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The Islamic State going DIY, the birth of the battle tram

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Images coming out of the recently captured town of Bashiqa, Mosul revealed the presence of an all too familiar Islamic State armoured fighting vehicle. Hidden under a tree and abandoned by its previous owners, this behemoth previously made an appearance in the now infamous Islamic State offensive near Naweran, North of Mosul, a video which went viral due to the rather comical performance of several fighters involved in the offensive. While Abu Hajaar became the inspiration of memes across all corners of the internet, the Islamic State's usage of up-armoured trucks and other vehicles involved in this offensive was of particular interest for others.

While many of the Islamic State's DIY creations are often very crude in nature, merely consisting of metal plates slapped onto a vehicle's hull, a large industry aimed at converting vehicles to better suit the Islamic State's needs does exist, and has produced several designs perfectly suited for the type of warfare encountered in the Syrian and Iraqi theatre. The armour workshops responsible for these designs are located through Islamic State held territory, with the largest workshops located in Raqqa and Mosul.

Shortly after the capture of Mosul and surrounding towns, the Islamic State established several armoured formations to operate some of the captured equipment previously left behind by the Iraqi Army and Ministry of Interior. While some of the vehicles remained unmodified and were subsequently used in their original configuration, others were modified for use as VBIEDs or as armour on the plains of Mosul with the 'Storming Battalion'.

In their role as Inghimasi – shock troops tasked with penetrating enemy lines without any expectation to come back alive – the 'Storming Battalion' mainly makes use of faster wheeled vehicles as opposed to heavier and therefore slower tracked armoured fighting vehicles. While Inghimasi normally make up about one-fourth of the fighters participating in a typical offensive, the whole 'Storming Battalion' is in fact an Inghimasi unit. While tanks are operated in an offensive role by the Islamic State in Iraq, most of these belong to the 'al-Farouq Armoured Brigade' and 'Shield Battalion'. Thus, it is mainly the 'Storming Battalion' that makes use of improvised and up-armoured AFVs.


Many of the vehicles converted for use with the 'Storming Battalion' are essentially armoured personnel carriers (APCs), featuring a cabin for the fighters to stand in and shoot from. While it is envisioned that at least some of the vehicles drop off the fighters carried onboard, the 'Storming Battalion's' offensives almost exclusively lead to the destruction of the vehicles before reaching their objective. But with plenty of trucks and other vehicles at hand for conversion, the production of vehicles for the 'Storming Battalion' continues and has even been standernised somewhat, with only marginal differences found on vehicles of essentially the same class. In the case of the battle tram, two examples are confirmed to have been produced, serialed '201' and '202'. The existence of battle tram '200' is likely but remains unconfirmed.

The battle tram features a heavily armoured front cabin, which is (with a little imagination) somewhat reminiscent of a human face or a character from Thomas the Tank Engine, inspiring the designator "battle tram". Spaced armour covers the fighter's compartment while metal plates protect the wheels, six of which are present on this vehicle. Indeed, the battle tram is almost certainly based on the Soviet KrAZ-260, several of which were captured in and around Mosul back in 2014. Previous attempts at producing such large armoured personnel carriers resulted in a host of impressive but awkward looking vehicles.[1][2] Contrary to these examples, the battle tram appears to be relatively well-balanced in its design.

The presumed armament of the second battle tram remains unchanged from the previous version, which has an heavily armoured cupola in which a machine gun can be fitted. Interestingly, battle tram '202' appears to be equipped with four rams on the front, two of which might also serve as structural reinforcement. Although these rams could be effective for breaking through certain obstacles, it would also make the vehicle prone to get stuck while navigating uneven terrain, not to mention that the debris from a collapsing obstacle would end up on the fighters' heads in the infantry compartment. No ladders for scaling trenches for climbing up Peshmerga positions were seen installed on '202', despite being a feature of '201'.

The cabin of the battle tram is largely similar to those of other vehicles used by the 'Storming Battalion'. Instead of seatbels found on smaller vehicles, metal handlebars were installed to provide support to the fighters inside during high speed operations. No pintle-mounts for light or heavy machine guns are present, forcing the crew to fire their weapons either without stabilisation or from the metal handlebars,which proved far from successful when used by inexperienced fighters.Battle tram '202' has a slightly different cabin layout than '201', with the small exit door located on the rear, and not on the side as with battle tram '201'.




The first battle tram featured in the now (in)famous Islamic State offensive near Naweran, North of Mosul. This offensive, apart from Abu Hajaar, Abu Abdullah and Abu Ridhwan in their up-armoured M1114, saw the participation of several highly modified trucks and other vehicles by the 'Storming Battalion'. This included the first battle tram '201', seen here shortly before the commencement of the offensive and shortly after the conclusion of the failed offensive.


The battle tram, along with the rest of the 'Storming Battalion's' vehicles, was effectively trapped when the bulldozer tasked with filling the huge trench in front of the Peshermerga positions was taken out. Shortly after, the battle tram was hit and subsequently abandoned by its operators, similar to what happened to the vehicle of Abu Hajaar. The presence of spaced armour installed on the sides of the vehicle is clearly visible here, and was apparently effective in stopping at least one hit before the vehicle was abandoned.

Seen above: Battle tram '201' underway near Naweran filmed out of Abu Hajaar's M1114. An RPG gunner stands in the armoured cabin of the battle tram aiming his next shot. Despite all of the increased weight because of the extra armour, the truck appears to have little problems crossing the field at reasonable speed. The large size of the vehicle is well apparent compared to the up-armoured M1114 behind, and makes for an easy target for Peshmerga ATGM teams or RPG gunners. Indeed, the usage of such a vehicle on the plains of Mosul is bound to end in failure due to the aforementioned reasons, and it would possibly be much better suited for usage in an urban environment such as seen in Mosul now.

The Islamic State's efforts to self-produce several types of armoured fighting vehicles has resulted in a myriad of highly specialised vehicles well adapted to the type of assaults typically carried out by the Islamic State. The profileration of ATGMs and the presence of Coalition aircraft and helicopters in the air over any major Islamic State offensive has however made these AFVs completely out of place on the Iraqi battlefield. A true belief in the possibility of success has led to attempt after attempt, each time ending with the same result: annihilation. While the Islamic State's efforts in the field of design and production are certainly impressive, producing large numbers of vehicles for use in offensives that are practically doomed right from the start is in sharp contrast to the operations of the Islamic State performed elsewhere, and is a luxury it will not be able to afford for much longer.

Special thanks to @tellmemo and @javed12186147.

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Replenishing the Stocks: Russian deliveries of T-62Ms and BMP-1s reach Syria

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Following many rumours concerning the delivery of new armoured fighting vehicles to the Syrian Arab Army, images coming out of Syria have now confirmed such a delivery did indeed take place. These newly delivered vehicles are destined for the Syrian Arab Army's 5th Corps, which is currently engaged in heavy combat with the Islamic State in between T4 airbase and Tadmur. Indeed, images and videos covering the fighting that currently takes place here have already confirmed the vehicles are doing their part in bringing the fight back to the Islamic State.

While many expected the delivery of more T-72s or even T-90s as a follow-up to the small deliveries of these vehicles to elements of the Syrian military in late 2015, it now appears the core of the 5th Corps will be made up of battle-proven armored fighting vehicles (AFVs) such as the T-62M and BMP-1(P) instead. Although certainly less advanced than some of the more modern T-72s and BMP-2 variants employed in the Syrian theatre elsewhere, the delivery of these AFVs are still a welcome addition to the badly-depleted vehicle park of the Syrian Arab Army.

Indeed, while deprived of any active protection systems such as the Shtora found on the T-90 series of tanks, the T-62M is a vast improvement over the T-55 and earlier T-62 variants that continue to make up the majority of Syria's now battered tank fleet. The BMP-1s and BMP-1Ps delivered offer little in offensive and defensive capabilities, but are likely to serve the 5th Corps well because of the fact that they are easy to master and maintain, especially for crews with existing experience in operating these vehicles.



The 5th Corps is a newly established unit of the Syrian Arab Army, and serves as a counterweight to the increasing strength of the various militias that have largely taken over the role of the Syrian Arab Army (SyAA) in the past years. While the partial dissolvement of the SyAA and the subsequent rise of militias was necessary for the survival of the Syrian regime, it ended up creating a whole host of major problems that could potentially spiral out of control in the future. The establishment of the 5th Corps aims to address at least a part of these problems.

Russia appears to be a key driver behind the de-facto re-establishment of the Syrian Arab Army by exerting pressure on the regime to bring back control of the many militias to the army instead of continuing as independent units under the control of the Syrian High Command. While Iran's goal of keeping Syria under its sphere of influence was enacted bythe establishment of several militias, many of which foreign, Russia seeks to create a stable situation that allows for the survival of the current government by creating an unified army instead.

The lack of such an unified army has been made painfully clear during most of the regime's defeats over the past several years, the failed Tabqa offensive and losing Tadmur for a second time serving as recent examples. A project similar to that of the establishment of the 5th Corps was initiated shortly after the Russian intervention in Syria, which called for the merging of several militias, including parts of the NDF, into the 4th Corps. When the NDF largely replaced the Syrian Arab Army as the regime's primary forces, the NDF saw its tasks expanding from guarding neighbourhoods to undertaking offensives elsewhere and guarding towns, gasfields and other strategic installations throughout Syria. Thus, this initiative would have called for the return of these tasks to the SyAA, with the NDF remaining a force dedicated for local defense only. Thus far, this process appears to have been largely unsuccessful however.

In contrast to other units of the Syrian Arab Army, which consist almost exclusively of drafted personnel, the 5th Corps hopes to attract large numbers of men by offering salaries and benefits that were previously only found with militias such as Suqour al-Sahraa' (The Desert Falcons). To further strengthen its ranks, Syrian men that were previously exempted from the draft are likely to join the 5th Corps amidst sharpened rules for exclusion from mandatory service.



The now almost six-year long civil war has taken a heavy toll on the once immense Syrian tank fleet, suffering heavy losses due to the widespread profileration of rocket propelled grenades (RPGs) and anti-tank guided missiles (ATGMs). Yet it is mainly the poor tactics employed by most regime forces that have effectively degraded the tank to the role of a vulnerable static pillbox. Although the amount of armoured fighting vehicles that remain available still appears to be sufficient for current operations, the number of vehicles of the same class is too low to equip an entirely new fighting force: The 5th Corps.

In accordance with Russia's role in the establishment of the 5th Corps, it is also Russia that is responsible for equipping the new force. Although this led some to believe the new force would be equipped with a wide range of modern Russian weapon systems, Russia has so far committed to the delivery of older weaponry that is no longer in service with the Russian Army itself. Nonetheless, the delivered vehicles and weaponry are ideally suited for the Syrian Arab Army and the 5th Corps.

In addition to the delivery of small arms and a large number of Ural, GAZ, KamAZ and UAZ trucks and jeeps, deliveries to the 5th Corps so far have encompassed T-62Ms, BMP-1Ps and BMP-1s and 122mm M-1938 (M-30) howitzers. The latter are of a more modern variant than the examples already in use in Syria, with the Russian-delivered examples part of a batch that underwent modernisation during the 1970s, exchanging the original rubber foam wheels for more modern ones allowing for better mobility both on-road and off-road.

Before their appearance in Syria, some of the T-62Ms were already spotted in Russia while underway to a harbour for transport to Syria. These vehicles were then shipped onboard the 'Syria Express' towards Tartus, where the majority of vehicles and equipment has been arriving. The T-62Ms and BMP-1s were subsequently spotted in Tartus waiting for distribution to their new units, including a part of the 5th Corps currently seeing action against the Islamic State in Central Syria.


The T-62M is an upgrade programme aimed at upgrading several variants of the T-62, which by the early 1980s had become severely outmatched by their more modern Western counterparts, to a common standard. The programme aimed to adress the T-62's shortcomings in the field of firepower, protection and mobility, greatly improving the capabilities of the until then badly underperforming tank. The upgrade ran parallel to the modernisation of the T-55 and T-55A to T-55M standard, which was carried out during the same time.

The increased armour protection was achieved by the installment of BDD 'Brovi' appliqué armour on the turret front and upper and lower glacis plates, increased armour protection against anti-tank mines, rubber side skirts and anti-radiation lining on parts of the turret. The resulting increased weight was compensated by a new V-55U diesel engine. To utilise the full potential of the powerful 115mm gun the 'Volna' fire control system module was installed, comprising the KTD laser rangefinder (LRF) and associated equipment. The tank also gained the capability to launch the tube-fired 9M117 (9K116-2) Sheksna ATGM, which is nearly identical to the 9M117 (9K116-1) Bastion in use with Syria's T-55(A)MVs. For this purpose, both the gunner and commander received new sighting systems, now also allowing for much increased efficacy during night combat. In addition to all this, the tank was equipped with a new stabiliser, a thermal sleeve for its 115mm gun, a new radio and a block of smoke grenade launchers on each side of the turret.

Despite its age, the T-62M has only just been retired by the Russian Army after decades of counter-terrorism operations in the Caucascus, a task for which it was also heavily employed in the mountainous terrain of Afghanistan during the Soviet invasion of this country. Several other nations continue to operate the T-62M, most notably Cuba, where it ironically serves as the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias' most modern tank.





While several variants such as the T-62 Obr. 1967 and T-62 Obr. 1972 were upgraded to the common T-62M standard, both are still easily discernible by the lack of the 12.7mm DShK on the T-62 Obr. 1967. Interestingly, Syria has received both Obr. 1967s and Obr. 1972s upgraded to T-62Ms. The latter has so far been featured more extensively in the footage coming out of Central Syria, and was also the first to fall victim to an Islamic State ATGM, with no casualties reported.

Most of the tanks can still be seen with the H22-0-0 rail transit markers that were applied in Russia before shipment to Syria. While not removing these markings is in this case of little significance, similar markings were also left in place on Russian tanks deployed in the Ukraine, which could once again be used to confirm Russia's involvement in the war in Eastern Ukraine.



The delivery of large amounts of these albeit dated vehicles could very well end up reversing the trend of widespread attrition that has decimated Syria's fighting vehicles. Perhaps more importantly, it shows Russia remains willing and capable of supporting its ally with large amounts of military equipment, despite economic hardships and the fact that Syria is bankrupt. This initiative essentially represents the re-establishment of the SyAA in organised form, and should it succeed it is certain to have far reaching consequences for future developments in the Syrian War.

A Forgotten Army: Transnistria's DIY APCs

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Transnistria, officially the Pridnestrovian Moldavian Republic (PMR), is a breakaway state in Eastern Europe that has remained in the shadows ever since its self-proclaimed independence as a Soviet republic in 1990 and subsequent breakaway from Moldova in 1992. Currently only recognized by Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Nagorno-Karabakh, which themselves are also unrecognised countries, Transnistria is situated in between the Ukraine and Moldova. Nonetheless, Transnistria functions as a de-facto state with its own army, air force and even its own arms industry.

It is the latter that has produced a number of very interesting designs that have entered service with Transnistria's armed forces over the past two decades. This industry was highly active during the Moldovan Civil War, producing a variety of DIY armoured fighting vehicles and homemade multiple rocket launchers (MRLs) for use against the Moldovan Army. After the cessation of hostilities, the arms industry would play a vital role in upholding the operational status of the Transnistria's army, which has remained unable to replace its dated inventory of Soviet weaponry ever since its establishment in 1991.

One of these designs is a unique armoured personnel carrier (APC) based on the Soviet GMZ-3 minelayer. First unveiled in 2015 by Transnistria's former president Yevgeny Shevchuk and Defense Minister Alexander Lukyanenko, at least eight of these vehicles are believed to have entered service with the Transnistrian army that year. At least two of these vehicles were seen participating in exercises just over a month later, confirming their operational status.




Transnistria is notorious for its supposed role in arms trafficking throughout the region and farther abroad. Large quantities of weaponry and ammunition from the Soviet 14th Army were taken over by Transnistrian locals, elements of the 14th Army loyal to Transnistria and foreign fighters when Moldava entered what according to the Moldovan government was and still is Moldovan territory, resulting in conflict between the two in 1992. While large amounts of the missing weaponry and ammunition was subsequently secured, taken over by the newly established Transnistrian Army or transported back to Russia under the supervision of the Operational Group of Russian Forces in Moldova, limited quantities of weapons originating in Transnistria still found their way abroad. Nevertheless, its status as an arms trafficking country is certainly exaggerated.

Despite having ended armed conflict in 1992, the situation in Transnistria remains extremely complicated, with the the breakaway state wishing to join the Russian Federation while continuing to remain heavily reliant on Moldova for exporting the limited produce its economy outputs. Despite making small steps towards increasing transparency to the outside world, Transnistria remains a Soviet Socialist Republic, as such continuing to make use of the hammer and sickle in its flag – even retaining the KGB as its main security agency. Russia still maintains a limited presence in Transnistria, its soldiers officially on a peacekeeping mission.

When the Soviet Union dissolved, much of the personnel and their associated weaponry which once made up its military became subordinate to the newly established states they were located in. While this process was often troubled by the departure of many ethnic Russians stationed outside of the former Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic, this wasn't the only problem encountered in Moldova. The 14th Army was in fact stationed in the Ukraine, Moldova and the breakaway state of Transnistria, with various units of the 14th becoming subordinate to either the Ukraine, Moldova and Russia, or loyal to the newly formed Transnistrian republic. Obviously, this made for an extremely complicated and sensitive process.

When Transnistria took over most of the weapon storage depots on the territory it controlled, it inherited large amounts of highly specialised vehicles while being left without any significant numbers of infantry fighting vehicles or self-propelled artillery. Indeed, apart from several 122mm 2S1 Gvozdikas and 152mm 2S3 Akatisyas that were present in this area (which in fact likely found their way to Russia), there is no self-propelled artillery in the inventory of the Transnistrian Army. Instead, it relies on an arsenal of towed field artillery and 122mm 'Pribor' MRLs for indirect fire support.

The specialised vehicles Transnistria took over included a large number of GMZ-2 and GMZ-3 minelayers. Redundant in their original role during the Moldovan Civil War, several GMZs were employed as makeshift armoured personnel carriers by Transnistria, and at least one was subsequently destroyed in the fighting. Transnistria would continue to make use of several GMZs in their original role after the war, but with no need for such a large fleet of minelayers, most vehicles were placed in storageuntil it was decided to convert at least eight GMZ-3s to armoured personnel carriers. Although the amount of GMZs available to Transnistria remains unknown, the number is likely insufficient for the conversion of much more GMZs to this role.














In order to be capable of carrying infantry, all minelayer equipment was removed in line with its new role as armoured personnel carrier. The minelaying arm and the compartment for its operator were removed to make place for a door, while the space the mines were stored in was cleared and expanded to accommodate for the infantry compartment. The GMZ-3 in its original configuration can be seen here, a striking indicator of the transformation it has underwent.

Aclearing was created between the driver's seat and infantry compartment for a gunner position equipped with a single 14.5mm KPV heavy machine gun (HMG), which was extensively modified for easier handling by its operator. In addition to the single HMG, rifles and light machine guns can be fired out of the vehicle's five firing ports. It is unknown if this transformation effected the armour of the GMZ-3, which was originally protected against small-arms fire and explosive fragments.





For Transnistria's size and economic means, the vehicle certainly exhibits impressively professional features, and presents a clear case of making the best possible use of every means available. In that regard, Transnistria is sure to continue surprising its tiny audience of foreign observers with the products of its indigenous military industry.

Photo Report: The Syrian Arab Army (2)

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By Stijn Mitzer and Joost Oliemans

With the Syrian Ministry of Defense finally having embraced 21st centurymedia technology, it now regularly uploads high-definition images on both its official website and twitter account. Despite this 'giant' leap forward, the Syrian MoD still only communicates to the outside world in Arabic, thereby excluding a large audience that could otherwise be interested in reading or viewing the MoD's statements on ongoing battles in the Syrian theatre. Nonetheless, the images published provide for a perfect opportunity for another 'Photo Report'.

A Pantsir-S1 of the Syrian Arab Air Defence Force (SyAADF). Significant quantities of modern surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) have reached Syria in the past decade, with deliveries even continuing during the Syrian Civil War. Although a complete overhaul of the SyAADF with the acquisition of S-300PMU-2s, Buk-M2s, Pechora-2Ms and Pantsir-S1s was originally planned during the 2000s, the delivery of the first has been postponed and is ultimately believed to have been cancelled. A more advanced version of the Pantsir-S1 has also been introduced to the SyAADF recently, similar to a variant that has been delivered to Iraq since 2014.



A Syrian T-72AV TURMS-T (Tank Universal Reconfiguration Modular System T-series), a variant upgraded by Galileo Avionica of Italy during the 2000s in order to enhance its fire-control system. Interestingly, instead of solely upgrading its T-72AVs or T-72M1s to TURMS-T standard, the SyAA decided to also include T-72 'Urals'in the upgrade programme. The T-72 'Ural' and T-72M1 also make up the majority of the fleet upgraded with the TURMS-T's panoramic sight. As upgrading all of the TURMS-T equipped T-72s with the panoramic sight was deemed too expensive, only a limited amount of T-72s received the system. Why mainly the less advanced T-72 variants received this sight remains a mystery.

A 'Volcano' rocket seen departing its launcher. These rockets became well known for their ability to destroy complete housing blocks with a direct hit, a decisive factor during the battle for al-Qusayr in 2013. The Volcano pairs a standard artillery rocket with a much larger warhead, drastically increasing its lethality at the cost of a decreased range and accuracy. Mass-production picked up pace around the same time, and these rockets are now in use on nearly every front in the Syrian theatre.

In Syria, three iterations of the Volcano are currently believed to be produced, further divided into several sub-variants each. The most widespread types in use are the 107mm and 122mm based variants, although a 220mm based variant also exists. Converting these rockets is a relatively easy process, as 107mm and 122mm (Grad) rockets are extremely common in Syria, and 220mm rockets are known to be in production in Syria itself.












The BMP-1 still constitutes the mainstay of the Syrian Arab Army's inventory of infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs), and with recent Russian deliveries of further BMP-1s and BMP-1Ps, this is unlikely to change in the near future. The BMP-1's lacklustre armament and thin armour protection have been made painfully clear during the Syrian Civil War, and only little work has been carried out by the regime side for the purpose of improving the capabilities of these vehicles. Some factions have attempted to 'reinforce' the armour of their BMP-1s by adding Kontakt-1 explosive reactive armour to the hull and turret of the vehicle. While the turret armour is strong enough to be compatible with Kontakt-1 blocks, the hull's paper thin armour is unable to withstand their detonation, shattering the thin layer of armour with the possibility of inflicting heavy injuries to the personnel inside.

The T-72 'Ural' is the oldest T-72 variant in service with the Syrian Arab Army. Once said to be''the best tank in the world'' by Hafez al-Assad, nowadays it is famous for its major flaw, and is the subject of many videos in which it suffers a violent cook-off after a hit, resulting in the turret being blown off spectacularly.







While the Syrian Civil War has seen a large number of AK-pattern rifles in service with the various factions fighting for control over Syria, the profileration of PK-pattern machine guns is often overlooked. While the PK and PKM still make up the majority of general-purpose machine guns in Syria, several derivatives have also showed up in the Syrian theatre in the past several years. This includes the Russian PKP Pecheneg and the North Korean Type-73. The latter originated in Iran, which bought a batch of these machine guns during the Iran-Iraq War. These were soon stored after Iran began producing its own PK and PKM-pattern machine guns, and ultimately found their way to Shiite militias in Iraq, Syria and Yemen.



Three T-72AVs, still in pristine condition, making their way through a Syrian battered town. Although it offers a vast improvement over the tank's regular armour, Kontakt-1 has proved to be incapable of protecting it against heavier rocket propelled grenades (RPGs) and anti-tank guided missiles (ATGMs). In addition, the supports for the ERA blocks on the side skirts have shown themselves to be too weak to withstand the blast of an incoming RPG, sometimes causing the whole side skirt to fall of after just one hit.




An incredibly rare sight: A Syrian T-72AV deprived of all its Kontakt-1 explosive reactive armour. This image allows for a great comparison between the T-72AV still sporting all of its explosive reactive armour seen above. The tank below is likely operated by a training unit, with the explosive reactive armour removed for use with T-72AVs serving in combat units serving on the frontline, which can obviously make better use of it.

A training exercise of one of Syria's commando units. Atlhough the Syrian Civil War is about to enter its sixth year, not much is known about special operations carried out by these units. Instead, most of Syria's 'Commandos' appear to be employed as regular infantry alongside the Syrian Arab Army and NDF. They can easily been discerned from other units by their 'القوات الخاصة – 'Commandos'– patch, but are only rarely seen wearing their red beret.




The profileration of anti-tank guided missiles (ATGMs) in the Syrian Civil War has meanwhile ben sufficient to test the armour plating of the Russian T-90, the U.S. M1 Abrams and even the German Leopard 2. With Turkey ramping up its intervention in Northern Syria by deploying M60Ts and Leopard 2A4s to the Syrian theatre, the Syrian Civil War serves as a perfect testing ground for the world's newest in armour and armour upgrades. While the M1 Abrams was once thought to be nearly impenetrable, the tank has found its match with the deployment of 9M133 Kornet ATGMs by the Islamic State. Similarly, Turkey's Leopard 2A4s have fallen victim to ATGM attacks during their short deployment to Northern Syria, mostly owing due to poor tactics employed.Although the T-90A's armour protection has also been tested during combat in Syria, a catastrophic ammo cook off has yet to occur.



Although the T-72 has received the most attention during the Syrian Civil War, the T-62 and T-55 series that remain in service continue to make up the majority of Syria's tank fleet. Indeed, the Syrian Arab Army's newly established 5th Corps has recently begun receivingT-62Ms from Russia. This recent Russian 'armour influx' has already seen the delivery of T-90As, T-90s, T-72 Obr 1989s, T-72Bs, BMP-2s and BMP-1(P)s in the past two years.











Syrian Arab Army soldiers aiming their small arms at a defensive position during an exercise. Although large quantities of Chinese-made helmets and body armour were procured from China shortly before the Civil War, the SyAA soon ran out of this newly issued equipment. While some units were re-equipped with whatever was found laying in warehouses, others had to do with far less, or would even be responsible for their own clothing and equipment as was the case with Suqour al-Sahraa' (The Desert Falcons), resulting in an abundant variety of uniforms and equipment on the battlefield seen today.











A T-72M1 makes it way through downtown Aleppo. Heavily contested since 2012, the days of regime presence in the city were once thought to be numbered. Under siege and attacked from all sides, the Syrian Arab Army looked to consolidate its remaining territory first, while later offensives would be key in tipping the scales in favour of the regime. Against all odds, the city was completely recaptured four years later; a fatal blow to the rebels.



The Tomb of the Unknown Soldier in Damascus, a memorial to all Syrian soldiers killed in conflict. The monument's dome symbolizes the universe, with the overlying arch symbolizing victory. Two verses (Quran:169,170) are written on either side of the dome.

وَلَا تَحْسَبَنَّ الَّذِينَ قُتِلُوا فِي سَبِيلِ اللَّـهِ أَمْوَاتًا بَلْ أَحْيَاءٌ عِندَ رَبِّهِمْ يُرْزَقُونَ﴿١٦٩﴾ فَرِحِينَ بِمَا آتَاهُمُ اللَّـهُ مِن فَضْلِهِ وَيَسْتَبْشِرُونَ بِالَّذِينَ لَمْ يَلْحَقُوا بِهِم مِّنْ خَلْفِهِمْ أَلَّا خَوْفٌ عَلَيْهِمْ وَلَا هُمْ يَحْزَنُونَ ﴿١٧٠﴾ (آل عمران: 169، 170) - 'Think not of those who are slain in God's Way as dead. Nay, they live, finding their sustenance in the Presence of their Lord; They rejoice in the Bounty provided by God: and with regard to those left behind, who have not yet joined them [in their bliss], the [Martyrs] glory in the fact that on them is no fear, nor have they [cause to] grieve.' (Quran:169,170)




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Back and Forth: How the Islamic State retook Tadmur

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By Stijn Mitzer and Joost Oliemans

While the city of Tadmur has been recaptured again by the Syrian military on the 2nd of March 2017, this article will be released to give insight in the Islamic State's offensive to capture the city on the 11th of December 2016. An article covering the subsequent recapture of Tadmur by the Syrian military is to follow soon.

The ancient city of Palmyra has become a symbol in the world's fight against the Islamic State. It represents one of the few places where every (non-IS) party agrees on the ultimate fate of the city and its archaeological ruins, this in sharp contrast to other cities and locations elsewhere in Syria and Iraq. Indeed, Palmyra holds a special place in the hearts of many, and preserving this symbol of civilisation is not only in the interest of Syrians, but for mankind in general. Despite its cultural significance, the ancient ruins are a mere collection of bricks in the face of civilian casualties during the course of the Civil War, which are thought to range in the hunderds of thousands. The regime's decision to prioritise the ruins of Palmyra (Tadmur) over strategic targets in March 2016 would ultimately result in failure, losing control over Tadmur for the second time on the 11th of December 2016.

The sudden fall of Tadmur came as a surprise to many following the Syrian Civil War, as there appeared to be no imminent threat to the city less than a week before its fall. Taking place less than nine months after the recapture of Tadmur by units of the Syrian Arab Army, Hizbullah, Shiite militias and the Russian Armed Forces, and one-and-a-half years after the Islamic State captured Tadmur for the first time, the speed and relative ease by which the Islamic State captured the town in less than three days must even have surprised the Islamic State itself, recapturing much of the ground it previously lost in May 2015. The large concentration of Islamic State fighters in and around Tadmur then threatened installations deeper into regime-held Syria, including T4 airbase. Despite this threat, it should be mentioned that Fortress T4 is among the best defended military installations in Syria, and the Islamic State indeed proved unable to overcome its strong defences once again.

The capture of Tadmur by the Islamic State came as the latest in a string of events swiftly unfolding throughout Syria at the end of 2016. In Aleppo, much of the rebel-held areas have been brought back under regime control, with the remaining rebel pocket crushed after vast artillery strikes just a day after the fall of Tadmur. Meanwhile, further North the Free Syrian Army backed by Turkey recently captured the Islamic State stronghold of al-Bab. While one could argue these events are directly related to the Islamic State's decision to attack now, rumours about the departure of much of the remaining contingent of defenders in the days before the capture might have played a more important role in the Islamic State's decision to act now. Having a clear view of the city from the mountainous area around Tadmur, it is at least possible that the Islamic State closely followed the situation inside the city before launching an offensive. Either way, many of the fighters involved were relocated from elsewhere in Islamic State held territory, suggesting the planning for the offensive had already been underway for quite some time.

The developments provided the Islamic State with the perfect opportunity to shift away attention from its recent setbacks in Mosul, where the Iraqi Army along with Shiite militias are engaged in a gruelling campaign aimed at taking back the largest city currently under Islamic State control. Being in control of Tadmur also gave the Islamic State another opportunity to prolong its control over parts of Syria, as larger cities such as Tadmur can be extremely time-consuming and costly to recapture once its fighters are dug in. In similar fashion, the Islamic State currently still attempts to gain complete control over Deir ez-Zor, but remains and in the future will likely remain unable to do so. Nonetheless, the prospect of a relief of the city by regime forces, prerequisites for which are control of Tadmur and al-Sukhna, had once again been set back massively, and the situation in Deir ez-Zor was looking all the more dire for it as a result. The capture of large amounts of weaponry, vehicles and other equipment will also have been a great bounty for the Islamic State, as such equipment can be easily distributed to its fighters elsewhere. Furthermore, the Islamic State soon continued its efforts to demolish the ancient ruins of Palmyra, attempting to use them as a propaganda tool for revenging its recent defeats and deterring its opponents from advancing further.Indeed, satellite imagery dating from January revealed that the Islamic State had begun demolishing several ancient structures, including the Tetrapylon and the Roman Theater. The heavy damage done to the latter is an unfortunate result of the 'Praying for Palmyra - Music revives ancient ruins' concert held here by Russia in March 2016, after which the Islamic State promised to demolish the theater upon return to the city.



Before going into detail on the capture of Tadmur itself, it is insightful to consider the regime's own offensive to recapture the city back in March 2016, which ended in success after over two weeks of fighting. Although promising at first, with the prospective of clearing a path to the besieged city of Deir ez-Zor looming, the offensive halted after pushing the Islamic State just out of the city's borders (liberating the city itself but little of the surrounding terrain), and the front had since then remained more or less stationary. This allowed the Islamic State to maintain a presence on the outskirts of the city, from where they even had a view of Tadmur airbase. During this time sporadic clashes continued, but no large scale offensive were undertaken by either side. Despite the lack of Islamic State attempts to retake the city, the defence of the city was a costly task in terms of manpower required to garrison it, and considering the fact these forces were direly needed in other parts of the country the value of the offensive was questionable in the first place. Indeed, the Islamic State had made no serious attempts to push further into regime-held territory after failing to overcome the extensive regime fortifications present around T4 airbase after it first captured Tadmur in May 2015, and from this location the area could have been kept secure until a full scale offensive against the Islamic State proper would have become a possibility. This optimism was reflected by the subsequent attempt at marching on Raqqa, which also failed disastrously after much of the forces involved fled from an Islamic State counter-attack.

Surprisingly, the Islamic State left large parts of the ancient city intact during its one year rule of Tadmur, and its subsequent capture by the Syrian Arab Army (SyAA), Hizbullah, Shiite militias and the Russian Armed Forces was hailed as a victory for mankind. Indeed, the recapture of Tadmur was an extremely well-orchestrated PR-stunt, aimed at showing the world that with Russia involved, terrorism on Syrian soil would be eradicated. To mark the success of the offensive, a triumphal concert was broadcasted into the world, hailing the victory over the Islamic State.

Despite Tadmur's vulnerability, significant forces were stationed around the city at the time of capture, supported by copious amounts of artillery, tanks and the Russian and Syrian air forces. Nonetheless, the mountainous terrain surrounding Tadmur can work both to the advantage and disadvantage of defending forces by giving a clear view of the city and its landscape. While in the hands of the defenders they can enhance the defensive overview of the battlefield, when lost to the enemy they provide an ideal position from which to attack the city. Losing one of these positions could quickly result in the city being overrun, which was exactly what happened during the Islamic State's December offensive.

The supposed arrival of hundreds or even thousands of Islamic State fighters from Mosul directly through Coalition patrolled territory prior to the start of the offensive was reported by the regime, but serves as nothing more than a poor excuse to hide the regime's own lack of anticipation on the deployment of Islamic State forces outside of Tadmur. Indeed, the relocation of large numbers of Islamic State forces and armour should have been easily noticable to Russian and Syrian intelligence forces prior to the attack as many of the units directly came from Raqqa. Even if the unlikely mass exodus of Islamic State fighters from Iraq to Tadmur took place, this should have become known to the regime well in advance of the Islamic State's offensive.

Defending Tadmur were numerous units part of the National Defence Force (NDF), remnants of the Syrian Arab Army's 11th and 18th divisions, elements of the Afghan Liwa Fatemiyoun brigade (de-facto part of Iran's Revolutionary Guards) and a small number of Tiger Forces, supported by an unknown number of Russian soldiers left in the city. Two major defensive positions surrounded Tadmur, comprising the mountainous area North of the city and the grain silos East of the city. If any of these were to fall, especially the position North of the city, the fall of Tadmur itself would essentially be inevitable. The regime was more than aware of this fact, and diverted much attention to the defence of the Northern and Eastern flanks of Tadmur. Although bolstering the defence of the city with large amounts of heavy weaponry, the lack of a well-led harmonious force in charge of defending the city was to leave its traces during the subsequent Islamic State offensive.

This brings us back to the actual offensive, where the attack would, in true Islamic State fashion, commence with the use of VBIEDs (the Islamic State's morbid equivalent of an airstrike). This type of suicide vehicle is not only effective in its destructive power, but even more so as a psychological weapon. This had its intended effect, and regime forces stationed Northeast of Tadmur were routed en masse in the resulting chaos. The Islamic State forces that followed mounted an offensive from this position and despite reports of heavy shelling and airstrikes continued to push closer to Tadmur itself. Most of the troops that fled appear not to have regrouped at Tadmur but instead fled directly to 'Fortress T4' itself, an indication of the poor state of the regime's military in this region. During the conquest for the city weaknesses in the Syrian and Russian air forces were apparent, diminishing the regime's chances of holding onto the city. Largely reliant on iron bombs and hindered by poor coordination, little impact was made by airstrikes in the early stages of the battle, contrasting with battles such as the conquest for Kobanê, where effective use of airpower prevented the Islamic State from capturing the city in a turning point in the war. Later heavy Russian air strikes would apparently temporarily halt the Islamic State's advance on Tadmur forcing them to regroup, but these efforts would prove to be too little too late. The ease with which the Islamic State can move through the open desert undetected remains a serious problem for the regime, and the loss of Tadmur could directly be attributed to this fact.



Although the actual number of Islamic State fighters that participated in the Tadmur offensive remains unknown, the presence of numerous tanks upgraded by the 'The Workshop' hinted at a significant redeployment of personnel and equipment from Raqqa to Tadmur. 'The Workshop' is the Islamic State's largest armour workshop in Syria, and has produced a wide range of armour upgrades for the around two-hundred tanks captured and operated by the Islamic State since 2014.

The defenders could count on around forty armoured fighting vehicles (AFVs), around thirty of which tanks. Interestingly, most of the tanks were held back in the city itself, likely to be used in a future regime offensive to advance deeper into Islamic State held Central Syria. Instead of deploying these tanks in the defence of the city, most appear not to have moved since the Islamic State commenced its attack. While one could blame the defenders for not deploying these tanks on the city's perimeter, the exodus of regime forces out of Tadmur left the remaining defenders with numerous tanks, but no personnel to move them.

Interestingly, some of the fighters that had previously fled to T4 airbase returned to Tadmur, reinforcing the remnants of the NDF, the Liwa Fatemiyoun brigade, the 18th and 11th Division and the Tiger Forces that stayed behind. While a welcome addition to the by then badly depleted defenders, their arrival would ultimately turn out to be too little support, too late. The region around Tadmur was also put under pressure, preventing these positions from offering assistance to the defence of the city.

The defence of the other major obstacle for the Islamic State on the road of Tadmur, the Grain Silos, was in the hands of Liwa Fatemiyoun, an AfghanShiite militia part of Iran's Revolutionary Guards. Liwa Fatemiyoun took part in the regime's first offensive to drive the Islamic State out of Tadmur and its surroundings, and had maintained a presence here ever since. Although their performance throughout Syria has been mixed, the Liwa Fatemiyoun contingent stationed near the Grain Silos proved incapable of anticipating the scale and speed of the Islamic State's offensive.

It is thus unsurprising that the other major obstacle for the Islamic State on the road to Tadmur would ultimately fall, opening the way up to the city. Further checkpoints guarding the perimeter of the city had already been abandoned by that time, ensuring a smooth entrance into the city for the Islamic State. While one could argue the decision to retreat from here was a cowardly one, it actually made tactical sense. There was no plan for defending the city using these checkpoints only, and if the regime forces would have held ground here, it was still extremely unlikely that they could have defended the city, especially considering it was largely uninhabited. If the defenders at the checkpoints had stood their ground, it would only have been a matter of time before the Islamic State would enter the city, where the house-to-house combat would have worked in the disadvantage of the defenders. While the loss of the city and its archaeological ruins was highly unfortunate, after losing the major defensive positions guarding the city retreating was the logical choice, especially considering the fact that conditions in the city were already close to untenable before the Islamic State assault.




Indeed, although the city and its defences were stocked with heavy weaponry, basic equipment such as enough radios and generators to charge them was lacking. Where there were generators, there was barely enough fuel to charge them. Food and water rations were not only insufficient, but of extremely poor quality. This had a serious effect on the morale of defenders, further worsening the situation. The image below details such a ration, which was supposedly meant to feed five people for one full day.





The Russian Army, which maintained a limited presence in Tadmur, had departed shortly before the fall of the city. Although Russians had been active in capturing the city in the first place, some were left behind to clear the many mines and IEDs in the city or to guard those that were doing so. For this purpose, sappers and special equipment were deployed, including several Uran-6 mine-clearing robots.


Although the Russian base appeared abandoned, with several of the original structures missing, tents were still seen standing, including what appeared to be the camp's kitchen with food still on display. Personal items such as a Russian credit card were also found. Tinkoff Bank, which had issued the credit card, swiftly blocked it after it featured in an Islamic State video from the base.




A Russian BPM-97 and two up-armoured Ural-4320s were some of the more notableamong the vehicles captured in Tadmur. Although both types are in use with the Russian Armed Forces contingent in Syria, small numbers also entered service with elements of the Syrian military. It is thus more likely that these vehicles were operated by Syria's Tiger Forces rather than the Russian Armed Forces.




A list of captured armour, artillery and vehicles featured in footage and images released by the Islamic State from Tadmur. The amount of heavy weaponry claimed to have been captured by the Islamic State included at least forty tanks and seven BMP-1s, which would make this the second-largest heavy arms haul of the Syrian Civil War after the capture of Brigade 93 by the Islamic State in August 2014, which was believed to have provided the Islamic State with no less than fifty tanks and just under twenty howitzers.

The amount of vehicles captured at Tadmur likely ended up higher however, and footage from te the Islamic State's march on T4 showed several tanks captured at Tadmur that weren't included in Islamic State footage from the city. The capture of a single T-72B, a single BPM-97, two armoured Ural-4320s, one UR-83P mine-clearing line charge and numerous AK-74s is notable, as these have all been provided to the Syrian military by Russia in the past few years.

- 7 T-55As
- 6 T-55Ms
- 4 T-62 Mod. 1967s
- 6 T-62 Mod. 1972s
- 1 T-72M1
- 1 T-72AV
- 1 T-72B
- 5 BMP-1s
- 1 ZSU-23
- 1 AMB-S
- 1 BPM-97
- 1 VT-55KS
- 7 122mm D-30 howitzers
- 2 130mm M-46 field-guns
- 1 152mm ML-20 howitzer
- 3 122mm BM-21 multiple rocket launchers
- 1 UR-83P mine-clearing line charge
- 1 14.5mm ZPU-4
- 6 23mm ZU-23s
- 1 37mm M-1939
- 1 57mm AZP S-60
- 3 S-125 surface-to-air missile (SAM) launchers
- 1 SNR-125 ''Low Blow'' (For the S-125)
- 7 Tatra (815)s
- 3 GAZ-33088
- 2 ZiL-131s
- 2 Armoured Ural-4320s
- 2 Ural-4320s
- 1 V3S
- Numerous technicals with associated anti-aircraft guns

The list includes at least twenty-six tanks, most of which captured within the perimeter of the city itself. Interestingly, most tanks appeared not to have been moved out of their bases, confirming that their crews had already fled well in advance of the Islamic State's takeover of the city. While this already poses a serious issue, the fact that none of them were then demolished by the remaining defenders or the Syrian or Russian Air Forces allowed the Islamic State to further strengthen its forces and could have led to serious consequences for T4 airbase later on.


Nonetheless, other tanks were seen parked at one of the several checkpoints guarding the city. While this may seem to make a lot more tactical sense than the situation described in the previous paragraph, the checkpoint the tanks were spotted at actually faced away from the Islamic State's advance. While Tadmur was thus packed with heavy weaponry, only a small part of that was actually available to the defenders on the frontline.




Boosted by the large amount of weaponry and ammunition captured in and around Tadmur, the fighters of the Islamic State then set their eyes on T4 airbase, which had proved an obstacle too ambitious to take on after the Islamic State captured Tadmur for the first time in May 2015. Indeed, the Islamic State's second attempt at taking T4 bears heavy resemblance to their previous effort. After capturing Tadmur on the 11th of December, the road to 'Fortress T4' was practically open, allowing for significant progress at advancing closer to the airbase.

T4, sharing its name with the nearby pumping station, is the Syrian Arab Air Force's (SyAAF) most important airbase. The remains of two fighter-bomber squadrons, a detachment of L-39s, one helicopter squadron, other helicopter detachments and Russian assets are currently operating out of T4, including the pride of the SyAAF: Its Su-24MK2s. Despite being Syria's largest airbase, T4 only has one runway, making the airbase's aircraft vulnerable in case it gets taken out. Given its status, it is unsurprising that the airbase is extremely well defended, now also including elements of the Russian military.

While the Islamic State had previously found itself unable to overcome T4's strong defences, its second attempt was carried out by a much stronger force, further bolstered by weaponry previously captured in Tadmur, which exceeded that of the previous capture in numbers. Before reaching the airbase's line of defensive, large swaths of open terrain surrounding the Eastern and Southern part of the T4 had to be overcome however. This is where the Islamic State's previous attempt came to a grinding halt, a place that would prove to be just as troublesome for its fighters this time around.





While the Islamic State could count on an increased number of fighters and weaponry, T4's defences were meanwhile quickly reinforced with elements of the Syrian military, including the first elements of the 5th Corps, and Russian special forces in addition to the experienced defenders already present. As the flat terrain worked heavily in the favour of the defenders, the Islamic State's best option was to attempt to encircle the airbase and try to achieve a breakthrough at a place less well defended. With reinforcements for the defenders underway, time was of the essence.

To deny the regime the ability to bring in these additional reinforcements, cutting the road connection between T4 and government-held territory was necessary to prevent a safe passage to the airbase. A strong Islamic State presence on the West side of T4 would also force the defenders to reinforce this part of the airbase, which is naturally less easily defended. This, in combination with Islamic State attacks on the Eastern and Southern part of T4 could have presented the Islamic State with the much needed weak spot that could then be exploited by the main force following behind. Images showing just how close the Islamic State had meanwhile gotten to T4 airbase can be seen below.




While the fighters of the Islamic State succeeded in temporarily disputing the major road leading to the airbase, they once again proved unable to maintain the encirclement of the airbase, allowing the regime to bring in further reinforcements. The Islamic State's armour also proved unable to place themselves into positions allowing for supression of the defenders due to the presence of anti-tank guided missiles (ATGMs), which knocked out several Islamic State tanks that attempted to do so. Russian ATGM teams armed with 9M133 Kornet ATGMs were also active at T4.

Further help came from an unexpected corner, as Coalition aircraft reportedly struck fourteen tanks, three howitzers, two buildings and two vehicles, supposedly killing at least thirty-eight Islamic State fighters in the vicinity of T4 airbase, denying the Islamic State the ability to build up sufficient forces needed for attempting a breakthrough. In the meantime, the weather took a turn for the worse and temporarily covered the surrounding area in snow, as depicted below.



Although continuing to exert heavy pressure on the Northern, Eastern and Southern part of T4, even capturing a S-125 surface-to-air missile site on the Northern flank, the Islamic State failed to find the weak spot needed to have any serious chance at infiltrating the airbase, at which point its offensive effectively ended. It had taken heavy losses while attempting to advance further into government-held territory, and much of the remaining Islamic State contingent left the area for Deir ez-Zor. The Islamic State was now on the defence, which would soon reveal a major weakness due to the unabating attrition its forces face.

This article is to be followed by another article detailing the subsequent offensive by the Syrian military to recapture Tadmur, which it succeeded in doing on the 2nd of March 2017.

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Striking from the Dark, Jaish al-Islam fires Iranian Zelzal-2 rockets

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By Stijn Mitzer and Joost Oliemans

Jaish al-Islam has once again secured its place in the spotlight after firing at least two Iranian Zelzal-2 artillery rockets against regime positions in Syria on the 6th of March 2017. Jaish al-Islam had previously deployed one of its Zelzal-2s in retaliation for the continued airstrikes on Jaish al-Islam held Eastern Ghouta on the 31th of August 2015, and although the target and results of the underreported attack remain unknown, the strike confirmed that the threat of a non-state party firing off long-range rockets was very real. A video of the March 2017 launches can be seen here.

The current deployment of Zelzal-2s, dubbed 'Islam-5' by Jaish al-Islam, likely serves the same goals of deterrent and revenge as it did back in August 2015. Indeed, shortly before the launch of the first Zelzal-2 a member of Jaish al-Islam reads the following statement:

''In response to attacks by regime forces on civilians in the districts of Qaboun and Tishreen in Eastern Damascus as well as on Eastern Ghouta, we Rocket and Artillery regiments of Jaish al-Islam in the Qalamoun area, declare the launch of missile shelling campaign on regime positions.''

The first deployment of the Zelzal-2 came as a surprise to many as Jaish al-Islam was previously unknown to be in the possession of such sophisticated weaponry. Indeed, the capture of these missiles was not featured in any of the rebel's press releases or videos. Although the exact story on how Jaish al-Islam acquired Iranian Zelzal-2s remains unclear, these artillery rockets were believed to have been captured in Syria's Qalamoun region by elements of the Free Syrian Army in 2013, which subsequently sold the Zelzal-2s (thought to total at least five in number) to Jaish al-Islam. As no launcher was believed to have been captured, Jaish al-Islam subsequently engineered its own launch platform.

The one-and-a-half year gap between the two launches confirms a pattern that has been typical of the usage of Jaish al-Islam's military assets throughout the course of the Syrian Civil War. Instead of utilising its assets to their full potential in the Civil War as they become available, Jaish al-Islam is deploying them mainly as a deterrent, threatening their use to force the regime to reconsider its military actions against Jaish al-Islam and Eastern Ghouta.

This strategy first became apparent with Jaish al-Islam's usage of its three 9K33 mobile surface-to-air missile (SAM) systems, which have only been used on several occassions in the past several years despite the fact that plenty of missiles are available to Jaish al-Islam. With no missiles confirmed to have been fired for more than two years in between the last two launches despite an abundance of targets, it appears Jaish al-Islam is indeed unwilling to constantly operate these systems in a conventional role.

The Zelzal-2 is a 610mm unguided artillery rocket originally developed by Iran during the 1990s, which became the subject of controversy after it was reported that Hizbullah was in possession of the system, thereby putting large parts of Israel in its range. Although it remains unknown if Hizbullah ever did possess the Zelzal-2s, their presence in Lebanon is unlikely. In the meantime, Iran was in the process of setting up an assembly line for Zelzal-2 artillery rockets and Fateh 110 ballistic missiles in Syria. The missiles were first seen in 2011's rocket and missile exercises, which were held in an effort to project Syria's strength to the outside world amidst the increasingly deteriorating security situation in the country.

Although often confused for a ballistic missile, the Zelzal-2 is in fact an unguided artillery rocket. Although the CEP (circular error probable) of the Zelzal-2 is currently unknown, the spin-stabilized projectile is anything but a precise weapon, and is best aimed at larger targets such as airbases. The Zelzal-2's 600 kilogram heavy warhead is capable of striking targets up to an impressive range of 200 kilometers, and possibly even beyond.

Interestingly, in Syria artillery rockets and missiles are seen as weapons of revenge and thus purposely named after military defeats suffered at the hands of foreign powers. Accordingly, the Zelzal-2 became the 'Maysalun', referring to the Battle of Maysalun, where the Arab Kingdom suffered a defeat at the hands of the French Army in 1920. The Fateh 110 became known as the 'Tishreen', which in turn refers to the October War. Along the same lines, the Scud is referred to as 'Joulan', in reference to the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights.

Only a limited number of Iranian Zelzal-2s and Fateh 110s are believed to have been fired against rebel targets throughout the course of the Syrian Civil War. Instead, regime forces have made heavy use of Soviet R-17 'Scud' and 9M79(-1/M) 'Tochka-U' missiles against rebel held villages, almost exclusively resulting in civilian casualties. Russia is reported to have delivered additional missiles for these systems as Syria is believed to have run out of its original stock of 9M79M missiles. The Maysalun (left)and the Tishreen (right)can be seen in the images below.

Despite their significance, the introduction of the Zelzal-2 'Maysalun' and the Fateh 110 'Tishreen' into Syrian service and the setting up of a production line for these weapons was especially notable due to the fact that they were but a part of a much larger Iranian-Syrian agreement to turn Syria into a weapons depot for Hizbullah. In this role, a large portion of the heavy weaponry destined for Hizbullah would be held back in Syria awaiting a future potential conflict with Israel. This included and still includes multiple rocket launchers, artillery rockets and ballistic missiles, but also anti-ship missiles.

The reason for this peculiar deal has to do with the inability to safely store and defend larger weapons systems in Lebanon. Buildings containing such high value targets are extremely vulnerable without an integrated network of surface-to-air missile systems (SAMs), something which Hizbullah lacks.Syria could be said to perform much better in this department with the planned acquisition of S-300PMU-2s, Buk-M2s, Pechora-2Ms and Pantsir-S1s, although the delivery of the first has been postponed and is ultimately believed to have been cancelled. This dense network of surface-to-air missiles should have deterred the Israeli Air Force from targeting these weapons depots, yet it has so far proved unable to counter the continued aerial intrusions and airstrikes by the Israelis.

This agreement was first put to the testin 2006, when Syrian 220mm and 302mm Khaibar-1 multiple rocket launchers (MRLs) crossed the border with Lebanon and positioned themselves throughout the country in preparation of striking targets in Israel. While Hizbullah was responsible for the covert transportation and operations of these MRLs in Lebanon, Syria's 158th Missile Regiment is believed to have operated the Khaibar-1s in close cooperation with Hizbullah. At least one Khaibar-1 was destroyed by the Israeli Air Force during the course of the war. A large-scale possible deployment of Syrian MRLs and ballistic missiles vehicles in Lebanon is also the reason why all vehicles are based on brightly coloured civilian trucks, which can move through Lebanon relatively unnoticed and quickly be reconfigured to a more civilian look shortly after launching their deadly payload.

Yet Syria's participation is believed to have gone much further than supplying Hizbullah with arms and ammunition (including 9M133 Kornets) and operating multiple rocket launchers on behalf of Hizbullah. Similar to its involvement in operating these systems, it is also believed to have been the primary culprit behind the attack on the INS Hanit, an Israeli Sa'ar 5 class corvette, which killed four crew members. This ship was hit by a Chinese C-802 or its Iranian derivative; the launcher and personnel employed were likely supplied by Syria.


Although nowadays completely overshadowed by those of the Islamic State, Jaish al-Islam's accomplishments during the course of the Civil War have been nothing short of spectacular. It was the first faction to operate its armour and infantry in a single mechanised force, as opposed to the poor coordination between the two often seen with other forces. Also, as mentioned before it can be said to be the only rebel faction to successfully maintain air defenceforces. In late 2013, Jaish al-Islam even established its own air force based at Kshesh airbase. While none of its L-39s ever flew operational sorties, it proved what Jaish al-Islam was capable of.

Similarly, it remains the only rebel faction to operate weapons in the Zelzal-2's class, even if it is uncertain how many missiles are in their arsenal. Despite the fact that the inaccuracy of this weapon makes it unlikely it actually managed to destroy anything, Jaish al-Islam's warning of a continued shelling campaigns should not be taken lightly, and only the future will tell if they are capable and willing of following through on it.

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Armour in the Islamic State, the DIY works of Wilayat al-Khayr

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By Stijn Mitzer and Joost Oliemans

The rise of the Islamic State from an militant group operating in Iraq to a self-proclaimed caliphate controlling large swaths of land in Iraq, Syria and further abroad has had a significant effect on the course of the Syrian Civil War, effectively hijacking the revolution's original goals and drastically changing the scope of warfare in Syria. At the forefront of this change is the Islamic State's ability to quickly adapt to the various situations that can be encountered on the battlefield, allowing it to become one of the most sophisticated designated terrorist groups to date.

While many militant groups around the world exclusively operate as a light infantry force focussing on guerilla warfare, the huge amounts of heavy weaponry captured by the Islamic State has allowed it to directly challenge stronger foes on the ground. The use of armoured fighting vehicles in its operations is no exception, with the Islamic State having captured and operated more than 200 tanks and around 50 BMPs in Syria alone. While Coalition efforts to destroy the Islamic State's heavy weaponry has slowly degraded its inventory of armoured fighting vehicles (AFVs) since the commencement of airstrikes in mid 2014, it continues to operate and utilise significant numbers of them throughout its Wilayats (governorates).

In an effort to provide technical support for this fleet of AFVs, several Wilayats established armour workshops to repair and modify vehicles for future use on the battlefield. While every governorate has workshops tasked with producing up-armoured vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (VBIEDs), only a handful of Wilayats currently have a meaningful industry capable of repairing and modifying armoured fighting vehicles. The establishment of these workshops directly depends on the amount of vehicles and AFVs present in the Wilayat, the governorate's industrial capabilities and its leadership and technical expertise.

All of these factors combined meant that several major armour workshops were established throughout Islamic State held territory, mainly concentrated around Mosul. The immense amounts of vehicles captured here gave birth to a large industry aimed at modifying vehicles to better suit the Islamic State's needs, leading to a myriad of DIY creations. In Syria, two major workshops would be established, 'The Workshop' located in Wilayat Raqqa (Raqqa) and another in Wilayat al-Khayr (Deir ez-Zor). This article will cover the DIY works of Wilayat al-Khayr.


Deir ez-Zor, the conquest for which was once perhaps the most underreported in Syria, has recently gained increased attention after the commencement of food drops by the United Nations and Russian Air Force to the starving population living in regime-held parts of the city. The contingent defending Deir ez-Zor against the Islamic State has been under siege since May 2015 and continues to hold its ground despite being under continuous engagement since 2011. While the Free Syrian Army found itself unable to further advance on the city's airbase and military installations, the Islamic State made renewed efforts at clearing Deir ez-Zor of regime presence after defeating the rebels around Deir ez-Zor in July 2014.

Inheriting the frontlines of the Free Syrian Army, the Islamic State continued pressing on three fronts, compromising the eastern perimeter of the city's airbase, Deir ez-Zor's city centre and the base of the 137th Brigade. The Islamic State originally focused its attacks mainly on the airbase and the town, and although managing to get close enough to the airbase to prevent larger transport aircraft such as the Il-76 from landing, it found itself unable to actually capture the airbase. The fight for Deir ez-Zor's city centre remains undecided, with fighters on both sides entrenched to such a degree that the defeat of the Islamic State is likely to occur sooner than regime fighters being flushed out of the city. Thus unable to advance on these fronts, the Islamic State made renewed efforts at advancing from the West and South side of the city. This tactic proved successful, bringing the fighters of the Islamic State ever closer to the airbase, dividing the regime-held parts of Deir ez-Zor in two. Despite this, the capture of either pocket remains extremely unlikely. An image of Deir ez-Zor's devastated city centre can be seen below, once again implying the great difficulties in advancing in such urban terrain.


The three fronts the Islamic State is currently fighting on in Deir ez-Zor each requires a different approach with various types of vehicles, creating the need for a workshop capable of providing such vehicles or modifying existing ones for new roles. The urban warfare in the city calls for large and heavily armoured VBIEDs to wipe out complete appartment blocks that would otherwise be nigh on impossible to overcome, the desert landscape west of the city sees the need for armoured fighting vehicles capable of hitting their targets from a distance while the lush environment south of the airbase requires up-armoured AFVs capable of withstanding hits in the close quarters combat they see action in.

Mainly the fight for control over the city's centre and the combat south of the airbase have led to a myriad of interesting and sometimes absurd DIY creations. With the bulk of the Syrian Arab Army's modern tank fleet stationed closer to the border with Israel and Lebanon before the commencement of the Civil War, most of the armoured fighting vehicles in Deir ez-Zor are older T-55s and BMP-1s. As a result, most of the Islamic State's DIY creations are based on these older vehicles.

However, this situation changed when the Republican Guard's 104th Brigade led by General Issam 'The Lion' Zahreddine deployed to Deir ez-Zor, bringing with it several T-72 'Urals', T-72M1s, T-72AVs and even T-72M1 TURMS-T on arrival. Interestingly enough, several T-55Ms and T-55(A)MVs also showed up in Deir ez-Zor, although it remains unknown if these were brought here by the 104th or arrived as reinforcements for the SyAA contingent at another date. The limited amount of T-72s captured by the Islamic State in Deir ez-Zor have so far solely been used in their original role.

The BMP-1 would prove to be an extremely popular vehicle for modification by Wilayat al-Khayr's workshops, and several vehicles have been converted to armoured personnel carriers (APCs) or to VBIEDs. The vehicle below has had a significant upgrade to its armour protection, and is without a doubt one of the more slick designs coming out of Wilayat al-Khayr. The side armour of the vehicle has been extensively reinforced with slat armour attached to a 'metal mattress' fully covering each side, which also acts as an extra layer of armour. The back doors, which also happen to act as the BMP-1's fuel tanks, saw the installment of slat armour further reinforced by sandbags, although the placement of the slat armour here might be too close to the vehicle itself to be effective. In addition, an extra layer of armour has been installed around the turret. The viewports of the commander's seat appear to have been painted over, which shouldn't prove to be a problem as most rebels, Jabhat Fateh al-Sham and the Islamic State operate their BMP-1s with a driver and gunner only.





A comparable installment of armour was seen on a BMP-1 modified to the fire-support role. Trading in its original turret, this vehicle was equipped with a turreted 23mm ZU-23 instead. This was accompanied by an increase in all round armour protection, using thick sheet metal and slat armour, which should at least enable it to withstand most types of small ams calibres from any range. Of note is the armour on the lower glacis plate and the sandbags for additional protection, owing to the thin armour especially on the upper hull front. This vehicle was lost to regime forces in Deir ez-Zor, which displayed the BMP-1 along with the bodies of the crew. Shortly after capturing the modified BMP-1, the vehicle was moved to a nearby regime checkpoint and left to rot. This checkpoint was later overrun by the Islamic State, which recaptured the vehicle sans the two 23mm barrels, which had been removed for usage elsewhere.



A BMP-1 that had likely previously seen use as an armoured personnel carrier would later end up as a VBIED in June 2016, the second confirmed use of a BMP-1 VBIED in Deir ez-Zor. This vehicle had its turret replaced with a very crude array of steel plates welded together with a clearing in the front for the installment of a machine gun or for use by the crew's personal weapons. The BMP-1's standard armour protection was reinforced by slat armour on the rear and both sides of the vehicle. This installment of slat armour is different from the BMP-1s above, and appears to have replaced the previous arrangement as witnessed by the vehicles below.




Another up-armoured BMP-1 converted to an armoured personnel carrier. In contrast to the vehicle above, this BMP-1 doesn't appear to be equipped with any replacement for its removed turret. The slat armour arrangement is the same as on the vehicle above, and clearly shows the weak attachment points to the vehicle's hull armour. Another interesting vehicle can be seen in the back, which appears to be based on a heavy truck chassis, although details on this vehicle are currently lacking.

Several BMP-1s continue to be used in their original role by the Islamic State in Deir ez-Zor. Although most vehicles remain unmodified, several have received slat armour similar to the example above, with minor differences between each variant. The vehicle below has lost its slat armour on one side, which likely fell off after a hit or collision with an object. The attachement points of such slat armour are not particularly strong, and it is not unlikely to fall of after just a single hit. With the slat armour installed on the turret, this BMP-1 bears a passing resemblance to a BMP-1 modification of 'The Workshop', albeit of much less quality.




BMP-1s that are converted to VBIEDs, or as in the cases above to an APC, often lose their turret in the process. The turret and its associated 73mm 2A28 Grom cannon rarely go to waste however, an example of which can be seen below. This Toyota Land Cruiser has been armed with one of these now redundant turrets, giving the fighters of the Islamic State a mobile platform for fire support. The black squares on the truck read: الدولة الإسلامية - 'Islamic State', جيش الخلافة - 'The Caliphate Army' (Jaish al-Khilafa), followed by a unique serial number.



Modifications to Main Battle Tanks (MBTs) in Wilayat al-Khayr have so far been limited to several T-55s and T-62s. In Deir ez-Zor, most tanks continue to operate in their original configuration or are converted to VBIEDs shortly after their capture by the Islamic State. The exact reasoning behind why some tanks are converted to VBIEDs while others remain in use in their original role remains unknown, as it appears even completely intact examples are being used for this task. Nonetheless, their heavy armour makes them ideally suited to make it to the designated target intact before detonating their deadly load.

Most of the tank upgrades have so far been limited to the T-55, which is the most numerous tank in service with the Islamic State in Deir ez-Zor. The T-55s below have been upgraded by the addition of metal plating to both sides of the vehicles and a frame around the turret, which allows for the stowage of various materials that can increase the armour of the vehicle. This can be anything from sandbags to rubber mats or even sheets. Of note is the North Korean laser rangefinder (LRF) on the tank directly below.





The stowage attachments on the turret of tanks counts as one of the most basic upgrades undertaken in Deir ez-Zor, and the simplicity of such impromptu armour "improvements" can't be overstated, as is seen on the T-55 below. It appears this tank was also crudely equipped with slat armour, which must have fallen off at some point.




The frame on the T-62 below appears to hold some sort of foam, certainly a curious choice for increasing your armour protection. The tank has been completely repainted, and a black square on the back of the tank was applied. Although unreadable, a similar square was found on a T-55 destroyed near Tadmur, which read: فرقة عثمان بن عفان ديوان الجند-الخنساء - Othman bin Affan Division - The Soldiers' Office- al-Khansaa'. This particular T-62 has been sighted on three different occasions over the past several months, and is likely to continue to see service in Deir ez-Zor.









A common sight in Syria, sandbags are used as a quick and cheap way to increase the armour protection of any armoured fighting vehicle. For this purpose, metal casings are usually installed around the turret to act as a support frame. While sandbags can be easily applied to the front of the tank, this is a much more cumbersome process when applied to its sides, for obvious reasons.




Another less sophisticated solution that has been quite popular among factions in Syria consists of installing spent shell casings around the turret, which in the case below appears to be held together by rope. The side skirts have been reinforced by metal or steel plates, as is the lower glacis plate. Although only contributing to a small part of the tank's armour and relatively hard to hit, the lower glacis plate is often overlooked during DIY armour upgrades. Metal plating has also been used as material for creating new mud guards, as the original ones are relatively fragile and are often missing on Syrian tanks.




While most of the upgraded armoured fighting vehicles operating in Deir ez-Zor are products of Wilayat al-Khayr's workshops, others have been brought in from elsewhere. Indeed, armour upgraded by 'The Workshop' in Wilayat Raqqa has been seen in Deir ez-Zor on several occasions. Although the Islamic State's assets are under constant threat of airstrikes by the US-led Coalition, the Islamic State is still able to move its armour throughout Syria and Iraq unnoticed. An example of this is the capture of a 2S1 Gvozdika from regime forces near the Shaer gas field in October 2014, which later showed up being used against the Syrian Arab Army in Deir ez-Zor. At least one U.S. Navistar International 7000 series truck previously captured in Iraq has also been active in the region, and has been sighted taking part in the fighting in Deir ez-Zor and the first offensive on al-Sukhna and Tadmur in May 2015.

Vehicles upgraded by 'The Workshop' in use by the Islamic State in Deir ez-Zor include the Toyota Land Cruiser with the BMP-1 turret seen above, but also an up-armoured T-72M1 and an up-armoured BMP-1. The latter was knocked out while advancing on regime positions East of the city in late 2015. These vehicles will be extensively covered in a future article on the DIY works of 'The Workshop' in Wilayat Raqqa.




Aside from using BMP-1s to transport troops to the frontline, an armoured personnel carrier based on either a bulldozer or truck is also active in Deir ez-Zor, and can be seen here leading a charge East of the airbase. A turret has been placed on top, likely housing a 12.7mm DShK or a 14.5mm KPV heavy machine gun and also comes equipped with several viewing ports for the crew and passengers to look out from. Metal plating on the sides and very rudimentary slat armour on the back provide some degree of protection.



In an effort to flush the remaining regime forces out of Deir ez-Zor's city centre, the Islamic State has tried everything from employing tunnel bombs to massive up-armoured VBIEDs based on bulldozers, several of which can be seen below. Although suffering from a slow speed, these vehicles can be incredibly resistant when upgraded with additional armour. In addition, the bulldozer's bucket also acts as an extra layer of armour when raised.

Most of these VBIEDs would feature in 'Support from God, and imminent victory (3)'. The slat armour arrangement on most of these vehicles is extremely similar to the arrangement found on some of the earlier BMP-1s, making it likely that a single workshop is responsible for the conversion of both designs. As should by now be evident, Wilayat al-Khayr's workshops favour pragmatism over good looks.





In footage covering yet another bulldozer-based VBIED the application of the armour is clearly visible. More interestingly, the installment of some of the explosives near the driver's cabin can also be seen. Several names have been applied on the additional armour in front, including Abu Ammar, Abu Hussein, Abu Al-Baraa'; undoubtedly the names of other Islamic State fighters.






The up-armoured bulldozer below appears to use its reinforced bucket as a shield while advancing through Deir ez-Zor's city centre. Two cutouts have been made in the armour to allow the driver to see where he is going. Practicality aside, the sight of such a monstrosity advancing on a position must also have a significant psychological effect on defenders.


While heavily armoured, not every VBIED in Deir ez-Zor has found its way to its target. At least two bulldozer-based VBIEDs are known to have been taken out before reaching before having the chance to detonate their deadly load. The early detection of these massive VBIEDs is of the utmost importance, as a nearby blast could still inflict massive damage to the building the defenders are located in. The projectile that struck the VBIED below penetrated at least two layers of armour, although it is unknown if it penetrated the vehicle itself. Indeed, it is probable that the VBIED got stuck and was abandoned before it was hit by regime forces.

Wheeled VBIEDs based on trucks have also been popular in Wilayat al-Khayr, most being used on the outskirts of the city rather than within the city centre. Interestingly, this particular truck appears to have been converted to a dump truck by the installment of an open-box bed on the back of the truck. This cargo hold is now used to carry the VBIED's deadly payload.




Indeed, dump trucks are a popular choice due to their ability to carry a large number of explosives, which are seperated from the driver sitting in the cabin. The slat armour on this vehicle has been directly installed on the metal plates, indicating a lack of understanding of how slat armour works as without the spacing the effect of disrupting incoming shaped warheads does not occur.

In addition to using heavily up-armoured bulldozers in Deir ez-Zor's city centre, the Islamic State in Deir ez-Zor was the first to make use of tank-based VBIEDs in the conflict, deploying the first example already in late 2014. This T-55-based VBIED was still equipped with its turret, although the gun had been removed to allow for easier navigating through the city's street, at the time of usage. At least four tank-based VBIEDs have followed since.

This includes the example below, which would be sent off against its target along with a BMP-based VBIED. Both drivers appeared very young, in their late teens or perhaps early twenties. While all parties involved in the Syrian Civil War make use of children in their fight, the Islamic State has been increasing their recruitment of younger fighters in an effort to close their ranks.


Another T-55-based VBIED was seen later, this time with its turret removed in order to allow for a larger payload to be installed in the space left vacant. The tank's resulting low profile is also advantageous in avoiding incoming RPGs, increasing the chance the VBIED makes it to its target. The explosion of the vehicle can be seen here (at the 3:26 mark). Contrary to the other VBIEDs, this vehicle is believed to have been produced by Wilayat al-Raqqa's 'The Workshop'.






A clear indication of the massive blast and damage inflicted by these tank-based VBIEDs is given by first in the series 'Support from God, and imminent victory' (Quran verse 61:13) (at the 5:24 mark). Before reaching its target, this T-55 was actually hit by an RPG fired by one of the defenders, which failed to penetrate the tank's armour. Although at that point the fate of the defenders was already sealed, it shows that armour is an important factor in a VBIED's success.




On the 1st of September 2016, the Islamic State published several images of its Istishhadis (suicide bombers) shortly before going out on their mission in Deir ez-Zor. The choice of vehicles used as VBIEDs was interesting to say the least, reflective of the current armour situation in Deir ez-Zor.This included the up-armoured T-62 VBIED below, driven to its target by Abu al-Harith al-Ansari.


The first ZSU-23-based VBIED would be driven by Abu Yamama al-Ansari, the resulting blast can be seen below. The supports for the slat armour appear similar to the arrangement found on some of the BMP-1s. Although it is extremely likely that the ZSU-23's four 23mm cannons were removed during its conversion to a VBIED, the RPK-2 'Tobol' radar can still be seen installed and is in active modus.




A previously captured 2P25 Transporter Erector Launcher (TEL), belonging to one of the 2K12 surface-to-air missile (SAM) sites around Deir ez-Zor would also be used as a VBIED. In similar fashion to the ZSU-23 above, the usage of a 2P25 as a VBIED is the first time a SAM system has be used for such a task. The driver of the 2P25 was Abu Omar al-Halabi, from Halab (Aleppo) Syria.






At least one of the two BREM-2 armoured recovery vehicles (ARVs) captured by the Islamic State after it overran the Ayyash weapon depots would later also be used as a VBIED. This conversion consisted of nothing more than the removal of the BREM-2's crane, which might see further use somewhere else. The Islamic State has no use for these vehicles in their original role, with even the Syrian Arab Army converting them to weapon carriers armed with 14.5mm ZPU-4s or 37mm M-1939 anti-aircraft guns. With the BREM-2 being unable to tow away any Main Battle Tanks (MBTs) and with more than enough VT-55KS' and BREM-1s ARVs at hand, the fate of the BREM-2 as a weapon carrier in Syria is effectively sealed.

While the VBIEDs of Wilayat al-Khayr are already monstrous in appearance, several up-armoured technicals operaing in and around Deir ez-Zor can also be said to be truly hideous. These vehicles have been upgraded with plates of steel patched together around the front and sides of the vehice, and sometimes with slat armour on the front. Such vehicles are likely made by Islamic State battalions themselves rather than in the true armour workshops of Wilayat al-Khayr.



The control of Deir ez-Zor, the birthplace of many Islamic State DIY projects, continues to be disputed between government forces and the Islamic State. With neither faction currently capable of finishing the other off, all eyes are now aimed at the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), which has been slowly advancing from Northern Syria closer to the city of Deir ez-Zor. Futher SDF offensives in this region will force the Islamic State to divert troops from the city to the defense of this sector, which will likely ultimately seal the fate of Deir ez-Zor in favour of the regime. Alternatively, pro-Assad forces could use the recent success in Tadmur as a stepping stone towards al-Sukhna and in so doing open up the road to Deir ez-Zor again, which would result in the same outcome in the long run. Until then, further DIY projects of ever increasing sophistication are sure to emerge on the battlefield of Deir ez-Zor, continuously increasing the vastly assymmetrical warfare that has come to typify the Syrian War.

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A rare species: Cuba's David IMV exported to Angola

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By Stijn Mitzer and Joost Oliemans 

Cuba is well known for its former leader Fidel Castro, its communism and its renowned cigars, exporting the latter two to numerous countries throughout the world. In contrast, its role as an arms exporter remains much more elusive. While Cuba has begun manufacturing a wide range of arms-related equipment and set up a large industry for converting armoured fighting vehicles in recent years, this industry has so far mostly been serving the needs of Cuba's own Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias. The presence of Cuban 'David' infantry mobility vehicles (IMVs) in service with the Forças Armadas Angolanas is thus highly notable.

The David IMV was first spotted in service with the Angolan Army during the SADC's (Southern African Development Community) multinational exercise 'Vale do Keve 2014', where it carried out simulated missions alongside Namibian Casspir MRAPs (Mine-Resistant Ambush Protected). The David had been sighted in Cuba several years earlier, taking part in the 50th Anniversary of Playa Giron's Victory parade (as seen in the image below), commemorating the failed Bay of Pigs Invasion of 1961.

The strong relationship between Angola and Cuba, established during the former's freedom struggle against the Portuguese colonial rule of the country, has had a significant influence on Angola and its armed forces, but was not known to have materialised in the delivery of military equipment to Angola over the past decades. The bond between the countries was once again reaffirmed by recent meetings of Angolan and Cuban officials, where ministers stated their willingness to continue and even strengthen cooperation in the military field.

The David IMV, sometimes called 'Iguana', is a direct result of Cuba's inability to replace its dated Soviet inventory of weaponry by equal numbers of newly acquired weaponry from abroad. This forced the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias to find an indigenous solution for the increasing obsolescence of and decreasing flow of spare parts for its equipment, a situation which became increasingly evident throughout the 90s and early 2000s. This solution had to be carried out with a limited budget and more importantly, within the technological capabilities of Cuban factories.

Cuba already had limited experience in the manufacturing and conversion of several types of vehicles, mostly by adding to or replacing their weaponry or by equipping vehicles with additional armour for increased protection on the battlefield. At least some of these vehicles were subsequently used in Angola, where the Cubans were fighting in support of the MPLA (People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola) against UNITA (National Union for the Total Independence of Angola), the FNLA (National Liberation Front of Angola), the FLEC (Front for the Liberation of the Enclave of Cabinda) and the South African Defence Force (SADF).

A large contingent of the Ejército (Army) and Fuerza Aérea Revolucionaria (Air Force) was deployed to Angola in the 1970s and 1980s to serve as advisors to the Angolan Army but also to engage in direct combat with the SADF. While the Cubans are often credited for defeating the SADF, causing the latter to pull out of the Angolan conflict and grant South West Africa independence (becoming Namibia in 1990), the Cubans also suffered a string of defeats at the hands of the SADF. However, they ultimately convinced the SADF that this conflict could not be won without a significant increase in commitment, thus essentially gaining the Cubans a political victory through their presence in Angola rather than a military one.

While the returning Cuban contingent was hailed as victorers over Apartheid South Africa, Cuba would soon find itself in major problems at home. Largely reliant on the Soviet Union for its trade, the dissolution of the Soviet Union had a devastated effect on the Cuban economy. The Cuban military was also hit hard, and was soon faced with a shortage of spares and fuel. As a result, large numbers of armoured fighting vehicles and aircraft were put into storage and large navy vessels and submarines were laid off.

In light of a more stable economic situation, a large number of vehicles and equipment were taken out of storage in recent years for conversion to new roles in an effort to increase the Cuban military's fighting capabilities, sometimes leading to dubious contraptions with little fighting value in case of war but also leading to more impressive projects such as the David IMV.

Other great examples of these conversions include the mating of surface-to-air (SAM) launchers onto the chassis of T-55 tanks, allowing for increased mobility of an otherwise static SAM site. Other projects include the installment of anti-tank guns, anti-aircraft guns, howitzers and field guns on the chassis of BMP-1s, T-55s and even stored T-34/85s. A full list of all known conversions can be seen here.

Although often said to be a MRAP, a more fitting designation would be an 'infantry mobility vehicle (IMV)'. The David represents an interesting mix of parts mostly cannibalised from different types of military vehicles. The chassis is that of a Soviet GAZ-66 truck, on which an armoured body was installed. Although the armour values of the vehicle are unknown, the all-round protection is likely sufficient against small-arms fire and explosive fragments.

The armament of the vehicle consists of a single 7.62mm PKT light machine gun taken from BTR-60s or BRDM-2s that have been converted to serve in different roles, losing their turret in the process. These vehicles are also the source of the roof hatches, up to four of which are present on the David. Two variants are known to exist, one with no such hatches and one with four of them, which is the variant in service with Angola. Three viewing ports with associated firing ports are located on each side of the vehicle.

While the prospect of more Cuban weaponry showing up in countries throughout the world is not very likely, the sighting of such an exotic vehicle in Africa once again shows the complexity of the international arms market, necessitating accurate analysis to keep track of the way armament proliferates. This particular vehicle serves as an excellent illustration of this fact, adding to an armed forces' arsenal of extremely diverse fighting vehicles, many of which originated from unconventional sources including even North Korea.

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Another One Bites the Dust: Major arms depot falls to Islamic State

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By Stijn Mitzer and Joost Oliemans

Just over a year after capturing Deir ez-Zor's Ayyash weapon depot in the largest arms haul of the Syrian Civil War, the Islamic State has once again got its hands on massive quantities of ammunition captured from a storage depot in Deir ez-Zor.This arms hauljoins the list of other major instances where vast amounts of weaponry and munitions traded ownerssuch as thecapture of the aforementioned Ayyash weapon depot, Regiment 121, Brigade 93 and the Mahin arms depot, all but the last of which were at the hands of the Islamic State. Each of these depots provided its capturers with a wide array of weaponry, vehicles and ammunition that could immediately be used against their former owners, a major blow to other factions fighting for control over Syria.

A propaganda video released by the Islamic State, showing its fighters on the offensive in Deir ez-Zor, was the only footage released of the capture of the depot. The video, على أبواب الملاحم - 'At the Doors of Epics [Battles]', details the Islamic State's efforts towards splitting the regime-held territory in two, which they succeeded in doing so in February 2017. This means that the airbase and Brigade 137 are now completely isolated, further complicating efforts to supply both pockets and drastically increasing the vulnerability of the airbase. Despite the growing threat, it remains unlikely that the Islamic State will be able to capture either pocket. The capture of significant quantities of ammunition, including up to three million rounds of small arms rounds will surely allow the Islamic State to prolong its fight for survival.

This is an estimate of the ammunition captured, the real figures are believed to be higher. The contents of at least 652 crates could not be identified. Small arms are not included due to the small quantities captured.

Ammunition:

˜ 3,320,600* rounds of 7.62x39, 7.62x54R, 12.7mm and 14.5mm ammunition.
- 2,310 rounds of 85mm ammunition.
- 693 rounds of 100mm ammunition.
- 13 rounds of 125mm ammunition.
- 120 rounds of 120mm ammunition.
- 68 rounds of 122mm rocket ammunition.
- 15 TM-62 anti-tank mines.

Vehicles:

- 1 T-72M1 TURMS-T.
- 3 T-72M1s.
- 1 AMB-S.
- 1 Tatra 148.
- 1 UAZ-469.
- 5 cars.

Although assessing the exact contents of each spam can of small arms munition is impossible, by volume the total amount would equal roughly 3.32 million rounds of 7.62x39mm, or a slightly smaller numer distributed of larger calibres such as 12.7mm and 14.5mm. Regardless, truly a tremendous amount of small arms ammunition was captured indeed.




An immense quantity of 85mm UBR-365P AP rounds was also discovered in the arms depot. While certainly an impressive sight, these rounds are completely useless to the Islamic State. The 85mm D-44 anti-tank cannon currently is the only weapon in the Syrian arsenal capable of firing these rounds, but only a small number of these are active on the battlefield. In fact, the D-44 is so rare the Islamic State is currently believed to be in the possession of just one.













At least 693 rounds of 100mm tank ammunition were also found stored in two seperate rooms. This quantity far exceeds the need of the Islamic State in the city of Deir ez-Zor as it only operates several T-55 tanks that use these shells here. It is thus extremely likely that at least a part was transported to Raqqa for further distribution among Islamic State units elsewhere.








The presence of Iranian ammunition crates dated the 5th of May 2015 is notable, dating back to shortly before the encirclement of the city. These crates likely arrived onboard of one of the SyAAF's Il-76s that frequently visisted Deir ez-Zor when it was still possible for these aircraft to land at the airbase. This has meanwhile become impossible due to the close proximity of the Islamic State to the runway from the Eastern and Southern side, a fact that was made painfully clear by the destruction of two L-39s in their Hardened Aircraft Shelter (HAS).










Much of the ammunition was quickly loaded onto trucks and cars, and was likely distributed among Islamic State units located throughout Syria. The targeting of these stockpiles before would prevent this from happening, and limit the Islamic State's ability to continue replenishing its stocks. Nonetheless, such action has time and again not been undertaken by either the SyAAF or Russian Air Force, which combined with the lack of timely evacuation or sabotage of such depots by ground units in the first place has been a major boon to opposing parties during the Syrian War.










The Islamic State also captured two airdrops destined for regime forces in the city, one of which was already believed to have been emptied of its contents before the Islamic State arrived. However, it is extremely likely that the ammunition from these crates was later encountered in one of the depots captured. Several airdrops have so far ended up in the wrong hands after landing in Islamic State controlled territory, which includes the two pallets below.

While a less than ideal situation, these airdrops are meanwhile the only way to supply the city and its inhabitants after the complete encirclement of Deir ez-Zor in May 2015. Both the United Nations and Russian Air Force have actively participated in dropping humanitarian aid to the starving population living in regime-held parts of the city, while Il-76s of the SyAAF are mostly active for the purpose of supplying weaponry, ammunition and fuel to the remaining regime forces held up in the city.


In addition to capturing huge amounts of ammunition, the offensive also provided the Islamic State with four T-72M1s, more than doubling the size of the T-72 fleet the Islamic State currently operates in and around Deir ez-Zor. This arms haul also included a single T-72M1 equipped with the Italian TURMS-T (Tank Universal Reconfiguration Modular System T-series) fire-control system, amounting the first T-72 TURMS-T to have been captured by the Islamic State.

Interestingly, two of the T-72M1s feature protective covers around their TPD-K1 gunner sights, a modification that is slowly being applied across what remains of Syria's battered T-72 fleet. A single Czechoslovak AMB-S armoured utility vehicle was also captured, which will likely end up employed as a VBIED similar to the two BREM-2 armoured recovery vehicles captured near the Ayyash weapon depots.


Article written in collaboration with MENA_Conflict.

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Suicide drones: The Islamic State's newest threat?

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The battle for Mosul has entered its seventh month of fierce fighting for the largest city in the hands of the Islamic State, with the most difficult fight for Mosul's Old City still to be fought. Facing a much stronger opponent with a large number of armoured fighting vehicles, special forces and air support, the Islamic State employs tactics that have become so characteristic for this organisation in its fight against Iraqi forces, including the large-scale use of VBIEDs in the narrow streets of the city.

Apart from the use of proven weapons and tactics, the Battle for Mosul also premiered several other weapons systems, 'Made in Islamic State', perfectly suited for the urban environment of the city and the way the Islamic State fights its battles. Arguably the best examples of this are the deployment of a new type of anti-tank rocket launcher as well as weaponised drones, both of which have widely publicised as their use intensified while the Iraqi Army captured ever more parts of the city from the entrenched Islamic State.

The latest Islamic State video release coming out of Mosul would go further into detailing some of the Islamic State's achievements in the production of weaponry and unmanned aerial and ground vehicles in the city. The video, 'We will surely guide them to Our ways', named in reference to Quran verse 29:69, would show the assembly and deployment of several weapon systems previously not seen before.

While the production of RPGs, recoilless-rifles and a homebred anti-tank rocket launcher is already a significant development, even more so is the combat debut of what appears to be a type of loitering munition, more commonly known as a 'suicide drone' (a somewhat inapt name as there is no human involved) against Iraqi forces in the city. While this threat has only received little coverage despite its potential, the drone's combat debut made painfully clear the current shortcomings of this new type of Islamic State munition.


Loitering munition is a relatively new concept that calls for flying munitions to loiter over the target area before striking a target chosen by a human operator or in some types, autonomously. This method has several advantages over conventional cruise missiles and guided rockets, which are programmed in advance to hit a set target. If no suitable target is found, the loitering munition self-destructs or in some cases can even return to base, thus allowing for much more flexibility in operations.

The Islamic State was previously reported to have utilised loitering munition in Syria on several occasions, mainly against regime forces in the besieged city of Deir ez-Zor. It however remains unknown if the unmanned aerial vehicles in question were supposed to crash themselves into regime positions with their payload of a single PG-7 rocket or wereactually designed to drop these instead: The latter seems more likely.

The Islamic State is not the first to have deployed loitering munition operationally. Indeed, such weaponry has already been used by Azerbaijan, Yemen, Israel and the U.S. in conflict, the latter even deploying them in Syria. Another operator of such "kamikaze-drones" is North Korea, which currently operates the largest of the type. Of course, the crudely constructed contraption used by the Islamic State is hardly comparable to modern munitions in use with countries that produce professional grade weaponry, but the threat remains comparably hard to counter, and has the potential significantly escalate the unabating harassment of Iraqi forces trying to weed the terrorist group out of the city.

The possible production of 'suicide drones' by the Islamic State was first hinted in a leak of documents from the Islamic State in March 2017. These documents detailed a request of a Tunisian drone developer Abu Yusra al-Tunisi for permission and funding for the development and production of multi-purpose UAVs that could loaded with 20 kilograms of explosives to be used as an air-to-surface missile. A summary in English of the Islamic State document can be found below.

Islamic State
Willayat Halab
Soldiers’ Central Office

(Summary)

Name: Abu Yusra al-Tunisi
Age: 47
Profession: Specialised in industrial electricity and electronics with some humble knowledge in the field of aviation and aeronautics. 

To those who may be concerned, I present the Ababil project. It is a multi-purpose UAV, with uses including: 

1- To recon an area 30 km in diameter.
2- Can be used as an air-to-surface missile with +20 kg payload.
3- It can be used to distract the enemy through the use of more than one UAV at night or during the day.
4- To jam the enemy aircraft.

The project will require a team composed of:
- An electro-mechanic engineer.
- A fiberglass specialist.
- An expert in AutoCAD who knows how to work on CNC.
- A metalworker 

The project will cost around 5,000 USD and will require 3 months to complete. I will show you photos of a prototype that I worked on when I worked in the field of research and development. The project was stopped for unknown reasons.

While it is unknown if Abu Yusra al-Tunisi ever received permission and funding to continue his Ababil project, it is unlikely that the drone seen in the latest Islamic State release is in fact the Ababil. Not only did Abu Yusra al-Tunisi ask for permission and funding to develop drones in Wilayat Halab (Aleppo governorate) in Syria, the supposed payload of more than 20kg of explosives seems a much too heavy load for the drone shown in Mosul.


Although the Islamic State's release only shows a glimpse of the drone's flight (which can be seen at 8:43), it reveals interesting details on the operations of the drone. Based around a metal frame (part of which held together by duct-tape) the drone is the largest type to have been produced by the Islamic State, which until thus far has mainly used quadcopters, Skywalkers and various indigenous drones for obversation purposes. Although the Islamic State has showcased weaponised Skywalkers on several occasions, no such conversion is believed to be used operationally.

The operator of the drone is seen standing left, holding a controller in his hands. It is likely that this operator was only responsible for bringing the drone into the air, after which the radio-control was taken over by another operator with access to a screen from which he could see the path of the drone due to its inbuilt camera. Despite the clear view of the drone in the video, which reveals a fuel tank half-full, no payload is visible. Whether this means it was unarmed at the time or if the payload was potentially installed closer to the engine and thus difficult to spot is uncertain.

The screen indicates the drone flew for about ten minutes at a speed of around 110 kilometres an hour before it makes its descent towards a gathering of Iraqi Army vehicles and soldiers, including a M1 Abrams. Interestingly, the footage cuts away shortly before the drone impacts. Although it is implied this is because its payload detonated, it's also entirely possible that it actually diverted at the last moment, or that it simply crashed and did not carry any payload. In the latter case, the purpose of the drone might have been aimed more at testing and propaganda uses than actually providing a workable weapon.






With the profileration of drones seen in the world of today, the use of an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) as a delivery platform of explosives to strike locations in the West is a threat to be taken seriously. The crudeness and obviously improvised nature does little to mitigate the fact that in an era where remotely controlled weaponry is increasingly easy to develop for factions such as the Islamic State it will become harder and harder to protect forces from such asymmetrical warfare tactics.






While this attempt at striking Iraqi forces with loitering munition was unlikely to be a success, the attack represents a growing threat that one day might become a widely deployed tactic in similar conflicts throughout the world.Although the Islamic State's days as a conventional force in Iraq are slowly coming to an end, more surprises are certain to await in Syria, and the conflict continues to develop in unpredictable ways that are sure to leave their mark on the way wars are fought in the future.

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Exotic Armour, an inside look at Sudan's armour repair facility

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By Stijn Mitzer and Joost Oliemans

Sudan is arguably one of the most interesting countries when it comes to the variation of military equipment in use with its army, owing to its diverse range of suppliers ever since the country's independence from Great Britain in 1956. Originally trained and equipped by Egyptians and the British, Sudan then began receiving large shipments of Soviet military equipment, followed by Chinese deliveries of arms. In recent years, Sudan has bought large numbers of weaponry from nations such as Belarus, Ukraine and Russia, which along with the Chinese and Iranians are now the lead suppliers of weaponry in Sudan.

In addition to the countries already listed, Sudan has also received weaponry from nations such as Germany, Libya, Czechoslovakia, France, US, Saudi Arabia, Czechoslovakia, Eastern Europe, and of course, North Korea. Operating such a diverse fleet of armoured fighting vehicles is nothing short of a logistical nightmare, and specialists from several of these countries are present in Sudan at any given time to help maintain these vehicles. To help ease the Sudan established an armour repair workshop and the Elshaheed Ibrahim Shams el Deen Complex, the latter of which is also involved in the production of several types of armoured fighting vehicles.

The armour repair workshop solely focusses on the repair of main battle tanks, infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs) and armoured personnel carriers (APCs) however, and falls under the command to the Sudanese Army. This opposed to the Elshaheed Ibrahim Shams el Deen Complex, which is part of the Military Industry Corporation (MIC). The armour repair workshop is located in the heart of Khartoum, which is certainly an interesting location to set up such a facility.

Walking through the many armoured fighting vehicles littering the complex, some in various states of decay, are not only Sudanese personnel but also several Eastern Europeans aiding with the maintenance and overhaul of Soviet-era AFVs. Most of the images in this article are from one of such advisors, many of which photograph their work during their stay in Sudan. This particular person has previously served in Uganda and Yemen, also aiding with the training of personnel here.

A badly damaged T-72AV, also known as the al-Zubair-1 in Sudan, awaiting repair of its destroyed 125mm 2A46 cannon or alternatively to be used as a source of spare parts. Sudan bought the last remaining stock of T-72AVs from the Ukraine, which previously supplied these tanks to several other nations worldwide, many in Africa. The Sudanese purchase of T-72AVs is noteworthy as South Sudan had previously bought a large number of T-72AVs just a few years earlier. This deal was arranged via Kenya, and became the subject of international debate due to the hijacking of the MV Faina cargo ship, which carried 33 T-72AVs on their way to South Sudan.

While Ukrainian instructors became responsible for training South Sudanese soldiers on operating the T-72AV, it appears the country had no problem selling the rest of its T-72AVs to Sudan, which quickly deployed them in Southern Sudan against the SPLA-N. This deal led to a peculiar situation where during the plausible event of renewed hostilities both the Sudanese Army and the South Sudanese Army would deploy their T-72AVs with identical camouflage against each other, which will almost certainly lead to confusion and possibly friendly-fire incidents on the battlefield.

The venerable Alvis Saladin armoured car, still in pristine condition awaiting repainting outside one of the facility's maintenance halls. Despite the Saladin's age, several countries continue to operate the vehicle, with even Indonesia looking to upgrade its remaining examples. It is unknown if the Sudanese Army continues to operate the vehicle or intends to display its remaining Saladins as gate guards.

The same Alvis Saladin after receiving an interesting camouflage pattern, which one could argue has  somewhat diminished the original looks of the vehicle. At least two vehicles have received the new paintjob, although the second vehicle suffers from serious damage to the front, further enhancing the perception of poor looks.



The Ferret armoured car is another British staple that has seen service in Sudan, and is one of the first armoured fighting vehicles to have served in the ranks of the Sudanese Army. This vehicle too has been repainted, and is missing its M1919 Browning machine gun. One of the front tires of the repainted vehicle has deep cuts, making it likely this vehicle is no longer intended for combat use. A row of seemingly decommissioned Chinese Type-62 light tanks can be seen in the first image, a few of which remain in active service.





A BMP-1 upgraded with a 30mm 2A42 Cobra one-man turret, replacing the ubiquitous 73mm 2A28 Grom armed turret normally installed on the BMP-1. A joint development between Belarus and Slovakia, Sudan also operates several BTR-70s upgraded with the Cobra turret. The coaxial 7.62mm PKT is missing on this example. One of Sudan's few BMP-2s can be seen in the background, which operate alongside a similarly small number of Iranian-designed Boragh Armored Infantry Combat Vehicles (AICV), itself a copy of the BMP-2.


A French Panhard M3 VTT (Véhicule de Transport de Troupes) APC among a hodgepode of other vehicles in the background, including a Soviet BMP-2, a Chinese WZ-551, a Chinese Type-59D and two Iranian Safir-74, Type 72z, T-72Z or ''Shabdiz''. This Panhard M3 was deprived of its 20mm autocannon, and is unlikely to ever see service again. Similarly, the fleet of French AML-90s is believed to have suffered the same fate.






Sudan operates an extremely diverse fleet of BTR variants, including the BTR-70, Belarusian upgraded BTR-70s, Ukrainian upgraded BTR-70s, BTR-80s, BTR-80As and BTR-3s amongst others. In addition, the Sudanese Army also has a large inventory of Chinese WZ-551s and WZ-523s APCs and what remains of the Czechoslovakian OT-64A fleet delivered in the early seventies. The turret of a BTR-80 can be seen being installed in the second image.


A Soviet BRDM-2, which the Military Industry Corporation markets as the Amir-2 reconnaissance vehicle, still in mint condition. Although the design of the BRDM-2 dates from the early sixties, the Sudanese Army is believed to have continued receiving more examples from Belarus in the 2000s, which joined the already existing fleet of BRDM-2s in service with the Sudanese Army.

The Amir-2 was recently also showcased at IDEX 2017 in the United Arab Emirates, which led some to believe MIC was offering newly-build BRDM-2s for the international market. Despite MIC's confusing marketing strategies, the Amir-2 is actually an upgrade for the BRDM-2 for nations that continue to operate the vehicle. This upgrade sees the replacement of the BRDM-2's original 140hp GAZ-41 engine with the 210 hp Isuzu 6HH1 engine, which offers increased mobility and fuel-efficiency. Although several African nations continue to operate the aging BRDM-2, it is unlikely that any of these countries would be interested in upgrading these.

Three Chinese WZ-551s in one of the armour facility's maintenance halls. The WZ-551 was previously offered by the Military Industry Corporation as the Shareef-2. Although it is unknown what the MIC actually was offering by simply listing the WZ-551 among their products, it is likely that this referred to the overhaul of the WZ-551s in Sudan. Adding to the confusion, the WZ-523, another Chinese product to have reached Sudan, is currently offered as the Shareef-2. This apparent lack of understanding what MIC actually offers is reflected among many of their products, but likely means the MIC is capable of overhauling both the WZ-551 and WZ-523 in this particular case.



Although primarily acquiring second-hand armoured fighting vehicles from Belarusian, Ukrainian and Russian stocks, the Sudanese Army also possesses Russian BTR-80As in addition to a limited number of Ukrainian BTR-3s, one of which can be seen below. A BRDM-2 (or Amir-2), a BMP-1 and a T-72AV can also be seen in the background. More interestingly however is the row of decommissioned M60s, only a few of which are still believed to be in operational use with the Sudanese Army.



An instruction room filled with the weapon systems of various Russian APCs and IFVs in service with the Sudanese Army. Two 14.5mm KPVs with a coaxial 7.62mm PKT for the BRDM-2, BTR-70 and BTR-80 can be seen on the left while two 30mm 2A42/2A72s cannons for the BTR-80A and BMP-2s can be seen on the right. Also note the complete BTR-80A module for the training of BTR-80A gunners seen in the back. The Russian flag leaves no doubt on the Russian influence on the training of Sudanese crews.



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Probe-and-drogue, the story of Libya's ill-fated in-flight refuelling programme

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Libya's aerial refuelling programme has only been rarely reported on since its inception in the late eighties, and suffered from a series of setbacks that ultimately led to the abandonment of the programme. Nonetheless, this ambitious project has definitely left its traces within the Libyan Air Force, and aircraft once playing a key role in the in-flight refuelling programme are still flying amidst the increasingly deteriorating security situation inside the country today.

The former LAAF (Libyan Arab Air Force) has been split into two air forces for several years now, each operating various types of fighter aircraft and helicopters. While a unity government is supposed to act as Libya's new government, the division of the country between several warring factions effectively continues. Libya Dawn, once loyal to Libya's unrecognised parliament, and the Libyan National Army (LNA), fighting for Libya's internationally recognised government are the strongest forces on the ground.

Although both are mainly focused on fighting Islamic extremism such as the Islamic State, sporadic clashes and bombings between the two continue at an increasing rate. This is an unfortunate result of the chaos that followed after the fall of Muammar Gaddafi, mainly caused by a greed for power on the side of Libyan factions and a lack of support on the side of NATO, which played a major role in the ousting of Gaddafi but provided inadequate support in helping Libya to develop itself into a functioning democracy.

With a limited number of operational airframes divided between two air forces, both Libya Dawn and the Libyan National Army have scrounged the divided country for aircraft that could be made operational with relatively little effort or by cannibalising other airframes. Aircraft previously thought to have found their final resting place are now repurposed and restored to operational status and with Libya's lax rules when it comes to photographing sensitive equipment on most Libyan airbases, images of these airframes leak regularly. This peculiar situation provides the ideal footage for a review of Libya's ill-fated aerial refuelling programme, which has remained unknown to many until this date.






Libya's large surface area makes aerial refuelling tankers a coveted asset that allows aircraft to cross long distances to reach their targets without frequent stopovers or forward deployments to airbases closer to the target. This was especially true during the Gaddafi-era, when Libyan aircraft frequently struck targets in Chad, Sudan and even Tanzania in support of Libyan forces deployed to Chad and Uganda, or simply as an act of retribution.

Libya's shadow war in Chad can be seen as a defining period for the Libyan Air Force, facing off against not only the Chadians but also the French, which deployed to Chad in support of Hissène Habré fighting against the Libyans and proxies present in the country. As most Libyan airbases were located in the North of the country, the LAAF forward-deployed its aircraft to the remoteness of Southern Libya or even in Northern Chad. Both locations would prove to be extremely vulnerable to strikes by the French Air Force and Chadian incursions, the latter raiding Maaten ar-Surra airbase in Southern Libya and even capturing Wadi Doum airbase in Chad, leading to severe losses on the Libyan side.

It is likely that the experiences gained in Chad and monitoring the developments worldwide were decisive factors in Libya's decision to acquire aerial refuelling tankers. Although by the mid-eighties the Soviet Il-78 was already in production, Libya instead turned to the West to help set up an aerial refuelling project of its own in a similar way Iraq would. Although the reasons for this decision remain unknown, it is possible that Libya was simply not permitted to acquire the Il-78 at the time.

In 1987, Libya contracted the West German company Intec Technical Trade und Logistic (ITTL) to set up an in-flight refuelling programme in Libya itself. Despite being a staunch opponent of the West, Libya had no problems contracting Western companies for all sorts of deals, including defence-related ones. On the delivering end Western companies, eager to profit from Libya's oil wealth, had no problems working for Libya either. Interestingly, ITTL began with acquiring in-flight refuelling (IFR) probes from France in addition to designing one of their own, which were subsequently installed on at least three MiG-23BNs and a single MiG-23UB.

Despite having bad experiences with the MiG-23MS, and also encountering more of the same problems with the MiG-23BN, the MiG-23BN proved to be a valuable asset for it sturdiness and weapon payload in Libyan service. Therefore, the decision to install in-flight refuelling probes on this fleet in particular so as to expand their range was not surprising. In addition to adding IFR-probes to its MiG-23BNs, the Libyan Arab Air Force could also count on the remainder of sixteen Mirage F.1ADs it had previously acquired from France; arguably the most capable aircraft in the Libyan inventory and already capable of being refuelled in mid-air.

ITTL proceeded with converting one of the LAAF's C-130s to the in-flight refuelling role by installing aerial-refuelling pods under both wings, which would have allowed for the refuelling of two aircraft at a time. Unfortunately,the C-130 proved less than ideal for this task when attempting to refuel the MiG-23, which was unable to adjust to its relatively slow operating speed. Although the Mirage F.1AD was capable on refuelling from the C-130, Libya already operated a far more suitable platform at this time: The Il-76.

As such, Il-76TD '5A-DNP' from Libyan Air Cargo (itself a de-facto part of the LAAF) was modified for the in-flight refuelling role by ITTL technicians. Despite their efforts, ITTL was forced to abort its operations in Libya when their involvement in Libya's in-flight refuelling programme became publically known. While their withdrawal would ultimately herald the end of this ambitious programme, it is believed that Libya continued the project for several years on its own, eventually ceasing all further efforts in the mid-nineties. Interestingly, footage of the project was documented on film and can be viewed online.



Around the same time as ITTL commenced work on Libya's in-flight refuelling programme, Libya entered negotiations with the Soviet Union to replace its fleet of Tu-22 bombers with up to 36 Su-24MKs supported by a fleet of six Il-78 tankers. This combination of Su-24s and Il-78s was to act as the LAAF's long arm, replacing the Tu-22 in this role. While the Tu-22s were able to cross long distances from their base at al-Jufra, the operational career of these aircraft was coming to an end at the late eighties, and they had to be replaced.

The Su-24MK brought with it a wide array of air-to-ground missiles and guided bombs that allowed for precision strikes, a capability the Tu-22 lacked. Indeed, during a bombing sortie against a target in Tanzania, the Libyan Tu-22 crew not only missed the target, but the entire country as well, with the bombs landing across the border in Burundi instead! Unfortunately for Libya, disagreements over payment and the UN arms embargo in effect since 1990 prevented the LAAF from receiving the desired amount of aircraft, and only six Su-24MKs and one Il-78 would eventually find their way to Libya.

It remains unknown however if this sole Il-78 was ever used in the in-flight refuelling role since its inception in 1989 or 1990, although it is certain that the aircraft spent the majority of its career as a cargo aircraft, still equipped with its three UPAZ pods aerial-refuelling pods attached. Wearing commercial Jamahiriya Air Transport (Libyan Air Cargo) titles, the Il-78 was first seen in early April 2005 coming in to land at Moscow Sheremetyevo International Airport (IAP) after having been overhauled at the 123 ARZ repair plant in Staraya Russa, Russia between 2004 and 2005.



Due to its extremely rare sightings, the Il-78 is perhaps the most elusive aircraft to have ever entered service with the Libyan Air Force. Only rarely sighted throughout its career, the aircraft became even more elusive after the conlusion of the Libyan Civil War, resulting in the ousting of Muammar Gaddafi. Remaining grounded at al-Jufra airbase, Libya's sole Il-78 was thought to have met its final resting place before the aircraft resurfaced at Misrata airbase in late 2015, confirming the ill-fated aircraft had re-entered service.

Forgoing the sophisticated capabilities that are its raison d'être, the aircraft continues its short career in the cargo rol. In accordance with its new owners, the Gaddafi-era Jamahiriya titles in English and Arabic were painted over, and the new Libyan flag applied over the Jamahiriya green. The aircraft bears heavy traces of wear on the aircraft's windows, and the front windows have likely been replaced.




As the Libyan Civil War continues with no cessation of hostilities in sight, military equipment is brought back to operational conditions in an effort to reinforce the arsenals of the warring factions wrestling for control over Libya and its resources. Although the dreams of a dedicated aerial refuelling fleet to support a long-gone professional air force capable of undertaking international sorties have faded from memory long ago, Libya's skies remain abuzz with the remnants of this past age, as the aircraft that played a vital role in the programme are slowly consumed by the unabating demands of war.

Special thanks to Tom Cooper from ACIG.

Flying under the radar, Syria's 'Special Purpose' Mi-17s

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The Syrian Arab Air Force's Hip fleet is perhaps best known for its leading role in the indiscriminate bombing of civilian areas across Syria with what have popularly become known as barrel bombs, an act that has defined the usage of aerial assets during the Syrian Civil War. While the role of makeshift bomber currently remains one of the main tasks of Syria's Mi-8/17s, other roles the Hip fleet has carried out during the past six years of brutal war have been severely underreported.

Perhaps the most significant role of the Hip fleet is that it represented a lifeline between regime-held Syria and besieged army garrisons across Syria, which had been completely cut off by road for sometimes up to several years. The Mi-8/17s could, contrary to transport aircraft, land to bring in reinforcements or transport the wounded to hospitals. Indeed, the city of Deir ez-Zor is now completely dependant on Syria's fleet of Hips for bringing in reinforcements and evacuation of civilians and wounded, as Deir ez-Zor's airport is too close to the fighting.

In addition to its role as a transport helicopter and makeshift bomber, several of Syria's Hips have been upgraded for tasks that remain largely unknown to the general public. While it is unclear if some of these helicopters continue to see service in their new configuration, it is certain that they represent an interesting albeit underreported chapter of the Syrian Arab Air Force (SyAAF), which will be the subject of this article.

Before going into detail on Syria's upgraded Mi-17s, it is of interest to mention that the first 'Special Purpose' Hips had already arrived in Syria in the early 1980s, shortly after the conclusion of the main phase of the 1982 Lebanon War. The SyAAF and Syrian Arab Air Defence Force (SyAADF) had suffered severe losses to the Israeli Air Force during aerial combat over the skies above Lebanon, where Israel fully exploited its superiority in electronic warfare. Unable to respond in a similar fashion with any of the equipment Syria then operated, Hafez al-Assad turned to the Soviet Union for assistance.

Eager to test its Mi-8 electronic warfare variants, the Soviet Union subsequently deployed up to eight Mi-8PPAs, Mi-8MTP/Us and Mi-8SMVs to Syria, where they were based at T4 airbase with regular detachments to Mezze airbase, located closer to the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights. These helicopters were tasked with jamming the guidance radars of enemy surface-to-air missile systems (SAMs), and might have been pitted against Israeli MIM-23 'Hawk' SAM sites during peacetime before they returned to the Soviet Union at the end of the eighties, ultimately ending up in a helicopter boneyard.



Back to Syria, where the vast majority of the SyAAF's Mi-8s and Mi-17s continue to operate in their original configuration, often with their rear doors removed to allow for easy loading and dropping of so-called barrel bombs (which by today's standards actually consist of more sophisticated designs that have little to do with barrels). The fact that several of the SyAAF's Hips had been upgraded was first hinted at shortly after the capture of Taftanaz airbase on the 11th of January 2013, resulting in the loss of more than a dozen Mi-8/17s and Mi-25s.

Taftanaz was the second heliport to be overrun by the rebels, following the capture of Majr as-Sultan heliport on the 25th of November 2012. Despite frantic efforts for a last ditch evacuation with some of the helicopters located here, the loss of Taftanaz represented the first major blow to the SyAAF, losing almost as many Mi-8/17s as there are operational airframes today.

Careful examination of the airframes captured here revealed the addition of an electro-optical system under the fuselage of one of the Mi-17s. Later footage from Taftanaz would also show a dismounted electro-optical system and its associated control panel. Another image taken in 2013 at Mezze airbase would also give us the first good view of the armoured panels protecting each side of the cockpit. Interestingly, this relatively simple addition aimed at increasing crew survival has only been applied to a small number of helicopters.

As these upgraded helicopters have only been sporadically sighted during more than six years of war, it is likely that only a few Mi-17s were upgraded to this new standard before the outbreak of the Civil War. Differentiating these upgraded Mi-17s from other non-upgraded Mi-17s helicopters remains difficult however, as is witnessed by this example. It might be easy to mistake this helicopter for one of the regular Mi-17s in use with the SyAAF's helicopter forces, but the hardly visible armoured panels on the cockpit and electro-optical turret serve to differentiate it as one of the upgraded examples.

While Syria's Mi-17 already come equipped with three hardpoints on either side of the fuselage, allowing for the installment of rocket pods, bombs or as in the case above, a 23mm UPK-23 gun pod, the addition of an electro-optical system would significantly increase the helicopter's capabilities in target acquisition and threat identification. In turn, the armoured panels installed around of the cockpit increase the survivability of the helicopter crew, a welcome addition to the anti-aircraft weapon rich environment of Syria.

It is highly likely that these upgrades were carried out by the SyAAF's overhaul and maintenance facility 'The Factory' at Neyrab/Aleppo IAP, which has also been responsible for the design and production of the indigenous chaff/flare launchers mounted on nearly all of the SyAAF's Mi-8s and Mi-17s. The electro-optical system seen in detail below and the armoured panels are believed to have been acquired from Iran, which has carried out similar upgrades on its helicopters.








Other specialised Mi-17s have been used for less lethal tasks, such as the transportation of very important persons (VIPs) across the war-thorn country. As movement from one side of Syria to the other by road has meanwhile become impossible or too time consuming to allow for rapid deployment across the country, Suheil 'The Tiger' al-Hassan nowadays make use of a Mi-17 configured as a VIP transport to allow him to swiftly cross long distances.

The SyAAF already operated several Mi-8Ps (identifiable by the rectangular/square windows instead of the round windows found on normal Mi-8/17s) for VIP transport, but had already retired these before the outbreak of the Syrian Civil War. Bashar al-Assad makes use of two VIP helicopters of his own, which will be covered on this site in a later article alongside his other transport aircraft.
 


While the tasks of the aforementioned helicopters are relatively straightforward, the SyAAF also operates at least two Mi-17s that have been converted for as of yet unknown tasks. First seen during a large-scale Syrian Arab Air Force exercise in July 2012, this Mi-17 was seen equipped with two oddly shaped containers installed on either side of the fuselage.

Although some argued that these boxes could be part of an active protection system against man-portable air-defense systems (MANPADS), this helicopter was already seen well in advance of any MANPADS threat in Syria, and it is unlikely that the SyAAF would sacrifice six hardpoints for these contraptions. The authors' best guess at this time is that these containers in part serve as a panoramic observation system, although its use may extend beyond that. This helicopter can also be seen in the header, where it is parked behind one of the Mi-17s upgraded with an electro-optical system and armoured panels at Mezze airbase.




Arguably the most interesting helicopter conversion to have served in the SyAAF is also the most mysterious; just one example is believed to have been converted to its new role before the project was cancelled, after which the helicopter was returned to its original configuration. This Mi-17 '2981' was only seen once: General Ali Abdullah Ayyoub, the Chief of the General Staff of the Syrian Arab Army, examined it during a visit to Bley airbase in July 2015.

This helicopter stood out because of its newly applied camouflage pattern, which has not been seen on any other Mi-8/17 in Syrian service. The green square on the right side of the fuselage was also of interest, and appeared to have been closed at some point after the helicopter received a new camouflage pattern. Interestingly, inquiries about the nature of this conversion revealed that the helicopter might have been a test platform for a remote weapon station, with the opening in the side housing a 7.62mm GShG-7.62 or 12.7mm Yak-B rotary machine gun. The only other instance that SyAAF Mi-8/17s were armed in such fashion was in 2012, when several helicopters were believed to have been fitted with a 12.7 mm DShK firing out of the rear of the helicopter.

As the Syrian Civil War has entered its sixth year, the SyAAF's Mi-8/17s Hip fleet remains at the forefront of the regime's aerial campaign against its opponents. While the effectiveness of these helicopters as makeshift bombers can be questioned, the Hip has once again proved to be the reliable workhorse it is well known for. Although the number of operational airframes continues to shrink, with just fifteen airframes believed to be operational at any given time, the adaptability and multifunctionality of the Mi-8/17 airframe ensures it will remain in use until the very end, possibly even outlasting the Syrian War.

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Syria Rearms: Russian deliveries of BMP-2s and 2S9s arrive

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By Stijn Mitzer and Joost Oliemans

After the first deliveryof T-62Ms and BMP-1s to the Syrian Arab Army earlier this year, new imagery coming out of Syria has now revealed that more types of armoured fighting vehicles have recently been sent to the country onboard Russia's 'Syria Express'. These new deliveries come as government forces are currently making major gains in Eastern Homs against the fighters of Islamic State, and the new vehicles will likely be deployed here to bring the fight back to the Islamic State once and for all.

The delivery of large amounts of weaponry and vehicles is part of the de-facto re-establishment of the Syrian Arab Army, with the aim of creating a unified army incorporating some of the many militias that are currently active throughout Syria. The driving force behind this processis the newly established 5th Corps, which is to serve as a counterweight to the increasing strength of the aforementioned militias that have largely taken over the role of the Syrian Arab Army (SyAA) in the past six years.

In accordance with Russia's role in the reinstatement of the Syrian Arab Army, it is also Russia that is responsible for training and equipping the new force. Although this led some to believe that Syria would soon receive additional T-72s, T-90s or even BMP-3s, all of which would be more advanced than the current armour composition of the regime forces, the deliveries until thus far have mostly included older weaponry excess to requirements or no longer in service with the Russian Army itself.

Nonetheless, many of these delivered vehicles and weaponry are ideally suited for the Syrian Arab Army in their current operations against the many factions fighting over control of parts of Syria. In addition to the delivery of small arms and large numbers of Ural, GAZ, KamAZ and UAZ trucks and jeeps, other deliveries so far have encompassed T-62Ms, BMP-1(P)s and 122mm M-1938 (M-30) howitzers, and now also including BMP-2s infantry fighting vehicles and 120mm 2S9 self-propelled mortars.

The delivery of BMP-2s and 2S9s is of interest as previous deliveries to the 5th Corps amounted to less advanced equipment such as BMP-1s and World War 2-era 122mm M-30 howitzers. The fact that more advanced equipment is now arriving in Syria might be a sign that Russia deems the rearmament programme a success, and could potentially step up the delivery of more advanced equipment as the conflict continues to develop in favour of the current government.

Despite the relative scarcity of the BMP-2 in footage and images of the Civil War, this vehicle is certainly no stranger to the Syrian battlefield. Indeed, Syria continues to operate the survivors of the around 100 BMP-2s it had previously acquired in the late eighties, all but a few of which are in service with the Republican Guard in operations mostly in and around Damascus. In addition to the BMP-2s already in service since the 1980s, a limited number of BMP-2s along with T-72Bs and BMP-1s were received from Russia in 2015 to take part in operations near Tadmur. At least one but possibly two of these BMP-2s were subsequently destroyed here.

The vehicles that are currently being delivered can easily be discerned from the BMP-2s already operating in Syria by their dark green camouflage and more importantly, by the presence of anti-radiation lining installed on the turret, which is only present from the BMP-2 Obr. 1984 variant and onwards. The BMP-2s that Syria had previously received in the late eighties were of the older Obr. 1980 variant and lack such anti-radiation lining, as well as other incremental improvements.

The BMP-2 improves significantly upon the capabilities of the BMP-1, which has served as the Syrian Arab Army's main infantry fighting vehicle ever since its introduction in the 1970s. Originally designed for use on the plains of Europe, the armament of the BMP-1 was quickly found to be inadequate for supporting infantry and incapable of targeting heavily armoured armoured fighting vehicles. In addition, the BMP-1's mediocre gun elevation, lack of armour and inability to fire accurately while on the move makes it woefully outdatedfor use in today's conflicts.

Incorporating many of the lessions learned from the BMP-1, the BMP-2 does away with several of these serious drawbacks. Most notably is the replacement of the 73mm 2A28 cannon with a fast-firing 30mm 2A42, which is very well-suited for supporting infantry and suppressing enemy positions thanks to its high elevation. The BMP-2 also comes with an anti-tank guided missile (ATGM) launcher for the 9M113 Konkurs as opposed to the BMP-1's unwieldy 9M14 Malyutka, which is rarely fitted let alone used.

The delivery of the 2S9 is also notable as this vehicle was previously not in service with the Syrian Arab Army, which had until thus far has never operated any type of self-propelled mortars. The 2S9 is armed with a 120mm breech-loaded 2A51 mortar that can lob shells over a distance of eight kilometers with conventional ammunition, and over 12 kilometers with a rocket assisted projectile. A guided mortar round has also been developed for the 2S9, but is unlikely to have been deployed to Syria.

While the Syrian Arab Army continues to operate large numbers of 122mm 2S1s and 122mm BM-21s in addition to several types of towed artillery guns for artillery support, the high elevation of the 2S9 makes it perfect for engaging entrenched Islamic State positions on mountains and ridges regime forces are currently facing in Eastern Homs. While some might be quick to note that the 2S9 is air-droppable, it is unlikely that any will be sent to Deir ez-Zor this way. As the 2S9 is the first of its type to have entered service with regime forces, it is likely that crews will first have to be trained on the vehicle, which is true for the BMP-2 as well (albeit to a lesser extent) so it might take some time before they show up on the frontline.

As regime forces are currently making major gains, mainly against the Islamic State, Russia appears intent on affirming its support for the Syrian government, further consolidating its stakes in a conflict that has so far seemed to continue on endlessly. For Syria, the actual delivery of these vehicles is possibly much less significant than the trend it represents. With an ally that is essentially capable of indefinitely replenishing the Syrian Arab Army's stocks and that despite economic hardships is willing to pay the checks required to bring about its return as a coherent fighting force, eventual victory for the pro-regime forces seems likely, barring any unexpected twists and turns in the future course of the war. Whatever the case, the current developments are certain to affect the strategic balance between force battling over Syria significantly, and could well have far-reaching consequences for the ultimate outcome of the Syrian War.

Special thanks to Wael Al Hussaini.

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Sanctions Busting, SyrianAir acquires A340 passenger jet via Iran

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By Stijn Mitzer and Joost Oliemans

SyrianAir can look back on a turbulent six years of operations serving a country thorn apart by Civil War. Heavily impacted by the implementation of sanctions against Syria in 2012, preventing the airline from buying new aircraft and forcing it to cease its flights to countries in the European Union, SyrianAir (officially known as Syrian Arab Airlines) has had to drastically scale back its operations. This marked the start of a slow degradation process that would see SyrianAir retiring ever more aircraft as spare parts became increasingly difficult to acquire.

Although some expected the acquisition of several types of Russian-produced aircraft such as the Tu-204 or even the Il-96 to replace SyrianAir's Western fleet of Airbus and Boeing aircraft, no such deliveries occurred. A sharp decrease in the operational availability of its Airbus fleet due to a lack of spare parts and maintenance checks, further exacerbated by a mid-air collision of an A320with a Syrian Arab Air Force (SyAAF) Mi-8/17 in 2012, meant that the airline's aging Tu-134s were now increasingly utilised to replace some of the flights previously carried out by the A320s.

This struggle went on for several years, ultimately leading to the retirement of all but two of SyrianAir's A320s, which currently remain active on some of the airline's routes to the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Algeria, Egypt, Bahrain, Jordan, Qatar, Iraq, Sudan, Iran and Russia. Despite the fact that flights to several of these destinations occur infrequently, it still puts a high burden on a fleet of only two A320s and semi-active Tu-134s. With no replacements from Russia, the United States or Europe in sight, SyrianAir's future was looking increasingly grim.

The situation would only improve in 2016 after the Iranian Mahan Air wet-leased one of its Airbus A300-600R passenger jets to SyrianAir, which quietly entered service with the airline in August 2016, circumventing the sanctions implemented against Syria. The wet-lease of an Airbus A300 was only a temporarily solution to SyrianAir's problems, yet it allowed SyrianAir some much needed breathing space until a suitable replacement aircraft for the airline could be found. The search and subsequent acquisition of an Airbus A340 would involve countries like Iran, Chad and Kazakhstan in a deal that is a perfect example of successful 'Sanctions Busting', to the point that no repercussions have had to be endured by the involved countries as a whole to this date at all.

Before going into detail on the story of the A340, it is insightful to consider the events leading up to the acquisition of the aircraft. As already stated above, SyrianAir leased a single A300 from Mahan Air to relieve the two A320s that remained operational on some of the flights to the airline's remaining destinations. Although a relatively outdated aircraft by today's standards, the A300 is capable of flying longer distances while carrying considerable more passengers than the smaller A320.

The privately owned Mahan Air serves as Iran's second airline behind the flag carrier Iran Air, and operates a large fleet of mainly Airbus passenger jets to destinations in the Middle East, Asia and Europe. However, apart from ferrying passengers to destinations across Asia and Europe, Mahan Air also plays an active role in the Syrian Civil War, transporting Shiite fighters and their equipment from locations in Iran and Iraq to Syria. Mahan Air is also implicated in transporting weapons to Yemen's Houthis before and during the early stages of the Saudi-led intervention in this country.

It thus comes as no surprise that Mahan Air is sanctioned by the U.S. government, which has also put member states of the European Union under pressure to ban Mahan Air from operating to these countries, a ban which has yet to take place. Despite effectively acting as Iran's Revolutionary Guard's long-arm in the Middle East and possibly farther abroad, the airline is still permitted to fly to various destinations in the Europe and even increased the frequency of these flights during this summer season.



The A300 wet-lease deal with Mahan Air is not the first time Syria has leased an aircraft from an Iranian airline. In an effort to increase the transport capabilities of the Syrian Air Force, SyrianAir wet-leased at least one Il-76 from Pouya Air, which serves as Iran's Revolutionary Guards' cargo airline. Furthermore, the Revolutionary Guards also delivered two Su-22s to the Syrian Arab Air Force in 2015, these being ex-Iraqi airframes that fled to Iran in 1991 and are now entering service with the Revolutionary Guards Aerospace Force.

In accordance with its status as a leased aircraft, the Airbus A300 only received the bare minimum of markings indicating that the aircraft belonged to SyrianAir during its career in Syrian service. Indeed, if one is not familiar with the logo of SyrianAir it would be impossible to discern the aircraft's operator from other airlines with similar logos. The airline's logo was applied to the engines and the tail of the plane.

During its service with SyrianAir, A300 'EP-MNM' is believed to not only have replaced A320s in flying commercial routes, but also to have regularly flown Shiite fighters from Iraq to Damascus. The aircraft would eventually return to Mahan Air in early 2017, just over half a year after having entered service with SyrianAir. During this period, a plan was worked out which called for the acquistion of a passenger jet with increased passenger capacity over SyrianAir's A320s at a favourable price for Syria. The aircraft had also be of a type common enough so that spare parts could be readily acquired on the open market or via friendly nations.


To facilitate the aquistion of a large passenger jet, Syria would seek the help of Iran, an expert in acquiring aircraft despite sanctions preventing them from doing so. Previously under sanctions that prevented the country from acquiring new aircraft on the open market, Iran initiated a programme that would see a large influx of mostly second-hand Fokker 100 and MD-80 series aircraft with Iranian airlines by acquiring them via various airlines in post-Soviet states.

The modus operandi of this elaborate scheme would be to use various small airlines in countries such as Tajikistan and Kazakhstan to purchase aircraft on behalf of Iran. When underway to any of these countries or other supposed destinations 'coincidentally' located in proximity to Iran, the aircraft would then report a malfunction in mid-air and divert to Tehran, where the aircraft would subsequently enter service with the Iranian airline that had purchased it. Unsurprisingly, this profitable business is believed to have been closely linked with Iran's Revolutionary Guards, which thus largely monopolised the acquisition of aircraft by Iranian airlines.

Apart from acquiring aircraft for various Iranian airlines, this elaborate scheme was also used to replace the Iranian government Boeing 707, which was originally acquired by the Shah in 1978 and in desperate need of replacement. Seeking the acquisition of a four-engined Airbus A340, Iran contracted Asian Express Airline, a small airline operating out of Tajikistan to various destinations in this country and Russia. Only operating smaller aircraft on its routes, Asian Express Airline suddenly had a requirement for a large A340 and acquired an aircraft that had previously been in service with Air Canada and Turkish Airlines. Of course, the aircraft never entered service with Asian Express Airline and instead arrived in Iran for its conversion to Iran's 'Air Force One'. The aircraft 'EP-AJA' is currently in service with Meraj Air, which operates the aircraft on behalf of the Iranian government.

Although the lifting of international sanctions on Iran in January 2016 meant that Iranian airlines were now able to purchase Western-made passenger aircraft directly from their manufacturer, which resulted in huge orders with Airbus and Boeing, Iran's scheme for acquiring passenger aircraft via other means apparently would be used at least once more. Indeed, Iran's largest and most ambitious aircraft haul to yet was still on the horizon.



On the 13th of April 2016, an Airbus A340-300 with the U.S. designation 'N322AK' comes in to land at Almaty International Airport, Kazakhstan. The unmarked aircraft is a surprising visitor to the city, which rarely sees landings of four-engined passenger jets. This particular aircraft had previously been in service with Cathay Pacific and SriLankan Airlines before placed into storage at Orlando Sanford International Airport in Miami. The sixteen-year-old aircraft had been phased out by SriLankan Airlines in 2015, and was awaiting a buyer in the United States before its arrival in Kazakhstan.

Reports then indicated that the A340 had been acquired by Bek Air, a Kazakh airline that operates services to several cities in the country using a fleet of eight Fokker 100s. This acquisition was highly suspicious as it was unlikely that the small airline had any requirement for a passenger jet as large as the A340 for its domestic routes to cities in Kazakhstan. It would soon be revealed that Bek Air was not destined to be the actual operator of the aircraft, and that the airline actually acted as an intermediate for an Iranian acquisition of an A340 in the same scheme as detailed above.

While the parties involved in this scheme succeeded in bringing the aircraft from the United States to Kazakhstan, it appears that bureacracy prevented the transfer of the aircraft to Iran. Namely, Kazakhstan's Civil Aviation Committee refused to register the aircraft, citing that non-flag carriers such as Bek Air were prohibited from operating large aircraft like the A340s under Kazakh law. This once again reaffirms that Bek Air never intended on operating the aircraft itself, as it would be highly unlikely that Bek Air would have acquired an aircraft it wasn't allowed to operate. Having failed to comply with Kazakh regulations, the aircraft subsequently remained grounded in Almaty.

This situation subsisted until September 2016, when Melad Herfeh, a British citizen of Iranian descent, provided documents stating that the aircraft was owned by the UAE-registered ZAK AVIATION FZE. For reasons that as of yet remain unknown, ZAK AVIATION was exempted from the rule that prevents Kazakh airlines like Bek Air from registering large aircraft, and the A340 could now be registered in Kazakhstan, receiving the designation of UP-A4001 on the 20th September 2016. It is not clear if Kazakh authorities still envisioned Bek Air as the supposed operator of the aircraft at this time, or if they expected the aircraft would enter service with an airline operating out of the UAE.

Now registred as 'UP-A4001', the crew of the Airbus A340 was then said to have detailed a flight plan to Yerevan, Armenia, where the aircraft was supposed to receive further services before re-entering service as a passenger jet. While at this point it already should have been more than clear that Kazakhstan's Civil Aviation Committee was used in a bid to circumvent the sanctions preventing Syria from acquiring passenger aircraft, the A340 eventually received permission to fly to Yerevan. Taking off on the 8th of October 2016, the aircraft instead set course for Iran and after safely landing in Tehran, 'UP-A4001' was towed to the FARS aircraft hangar (seen below) for further servicing and and repainting in the colours of SyrianAir.

During this period, the A340 was removed from the Kazakh aviation register and transferred to the air operator's certificate (AOC) of the Chadian airline AirInter 1. Now operating as 'TT-WAG', the A340 departed Tehran for Damascus on the 10th of February 2017. After its arrival in Syria, the aircraft changed registration for a final time, becoming 'YK-AZA'. The A340, still registered as 'UP-A4001', can be seen at Tehran Mehrabad Airport below prior to servicing and repainting.




While the illegal acquisition and subsequent transfer of a single A340 to Syria via Iran through Kazakh territory and law was already an unfortunate blunder for the country, this aircraft was only a  part of a much larger scheme that would eventually see the acquisition of three A340s by exploiting the exact same Kazakh laws. Contrary to the previous transfer, these two A340s would directly fly to Tehran from Athens, were both aircraft had previously been stored for eight years after the bankruptcy of their former operator Olympic Airlines.

Interestingly, while the involved parties encountered problems with registering the first A340 because of the aforementioned laws that prevented Bek Air from operating aircraft like the A340, another UAE-registered company, Bright Horizon FZE, was used during the registration of the second and third aircraft, and both A340s were subsequently registered as UP-A4002 and UP-A4003 on the 30th of December 2016. Both aircraft were still in storage at Athens International Airport at this time, and their new registration allowed the involved parties to ready themselves for their departure for 'Kazakhstan'.

Contrary to the first A340 (UP-A4001), UP-A4002 and UP-A4003 were registered by a citizen of the Republic of Kazakhstan, Kairat Temirgalievich Sarinov, whose profession as a housekeeper should in the least have raised several red flags during the registration process of two multi-million passenger jets. Investigations into Kairat Sarinov revealed that he worked for Talgat Kasenov, the former Deputy Chairman of the Civil Aviation Committee. Talgat Kasenov was forced to resign in January 2016 for having accepted bribes, just two months after his appointment. The fact that his name emerged during investigations into this deal is almost too coincidental, and his involvement in this deal is therefore very likely.

Despite losing his position as the Deputy Chairman of the Civil Aviation Committee, it appears that Talgat Kasenov's influence in this organisation still reached far enough to help facilitate the transfer of UP-A4002, UP-A4003 and possibly also UP-A4001 to Iran. UP-A4002 and UP-A4003 departed Athens on the 14th and 15th of February 2017 respectively, with the takeoff of the latter being filmed. It is likely that the aircraft's flight plan called for a direct flight to either Astana or Almaty, Kazakhstan, but unsurprisingly, both aircraft changed course while over the Caspian Sea and landed in Tehran instead.

UP-A4002 and UP-A4003, both still in their Greek Olympic Airlines livery, can be seen at Tehran Mehrabad Airport below. Although UP-A4001 was quickly flown to Damascus after servicing in Tehran, UP-A4002 and UP-A4003 still remain in storage at Tehran. As the two A340s had been in storage for more than eight years, both aircraft still have very low-flying hours and despite their high fuel consumption are attractive aircraft for either SyrianAir or Iranian airlines. The two A340s differ slightly from UP-A4001 (later YK-AZA) by their engines, which is indicated by their designation of A340-313 (A340 300 series with CFM 56-5C4 engines).

The A340 acquired by SyrianAir is also of the 300 series, the initial variant produced by Airbus. Equipped with CFM 56-5C3 engines, the aircraft's official designation is A340-312 (A340 300 series with CFM 56-5C3 engines). The A340 has been gradually phased out by airlines around the world in favour for more fuel-efficient aircraft, which makes SyrianAir's acquisition of up to three aircraft somewhat curious. The type's fuel consumption is however offset by its purchase price, which is low compared to other aircraft in the same class due to the wealth of airlines retiring the type. Alternatively, SyrianAir acquired the A340 because of a lack of other suitable aircraft types that could be acquired via similar paths.


The illegal acquisition and transfer of three A340s to Iran and Syria is currently under investigation by Kazakhstan's National Anti-Corruption Bureau. Although it remains unknown to what extent officials from Kazakhstan's Civil Aviation Committee were involved in this elaborate scheme, the U.S. embassy in Astana expressed its concern for Kazakhstan's meddling in the scheme as per Ratel KZ, whose investigations uncovered interesting details about its involvement in the transfer of the three A340s.

These investigations have meanwhile confirmed that almost every rule in the registration, deregistration and inspection of the three A340s was either grossly violated or completely ignored. The Civil Aviation Committee stated that one of its employees, a twenty-five year old woman, was responsible for the registration and that her ignorance was the culprit for the illegal  acquisition and transfer of three aircraft through Kazakh law. An unlikely explanation given the magnitude of this scheme, as well as the signatures of several officials of the Civil Aviation Committee in the documents and the likely involvement of the former Deputy Chairman Talgat Kasenov.

It is certain that several nations have some thorough investigations to do regarding the extent of their involvement in the transfer of the three A340s, be it by mistake, complete ignorance or simply corruption. The fact that a British national,Melad Herfeh, was also involved in the transfer of the first A340 but also likely the second and third aircraft will indubitably be most interesting for British authorities.





While it currently remains unknown when SyrianAir will receive the two A340s that currently remain stored in Iran, or if such an acquistion is envisioned at all, 'YK-AZA' currently operates daily to some of SyrianAir's remaining destinations in the Gulf and Egypt. These flights were previously only carried out by the smaller A320s and the wet-leased A300, and it is highly unlikely that the A340 is fully booked on these flights. This raises the question if the flights carried out by the A340 are profitable given the aircraft's high fuel costs.


A340 'YK-AZA' would make its inaugurational flight to Dubai on the 12th of April 2017, an event not only well attended by the press, but also by various government officials such as Syria's Minister of Transport Ali Hammoud, who stated the following:

''Today Airbus 340 is taking off from Damascus International Airport to Dubai in the first flight after it was rehabilitated by the Syrian Ministry of Transport. This big achievement is an indicator of the resilience and vigor of the Syrian people and their ability to produce solutions.''

...

''Steps are underway to revamp and re-equip all facilities in the airport to allow for an increase in the number of planes and more air traffic. The economic blockade imposed on Syria had badly affected our ability to repair the equipment in the airport. However, we are working with partners to secure more equipment needed to re-operate the airport. In addition to its role in securing more revenue for the state, this step is a message to the world that the air transport sector in Syria is recovering despite the relentless war being waged on Syria.''

Footage of the inaugurational flight can be seen here, here and here.

SyrianAir's A340 seats up to 300 passengers in a two-class layout, 275 economy class seats and 25 business class seats. The seats are different from those installed in the aircraft during its service for SriLankan Airlines, and appear similar to the seats in used by Mahan Air in some of its aircraft. The same seats were also used in the A300-600 SyrianAir previously wet-leased, making it likely that the current interior was installed during the aircraft's stay in Iran. To minimise costs, none of the seats have seatback TV screens, not even in Business Class. A video covering the pre-flight and in-flight services provided for passengers of the A340 can be seen here.

Although it has been speculated that the A340 will be used on new routes to China and Venezuela, it is unlikely that any new routes to these destiations will be launched in the foreseeable future, at least until more aircraft are received to relieve SyrianAir's current fleet of aircraft. Regular flights to cities in China could be attractive for Chinese companies seeking to invest in the rebuilding and economy of Syria in the long run, yet it remains to be seen if there is enough interest to launch these routes at the moment.

While Venezuela's flag carrier Conviasa previously operated flights between Caracas, Damascus and Tehran, supposedly to facilitate the transfer of officials, spies, drugs and weaponry between these countries (hence being dubbed the 'Terror Flight') it is also unlikely that passenger services or any the services above will see SyrianAir flying to Caracas on a regular basis. Indeed, while the introduction of a single but possibly up to three A340s will permit SyrianAir to launch flights to the few remaining friendly nations in the world, its focus is likely to be centered on countries in the Middle East for the years to come.



Although images of bombed out hospitals and schools (rightfully) continue to dominate headlines about Syria around the world, normal life goes on for many Syrians living in Damascus and the coastal region, their ordinary dealings and businesses contrasting starkly with the suffering of their less fortunate countrymen. Amidst an increasingly stable security situation in Damascus and what is by now a tight control of all its major population centres, the Syrian government can start to look at ways to stabilise and normalise the life of at least a part of the Syrian population loyal to the regime. Although it remains unlikely that the implemented sanctions against Syria will be lifted in the foreseeable future, at least until the Assad clan leaves power, it is certain that Syria's allies will aid the country in slowly restoring its status as an at least semi-functional nation. This recent investment in its national airline, despite its illegal nature, is a testimony to this fact, showing the resilience of a regime that more than once was at the brink of defeat during the unabating fury of the Syrian War.

While the civilian nature of this article is somewhat of a departure from the regular postings found on this blog, significant interest in these articles could see the coverage of more subjects in the field of aerospace industry and airlines. Further articles will be released to give better insight in the operations and current status of SyrianAir's fleet.

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Armour in the Islamic State, the Story of 'The Workshop'

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By Stijn Mitzer and Joost Oliemans

The Islamic State's rise to the status of one of the most sophisticated designated terrorist groups ever to exist has been accompanied by an unprecedented level of ingenuity, adaption and brutality on the battlefields it engages in across Syria, Iraq and abroad. Exploiting the lack of security after the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Iraq in 2011 and making smart use of the power vacuum in Syria it effectively hijacked the revolution's original goals. The Islamic State would quickly present itself as a threat like no other – not only to Syria and Iraq, but to the entire world.

At the forefront of the Islamic State's sudden metamorphosis from a militant group in Iraq to a self-proclaimed caliphate controlling large swaths of land in Iraq, Syria and across the globe is its ability to quickly adapt to the various situations encountered on the battlefield, its ingenuity in coming up with appropriate adaptations and their enthusiastic execution of said adaptations. The sudden change in the scope of warfare the Islamic State's rise brought to Syria and Iraq would be a shock to those caught up in it, and could only be contained through the massive influx of manpower, weapons and perhaps above all, airpower.

This massive force aimed at the destruction of the Islamic State would be pitted against a self-proclaimed caliphate that hadn't seen an equivalent since the fall of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan in 2001, positing itself as a power that could engage its enemies in both guerrilla and conventional warfare. The huge amounts of weaponry captured by the Islamic State allowed it to directly challenge stronger foes on the ground which, despite the constant threat of precision-guided strikes against its assets, included the deployment of large numbers of heavy weaponry during operations in both Syria and Iraq.

The use of armoured fighting vehicles in these operations is no exception, with the Islamic State having captured and operated more than 200 tanks and around 70 BMPs in Syria alone, making it the second-largest operator of armour behind government forces. While practically all of the many rebel factions wrestling for control over Syria have operated armoured fighting vehicles (AFVs) at some point during their existence, only the Islamic State would deploy armour on such a large and organised scale, even surpassing the militaries of many established nations states in amount and quality of its equipment as well as tactics employed.

In an effort to provide technical support for this fleet of AFVs, several Wilayats (governorates) throughout the Islamic State established armour workshops for repairing and modifying vehicles for future use on the battlefield. While every governorate has workshops tasked with producing up-armoured vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (VBIEDs), only a handful of Wilayats have a meaningful industry capable of repairing and modifying armoured fighting vehicles. In Syria, two major workshops would be established,:'The Workshop' located in Wilayat al-Raqqa (Raqqa) and another (Armour in the Islamic State, the DIY works of Wilayat al-Khayr) in Wilayat al-Khayr (Deir ez-Zor). This article will cover the works of the 'Workshop of the Tracked' in Wilayat al-Raqqa, better known as 'The Workshop'.




While the Islamic State is well known for operating all kinds of contraptions for use on the battlefields in Iraq in Syria, ranging from earthmovers modified for the role of vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (VBIEDs) to simple up-armoured civilian vehicles crude in appearance, the attention some of these monstrous contraptions have received has given the Islamic State the reputation of solely operating such vehicles and being incapable of utilising more conventional weaponry.

Not only is this stereotype incorrect, the often heard arguments doubting the effectiveness of Islamic State's armour in the face of precision-guided airstrikes are also greatly exaggerated. Despite intensive efforts by the Coalition and to some degree the Russian Air Force at degrading the Islamic State's heavy weaponry throughout Syria and Iraq, the Islamic State was freely able to operate AFVs on most Syrian fronts it has been fighting on since the commencement of Coalition airstrikes in late September 2014, with only little risk of being targeted. Large numbers of these armoured fighting vehicles were in fact products of 'The Workshop'.


'The Workshop' is the second-largest armour repair workshop to have existed in Syria, but in terms of activity could very well have been the single most active in the country. Since its inception in the summer of 2014, 'The Workshop' is believed to have overhauled and upgraded over 150 armoured fighting vehicles before its demise three years later in June 2017. This number accounts for more than half of the Islamic State's inventory of tanks and BMPs it operated since 2014, a testimony to the scale of the Islamic State's efforts aimed at overhauling and upgrading AFVs for future use on the battlefield.

The facility would perform a wide variety of overhauls and upgrades on nearly all types of armoured fighting vehicles in use with the Islamic State, ranging everything from installing multi-spectral camouflage on tanks to the up-armouring of AFVs and even constructing modular turrets for installation on four-wheel drive vehicles such as the Toyota Land Cruiser. While located in Wilayat al-Raqqa, its products would show up throughout the whole of the Islamic State, including Wilayats in Iraq. Indeed, several ex-Syrian T-55s overhauled at 'The Workshop' could be seen in action during the Islamic State defence of Mosul, and would later be captured by Iraqi forces.



In addition to providing an overview of the projects undertaken by 'The Workshop' since its inception in 2014, this article will also follow the life of some of the Islamic State fighters who operated the upgraded armoured fighting vehicles in combat throughout Syria. The photos showing the fighters' daily life in Syria present an interesting look into the surreal life of an Islamic State fighter, which includes everything from spending time with friends and family to taking detailed photographs of bodies after mass executions and beheadings.

The wealth of personal images taken by these Islamic State fighters would also allow the author to pinpoint the exact location of 'The Workshop', both a testimony to open source intelligence (OSINT) and operations security (OPSEC), the latter of which clearly ignored by the Islamic State fighters working out of 'The Workshop'. This goes to show the importance of OPSEC during wartime, where one image can make the difference between being targeted or escaping detection.

The location of 'The Workshop' first became apparent in June 2016 after images taken inside the armour repair workshop could be used to geolocate the structures seen in the images, which ultimately corresponded with a facility located just fourteen kilometers Southwest of Tabqa airbase: the Thawrah Industrial Facility and Workers' Housing. This facility was originally built as a housing complex and support facility for the many oilfields located in this region, and would provide the Islamic State with the perfect location for the establishment of an armour repair workshop.

Although the location of 'The Workshop' had already been discovered, the constant stream of additional information and images that allowed for an ever more comprehensive article on the facility unfortunately led to its delay for over a year. Interestingly, it appears the location of 'The Workshop' has thus far eluded most analysts, despite the fact that it received its fair share of attention over a year ago.

On the 2nd of June 2016, regime forces launched the disastrous 'To Raqqa' offensive with the aim of establishing a foothold in the Raqqa Governorate. Advancing along a narrow stretch of road, regime forces quickly reached the Safiya crossroad before heading North, eventually reaching 'The Workshop', which was likely already abandoned by the Islamic State before its capture. Despite reaching its location without any major setbacks, a sudden Islamic State counterattack quickly recaptured 'The Workshop' and reversed all gains that had been made by regime forces in the previous days, ultimately allowing it to return to normal operations.

Much to the authors' surprise, and despite the obvious presence of several tank wrecks cannibalised for spare parts in 'The Workshop' itself, it appears that even regime forces were completely unaware of the nature of the facility they had just captured. To add insult to injury, Amaq News Agency even released footage of the partial remains of two T-72M1s cannibalised for spare parts located in 'The Workshop' after the fighters of the Islamic State had recaptured the facility from regime forces.


While it appears that nobody knew the exact whereabouts of 'The Workshop', it is certain that the Coalition was already aware of the facility as of the 30th of August 2016, when an airstrike targeted a BMP-1 that was in the process of being converted to a VBIED in the largest structure of the facility, resulting not only in the destruction of the BMP-1, but also of the whole building. Satellite imagery obtained from Terraserver already reveals heavy damage to two other structures on the 24th of August 2016, but it remains unknown if this was the result of the fighting between the Islamic State and regime forces here in June or another Coalition airstrike.

Despite the fact that the Coalition struck 'The Workshop' on the 30th of August 2016, it remains unknown if they were ever fully aware of the exact nature of the facility, possibly only striking the BMP because it was discovered by accident. While one could argue that Coalition intelligence should have been able to identify this facility early on with the amount of resources it possesses, the fact that more than 150 armoured fighting vehicles could be overhauled and upgraded here seems to directly contradict this possibility. While regime forces not only captured the facility, but would also be presented with large numbers of photographs taken inside 'The Workshop', it is likely that the sheer inefficiency of the Syrian military apparatus prevented any action to be taken against it.

What is certain however is that 'The Workshop' was able to carry out its work unhindered by airstrikes for over two years. Indeed, despite having been captured by regime forces and being struck by the Coalition in a timespan of just several months, work is believed to have continued at an even faster pace than before. Due to the simplification of several of its designs, the past year would allow 'The Workshop' to overhaul and upgrade the largest number of tanks since its inception in 2014. The delegation of at least a part of the work to newly set-up armour repair workshops in Wilayat al-Raqqa can't be excluded however.


Although the location of 'The Workshop' might seem randomly chosen, it is highly likely that the Thawrah Industrial Facility and Workers' Housing was chosen for the strategical location it occupies. Situated just South-West of of Raqqa, it was located at a seemingly deserted spot in the desert, one that would not attract much attention from the Coalition's aerial assets. Its central location and close proximity to Raqqa was also ideal for sending armoured fighting vehicles to the various fronts the Islamic State was fighting on without having to risk detection by driving through Raqqa.

While a lack of airstrikes against 'The Workshop' allowed the Islamic State to continue using large amounts of armoured fighting vehicles on the front, it is important to note that although airstrikes would surely have crippled the 'The Workshop' for a short period of time, it could have easily moved elsewhere shortly afterwards. It is certain however that intensive aerial reconnaissance around Tabqa could not only have prevented 'The Workshop' from delivering overhauled vehicles to its operators, but also from receiving AFVs to overhaul and upgrade in the first place.

It was initially believed the quick advances made by the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) around Tabqa would ultimately result in the capture of the 'The Workshop'. Surprisingly, the SDF halted their advance just a few kilometers away from the facility. As quiet as 'The Workshop' came into being and remained during its operations, the now abandoned facility would eventually be recaptured by government forces in early June 2017, just short of three years after its initial inception. Almost completely unreported during its three years of service, 'The Workshop' was to remain wholly uncovered by the media despite its significant impact on the course of the Syrian War.


The story of the actual tanks overhauled and upgraded by 'The Workshop' begins on the 26th of January 2014, when a convoy of vehicles belonging to what was then still named the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) made its way through Northern Aleppo. Although featuring little in terms of heavy armour, the T-72AV leading the convoy would later provide the first hint that the Islamic State had begun performing upgrades on its tanks and other armoured fighting vehicles.

More interestingly, it gave us a first look at an Islamic State unit that would participate in nearly every major Islamic State offensive throughout 2014. It is believed that experience gained with this particular unit would later lead to the establishment of several other such units, which will be referred to as  سرية المهام الخاصة - 'Platoon of Special Tasks' in this article. Sometimes (incorrectly) referred to as جيش الخلافة - Jaish al-Khilafa (The Caliphate Army), the Platoons of Special Tasks would be responsible for nearly every major Islamic State offensive conducted in Syria since 2014.



Back to the T-72AV, which would resurface around seven months later, on the 9th of July 2014 to be precise, 'guarding' a meeting between the Islamic State and tribal elders in a bid to get support of the latter in this region. This show of strength further emphasised the abysmal state of the T-72AV's explosive reactive armour, parts of which were dangling loosely from the tank's body. The text bar reads: ولاية حلب: جانب من الأسلحة الثقيلة والآليات العسكرية التي كانت تحمي الملتقى العشائري - ''Wilayat Halab: Some of the heavy weaponry and military vehicles that were deployed to guard the tribal meeting.''

It would take only a few weeks before this T-72AV would be photographed again, this time after having been modernised by 'The Workshop'. This is believed to be the one of the first tanks to have underwent significant modifications at this facility, which included a complete rearrangement of its explosive reactive armour and a new coat of paint. These photos would also give us a first look at some of the personnel manning Islamic State armour: Abu Hamza al-Khalidi and Abu Omar al-Mansouri (alternate names made up for this article), both of which serving in the كتيبة الدبابات - 'Tank Battalion'.


The same tank would reappear only a short time later at Raqqa's grain silos, located in the Northern part of the city. This facility previously served as a base for the 'Tank Battalion' and 'Platoon of Special Tasks', but any presence of armour near the grain silos soon became impossible due to extensive Coalition efforts to seek and destroy Islamic State fortifications in the city, which would ultimately also result in the targeting and destruction of the nearby warehouses by Coalition airstrikes. Despite playing no role in the overhauling and upgrading of Islamic State armour, this facility was misidentified as 'The Workshop' on several occasions however.

The grain silos also served as the main rally point from where Islamic State forces made their way to Ayn Issa in a bid to capture Brigade 93 in early August 2014, which also included the T-72AV. This offensive would eventually result in the capture of the base on the 7th of August. Of interest is the damage that occurred to the row of of explosive reactive armour bricks installed on the lower glacis plate, which must have occured as the tank was transported from 'The Workshop' to the grain silos.




The by now all too familiar T-72AV being loaded onto its trailer. Interestingly, the normal dense arrangement of Kontakt-1 explosive reactive armour (ERA) on the side skirts was switched for a more evenly distributed array of ERA. The placement of Kontakt-1 on the rear mudguards is notable, as it serves little to no purpose in terms of increased protection and could instead have been placed on real weak spots, of which the T-72 knows all too many.

Images released by the Islamic State after it captured the isolated Brigade 93 would also show the T-72AV again, which took part in the offensive along with several other tanks of the 'Tank Battalion'. Despite being the first public sighting of the tank in its new configuration, no further images or footage of the T-72AV was shared by Islamic State media in the months after the offensive. This for reasons that would soon become evident.

The sad remains of the T-72AV after being hit by presumably two projectiles, with the subsequent fire resulting in the definitive destruction of the tank. Ironically, one of the projectiles fired at the tank appears to have hit the front of the turret that was left without explosive reactive armour after it was removed here for installation on the new side skirts. This image was taken by one of the members of the 'Tank Battalion', all of which are believed to have survived the destruction of the tank.



The tracking of the aforementioned T-72AV presented itself as a rare occasion in a conflict that has seen the participation and destruction of thousands of armoured fighting vehicles, and could not have been possible to this extent without the photographs taken by Abu Hamza al-Khalidi. The digital footprints of this member of the 'Tank Battalion' would not only aid the author in identifying the location of 'The Workshop', but would also prove vital in the identification of other members of 'Tank Battalion', the armoured fighting vehicles used by its fighters and their operations throughout Syria.

In addition to Abu Hamza al-Khalidi, several other members of the 'Tank Battalion' and technicians of 'The Workshop' could also be identified thanks to their presence on social media. While Twitter had already declared war on designated terrorist groups in 2014, banning the accounts of Islamic State fighters and its supporters, large numbers of Islamic State fighters continue to maintain accounts on various other social media platforms, most notably Facebook.

The author made several attempts to get in contact with several of these individuals by posing as a member of a different unit from the 'Tank Battalion' for the gathering of information and photographs of their operations and daily life in Syria, leading to the removal of the account by Facebook on several occasions. Ironically, many of the accounts of the Islamic State fighters in question remain present on Facebook to this day. Although it is extremely likely that foreign fighters played a vital role in running 'The Workshop', their presence here could not be verified.

Many of the Islamic State tankers active on Facebook are not only friends with each other, but also with fighters of various other factions fighting for control over Syria. Indeed, most appear to have bonded by their shared passion for armoured fighting vehicles, choosing to ignore whatever religious beliefs and other differences may divide them. Posing with their tanks, photographing them from different angles and even becoming members of tank enthusiast groups on Facebook, their presence on social media certainly provides for an interesting insight into the life of Islamic State fighters one doesn't get to see often.

Back to Abu Hamza al-Khalidi (from here on known as Abu Hamza), whose digital breadcrumbs became of vital importance in researching 'The Workshop'. Although some aspects of his life remain unknown, he is believed to have joined the Islamic State along with Abu Omar when their rebel Liwaa' Dawud brigade defected to the Islamic State on the 8th of July 2014. This defection would present the Islamic State with more than a dozen operational armoured fighting vehicles along with their crews, most of which quickly deployed across Northern Aleppo in an attempt to eradicate all other rebel factions in this region.

The Islamic State's frequent media releases allowed the tracing of several of these armoured fighting vehicles as the Islamic State captured ever more territory from rebel groups and regime forces in Northern Syria. An example is this T-72 'Ural' of the 'Tank Battalion'deployed to Kweres airbase in a bid to dislodge regime forces defending the airbase. More interestingly, Abu Hamza would also appear in a photo report along with his T-72 'Ural' in the town of Akhtarin, captured by the Islamic State on the 14th of August 2014.






Before being photographed in Akhtarin, Abu Hamza is known to have participated in the assault on Brigade 93, where he took several photographs of massacred and dismembered defenders afterwards. The bodies shown in his photographs could be compared to those seen in official Islamic State images released after the conquer of Brigade 93, and quickly provided a match. His actions on the battlefield in the months that followed remain unknown however, and he would only reappear in May 2015 after the first capture of Tadmur (Palmyra) while inspecting the huge ammunition depots located North of city.

While a large number of photographs were dedicated to his interest in military affairs, other images would show Abu Hamza's personal life with his three children, family, friends and other Islamic State fighters, most of whom believed to have been members of the 'Tank Battalion'. Although still at a young age himself, Abu Hamza was already a father of three. When not at the front or 'The Workshop', Abu Hamza spent most of his time in the city of Raqqa, often hanging out with other members of the 'Tank Battalion'.

This group of friends would regularly be photographed during their stay in Raqqa, often enjoying time near the Euphrates river or simply enjoying meals in between their time away from the front. The image below was taken near the now destroyed 'New Raqqa Bridge', the exact same location where VICE News filmed a part of their documentary on the Islamic State, which was filmed roughly at the same time. The faces of three individuals are blurred so as not to compromise ongoing research.

This outright strange contrasting blend of photos of armoured fighting vehicles, decapitated human remains and of precious moments spent with his newborns would continue until Abu Hamza's death on the 10th of August 2015, when he was believed to have been killed along with Abu Omar after fleeing his T-72 'Ural' in a failed attack on Kweres airbase. Unfortunately for the research on this article, most individuals involved with 'The Workshop' have been killed in combat over the past years.







Before going into detail on the actual upgrades performed by 'The Workshop', it is insightful to understand what is currently known about the structure of Islamic State units that used armoured fighting vehicles throughout Syria. As previously mentioned, many of the Islamic State's tanks were organised into the 'Tank Battalion', which is believed to have been further divided into several units, each with different bases. While it was an independent unit in theory, the 'Tank Battalion' would never go out on its own, with its AFVs instead attached to so-called 'Platoons of Special Tasks' during offensives across Syria.

While analysts are still a long way from unravelling the Islamic State's operational structure in Syria and Iraq, it is now commonly accepted that there is a special type of unit tasked with launching offensives across Syria. Sometimes (likely incorrectly) known as 'The Caliphate Army' (Jaish al-Khilafa), these units (known as 'The 'Platoons of Special Tasks' in this article) were the forces responsible for every major Islamic State offensive since 2014, and would make heavy use of armour during its operations.

While the foundation for the 'Platoons of Special Tasks' is already believed to have been laid down in early 2014 during the Islamic State's increased presence in Syria, the large influx of foreign fighters in 2014 and 2015 would enable the Islamic State to set up more specialised units to expand the Caliphate across its current boundaries. Instead of directly deploying its new recruits on the frontline, large numbers were held back in Raqqa for enlistment in the 'Platoon of Special Tasks'. These Platoons are believed to have been more motivated and better trained than regular Islamic State units, likely a result of the fact that a significant portion of its fighters travelled to Syria specifically to join the Islamic State.


In its normal configuration, a 'Platoon of Special Tasks' would consist of Raqqa-based fighters with several technicals as support, and attachments from the 'Tank Battalion' and artillery units depending on the type of operation. After carrying out their objectives, these units would return to their individual bases awaiting their next mission. This meant that no unit was ever the same, and could consist of several individual components during each operation.

The bases of these units were believed to be mostly located in the region surrounding Tabqa, where Raqqa-based fighters would collect their vehicles before heading out to their objective. This way no heavy weaponry had to be transported through Raqqa, minimising the risk of detection by the Coalition. A typical makeup of a 'Platoon of Special Tasks' can be seen in the image below. The text bar reads: استعداد المجاهدين لغزو مواقع الجيش النصيري شرق مدينة دار الفتح - ''Mujahideens preparing to storm positions of the Nusayri [Derogatory: Alawite] army east of the town of Dar al-Fateh.''

In addition to the 'Tank Battalion', at least three other units are known to operate armoured fighting vehicles in Syria, comprising the فرقة عثمان بن عفان - Othman bin Affan Division, the فرقة أبي عبيدة بن الجراح - Abi Obaida bin al-Jarrah Division and the فرقة الزبير بن العوام - Zubayr ibn al-Awam Division. All three divisions are named after companions of Prophet Muhammad, and served important roles during the times of the Rashidun Caliphate.


Abu Hamza's unit was initially stationed at 'The Workshop', where its tanks were well hidden in the nearby orchard. However, as the Coalition launched its aerial campaign over Syria and Iraq, the time the tanks spent outside was greatly reduced to minimise chances of detection by aerial assets. This is not believed to have provided any major problem as the many buildings of the facility provided enough shelter for the tanks. The T-72AV 'hidden' in the orchard below is believed to have been one of the tanks that arrived with Liwaa' Dawud and was previously featured in their videos.


Interestingly, one of the T-72 'Urals' in Abu Hamza's unit donned markings of Jaish al-Islam, best known for controlling a large portion of Eastern Ghouta but which previously also had a strong presence in Northern Syria. It is thus likely that this example was either captured from Jaish al-Islam as the Islamic State took over the former's territory or alternatively, that the tank came from Liwaa' Dawud which never bothered to remove the markings themselves.




Five tanks await their turn for being overhauled and upgraded by 'The Workshop'. The parking space of the facility provided a somewhat safe hiding place for aerial reconnaissance and was left untouched by Coalition airstrikes over the years. It is however likely that after the commencement of Coalition airstrikes the tanks at the facility were more evenly spread, avoiding the destruction of several AFVs by just one airstrike. The T-72 at the rear appears to have sustained serious combat damage, and would likely end up used as a source of spare parts.




Although the largest building of the facility could house several armoured fighting vehicles at the same time, other smaller buildings were also used as workplaces and for storage. The targeting of the largest building on the 30th of August 2016 necessitated moving the whole production line to the smaller buildings, which usually housed just one tank at a time. Some buildings were in fact so small that a larger entrance had to be cut out in order for the tank to drive into the building.



In addition to housing 'The Workshop' and a 'Tank Battalion', the Thawrah Industrial Facility and Workers' Housing was also used as an ammunition depot not only for the 'Tank Battalion', but also for the armoured fighting vehicles that were overhauled and upgraded here. After completion of work, these AFVs were loaded with the right ammunition before being sent to their new operators, some of which also believed to have been trained at 'The Workshop'. This further emphasises just how large the scale of the works of 'The Workshop' actually was.









A look at some of the tank ammunition present at Thawrah, which includes nearly every type of shell present in Syria. Of interest is the 3UBK10M-1 tank gun round with the associated 9M117M guided missile, together with the guidance device aboard the T-55AM(V) tank known as 9K116-1 Bastion. Only rarely used during the Syrian Civil War, this round was misidentied as an illuminating round by the Islamic State.


The remains of a battle-damaged T-72AV taken to 'The Workshop' and subsequently completely wrecked for spare parts. As many of these armoured fighting vehicles could be cannibalised for various spare parts, sights or even the cannon for installation on other tanks, transporting damaged or sometimes destroyed tanks became common practise for 'The Workshop'. This also explains the aforementioned presence of the two T-72 turrets filmed by the Islamic State as it recaptured the facility in June 2016.

In addition to recycling internal components of AFVs, tanks such as the T-72AV and T-55(A)MV come equipped with explosive reactive armour, intact bricks of which could subsequently be placed on other tanks. An example of this is the regime-operated T-55(A)MV below, orginally destroyed during the 'To Raqqa' offensive in June 2016 and subsequently taken to 'The Workshop', where it resurfaced after regime forces captured the facility in June 2017. The tank has been completely stripped of its explosive reactive armour but otherwise has been left untouched.

Another example of recycling is this T-62 Model 1972, which had been destroyed near the Thawrah Industrial Facility by the Free Syrian Army back in 2013. This tank would be sighted again during the first capture of the facility by regime forces in June 2016 and encountered for a second time during the second capture of 'The Workshop'. Both sightings revealed the absence of its lamps, infrared searchlight and the TSh-2B-41 gunner sight.



The transportation of Islamic State tanks throughout Syria and Iraq always occurred via heavy-duty trucks, one of which ('603') can be seen below with a T-72 'Ural' on its trailer captured after a succesful raid in Wilayat Hama. As regime forces are notorious for leaving equipment, vehicles or sometimes even complete warehouses full of ammunition behind, the Islamic State made frequent use of heavy-duty transports to haul ghaneema (spoils of war) back to its heartland. These trucks, being largely indistinguishable from civilian trucks apart from their deadly load, have rarely been targeted, the example below which carried a T-62 model being an exception.

This is also the reason the USAF frequently targets weaponry captured by the Islamic State: to prevent its fighters from having a chance to move the 'ghaneema' away from the frontline, which in Tadmur also included seven tanks taken over by the Islamic State and subsequently stored in the airbase's Hardened Aircraft Shelters. Inaction by the SyAAF and Russian Air Force would have resulted in them swiftly being hauled off on heavy-duty trucks, a crucial mistake which lays bare some of the glaring shortcomings that plague these air forces in the Syrian Civil War. Ultimately, they would have made their way to 'The Workshop' for overhauling, upgrading and further distribution elsewhere in Syria.


Prior to delivery to its operators, armoured fighting vehicles overhauled and/or upgraded by 'The Workshop' would receive markings indicating the vehicle had been overhauled by this facility. These markings usually consisted of black squares (up to three of which applied on a vehicle) reading: الدولة الإسلامية - 'Islamic State', جيش الخلافة - 'The Caliphate Army' (Jaish al-Khilafa), followed by a unique serial number. This marking can be seen in the image below. Several variations of these markings have been noted over the past several years, replacing Islamic State's previous short-lived 9xx designation system. The Othman bin Affan Division and the Abi Obaida bin al-Jarrah Division are known to use their own designation system, '101', '701' and '506' have been noted so far.

These markings initially led to some to conclude that the black square was exclusive to 'The Caliphate Army', a so-called Islamic State elite unit mostly consisting of battle-hardened foreign fighters (known as 'The Platoon of Special Tasks' in this article). Although the Islamic State does apply unit markings on some its vehicles mostly in Iraq but also in Syria, it is extremely likely that the black square represented nothing more than a plaquette indicating this tank had been overhauled by 'The Workshop'. 'The Caliphate Army' in turn likely refers to the whole of the Islamic State's military structure.

More interestingly, the markings would allow counting and tracking the armoured fighting vehicles upgraded by the 'The Workshop'. Below is a list of known serials applied to various types of armoured fighting vehicles. Notable is the presence of only three T-72s in this list, most of which never received the black square for reasons that remain as of yet unknown. Although never actually detected among vehicles, the 5xx series was likely used for the BRDM-2, at least one of which was overhauled by 'The Workshop'.

BMP-1: 202, 206, 208, 211, 212, 213, 215, 218, 219, 222, 225, 227, 229, 230, 231, 232, 233, 235

T-55: 301, 302, 309, 310, 314, 319, 324, 325, 331, 334, 352, 370, 363, 366, 370, 372

T-62: 333, 335, 336, 34?, 3?2, 344, 347, 348, 352, 353

T-72: 311, 329, 334

ZSU-23: 400

BTR-50: 601

While the numbering system looks pretty straightforward, with each vehicle category receiving its own first digit, its application was complicated by several factors. Foremost, no distinction between AFV and VBIED was made, meaning that a vehicle type's serial number is exclusive to the chassis of the vehicle. That is until the first sighting of Toyota Land Cruisers with a BMP-1 turret, which also received 2xx serials of the BMP-1. It also remains unknown if overhauled and upgraded AFVs without the black square were given their own serial number or were not included in the designation system.



Although initially applied on most vehicles overhauled by 'The Workshop', these markings sometimes became invisible after the fitting of additional armour and appears to have been completely abandoned on later iterations of upgrades of main battle tanks. Other vehicles continued to wear the black square throughout their career in Syria, sometimes worn out and barely visible as on the ZSU-23 below.

In an attempt to elucidate the armour upgrades performed by 'The Workshop', this article will cover the main upgrade programmes along with interesting varations of these, which makes for an extremely long list of armoured fighting vehicles. In addition to the vehicles covered in this article, many more variations of each upgrade programme have existed over the past several years. Indeed, while some of the upgrade programmes were standardised, no vehicle upgraded by 'The Workshop' was ever exactly the same.

A perfect example of this is T-72 'Ural''311', which was overhauled and upgraded by 'The Workshop' no less than three times during its career. This tank was the personal mount of Abu Hamza, which would regularly photograph and be photographed with the tank both at 'The Workshop' and in the field. The image below shows the tank during its second overhaul, with additional armour and supports for the multi-spectral camouflage already having been installed.

Below is '311' again in the final stages of its second upgrade: the tank has been repainted and received additional armour protection and linings for the addition of camouflage on the front and rear of the tank. The black squares are not yet present in the first image, but already have been applied in the second and third pictures. A T-55A and a T-72AV are also in the process of upgrading in the largest building of 'The Workshop'. The Czechoslovak Praga V3S truck on the right is believed to have acted as a tool workshop.

The armour arrangement on this tank is typical of earlier upgrade programmes by 'The Workshop', featuring slat armour on either side of the tank and around the turret, with the former having been applied directly over armour plates with only little spacing in between. The armour plates can easily be replaced after having sustained combat damage, which would be a feature of several upgraded tanks. Additional features include a layer of rubber just above the side skirts of the tank and three Kontakt-1 ERA blocks scavenged from a T-72AV protecting the gun manlet. Also of interest is the placement of slat armour above the rear part of the tracks, which serves little to no purpose protecting the tank but is a nice touch nonetheless.

Despite having received a boost in its armour protection, the armour arrangement of this tank is less than ideal and difficult to produce and install due to the unique parts it is comprised of. Unsurprisingly, this armour arrangement would later be replaced by a more conventional layout. T-72 '311' is however a tribute to the craftsmanship of 'The Workshop', carefully overhauled with an almost redundant attention to detail.



The same tank after the addition of multi-spectral camouflage on the turret, which is not yet present on the front and sides of the tank. The presence of the thick cords around the turret seriously complicates the use of the tank's optics, the view of which is now seriously diminished. Although this reduces the T-72 'Ural's' already abysmal accuracy even further, it is unlikely that this posed a major issue to the Islamic State, which would operate many of its up-armoured T-72 'Ural's' with a part of their optics blocked by additional armour.

Although '311' is likely to have seen combat after its second overhaul, little is known on its operations throughout late 2014 and early-to-mid 2015. The installing of multi-spectral camouflage hints at possible deployments to areas with heavy activity of coalition aircraft, but despite frequent postings of propaganda videos depicting Islamic State units on the offensive here, this tank was never featured in any of them.

Despite its apparent absence in Islamic State media releases, T-72 '311' would be upgraded for the third time by 'The Workshop' during mid-2015. This upgrade included several changes to the tank's armour arrangement, most notably the replacement of the armour panels on either side of the tank by two larger panels, each consisting of slat armour and a layer of what is presumed to be rubber, while the slat armour installed around the turret was heightened to provide better protection to this part of the tank.

Shortly after what would later prove to be the tank's last visit to 'The Workshop', '311' was deployed to Kweres in early August 2015 in preparation for the largest offensive that would be launched at the airbase since it was besieged in December 2012. The 'Tank Battalion' had already engaged the defenders of Kweres on several occasions, which successfully fought off several attacks launched by various rebel factions and the Islamic State since 2012. While the rebels proved incapable of seriously contesting the airbase, renewed efforts made by the Islamic State were meant to end Kweres' resilience once and for all.

The long-awaited offensive to capture Kweres would finally take place on the 9th of August 2015, and although almost completely unreported, would be one of the largest Islamic State offensives since the fall of Tabqa airbase on the 24th of August 2014. Several 'Platoons of Special Tasks' along with associated armour support would take part in the offensive, incuding Abu Hamza's T-72 '311', seen below behind one of the suicide bombers commencing the offensive of the 9th of August. The text bar below reads: الأخ الاستشهادي أبو عبدالله الشامي - ''Istishhadi brother Abu Abdullah al-Shami.''
 


Having successfully fought off several large attacks while under siege for just under three years at that time, the garrison defending Kweres was not going to give up without a fight however. Despite lacking any armour or artillery support and under heavy bombardment by the Islamic State, the defences of the airbase were optimised against any intruder that dared to cross the large swaths of open land separating Kweres airbase from Islamic State-held territory.

While going into detail on the defensive positions of Kweres is beyond the scope of this article, their strength mainly comes down to successful use of the airbase's Hardened Aircraft Shelters (HAS), many of which were turned into true fortresses. Trying to capture one would prove to be an extremely arduous task, and the fact that the Islamic State never managed to advance beyond the HAS' is a testimony to their strength.

Unfortunately for the Islamic State, these HAS' had to be overcome in order to capture the airbase. As the flat terrain surrounding the airbase would quickly see waves of Islamic State fighter being mowed down by the defenders, the 'Platoons of Special Tasks' made heavy use of armour to safely transport the infantry during the storming of the HAS'. A total of two mechanized assaults would be carried out during the August 2015 offensive, each remarkably similar in execution and outcome.

The first assault would occur on the 10th of August 2015, involving Abu Hamza's T-72 '311' and BMP-1 '208', whose objective was to advance to Kweres'Eastern-most HAS to drop off the fighters that would later storm the heavily fortified position. If this attack would have had any chance of succeeding, the defenders of the HAS' hiding in trenches would have had to be suppressed to allow the Islamic State fighters dismounting the BMP-1 to safely reach cover, from where they could make their way closer to the HAS.

It is at this exact moment that the inexperience of the crew operating in such an environment came to light, which would have drastic consequences for the attackers. Instead of positioning itself behind the BMP-1 that would allow for a wide field of view and the necessary gun elevation to suppress the defenders of the HAS, Abu Hamza's T-72 overtook the BMP-1 and positioned itself behind a berm from where it lacked the gun elevation to hit the defenders of the HAS', and the field of view to fire on other positions which were now blocked by the berm.


Without any covering fire from Abu Hamza's T-72, the Islamic State fighters dismounting the BMP-1 were quickly mowed down as they ran for cover towards the berm. The BMP-1 carrying the fighters was subsequently also hit, with a single shot hitting the slat armour on the right side of the vehicle but likely not penetrating the hull armour. The fate of the crew is likely to have been the same as the fighters storming the HAS: shot after they exited the vehicle.

While it remains unknown if Abu Hamza's T-72 was also hit by the defenders, it appears he and his crew abandoned the tank in an attempt to escape the carnage unfolding around them. With nowhere to run to for safety, Abu Hamza was an easy target and was killed as well. Although failing in his objective to capture Kweres' Eastern-most HAS, his death would provide a wealth of knowledge and images after government soldiers managed to get access to his phone and shared the many images on it with journalists, leading to their exposure on the internet.

The image below clearly reveals the massacre that took place during the assault, with several bodies littered around the abandoned BMP-1. The penetration hole on the BMP-1 is clearly visible, which must have either disabled the vehicle or caused the crew to panick and flee. Also of interest is the additional layer of armour on the rear doors of the vehicle, which also happen to act as the BMP-1's fuel tanks. 

Despite the fact that T-72 '311' was captured intact, photographs taken at a later date would show the tank completely burnt-out. Several bodies were also moved around the scene, and can be compared with the images above taken shortly after the attack. While the reasons for this remain unknown, it might have something to do with the fact that several journalists would visit the airbase in the months that followed, and this rearranged scene might have made for a more dramatic picture. Alternatively, the site might have been used for target practice, possibly explaining the T-72's state. While the BMP-1 was removed from the scene at a later date, the T-72 remains present here to this day.




This complete failure apparently did not deter the Islamic State from carrying out their second mechanised assault however, this time involving T-55 '319' and BMP-1 '206'. T-55 '319' is perhaps one of the most iconic tanks to have served with the Islamic State: while the tank has no special external features that distinguish it from other T-55s, it featured and (occasionally still does) in articles covering the Islamic State due to its role in the parade celebrating the proclamation of the caliphate on the 30th of June 2014 in Raqqa.

This badly battered T-55A is one of the many Syrian T-55s to have been upgraded with a North Korean laser rangefinder (LRF) and wind-sensor during the late seventies and early eighties. This large upgrade programme saw hundreds of T-55A receive a North Korean designed LRF, wind-sensors and 14.5mm KPV heavy-machine guns. It is unlikely however that many factions operating these North Korean upgraded examples in the Syrian Civil War make use of these laser rangefinders, which would require training or past experience with the system to operate.

Before being deployed to Kweres airbase, this tank underwent significant modifications at 'The Workshop' in anticipation of its deployment to the battlefield. Most notable is its highly impressive array of slat armour which covers a significant part of the tank, including its sides and a significantly spaced area surrounding the turret. In order to preserve the tank's mobility, the slat armour on the sides is spaced very closely to the rubber behind them, in part negating their effectiveness.

Additionally, and as is the case on many tanks similarly upgraded by 'The Workshop' the slat armour is likely to seriously impede the tank's situational awareness by obstructing its optics, a sacrifice the Islamic State appears to be more than willing to make. The only compromise in the slat armour was to enable the use of the coaxial 7.62mm PKT, for which a small cutout was made. Also of interest is the large container at the rear of the tank, likely used for storing equipment and to hold additional DIY armour which could come in handy considering the T-55's vulnerable rear.

Apparently taking no lessons from the failed attack involving Abu Hamza's T-72, this T-55 would participate in the second attack that would unfold itself in roughly the same way as the first. Instead of positioning itself in a behind the BMP-1 from where it could support the dismounted infantry, the T-55 literally ploughed itself into the berm, which was clearly up to the task of preventing any enemy vehicles from passing this obstacle. Having little space to manoeuvre after this catastrophic mistake, the T-55 appeared to have subsequently been hit but not penetrated. The crew of the BMP-1 is believed to have abandoned their still functioning vehicle immediately thereafter.



The 100mm D-10T cannon of the T-55 was penetrated by what is likely to have been an RPG, achieving a mission kill on the tank after which it appears to have been abandoned. The fact that the tank was otherwise still operational is proven by the fact that it appears to have moved and turned its turret on its own multiple times afterwards, with the damage to its main gun solely responsible for taking the entire vehicle out of combat.





Both the T-55A and BMP-1 would later be moved inside the perimeter of the airbase, allowing for closer inspection of both vehicles. The slat armour on the T-55's turret had already partially come off at this point, likely caused by regime forces themselves. Although BMP-1 '206' comes equipped with the attachments for additional armour on the rear doors of the vehicle, the armour was not present during the attack.

While the offensive aimed at capturing Kweres would continue for several more days, slowly winding down throughout the end of August, the Islamic State's goal of capturing Kweres had to be given up for the time being, and would later be completely abandoned after regime forces launched their own offensive with the aim of ending the siege of Kweres airbase. Now suddenly on the defence, these engagements were to see the involvement of many more upgraded Islamic State tanks.







The heavy fighting around the perimeter of Kweres airbase resulted in the loss of several upgraded BMP-1s, two of which ('206' and '208') would later enter service with government forces. Ironically, the defenders of the airbase previously lacked any kind of armour, and the abandoned BMP-1s on the defenders' doorstep must surely have been a welcome addition to their arsenal. While the slat-armoured T-55 was seemingly also captured intact, the damage it received to its cannon prevented further use by regime forces.





While this disastrous attempt at capturing Kweres saw the loss of several upgraded armoured fighting vehicles with ultimately absolutely no gains (and even adverse ones) made, 'The Workshop' would continue to upgrade several armoured fighting vehicles along the same lines as the examples lost at Kweres. Arguably the most impressive looking of all was T-72AV '334', which received slat armour in addition to the explosive reactive armour already present on the turret and front of the tank.

As the presence of the ERA left no place for the markings of 'The Workshop', a steel plate was attached to the front of the tank displaying  جيش الخلافة - 'The Caliphate Army' followed by its serial number. This practise was abandoned later all together, likely because it was seen as a waste of time. Incidentally, it appears that '334' was the source of the explosive reactive armour found on the gun manlet of Abu Hamza's T-72 '311', which clearly did not save him in combat. The eventual fate and area of operations of this tank remains unknown.




Two identically upgraded T-72s would later be seen operating in Wilayat Homs, Wilayat Hama and Wilayat Halab throughout 2015, one of which also seen here while transported back to base after taking part in an offensive in Wilayat Hama. Although both of the T-72M1 variant instead of the T-72AV seen above, the impressive slat armour arrangement on these tanks is nearly identical, a rare sight in the Syrian Civil War. The image below reads: دك تجمعات الجيش النصيري بقذائف الدبابة في منطقة الدوة - ''Hitting positions of the Nusayri [Derogatory: Alawite] army with tank shells in the Duwa area.''








A significant number of vehicles would eventually receive this type of slat armour, the manufacturing process of which clearly became standardised with several sub-variants. Although the effectiveness of this armour arrangement will likely remain unknown, it is likely that it proved effective against shaped-charge projectiles such as RPGs and possibly ATGMs. Unfortunately for the Islamic State, these weapons would prove to be the least of their problems after the commencement of airstrikes by the Coalition.

A single T-62 Model 1967 and a T-55A upgraded with this armour can be seen in action in Wilayat Halab below. The text bar reads: دك تجمعات مرتدي pkk بقذائف الدبابة - ''Hitting gatherings of the PKK apostates with tank shells''andظك تجمعات الجيش النصيري وميليشياته في قرية رسم النفل شمال خناصر بقذائف الدبابة - ''Hitting the gatherings of the Nusayri army [Derogatory: Alawite] and militias in the village of Rasm Alnafl North of Khanasir with tank shells.''




A subvariant of this upgrade programme carried a different type of slat armour arrangement, which appears to be more similar to the armour placement seen on Abu Hamza's T-72 'Ural'. This particular tank is slated to receive multi-spectral camouflage around its turret, the supports for which are already present during this stage of construction. Although certainly looking impressive, the slat armour has been installed over the 'metal mattress' with only little spacing in between. Similarly, whether the metal mud guards in the front of the tracks are truly effective  against projectiles is doubtful.





A look at BMP-1 '213' after completion of its overhaul, upgrade and repainting in 'The Workshop'. This image gives us a great look at the attachments of the additional armour panels on the sides of the vehicles. It is likely that the installation methods differed greatly between vehicles, as some armoured panels remained attached to the vehicle even after being hit, while others appear to have fallen off before the vehicle in question ever even saw combat.


The exact same example would later be seen in Deir ez-Zor, where it had been destroyed by regime forces while trying to advance closer to the city. It is likely that the vehicle suffered an ammunition explosion as the turret is detached from the hull of the vehicle. While the installation of slat armour on the sides and turret was obviously not sufficient to prevent this particular example from being destroyed, the same armour arrangement is known to have stopped RPGs fired against it on several occasions.

While the placement of explosive reactive armour on the hull of the BMP-1 would seem to be a simpler method of increasing the armour protection of the vehicle, the BMP's paper thin armour would actually make this method counterproductive as the explosion of Kontakt-1 ERA would shatter it upon being hit, further reinforcing fragmentation of the blast projected against the hull armour. Despite this effect, several factions in the Syrian Civil War have tried reinforcing the BMP-1's armour with explosive reactive armour on the hull, sometimes with disastrous results.

In addition to increasing the armour protection of several types of armoured fighting vehicles, 'The Workshop' also attempted to create solutions for the targeting of Islamic State armour by Coalition aircraft, which began since the latter launched its aerial campaign over Syria in September 2014. The Battle for Kobanî, where Coalition airpower played a decisive role in the defence of the city, made painfully clear the vulnerability of Islamic State forces to aircraft armed with precision guided munitions.

Left defenceless against fast jets and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) circling overhead, the Islamic State's only viable option was to decrease the chances of detection of its forces, leading to interesting adaptations on the battlefield. An example is the production on several types of camouflage uniforms with an aluminium lining to prevent looking infrared (FLIR) targeting pods from picking up the heat source of the soldier.

While these methods are relatively straightforward and easy to implement, the camouflaging of an object as large as a tank required a wholly different method, as clearly evidenced below and referenced earlier in this article. The suspended rope-like components that make up the camouflage are believed to be leather strips, and have a similar working as the camouflage uniforms mentioned above.







Unsurprisingly, nearly all of the tanks upgraded with multi-spectral camouflage would be deployed to Wilayat al-Barakah (al-Hasakah governorate), where the Islamic State was on the offensive against not only government forces but mainly the YPG. The latter could count on heavy Coalition air support, which would play a vital role in stopping the Islamic State's advance in this region. The T-55 seen below, with its camouflage nets still in travel position, is one of the examples to have been deployed to the al-Hasakah governorate, where it would later be seen in 'Lion of the Battlefield 2'. The markings on this vehicle have been applied in a crude manner, reading: جيش الخلافة - 'The Caliphate Army''334'.




Similar to other Islamic State armour upgrades, the effectiveness of the multi-spectral camouflage at deceiving Coalition airpower remains largely unknown. However, as no tank upgraded with this type of camouflage has ever been featured being targeted in footage of Coalition airstrikes, or has been seen destroyed by a presumed airstrike on the ground in Syria, it could indeed have proved effective at deceiving Coalition aircraft and thus avoiding detection.

The limited footage that exists of the camouflaged tanks revealed that the construction and the strips themselves were highly susceptible to wear and tear, as is clearly evidenced on the T-62 below. This particular T-62 was featured in the propaganda video 'The Glory of Jihad', which covered the Islamic State's attempt at infiltrating and capturing the city of al-Hasakah. It is unlikely that the battered camouflage arrangement in the second image still contributed much to deceiving Coalition airpower.




The same tank after having been captured by the YPG in al-Hasakah, July 2015. T-62 '335' became trapped in the city after the YPG and regime forces surrounded the remaining Islamic State forces still left in the city, ultimately leading to the liberation of al-Hasakah on the 1st of August 2015. The wreck of T-62 '335' would be extensively documented, allowing for a better look at the construction previously holding the camouflage nets. The tank itself had already been disabled at this time, revealing extensive damage to its engine and rear of the turret.



Abu Hamza would also photograph several T-62s while undergoing installation of the multi-spectral camouflage in 'The Workshop'. The T-62 seen directly below would later become '335' before it was hit and abandoned in al-Hasakah (above). While the markings applied by 'The Workshop' allowed for easy tracking of Islamic State armour as they moved throughout Syria, the original Syrian Arab Army markings still left in place on several of the tanks could sometimes also provide valuable clues on the origins of the tanks.

This became especially imperative after the capture of Brigade 93 on the 7th of August 2014, which presented the Islamic State with at least thirty T-55s and more than a dozen artillery pieces, amounting to the largest heavy-arms haul of the Syrian Civil War. Arms hauls like this and others such as the capture of al-Qaryatayn in August 2015, providing the Islamic State with a further dozen T-62s and T-55s, would allow 'The Workshop' to continuously overhaul and upgrade a seemingly endless amount of armoured fighting vehicles.





The upgrading of AFVs with increased armour protection meanwhile continued at a comparably fast pace, with large numbers of vehicles receiving a wide variety of armour upgrades. The quality of many of these upgrades sharpy declined during this period, this in sharp contrast to some of the earlier works of 'The Workshop' seen above. The T-72 seen below is a perfect example of this, with the extensive slat armour arrangement previously seen now replaced by sandbags around the turret and a shoddy-looking slat armour arrangement on the side of the tank.

This particular tank was deployed to the area surrounding Kweres airbase, where Islamic State fighters were now engaged in holding the perimeter after the siege was lifted in November 2015. The first text bar reads: استهداف تجمعات الجيش النصيري بقذائف الدبابات غربي مطار كويرس - ''Targeting gatherings of Nusayri [Derogatory: Alawite] army west of Kweres airbase with tank shells'' while the second text bar reads: التصدي للطيران الروسي بالأسلحة الرشاشة غربي مطار كويرس - ''Fending off Russian airplanes with machine guns west of Kweres airbase.''.


Upgraded along the lines of the earlier upgrade programme, several tanks would also receive similar slat armour fittings on the turret and sides of the tank. The extensive slat armour arrangement around the turret was abandoned around the same time, being replaced with a much simpler installation of metal bars that could also hold sandbags or various other materials in order to further reinforce the protection of the turret.

The side skirts on this tank are of the same design as seen on some of the extensively modified AFVs above, albeit of a noticably worse quality. The horizontal bars have been unevenly welded on the frame, which further adds to the vehicle DIY (Do It Yourself) look. The thin strip of slat armour installed in between the turret and the slat armour on the sides looks especially fragile, and clearly hasn't been constructed properly.



Further examples mainly differed in the layour of their turret armour, which was different on almost every tank. The usual arrangement consisted of the aforementioned installation of metal bars for stowage of sandbags or various materials. This is also evident on the three tanks below, each bearing traces of an upgrade along the path of the extensive slat armour programmes seen earlier. The single armour block still present on the T-55 with a North Korean LRF is especially curious for its use of slat armour, which has again been applied directly over another layer of armour, reducing its chances of actually stopping a shaped charge hit.




Large numbers of tanks upgraded by 'The Workshop' during 2015 would survive well into 2017, such as the T-55 operating in Wilayat Halab seen below. Much of the additional armour fittings on this tank appear to have fallen off, a logical result of months or sometimes years of fighting without being overhauled by 'The Workshop' again. Indeed, while earlier periods saw tanks returning to 'The Workshop' on several occasions, the gradual decrease in the Islamic State's tank park prevented this from happening at later stages during the war.


Apart from overhauling and upgrading various types of armoured fighting vehicles for future use on the battlefield, 'The Workshop' also began converting large numbers of AFVs to the role of vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED). In true Islamic State fashion, many offensives commence with the use of VBIEDs (which can be considered the Islamic State's morbid equivalent of an airstrike), usually consisting of a truck or an up-armoured 4x4. These suicide vehicles are not only effective in their destructive power, but even more so as a psychological weapon.

The Islamic State's efforts at producing VBIEDs did not remain limited to civilian vehicles however, and increasing numbers of AFVs were converted to this role since 2015. 'The Workshop' likely followed the example of Islamic State forces in Deir ez-Zor, where tanks and bulldozers were used as early as 2014 as a platform for VBIEDs in an effort to flush the remaining regime forces out of Deir ez-Zor's heavily fortified city centre, often to devastating effect. Two VBIEDs based on a BMP-1 and 2S1 were also employed in the Battle for Mennegh in 2013, where the Islamic State's use of VBIEDs proved decisive in the capture of the heliport.

Many of the VBIEDs produced by 'The Workshop' were based on the BMP-1, which provided the driver with increased protection and mobility over conventional vehicles. While one could argue that using precious BMP-1s for the role of VBIED would be a waste of resources, the BMP-1's paper thin armour and unimpressive armament makes it of limited use in today's conflict. While some unconverted BMP-1s have seen action in Wilayat Halab (Aleppo) and Wilayat al-Khayr (Deir ez-Zor), their absence has been noted on nearly every other front.

With morea than enough examples at hand, many BMP-1s would sacrificed for the conversion to VBIED, a process that quickly became standardised. This process would entail the removal of the turret and one of the rear doors, which was then welded and closed. The exact reasoning behind the removal of this rear door currently remains unknown however. Some vehicles would then receive additional armour consisting of rubber side skirts or slat armour, which likely depended on the time and resources available. A typical BMP-1 VBIED can be seen below. The example below came under heavy fire before ultimately reaching its target, and is featured (19:47) in the Islamic State propaganda video ''Between the Two States: Tribulations and Grants''. The text bar reads: انطلاق الأخ الاستشهادي أبو داوود التونسي-تقبله الله-نحو مواقع صحوات الردة في قرية عولان - ''Istishhadi brother Abu Dawud Al-Tunisi-May Allah accept him-heading towards positions of the apostate sahwat [Sunnis fighting the Islamic State] in the village of Awlan.''


Arguably the most dreadful instances of these BMP-1 VBIEDs being used occurred near al-Qaryatayn, located in between Damascus and Tadmur. This town was heavily contested between regime forces and the Islamic State, which originally took control over the town on the 5th of August 2015. A government offensive launched in March 2016 sought to regain control over al-Qaryatayn, but quickly ran into Islamic State forces defending the town, which deployed several VBIEDs during its defence.

In an attempt to disrupt the regime's offensive on the town, Islamic State forces stationed in al-Qaryatayn actually used its BMP-1 VBIEDs to frontally attack assaulting government forces in the wide open desert. Advancing under heavy covering fire, at least two examples were successfully used in this manner, causing the assaulting forces to flee. Both would feature (10:12) in the Islamic State propaganda video ''And If They Fight You, They Will Show You Their Backs'', which turns out to be a descriptive title for the scenes depicted in the footage

Despite the Islamic State's best efforts, al-Qaryatayn would eventually be recaptured in April 2016. The text bar in the images below showing an explosives-laden BMP-1 reads: الاستشهادي أبو جراح لهيبي الغائر على تجمع للنصيرية في محيط مدينة القريتين - ''Istishhadi Abu Jarrah Lahibi who raided a group of Nusayris (derogatory: Alawites) on the outskirts of the town of al-Qaryatayn.'' and (last) عربة الأخ الاستشهادي أبو جعفر الجولاني الغائر على أحد أرتال النصيرية في محيط مدينة القريتين - ''The vehicle of the Istishhadi brother Abu Jaffar al-Joulani who raided a column of Nusayris in the outskirts of the town of al-Qaryatayn.''










Apart from exploiting the chaos raging around al-Qaryatayn, the Islamic State found perfect use for its VBIEDs against positions of the Free Syrian Army and Turkish Army advancing on al-Bab. The slow advances made by the Free Syrian Army forced the Turkish Army to take up positions vunerable to Islamic State ATGM and VBIED attacks, a fact the fighters of the Islamic State knew all to well.

The up-armoured BMP-1 VBIED '225' below would be used against such a joint Free Syrian and Turkish Army position near al-Bab, which it managed to enter despite the presence of sand barriers erected precisely to prevent enemy vehicles from doing so. It later detonated its load after being blocked by a Turkish Army vehicle, which prevented '225' from inflicting greater damage. Footage of this VBIED attack can be seen in the Islamic State propaganda video ''Shield of the Cross'' (8:45) The text bar below reads: الأخ أبو عمر الهاشمي - تقبله الله - منفذ العملية الاستشهادية وسط تجمع للصحوات والجيش التركي المرتدين غرب مدينة الباب. - ''Brother Abu Omar Al-Hashimi, may Allah accept him, who carried out an Istishhadi operation amongst a group of Sahwat [Free Syrian Army] and apostates of the Turkish army west of the town of al-Bab.''













Although several tank-based VBIEDs with the markings of 'The Workshop' would also be used throughout Syria, it is believed that most of these VBIEDs were actually converted to the role of VBIED in the field, not by 'The Workshop'. An example is T-55 '363' operating in Wilayat al-Khayr (Deir ez-Zor) seen below, which had its turret removed in order to allow for a larger payload to be installed in the space left vacant. The tank's resulting low profile is also advantageous in avoiding incoming RPGs, increasing the chance the VBIED makes it to its target. The explosion of the vehicle can be seen here (at the 3:26 mark).


Another tank converted to this role was T-62 '347', which had previously been upgraded with the extensive slat armour arrangement covered earlier in this article. It appears that at some point during the tank's career its operators opted to use it as a VBIED instead, after which its turret was removed. The tank was subsequently deployed near Manbij, where it can be seen in Islamic State images below. The text bar reads: تقدم سرايا الانغماسيين على مواقع مرتدي الأكراد في الريف الجنوبي لمدينة منبج - ''The inghimasi platoons advancing on the positions of the apostate Kurds south of the town of Manbij.''

Likely still waiting for a target of opportunity, T-62 '347' would later be seen through the targeting pod of a Coalition aircraft before being blown to smithereens by an airstrike. The resulting explosion was so powerful that it not only completely destroyed the vehicle, but also disintegrated any evidence that a tank was ever there. Incidentally, the turret of '347' would later be found in an Islamic State field workshop in Northern Aleppo along with the turret of T-55 '324', which was likely also converted to a VBIED, and a captured M1114 belonging to the Abi Obaida bin Al-Jarrah Division.







Islamic State fighters surrounding Seen airbase had meanwhile attemped to use the world's first T-72-based VBIED, which however failed to detonate its payload and was captured by government forces defending the area surrounding the airbase. Despite having taken up positions so close to Seen airbase's runway its fighters could see aircraft take off, the Islamic State never managed to gain enough momentum to launch a serious offensive on this airbase. This particular T-72 had been donned with side skirts that would later become standard on nearly all T-72s upgraded by 'The Workshop'.


Interestingly, a single BTR-50 would also be used in the role of VBIED in Deir ez-Zor. Although a portion of the once significant fleet of BTR-50s might still survive in storage until this day, this vehicle has remained almost completely absent in the Syrian Civil War. This particular example is likely to have been found at one of the many Syrian Arab Army bases captured by the Islamic State throughout 2014, after which it was sent to 'The Workshop' for an overhaul and conversion to a VBIED.







The conversion of BMP-1s to the role of VBIED resulted in a steady flow of turrets of the BMP-1s that were removed from the vehicles prior to their deployment. These turrets appear to have been cannabilised during earlier conversions, but later some were adapted for emplacement on a range of civilian vehicles such as the infamous Toyota Land Cruiser. The turret and crew compartment are modular, meaning they can be installed on different types of vehicles.

The result is without a doubt one of the more slick designs coming out of the Syrian Civil War, and stands in sharp contrast to similar vehicles seen operating during the Libyan Civil War. One such vehicle can be seen below. The images read: استهداف نقطة للجيش النصيري وسط مدينة الخير بقذيفة صاروخية - ''Hitting a position of the Nusayri [Derogatory: Alawite] army in central al-Khayr city with shells.''andاستهداف عناصر الجيش النصيري بالأسلحة الثقيلة في محيط مدينة الخير - ''Hitting members of the Nusayri [Derogatory: Alawite] army on the outskirts of Al-Khayr cirt with heavy weapons.'' 




At least three of such heavily armed technicals are known to have been completed by 'The Workshop', which have mainly seen use in and around Deir ez-Zor. However, one example has also been sighted in action against the Turkish Army in Wilayat Halab, where curiously enough the vehicle's 73mm 2A28 cannon was used (20:59) in the role of artillery. These vehicles pack a serious punch for their size, and can even be armed with Malyutka anti-tank guided missiles.

No less than 98 of these missiles were captured by Islamic State forces after they captured the Ayyash weapon depot outside Deir ez-Zor, which provided the Islamic State with the largest arms haul of the Syrian Civil War. The images read:إطلاق صاروخ (مالوتكا) باتجاه ثكنة للجيش النصيري على جبل هرابش - ''Firing a Malyutka missile on barracks of the Nusayri [Derogatory: Alawite] army on Haramish hilltop.''and استهداف تجمعات الجيش النصيري غرب مدينة الخير بالأسلحة الثقيلة - '' Hitting positions of the Nusayri [Derogatory: Alawite] army west of al-Khayr city with heavy weapons.''



In addition to deploying these vehicles in Syria, at least one of these modular turrets '231' ended up with the Islamic State in Iraq, where it was subsequently mounted on a U.S. Ford F-350 in Wilayat Ninawa. It was later seen participating in several offensives in this Wilayat, which also saw the rare use of tanks by the Islamic State in Iraq. This included the use of an up-armoured T-55 with a North Korean laser rangefinder supplied from Syria. The fact that these vehicles could operate in Iraq at all is a testament to the fact that the Islamic State managed to attain nearly unlimited freedom of movement in the territories it held despite the air forces aspiring to prevent precisely that.






Although 'The Workshop's' influence reached all the way to Iraq, the facility would come under direct threat at home for the first time in June 2016, the first serious setback for the until then still undetected facility. The Western flank of the Islamic State's heartland of Raqqa and Tabqa, also responsible for the protection of 'The Workshop', was only lightly defended owing to the flat terrain of the region, which left defensive positions vulnerable to both air and ground atttacks.

Although regime forces would successfully advance along the desert road closer to Tabqa, ultimately leading to the capture of 'The Workshop', the Islamic State made several efforts to slow their advance down to allow for the arrival of reinforcements that could stop and possibly reverse at least some of the advances previously made. Three BMP-1 VBIEDs were also destined to take part in one of these attempts, comprising BMP-1 '202', '212' and '222'.


Although all three would succeed in temporarily slowing the regime's advance down, this was purely due to the fact that its forces had to neutralise the VBIED threat first. The flat terrain, the abundance of tanks and the frontal assault employed made the task of detonating the VBIED close to regime forces nigh on impossible, and all three would be captured intact. BMP-1 '202' appeared to have taken a serious hit, as evidenced by the metal armour plate seen above.




While the Islamic State's subsequent counterattack dissuaded regime forces from making further efforts at advancing in this region for more than a year, the Islamic State was now heavily engaged with government forces advancing around Kweres airbase. Gradually losing territory around the city of Aleppo itself, and having lost the initiative to capture Kweres, the Islamic State quickly found itself on the defence throughout Wilayat Halab.






The large advances made by the SDF and Free Syrian Army supported by Turkey in the same region would also see regular appearances of Islamic State armour. Operating very little in terms of armour and anti-tank guided missiles (ATGMs), the Syrian Democratic Forces mostly relied on short range anti-tank weapons and Coalition airpower for the destruction of Islamic State vehicles and defensive positions.

The Free Syrian Army advancing on al-Bab could also rely on airpower in addition to Turkish Leopard 2s and M60T Sabras, several of which were captured and destroyed by the Islamic State. In return, Turkish Army tanks are believed to have been responsible for the destruction of at least two Islamic State tanks around al-Bab. Despite the deployment of thousands of tanks by different factions, tank to tank fighting remains an extremely rare occurrence during the Syrian Civil War.


An entirely different type of modification to Islamic State armour appeared in late 2016 on a T-55 operating in Wilayat al-Barakah, as seen in the Islamic State propaganda video 'Lion of the Battlefield 4'. This upgrade uses armour plates on the sides and turret of the tank to increase its chances of stopping a round similar to how slat armour would. In the case of the turret the armour plates are spaced widely and filled up with gravel or sand for additional protection. Although this conversion provides slightly better protection than the slat armour upgrade, the downside is increased weight leading to somewhat less mobility. For this T-55, which ordinarily has no sideskirts, the upgrade has the added benefit of addressing this shortcoming in an unusually well-engineered manner, the professionality of which seems to go well beyond mere DIY.


This exact same tank would later be seen operating in Wilayat al-Khayr, now camouflaged to better blend in with the terrain of Deir ez-Zor. The square on the front of the vehicle reads: فرقة الزبير بن العوام ورشة المجنزرات - Zubayr ibn al-Awam Division - Workshop of the Tracked [vehicles]. It is likely that this tank was transferred from the Hasakah Governorate to Deir ez-Zor after a string of defeats ended the Islamic State's hopes of eliminating the remaining YPG and regime presence here.



The first product of this new upgrade programme had already been seen participating in the counteroffensive near Tabqa on the 21st of June 2016 as a part of the 'Platoons of Special Tasks' sent out to halt and reverse the government forces advances previously made. This slick design incorporates an armour belt filled with gravel or sand around its turret and sets of armour plates bolted onto the already existing sideskirts. The crew of this tank would later permanently add sandbags to the turret and glacis plate in the hopes of slightly increasing armour protection.

Although most Islamic State tanks ended up being deployed throughout the whole of the Islamic State-held territory in Syria, this tank could be exclusively seen operating against regime forces in Syria's desert environments, for which it received a well-matching sand dune paintjob. After its deployment to Tabqa, the exact same tank would later reappear in Wilayat Homs, where it could be seen operating in the Islamic State propaganda video 'The Clear Victory'. A slightly different variation of the tank displayed above would later be seen in Wilayat Dimashq, showing the upgrade was performed on more than one tank.







The last sighting of this tank occured in October 2016 just outside of Deir ez-Zor, where the tank featured in 'Support from God, and imminent victory (5)' along with two other up-armoured T-72s. The footage includes the arrival of this particular tank by a heavy-duty truck, confirming it had deployed to Wilayat al-Khayr specifically to take part in the offensive, after which it was likely redeployed again to another theatre of operations. The tank has not been sighted since, and has likely fallen victim to Coalition or Russian air power.







This armour arrangement would serve as the basic template for a series of very meticulously converted tanks with slick appearances and an obviously much more carefully deliberated layout. Although most converted tanks are T-72s, the upgrades performed on each are different and applied in just a single instance, making each and every design unique. Each iteration introduces its own improvements over the last however, suggesting an increasingly sophisticated approach towards upgrading the Islamic State's remaining tank force, as well as a hithero unprecedented amount of time and resources spent on individual vehicles.


A prime example is this neatly upgraded T-72AV, the first of the upgraded tanks to receive an elaborate camouflage pattern, clearly reflecting the care invested in the upgrade as a whole (the misplaced tow hooks constituting an oversight that the author is willing to forgive). This is affirmed by the meticulously repaired mud guards which alongside details such as the holes cut in the tool boxes – to allow for filling them with additional materials for armour – attest to the precise approach undertaken by the Islamic State engineers working on the project. This is also apparent in the main feature of the upgrade; a belt of armour likely filled with gravel or sand closely fitted to the turret.

While the angle of the newly installed ERA on the armour belt and the presence of ERA on top of the turret but not on the glacis of the tank might seem strange, it is likely related to the increased threat of Coalition air power, which the crew hoped to counter by adding ERA tiles oriented towards the sky. Despite the highly serialised outlook of the tank, which one would sooner expect to see as the result of an indigenous project of an ex-Soviet republic, a closer look reveals the loss of some of the tank's functionality. Aside from blocked optics and missing IR searchlight, a notable example of this is the smoke grenade dischargers, which due to the placement of the newly installed armour belt would now strike the tank itself when fired. As Islamic State fighters are unlikely to make frequent use of such features anyway, the decision to forgo them is sensible.





This same tank was sighted in action only once; during an Islamic State offensive near the town of Um al-Qira it participated in the assault on the town along with another upgraded T-72. Incidentally, this tank was filmed from both the side of the Islamic State and the defending SDF during the offensive. The text bar reads: توجه دبابات جنود الخلافة نحو مواقع مرتدي ال PKK في قرية (أم القرى) - ''Tanks of the Caliphate soldiers rolling towards the positions of the PKK apostates in the village of Um Al-Qira.''


Featuring a completely redesigned arrangement of Kontakt-1 ERA blocks on its armour belt, this modified T-72AV was seen in action near Tadmur in December 2016. The appropriately chosen camouflage pattern of the tank, the unusual array of ERA tiles and thewell-designed side skirts could lead one to believe it concerns a more modern T-72 or T-90 variant, far from the creation of a terrorist group embroiled in close to half a decade of war. While the modified T-72 above has no ERA on its front glacis plate this variant does, which is likely directly related to the amount of explosive reactive armour available at the time of upgrading.


Arguably the most impressive looking product coming from the Islamic State is also one that is unusually often sighted in propaganda material. Ironically, it has nonetheless eluded attention mostly due to the quality of the footage it has thus far been shown in, a problem that is fully addressed by the images below. This tank stands out for its attractive 'Splinter camouflage' (the efficacy of which is doubtful on this tank however), which has so far only been sighted on one other tank, as well as the extremely neatly aligned composition of its armour upgrades and ERA tiles.

The obviously high level of attention to detail expresses itself in cutouts made for the optics, the preservation and relocation of two smoke grenade dischargers next to the main gun dust cover and holes made in the tool boxes above the tracks for aforementioned reasons. Like its converted siblings, it features a belt of armour filled with gravel around the turret as well as reinforced sideskirts. The ERA placement on this armour once again differs however, with specific attention diverted to the front glacis plate, turret roof and only the upper side of the turret armour belt, as opposed to the generous rows of ERA on the previous two examples. All in all, the fancy camouflage, detailed upgrades and impressive armour modifications make this tank a truly unexpected sight amongst the battered vehicles usually encountered with the Islamic State.

This tank was seen in the same convoy as one of the upgraded T-72s already mentioned above near Um al-Qira, this would be the first of three sightings of the tanks in action. It was again seen during the Tadmur offensive leading a convoy of Islamic State vehicles, likely belonging to one of the 'Platoons of Special Tasks' who took part in the offensive. This nowadays rare display of Islamic State strength in Syria eventually resulted in the capture of the city on the 11th of December 2016. However, failing to push further to T4 airbase, as well as lacking the troops to defend the area, government forces recaptured the area on the 2nd of March 2017. The text bar reads: انطلاق جنود الخلافة لاستهداف حواجز الجيش النصيري في منطقة جزل - ''Soldiers of the Caliphate on their way to hit checkpoints of the Nusayri [Derogatory: Alawite] army in Jazl area.''The last sighting of the tank occurred near Salamiya, Hama Governorate, where its frequent combat use had left it with a battered exterior, soldiering on despite the obvious wear the unabating struggle for control over Syria has inflicted it with.






In addition to these impressive looking designs, 'The Workshop' produced several additional subvariants, each boasting a different layout of explosive reactive armour around the turret. Although likely roughly equal in terms of protection, these tanks are arguably less impressive in their looks, and don't appear to have received the same share of attention as the slick designs showcased above. Interestingly, the example below appears to have received additional armour plating on its lower glacis plates to marginally increase its chances of survival when hit here.



Two similarly upgraded tanks would later show up after having been destroyed by Russian Air Force assets near Arak, Homs Governorate. Rapidly losing its remaining territory throughout Syria, the Islamic State committed large numbers of troops and AFVs in a desperate attempt to hold off regime forces advancing to the besieged city of Deir ez-Zor. Having no suitable anti-aircraft weaponry whatsoever, many tanks subsequently fell victim to Russian attack helicopters operating in the area.

The sad remains of both T-72s nonetheless give an interesting look into the contents of the armour belt wrapped around their turrets, which confirms the earlier notion that gravel or sand was used as a filler. The hit that destroyed the first T-72 appears to have knocked the ERA-rich armour belt loose from the turret, showing the sturdiness of engineering left something to be desired.






The upgrade of several tanks, mostly T-55s and T-62s, with less advanced armour packages continued for as long as 'The Workshop' remained active. Interestingly, none of these tanks received any explosive reactive armour, which appears to have been exclusively used for installation on the aforementioned T-72s. The quality of these upgrades differs on each of these examples, likely dependent on the amount of recources and time that happened to be available during its stay at 'The Workshop'.




One of these tanks would suffer a catastrophic failure of its main gun in the Syrian desert, tearing much of the barrel apart and rendering it completely useless for future use. To no one's surprise, this tank was subsequently abandoned. While the cause of this failure is unknown, it is certain that many tanks still operating in the Syrian Civil War are badly worn out and likely in need of a replacement of their gun barrels, which are made to only fire a certain number of rounds before installation of a new one is required.



Another variant was seen with a curious layout of side skirts, which appears to consist of individual armoured panels bolted on to the side of the tank. These panels could allow for easier replacement after a hit has taken one out, but above all this construction appears to be tougher than the other variants of side skirts seen before. The turret armour on this tank is less innovative however, merely consisting of a metal slat armour frame reinforced by sandbags for a marginal improvement in protection.



While the eventual fate of most of these upgraded tanks unfortunately remains unknown, the final resting place of one of them was clearly shown after it had deployed to Wilayat Halab initially in a bid to halt the advances made by government forces around Kweres airbase, as seen in the first image blow. The text bar reads: جانب من الهجوم على مواقع الجيش النصيري بين قريتي المفكر وعقارب الصافي - غنم دبابة نوع T-55 - ''Scene from the attack on the positions of the Nusayri [Derogatory: Alawite] army between the villages of Mufakkar and Aqarib Al-Safi. A T-55 tank was captured.'' It apparently redeployed to al-Bab some time later, and would later be destroyed by the Turkish Army around al-Bab.


The penultimate upgrade produced in meaningful numbers continued with the earlier concept of an armour belt wrapped around its turret, but this time somewhat of a bulkier and thus likely somewhat tougher appearance. This type of upgrade commenced in 2017 and has only been seen on three tanks before 'The Workshop' was overrun by government forces, ending the prospect of seeing more of these tanks roaming around on the battlefield.

While some noted similarity with the BDD appliqué armour on the turret front of several types of upgraded Soviet tanks such as the T-62M and T-55AM, this is actually a solid structure with no spacing in between like on the Soviet examples. The text bar reads: استهداف الجيش النصيري وميليشياته الرافضية بقذائف الدبابة في قرية الشريفة - ''Hitting the Nusayri [Derogatory: Alawite] army and its [allied] rafidiya [Derogatory: Shiite] militias in the village of al-Sharifa with tank shells.'' 


Despite the limited nature of this upgrade, it would quickly be seen on two T-72 'Urals'. Like previous upgrades, these tanks woulf also suffer from reduced situational awareness due to optics obstructed by armour. The presence of ERA on the armour belt is notable, as it already constitutes the best protected part of the tank and since it has no side armour it would have made more sense to perhaps address this issue first. The caption reads: تقدم الدبابة لدك مواقع الجيش النصيري في مفرق الجويم شرق مدينة مسلمة - ''Al-Mujahedeen’s' tank moving to pound positions of the Nusayri [Derogatory: Alawite] army and its [allied] rafidiya [Derogatory: Shiite] militias.''



The other T-72 'Ural', outfitted with a more conventional ERA arrangement. This tank also clearly shows the metal frame holding sandbags on its upper glacis plate, which is an easy solution to reinforcing (albeit only very slightly) the armour of the front of the tank. The text bar reads: تقدم دبابة المجاهدين لدك معاقل الجيش النصيري وميليشياته الرافضية - ''A tank moving to pound positions of the Nusayri [Derogatory: Alawite] at the Juwaim intersection east of the village of Maslama.''




The final tanks upgraded by 'The Workshop' represented a hodgepodge of designs mirroring earlier armour upgrades in general layout but of lesser quality and presumably efficacy. On the examples seen below, the armour around the turret appears to consist of simple welded metal plates, again filled with sand or concrete. ERA was added to the turret roof and upper glacis plate whenever available, but often also omitted. Additionally, the same reinforcement of the side skirts seen on previously upgraded tanks is apparent, which in the case of the third image below evidently did not protect the tank as it was captured by regime forces after a hit from the side knocked out its engine.

On the T-72s below, the seal displayed on the turret armour reads: فرقة عثمان بن عفان ديوان الجند - البلقاء - 'Othman bin Affan Division - The Soldiers' Office - Al-Balqaa'. It is believed three or four tanks have been converted in this manner, before the last stage of designs 'The Workshop' would output appeared.



These last converted tanks retained the rough outline of the armour upgrades mentioned before, but executed far more poorly, featuring crudely shaped armour plating around the turret and often omitting the reinforced side skirts entirely. As the turret armour was now completely open from the top its contents and thickness can be readily identified: sand and gravel, as witnessed by the image below of an upgraded T-55 with North Korean LRF (also note the ammunition for the DShK lazily dumped into its box, preventing its proper use).

These final upgrades performed by 'The Workshop' were spotted on roughly half a dozen tanks of a variety of types, some of which deployed in Wilayat al-Khayr, a city which the Islamic State still hopes to capture to give it a strategic stronghold from which to drag out the conflict as long as possible. Now that its foremost conversion factories have been captured, it's unlikely we'll see a further evolution of designs before the Islamic State is vanquished in Syria.












As the Islamic State's end in its current form is rapidly approaching, the wrecks of its once so impressive upgrades litter the battlefields in ever greater numbers. In one instance, the SDF would encounter a warehouse full of Islamic State armour near Tabqa, which had already been hit by Coalition aircraft. Likely used as a base by the 'Platoons of Special Tasks', it contained three T-62s, two T-55s and a turretless BMP-, some of which showing signs they had been overhauled at 'The Workshop'.








Footage of 'The Workshop' itself showcased the remnants of what once was a large operation, now only evidenced by countless bombed out wrecks and vehicle parts waiting in vain for their repair which never came. Nevertheless, the impressive scale of 'The Workshop' is undeniable, reaching far beyond mere DIY and venturing well into a professionally organised and managed upgrade programme, much more advanced than what most other rebel factions in the Syrian War could muster.









Although the tanks themselves were rarely used in a role where their (upgraded) armour could actually be used effectively, with many of the fanciest examples simply obliterated by enemy air power, 'The Workshop's' effect on the war cannot be underestimated. Aside from the scores of uparmoured tanks which demonstrated the ingenuity and resourcefulness of engineers working for the Islamic State, the hordes of VBIEDs for which it was also responsible may have changed the way warfare is conducted forever.

Through close to half a decade of gruelling warfare and continuous aerial bombardment this threat is now finally its way to being subdued, once again transforming the Islamic State from a state of terror capable of waging open conventional warfare to a terrorist group in hiding. Beyond the path of destruction and suffering it leaves in its wake, in time only the rusting husks of its bombed out armour creations will be left to attest it had ever existed, scarring the Middle Eastern landscape like it has scarred its population.



Special thanks to Abu Nuggie, Within Syria and Morant Mathieu.

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By Stijn Mitzer and Joost Oliemans

The Sudanese Air Force has had a turbulent history ever since its founding in January 1956, the year that the Sudan gained independence from the British. Originally trained and equipped by Egyptians and the British, it acquired aircraft and helicopters from the Soviet Union in the late 1960s, followed by Chinese examples several years later. The Sudanese Air Force (SuAF) then sought to purchase aircraft from France, but ended up acquiring U.S. F-5Es and C-130s. In the late 1980s it began receiving military aid in the form of aircraft and helicopters from Libya, followed by the delivery of more Chinese aircraft shortly after, which would continue to deliver aircraft in the last two decades. In more recent years the SuAF's core is made up by aircraft acquired from Belarus, Russia and unsurprisingly, China. This is not all however, as the SuAF also operates or used to operate aircraft sourced from a variety of countries such as Germany, Switzerland, the Netherlands and Canada.

While operating such a diverse fleet of aircraft ranging from several sources is already a logistical and financial nightmare, the political instability in Sudan during the 1960s to the early 1990s meant that Sudan frequently switched governments, all with different political orientations and thus different foreign policies. This meant the SuAF was unable to acquire spare parts for aircraft it had only recently acquired, resulting in decreased operational capability and eventually even the grounding of much of its fleet since its founding in 1956.

The Sudan has in recent decades enjoyed a more stable political and economical landscape, largely due to the discovery and large-scale exploitation of large oil reserves, allowing the country to purchase more advanced aircraft and equipment for the SuAF. Sudan also succeeded in establishing a facility that would allow it to overhaul certain types of aircraft and helicopters in the country itself with the aid of China, Iran, Russia and companies based in the United Arab Emirates (UAE). The Safat Maintenance Center (more commonly known as the Safat Aviaton Complex, part of the larger Safat Aviation Group) was first opened in 2004, and began work on overhauling its first aircraft in 2006.


While SAFAT initially almost exclusively relied on foreigners to perform overhauls on mainly Soviet aircraft and helicopters, increasing numbers of Sudanese have largely replaced other nationalities. Although SAFAT is now capable of independently overhauling several types of aircraft and helicopers, it still relies on the assistance of foreigners on most (major) projects however. The overhaul of Chinese aircraft sees heavy involvement of Chinese technicians, the overhaul and maintenance of Soviet-era aircraft is done with the assistance of mainly Russians and Ukrainians while Iran provides personnel and expertise on most other projects. In agreement with Ethiopia's Dejen Aviation Industry (Formerly known as DAVEC, Dejen Aviation Engineering Complex), Ethiopians aided SAFAT with overhauling its Soviet-era helicopters, transport aircraft and even MiG-23s, both in the Sudan and in Ethiopia. Nonetheless, the SuAF continues to send some of its aircraft and helicopters abroad for overhaul, indicating SAFAT is not yet able to cope with the demands of the SuAF. The images below provide a look into the helicopter maintenance hangar of SAFAT, showing Mi-24P '912' as well as four BO-105s in the background.









The sighting of these four BO-105s was the first indication the Sudan was working on bringing several examples of the type back to operational condition after years of being stored. Sudan had originally ordered twenty BO-105s from West Germany in 1977, which were all believed to have been delivered just a year later. At least twelve of these helicopters were destined for the Sudanese Police Force, with the other eight going to the SuAF at some point during their career. The examples operated by the police can easily be identified by their civilian paintjob, while BO-105s operated by the SuAF wore a camouflage pattern more adaptive to the Sudanese terrain.







While the BO-105s were brand new at the time of delivery, the Sudan plunged into an even deeper crisis in the early eighties, which began to take its toll on the SuAF and Sudanese military as a whole. The social unrest, the back-to-back wars and the political instability of the country would eventually result in another coup, bringing the current President Omar al-Bashir into power, which was quick to shift Sudan's alliance away from the West and towards Iran and Libya. This drastic shift meant that the SuAF was now unable to acquire spares for its fleet of Western aircraft however, resulting in the grounding of F-5s, C-130s and other aircraft over the next years. This also included the fleet of BO-105s, which were believed to have been flown only rarely during their short career. Most of the surviving airframes were then stored at the Sudanese Air Force's largest airbase, Wadi Sayyidna, which would likely become their final resting place.



With SAFAT's expertise growing, allowing it to service an increasing number of aircraft and helicopters (albeit with foreign help), SAFAT began to overhaul several types formerly operated by the SuAF of which it was once believed they would never fly again, including BO-105s. Four helicopters of this type, comprising three former SuAF mounts and one BO-105 operated by the police, were overhauled in 2012 with the assistance of the IHSRC (Iranian Helicopter Support and Renewal Company, commonly known as Panha), likely by cannibalising other airframes for spare parts or by acquiring these via the black market. The work on all four helicopters was believed to have been finished in late 2012 or early 2013, when four BO-105s were spotted on satellite imagery on the the tarmac outside one of SAFAT's maintenance hangers. These helicopers would continue to show up on satellite imagery here well into 2014, possibly indicating they were still undergoing test flights or were simply waiting for their handover to the SuAF. One of the now once again operational BO-105s can be seen below.







All of Sudan's BO-105s can be armed with rocket pods containing 28x 50mm SNIA rockets and gun pods with two 7.62mms, which can be seen in the image below. Of course, compared to dedicated gunships such as the Mi-24/35s also operated by the SuAF this weaponry amounts to very little.TheMi-24/35 has secured its position as the SuAF's primary gunship, and the type's ruggedness, range and payload makes it an ideal platform for the SuAF. The BO-105 is a completely different platform however, lacking the range and armour for effective use over the hostile battlefields of Sudan. It could instead be used as an armed reconnaissance helicopter or even handed over to the police for more peaceful duties.



While the BO-105s are unlikely to significantly bolster the Sudanese Air Force's capabilities, they can be brought back to flying condition with minimal effort, presenting the SuAF with at least another four helicopters. Perhaps more importantly, the rotarcraft also represent an important step for the Sudan, one that could allow the country to become even more self-reliant in overhauling aircraft and helicopters in the future.

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Back from retirement, Sudan's BO-105s take to the skies

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By Stijn Mitzer and Joost Oliemans

The Sudanese Air Force has had a turbulent history ever since its founding in January 1956, the year that the Sudan gained independence from the British. Originally trained and equipped by Egyptians and the British, it acquired aircraft and helicopters from the Soviet Union in the late 1960s, followed by Chinese examples several years later. The Sudanese Air Force (SuAF) then sought to purchase aircraft from France, but ended up acquiring U.S. F-5Es and C-130s. In the late 1980s it began receiving military aid in the form of aircraft and helicopters from Libya, followed by the delivery of more Chinese aircraft shortly after, which would continue to deliver aircraft in the last two decades. In more recent years the SuAF's core is made up by aircraft acquired from Belarus, Russia and unsurprisingly, China. This is not all however, as the SuAF also operates or used to operate aircraft sourced from a variety of countries such as Germany, Switzerland, the Netherlands and Canada.

While operating such a diverse fleet of aircraft ranging from several sources is already a logistical and financial nightmare, the political instability in Sudan during the 1960s to the early 1990s meant that Sudan frequently switched governments, all with different political orientations and thus different foreign policies. This meant the SuAF was unable to acquire spare parts for aircraft it had only recently acquired, resulting in decreased operational capability and eventually even the grounding of much of its fleet since its founding in 1956.

The Sudan has in recent decades enjoyed a more stable political and economical landscape, largely due to the discovery and large-scale exploitation of large oil reserves, allowing the country to purchase more advanced aircraft and equipment for the SuAF. Sudan also succeeded in establishing a facility that would allow it to overhaul certain types of aircraft and helicopters in the country itself with the aid of China, Iran, Russia and companies based in the United Arab Emirates (UAE). The Safat Maintenance Center (more commonly known as the Safat Aviaton Complex, part of the larger Safat Aviation Group) was first opened in 2004, and began work on overhauling its first aircraft in 2006.


While SAFAT initially almost exclusively relied on foreigners to perform overhauls on mainly Soviet aircraft and helicopters, increasing numbers of Sudanese have largely replaced other nationalities. Although SAFAT is now capable of independently overhauling several types of aircraft and helicopers, it still relies on the assistance of foreigners on most (major) projects however. The overhaul of Chinese aircraft sees heavy involvement of Chinese technicians, the overhaul and maintenance of Soviet-era aircraft is done with the assistance of mainly Russians and Ukrainians while Iran provides personnel and expertise on most other projects. In agreement with Ethiopia's Dejen Aviation Industry (Formerly known as DAVEC, Dejen Aviation Engineering Complex), Ethiopians aided SAFAT with overhauling its Soviet-era helicopters, transport aircraft and even MiG-23s, both in the Sudan and in Ethiopia. Nonetheless, the SuAF continues to send some of its aircraft and helicopters abroad for overhaul, indicating SAFAT is not yet able to cope with the demands of the SuAF. The images below provide a look into the helicopter maintenance hangar of SAFAT, showing Mi-24P '912' as well as four BO-105s in the background.









The sighting of these four BO-105s was the first indication the Sudan was working on bringing several examples of the type back to operational condition after years of being stored. Sudan had originally ordered twenty BO-105s from West Germany in 1977, which were all believed to have been delivered just a year later. At least twelve of these helicopters were destined for the Sudanese Police Force, with the other eight going to the SuAF at some point during their career. The examples operated by the police can easily be identified by their civilian paintjob, while BO-105s operated by the SuAF wore a camouflage pattern more adaptive to the Sudanese terrain.







While the BO-105s were brand new at the time of delivery, the Sudan plunged into an even deeper crisis in the early eighties, which began to take its toll on the SuAF and Sudanese military as a whole. The social unrest, the back-to-back wars and the political instability of the country would eventually result in another coup, bringing the current President Omar al-Bashir into power, which was quick to shift Sudan's alliance away from the West and towards Iran and Libya. This drastic shift meant that the SuAF was now unable to acquire spares for its fleet of Western aircraft however, resulting in the grounding of F-5s, C-130s and other aircraft over the next years. This also included the fleet of BO-105s, which were believed to have been flown only rarely during their short career. Most of the surviving airframes were then stored at the Sudanese Air Force's largest airbase, Wadi Sayyidna, which would likely become their final resting place.



With SAFAT's expertise growing, allowing it to service an increasing number of aircraft and helicopters (albeit with foreign help), SAFAT began to overhaul several types formerly operated by the SuAF of which it was once believed they would never fly again, including BO-105s. Four helicopters of this type, comprising three former SuAF mounts and one BO-105 operated by the police, were overhauled in 2012 with the assistance of the IHSRC (Iranian Helicopter Support and Renewal Company, commonly known as Panha), likely by cannibalising other airframes for spare parts or by acquiring these via the black market. The work on all four helicopters was believed to have been finished in late 2012 or early 2013, when four BO-105s were spotted on satellite imagery on the the tarmac outside one of SAFAT's maintenance hangers. These helicopers would continue to show up on satellite imagery here well into 2014, possibly indicating they were still undergoing test flights or were simply waiting for their handover to the SuAF. One of the now once again operational BO-105s can be seen below.







All of Sudan's BO-105s can be armed with rocket pods containing 28x 50mm SNIA rockets and gun pods with two 7.62mms, which can be seen in the image below. Of course, compared to dedicated gunships such as the Mi-24/35s also operated by the SuAF this weaponry amounts to very little.TheMi-24/35 has secured its position as the SuAF's primary gunship, and the type's ruggedness, range and payload makes it an ideal platform for the SuAF. The BO-105 is a completely different platform however, lacking the range and armour for effective use over the hostile battlefields of Sudan. It could instead be used as an armed reconnaissance helicopter or even handed over to the police for more peaceful duties.



While the BO-105s are unlikely to significantly bolster the Sudanese Air Force's capabilities, they can be brought back to flying condition with minimal effort, presenting the SuAF with at least another four helicopters. Perhaps more importantly, the rotarcraft also represent an important step for the Sudan, one that could allow the country to become even more self-reliant in overhauling aircraft and helicopters in the future.

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A Forgotten Army: Transnistria unveils new type of multiple rocket launcher

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By Stijn Mitzer and Joost Oliemans

Transnistria, officially named the Pridnestrovian Moldavian Republic (PMR), is a breakaway state in Eastern Europe that has remained in the shadows ever since its self-proclaimed independence as a Soviet republic in 1990 and subsequent breakaway from Moldova in 1992. Currently only recognized by Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Nagorno-Karabakh, themselves also unrecognised countries, Transnistria is situated in between Moldova and Ukraine. Despite having ended armed conflict in 1992, the situation in Transnistria remains extremely complicated, with the the breakaway state wishing to join the Russian Federation while continuing to remain heavily reliant on Moldova for exporting the limited produce its economy outputs.

Despite making small steps towards increasing transparency to the outside world, Transnistria remains a Soviet Socialist Republic, as such continuing to make use of the hammer and sickle in its flag – even retaining the KGB as its main security agency. Russia still maintains a limited presence in Transnistria, its soldiers officially on a peacekeeping mission. Despite its disputed status as a true country, Transnistria functions as a de-facto state with its own army, air arm and even its own arms industry.

It is the latter that has produced a number of very interesting designs that have entered service with Transnistria's armed forces over the past two decades. This industry was highly active during the Moldovan Civil War, producing a variety of DIY armoured fighting vehicles, multiple rocket launchers (MRLs) and other weaponry for use against the Moldovan Army. After the cessation of hostilities, the arms industry would play a vital role in upholding the operational status of the Transnistria's army, which has remained unable to replace its dated inventory of Soviet weaponry ever since its establishment in 1991.

One of these designs is a new multiple rocket launcher using the same 122mm rockets of the ubiquitous BM-21, yet radically different in its design. First seen in 2016 during the 'Commonwealth Warrior - 2016' army competitions, this MRL (referred to as 'Pribor-2' in this article for the plant which produced it) is a huge upgrade over Transnistria's previous homegrown MRL: referred to as 'Pribor-1' in this article. Sporting the impressive number of 48 122mm tubes compared to the Pribor-1's 20 tubes, the 'Pribor-2' is the latest addition to the Transnistrian Army after the unveilment of the locally converted GMZ-3 APCs.

Transnistria is notorious for its supposed role in arms trafficking throughout the region and farther abroad. Large quantities of weaponry and ammunition from the Soviet 14th Army were taken over by Transnistrian locals, elements of the 14th Army loyal to Transnistria and foreign fighters when Moldava entered what according to the Moldovan government was and still is Moldovan territory, resulting in conflict between the two in 1992. While large amounts of the missing weaponry and ammunition was subsequently secured, taken over by the newly established Transnistrian Army or transported back to Russia under the supervision of the Operational Group of Russian Forces in Moldova, limited quantities of weapons originating in Transnistria still found their way abroad.

When the Soviet Union dissolved, much of the personnel and their associated weaponry which once made up its military became subordinate to the newly established states they were located in. While this process was often troubled by the departure of many ethnic Russians stationed outside of the former Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic, this wasn't the only problem encountered in Moldova. The 14th Army was in fact stationed in Ukraine, Moldova and the breakaway state of Transnistria, with various units of the 14th becoming subordinate to either Ukraine, Moldova and Russia, or loyal to the newly formed Transnistrian republic. Obviously, this made for an extremely complicated and sensitive process.

When Transnistria took over most of the weapon storage depots on the territory it controlled, it inherited large amounts of highly specialised vehicles while being left without any significant numbers of infantry fighting vehicles or self-propelled artillery. Indeed, apart from several 122mm 2S1 and 152mm 2S3 self-propelled guns (SPGs) that took part in the 1992 war (which in fact are likely to have returned to Russia afterwards), there is no self-propelled artillery in the inventory of the Transnistrian Army. Instead, it relies on an arsenal of towed anti-aircraft, anti-tank guns and 122mm MRLs (The 'Pribor-1' seen below) for indirect fire support. By comparison, Moldova continues to operate a sizeable number of 220mm BM-27 and 122mm BM-21 MRLs, 152mm 2A36 Giatsint-B field guns and 120mm 2S9 Nona self-propelled mortars.

While certain to be outgunned and outranged in any future conflict with Moldova, Transnistria is looking at other ways to offset its numerical and technological disadvantage with Moldova. Starting with designing and producing crude types of MRL known as 'Alazan' to bolster its firepower during the 1992 war, Transnistria's flourishing arms industry would experiment with other types of MRLs during the 1990s, but none appear to have been particularly successful or entered service with the Transnistrian Army.

For Transnistria, the first true success story came in the form of the Pribor-1, which combines a ZiL-131 truck with an indigenous launching erector system similar in operation to that of the BM-21. However, the biggest difference is a 50% reduction in the total rockets the vehicle can fire in one salvo, from 40 on the BM-21 to just 20 on the Pribor-1. While the actual reason for this remains unknown, it could have been an attempt by the Transnistrian Army to increase the number of MRLs in its inventory by simply cannabilizing one BM-21 for two Pribor-1s. However, different in virtually every aspect from the regular BM-21, this theory is nowadays considered implausible. More likely is that Transnistria took over several thousands of 122mm rockets from the Soviet 14th Army, but no MRL to fire them, and subsequently acquired or produced the rocket tubes themselves.

Opposed to the Pribor-1's 20 launching tubes, the Pribor-2 can fire no less than 48 122mm rockets in one salvo, which considering the Pribor-1's obvious downgrade from the BM-21 might indicate the Transnistrians are indeed capable of producing their own launching tubes. Based on a commercially available KAMAZ-43114 or a close derivative, the Pribor-2 stands out compared to other MRL designs in that its launch tubes are installed backwards and its interesting arrangement of 4x12 122mm rockets. Although the number of Pribor-2s currently available to Transnistria remains unknown, continued production might eventually allow its army to supplement or even replace the older and less capable Pribor-1.

Apart from expanding and even introducing new MRLs, Transnistria has also taken measures to improve the detection of enemy forces and particularly artillery, which could allow the MRLs to take on the role of counter-battery fire. In particular, Transnistria has acquired several commercially available DJI FC40 Phantoms and even launched an indigenous drone programme which could eventually aid the Transnistrian Army in identifying targets for its Pribor-1 and Pribor-2 MRLs. The Transnistrian Army also operates several battlefield surveillance radars, including the relatively modern Credo-M1 portable battlefield surveillance radar that can detect armoured fighting vehicles  from rougly 30km away, and movement of personnel from 10km.


For Transnistria's size, status and economic means, introducing a new type of MRL is certainly an impressive feat, and presents a clear case of making the best possible use of every means available. In that regard, Transnistria is sure to continue surprising its tiny audience of foreign observers with the products of its indigenous military industry. Perhaps more importantly, it shows Transnistria is becoming more self-reliant in the production of arms and equipment, a necessary measure for the republic to maintain its status as a breakaway state.

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Dear reader,

You are sure to have noticed a lack of content this past year. This is because we were fully committed to finishing our book on the North Korean military by the title of The Armed Forces of North Korea, on the path of Songun, which deprived us of most of the time normally spent on writing articles for Oryx Blog. Regular posting is expected to resume this month. We thank you for your patience, and look forward to finally releasing the culmination of years of extensive study of the DPRK and its armed forces.

Kind regards,

Stijn Mitzer and Joost Oliemans

''North Korea’s Armed Forces: On the path of Songun seeks to bring order and coherence to the chaotic state of affairs in the intelligence community of North Korea-watchers, as well as to disprove the much-echoed stance that there is little to fear from the DPRK by providing information on a plethora of never-before described weapons systems and modernisation programmes.

North Korea’s Armed Forces maps the most important events from the inconclusive ceasefire struck at the end of the Korean War, throughout the Cold War until modern day, and an especially heavy emphasis is placed on the current status of the Korean People's Army branches by examining their wealth of indigenously designed weaponry. In the course of the book not only will many of the Korean People's Army’s projects and tactics be unveiled, but also new light will be shed on the deadly flare-ups between the North and the South, and novel evidence on tragic incidents such as the Cheonan sinking and Yeongpyeong bombing of 2010 is brought forth. Moreover, an up-to-date, comprehensive listing of the equipment holdings of several branches of the Korean People's Army is included, offering a numerical assessment of its naval and aerial capabilities. From the recently introduced stealth missile boats, ballistic missile submarines and main battle tank families to their often-ignored indigenous aircraft industry, virtually all indigenous weapons systems are discussed extensively.

This exclusive content is illustrated by over seventy detailed color artworks and various maps put together through exhaustive research and analysis, as well as around 170 unique images, many of which have never before been seen by the general public. Through scrutiny of satellite footage, the observation of North Korean propaganda outlets and by carefully examining information from the United States Department of Defense, the DPRK's advances in each of the Korean People's Army's respective branches are uncovered. Nearly all of the ’hermit kingdom’s’ military exploits are included and an accurate picture of the North's capabilities in both symmetrical and asymmetrical warfare is provided. This book was written specifically for anyone interested in North Korea's military capabilities or looking to find answers to many questions raised by the minefield of contradictory statements and misinformation that make up current intelligence about this reclusive nation.''
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