to shift Sudan's alliance away from the West and towards Iran and Libya. This drastic shift meant that the SuAF was now unable to acquire spares for its fleet of Western aircraft however, resulting in the grounding of F-5s, C-130s and other aircraft over the next years. This also included the fleet of BO-105s, which were believed to have been flown only rarely during their short career. Most of the surviving airframes were then stored at the Sudanese Air Force's largest airbase, Wadi Sayyidna, which would likely become their final resting place.



With SAFAT's expertise growing, allowing it to service an increasing number of aircraft and helicopters (albeit with foreign help), SAFAT began to overhaul several types formerly operated by the SuAF of which it was once believed they would never fly again, including BO-105s. Four helicopters of this type, comprising three former SuAF mounts and one BO-105 operated by the police, were overhauled in 2012 with the assistance of the IHSRC (Iranian Helicopter Support and Renewal Company, commonly known as Panha), likely by cannibalising other airframes for spare parts or by acquiring these via the black market. The work on all four helicopters was believed to have been finished in late 2012 or early 2013, when four BO-105s were spotted on satellite imagery on the the tarmac outside one of SAFAT's maintenance hangers. These helicopers would continue to show up on satellite imagery here well into 2014, possibly indicating they were still undergoing test flights or were simply waiting for their handover to the SuAF. One of the now once again operational BO-105s can be seen below.







All of Sudan's BO-105s can be armed with rocket pods containing 28x 50mm SNIA rockets and gun pods with two 7.62mms, which can be seen in the image below. Of course, compared to dedicated gunships such as the Mi-24/35s also operated by the SuAF this weaponry amounts to very little.TheMi-24/35 has secured its position as the SuAF's primary gunship, and the type's ruggedness, range and payload makes it an ideal platform for the SuAF. The BO-105 is a completely different platform however, lacking the range and armour for effective use over the hostile battlefields of Sudan. It could instead be used as an armed reconnaissance helicopter or even handed over to the police for more peaceful duties.



While the BO-105s are unlikely to significantly bolster the Sudanese Air Force's capabilities, they can be brought back to flying condition with minimal effort, presenting the SuAF with at least another four helicopters. Perhaps more importantly, the rotarcraft also represent an important step for the Sudan, one that could allow the country to become even more self-reliant in overhauling aircraft and helicopters in the future.

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Photo Report: Syrian Armed Forces Calendar 2015

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By Stijn Mitzer and Joost Oliemans

Although many military enthusiasts and analysts spend hours scrounging social media pages for any interesting images of Syrian Arab Army, Air Force or Navy equipment, it now appears that a wealth of never-before-seen images has been uploaded to the official page of the Syrian Armed Forces. Most of these images, taken over the past six years, have gone completely unnoticed to the general public.

While you can be sure to find plenty of articles with a better balance of visual content to text on this blog, the sheer amount of images, their high quality and the fact that most of the images were never seen before allow for an exception to the rule. We can only hope that more of such photo reports will released in the future.

We'll be kicking off with the Syrian Armed Forces Calendar for 2015, which, although little under two years late, still makes for an interesting bundle of high-definition images.

January:



February:



March:



April:



May:



June:



July:



August:



September:



October:



November:



December:



Special thanks to SyrianMilitaryCap from Syrian Military Capabilities.

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Islamic State captures Ayyash weapons depots in largest arms haul of Syrian Civil War

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The Syrian Civil War has seen a range of major arms hauls by various parties as weapons depots get overrun, captured and in many cases simply abandoned by retreating forces. The capture of Regiment 121, Brigade 93 and the Mahin arms depot have until now topped the list in terms of ghaneema (spoils of war). Regiment 121 provided the Islamic State with large numbers of field-guns and MRLs while Brigade 93 saw the capture of at least thirty tanks and around a dozen howitzers. Mahin became notorious for providing its capturers (Jaish al-Islam and the Free Syrian Army) with hundreds of anti-tank guided missiles (ATGMs). For this reason, Mahin was seen as the largest and most important haul of arms during the now five-year long Civil War.

But that reputation appears to have been surpassed now that footage (WARNING: EXTREMELY GRAPHIC. Advised to only watch from 12:55 onwards) showing the capture of the Ayyash weapons depot by fighters of the Islamic State in Deir ez-Zor has been released. The video, the fourth in the series 'Support from God, and imminent victory' (Quran verse 61:13) is the fourth to have been released showing the Islamic State's operations in and around Deir ez-Zor. The contents of the weapon depot, captured on the 20th of January, were supposedly removed before the Islamic State took over according to pro-regime sources. Now that the war reached its fifth year, this appears to be some language code for 'The weapon depots were completely overstocked, brace yourselves on every front'. And thus, no less than 2 million rounds of (small) arms ammunition, 9000 grenades and a hundred ATGMs were among the spoils of Ayyash, making the capture of this weapon depot the largest ever in Syria. A detailed list of captured ammunition, weaponry and vehicles can be seen below.

This is an approximate guess of the captured weapons and ammunition featured in the video of the Ayyash weapon depot, the real figures are believed to be much higher. The content of at least 2600 crates could not be identified.

Ammunition:

- 1,348,300 to 1,791,960 rounds of 7.62x39 and 7.62x54R ammunition.
- 17,140 rounds of 12.7mm ammunition.
- 158,996 rounds of 14.5mm ammunition.
- 119,768 rounds of 20mm ammunition.
- 450 rounds of 23mm ammunition.
- 223 rounds of 73mm ammunition.
- 72 rounds of 82mm ammunition.
- 2000 rounds of 85mm ammunition.
- 6 rounds of 107mm ammunition.
- 4 rounds of 120mm ammunition.
- 165 rounds of 120mm RAP ammunition.
- 576 rounds of 122mm ammunition.
- 1120 fuses for 122mm artillery rounds.
- 7 PG-2 rocket-propelled grenades.
- 10 PG-7 rocket-propelled grenades.
- 1 PG-7VL rocket-propelled grenade.
- 1 TBG-7V rocket-propelled grenade.
- 1 OG-7V rocket-propelled grenade.
- 2 PG-29V rocket-propelled grenades.
- 2 M-57 rocket-propelled grenades.
- 9025 grenades.
- 36 rifle grenades.
- 98 9M14M Malyutka ATGMs.
- 1 9M113M Konkurs ATGMs.
- 7 3M9 surface-to-air missiles.

Weaponry:

- 84 7.62mm AK(M)-47s.
- 5 7.62mm PKMs.
- 1 7.62mm RPD.
- 1 7.62mm SGM.
- 3 12.7mm DShK(M)s.
- 11 14.5mm KPVs.
- 2 23mm ZU-23s.
- 1 RPG-2.
- 13 RPG-7s.
- 1 73mm 2A28 Grom.
- 1 M40 106mm RCL.
- 122 bayonets.
- 1 pistol.
- 1 flintlock.

Vehicles (derelict trucks not included):

- 1 T-55(A)MV.
- 2 T-55As.
- 5 BMP-1s.
- 1 23mm ZSU-23.
- 1 BRDM-2.
- 1 BTR-152.
- 2 BREM-2 ARVs.
- 3 2P25 TEL.
- 1 SURN 1S19 radar.
- 6 ZiL-131.
- 3 GAZ-3308.
- 2 GAZ-66.
- 1 GAZ Sobol.
- 2 Tatra 148.
- 1 UAZ-469
- 2 excavators.
- 1 Land Rover.
- 2 technicals.
- 3 trucks.
- 4 cars.

Figures made available by the Islamic State:

- 400 killed or injured.
- 100 [pro-regime militants] captured.
- 4 tanks captured.
- 10 BMPs captured.
- 3 guns captured.
- 350 tank shells captured.
- 7,000 shells and rockets captured.
- 30 rocket launchers captured.
- 100 anti-armor rockets captured.
- 410 anti-armor shells captured.
- 1,000s of hand grenades captured.
- Tons of various ammo captured.

Having so much ammunition and weaponry stationed so close to a fragile frontline that is incapable of dealing with large Islamic State attacks is a sign of extremely incompetent military planning. This is especially true when considering the immensely large 137th Brigade's base located nearby has plenty of space to house tenfold the contents of Ayyash. This base is located much closer to the airbase and Deir ez-Zor's city centre and thus better capable of dividing the munitions between the defenders of Deir ez-Zor. To lose the largest weapon arsenal ever to have been captured in the war due to nothing other than poor planning and above all laziness raises the issue of whether the current organisation in charge of regime operations is capable of dealing with the situation it faces. Instead, units such as the ones commanded by Suheil 'The Tiger' al-Hassan and Issam 'The Lion' Zahreddine are constantly being relocated to positions that had previously been abandoned by other regime forces. One such example is Tadmur, where the Syrian Arab Army only barely fled away faster than the Islamic State could push forward. As a result, a small force which had the goal of capturing the town of al-Sukhna suddenly found itself amidst the ruins of Palmyra (Tadmur). The international outcry resulting from Islamic State released productions showing the partial destruction of the ancient town could perhaps have been partially diverted at the regime for making no serious effort to defend it, which surprisingly received no media attention at all. Of course, military priorities are unlikely to lie with the protection of cultural heritage during a war of this intensity, but the sheer fact that the entire population of Tadmur as well as its archaeological sites were left behind without conquest purely due to the employment of poor military strategy signifies a recurring problem within the Syrian Arab Army.

Back to Ayyash, located a mere ten kilometers north-west from Deir ez-Zor's city centre, which was the scene of heavy fighting as fighters of the Islamic State pushed their way into the town and surrounding sites. As the regime has to defend Deir ez-Zor with only a limited amount of personnel, it has been forced to spread its troops thinly along the perimeter, with the main bulk stationed near Deir ez-Zor's airbase, the city centre and surrounding hills. The Islamic State has focused its attacks mainly on the airbase and the town, which has seen bitter fighting ever since the start of the Civil War, but especially since the Islamic State took over from the Free Syrian Army in July 2014.

Ayyash, defended by a mix of NDF troops, SyAA personnel from the 137th Brigade and detachments of the Republican Guard's 104th Brigade, sees a perimeter that was less well defended by troops not matching the performance of the soldiers stationed elsewhere in Deir ez-Zor. Indeed, some of the soldiers stationed here were formely tasked with manning the nearby surface-to-air missile site, but were then armed and tasked with defending Ayyash itself. While this careful balancing of troops in Ayyash appears quite logical, it becomes less so when considering the fact that Ayyash is home to a weapons depot once built as a strategic reserve for a possible confrontation with Ba'athist Iraq, then the fourth largest army in the world. While the contents of the depot had partially been depleted in the defence of Deir ez-Zor, it was still massively overstocked with arms and ammunition.

The fact that the contents of the weapons depot were left wholely intact both prior to and after the takeover (contents which could either have been destroyed beforehand or with artillery and airstrikes afterwards) indicates that the Syrian Arab Army is still incapable of dealing with such situations. The 2K12 surface-to-air missile systems captured were said to have been destroyed by the Russian Air Force after their capture. These systems were slowly abandoned over the past few years, with only the associated SURN 1S19 radar remaining operational. Bringing these systems back to operational condition would have been nigh impossible, not in the least because the missiles were in even worse shape than the launchers. Not targeting millions of small arms rounds and a hundred ATGMs and instead striking inoperable 2K12 SAMs remains a curious decision to say the least.

The captured ammunition, quickly taken away by trucks, will likely be distributed between the various fronts the Islamic State is fighting at. A part might also be held back for the upcoming battle for Raqqa, the capital of the Islamic State.While one would expect trucks loaded with ammunition have no chance of driving through half of Syria towards their designation, such transports can still freely drive to any Islamic State held territory, as witnessed by the presence of a 2S1 Gvozdika in Deir ez-Zor that was originally captured at Shaer back in 2014.This self-propelled howitzer passed through four governorates before arriving in Deir ez-Zor unharmed by Coalition airstrikes back in early to mid-2015.
























The largest stash of 9M14M Malyutkas at the Ayyash weapon depot, at least 90 of which are piled up here. A single 9M113M Konkurs missile can also be seen below.


The 2K12 surface-to-air missile battery, supposedly bombed by the Russian Air Force after having been captured. The capture of this battery marks the second 2K12 site to have fallen in the hands of the Islamic State.







Heavy equipment now in the hands of the Islamic State: The T-55(A)MV is the second example to have been captured by fighters of the Islamic State in Deir ez-Zor. A limited number of T-55(A)MVs were believed to have been brought to Deir ez-Zor along with T-72 'Urals', T-72M1s and T-72AVs before the supply route was closed by the capture of al-Sukhna on the 13th of May 2015. The two other T-55s were among the examples upgraded by North Korea in the late 70s and early 80s and can be seen with two different types of laser-range finders 'Made in DPRK'. Interestingly, one T-55 still operates the 14.5mm KPV instead of the regular 12.7mm DShK. Most formerly 14.5mm KPV-equipped T-55s lost theirs, which was usually deemed to be of more use on technicals.

One of the BMP-1s sports Kontakt-1 explosive reactive armour (ERA) alongside its turret in a bid to enhance the poor armour of the vehicle. It is expected that vehicles such as the BRDM-2, BTR-152 and the two BREM-2s will be used as VBIEDs, the Islamic State having no use for them in their originally intended role.














Article written in collaboration with MENA_Conflict from Type 63: A collection of Musings on Middle East Conflict.

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The Islamic State going DIY, R-40 air-to-air missiles used as SAMs?

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Starting in June 2014, Coalition airstrikes conducted on positions, vehicles and high-ranking members of the Islamic State have taken a heavy toll on the group. These airstrikes combined with increased bombardements conducted by the Syrian Arab Air Force (SyAAF) and the Russian Air Force (RuAF) have made a significant difference during several battles already, most notably in Kobanî. The Islamic State has so far been unable to come up with an answer against the many air forces now threatening them in both Syria and Iraq. Although it has tried to better camouflage its forces in order to prevent them from being spotted and hit, it has so far failed to directly hit any of the aircraft conducting these strikes.

Although the Islamic State has no lack of surface-to-air missiles nor launchers to launch these, it lacks the expertise to turn these often derelict systems into operational systems capable of hitting any foe in the air. Indeed, only the limited amount of MANPADS in the hands of the Islamic State (even including North Korean examples) have so far only managed to damage or down Iraqi Air Force helicopters. The capture of a fully operational S-125 battery in between Hama and Aleppo did not help the Islamic State in any way, as it was not only incapable of operating these sophisticated systems, but unable to transport these systems to Raqqa in the first place. Using one of the S-75 missiles captured back in 2014 was complicated by the fact that none of the systems captured were operational or in a state to be made operational, not to mention the lack of expertise to use them. The usage of one 2P25 launch system, part of the 2K12 Kub SAM complex, captured in Deir ez-Zor was foiled by the lack of any missiles and significant damage on the launcher itself. The capture of a 2K12 Kub battery in Deir ez-Zor in January 2016 did provide the Islamic State with an operational SURN 1S19 radar system and intact launchers, but in such a sorry state that bringing these systems back to operational condition would have been nigh impossible, not to mention the bad condition of the associated missiles. Although not confirmed through video footage, the whole site was said to have been bombed by the RuAF shortly after its capture.

The capture of Tabqa airbase on the 24th of August 2014 did provide the Islamic State with at least ten R-3S and four R-13M air-to-air missiles originally intended to be used on the resident 12th squadron and another unknown squadron flying MiG-21bis and MiG-21MFs. The Islamic State subsequently moved these missiles to Raqqa, where it tried to convert them to the surface-to-air role. This progress was filmed by one of the project leaders, which was subsequently arrested at a rebel checkpoint. The footage was then given to SkyNews, which first reported on the conversion of R-13Ms to the surface-to-air role in the 6th of January 2016.

Tadmur, captured on the 20th of May 2015 and the third airbase to fell in the hands of the Islamic State in Syria, also provided the Islamic State with large numbers of air-to-air missiles and even anti-radiation missiles. Tadmur was previously home to a squadron flying the MiG-25PD(S) interceptor and the MiG-25PU two-seat trainer, but as these aircraft were gradually withdrawn from service, the three remaining MiG-25PD(S) and one MiG-25PU left for T4 in late 2013. Their associated missiles remained stored in two of Tadmur's sixteen Hardened Aircraft Shelters however. When the fighters of the Islamic State overran the airbase, it not not only encountered dozens of R-40 air-to-air missiles but also large numbers of Kh-28 anti-radiation missiles, likely intended for use on Su-22s and Su-24s stationed at T4 but never transported to this airbase.







While it was extremely unlikely that the Islamic State could turn the Kh-28s and its 140kg heavy warhead, intended to be launched against radar systems of SAM sites, into anything useful other than an IED or DIY surface-to-surface rocket, it did found a role for the R-40 missiles also found at the airbase. Two variants of the R-40 were captured: The semi-active radar homing guided R-40RD and the infrared-guided R-40TD. As the R-40RD requires an onboard radar to lock on to the targeted aircraft, it was useless for the Islamic State in its intended role. The R-40TD on the other hand is guided by its infrared warhead, and does not require guidance by an onboard radar. Several similar modifications of the R-3S, the R-13M, the R-60 and the R-73 were seen in Yugoslavia in an attempt to counter the Coalition airpower here. All mounted on trucks, none ever scored a hit. The SyAAF took it one step further and experimented with launching R-40TDs at ground targets several years back, unsuprisingly to no avail.

When regime forces entered one of the recently captured Hardened Aircraft Shelters at Tadmur, they encountered a dump truck armed with no less than an R-40TD! The missile, installed on a newly erased platform, can be aimed by using the dump truck's tipper mechanism. As the R-40 was designed to hit large and fast flying targets, it comes with a 70kg heavy warhead, enabling the missile to destroy most targets by only exploding in the vicinity of the targeted aircraft. The heavy warhead also makes using the R-40 as a DIY surface-to-surface rocket an attractive option. Although such a conversion will be in no way accurate, neither are the hundreds of much lighter DIY rockets still assembled and used by the fighters of the Islamic State each day. While the R-40TD looks to be mounted the wrong way around, the attachment points that connects the missile with the MiG-25's pylons are located on the top of the missile, creating the false image the missile sits inverted.


As no aircraft or helicopters were reported to have been shot down over Tadmur, nor did anyone witness the impact of an R-40, it will probably always remain unknown what the intended role of this contraption was, or if it was ever used in the first place. It does however once again prove that whatever falls in the hands of the Islamic State, you're always sure they come up with an inventive way to put it to use




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Tadmur recaptured, Islamic State forces on the run

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By Stijn Mitzer and Joost Oliemans

After having been captured by the Islamic State just short of a year ago, the city of Tadmur is now back in the hands of the regime after a large offensive conducted by units of the Syrian Arab Army (SyAA), Hizbullah, Shiite militias and the Russian Armed Forces cleared the town city and its surroundings from the presence of the Islamic State. While the recapture of the ancient town of Palmyra, home to many well-preserved ruins and archeologica artifacts, will surely make the headlines all over the world, wrestling control over the city of Tadmur itself from the Islamic State is of a much larger significance to the future course of the Syrian War.

Its significance arises not only from the gasfield-rich terrain in which it lies, a factor which is sure to aid future regime operations, but also from the strategic location of Tadmur within Syria. Holding the key to the highway connecting Deir ez-Zor to the West of Syria, the only thing laying in the way of breaking the siege of this heavily embattled city is al-Sukhna, held firmly in Islamic State control since May 2015. However, with the fighters of the Islamic State on the run and little reinforcements present in the area, a regime offensive to quickly retake al-Sukhna before the Islamic State has had the chance to regroup seems likely.

The siege of Deir ez-Zor, in place since the capture of al-Sukha by the Islamic State on the 13th of May 2015, prevents any aid from being brought in by trucks, forcing the remaining citizens of the city to rely on an airbridge conducted by the Syrian Arab Air Force's (SyAAF) Il-76 fleet. Maintaining the airbridge is an expensive affair, not to mention the fact that it prevents the precious Il-76 fleet from being used for other critical tasks. To quickly continue the offensive in the direction of al-Sukhna is critical in order to deny the fighters of the Islamic State the opportunity to dig in and create defensive line here. The fact that Tadmur airbase has been captured intact will greatly benefit the SyAA in future operations in Central to Eastern Syria. The long runway will allow cargo aircraft to bring in supplies and additional troops and could be used for the forward deployment of attack helicopters, as was already witnessed the day after the capture.

While the capture of Tadmur will surely be celebrated as a heroic feat by the Syrian Arab Army, one must not forget it was the same SyAA that gave up the town without any serious opposition one year ago. Indeed, what was intended to be a lightning attack on the town of al-Sukhna in a way so often seen conducted by the fighters of the Islamic State ultimately ended up as the surprise capture of Tadmur. Instead of putting up a serious fight to defend the town, the garrison of al-Sukhna quickly fled for the desert after two of its tanks were destroyed by ATGMs, only to be chased and hunted down by the fighters of the Islamic State. Encountering nothing but desert after al-Sukhna, the Islamic State waged its chances and quickly continued its offensive deeper into Central Syria. When arriving at the next (heavily defended) regime bases; T3 pumping station, Arak, and Hulayhilah, the defenders not only failed to point their artillery and tanks in the right direction, but in fact didn't manage to deploy them in the first place. It seems plausible that the defenders were completely unaware of the impending danger, which is all the more strange as Hulayhilah served as a communication hub to coordinate regime operations in Central Syria. Unfortunately, the defenders that did manage to escape the massacre that followed at Hulayhilah were also hunted down after fleeing into the desert.

Boosted by these successes, the fighters of the Islamic State then set their eyes on the town of Tadmur. Although by now fully aware of the impending danger, regime forces present in Tadmur proved to be completely incapable of properly anticipating the impending assault and setting up defensive positions. Not even the local airbase, guarding the entrance of the town and without a doubt the best defensive position a commander could wish for was employed in the defence of the town. While the regime saved no effort to show off artillery and aircraft striking positions of the Islamic State east of Tadmur for the international press, it then quickly fled the town, leaving not only the civilian population behind, but also many soldiers incapable of fleeing and left to fend for themselves. A small Islamic State force originallytasked with capturing al-Sukhna thus suddenly found itself amidst the ruins of Palmyra just a week later; it had advanced quicker than the Syrian Arab Army could retreat on several occasions, only being 'beaten' by the rapid retreat of the troops tasked with defending Tadmur.

The Islamic State quickly rounded up the remaining regime forces, some of which were directly executed in front of the local population but most locked up in the infamous prison of Tadmur, sight of the 1980 massacre. After featuring the captured soldiers in various propaganda videos, during which some were executed in front of the prison but mainly in the ancient town of Palmyra (most notoriously in the Roman Theatre), the prison was blown up, in addition to various well-preserved temples in the ancient city. The fighters of the Islamic State were meanwhile busy fighting their way farther into the Homs governorate, capturing T4 pumping station and clashing with the defenders of T4 airbase. Being the SyAAF's largest and most important airbase, it can truly be called a fortress. The fighters of the Islamic State found itself incapable of capturing the airbase (which would have required an offensive on a scale not yet seen before) and were forced to work around the airbase in order to continue its advance. It then focused on the towns of al-Qaryatayn and Mahin and by advancing into the Damascus and Homs countryside, it even successfully cut of T4 airbase for a short time. Although capturing large swaths of territory, the fighters of the Islamic State soon found themselves unable to push deeper into the Homs and Damascus governorates. While it captured, lost, and then recaptured al-Qaryatayn and Mahin, further Islamic State's advances were effectively blocked here. Although in no way short on ammunition due to the huge amounts of weaponry found at al-Qaryatayn earlier (including ten tanks), the town is now fully under siege by the regime. Back to Tadmur, where the first serious reports about regime forces aiming to recapture the town started to surface in July. From this point on, three different offensives were launched at the town.


The defence of Tadmur was in the hands of a small Islamic State garrison, which due to the now worsening shortages in manpower was unable to defend such a large area. Although the Islamic State hugely expanded its territories by the capture of much of Central Syria, it simply lacked the troops to properly defend it. The small garrison present therefore chose to focuss its firepower at the mountainous terrain west of the city. Serving as a natural barrier, these mountains proved ideal for fighting off the first offensive conducted by the regime. This first offensive consisted of poorly trained NDF and militia memberssupported by T-55s and T-62s and the SyAAF flying Su-22M4s and Su-24MK2s from T4. Several attempts were made to advance on Tadmur and although terrain was captured, heavy losseswere also incurred due to the use of ATGMs by the Islamic State. Several follow-up attempts yielded the same result, and regime forces were ultimately broken up and routed each time. The second offensive was launched after Russian-supplied T-72Bs, BMP-2s, BMP-1s, BTR-80s and Russian-manned 152mm 2A65 Msta-B howitzers and 122mm BM-21-1 multiple rocket launchers (MRLs) arrived on the scene, further supported by the Russian Air Force (RuAF) flying Mi-8s, Mi-24Ps and Mi-35Ms from T4 and Sh'eirat and Su-24s and Su-25s from Hmeemeem/Bassel al-Assad IAP. This offensive, now jointly conducted with the Russians, again advanced closer to Tadmur but failed to break through to the town. The Islamic State frequently counterattacked with its fighters and tanks, but also with BMP-1 based vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (VBIEDs). The short range of the BMP-1's 73mm 2A28 Grom cannon made this vehicle practically useless for the Islamic State in its intended role, and the large numbers captured allowed the Islamic State to effectively employ them as VBIEDs. Such attacks were usually preceded by a defensive position drawing attention from the opposing regime forces, allowing the BMP-1 VBIEDs to speed towards the distracted regime forces unnoticed, detonating their deadly payload when close by.


The sheer size and firepower of the units in the third offensive is what ultimately caused the fighters of the Islamic State to break. The offensive, preparations for which were already underway for a month, involved the best Russia and the regime had to offer. The armoured forces were expanded by the addition of more T-72Bs, and T-72B Obr. 1989s and T-90s while the artillery was strenghtened by the addition of 220mm BM-27s, 300mm BM-30s and 220mm TOS-1As. The Russian Air Force intensified its operations over Tadmur, even bringing in recently arrived Mi-28N attack helicopters. The regime brought in a large contingent of the elite Suqour al-Sahraa' (Desert Falcons) troops, Navy Seals, commandos and Shiite militias, even including an Afghan battalion with its own tanks, once again highlighting the shortage of regular manpower. The deployment of such a large force, part of which led by Suheil 'The Tiger' al-Hassan, was made possible after the successes around Aleppo and Lattakia, allowing for the redistribition of troops elsewhere. The SyAAF's SA-342 'Gazelles' also saw heavy action over the skies of Tadmur, each helicopter deploying 4 HOT ATGMs.

Aided by the deployment of Russian Special Forces, mainly tasked with calling in fire and air support, this force gradually fought its way closer to the city. Completely outmatched by the vast amount of firepower this offensive brought with it, the fighters of the Islamic State gradually retreated closer to the town, holding up in the ancient castle west of the city until it was overrun as well. The huge weapon depots north of the city also quickly came under the control of the attacking forces. Although large numbers of weaponry and ammunition were expected to have been present here before being captured by fighters of the Islamic State, only one image was ever published after the capture of the depots, leaving the amount of ghaneema (spoils of war) unknown.

While it was expected the remaining Islamic State fighters would turn the town into a fortress, forcing the attacking forces to fight for every building like in Ramadi, they gave up large parts of the town without putting up much resistance, instead retreating to al-Sukhna. The regime had prepared its forces for the possibility of house-to-house fighting, even bringing in T-72s upgraded with slat and spaced armour to better counter the threat posed by RPGs in urban areas. Large numbers of IEDs were reportedly left behind, which are certain to claim additional lives as efforts are undertaken to remove them. It is unknown what happened to the mainly Sunni civilian population, thousands of which still believed to have been in the city shortly before being recaptured by the regime. While pro-regime sources claimed they had all escaped safely into regime territory, the Islamic Stateasked civilians to leave the town and head towards al-Sukhna a short while later. Supposedly, the Russian Army is to deploy advanced equipment and sappers to aid in the removal of the many IEDs left behind in the area.


Tadmur airbase was captured almost entirely intact, which will prove of great value for future offensives conducted in the region, and also help resolidify the regime's grasp on the large swaths of desert that make up most of Central Syria. The Hardened Aircaft Shelters (HAS) revealed that most of the Kh-28 anti-radiation missiles and R-40 air-to-air missiles left behind by the SyAAF remained untouched by the fighters of the Islamic State. Surprisingly however, at least one R-40TD infrared-guided missile was turned into a makeshift surface-to-air missile. The HASes also functioned as improvised weapon and IED factories under Islamic State control. It is unknown if any of the six radars previously captured by the Islamic State suffered any kind of damage, although it certain the regime is hoping the modern JY-27 radar located here survived, as it was one of the most valuable systems present. Without these radars, most of Central Syria is essentially fair game for any air force to invade completely unnoticed. Of course, as sovereignty of Syrian air space is a term of very little significance in the present one can wonder whether preservation of such systems has any real meaning however.







Now that Tadmur has been retaken and a swift advance on al-Sukhna appears to be likely, the future of the city of Deir ez-Zor is suddenly full of possibilities again. A logical course of actions for the Assad regime would to restore a ground supply line to the city as fast as possible and then attempt take as much territory from the Islamic State as possible in this area before the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) sweep in from the North. Should the siege of Deir ez-Zor indeed be lifted and the surrounding areas taken, the Islamic State would no longer have any roads connecting the capital of Raqqa with Mosul and Iraq in general, which would certainly hasten its demise.

The regime upmarch contrasts sharply with gains made by the Islamic State in the previous few years, and sheds light on just how much the odds have shifted in favour of President Assad since those times. As regime-held territory continues to expand and viable alternatives are outcompeted by more radicalised factions, Assad holds an increasingly favourable position in the Geneva peace talks, and is unlikely to resign or be forced to step down in the foreseeable future. In the meanwhile the Islamic State, though threatened on almost every front, is still far from defeated and as is witnessed by the recent flurry of attacks across the world, has suffered little in its capacity to conduct operations abroad. Nonetheless, considering the amount of foes it faces and territories it has lost in both Syria and Iraq in recent months, it is certain that the Islamic State will never be able to regain control over an area as large as it had the summer of last year.

Images by TASS Russian News Agency

Islamic State captures masses of Iranian-supplied weaponry near Khanasir

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By Stijn Mitzer and Joost Oliemans

An Islamic State offensive near Khanasir, Eastern Aleppo, managed to overrun defending forces, capturing several checkpoints nearby and large amounts of weaponry stocked there in the process. The town of Khanasir, a dusty and deserted place carrying without a doubt the heaviest strategic weight on its shoulders of any town of its kind in Syria. The highway that runs through it is effectively the only access route to embattled Aleppo, and the Islamic State's advances mean that regime forces fighting in the city might soon be completely cut off for some time. This is also the reason why when the Islamic State first captured the town back in late February, the regime was quick to launch an offensive to take back the town, which happened several days later. Nonetheless, the Islamic State's losses were relatively low and the attention the offensive received made it a propaganda victory if not a strategic one. The amount of ghaneema (spoils of war) captured was also substantial, consisting of several tanks, armoured vehicles, artillery and small arms. The Islamic State's second assault on the city and its surroundings appears to have trumped even these earlier gains, as masses of Iranian-supplied small arms and munitions to even a Sarab-1 equipped T-72M1 fell in the hands of the fighters of the Islamic State.

The many checkpoints covering the road going through Khanasir have in typical Syrian Arab Army (SyAA) fashion always been overstocked with arms, resulting large amounts of weaponry being captured by the Islamic State that were dumped around the base as there simply was no personnel to man them. This situation also led to the first capture of Khanasir, where the local garrison found itself unable to counter the swift and unexpected push on the town. After quickly recapturing the town, the new garrison left to defend the town and its surroundings did not only consist of local SyAA and National Defence Force (NDF) fighters, but also of Iraqi Shiite militias and even Iranian soldiers. Indeed, while already obvious by the large amounts of Iranian weaponry, Iranian clothing and Iranian documents, one Iranian helmet captured by fighters of the Islamic State clearly reads: 'IR Army'.




While the fighters of the Islamic State did capture soldiers after gaining control over several checkpoints, all of them were Syrian, raising questions about the amount of Iraqi and Iranian soldiers actually stationed here. Although some of the Iranian equipment could obviously have been used by Syrian soldiers, the presence of [patch] and Iranian military gear (including a helmet with "IR army" written on it) leaves no doubt about the presence of foreign fighters. Whether these fled in the face of Islamic State soldiers or simply withdrew during the fighting is unknown.

The spoils left behind also illustrate the continuously growing influence of foreign military equipment on the conflict: Islamic State forces can now be deen operating anything from the Iranian equipment and newly delivered Russian field guns to U.S.-made weaponry

While it is unlikely the Islamic State will be able to capture huge swats of lands and retain them like they did in previous years, quick and well executed offensives as seen lately in Dmeyr, Northern Aleppo and now Eastern Aleppo will continue to provide the Islamic State with new weaponry, and may delay its inevitable downfall significantly.

This is an approximate guess of the captured weapons and ammunition featured in the photo report. The content of at 89 least crates could not be identified, but are likely to be artillery shells.

Ammunition:

- 19,330 rounds of 7.62x39 and 7.62x54R ammunition.
- 430 rounds of 12.7x99 ammunition.
- 90 rounds of 12.7x108 ammunition.
- 2634 rounds of 23mm ammunition.
- 116 rounds of 60mm ammunition.
- 30 rounds of 106mm ammunition.
- 3 rounds of 107mm ammunition.
- 2 rounds of 120mm ammunition.
- 30 rounds of 122mm MRL ammunition.
- 7 rounds of 3BK14 125mm ammunition.
- 1 round of 3BM-44 125mm ammunition.
- 45 rounds of artillery ammunition.
- 43 charges for artillery rounds.
- 98 (PG)-7 (Nader) rocket-propelled grenades.
- 7 RPG boosters.
- 39 grenades.

Weaponry:

- 65 7.62mm AK(M)-47s (KL).
- 5 7.62mm PKMs.
- 2 7.62mm SVD Dragunov.
- 1 7.62mm PSL.
- 1 12.7mm HS.50 (AM.50)
- 1 12.7mm DShK.
- 1 14.5mm KPV.
- 8 RPG-7s.
- 2 Type-69s.
- 1 60mm mortar.
- 1 81mm mortar.
- 1 73mm SPG-9
- 1 130mm M-46 field gun.
- 2 122mm D-74 field gun.
- 1 152mm D-20 howitzer.
- 1 M40 106mm RCL.

Vehicles:

- 1 T-72M1 (equipped with the Sarab-1).
- 1 BMP-1
- 1 122mm 2S1 Gvozdika.
- 1 Safir.
- 1 GAZ-3308s.
- 1 Tatra 148.
- 1 Tatra 815s.
- 1 truck.
- 6 technicals.
- 3 bulldozers.
- 2 motorcycles.

Interestingly, the T-72M1 encountered during the offensive is the first Sarab-1 equipped vehicle to have been captured by opponents of the regime. Covered by the means of tarp on this T-72M1, the exact role of the Sarab-1 is still debated upon but has been deployed on a range of vehicles and checkpoints. It likely makes uses of infrared lamps to confuse the TOW's gunner, thus missing its intended target. Also captured was a single BMP-1.


Also encountered were five artillery pieces, making up most of heavy armament captured during this offensive. One 122mm Gvozdika self-propelled howitzer, one 130mm M-46 field gun, two 122mm D-74 field gun and one 152mm D-20 howitzer fell in the hands of the fighters of the Islamic State. Both the D-20 and D-74 were delivered by Russia to Syria in the past year, and were not present in the arsenals of the SyAA before the start of the Civil War.





Some of the technicals to have fallen in the hands of the Islamic State, including the infamous Iranian designed and produced Safir 4x4, here seen armed with a M40 106mm recoilless rifle (RCL). A CF Moto 800 series, mostly seen in use with Suqour al-Sahraa' (Desert Falcons).








Three trucks, two of Czechoslovak descent. The oldest, the Tatra 148 can already be seen being loaded with captured ammuntion, likely to be transported further away from the frontline for distribution to other fronts. The Tatra 815 and Russian GAZ-3308 represent some of the more modern trucks in service with the SyAA. Three bulldozers, one of which with protective steel installed around its wheels were also captured.





Small arms, including everything from a Soviet Mosin-Nagant rifle to an Iranian 60mm mortar. Several AK-47s upgraded with picatinny rails, allowing for the installment for sights and other gadgets, were also encountered. These rifles are almost exclusively seen in use with Iraqi fighters, which more often than not take their personal weapons with them from Iraq.








Almost all of the ammunition was Iranian supplied, and includes both recently produced products and ammunition produced in the seventies. Although 122mm multiple rocket launcher (MRL) was pictured, the presence of thirty 122mm rounds indicates a single-barrelled launcher is likely present somewhere. As often seen, crates and products are labeled both in Farsi and English.















Small arms ammunition, much of which of Iranian origin too. Although a large number of 23mm rounds were captured, no 23mm guns were seen among the spoils, making it likely the trucks or technicasl they were put on left the scene before the Islamic State took over.












What is believed to be Iranian and (Shiite) Iraqi military gear, left behind by the soldiers formerly stationed here. Images released by the Islamic State showed around a dozen fighters fleeing from their checkpoints, undoubtedly also including Iranian soldiers and Shiite fighters from Iraq.



Article written in collaboration with MENA_Conflict from Type 63: A collection of Musings on Middle East Conflict.

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The peculiarity of the Syrian War, Islamic State captures Shaer gas field for a third time

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By Stijn Mitzer and Joost Oliemans

Shaer gas field, three words that must strike fear into the head of any National Defence Force (NDF) member without any active assignment in Syria. Being stationed at Shaer guarantees heavy action, frequent Islamic State attacks and unfortunately for many drafted recruits, death. The capture of Shaer by the Islamic State on the 5th of May 2016 is the third time that its fighters gained control of the gas field. Shaer and its surrounding checkpoints were under heavy attack since the first of May, and its defenders were ultimately defeated on the 5th of May. The ghaneema (spoils of war) is said to have amounted to no less than twenty T-55s and T-62s, nine howitzers and field guns, ATGMs and a large number of small arms and associated ammunition.

The capture of Shaer stands symbol for a situation that so often happens throughout regime-controlled Syria: Opposing forces overrun poorly trained conscripts defending a location which is massively overstocked with arms, forcing a well-trained and motivated Syrian Arab Army (SyAA) formation to abandon its current offensive in order to recapture the important location that has just been lost, resulting in another stalled offensive or even further terrain loss due to the mass departure of troops. This task is often given to Suheil 'The Tiger' al-Hassan along with his Tiger Force, which was behind the previous two offensives to retake Shaer gas field and will undoubtedly be tasked with recapturing it for a third time again.

While it is not uncommon for places to switch hands several times during the course of the war, losing such an important location three times in just over two years is shocking to say the least. The concentration of armour and artillery both in Shaer and the surrounding checkpoints have always been massive, and should in theory be more than capable of handling the infantry focused tactics empoyed by the Islamic State. A total of thirteen checkpoints were believed to have been set up around Shaer, most with its own armour support or even artillery support. While a suprise Islamic State attack on either one of these checkpoints is incredibly likely to succeed, this puts its fighters within firing range of tanks and artillery stationed at other checkpoints nearby. Indeed, artillery could play a decisive role in keeping fighters of the Islamic State at bay and denying large troop concentrations, especially when assisted by UAVs.

While the concentration of artillery this time around was inferior to the previous defenders, which could call on 122mm 2S1 Gvozdika self-propelled howitzers and 122mm BM-21 Grad MRLs, it still boosted up to nine 122mm D-30 howitzers and 130mm M-46 field guns, two of which have been visually confirmed by footage of Shaer. While these howitzers and field guns thus could prove a valuable asset in the hands of the defenders, one of the two 122mm D-30 howitzers seen in Islamic State released footage was simply dumped into a corner of its base. In fact, both howitzers were in travel mode, and for one gun this likely indicates that is was left untouched after its arrival at Shaer. The same applied for the single 57mm AZP S-60, also in travel position with its associated ammuntion neatly packed behind the anti-aircraft gun.



While it only appears logical to blame the defenders for their failure to propely deploy the equipment assigned to them, the situation is slightly more complicated. While an inspection of the area and its terrain that is to be defended to see what weapon system is needed and where it needs to be placed sounds logical, the distribution of military hardware is often random and does not take into account the limits of the defenders. For example, artillery can be stationed at a location extremely close to the frontline, or worse, stationed at a location where none of the defenders are capable of operating artillery in the first place. This has led to situations were artillery and anti-aircraft guns were simply dumped into a corner or even outside the perimeter of the base due to a lack of manpower to operate them, the defending troops being incapable of operating sophisticating equipment or a lack of suitable terrain and space to deploy these systems.

While the situation is certainly better with self-propelled artillery and armoured fighting vehicles, as these always come with their own crew, these create another major problem however. As the SyAA was deprived of most of its combat power, its tanks stopped operating in pre-exisiting units (or what was left of them after years of fighting and defections) and were instead individually attached to various NDF units or worse, attached to defend locations such as Shaer. As a result, NDF detachments often consist of 'a tank from this brigade, an artillery gun from this regiment, a conscript from Damascus, a conscript from Aleppo and so on'. This results in units which in fact consist of several individual components, which all received their training elsewhere, rather than a well-oiled machine. This is then further worsened by the composition of personnel in many of these units. While some NDF units consist of conscripts and volunteers from the same town or neighbourhood, most units are made up by personnel with other religions and personal motivations, resulting in distrust among its members. Personal motivations for joining the NDF can range to anything from defending one's town to the need to earn money for one's family to having been drafted after walking by a regime checkpoint at the wrong time, put onto a bus and sent to a military base nearby for training.

The fact that such poorly trained, yet overstocked with arms, units remain responsible for protecting highly important locations highlights the chronic shortage of (well trained and motivated) manpower on the side of the regime. A larger influx of Shiite fighters deployed by Iran can only partially solve this issue, which is unlikely to be ever completely resolved.





While the Islamic State was quick to claim that it had captured twenty T-55s and T-62s, nine howitzers and field guns, ATGMs and a large number of small arms and associated ammunition, images and footage of Shaer and its surrounding checkpoints have so far shown the capture of far less equipment. As the previous NDF detachments defending Shaer could also count on around twenty armoured fighting vehicles, the lack of footage could be due to the large amounts of checkpoints captured on the vast size of the terrain that is Shaer.

The heavy armament seen in footage and images included one T-62 Model 1972, two T-55As (one of which upgraded with the addition of a North Korean laser rangefinder) and one BMP-1. All tanks were captured intact, with the image of the first T-55A indicating this tank took part in defending Shaer but was later abandoned by its operators.




Although claiming to have captured nine artillery pieces, the Islamic State only showed off two 122mm D-30 howitzers in its footage. The claim of capturing a single 57mm AZP S-60 was however, confirmed.



The amount of vehicles found left behind at Shaer was substantial, and included at least twelve technicals and four trucks. All 14.5mm KPV guns, at least six of which found, were removed from the technicals by the fighters of the Islamic State however, likely indicating that not all technicals are to be taken with them. The ZPU-4 armed Isuzu gun truck lost all of its 14.5mm barrels in a similar fashion.



Also captured was a single KamAZ 5350, a truck recently delivered to Syria by Russia. While the rebels and the Islamic State already destroyed several of those trucks, they never managed to capture any examples intact.

The defenders used several gun emplacements up-armoured with metal plating in a bid to protect the operator. Mounted on a truck to be taken away further into Islamic State held territory, this 23mm ZU-23 also lost both of its barrels.

While the Islamic State claimed to have captured both 9M133 Kornets and 9M113 Konkurs anti-tank guided missiles (ATGMs), a single 9M133 and one 9M14M Malyutka were the only captured ATGMs shown.


Footage of captured small arms was limited to seven AK(Ms) and two RPG-7s along with associated ammunition. The large but empty crate seen below is more interesting however, as this once used to hold Chinese 120mm rocket assisted projectiles (RAP). An impressive 165 of such rounds were previously captured by fighters of the Islamic State at Ayyash on the 20th of January 2016.


One of the facilities at Shaer functioned as weapon depot, and the dozens of bullet holes indicate the history of the facility in the past two years. 242 crates containing a total of 484 cans for 12.7mm and 14.5mm ammunition, 41 crates of 120mm ammunition for a total of 82 120mm rounds, 18 crates of 7.62x39 and 7.62x54 ammunition, for a total of 1320 rounds per crate for x39, 880 for x54 and another 209 unidentied crates were among the spoils found at Shaer and surrounding checkpoints. Quickly loaded on trucks, these too are likely to have been moved further into Islamic State held territory for distribution to other fronts.





While Shaer will undoubtedly be recaptured in the coming months, it represents the current situation so often seen throughout Syria. With no offensive on Deir ez-Zor or Raqqa in sight, and with the Islamic State still in control of large swaths of lands, this situation will undoubtedly continue for the time being. With the gas production at Shaer for regime-held Syria likely to continue, the capture of this strategic gas field will prove to be more than a propaganda victory and major arms haul, yielding a significant financial benefit as well.

Article written in collaboration with MENA_Conflict from Type 63: A collection of Musings on Middle East Conflict.

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No end in sight: Failed Tabqa offensive reveals underlying shortcomings of regime forces

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The regime's recent offensive against the Islamic State aimed at clearing large parts of desert in Syria's Raqqa Governorate of Islamic State presence took a drastic turn when a counter-attack spread chaos and fear among the forces spearheading the offensive. Completely misjudging the impending danger and incapable of properly anticipating the Islamic State's counter-attack, the offensive collapsed and instead of capturing large swaths of territory, the remaining regime forces were forced on the defensive, eventually being beaten all the way back to their starting point. The outcome of the offensive came as a surprise to many, not in the least because its exact goals remained unclear for some.

While some were quick to state the offensive was an attempt to capture the Islamic State's capital Raqqa or even to reach the besieged garrison in Deir ez-Zor, the actual goal of the offensive was to capture Tabqa airbase and from there to move on to the actual town of Tabqa itself. Much of the confusion originated from the unofficial name tied to the offensive: ''To Raqqa'', which actually meant this offensive was only the beginning of regime operations in the Governorate of Raqqa rather than directly capturing Raqqa itself. If the attempt at capturing Tabqa would have proved successful, this would have completely cut off the remaining road connections to the Islamic State from the outside world, and allowed the regime to use Tabqa as a staging base for future operations into the Islamic State's heartland. Thanks to the ambitious nature of the offensive, it could be seen as a gauge indicating the measure to which regime forces are capable of coordinating after the severe transformations it has been forced to undergo in the previous years. This is especially true after President Bashar al-Assad vowed to liberate 'Every Inch of Syria from Terrorism' in a speech adressed to Syria's parliament on the 7th of June, five days after the offensive had started.

The offensive appeared to have been timed perfectly to coincide with another major operation taking place against the Islamic State in Northern Syria. This offensive, carried out by the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), was aimed at capturing the town of Manbij and the nearby Manbij Pocket. Holding this region is absolutely crucial for the Islamic State, as losing it could also result in losing the last remaining road connection to Turkey. It was previously thought that the Islamic State would prove unable to commit sufficient forces to two entire different fronts so close to each other, but time would eventually show just how false this belief was.

While a successful conclusion of the offensive thus would have seriously hampered the Islamic State's capabilities to bring in supplies and foreign fighters via Turkey, not to mention the fact that cutting off the Islamic State's sole remaining road connection to Turkey in general would be a major propaganda victory for the regime, neither the current military situation on the ground nor the state of the regime's military allowed for such a zealous undertaking. In fact, one could argue that the very existence of this offensive in the first place rather than its catrastophic outcome is representative of the poor state of the regime and its armed forces.


The regime's intentions of taking the fight to the Islamic State rather than repelling and counter-attacking Islamic State offensives throughout Syria first became clear in early 2016, when the National Defence Force's (NDF) Golan Regiment arrived in the town of Ithiriya, from where the offensive would later be launched. The area around the town would see sporadic engagements aimed at testing the Islamic State's capabilities and willingness to defend this area in the months that followed. This would later prove a catrastophic miscalculation, as the initial situation encountered around Ithiriya was in no way representative of the Islamic State's true strength and willingness to defend this important location.

Due to the sheer length of the front the Islamic State currently has to defend against a variety of factions, it can't commit large numbers of fighters to a particular location. This is especially true for the area around Ithiriya, which due to the flat terrain and lack of easily defended obstacles (such as towns and oilfields) is nigh on impossible to defend. Concentrating large numbers of Islamic State fighters here would be senseless, as they wouldn't have any location to fall back to when routed, forcing them to flee into the open desert as easy targets for chasing regime forces.

Instead, the garrison deployed around Ithiriya, defending the crucial Ithiriya-Raqqa highway, only consisted of a small contingent of Islamic State fighters. This contingent was beaten back by the regime's first 'probing offensive' in February and March, which was halted after the Islamic State launched a diversionary attack near Khanasir. As the Syrian Arab Army (SyAA), National Defence Force and Shiite militias stationed here proved incapable of handling Khanasir alone, all effort went into defending and later recapturing lost positions around Khanasir, effectively ending operations near Ithiriya.



It was only during May 2016 when large numbers of regime forces started arriving in Ithiriya, ultimately said to be totalling up to 5000 soldiers, although the actual number is believed to be slightly lower. This is when the first major problem came into being. As the five-year long war has starved the regime's military of equipment, supplies but foremost manpower, gathering such a large amount of soldiers can nowadays only be achieved by pulling several brigades, regiments and militias together. These are then supposed to act as a unified army, but the past five years have shown us that such 'unified' formations are usually extremely inefficient in their operations.

This is only worsened by the decentralisation of the Syrian military into the National Defence Force (NDF) and dozens of other large and small militias nowadays responsible for regime operations throughout the country. The large numbers of soldiers that defected from the Syrian Arab Army (SyAA) and the sheer ineffectiveness of what remained led to the partial dissolvement of the SyAA. Although the SyAA remained in control of the many bases littered throughout Syria, much of its remaining offensive capabilities were stripped and subsequently handed over to the various militias, with the NDF receiving much of the manpower and equipment. This practically meant the end for Syria's once prestigious mechanised brigades, previously boasting up to 2500 tanks.

While transferring manpower and equipment to various militias that were deemed more trustworthy and loyal to the regime appeared logical at the time, it ended up creating a whole host of major problems that could potentially spiral out control in the future. While the move was absolutely necessary for the survival of the regime, it showed that the army that was once estimated to be one of the most powerful in the Middle East was actually completely dysfunctional. The results of decades of sectarianism, corruption and bad management on every level became painfully clear, and had simply eroded the SyAA to the point of total inoperability.





While the creation of numerous small militias proved to be extremely successful, spawning various highly-motivated regiments standing their ground in most fights, the expansion of the NDF recreated the problems encountered with the SyAA on several occasions, and sometimes actually worsened them. The NDF was originally established with the aim of raising up units willing to defend their town or neighbourhood against incursions by rebels. Such NDF units were composed of armed locals tasked with manning checkpoints and patrolling their neighbourhood or town. In essence, it obeyed the pure definition of a militia in its founding days. With the partial dissolvement of the SyAA, the NDF further expanded and partially replaced the SyAA as the regime's army. New units were erected and existing ones expanded, now including everything from convictees, men that solely enlisted for money and soldiers using the original equipment from what was once the SyAA.

This meant that a militia once comprised of local volunteers now inherited soldiers and equipment from various SyAA units, and saw its tasks expanding from guarding neighbourhoods to undertaking offensives elsewhere and guarding towns, gasfields and other strategic installations on the other side of Syria. This meant that once highly-motivated men that enlisted to defend their neighbourhood against Sunni rebels could now be manning checkpoints in Sunni-dominated towns. As these men often enlisted with the sole reason of protecting their minority neighbourhood, they have zero interest in defending a Sunni-dominated town from rebels, leading to a situation that is very prevalant in Syria, where defending regime forces flee instead of defending their designated town because they see no personal benefit in holding it. This is why countries ordinarily employ armies composed of professional soldiers, which when undertaking operations don't base their actions on their private reasoning, but on the reasoning on the state it serves. These soldiers defend gasfields because they're ordered to, knowing that the continuing flow of gas generates income for the country, which will eventually help it win the war.

While this already renders large parts of NDF units combat ineffective for anything but manning checkpoints, the Syrian High Command made the crucial mistake of individually attaching armoured fighting vehicles (AFVs) to militias instead of letting them operate in pre-existing armoured formations, albeit attached to the NDF. This results in some NDF regiments consisting solely of individual components rather than a well-oiled machine of interconnecting units.




But perhaps the most serious problem with the different forces fighting for the regime is that some units have become so powerful that these are now essentially private armies. Many of these elite units consist mainly of Alawites originating from Syria's coastal region or minorities (mostly Druzes) and are extremely sectarian as a result. These units make up much of the regime's offensive capabilities, and received the largest share of Russian-supplied weaponry in the past year, including T-90s. The now infamous Tiger Forces, led by Suheil 'The Tiger' al-Hassan and Suqour al-Sahraa' (The Desert Falcons) are the best-known examples of these private armies, and appear to be neither under SyAA or NDF command, but rather taking orders straight from the Syrian High Command or President Bashar al-Assad. This means that if one of these two units operate alongside SyAA or NDF units, different commanders from different branches of the regime's military are issuing different orders while both pursuing the exact same objective. It does occasionally happen that either of the two units take command and issues orders to forces of other branches, but this creates a whole host of other problems as many of the (semi-)independent militias are anything but keen to receive orders from a different branch (which was indeed a common complaint heard during the offensive on Tabqa). This proved to be less of a problem at Tadmur, where the Russian Armed Forces had considerable influence upon the whole operation.

Another not unimportant shortcoming in the regime's tactics is the fact that it constantly moves its most capable units (Suqour al-Sahraa' and the Tiger Forces) throughout Syria when another position is about to run over or has been run over, forcing either of the two units to abandon their current operations. This has led to a string of unfinished offensives costing precious fuel, equipment and manpower. This also applies to the capture of Tadmur (Palmyra), the capture of which would have been justified if it had been taken with the aim of further advancing towards the besieged town of Deir ez-Zor. But instead of chasing the Islamic State all the way to the gates of Deir ez-Zor, which would have proved to be relatively easy as there were no major Islamic State strongholds between Tadmur and Deir ez-Zor, the regime halted its operations after seizing Tadmur. As the town of Tadmur and its archaeological remains had little military value to the regime, its capture turned out to mostly part of a PR-stunt likely aimed at showing the world the Syrian regime and Russia were defeating terrorism in Syria.



While the SyAA and NDF have recently begun advancing in the direction of al-Sukhna, located in between Tadmur and Deir ez-Zor, the units participating in these assaults consist of poorly trained units operating a hodgepodge of equipment and arms. Although supported by the Russian Army, it recently took huge losses when an Islamic State vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED) managed to reach their positions, resulting in the death of a Russian serviceman and large numbers of regime fighters. The large amount of time between the capture of Tadmur and renewed operations in this region gave the Islamic State plenty of time to construct defensive fortifications, and any serious offensive aimed at overtaking them would require the deployment of either the Tiger Forces or Suqour al-Sahraa'. Had regime forces advanced immediately they could've taken advantage of the fact that IS forces were routing with little order or coordination, and possibly break open the road towards Deir ez-Zor in one fell swoop.

This brings us back to the Tabqa offensive, where all of the points mentioned above in combination with a gross underestimation of the Islamic State's capabilities, poor planning, greatly exposed flanks and a lack of Russian support which was desperately needed to make such an operation succeed led to a veritable disaster.

The force tasked with capturing Tabqa airbase and the town of Tabqa itself consisted of no less than eleven different branches and factions out of three (technically four) different countries, comprising Suqour al-Sahraa', the Syrian Arab Army (further divided into at least two regiments, at least believed to have been part of the 4th Armoured Division), the Syrian Arab Air Force, the National Defence Force (further divided into the Golan Regiment and several smaller regiments), the Syrian Social Nationalist Party (SSNP), the Ba'ath Brigades, the Arab Nationalist Guard, the Republican Guard, Hizbullah, the Russian Army and the Russian Air Force, each operating its own tanks and equipment. In addition, the Syrian Navy Seals also took part in the operation, although it remains unknown under what branch this unit serves. No Shiite militias are believed to have taken part in the fighting, likely due to their preoccupation with holding the front in Southern Aleppo.


This force could call upon large numbers of tanks, artillery, multiple rocket launchers (MRLs), the Syrian Arab Air Force's (SyAAF) assets, including fighter-bombers and attack helicopers, the Russian Army's 291th artillery brigade operating 152mm 2A65 Msta-Bs and the Russian Air Force's (RuAF) Mi-24s forward deployed at Kweres airbase. The composition of tanks used by the various branches and factions involved in the conflict give a clear image of the current state of the regime's military and the logistical nightmare in equipping each and every tank with the right type of ammunition and spare parts. Participating in the offensive were: T-90s, T-72Bs, T-72AVs, a T-72AV 'TURMS-T', T-72M1s, T-62 Model 1967s and T-62 Model 1972s, T-55As, T-55Ms and T-55(A)MVs and BMP-1s. Artillery support was in the hands of truck-mounted anti-aircraft guns, Syrian-manned 122mm D-30 howitzers and 130mm M-46 field-guns and truck-mounted 107mm MRLs, 122mm BM-21s, IRAMs and 220mm BM-27s. The Russian Army provided one battery of 152mm 2A65 Msta-B howitzers. Surprisingly, the Russian Air Force limited its support to several Mi-24s, leaving the SyAAF to provide fast jets for aerial support to the advancing troops. The SyAAF however remains incapable of providing the same degree of air support as the RuAF has been doing over the past year. The SyAAF's SA-342 and Mi-25 attack helicopters also made an appearance over the battlefield, but ended up seeing almost no use during the offensive. Whether this was due to a lack of coordination between the SyAAF and the forces on the ground or due to a lack of sufficient operational airframes in the area remains unknown.




Altogether, these units posed an impressive force on paper. While the aerial support provided by the RuAF and the SyAAF was not up to the same standards seen during the offensive on Tadmur, the largely flat terrain around Tabqa was a huge advantage to the regime, sharply contrasting the mountainous area surrounding Tadmur. The force was mobilised for the upcoming offensive on the 1st of June, which was launched a day later. Spearheading the offensive was Suqour al-Sahraa', which deployed its Russian-delivered T-90s, T-72Bs, GAZ Tigers, Iveco LMs and armoured Ural-4320s, along with Russian advisors. Behind Suqour al-Sahraa' came the rest of the force, with the more experienced units operating closer to Suqour al-Sahraa' than the poorly trained units operating in the back and flanks. This immediately proved to be a problem however, as communication between such large numbers of units taking part has to be excellent in order to advance at the same time, inform other units about possible incoming attacks and to coordinate a possible retreat. Communication between all units was completely inadequate however, which would eventually result in the catastrophic defeat.

Another major issue was the location of the offensive, which cut right through Islamic State-held territory alongside the Ithiriya-Raqqa highway. This left the main force exposed on two sides, leaving them extremely vulnerable to counterattacks. Additionally, the forces designated to protect these flanks were poorly trained and equipped. Although this was indeed a potential recipe for disaster, and source of worry for many following the offensive over the past weeks, the Islamic State efforts at flanking regime forces proved problematic, but ultimately not the reason for its actual defeat.

The offensive, launched on the 2nd of June 2016, made its way from Ithiriya through territory previously captured during February. The Islamic State had mined the road plentiful before the start of offensive, which would prove a nuisance for the regime forces early on, but grow perpetually more problematic over time. While some IEDs were carefully camouflaged or even disguised as rocks, the placement of mines often left much to desire. A map showing the strategic situation before the offensive can be seen below, including the territory previously captured East of Ithiriya back in February 2016. All maps by Peto Lucem, click on them to enlarge.

The offensive had only been going on for two days before it was already hailed as a major success. Namely, it had managed to enter Raqqa Governorate, of high symbolic value for any major party fighting in the Syrian Civil War. Elements of the Syrian Arab Army (SyAA) and Syrian Arab Air Force (SyAAF) were kicked out of Raqqa Governorate just under two years ago, when fighters of the Islamic State captured Division 17, Brigade 93 and Tabqa airbase, thereby completely ending the regime's presence in this part of the country.

The regime forces encountered only sporadic resistance in the first days, allowing it to further advance towards Tabqa airbase with relative ease. This has much to do with the terrain, which due to a lack of prominent terrain features or towns was extremely difficult to defend. The Islamic State deployed several T-55s, technicals, truck-based VBIEDs and artillery to counter or at least slow down the regime's advances, but these lone units made easy targets for the regime's superior firepower. The resulting battles saw the destruction of one T-55, another example captured intact, one 122mm BM-21 captured (originally captured at Shaer back in July 2014) alongside a single 122mm D-30 howitzer, one seizure of a truck-based VBIED, one BMP-based VBIED and several technicals. Interestingly, the Islamic State also deployed several UAVs to the theatre, at least two of which were shot down by the use of 14.5mm ZPU-4s and 23mm ZU-23s.[1][2]

The contingent spearheading the offensive meanwhile captured the small settlement of Abu al-Elaj on the 4th of June. This is where the Islamic State made its first true stand and even attempted a counter-attack to take the village back after losing it. This would have cut the the road between Ithiriya and the contingent speadheading the offensive, showing how vulnerable the whole operation was. In spite of their efforts, Abu al-Elaj and its surroundings remained in regime control during the offensive.


The sighting of the first BMP-based VBIED on the 3rd of June, the driver of which was killed before coming in a range close enough to detonate its deadly payload, revealed a now familiar identification marking. This black square reads: الدولة الإسلامية - 'Islamic State', جيش الخلافة - 'The Caliphate Army' (Jaish al-Khilafa) followed by a unique serial number. While many thought this black square referred to the particular tank or VBIED being in service of an Islamic State unit called 'Jaish al-Khilafa', the black square is actually applied on any armoured fighting vehicle (AFV), including VBIEDs, overhauled by the Islamic State's armour workshop in Raqqa, whose conversions will be covered in a future article.


At least three BMP-based VBIEDs would be sent off against advancing regime forces during the course of the offensive. Remarkably, not one managed to actually detonate its payload, and all three were captured intact, comprisingvehicles with serial numbers '212', '202' and '222'. Only '222' was immobilised after being hit, which severely damaged the vehicle and blew off its tracks.


While some might find using the BMP-1 as an VBIED an absolute waste of a precious AFV, this has proved to be an extremely popular conversion in the Islamic State. Not only is the vehicle perfectly suited for this role due to the spaciousness of its troop compartment, the BMP-1's 73mm 2A28 Grom main gun is next to useless in long range engagements so often seen in the Syrian desert anyway, often reducing the vehicle's role to a mere battle taxi when used conventionally. This effectively means that the Islamic State immediately converts captured BMPs to VBIEDs in desert areas, while continuing to operate them as an AFV in urban areas.

After having cleared Abu al-Elaj and its surroundings, the contingent spearheading the offensive further advanced along the Ithiriya-Raqqa highway, securing several other small settlements along the road. Traces of previous fighting when the Islamic State first captured this area were evident throughout the offensive. Most of these settlements were then fortified to prepare for a potential surprise attack by the Islamic State. Footage showing the chaotic advance of regime forces along the highway gave the impression of an immense and well-equipped militia rather than that of a true army.

Despite this, regime forces reached and cleared the crucial Safiya crossroad and the nearby Sufyan oilfield just over a week after launching the offensive. The main contingent was now to leave the highway leading to Raqqa and head North to Tabqa airbase. But instead of continuing the offensive and thus giving the Islamic State no time to strenghten their positions along the road heading to Tabqa and Tabqa airbase itself, the whole offensive came to a grinding halt. While this also gave regime forces time to fortify their previous gains and further secure the highway, it would ultimately prove to be a fatal mistake. Namely, while this short lull might have been an attractive choice for a variety of reasons, it allowed the Islamic State to gather forces for a counter-attack, which is exactly what occurred. Fighters and vehicles from Raqqa immediately began arriving in Tabqa, where they joined units already present here. Largely consisting of foreign fighters, these well-equipped forces would prove to be determined enough to be capable of stopping the offensive dead in its tracks.

Although deeply infiltrated in most other major rebel forces, the Syrian regime has so far proved incapable of infiltrating in the Islamic State on a large scale. While the lack of intelligence could be countered by the regime's aircraft, helicopters and UAVs by conducting aerial reconnaissance between Raqqa and Tabqa, these sorties were never flown and thus this build-up of troops remained unnoticed to the regime forces.


With only limited resistance encountered during the previous weeks, a large part of the contingent spearheading the offensive was pulled out of the theatre for deployment elsewhere, leaving behind well trained troops with only light equipment and poorly trained troops with heavy equipment. The force that stayed behind was apparently deemed capable of reaching the operation's intended objectives with consideration of the limited resistance encountered so far. This analysis excluded the newly arrived Islamic State forces from Raqqa however, which despite its small size compared to the thousands of regime fighters previously present here, boasted not only armoured fighting vehicles, but also plenty of U.S. arms and equipment originally captured in Mosul back in the summer of 2014. This force would prove to be more than capable of reversing the regime's gains it made in the weeks prior.

Unaware of the impending danger, the Syrian Navy Seals made their way to Thawra oilfield on the 18th of June. Being not particularly well defended, Thawra was captured shortly after. Although now only around fourteen kilometers away from Tabqa airbase, this would prove to be the last advance of regime forces during this offensive.

Although capturing Thawra oilfield with relative ease, the Syrian Navy Seals soon clashed with the vanguard of the newly-arrived Islamic State unit from Raqqa, leading to fierce fighting on the outskirts of Thawra. In no position to defend the oilfield, the Syrian Navy Seals then retreated and called in fire support, which came in the form of a barrage of artillery shells as well as cluster bombs delivered by the SyAAF raining down on the fighters of the Islamic State. Completely clueless about what kind of unit they just had run into to, the Syrian Navy Seals made another attempt at advancing, only to find themselves ambushed by the Islamic State, which responded with ATGM strikes against the Syrian Navy Seals' technicals and trucks. These strikes resulted in the destruction of several vehicles, including a Russian-delivered armoured Ural-4320. Although the partial remains of two T-72M1s were encountered at Thawra, these were likely present since the Islamic State first took over the oilfield, once again showing how mere visual observation of wreckage from available footage does not provide an entirely accurate picture of losses.








Graffiti on a wall inside the compound Thawra oilfield of reading صقور الصحراء - 'The Desert Hawks', a limited number of which were still believed to have been present during the assault.

Outmanoeuvred and outgunned, the Syrian Navy Seals then quickly retreated to the Safiya crossroad and the nearby Sufyan oilfield, where instead of anticipating and preparing for the impending assault, most regime forces simply fled. Although it remains unknown what triggered the regime forces to flee, the whole situation was reminiscent of the total collapse of regime forces in al-Sukhna, T3 pumping station, Arak, Hulayhilah, and Tadmur in May 2015. Within hours, the remaining regime forces packed their gear and fled along the same road it had advanced on in the previous weeks, in what was described by regime sources as an ''organised retreat''. Although part of the retreat indeed gave the impression of being relatively well organised, the mere fact that it did not actually include all forces stationed here is a testament to the poor communication between units within the offensive. The bewildered part of the contingent that was left behind was quickly overwhelmed by the superior Islamic State forces.



Images showing vehicles and equipment used by fighters of the Islamic State near the Safiya crossroad. The T-72M1 has been upgraded with additional armour on the front of the turret and additional side skirts on both sides of the tank. A U.S. M1114 from Iraq can be seen in the second image, although it remains unknown if it was used by or instead captured by the Islamic State. The latter seems more likely as it appears to have been abandoned and faces towards Islamic State held territory rather than the other way around.



After securing the Safiya crossroad, the fighters of the Islamic State began advancing along the same road the regime forces had previously fought for. This convoy moved through the open desert at high speed, completely untouched by the Syrian Arab Air Force. According to several regime sources, this was the case due to a sandstorm which prevented the SyAAF from striking the advancing fighters of the Islamic State. The images below however show no such no sandstorm taking place during the Islamic State's advance from Safiya along the Ithiriya-Raqqa highway.


While having captured several armoured fighting vehicles and a 122mm BM-21 Grad MRL weeks before, the regime forces now left behind more than they had originally captured from the Islamic State. These forces here must have left in a hurry, as one abandonded BM-21 suffered only from a flat tire, which could simply have been ignored or replaced by the spare tyre located at the back of the truck's cabin.










The remains of several vehicles hit early on during the regime's offensive were also found alongside the road. The T-62 below fell victim to an ATGM strike while the technical got hit by an IED. The blast responsible for taking it out was so powerful that it not only blew the front of the vehicle away, but also activated the airbags of the driver and passenger seats.






Interestingly, these vehicles also included the remains of a Russian KAMAZ-63501AT artillery towing truck used by the 291th artillery brigade deployed to the theatre in support of the regime's forces. One of the trucks drove over an IED during the initial stages of the offensive, resulting in its destruction. Although the Islamic State claimed this led to the death of three Russian servicemen, this claim couldn't be independently verified.

With no serious opposition encountered until this point, the Islamic State then pressed on to the settlement of Abu al-Elaj and the SyriaTel towers along the Ithiriya-Raqqa highway. Such isolated positions, while often overstocked with arms, have proven to be extremely vulnerable to rebel and Islamic State attacks during the course of the war. Along the highway, these outposts were defended by relatively poorly trained troops, which were in no way capable of stopping the more experienced fighters of the Islamic State.




An Islamic State convoy leaving the highway for the SyriaTel towers. Even though they represented easy targets for the Syrian Arab Air Force, the SyAAF was nowhere to be found after initially striking the fighters of the Islamic State when capturing Thawra oilfield and the Safiya crossroads.




Several vehicles were destroyed near the SyriaTel towers. Although heavy usage of VBIEDs by the Islamic State was reported during their counter-attack, these were not seen in footage shot by the Amaq News Agency covering the offensive.


Ghaneema (spoils of war) from the regime's positions near the SyriaTel towers included one BMP-1, multiple trucks, ATGMs, small arms and the equipment such as the tents the contingent defending the positions were sleeping in. At least two regime soldiers were captured alive, although their final fate remains unknown.










And as such it happened to be that a small group of Islamic State fighters along with associated vehicles and just two tanks had completely reversed an offensive undertaken by thousands of men with dozens of tanks, artillery and air support. Not only did they manage to take back all the territory the Islamic State had lost during the regime's offensive,the fighters of the Islamic State even gained new territory and is now marching on the town of Ithiriya. Of course, it is unlikely that they will be capable of actually taking Ithiriya for now, but the mere fact that it is now being threatened shows the degree to which the once daring offensive has now backfired.

In an effort to defend the catastrophe of Tabqa, the regime and its supporters went to entirely new lengths to put the blame on anything but the military's incompetence. Some argued the offensive was nothing more than a probing attack, to see what the Islamic State's military response would be like. Russia was blamed for not providing the much-needed air support, although the extent to which it would be participating was already known to the regime before launching the offensive. The whole undertaking was said to be an idea of Russia, in which the regime was forced to take part. Others claimed weather conditions had supposedly prevented the SyAAF from striking the Islamic State, despite the fact that the weather was in favour of the regime during the entirety of offensive. Some even claimed the Islamic State's ''hundreds of VBIEDs'' simply proved too much for the forces taking part in the offensive, attributing the failure purely to the suicidal nature of the Islamic State's tactics.But worst of all, the various branches of the regime's military blamed each other for the failed offensive. Suqour al-Sahraa' blamed the SyAA and militias taking part in the offensive for not actually taking part in the offensive, while the SyAA and militias blamed Suqour al-Sahraa' for taking part in the offensive and then suddenly not taking part in the offensive anymore, leaving poorly trained troops to fight for themselves.

The catastrophic outcome of the regime's attempt at directly challenging the Islamic State's heartland must have not only amazed those following the offensive, but also the regime's military itself. Once thought to be amongst the most powerful armies of the Middle East, the biggest enemy of the Syrian Arab Army didn't prove to be Israel or Ba'athist Iraq, but the Syrian regime itself. The sectarianism, corruption and complete denial of reality so deeply embedded in its way of governing not only contributed to dragging Syria into an endless Civil War, but also completely debilitated the Syrian Armed Forces as an effective fighting force. In the past five years of conflict the regime's military has so far proven to be entirely incapable of adapting to the type of warfare necessary to operate in the Syrian Civil War. As the core issues of the Syrian Arab Republic have only worsened over the past five years, it appears unlikely that the Syrian Arab Army will ever manage to present itself as a properly functioning military as long as the Ba'ath Party remains in power.

The failure atTabqa plunged the Syrian Arab Army into an all time low, not only because it was made painfully clear that President Bashar al-Assad's vision of bringing back 'Every Inch of Syria' under its control is currently a completely absurd notion, but also because it increased hostilities between the various forces participating in the offensive. With the regime's military proven to be an unreliable partner for Russia, and with Syria's role as a weapons depot and supply line for Hizbullah well secured for Iran and Hizbullah, it is not unlikely that the regime's inability to conquer and secure more territory will lead to increased calls and pressure to allow for self-governing of certain parts of Syria. In any case, the needless waste of manpower, equipment and perhaps most of all morale shines a poignant light on the fact that there's still no end in sight for Syria's devastating war.

Back and Forth: How the Islamic State retook Tadmur

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By Stijn Mitzer and Joost Oliemans

While the city of Tadmur has been recaptured again by the Syrian military on the 2nd of March 2017, this article will be released to give insight in the Islamic State's offensive to capture the city on the 11th of December 2016. An article covering the subsequent recapture of Tadmur by the Syrian military is to follow soon.

The ancient city of Palmyra has become a symbol in the world's fight against the Islamic State. It represents one of the few places where every (non-IS) party agrees on the ultimate fate of the city and its archaeological ruins, this in sharp contrast to other cities and locations elsewhere in Syria and Iraq. Indeed, Palmyra holds a special place in the hearts of many, and preserving this symbol of civilisation is not only in the interest of Syrians, but for mankind in general. Despite its cultural significance, the ancient ruins are a mere collection of bricks in the face of civilian casualties during the course of the Civil War, which are thought to range in the hunderds of thousands. The regime's decision to prioritise the ruins of Palmyra (Tadmur) over strategic targets in March 2016 would ultimately result in failure, losing control over Tadmur for the second time on the 11th of December 2016.

The sudden fall of Tadmur came as a surprise to many following the Syrian Civil War, as there appeared to be no imminent threat to the city less than a week before its fall. Taking place less than nine months after the recapture of Tadmur by units of the Syrian Arab Army, Hizbullah, Shiite militias and the Russian Armed Forces, and one-and-a-half years after the Islamic State captured Tadmur for the first time, the speed and relative ease by which the Islamic State captured the town in less than three days must even have surprised the Islamic State itself, recapturing much of the ground it previously lost in May 2015. The large concentration of Islamic State fighters in and around Tadmur then threatened installations deeper into regime-held Syria, including T4 airbase. Despite this threat, it should be mentioned that Fortress T4 is among the best defended military installations in Syria, and the Islamic State indeed proved unable to overcome its strong defences once again.

The capture of Tadmur by the Islamic State came as the latest in a string of events swiftly unfolding throughout Syria at the end of 2016. In Aleppo, much of the rebel-held areas have been brought back under regime control, with the remaining rebel pocket crushed after vast artillery strikes just a day after the fall of Tadmur. Meanwhile, further North the Free Syrian Army backed by Turkey recently captured the Islamic State stronghold of al-Bab. While one could argue these events are directly related to the Islamic State's decision to attack now, rumours about the departure of much of the remaining contingent of defenders in the days before the capture might have played a more important role in the Islamic State's decision to act now. Having a clear view of the city from the mountainous area around Tadmur, it is at least possible that the Islamic State closely followed the situation inside the city before launching an offensive. Either way, many of the fighters involved were relocated from elsewhere in Islamic State held territory, suggesting the planning for the offensive had already been underway for quite some time.

The developments provided the Islamic State with the perfect opportunity to shift away attention from its recent setbacks in Mosul, where the Iraqi Army along with Shiite militias are engaged in a gruelling campaign aimed at taking back the largest city currently under Islamic State control. Being in control of Tadmur also gave the Islamic State another opportunity to prolong its control over parts of Syria, as larger cities such as Tadmur can be extremely time-consuming and costly to recapture once its fighters are dug in. In similar fashion, the Islamic State currently still attempts to gain complete control over Deir ez-Zor, but remains and in the future will likely remain unable to do so. Nonetheless, the prospect of a relief of the city by regime forces, prerequisites for which are control of Tadmur and al-Sukhna, had once again been set back massively, and the situation in Deir ez-Zor was looking all the more dire for it as a result. The capture of large amounts of weaponry, vehicles and other equipment will also have been a great bounty for the Islamic State, as such equipment can be easily distributed to its fighters elsewhere. Furthermore, the Islamic State soon continued its efforts to demolish the ancient ruins of Palmyra, attempting to use them as a propaganda tool for revenging its recent defeats and deterring its opponents from advancing further.Indeed, satellite imagery dating from January revealed that the Islamic State had begun demolishing several ancient structures, including the Tetrapylon and the Roman Theater. The heavy damage done to the latter is an unfortunate result of the 'Praying for Palmyra - Music revives ancient ruins' concert held here by Russia in March 2016, after which the Islamic State promised to demolish the theater upon return to the city.



Before going into detail on the capture of Tadmur itself, it is insightful to consider the regime's own offensive to recapture the city back in March 2016, which ended in success after over two weeks of fighting. Although promising at first, with the prospective of clearing a path to the besieged city of Deir ez-Zor looming, the offensive halted after pushing the Islamic State just out of the city's borders (liberating the city itself but little of the surrounding terrain), and the front had since then remained more or less stationary. This allowed the Islamic State to maintain a presence on the outskirts of the city, from where they even had a view of Tadmur airbase. During this time sporadic clashes continued, but no large scale offensive were undertaken by either side. Despite the lack of Islamic State attempts to retake the city, the defence of the city was a costly task in terms of manpower required to garrison it, and considering the fact these forces were direly needed in other parts of the country the value of the offensive was questionable in the first place. Indeed, the Islamic State had made no serious attempts to push further into regime-held territory after failing to overcome the extensive regime fortifications present around T4 airbase after it first captured Tadmur in May 2015, and from this location the area could have been kept secure until a full scale offensive against the Islamic State proper would have become a possibility. This optimism was reflected by the subsequent attempt at marching on Raqqa, which also failed disastrously after much of the forces involved fled from an Islamic State counter-attack.

Surprisingly, the Islamic State left large parts of the ancient city intact during its one year rule of Tadmur, and its subsequent capture by the Syrian Arab Army (SyAA), Hizbullah, Shiite militias and the Russian Armed Forces was hailed as a victory for mankind. Indeed, the recapture of Tadmur was an extremely well-orchestrated PR-stunt, aimed at showing the world that with Russia involved, terrorism on Syrian soil would be eradicated. To mark the success of the offensive, a triumphal concert was broadcasted into the world, hailing the victory over the Islamic State.

Despite Tadmur's vulnerability, significant forces were stationed around the city at the time of capture, supported by copious amounts of artillery, tanks and the Russian and Syrian air forces. Nonetheless, the mountainous terrain surrounding Tadmur can work both to the advantage and disadvantage of defending forces by giving a clear view of the city and its landscape. While in the hands of the defenders they can enhance the defensive overview of the battlefield, when lost to the enemy they provide an ideal position from which to attack the city. Losing one of these positions could quickly result in the city being overrun, which was exactly what happened during the Islamic State's December offensive.

The supposed arrival of hundreds or even thousands of Islamic State fighters from Mosul directly through Coalition patrolled territory prior to the start of the offensive was reported by the regime, but serves as nothing more than a poor excuse to hide the regime's own lack of anticipation on the deployment of Islamic State forces outside of Tadmur. Indeed, the relocation of large numbers of Islamic State forces and armour should have been easily noticable to Russian and Syrian intelligence forces prior to the attack as many of the units directly came from Raqqa. Even if the unlikely mass exodus of Islamic State fighters from Iraq to Tadmur took place, this should have become known to the regime well in advance of the Islamic State's offensive.

Defending Tadmur were numerous units part of the National Defence Force (NDF), remnants of the Syrian Arab Army's 11th and 18th divisions, elements of the Afghan Liwa Fatemiyoun brigade (de-facto part of Iran's Revolutionary Guards) and a small number of Tiger Forces, supported by an unknown number of Russian soldiers left in the city. Two major defensive positions surrounded Tadmur, comprising the mountainous area North of the city and the grain silos East of the city. If any of these were to fall, especially the position North of the city, the fall of Tadmur itself would essentially be inevitable. The regime was more than aware of this fact, and diverted much attention to the defence of the Northern and Eastern flanks of Tadmur. Although bolstering the defence of the city with large amounts of heavy weaponry, the lack of a well-led harmonious force in charge of defending the city was to leave its traces during the subsequent Islamic State offensive.

This brings us back to the actual offensive, where the attack would, in true Islamic State fashion, commence with the use of VBIEDs (the Islamic State's morbid equivalent of an airstrike). This type of suicide vehicle is not only effective in its destructive power, but even more so as a psychological weapon. This had its intended effect, and regime forces stationed Northeast of Tadmur were routed en masse in the resulting chaos. The Islamic State forces that followed mounted an offensive from this position and despite reports of heavy shelling and airstrikes continued to push closer to Tadmur itself. Most of the troops that fled appear not to have regrouped at Tadmur but instead fled directly to 'Fortress T4' itself, an indication of the poor state of the regime's military in this region. During the conquest for the city weaknesses in the Syrian and Russian air forces were apparent, diminishing the regime's chances of holding onto the city. Largely reliant on iron bombs and hindered by poor coordination, little impact was made by airstrikes in the early stages of the battle, contrasting with battles such as the conquest for Kobanê, where effective use of airpower prevented the Islamic State from capturing the city in a turning point in the war. Later heavy Russian air strikes would apparently temporarily halt the Islamic State's advance on Tadmur forcing them to regroup, but these efforts would prove to be too little too late. The ease with which the Islamic State can move through the open desert undetected remains a serious problem for the regime, and the loss of Tadmur could directly be attributed to this fact.



Although the actual number of Islamic State fighters that participated in the Tadmur offensive remains unknown, the presence of numerous tanks upgraded by the 'The Workshop' hinted at a significant redeployment of personnel and equipment from Raqqa to Tadmur. 'The Workshop' is the Islamic State's largest armour workshop in Syria, and has produced a wide range of armour upgrades for the around two-hundred tanks captured and operated by the Islamic State since 2014.

The defenders could count on around forty armoured fighting vehicles (AFVs), around thirty of which tanks. Interestingly, most of the tanks were held back in the city itself, likely to be used in a future regime offensive to advance deeper into Islamic State held Central Syria. Instead of deploying these tanks in the defence of the city, most appear not to have moved since the Islamic State commenced its attack. While one could blame the defenders for not deploying these tanks on the city's perimeter, the exodus of regime forces out of Tadmur left the remaining defenders with numerous tanks, but no personnel to move them.

Interestingly, some of the fighters that had previously fled to T4 airbase returned to Tadmur, reinforcing the remnants of the NDF, the Liwa Fatemiyoun brigade, the 18th and 11th Division and the Tiger Forces that stayed behind. While a welcome addition to the by then badly depleted defenders, their arrival would ultimately turn out to be too little support, too late. The region around Tadmur was also put under pressure, preventing these positions from offering assistance to the defence of the city.

The defence of the other major obstacle for the Islamic State on the road of Tadmur, the Grain Silos, was in the hands of Liwa Fatemiyoun, an AfghanShiite militia part of Iran's Revolutionary Guards. Liwa Fatemiyoun took part in the regime's first offensive to drive the Islamic State out of Tadmur and its surroundings, and had maintained a presence here ever since. Although their performance throughout Syria has been mixed, the Liwa Fatemiyoun contingent stationed near the Grain Silos proved incapable of anticipating the scale and speed of the Islamic State's offensive.

It is thus unsurprising that the other major obstacle for the Islamic State on the road to Tadmur would ultimately fall, opening the way up to the city. Further checkpoints guarding the perimeter of the city had already been abandoned by that time, ensuring a smooth entrance into the city for the Islamic State. While one could argue the decision to retreat from here was a cowardly one, it actually made tactical sense. There was no plan for defending the city using these checkpoints only, and if the regime forces would have held ground here, it was still extremely unlikely that they could have defended the city, especially considering it was largely uninhabited. If the defenders at the checkpoints had stood their ground, it would only have been a matter of time before the Islamic State would enter the city, where the house-to-house combat would have worked in the disadvantage of the defenders. While the loss of the city and its archaeological ruins was highly unfortunate, after losing the major defensive positions guarding the city retreating was the logical choice, especially considering the fact that conditions in the city were already close to untenable before the Islamic State assault.




Indeed, although the city and its defences were stocked with heavy weaponry, basic equipment such as enough radios and generators to charge them was lacking. Where there were generators, there was barely enough fuel to charge them. Food and water rations were not only insufficient, but of extremely poor quality. This had a serious effect on the morale of defenders, further worsening the situation. The image below details such a ration, which was supposedly meant to feed five people for one full day.





The Russian Army, which maintained a limited presence in Tadmur, had departed shortly before the fall of the city. Although Russians had been active in capturing the city in the first place, some were left behind to clear the many mines and IEDs in the city or to guard those that were doing so. For this purpose, sappers and special equipment were deployed, including several Uran-6 mine-clearing robots.


Although the Russian base appeared abandoned, with several of the original structures missing, tents were still seen standing, including what appeared to be the camp's kitchen with food still on display. Personal items such as a Russian credit card were also found. Tinkoff Bank, which had issued the credit card, swiftly blocked it after it featured in an Islamic State video from the base.




A Russian BPM-97 and two up-armoured Ural-4320s were some of the more notableamong the vehicles captured in Tadmur. Although both types are in use with the Russian Armed Forces contingent in Syria, small numbers also entered service with elements of the Syrian military. It is thus more likely that these vehicles were operated by Syria's Tiger Forces rather than the Russian Armed Forces.




A list of captured armour, artillery and vehicles featured in footage and images released by the Islamic State from Tadmur. The amount of heavy weaponry claimed to have been captured by the Islamic State included at least forty tanks and seven BMP-1s, which would make this the second-largest heavy arms haul of the Syrian Civil War after the capture of Brigade 93 by the Islamic State in August 2014, which was believed to have provided the Islamic State with no less than fifty tanks and just under twenty howitzers.

The amount of vehicles captured at Tadmur likely ended up higher however, and footage from te the Islamic State's march on T4 showed several tanks captured at Tadmur that weren't included in Islamic State footage from the city. The capture of a single T-72B, a single BPM-97, two armoured Ural-4320s, one UR-83P mine-clearing line charge and numerous AK-74s is notable, as these have all been provided to the Syrian military by Russia in the past few years.

- 7 T-55As
- 6 T-55Ms
- 4 T-62 Mod. 1967s
- 6 T-62 Mod. 1972s
- 1 T-72M1
- 1 T-72AV
- 1 T-72B
- 5 BMP-1s
- 1 ZSU-23
- 1 AMB-S
- 1 BPM-97
- 1 VT-55KS
- 7 122mm D-30 howitzers
- 2 130mm M-46 field-guns
- 1 152mm ML-20 howitzer
- 3 122mm BM-21 multiple rocket launchers
- 1 UR-83P mine-clearing line charge
- 1 14.5mm ZPU-4
- 6 23mm ZU-23s
- 1 37mm M-1939
- 1 57mm AZP S-60
- 3 S-125 surface-to-air missile (SAM) launchers
- 1 SNR-125 ''Low Blow'' (For the S-125)
- 7 Tatra (815)s
- 3 GAZ-33088
- 2 ZiL-131s
- 2 Armoured Ural-4320s
- 2 Ural-4320s
- 1 V3S
- Numerous technicals with associated anti-aircraft guns

The list includes at least twenty-six tanks, most of which captured within the perimeter of the city itself. Interestingly, most tanks appeared not to have been moved out of their bases, confirming that their crews had already fled well in advance of the Islamic State's takeover of the city. While this already poses a serious issue, the fact that none of them were then demolished by the remaining defenders or the Syrian or Russian Air Forces allowed the Islamic State to further strengthen its forces and could have led to serious consequences for T4 airbase later on.


Nonetheless, other tanks were seen parked at one of the several checkpoints guarding the city. While this may seem to make a lot more tactical sense than the situation described in the previous paragraph, the checkpoint the tanks were spotted at actually faced away from the Islamic State's advance. While Tadmur was thus packed with heavy weaponry, only a small part of that was actually available to the defenders on the frontline.




Boosted by the large amount of weaponry and ammunition captured in and around Tadmur, the fighters of the Islamic State then set their eyes on T4 airbase, which had proved an obstacle too ambitious to take on after the Islamic State captured Tadmur for the first time in May 2015. Indeed, the Islamic State's second attempt at taking T4 bears heavy resemblance to their previous effort. After capturing Tadmur on the 11th of December, the road to 'Fortress T4' was practically open, allowing for significant progress at advancing closer to the airbase.

T4, sharing its name with the nearby pumping station, is the Syrian Arab Air Force's (SyAAF) most important airbase. The remains of two fighter-bomber squadrons, a detachment of L-39s, one helicopter squadron, other helicopter detachments and Russian assets are currently operating out of T4, including the pride of the SyAAF: Its Su-24MK2s. Despite being Syria's largest airbase, T4 only has one runway, making the airbase's aircraft vulnerable in case it gets taken out. Given its status, it is unsurprising that the airbase is extremely well defended, now also including elements of the Russian military.

While the Islamic State had previously found itself unable to overcome T4's strong defences, its second attempt was carried out by a much stronger force, further bolstered by weaponry previously captured in Tadmur, which exceeded that of the previous capture in numbers. Before reaching the airbase's line of defensive, large swaths of open terrain surrounding the Eastern and Southern part of the T4 had to be overcome however. This is where the Islamic State's previous attempt came to a grinding halt, a place that would prove to be just as troublesome for its fighters this time around.





While the Islamic State could count on an increased number of fighters and weaponry, T4's defences were meanwhile quickly reinforced with elements of the Syrian military, including the first elements of the 5th Corps, and Russian special forces in addition to the experienced defenders already present. As the flat terrain worked heavily in the favour of the defenders, the Islamic State's best option was to attempt to encircle the airbase and try to achieve a breakthrough at a place less well defended. With reinforcements for the defenders underway, time was of the essence.

To deny the regime the ability to bring in these additional reinforcements, cutting the road connection between T4 and government-held territory was necessary to prevent a safe passage to the airbase. A strong Islamic State presence on the West side of T4 would also force the defenders to reinforce this part of the airbase, which is naturally less easily defended. This, in combination with Islamic State attacks on the Eastern and Southern part of T4 could have presented the Islamic State with the much needed weak spot that could then be exploited by the main force following behind. Images showing just how close the Islamic State had meanwhile gotten to T4 airbase can be seen below.




While the fighters of the Islamic State succeeded in temporarily disputing the major road leading to the airbase, they once again proved unable to maintain the encirclement of the airbase, allowing the regime to bring in further reinforcements. The Islamic State's armour also proved unable to place themselves into positions allowing for supression of the defenders due to the presence of anti-tank guided missiles (ATGMs), which knocked out several Islamic State tanks that attempted to do so. Russian ATGM teams armed with 9M133 Kornet ATGMs were also active at T4.

Further help came from an unexpected corner, as Coalition aircraft reportedly struck fourteen tanks, three howitzers, two buildings and two vehicles, supposedly killing at least thirty-eight Islamic State fighters in the vicinity of T4 airbase, denying the Islamic State the ability to build up sufficient forces needed for attempting a breakthrough. In the meantime, the weather took a turn for the worse and temporarily covered the surrounding area in snow, as depicted below.



Although continuing to exert heavy pressure on the Northern, Eastern and Southern part of T4, even capturing a S-125 surface-to-air missile site on the Northern flank, the Islamic State failed to find the weak spot needed to have any serious chance at infiltrating the airbase, at which point its offensive effectively ended. It had taken heavy losses while attempting to advance further into government-held territory, and much of the remaining Islamic State contingent left the area for Deir ez-Zor. The Islamic State was now on the defence, which would soon reveal a major weakness due to the unabating attrition its forces face.

This article is to be followed by another article detailing the subsequent offensive by the Syrian military to recapture Tadmur, which it succeeded in doing on the 2nd of March 2017.

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Another One Bites the Dust: Major arms depot falls to Islamic State

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By Stijn Mitzer and Joost Oliemans

Just over a year after capturing Deir ez-Zor's Ayyash weapon depot in the largest arms haul of the Syrian Civil War, the Islamic State has once again got its hands on massive quantities of ammunition captured from a storage depot in Deir ez-Zor.This arms hauljoins the list of other major instances where vast amounts of weaponry and munitions traded ownerssuch as thecapture of the aforementioned Ayyash weapon depot, Regiment 121, Brigade 93 and the Mahin arms depot, all but the last of which were at the hands of the Islamic State. Each of these depots provided its capturers with a wide array of weaponry, vehicles and ammunition that could immediately be used against their former owners, a major blow to other factions fighting for control over Syria.

A propaganda video released by the Islamic State, showing its fighters on the offensive in Deir ez-Zor, was the only footage released of the capture of the depot. The video, على أبواب الملاحم - 'At the Doors of Epics [Battles]', details the Islamic State's efforts towards splitting the regime-held territory in two, which they succeeded in doing so in February 2017. This means that the airbase and Brigade 137 are now completely isolated, further complicating efforts to supply both pockets and drastically increasing the vulnerability of the airbase. Despite the growing threat, it remains unlikely that the Islamic State will be able to capture either pocket. The capture of significant quantities of ammunition, including up to three million rounds of small arms rounds will surely allow the Islamic State to prolong its fight for survival.

This is an estimate of the ammunition captured, the real figures are believed to be higher. The contents of at least 652 crates could not be identified. Small arms are not included due to the small quantities captured.

Ammunition:

˜ 3,320,600* rounds of 7.62x39, 7.62x54R, 12.7mm and 14.5mm ammunition.
- 2,310 rounds of 85mm ammunition.
- 693 rounds of 100mm ammunition.
- 13 rounds of 125mm ammunition.
- 120 rounds of 120mm ammunition.
- 68 rounds of 122mm rocket ammunition.
- 15 TM-62 anti-tank mines.

Vehicles:

- 1 T-72M1 TURMS-T.
- 3 T-72M1s.
- 1 AMB-S.
- 1 Tatra 148.
- 1 UAZ-469.
- 5 cars.

Although assessing the exact contents of each spam can of small arms munition is impossible, by volume the total amount would equal roughly 3.32 million rounds of 7.62x39mm, or a slightly smaller numer distributed of larger calibres such as 12.7mm and 14.5mm. Regardless, truly a tremendous amount of small arms ammunition was captured indeed.




An immense quantity of 85mm UBR-365P AP rounds was also discovered in the arms depot. While certainly an impressive sight, these rounds are completely useless to the Islamic State. The 85mm D-44 anti-tank cannon currently is the only weapon in the Syrian arsenal capable of firing these rounds, but only a small number of these are active on the battlefield. In fact, the D-44 is so rare the Islamic State is currently believed to be in the possession of just one.













At least 693 rounds of 100mm tank ammunition were also found stored in two seperate rooms. This quantity far exceeds the need of the Islamic State in the city of Deir ez-Zor as it only operates several T-55 tanks that use these shells here. It is thus extremely likely that at least a part was transported to Raqqa for further distribution among Islamic State units elsewhere.








The presence of Iranian ammunition crates dated the 5th of May 2015 is notable, dating back to shortly before the encirclement of the city. These crates likely arrived onboard of one of the SyAAF's Il-76s that frequently visisted Deir ez-Zor when it was still possible for these aircraft to land at the airbase. This has meanwhile become impossible due to the close proximity of the Islamic State to the runway from the Eastern and Southern side, a fact that was made painfully clear by the destruction of two L-39s in their Hardened Aircraft Shelter (HAS).










Much of the ammunition was quickly loaded onto trucks and cars, and was likely distributed among Islamic State units located throughout Syria. The targeting of these stockpiles before would prevent this from happening, and limit the Islamic State's ability to continue replenishing its stocks. Nonetheless, such action has time and again not been undertaken by either the SyAAF or Russian Air Force, which combined with the lack of timely evacuation or sabotage of such depots by ground units in the first place has been a major boon to opposing parties during the Syrian War.










The Islamic State also captured two airdrops destined for regime forces in the city, one of which was already believed to have been emptied of its contents before the Islamic State arrived. However, it is extremely likely that the ammunition from these crates was later encountered in one of the depots captured. Several airdrops have so far ended up in the wrong hands after landing in Islamic State controlled territory, which includes the two pallets below.

While a less than ideal situation, these airdrops are meanwhile the only way to supply the city and its inhabitants after the complete encirclement of Deir ez-Zor in May 2015. Both the United Nations and Russian Air Force have actively participated in dropping humanitarian aid to the starving population living in regime-held parts of the city, while Il-76s of the SyAAF are mostly active for the purpose of supplying weaponry, ammunition and fuel to the remaining regime forces held up in the city.


In addition to capturing huge amounts of ammunition, the offensive also provided the Islamic State with four T-72M1s, more than doubling the size of the T-72 fleet the Islamic State currently operates in and around Deir ez-Zor. This arms haul also included a single T-72M1 equipped with the Italian TURMS-T (Tank Universal Reconfiguration Modular System T-series) fire-control system, amounting the first T-72 TURMS-T to have been captured by the Islamic State.

Interestingly, two of the T-72M1s feature protective covers around their TPN-1-49 gunner sights, a modification that is slowly being applied across what remains of Syria's battered T-72 fleet. A single Czechoslovak AMB-S armoured utility vehicle was also captured, which will likely end up employed as a VBIED similar to the two BREM-2 armoured recovery vehicles captured near the Ayyash weapon depots.


Article written in collaboration with MENA_Conflict.

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North Korean Helical AK Magazines

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By Stijn Mitzer and Joost Oliemans 

Several new developments in North Korean armaments can be witnessed amongst the recent flow of propaganda released by Pyongyang after Kim Jong-un’s ascension to power.  One such development is what appears to be a new magazine model for the North Korean copy of the AK-74, the Type 88. This new magazine uses a staggered helix design, which allows for a high number of 5.45 x 39 mm cartridges to be carried without the notable increases in size and unwieldiness that characterise many other high capacity magazines. So far the only users of this helical magazine appear to be Kim Jong Un’s (and formerly Kim Jong Il’s) personal bodyguards. While in the picture above each bodyguard appears to be carrying only one magazine (which, given their high capacity, isn’t that surprising), other, earlier, footage shows a loadout of two spare magazines for each bodyguard, as seen below. The magazines appear to have been in service since 2010, and possibly earlier.

The North Korean Type 88 is usually seen issued with standard 30 round magazines and, aside from the standard wooden or synthetic fixed stock, a side-folding or top-folding stock (pictured). Two notable distinctions differentiate the North Korean helical design from other helical magazines that have been developed. First, and perhaps most obviously, this magazines was developed for a larger, more powerful rifle calibre than existing designs. Existing helical magazines have typically been developed for pistol calibre weapons, with designs having been produced in calibres such as 7.62 x 25, 9 x 17SR (.380 ACP), 9 x 18, and 9 x 19 mm. Secondly, whereas other helical magazines have typically been developed in conjunction with the firearms intended to make use of them, the recent North Korean example was instead produced for use with an existing weapon, appearing to make use of the bayonet lug for mounting. The top-folding stock, another North Korean innovation, allows the stock to be folded with the magazine inserted, which would not be possible with typical side-folding or under-folding AK stocks. Whilst there are persistent rumours of both Russian and Chinese developments of helical magazines for AK pattern weapons, no documentary evidence has emerged to date.

The nature of the post-production design and the inherent complexity of helical magazines (when compared to standard removable box magazines) suggest that while these magazines offer a greatly increased cartridge capacity, they may render the weapon more prone to malfunctions and misfires. It is unknown if similar magazines have been developed for other calibres, or to what extent the helical magazine has been integrated into the Korean People’s Army.

Magazine specifications:

The following specifications are estimated based upon measurements extrapolated from known dimensions, as well as a comparison with existing helical magazines. They represent the author’s ‘best guess’ at present. 

Calibre: 5.45 x 39 mm
Capacity: 100 to 150 cartridges
Weight: Approximately 2 kg
Length: Approximately 370 mm
Diameter: Approximately 85 mm



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North Korean Kh-35 anti-ship missiles shed light on a modernizing navy

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By Stijn Mitzer and Joost Oliemans

Even though a lot of categories of equipment of the Korean People's Army are known quite well due to satellite imagery and propaganda videos, the rare aspect of the Korean People's Navy (KPN) is often overlooked. Considering the scarcity of footage and high-quality satellite footage of KPN naval ships, this is hardly surprising. However, as is illustrated by the sheer amount of ships being produced over the years, the Korean People's Navy still does play an important role in the current day North Korean military.

The most recent developments of this secretive branch has been the introduction of so-called Surface Effect Ships (SES), stealth technology and even domestically produced Kh-35 missiles. The latter, a true game changer in the Korean peninsula, signifies the start of a new dawn for the Korean People's Navy.

 A North Korean Kh-35 launched from Surface Effect Ship. Note the 76mm OTO Melara copy in the lower left in the second shot.

The Korean People's Navy, commonly known to be solely operating ageing P-15 Termit (Styx), HY-2 (Sillkworm) and indigenous KN-01 anti-ship missiles, received two types of anti-ship missiles since the dissolution of the Soviet Union: Chinese made C-802s were supplied to North Korea from Iran in 1999 to help Iran producing this missile for its own navyand Kh-35s (also known as 3M-24) were received from Russia in the 90s.

The missile, the Korean designation of which is currently unknown, was also exported to Myanmar. Relations between North Korea and Myanmar reached a peak in the mid 2000s, and also seems to have led to the export of sophisticated weaponry to Myanmar. The Navy of Myanmar, along with other North Korean naval weaponry, installed the missiles on the frigate F11 Aung Zeya.

North Korean Kh-35 canisters aboard the F-11 Aung Zeya.

The import of Kh-35s was first unveiled in early 2012, when imagery of a North Korean SES was released as part of a military documentary, showing racks used to mount four Kh-35 canisters. The recent surfacing of imagery of the Myanmarian F11 Aung Zeya class frigate confirmed that the missiles are produced by North Korea and actively exported to friendly nations, along with other naval assets.

Originally developed by the Tactical Missiles Corporation, the North Korean missile differs in a few areas compared to the original Russian Kh-35. Most notably, the canisters have been extensively modified compared to the original Uran-E launcher. The number of mounts for the stowage of additional missiles has been increased to three and the canister has a much cleaner look compared to the Russian canister. It also appears the engine was modified, as is shown by the cone-shaped exhaust nozzle which appears to be unique to the North Korea design. Lastely North Korea appears to manufacture their own distinctly shaped mounting rack.


Kim Jong-un walking in front of a quadruple mounting rack on one of the Surface Effect Ships.


It is unknown if the indigenous Kh-35 constitutes an up- or downgrade over the original design. The
original Kh-35E is capable of destroying ships up to five-thousand tonnes at a maximum range of one hundred and thirty kilometres while under heavy electronic countermeasures. The missile enjoys a low signature due to its small size, sophisticated radar, sea-skimming capability and capability to resist the strongest of electronic countermeasures.

The indigenous Kh-35 missile, the Russian base variant of which is often regarded as the most cost-effective anti-ship missile in existence, is a huge improvement over other North Korean anti-ship missiles, and poses a massive threat to the navies of both South Korea and the United States due to its large range and countermeasure-defeating properties. While the measure to which it is deployed by the Korean People's Navy is as of yet unknown, the missile is likely used on a variety of newly produced naval platforms. This is certain to present a great challenge to opposing forces, and will definitely have serious implications on naval balance in the area.

Although it has only just been publicly confirmed the Kh-35 is in use by North Korea, their first usage by the DPRK dates back to the 90s, a testimony to the capability of the secretive state to keep prying eyes away from military projects.

The domestically produced Kh-35 is to form the spearhead of the Korean People's Navy striking power for years to come.

North Korean anti-tank missiles in the Middle East

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North Korea, well known for its ballistic missile programme, depends on its foreign relations to provide currency that allows the regime to maintain control over the country. Exports of ballistic missile and even nuclear technology to countries such as Egypt, Syria, Iran and Myanmar have been much reported and draw a lot of attention from international observers. However, aside from delivering both conventional and strategic weaponry to sovereign states around the world, it appears North Korean anti-tank guided missiles (ATGMs) are now also showing up in the hands of what have been branded as terrorist organizations by the USA, a development which shows a broadening involvement of the DPRK in the arms trafficking market.


Imagery of a fighter loyal to the Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades, the military wing of Hamas, shows him operating an indigenous variant of the 9K111 Fagot, designated the Bulsae-2 in North Korean service. The al-Qassam Brigades is likely to have received the missiles from North Korea via Iran through an elaborate network of smugglers and backdoor channels ranging from Sudan to the Gaza Strip. This likely happens in a similar fashion to how this is done with other transports: after delivery to Port Sudan, the weaponry is transported overland to the Gaza Strip via Egypt, as was supposed to be done with the the delivery onboard the Klos C, which was intercepted by the Israeli navy near the coast of Sudan in the Red Sea.

More launchers and missiles have popped up in the inventory of the Al-Nasser Salah al-Deen Brigades, which seceded from Hamas because of political differences. It is unknown whether other conventional armament was delivered alongside the ATGMs, but North Korea is also known as a major producer of MANPADS and rocket-propelled grenades, making it plausible some of these were exported as well.



To further support this theory: in December 2009, a North Korean arms shipment aboard an Ilyushin Il-76 cargo plane was discovered and seized by the Thai authorities immediately after landing in Bangkok. The cargo, which was marked as consisting of oil-drilling equipment, contained thirty-five tons worth of rockets, surface-to-air missiles (MANPADS), explosives, rocket-propelled grenades and other weaponry. Another similar shipment was impounded in the United Arab Emirates a few months earlier (July 2009). A large quantity of shipments to both Hamas and Hizbullah is believed to have been transferred unnoticed. With North Korea being a lead player in the arms trafficking business, ways of transport and smuggle routes are always evolving.


North Korea’s role is thus limited to being the manufacturer of the systems. Yet, even though both Iran and North Korea maintain the ‘don’t ask don’t tell’ policy, it can be assumed North Korea has full knowledge of the destination of the Bulsae-2s. But with North Korea’s sole interest in this deal being the money, that shouldn’t be a problem.

The 9M111 wire-guided missile uses semi-automatic command to line of sight (SACLOS) to make its way to the target and can penetrate up to 460mm of armour, depending on the variant and target. Upgraded variants, including the 9M113 missile used by the 9K111-1 Konkurs system, can also be fired by the same launcher (with the exception of the earliest variant), providing cross-platform compatibility for both the 9M111 and 9M113 missile series. The DPRK is known to have received the 9K111 system from the Soviet Union first in 1988, a deal which supposedly continued with the Russian Federation until 2010 and entailed the delivery of some 4500 systems. Due to the interchangeable nature of the missiles, it can’t be said for certain whether or not only the 9K111 Fagot or also the 9K111-1 Konkurs was delivered. However, there is no known Korean designation for the 9K111-1 Konkurs, and the Bulsae-3 is most likely an unrelated system.


The North Korean launchers differ in a few key areas. Most notably, the optics have been extensively modified. While the operator’s scope of the 9P135 (the lower scope in above picture) is similar to the operator’s scope on the Bulsae-2, the scope auto-tracking the missile (the upper scope in above picture) has been swapped for two separate smaller optics. The way this works is unknown, as is whether or not it constitutes an up- or downgrade over the original design. Lastely North Korea appears to manufacture their own distinctly shaped batteries, which likely does not affect the quality of the system.



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