The first appearance of a BTS-5B armoured recovery vehicle (ARV) converted to a battle bus back in January 2015 certainly raised eyebrows, not least because it quicklygot stuck in a ditch and was then destroyed. This contraption was the Islamic State's first attempt at converting an otherwise useless vehicle into a weapons platform adapted to the Islamic State's needs. While thus not very successful in its intended role, it took less than a year for its successor to appear on the plains of Iraq. First seen in December 2015, this first iterationcombines lessons learned from its predecessor with technology not widely used by the Islamic State until that point.

The new vehicle makes an appearance in the Islamic State propaganda video 'The Dabiq Appointment', produced by the media office of Wilayat Ninawa (Nineveh Governorate) in Mosul, Iraq. The 'Dabiq Appointment' refers to the town of Dabiq in Northern Syria, where according to the Islamic State, the final battle between righteousness (The Islamic State) and wrongness (everything not the Islamic State) will take place. Contrary to what one might think, a large scale deployment of Coalition forces near this town and a resulting battle is what the Islamic State desperately wants. It is thé way the Islamic State wants to confront the 'Crusaders' (the Coalition), referring to its current air attacks and drone strikes as acts of cowardness. To further add to this threat, the video also includes a shot of an Islamic State operated T-55 marching on the Colosseum in Rome, Italy.

Featuring in the 'Dabiq Appointment' is the 3rd al-Farouq armoured brigade, which together with the 'Shield battalion' is responsible for operating armoured fighting vehicles (AFVs) in Wilayat Ninawa. This city is home tothe largest concentration of Islamic State operated AFVs as Mosul was overstocked with equipment intended to be used by the Iraqi Army, which left all of their equipment behind before fleeing the city. The 3rd al-Farouq armoured brigade is seen training for the ''imminent'' battle at Dabiq, shooting up targets and storming positions while employing a host of armoured fighting vehicles including 2 T-55 MBTs, 1 Type-59 MBT, 2 MT-LBs, 2 Badger ILAVs MRAPs, 1 Battle fortress and 1 BTR-80UP APC in junction with well-equipped infantry.

The image below shows the seal of 3rd al-Farouq Armoured Brigade, reading: ولاية نينوى - الجند (?) لواء الفاروق المدرع الثالث - 'Wilayat Ninawa - Soldiers (?) - al-Farouq Armoured Brigade - 3rd'. The second part of the Shahada: محمد رسول الله - 'Muhammed is Allah's prophet' is seen on the right. This is sometimes seen on Islamic State operated vehicles and is believed to be applied for decorative purposes only.







As with its predecessor, this BTS-5B was heavily modified for its new role as an armoured fighting vehicle. The crane, snorkel and various crates normally mounted on top of the vehicle were removed. Although unlikely to ever be used, the dozer blade was retained however.

While the previous version had to do with simple blocks of armour installed around its newly erected platform, the new vehicle comes with slat armour installed around the hull and around its raised platform. The platform, complete with a door in the back, is believed to be well armoured. Although looking impressive, the strength of the protective slat armour and the firmness of its supportive mounts look marginal at best, raising questions about its viability against RPGs while in battle. No rubber side skirts are seen mounted, which was a feature of the first battle bus.

The erected platform does not appear to be blocking the driver's hatch, which was a serious issue of the previous version, where the driver had to enter its position by a hatch on the floor of the erected platform. The driver also had to stick its head out while driving as the support beams blocked the driver's viewing port. On this vehicle, his view is only slightly hampered by the slat armour installed on the front of the vehicle. To compensate for the removed headlights, the light beams of which would have been blocked by the slat armour, two new headlights have been installed on the front mudguards. All of the crew is believed to enter the vehicle by the door on the back of the vehicle.




Armament has been much improved from the previous version, which only donned a single 12.7mm DShK in addition to several mounts for light-machine guns (LMGs). The new battle fortress comes with the same 12.7mm DShK, this time mounted on the commander's cupola, and a 14.5mm KPV in an armoured cupola taken from an ex-Iraqi Army M-1114 placed on top of the raised platform. While providing an easy target for the enemy, the elevated position of the 14.5mm KPV offers it a great view of its surroundings, and enables it to fire at practically any target with a Line Of Sight (LOS) to the vehicle. A soldier operating a 7.62mm PKM LMG can be seen on the back of the battle fortress in the image above, which will likely accompany the vehicle when going into battle as well.

Contrary to the previous version, which was more of a heavily armoured battering ram carrying infantry than it was a real AFV, this vehicle is much more akin to a true armoured fighting vehicle. The sheer size of the erected platform serves both as an advantage as well as an disadvantage as it makes the vehicle an ideal target for ATGMs and RPGs.

Although training for a possible confrontation at Dabiq, the vehicle could just as well be sent off against Peshermerga positions around Mosul. Such an attack usuallycommences with one vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED) followed by M-1114s, Badger ILAVs, M1117 ASVs and infantry. As the Peshmerga has been entrenched around Mosul ever since its capture by the Islamic State in early June 2014, these ATGM-armed positions are meanwhile fortified to such a degree that capturing them has become nigh impossible. The fighters of the Islamic State still frequently attempt to storm these positions however, resulting in the loss of precious vehicles, equipment and manpower after every attempt.

While the new battle fortress is likely to suffer the same fate as its older brother (destroyed after getting stuck in a ditch while storming Peshermerga positions) it demonstrates the efforts made by the Islamic State to keep improving its vehicle park. Despite the Islamic State's best efforts, it remains to be seen if this vehicle will have any meaningful impact on the battlefield or if it will end up as target practice on the plains of Mosul. With the supply of captured BTS-5Bs in Iraq now believed to be completely exhausted, all eyes are now at the single BREM-1 captured in Tadmur, which could potentially serve as the basis for the next battle fortress.

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The Syrian Civil War has seen a range of major arms hauls by various parties as weapons depots get overrun, captured and in many cases simply abandoned by retreating forces. The capture of Regiment 121, Brigade 93 and the Mahin arms depot have until now topped the list in terms of ghaneema (spoils of war). Regiment 121 provided the Islamic State with large numbers of field-guns and MRLs while Brigade 93 saw the capture of at least thirty tanks and around a dozen howitzers. Mahin became notorious for providing its capturers (Jaish al-Islam and the Free Syrian Army) with hundreds of anti-tank guided missiles (ATGMs). For this reason, Mahin was seen as the largest and most important haul of arms during the now five-year long Civil War.

But that reputation appears to have been surpassed now that footage (WARNING: EXTREMELY GRAPHIC. Advised to only watch from 12:55 onwards) showing the capture of the Ayyash weapons depot by fighters of the Islamic State in Deir ez-Zor has been released. The video, the fourth in the series 'Support from God, and imminent victory' (Quran verse 61:13) is the fourth to have been released showing the Islamic State's operations in and around Deir ez-Zor. The contents of the weapon depot, captured on the 20th of January, were supposedly removed before the Islamic State took over according to pro-regime sources. Now that the war reached its fifth year, this appears to be some language code for 'The weapon depots were completely overstocked, brace yourselves on every front'. And thus, no less than 2 million rounds of (small) arms ammunition, 9000 grenades and a hundred ATGMs were among the spoils of Ayyash, making the capture of this weapon depot the largest ever in Syria. A detailed list of captured ammunition, weaponry and vehicles can be seen below.

This is an approximate guess of the captured weapons and ammunition featured in the video of the Ayyash weapon depot, the real figures are believed to be much higher. The content of at least 2600 crates could not be identified.

Ammunition:

- 1,348,300 to 1,791,960 rounds of 7.62x39 and 7.62x54R ammunition.
- 17,140 rounds of 12.7mm ammunition.
- 158,996 rounds of 14.5mm ammunition.
- 119,768 rounds of 20mm ammunition.
- 450 rounds of 23mm ammunition.
- 223 rounds of 73mm ammunition.
- 72 rounds of 82mm ammunition.
- 2000 rounds of 85mm ammunition.
- 6 rounds of 107mm ammunition.
- 4 rounds of 120mm ammunition.
- 165 rounds of 120mm RAP ammunition.
- 576 rounds of 122mm ammunition.
- 1120 fuses for 122mm artillery rounds.
- 7 PG-2 rocket-propelled grenades.
- 10 PG-7 rocket-propelled grenades.
- 1 PG-7VL rocket-propelled grenade.
- 1 TBG-7V rocket-propelled grenade.
- 1 OG-7V rocket-propelled grenade.
- 2 PG-29V rocket-propelled grenades.
- 2 M-57 rocket-propelled grenades.
- 9025 grenades.
- 36 rifle grenades.
- 98 9M14M Malyutka ATGMs.
- 1 9M113M Konkurs ATGMs.
- 7 3M9 surface-to-air missiles.

Weaponry:

- 84 7.62mm AK(M)-47s.
- 5 7.62mm PKMs.
- 1 7.62mm RPD.
- 1 7.62mm SGM.
- 3 12.7mm DShK(M)s.
- 11 14.5mm KPVs.
- 2 23mm ZU-23s.
- 1 RPG-2.
- 13 RPG-7s.
- 1 73mm 2A28 Grom.
- 1 M40 106mm RCL.
- 122 bayonets.
- 1 pistol.
- 1 flintlock.

Vehicles (derelict trucks not included):

- 1 T-55(A)MV.
- 2 T-55As.
- 5 BMP-1s.
- 1 23mm ZSU-23.
- 1 BRDM-2.
- 1 BTR-152.
- 2 BREM-2 ARVs.
- 3 2P25 TELs.
- 1 SURN 1S19 radar.
- 6 ZiL-131s.
- 2 GAZ-3308s.
- 2 GAZ-66s.
- 2 Ural-375Ds.
- 1 KamAZ-53212.
- 1 MAZ-5336
- 1 Tatra 815.
- 1 GAZ Sobol.
- 1 UAZ-469.
- 2 excavators.
- 1 Land Rover Defender.
- 2 technicals.
- 3 trucks.
- 4 cars.

Figures made available by the Islamic State:

- 400 killed or injured.
- 100 [pro-regime militants] captured.
- 4 tanks captured.
- 10 BMPs captured.
- 3 guns captured.
- 350 tank shells captured.
- 7,000 shells and rockets captured.
- 30 rocket launchers captured.
- 100 anti-armor rockets captured.
- 410 anti-armor shells captured.
- 1,000s of hand grenades captured.
- Tons of various ammo captured.

Having so much ammunition and weaponry stationed so close to a fragile frontline that is incapable of dealing with large Islamic State attacks is a sign of extremely incompetent military planning. This is especially true when considering the immensely large 137th Brigade's base located nearby has plenty of space to house tenfold the contents of Ayyash. This base is located much closer to the airbase and Deir ez-Zor's city centre and thus better capable of dividing the munitions between the defenders of Deir ez-Zor. To lose the largest weapon arsenal ever to have been captured in the war due to nothing other than poor planning and above all laziness raises the issue of whether the current organisation in charge of regime operations is capable of dealing with the situation it faces. Instead, units such as the ones commanded by Suheil 'The Tiger' al-Hassan and Issam 'The Lion' Zahreddine are constantly being relocated to positions that had previously been abandoned by other regime forces. One such example is Tadmur, where the Syrian Arab Army only barely fled away faster than the Islamic State could push forward. As a result, a small force which had the goal of capturing the town of al-Sukhna suddenly found itself amidst the ruins of Palmyra (Tadmur). The international outcry resulting from Islamic State released productions showing the partial destruction of the ancient town could perhaps have been partially diverted at the regime for making no serious effort to defend it, which surprisingly received no media attention at all. Of course, military priorities are unlikely to lie with the protection of cultural heritage during a war of this intensity, but the sheer fact that the entire population of Tadmur as well as its archaeological sites were left behind without conquest purely due to the employment of poor military strategy signifies a recurring problem within the Syrian Arab Army.

Back to Ayyash, located a mere ten kilometers north-west from Deir ez-Zor's city centre, which was the scene of heavy fighting as fighters of the Islamic State pushed their way into the town and surrounding sites. As the regime has to defend Deir ez-Zor with only a limited amount of personnel, it has been forced to spread its troops thinly along the perimeter, with the main bulk stationed near Deir ez-Zor's airbase, the city centre and surrounding hills. The Islamic State has focused its attacks mainly on the airbase and the town, which has seen bitter fighting ever since the start of the Civil War, but especially since the Islamic State took over from the Free Syrian Army in July 2014.

Ayyash, defended by a mix of NDF troops, SyAA personnel from the 137th Brigade and detachments of the Republican Guard's 104th Brigade, sees a perimeter that was less well defended by troops not matching the performance of the soldiers stationed elsewhere in Deir ez-Zor. Indeed, some of the soldiers stationed here were formely tasked with manning the nearby surface-to-air missile site, but were then armed and tasked with defending Ayyash itself. While this careful balancing of troops in Ayyash appears quite logical, it becomes less so when considering the fact that Ayyash is home to a weapons depot once built as a strategic reserve for a possible confrontation with Ba'athist Iraq, then the fourth largest army in the world. While the contents of the depot had partially been depleted in the defence of Deir ez-Zor, it was still massively overstocked with arms and ammunition.

The fact that the contents of the weapons depot were left wholely intact both prior to and after the takeover (contents which could either have been destroyed beforehand or with artillery and airstrikes afterwards) indicates that the Syrian Arab Army is still incapable of dealing with such situations. The 2K12 surface-to-air missile systems captured were said to have been destroyed by the Russian Air Force after their capture. These systems were slowly abandoned over the past few years, with only the associated SURN 1S19 radar remaining operational. Bringing these systems back to operational condition would have been nigh impossible, not in the least because the missiles were in even worse shape than the launchers. Not targeting millions of small arms rounds and a hundred ATGMs and instead striking inoperable 2K12 SAMs remains a curious decision to say the least.

The captured ammunition, quickly taken away by trucks, will likely be distributed between the various fronts the Islamic State is fighting at. A part might also be held back for the upcoming battle for Raqqa, the capital of the Islamic State.While one would expect trucks loaded with ammunition have no chance of driving through half of Syria towards their designation, such transports can still freely drive to any Islamic State held territory, as witnessed by the presence of a 2S1 Gvozdika in Deir ez-Zor that was originally captured at Shaer back in 2014.This self-propelled howitzer passed through four governorates before arriving in Deir ez-Zor unharmed by Coalition airstrikes back in early to mid-2015.

























The largest stash of 9M14M Malyutkas at the Ayyash weapon depot, at least 90 of which are piled up here. A single 9M113M Konkurs missile can also be seen below.


The 2K12 surface-to-air missile battery, supposedly bombed by the Russian Air Force after having been captured. The capture of this battery marks the second 2K12 site to have fallen in the hands of the Islamic State.







Heavy equipment now in the hands of the Islamic State: The T-55(A)MV is the second example to have been captured by fighters of the Islamic State in Deir ez-Zor. A limited number of T-55(A)MVs were believed to have been brought to Deir ez-Zor along with T-72 'Urals', T-72M1s and T-72AVs before the supply route was closed by the capture of al-Sukhna on the 13th of May 2015. The two other T-55s were among the examples upgraded by North Korea in the late 70s and early 80s and can be seen with two different types of laser-range finders 'Made in DPRK'. Interestingly, one T-55 still operates the 14.5mm KPV instead of the regular 12.7mm DShK. Most formerly 14.5mm KPV-equipped T-55s lost theirs, which was usually deemed to be of more use on technicals.

One of the BMP-1s sports Kontakt-1 explosive reactive armour (ERA) alongside its turret in a bid to enhance the poor armour of the vehicle. It is expected that vehicles such as the BRDM-2, BTR-152 and the two BREM-2s will be used as VBIEDs, the Islamic State having no use for them in their originally intended role.














Article written in collaboration with MENA_Conflict from Type 63: A collection of Musings on Middle East Conflict.

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The establishment of the Islamic State has led to a myriad of DIY projects as the group attempts to equip its fighters with a semblance of armour and heavy firepower. The latest homebred gem was spotted during a recent offensive in Derna, Libya, where it is used to combat the Haftar-aligned Libyan National Army and the Shura Council. The fighters of the Islamic State in Derna are completely cut off from other Islamic State held territory in Libya and thus have to do with what they currently got.

The sighting of this vehicle comes a month after the 'unveiling' on Ansar al-Sharia's take on the BMP-1. This behemoth comes with an armoured 14.5mm ZPU-4 platform over the main gun in addition to bow armour. Deployed in Benghazi, it did not have a long career, being knocked out in early March by the Libyan National Army.

The new contraption, based on a 6x6 truck, features a variety of metal plating and slat armour and is equipped with not just a BMP-1 turret, but actually incorporates a complete BMP-1 hull instead! The 73mm 2A28 Grom main gun and coaxial 7.62mm PKT machine gun have been removed however, and an armoured platform housing a single 106mm M40 recoilless rifle (RCL) has been installed over the turret. Although swinging the 106mm M40 around demands an operator in the turret itself, the elevated position of the RCL offers a clear advantage in the close quarter combat currently seen in Derna's city centre.


The armour of this battle monstrosity is special to say the least. The armour protection of the side of the BMP-1's hull has been strengthened by the addition of slat armour, which also found its way to the front of the vehicle. The space in between the BMP-1's hull and slat armour has further been strengthened by sandbags. Metal plating of different strenghts covers the rest of the vehicle. Most special is undoubtedly the fact that the BMP-1's tracks have been reused to provide protection to the otherwise exposed wheels of the truck.

Armament consists of the 106mm M40 RCL, a very popular weapon in Libya, in addition to rifles and light-machine guns fired out of the BMP-1's eight (or when counting the firing port in the back nine) firing ports. It is not entirely clear why the 73mm main gun has been removed, but it could have been damaged or previously removed for installment on a technical.

As indicated by the image above, the role of this vehicle is similar to that of an APC or IFV, although getting in and out of the vehicle has been made significantly more difficult. It is worth noting that the driver of this battle monstrosity must have extreme difficulties steering this vehicle through the narrow streets of Derna, not to mention backing up after missing the intended location because of the small viewport to look through. The driver can be seen 'aiming' his 7.62mm AK-103 out of the window, likely just done just for the camera.


Libya, the birthplace of over the top DIY projects, is sure to produce plenty more of conversions aimed at giving each faction an edge over its opponents to secure the victory in a long conflict that just doesn't seem to end. Although only few countries are willing to stick to the arms embargo placed on Libya, the lack of (working) heavy weaponry being supplied to the various factions means there will continue to be a necessity to continue such DIY projects, whether they are actually useful or not.



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Starting in June 2014, Coalition airstrikes conducted on positions, vehicles and high-ranking members of the Islamic State have taken a heavy toll on the group. These airstrikes combined with increased bombardements conducted by the Syrian Arab Air Force (SyAAF) and the Russian Air Force (RuAF) have made a significant difference during several battles already, most notably in Kobanî. The Islamic State has so far been unable to come up with an answer against the many air forces now threatening them in both Syria and Iraq. Although it has tried to better camouflage its forces in order to prevent them from being spotted and hit, it has so far failed to directly hit any of the aircraft conducting these strikes.

Although the Islamic State has no lack of surface-to-air missiles nor associated launchers, it lacks the expertise to turn these often derelict systems into operational systems capable of hitting any foe in the air. Indeed, the limited amount of MANPADS in the hands of the Islamic State (even including North Korean examples) have so far only managed to damage or down Iraqi Air Force helicopters. The capture of a fully operational S-125 battery in between Hama and Aleppo did not help the Islamic State in any way, as it was not only incapable of operating these sophisticated systems, but unable to transport these systems to Raqqa in the first place. Using the S-75 missiles captured back in 2014 was complicated by the fact that none of the systems captured were operational or in a state that could easily be made operational, not to mention the fact that they lack the expertise to use them. The usage of one 2P25 launch system, part of the 2K12 Kub SAM complex, captured in Deir ez-Zor was foiled by the lack of any missiles and significant damage on the launcher itself. The capture of a 2K12 Kub battery in Deir ez-Zor in January 2016 did provide the Islamic State with an operational SURN 1S19 radar system and intact launchers, but in such a sorry state that bringing these systems back to operational condition would have been nigh impossible, not to mention the bad condition of the associated missiles. Although not confirmed through video footage, the whole site was said to have been bombed by the RuAF shortly after its capture.

The capture of Tabqa airbase on the 24th of August 2014 did provide the Islamic State with at least ten R-3S and four R-13M air-to-air missiles originally intended to be used on the resident 12th squadron and another unknown squadron flying MiG-21bis and MiG-21MFs. The Islamic State subsequently moved these missiles to Raqqa, where it tried to convert them to the surface-to-air role. This progress was filmed by one of the project leaders, which was subsequently arrested at a rebel checkpoint. The footage was then given to SkyNews, which first reported on the conversion of R-13Ms to the surface-to-air role in the 6th of January 2016.

Tadmur, captured on the 20th of May 2015 and the third airbase to fall in the hands of the Islamic State in Syria, also provided the Islamic State with large numbers of air-to-air missiles and even anti-radiation missiles. Tadmur was previously home to a squadron flying the MiG-25PD(S) interceptor and the MiG-25PU two-seat trainer, but as these aircraft were gradually withdrawn from service, the three remaining MiG-25PD(S) and one MiG-25PU left for T4 in late 2013. Their associated missiles remained stored in two of Tadmur's sixteen Hardened Aircraft Shelters however. When the fighters of the Islamic State overran the airbase, it not only encountered dozens of R-40 air-to-air missiles but also large numbers of Kh-28 anti-radiation missiles, likely intended to be used on Su-22s and Su-24s stationed at T4 but never transported to this airbase.








While it was extremely unlikely that the Islamic State could turn the Kh-28s and its 140kg heavy warhead, intended to be launched against radar systems of SAM sites, into anything useful other than an IED or DIY surface-to-surface rocket, it did find a role for the R-40 missiles also found at the airbase. Two variants of the R-40 were captured: The semi-active radar homing guided R-40RD and the infrared-guided R-40TD. As the R-40RD requires an onboard radar to lock on to the targeted aircraft, it was useless for the Islamic State in its intended role. The R-40TD on the other hand is guided by its infrared warhead, and does not require guidance by an onboard radar. Several similar surface-to-air modifications of the of the R-3S, the R-13M, the R-60 and the R-73 were seen in Yugoslavia in an attempt to counter the Coalition airpower here. All were mounted on trucks, none ever scored a hit. The SyAAF took it one step further and experimented with launching R-40TDs at ground targets several years back, unsurprisingly to no avail.

When regime forces entered one of the recently captured Hardened Aircraft Shelters at Tadmur, they encountered a dump truck armed with no less than an R-40TD! The missile, installed on a newly raised platform, can be aimed by using the dump truck's tipper mechanism. As the R-40 was designed to hit large and fast flying targets, it comes with a 70kg heavy warhead, enabling the missile to destroy most targets by only exploding in the vicinity of the targeted aircraft. The heavy warhead also makes using the R-40 as a DIY surface-to-surface rocket an attractive option. Although such a conversion will be in no way accurate, neither are the hundreds of much lighter DIY rockets still assembled and used by the fighters of the Islamic State each day. While the R-40TD looks to be mounted the wrong way around, the attachment points that connects the missile with the MiG-25's pylons are located on the top of the missile, creating the false impression that the missile sits inverted.


[22:03:37] Joost: As no aircraft or helicopters were reported to have been shot down over Tadmur, and no one witnessed the impact of an R-40, it will probably always remain unknown what the intended role of this contraption was, or if it was ever used in the first place. It does however once again prove that whatever falls in the hands of the Islamic State, you're always sure they come up with an inventive way to put it to use.




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After having been captured by the Islamic State just short of a year ago, the city of Tadmur is now back in the hands of the regime after a large offensive conducted by units of the Syrian Arab Army (SyAA), Hizbullah, Shiite militias and the Russian Armed Forces cleared the town city and its surroundings from the presence of the Islamic State. While the recapture of the ancient town of Palmyra, home to many well-preserved ruins and archeologica artifacts, will surely make the headlines all over the world, wrestling control over the city of Tadmur itself from the Islamic State is of a much larger significance to the future course of the Syrian War.

Its significance arises not only from the gasfield-rich terrain in which it lies, a factor which is sure to aid future regime operations, but also from the strategic location of Tadmur within Syria. Holding the key to the highway connecting Deir ez-Zor to the West of Syria, the only thing laying in the way of breaking the siege of this heavily embattled city is al-Sukhna, held firmly in Islamic State control since May 2015. However, with the fighters of the Islamic State on the run and little reinforcements present in the area, a regime offensive to quickly retake al-Sukhna before the Islamic State has had the chance to regroup seems likely.

The siege of Deir ez-Zor, in place since the capture of al-Sukha by the Islamic State on the 13th of May 2015, prevents any aid from being brought in by trucks, forcing the remaining citizens of the city to rely on an airbridge conducted by the Syrian Arab Air Force's (SyAAF) Il-76 fleet. Maintaining the airbridge is an expensive affair, not to mention the fact that it prevents the precious Il-76 fleet from being used for other critical tasks. To quickly continue the offensive in the direction of al-Sukhna is critical in order to deny the fighters of the Islamic State the opportunity to dig in and create defensive line here. The fact that Tadmur airbase has been captured intact will greatly benefit the SyAA in future operations in Central to Eastern Syria. The long runway will allow cargo aircraft to bring in supplies and additional troops and could be used for the forward deployment of attack helicopters, as was already witnessed the day after the capture.

While the capture of Tadmur will surely be celebrated as a heroic feat by the Syrian Arab Army, one must not forget it was the same SyAA that gave up the town without any serious opposition one year ago. Indeed, what was intended to be a lightning attack on the town of al-Sukhna in a way so often seen conducted by the fighters of the Islamic State ultimately ended up as the surprise capture of Tadmur. Instead of putting up a serious fight to defend the town, the garrison of al-Sukhna quickly fled for the desert after two of its tanks were destroyed by ATGMs, only to be chased and hunted down by the fighters of the Islamic State. Encountering nothing but desert after al-Sukhna, the Islamic State waged its chances and quickly continued its offensive deeper into Central Syria. When arriving at the next (heavily defended) regime bases; T3 pumping station, Arak, and Hulayhilah, the defenders not only failed to point their artillery and tanks in the right direction, but in fact didn't manage to deploy them in the first place. It seems plausible that the defenders were completely unaware of the impending danger, which is all the more strange as Hulayhilah served as a communication hub to coordinate regime operations in Central Syria. Unfortunately, the defenders that did manage to escape the massacre that followed at Hulayhilah were also hunted down after fleeing into the desert.

Boosted by these successes, the fighters of the Islamic State then set their eyes on the town of Tadmur. Although by now fully aware of the impending danger, regime forces present in Tadmur proved to be completely incapable of properly anticipating the impending assault and setting up defensive positions. Not even the local airbase, guarding the entrance of the town and without a doubt the best defensive position a commander could wish for was employed in the defence of the town. While the regime saved no effort to show off artillery and aircraft striking positions of the Islamic State east of Tadmur for the international press, it then quickly fled the town, leaving not only the civilian population behind, but also many soldiers incapable of fleeing and left to fend for themselves. A small Islamic State force originallytasked with capturing al-Sukhna thus suddenly found itself amidst the ruins of Palmyra just a week later; it had advanced quicker than the Syrian Arab Army could retreat on several occasions, only being 'beaten' by the rapid retreat of the troops tasked with defending Tadmur.

The Islamic State quickly rounded up the remaining regime forces, some of which were directly executed in front of the local population but most locked up in the infamous prison of Tadmur, sight of the 1980 massacre. After featuring the captured soldiers in various propaganda videos, during which some were executed in front of the prison but mainly in the ancient town of Palmyra (most notoriously in the Roman Theatre), the prison was blown up, in addition to various well-preserved temples in the ancient city. The fighters of the Islamic State were meanwhile busy fighting their way farther into the Homs governorate, capturing T4 pumping station and clashing with the defenders of T4 airbase. Being the SyAAF's largest and most important airbase, it can truly be called a fortress. The fighters of the Islamic State found itself incapable of capturing the airbase (which would have required an offensive on a scale not yet seen before) and were forced to work around the airbase in order to continue its advance. It then focused on the towns of al-Qaryatayn and Mahin and by advancing into the Damascus and Homs countryside, it even successfully cut of T4 airbase for a short time. Although capturing large swaths of territory, the fighters of the Islamic State soon found themselves unable to push deeper into the Homs and Damascus governorates. While it captured, lost, and then recaptured al-Qaryatayn and Mahin, further Islamic State's advances were effectively blocked here. Although in no way short on ammunition due to the huge amounts of weaponry found at al-Qaryatayn earlier (including ten tanks), the town is now fully under siege by the regime. Back to Tadmur, where the first serious reports about regime forces aiming to recapture the town started to surface in July. From this point on, three different offensives were launched at the town.


The defence of Tadmur was in the hands of a small Islamic State garrison, which due to the now worsening shortages in manpower was unable to defend such a large area. Although the Islamic State hugely expanded its territories by the capture of much of Central Syria, it simply lacked the troops to properly defend it. The small garrison present therefore chose to focuss its firepower at the mountainous terrain west of the city. Serving as a natural barrier, these mountains proved ideal for fighting off the first offensive conducted by the regime. This first offensive consisted of poorly trained NDF and militia memberssupported by T-55s and T-62s and the SyAAF flying Su-22M4s and Su-24MK2s from T4. Several attempts were made to advance on Tadmur and although terrain was captured, heavy losseswere also incurred due to the use of ATGMs by the Islamic State. Several follow-up attempts yielded the same result, and regime forces were ultimately broken up and routed each time. The second offensive was launched after Russian-supplied T-72Bs, BMP-2s, BMP-1s, BTR-80s and Russian-manned 152mm 2A65 Msta-B howitzers and 122mm BM-21-1 multiple rocket launchers (MRLs) arrived on the scene, further supported by the Russian Air Force (RuAF) flying Mi-8s, Mi-24Ps and Mi-35Ms from T4 and Sh'eirat and Su-24s and Su-25s from Hmeemeem/Bassel al-Assad IAP. This offensive, now jointly conducted with the Russians, again advanced closer to Tadmur but failed to break through to the town. The Islamic State frequently counterattacked with its fighters and tanks, but also with BMP-1 based vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (VBIEDs). The short range of the BMP-1's 73mm 2A28 Grom cannon made this vehicle practically useless for the Islamic State in its intended role, and the large numbers captured allowed the Islamic State to effectively employ them as VBIEDs. Such attacks were usually preceded by a defensive position drawing attention from the opposing regime forces, allowing the BMP-1 VBIEDs to speed towards the distracted regime forces unnoticed, detonating their deadly payload when close by.


The sheer size and firepower of the units in the third offensive is what ultimately caused the fighters of the Islamic State to break. The offensive, preparations for which were already underway for a month, involved the best Russia and the regime had to offer. The armoured forces were expanded by the addition of more T-72Bs, and T-72B Obr. 1989s and T-90s while the artillery was strenghtened by the addition of 220mm BM-27s, 300mm BM-30s and 220mm TOS-1As. The Russian Air Force intensified its operations over Tadmur, even bringing in recently arrived Mi-28N attack helicopters. The regime brought in a large contingent of the elite Suqour al-Sahraa' (Desert Falcons) troops, Navy Seals, commandos and Shiite militias, even including an Afghan battalion with its own tanks, once again highlighting the shortage of regular manpower. The deployment of such a large force, part of which led by Suheil 'The Tiger' al-Hassan, was made possible after the successes around Aleppo and Lattakia, allowing for the redistribition of troops elsewhere. The SyAAF's SA-342 'Gazelles' also saw heavy action over the skies of Tadmur, each helicopter deploying 4 HOT ATGMs.

Aided by the deployment of Russian Special Forces, mainly tasked with calling in fire and air support, this force gradually fought its way closer to the city. Completely outmatched by the vast amount of firepower this offensive brought with it, the fighters of the Islamic State gradually retreated closer to the town, holding up in the ancient castle west of the city until it was overrun as well. The huge weapon depots north of the city also quickly came under the control of the attacking forces. Although large numbers of weaponry and ammunition were expected to have been present here before being captured by fighters of the Islamic State, only one image was ever published after the capture of the depots, leaving the amount of ghaneema (spoils of war) unknown.

While it was expected the remaining Islamic State fighters would turn the town into a fortress, forcing the attacking forces to fight for every building like in Ramadi, they gave up large parts of the town without putting up much resistance, instead retreating to al-Sukhna. The regime had prepared its forces for the possibility of house-to-house fighting, even bringing in T-72s upgraded with slat and spaced armour to better counter the threat posed by RPGs in urban areas. Large numbers of IEDs were reportedly left behind, which are certain to claim additional lives as efforts are undertaken to remove them. It is unknown what happened to the mainly Sunni civilian population, thousands of which still believed to have been in the city shortly before being recaptured by the regime. While pro-regime sources claimed they had all escaped safely into regime territory, the Islamic Stateasked civilians to leave the town and head towards al-Sukhna a short while later. Supposedly, the Russian Army is to deploy advanced equipment and sappers to aid in the removal of the many IEDs left behind in the area.


Tadmur airbase was captured almost entirely intact, which will prove of great value for future offensives conducted in the region, and also help resolidify the regime's grasp on the large swaths of desert that make up most of Central Syria. The Hardened Aircaft Shelters (HAS) revealed that most of the Kh-28 anti-radiation missiles and R-40 air-to-air missiles left behind by the SyAAF remained untouched by the fighters of the Islamic State. Surprisingly however, at least one R-40TD infrared-guided missile was turned into a makeshift surface-to-air missile. The HASes also functioned as improvised weapon and IED factories under Islamic State control. It is unknown if any of the six radars previously captured by the Islamic State suffered any kind of damage, although it certain the regime is hoping the modern JY-27 radar located here survived, as it was one of the most valuable systems present. Without these radars, most of Central Syria is essentially fair game for any air force to invade completely unnoticed. Of course, as sovereignty of Syrian air space is a term of very little significance in the present one can wonder whether preservation of such systems has any real meaning however.







Now that Tadmur has been retaken and a swift advance on al-Sukhna appears to be likely, the future of the city of Deir ez-Zor is suddenly full of possibilities again. A logical course of actions for the Assad regime would to restore a ground supply line to the city as fast as possible and then attempt take as much territory from the Islamic State as possible in this area before the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) sweep in from the North. Should the siege of Deir ez-Zor indeed be lifted and the surrounding areas taken, the Islamic State would no longer have any roads connecting the capital of Raqqa with Mosul and Iraq in general, which would certainly hasten its demise.

The regime upmarch contrasts sharply with gains made by the Islamic State in the previous few years, and sheds light on just how much the odds have shifted in favour of President Assad since those times. As regime-held territory continues to expand and viable alternatives are outcompeted by more radicalised factions, Assad holds an increasingly favourable position in the Geneva peace talks, and is unlikely to resign or be forced to step down in the foreseeable future. In the meanwhile the Islamic State, though threatened on almost every front, is still far from defeated and as is witnessed by the recent flurry of attacks across the world, has suffered little in its capacity to conduct operations abroad. Nonetheless, considering the amount of foes it faces and territories it has lost in both Syria and Iraq in recent months, it is certain that the Islamic State will never be able to regain control over an area as large as it had the summer of last year.

Images by TASS Russian News Agency

An Islamic State offensive near Khanasir, Eastern Aleppo, managed to overrun defending forces, capturing several checkpoints nearby and large amounts of weaponry stocked there in the process. The town of Khanasir, a dusty and deserted place carrying without a doubt the heaviest strategic weight on its shoulders of any town of its kind in Syria. The highway that runs through it is effectively the only access route to embattled Aleppo, and the Islamic State's advances mean that regime forces fighting in the city might soon be completely cut off for some time. This is also the reason why when the Islamic State first captured the town back in late February, the regime was quick to launch an offensive to take back the town, which happened several days later. Nonetheless, the Islamic State's losses were relatively low and the attention the offensive received made it a propaganda victory if not a strategic one. The amount of ghaneema (spoils of war) captured was also substantial, consisting of several tanks, armoured vehicles, artillery and small arms. The Islamic State's second assault on the city and its surroundings appears to have trumped even these earlier gains, as masses of Iranian-supplied small arms and munitions to even a Sarab-1 equipped T-72M1 fell in the hands of the fighters of the Islamic State.

The many checkpoints covering the road going through Khanasir have in typical Syrian Arab Army (SyAA) fashion always been overstocked with arms, resulting large amounts of weaponry being captured by the Islamic State that were dumped around the base as there simply was no personnel to man them. This situation also led to the first capture of Khanasir, where the local garrison found itself unable to counter the swift and unexpected push on the town. After quickly recapturing the town, the new garrison left to defend the town and its surroundings did not only consist of local SyAA and National Defence Force (NDF) fighters, but also of Iraqi Shiite militias and even Iranian soldiers. Indeed, while already obvious by the large amounts of Iranian weaponry, Iranian clothing and Iranian documents, one Iranian helmet captured by fighters of the Islamic State clearly reads: 'IR Army'.




While the fighters of the Islamic State did capture soldiers after gaining control over several checkpoints, all of them were Syrian, raising questions about the amount of Iraqi and Iranian soldiers actually stationed here. Although some of the Iranian equipment could obviously have been used by Syrian soldiers, the presence of [patch] and Iranian military gear (including a helmet with "IR army" written on it) leaves no doubt about the presence of foreign fighters. Whether these fled in the face of Islamic State soldiers or simply withdrew during the fighting is unknown.

The spoils left behind also illustrate the continuously growing influence of foreign military equipment on the conflict: Islamic State forces can now be deen operating anything from the Iranian equipment and newly delivered Russian field guns to U.S.-made weaponry

While it is unlikely the Islamic State will be able to capture huge swats of lands and retain them like they did in previous years, quick and well executed offensives as seen lately in Dmeyr, Northern Aleppo and now Eastern Aleppo will continue to provide the Islamic State with new weaponry, and may delay its inevitable downfall significantly.

This is an approximate guess of the captured weapons and ammunition featured in the photo report. The content of at 89 least crates could not be identified, but are likely to be artillery shells.

Ammunition:

- 18,010 rounds of 7.62x39 and 7.62x54R ammunition.
- 430 rounds of 12.7x99 ammunition.
- 90 rounds of 12.7x108 ammunition.
- 2634 rounds of 23mm ammunition.
- 26 rounds of 60mm ammunition.
- 30 rounds of 106mm ammunition.
- 3 rounds of 107mm ammunition.
- 30 rounds of 122mm MRL ammunition.
- 45 rounds of artillery ammunition.
- 43 charges for artillery rounds.
- 55 (PG)-7 rocket-propelled grenades.
- 7 RPG boosters.
- 39 grenades.

Weaponry:

- 64 7.62mm AK(M)-47s.
- 5 7.62mm PKMs.
- 2 7.62mm SVD Dragunov.
- 1 7.62mm PSL.
- 1 12.7mm DShK.
- 1 14.5mm KPV.
- 10 RPG-7s.
- 1 60mm mortar.
- 1 130mm M-46 field gun.
- 2 122mm D-74 field gun.
- 1 152mm D-20 howitzer.
- 1 M40 106mm RCL.

Vehicles:

- 1 T-72M1 (equipped with the Sarab-1).
- 1 122mm 2S1 Gvozdika.
- 1 Safir.
- 1 GAZ-3308s.
- 1 Tatra 148.
- 1 Tatra 815s.
- 1 truck.
- 3 technicals.
- 2 motorcycles.

Interestingly, the T-72M1 encountered during the offensive is the first Sarab-1 equipped vehicle to have been captured by opponents of the regime. Covered by the means of tarp on this T-72M1, the exact role of the Sarab-1 is still debated upon but has been deployed on a range of vehicles and checkpoints. It likely makes uses of infrared lamps to confuse the TOW's gunner, thus missing its intended target.

Also encountered were five artillery pieces, making up most of heavy armament captured during this offensive. One 122mm Gvozdika self-propelled howitzer, one 130mm M-46 field gun, two 122mm D-74 field gun and one 152mm D-20 howitzer fell in the hands of the fighters of the Islamic State. Both the D-20 and D-74 were delivered by Russia to Syria in the past year, and were not present in the arsenals of the SyAA before the start of the Civil War.




Some of the technicals to have fallen in the hands of the Islamic State, including the infamous Iranian designed and produced Safir 4x4, here seen armed with a M40 106mm recoilless rifle (RCL).



Three trucks, two of Czechoslovak descent. The oldest, the Tatra 148 can already be seen being loaded with captured ammuntion, likely to be transported further away from the frontline for distribution to other fronts. The Tatra 815 and Russian GAZ-3308 represent some of the more modern trucks in service with the SyAA.




Small arms, including everything from a Soviet Mosin-Nagant rifle to an Iranian 60mm mortar. Several AK-47s upgraded with picatinny rails, allowing for the installment for sights and other gadgets, were also encountered. These rifles are almost exclusively seen in use with Iraqi fighters, which more often than not take their personal weapons with them from Iraq.








Almost all of the ammunition was Iranian supplied, and includes both recently produced products and ammunition produced in the seventies. Although 122mm multiple rocket launcher (MRL) was pictured, the presence of thirty 122mm rounds indicates a single-barrelled launcher is likely present somewhere. As often seen, crates and products are labeled both in Farsi and English.












Small arms ammunition, much of which of Iranian origin too. Although a large number of 23mm rounds were captured, no 23mm guns were seen among the spoils, making it likely the trucks or technicasl they were put on left the scene before the Islamic State took over.







What is believed to be Iranian and (Shiite) Iraqi military gear, left behind by the soldiers formerly stationed here. Images released by the Islamic State showed around a dozen fighters fleeing from their checkpoints, undoubtedly also including Iranian soldiers and Shiite fighters from Iraq.



Article written in collaboration with MENA_Conflict from Type 63: A collection of Musings on Middle East Conflict.

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Islamic State captures Ayyash weapons depots in largest arms haul of Syrian Civil War

A video obtained by VICE News and uploaded on the 27th of April 2016 shows off spectacular footage taken by the headcam of an Islamic State fighter as he and his comrades fight their way to Peshmerga positions near Naweran while under heavy enemy fire. The attack, which took place North of Mosul, clearly shows the panic and chaos that occur while on the battlefield, a completely different picture from the one presented in the videos published by the Islamic State's media department, which almost exclusively shows well-trained fighters of the Islamic State defeating their opponents without any fear or regard to their own safety.

The footage offers a rare glimpse into the attacks that Peshmerga forces have been facing ever since the fall of Mosul, but now from the perspective of the Islamic State. This video doesn't offer the whole story however, and because this attack has been documented extremely well by both the Islamic State and Peshmerga, we will attempt to break down the footage and images released by both parties and paint a clearer picture of this attack conducted by the Islamic State.

While VICE News claims the footage was taken in March this year, the depicted attack actually occurred in mid December 2015. As the Islamic State's resulting defeat was widely reported on in Iraqi Kurdistan and abroad, it is not entirely clear how the supposed date got mixed up and suddenly ended up being March 2016.

Before going into detail about the actual battle itself, it is important to know the background of similar Islamic State offensives involving the use of armoured fighting vehicles (AFVs) conducted North of Mosul. Being the largest city located in the territory currently held by the Islamic State, Mosul is the capital of Wilayat (governorate) Ninawa. When it was overrun by the Islamic State, Mosul was overstocked with weaponry and vehicles intended to be used by the Iraqi Army and Police, which left all of their equipment behind before fleeing the city. While large parts of the huge arsenal left behind around Mosul were quickly distributed over the various fronts the Islamic State was fighting on, including Syria, some of AFVs that remained behind would later form the core of the Islamic State's first armoured formations. Before the establishment of these formations, the use of AFVs by the Islamic State in Iraq was disorganised, and captured tanks would often be destroyed rather than operated simply because they weren't deemed to be of use in the lightning attacks conducted by the Islamic State in Iraq. Only in the past year the limited amount of tanks in the Islamic State's inventory have seen more widespread use in Iraq. While several U.S. M1 Abrams were captured intact, they were all deliberately demolished instead of put to use in offensives.

While these armoured formations were in the process of being set up, many of the vehicles were sent to workshops in Mosul for conversion into weapons platforms adapted to the Islamic State's needs. Several of these vehicles have already been sighted in the past year, including two contraptions based on the BTS-5B armoured recovery vehicle (ARV), an otherwise useless vehicle for the Islamic State. The vehicles used in the December attacks on Peshmerga positions came from the same workshops, and their DIY armour certainly has the same improvisational tone to it as that seen on earlier Islamic State AFVs.



At least three armoured formations are believed to have been set up in Mosul, comprising the 'al-Farouq Armoured Brigade', which can be further divided into the 1st, 2nd, 3rd and possibly more battalions, the 'Shield Battalion', which has most of its vehicles painted in black, and the 'Storming Battalion'. In addition to these three, a fourth formation called the 'Suicide Battalion' also operates a host of up-armoured vehicles as vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (VBIEDs). But contrary to regular VBIED attacks so often used by the Islamic State, the 'Suicide Battalion' usually accompanies either of the three armoured formations as they are sent to the battlefield. VBIEDs of the 'Suicide Battalion' are to clear the way for the following armoured formations and can be seen as the Islamic State's version of air support. During this attack, both the 'Storming Battalion' and the 'Suicide Battalion' took part.

Each battalion has its own seal. For example, the seal seen below is used by the 3rd al-Farouq Armoured Brigade. It reads: ولاية نينوى - الجند (?) لواء الفاروق المدرع الثالث - 'Wilayat Ninawa - Soldiers (?) - al-Farouq Armoured Brigade - 3rd'. The second part of the Shahada: محمد رسول الله - 'Muhammed is Allah's prophet' is seen on the right. This can sometimes be seen on Islamic State operated vehicles and is believed to be applied for decorative purposes only. While the seal is usually applied on vehicles in the form of a sticker, it is sometimes simply painted on vehicles, such as on this up-armoured M1114 (formerly) operated by the 'Storming Battalion'.



While the Islamic State has proved to be more than capable of handling armour in Syria, its use of armoured fighting vehicles in Iraq leaves much to desire. At the core of this failure to properly field AFVs are the armoured formations based in Mosul, which apparently feel so comfortable knowing that every loss can simply be replaced by just another vehicle originally captured at Mosul when the city was overrun, that it keeps sending its AFVs against well-fortified Peshmerga positions to little effect. The first recorded example of such a large scale attack occurred in January 2015 near Shekhan, when several M1114s, Badger ILAVs, a M1117 ASV and the first battle bus took on a fortified Peshmerga position before getting obliterated. This loss did not deter the Islamic State from trying again however, as it would continue to send armoured formations (sometimes consisting of just a single vehicle) to the frontline, resulting in the same outcome every time. As the Peshmerga holds the high ground, and has had nearly two years to fortify their postions, even well-coordinated attacks are unlikely to succeed here, especially after they took delivery of MILAN anti-tank guided missiles (ATGMs).

This leads us to the attack depicted in the video released by VICE News, one in the series that ended up resulting in high losses for the Islamic State and literally no gains made. The attack, believed to have taken place on the 16th of December 2015, saw fighters of the Islamic State trying to breach Peshmerga positions on several locations, resulting in the death of at least seventy fighters. More about this offensive can be read here. Although the offensive resulted in failure, the media department of Wilayat Ninawa bravely decided to publish the images shot before and during the offensive anyway. Ironically, these images were uploaded only after the TV channel 'Kurdistan24' had already shown footage of the result of the attack, including the still burning remains of the vehicles after the attack. The photo report released by the Islamic State a day later would show these exact same vehicles still in pristine condition hours before the attack. Nonetheless, the photo report gives us a great insight into the development of the attack and even reveals the names of the fighters involved.

The footage released by VICE News starts at 0:46, when the cameraman (Abu Ridhwan) records the final words of a suicide bomber, a member of the 'Suicide Battalion', before he attempts to blow himself up. He is accompanied by two younger fighters, which were not seen during the attack and likely didn't participate. Although the presence of a camera hints that this video was to be released by the media department of Wilayat Ninawa if the attack would have succeeded or the cameraman would have survived, the presence of two children next to the suicide bomber leave a rather awkward impression, and would likely not have made the final cut.



The next shot, starting at 1:11, shows the suicide bomber before heading off to his target. He says his final words, one of which can be seen in the image below. The load of explosives is mounted at the back of his vehicle, and can be seen covered by a plastic tarp here. His up-armoured vehicle has been serialled '502', which is common practice with VBIEDs of the 'Suicide Battalion'.



A total of four VBIEDs would be used during this offensive, two of which can be seen below. The monstrosity on the left is clearly marked as a vehicle of the 'Suicide Battalion', carrying the serial '1000'. This vehicle appears well-armoured, with thick panels installed on the front and side of the vehicle to protect its wheels. Its deadly payload, also covered by a plastic tarp, can be seen on the back of the vehicle, which has been 'camouflaged' by the addition of several tree branches. The black painted VBIED on the right received slat armour on the front of the vehicle in addition to plated armour elsewhere.  Four headlights have been mounted somewhat clumsily on the front row of the slat armour. In fact, although attacking in broad daylight, almost all vehicles can be seen with headlights, likely because movement to the operational zone happens by night. An armoured bulldozer can be seen behind the two VBIEDs, which would also feature in the attack.


Next at 1:31 is the departure of Abu Ridhwan's up-armoured M1114, which has been converted to hold an armoured cabin over its original body. This cabin is large enough to hold three occupants, their weaponry and ammunition and a pintle-mounted machine gun. Two of such converted vehicles would take part in the attack. Although the other vehicle boasts a Chinese 12.7mm W85 heavy machine gun, the vehicle of Abu Ridhwan is not equipped with a heavy machine gun, and has to do with a German 7.62mm MG3, which is manned by Abu Hajaar, seen on the right in the image below. Abu Ridhwan's M1114 is crewed by a total of five people including: Khattab (Driver), Abu Hajaar (MG3 gunner), Abu Abdullah (RPG gunner), Abu Ridhwan (Commander, reloader and 7.62mm 'al-Quds' RPK gunner) and Walid (AKM gunner) occupying the front seat.

As an armoured panel blocks our view of the front seats, the faces of Khattab and Walid aren't seen throughout the video. Of Abu Hajaar, Abu Abdullah and Abu Ridhwan, only the latter appears to have any kind of combat experience. Both Abu Hajaar and Abu Abdullah's performance is rather unimpressive, and in a certain sense almost comedic.

The new cabin of the M1114 was well protected by its slat armour and additional metal plating in combined with the vehicle's original armour. To allow the cabin crew of three to sit during the ride to the battlefield, the cabin has been covered with foam and seatbelts were installed.



The other M1114 almost identical to that of Abu Ridhwan but armed with a Chinese 12.7mm W85. This vehicle is not armed with slat armour however, and relies on its orginal armour and the somewhat peculiar additional metal plating. An opening has been made in the metal plating at the front of the vehicle, the purpose of which is unknown however.


At 1:43 Abu Ridhwan's GoPro records some of the unguided rockets that would be fired in advance of their attack. The impressive amount of 45 'Fath' unguided rockets (albeit with less impressive accuracy and destruction power) supplemented by a single 120mm mortar would be used to pound Peshmerga positions.



1:52 begins with the 'Storming Battalion's' march to the combat zone. It is likely that all four VBIEDs had already made their way to their targets by this time, of which at least two were destroyed before reaching their targets. Abu Ridhwan's vehicle is encircled in the second image below.


Apart from the two converted M1114s, the 'Storming Battalion' used several other converted vehicles in this battle, including another M1114, one U.S. M1117 ASV, one up-armoured bulldozer equipped with a heavy machine gun cupola, one up-armoured truck with an armoured cabin and a heavy machine gun cupola and several technicals with various amounts of DIY armour equipped with a range of different guns.



The battalion first starts to take fire at 2:00, when an RPG shot bounces off the ground slightly in front the other up-armoured M1114. Only seconds later, Abu Ridhwan optimistically begins to engage the entrenched Peshmerga with his 7.62mm al-Quds light machine gun from afar. After he's emptied his first magazine (and struggles to find a new one), Abu Hajaar then begins engaging the enemy with his 7.62mm MG3. This is where the first problems for the crew start to arise. As RPGs are designed to be operated right-handed, Abu Abdullah is standing on the right side of armoured cabin, with Abu Hajaar on the left and Abu Ridhwan in the back. Abu Hajaar's MG3 empties its belt links to the right side however, resulting in Abu Abdullah getting hit by these hot belt links flying through the cabin. He attempts to warn Abu Hajaar of this effect, which can only be stopped if he ceases firing the MG3 or turns it sideways, due to which he can no longer aim.


As the vehicle is closing in on Peshermerga positions, Abu Ridhwan and Abu Hajaar begin to engage a position on their left side. Abu Hajaar's MG3 is leaning on a thin piece of metal of the front of the cabin, which due to the blocking unfolded bipod gives little support to the MG3. Unsurprisingly given the poor support of the gun and bad handling by Abu Hajaar, his MG3 then falls off the railing and begins firing into the plating just below, causing bullets to fly through the cabin. Abu Ridhwan and Abu Abdullah then begin screaming 'Abu Hajaar' again, who continues firing in the meantime.




This is also when we receive the first glimpse of Abu Abdullah's RPG-7, for which he used both 85mm PG-7V anti-tank grenades and 40mm OG-7V fragmentation grenades for use against personnel. Indeed, all occupants are extremely well armed and equipped, carrying several magazines and reloads each. Furthermore, plenty of food and water is stored in the vehicle.

The next shot at 2:30 shows the up-armoured behemoth and the other up-armoured M1114 that was nearly hit only a minute before. One RPG gunner stands in the armoured cabin of the truck to aim his next shot.

This is also when Abu Abdullah has just fired his first OG-7V and asks for a reload, but forgets to mention whether he wants an AP or fragmentation round next and then begins looking towards the enemy positions again. Abu Ridhwan randomly grabs a round and gives it to Abu Abdullah, which fails to notice a round is being handed to him, leading to further frustation from Abu Ridhwan.



Abu Abdullah then makes the crucial mistake of asking Abu Hajaar to cover him while reloading, which unsurprisingly leads to another stream of hot shell casings hitting Abu Abdullah, which then bursts into anger with Abu Hajaar for not looking out.



Sensing the impending danger of Abu Abdullah firing off an RPG grenade, Abu Ridhwan warns him to watch out, followed by an instruction to change his position not to allow the backblast to fly into the small compartment. While he does change his position, the adjustment is not enough and the subsequent backblast damages Abu Ridhwan's camera.


The next shot shows one of the other up-armoured M1114s having been hit, disabled and set on fire,Abu Hajaar then continues firing towards the enemy positions and manages to fire into the cabin for a second time.


A specially modified Zavasta M70 is then used to fire rifle grenades towards Peshermerga positions as the crew gets closer to their entrenched position. The first two rifle grenades are deemed to be too tight a fit by Abu Abdullah, a result of their crude DIY design, and while the third fits more readily, the slow fuse won't ignite. In the end, Abu Ridhwan attempts to light it again himself, but it seems doubtful the rifle grenade will have functioned properly.




In the theme of the 16th of December clearly not being Abu Hajaar's day, he almost gets hit by Abu Ridhwan's rifle grenade as he fires it towards the Peshmerga.



Abu Ridhwan and Abu Abdullah then have trouble agreeing on what RPG round to take, with Abu Abdullah insisting he needs a fragmentation round. Abu Ridhwan then gives him an AT round, which he attempts to launch with the safety cap still on. The vehicle has meanwhile stopped driving (possibly because Khattab the driver has been shot), providing an easy target for the Peshmerga forces.

Indeed, before having the chance to fire his RPG, the vehicle gets hit by (presumably) an RPG itself, and if the driver was still alive until this point, moments later he certainly is not. While escaping the vehicle through the back, a fourth person can be seen laying on the ground, likely Walid which sat next to Khattab. Abu Ridhwan continues firing on the Peshmerga with his al-Quds light machine gun, taking cover behind the now useless M1114.






A disorganised retreat ensues. While Abu Abdullah and Abu Hajaar make their way across the open fields by rolling sideways through the dirt in order to maintain a low profile, Abu Ridhwan makes a run for it and is shot after stopping for a moment. The four remaining fighters attempt to return fire for a while, and Abu Abdullah is seen running back to the M1114 whilst firing at random in a suicidal last ditch effort to make something of the situation. Abu Ridhwan and continues retreating (this time adopting the sideways roll employed by his fellow fighters) but is ultimately killed nonetheless.


The footage shot by Kurdistan24 shows the aftermath of the attack, including much of the destroyed armour after having being towed closer to Peshmerga positions by an armoured bulldozer. First off is one of the VBIEDs, which has been disabled before being able to detonate its deadly load. More interesting however is the vehicle parked behind this VBIED, as this up-armoured M1114 is in fact the vehicle of Abu Ridhwan.







Also seen again is the armoured bulldozer, which apparently got stuck in the ditch that would have prevented vehicles of the Islamic State from ever reaching Peshmerga positions in the first place. The armoured cabin of the bulldozer appears to have been hit, after which the vehicle was rendered inoperable or simply abandoned.



Although not seen during the attack itself, the remains of a U.S. M1117 Armoured Security Vehicle (ASV) can also be seen. This vehicle, armed with a single 40mm Mk.19 grenade launcher and 12.7mm M2 Browning heavy machine gun, has been completely obliterated by Peshmerga fire or perhaps an airstrike, tearing the hull to shreds and leaving little more than a carcass behind.The remains of another unidentified vehicle can be seen shortly after.



Another truck-based behemoth used during the assault (visible in VICE's video at 2:31) can be seen below, carrying the serial number '201' and the seal of 'Storming Battalion'. Note the ladders mounted on the side of the vehicle, likely there for scaling the trenches or climbing up fortified Peshmerga positions.















In the end, the attack paints a clear picture of the result any poorly planned offensive against a dug in adversary will attain. No amount of DIY monstrosities or VBIEDs will make up for this strategic disadvantage, and the stumbling and fumbling of the unexperienced Islamic State fighters before their inevitable death should be a clear sign these tactics will accomplish little. For the time being, it appears the Islamic State remains capable of producing more AFVs and willing to sacrifice lives to keep up such pointless assaults, and thus the Peshmerga front North of Mosul is likely to continue to be the scene of fierce fighting and ever more grotesque DIY creations.

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Shaer gas field, three words that must strike fear into the head of any National Defence Force (NDF) member without any active assignment in Syria. Being stationed at Shaer guarantees heavy action, frequent Islamic State attacks and unfortunately for many drafted recruits, death. The capture of Shaer by the Islamic State on the 5th of May 2016 is the third time that its fighters gained control of the gas field. Shaer and its surrounding checkpoints were under heavy attack since the first of May, and its defenders were ultimately defeated on the 5th of May. The ghaneema (spoils of war) is said to have amounted to no less than twenty T-55s and T-62s, nine howitzers and field guns, ATGMs and a large number of small arms and associated ammunition.

The capture of Shaer stands symbol for a situation that so often happens throughout regime-controlled Syria: Opposing forces overrun poorly trained conscripts defending a location which is massively overstocked with arms, forcing a well-trained and motivated Syrian Arab Army (SyAA) formation to abandon its current offensive in order to recapture the important location that has just been lost, resulting in another stalled offensive or even further terrain loss due to the mass departure of troops. This task is often given to Suheil 'The Tiger' al-Hassan along with his Tiger Force, which was behind the previous two offensives to retake Shaer gas field and will undoubtedly be tasked with recapturing it for a third time again.

While it is not uncommon for places to switch hands several times during the course of the war, losing such an important location three times in just over two years is shocking to say the least. The concentration of armour and artillery both in Shaer and the surrounding checkpoints have always been massive, and should in theory be more than capable of handling the infantry focused tactics empoyed by the Islamic State. A total of thirteen checkpoints were believed to have been set up around Shaer, most with its own armour support or even artillery support. While a suprise Islamic State attack on either one of these checkpoints is incredibly likely to succeed, this puts its fighters within firing range of tanks and artillery stationed at other checkpoints nearby. Indeed, artillery could play a decisive role in keeping fighters of the Islamic State at bay and denying large troop concentrations, especially when assisted by UAVs.

While the concentration of artillery this time around was inferior to the previous defenders, which could call on 122mm 2S1 Gvozdika self-propelled howitzers and 122mm BM-21 Grad MRLs, it still boosted up to nine 122mm D-30 howitzers and 130mm M-46 field guns, two of which have been visually confirmed by footage of Shaer. While these howitzers and field guns thus could prove a valuable asset in the hands of the defenders, one of the two 122mm D-30 howitzers seen in Islamic State released footage was simply dumped into a corner of its base. In fact, both howitzers were in travel mode, and for one gun this likely indicates that is was left untouched after its arrival at Shaer. The same applied for the single 57mm AZP S-60, also in travel position with its associated ammuntion neatly packed behind the anti-aircraft gun.



While it only appears logical to blame the defenders for their failure to propely deploy the equipment assigned to them, the situation is slightly more complicated. While an inspection of the area and its terrain that is to be defended to see what weapon system is needed and where it needs to be placed sounds logical, the distribution of military hardware is often random and does not take into account the limits of the defenders. For example, artillery can be stationed at a location extremely close to the frontline, or worse, stationed at a location where none of the defenders are capable of operating artillery in the first place. This has led to situations were artillery and anti-aircraft guns were simply dumped into a corner or even outside the perimeter of the base due to a lack of manpower to operate them, the defending troops being incapable of operating sophisticating equipment or a lack of suitable terrain and space to deploy these systems.

While the situation is certainly better with self-propelled artillery and armoured fighting vehicles, as these always come with their own crew, these create another major problem however. As the SyAA was deprived of most of its combat power, its tanks stopped operating in pre-exisiting units (or what was left of them after years of fighting and defections) and were instead individually attached to various NDF units or worse, attached to defend locations such as Shaer. As a result, NDF detachments often consist of 'a tank from this brigade, an artillery gun from this regiment, a conscript from Damascus, a conscript from Aleppo and so on'. This results in units which in fact consist of several individual components, which all received their training elsewhere, rather than a well-oiled machine. This is then further worsened by the composition of personnel in many of these units. While some NDF units consist of conscripts and volunteers from the same town or neighbourhood, most units are made up by personnel with other religions and personal motivations, resulting in distrust among its members. Personal motivations for joining the NDF can range to anything from defending one's town to the need to earn money for one's family to having been drafted after walking by a regime checkpoint at the wrong time, put onto a bus and sent to a military base nearby for training.

The fact that such poorly trained, yet overstocked with arms, units remain responsible for protecting highly important locations highlights the chronic shortage of (well trained and motivated) manpower on the side of the regime. A larger influx of Shiite fighters deployed by Iran can only partially solve this issue, which is unlikely to be ever completely resolved.





While the Islamic State was quick to claim that it had captured twenty T-55s and T-62s, nine howitzers and field guns, ATGMs and a large number of small arms and associated ammunition, images and footage of Shaer and its surrounding checkpoints have so far shown the capture of far less equipment. As the previous NDF detachments defending Shaer could also count on around twenty armoured fighting vehicles, the lack of footage could be due to the large amounts of checkpoints captured on the vast size of the terrain that is Shaer.

The heavy armament seen in footage and images included one T-62 Model 1972, two T-55As (one of which upgraded with the addition of a North Korean laser rangefinder) and one BMP-1. All tanks were captured intact, with the image of the first T-55A indicating this tank took part in defending Shaer but was later abandoned by its operators.




Although claiming to have captured nine artillery pieces, the Islamic State only showed off two 122mm D-30 howitzers in its footage. The claim of capturing a single 57mm AZP S-60 was however, confirmed.



The amount of vehicles found left behind at Shaer was substantial, and included at least twelve technicals and four trucks. All 14.5mm KPV guns, at least six of which found, were removed from the technicals by the fighters of the Islamic State however, likely indicating that not all technicals are to be taken with them. The ZPU-4 armed Isuzu gun truck lost all of its 14.5mm barrels in a similar fashion.



Also captured was a single KamAZ 5350, a truck recently delivered to Syria by Russia. While the rebels and the Islamic State already destroyed several of those trucks, they never managed to capture any examples intact.

The defenders used several gun emplacements up-armoured with metal plating in a bid to protect the operator. Mounted on a truck to be taken away further into Islamic State held territory, this 23mm ZU-23 also lost both of its barrels.

While the Islamic State claimed to have captured both 9M133 Kornets and 9M113 Konkurs anti-tank guided missiles (ATGMs), a single 9M133 and one 9M14M Malyutka were the only captured ATGMs shown.


Footage of captured small arms was limited to seven AK(Ms) and two RPG-7s along with associated ammunition. The large but empty crate seen below is more interesting however, as this once used to hold Chinese 120mm rocket assisted projectiles (RAP). An impressive 165 of such rounds were previously captured by fighters of the Islamic State at Ayyash on the 20th of January 2016.


One of the facilities at Shaer functioned as weapon depot, and the dozens of bullet holes indicate the history of the facility in the past two years. 242 crates containing a total of 484 cans for 12.7mm and 14.5mm ammunition, 41 crates of 120mm ammunition for a total of 82 120mm rounds, 18 crates of 7.62x39 and 7.62x54 ammunition, for a total of 1320 rounds per crate for x39, 880 for x54 and another 209 unidentied crates were among the spoils found at Shaer and surrounding checkpoints. Quickly loaded on trucks, these too are likely to have been moved further into Islamic State held territory for distribution to other fronts.





While Shaer will undoubtedly be recaptured in the coming months, it represents the current situation so often seen throughout Syria. With no offensive on Deir ez-Zor or Raqqa in sight, and with the Islamic State still in control of large swaths of lands, this situation will undoubtedly continue for the time being. With the gas production at Shaer for regime-held Syria likely to continue, the capture of this strategic gas field will prove to be more than a propaganda victory and major arms haul, yielding a significant financial benefit as well.

Article written in collaboration with MENA_Conflict from Type 63: A collection of Musings on Middle East Conflict.

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Just six days after the release of the now infamous footage showing fighters of the Islamic State fighting, failing and getting killed while storming Peshmerga positions North of Mosul, the Islamic State made another attempt at taking Peshmerga positionson the 3rd of May 2016 near the Assyrian town of Tesqopa (or Telskuf, Tel Eskof, Tel Asqof or Tel Asqaf in Arabic). The result of this attack received worldwide attention as the resulting battle saw the death of a U.S. serviceman stationed there as part of Navy SEAL unit sent to protect this part of Iraq from further Islamic State attacks.

As was the case with the attack on the 16th of December 2015 near Naweran, the Islamic State published its own images taken both prior and during the attack. This has again led to the strange situation where defending Peshmerga troops publish images of killed Islamic State fighters first, followed by an Islamic State photo report showing these exact same soldiers very much alive while preparing for battleshortly after. The results of the battle, and the fact that most of the Islamic State contingent was wiped out, makes it unlikely any Islamic State video covering the attack will every be released.

Contrary to similar offensives conducted by the Islamic State North of Mosul, often featuring its fighters operating in junction with heavily modified armoured fighting vehicles (AFVs), the initial phase of the assault on Telskuf was actually successful. Not only did the Islamic State breach the defenders' positions on several fronts, its fighters also managed to enter and take control of large parts of the town. This is where their success story ends however, as a counterattack carried out by Peshmerga forces and U.S. Navy Seals with heavy U.S. air support annihilated the Islamic State's armoured fighting vehicles and troop concentrations, allowing Peshmerga troops to retake the town as quickly as it was lost. The last pockets of remaining Islamic State fighters hiding in the town were said to have been cleared later the same day.


The attack on Telskuf was spearheaded by the 'Storming Battalion - Abu Laith al-Ansari's Sector', further supported by at least ten vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (VBIEDs) from the 'Suicide Battalion'. Interestingly, the 'Storming Battalion' designates its formations as 'Sectors', each 'Sector' being responsible for operating in its designated area. The formation leading the attack on Telskuf was named in honour of the former Wali of Mosul Abu Laith al-Ansari, which was killed by a U.S. airstrike back in November 2014. Several military formations would be named after him, including the Abu Laith al-Ansari Brigade. The 'Storming Battalion' was also responsible for the failed offensive near Naweran, involving the crew of Abu Ridhwan and the now infamous Abu Hajaar. The 'Sector' responsible for the attack remains unknown however. No major attacks like these are believed to have taken place since the offensive near Naweran in December 2015, which should have given the 'Storming Battalion' plenty of time to rethink their strategy.

The major problems encountered during (previous) 'Storming Battalion' attacks North of Mosul were serious enough to deter any military force from carrying out such attacks in the first place. But with plenty of armoured fighting vehicles and fighters to spare, the Islamic State apparently does see these attacks as justifiable. The major obstacle the 'Storming Battalion' usually runs into are the well-fortified Peshmerga positions they are intend to capture. These positions, often located on the high-ground, forces the armoured fighting vehicles to drive through open fields while fully exposed to RPG, ATGM and tank fire from the Peshmerga. With most of the vehicles already knocked out by the tme they arive here, those remaining are then blocked by a huge trench often surrounding Peshmerga positions, which can only be crossed by bridgelayer or by filling it with dirt. While all of this is going on, the US-led coalition is often already present over the battlefield, striking the attackers with its aircraft and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs).

While Wilayat Ninawa (Mosul) scores best among all Wilayats of the Islamic State when it comes to air defence, the anti-aircraft artillery it operates is only of real use against low-flying helicopters and slow-flying aircraft. The speed of fast jets and the height they're flying at makes it extremely unlikely any will ever get hit over the skies of Iraq and Syria. Interestingly, the Islamic State set up an independent battalion for air defence tasks in Wilayat Ninawa. The 'Wilayat Air Defence Battalion' was first paraded through Mosul back in March 2015 and again made an appearance when it was shown trying to bring down U.S. (E)P-3s used for intelligence gathering and electronic warfare over Mosul by using 122mm D-30 howitzers.

But instead of assigning the 'Wilayat Air Defence Battalion's assests to the 'Storming Battalion' as they go out on their mission, the 'Storming Battalion' is responsible for its own air defence. During the past attacks, including the one near Telskuf, this has meant that air defences consisted of nothing more than 14.5mm and single-barreled 23mmanti-aircraft guns installed on pickup trucks. While the anti-aircraft guns of the 'Wilayat Air Defence Battalion' are unlikely to bring down any fast jets, it could at least deter coalition aircraft with its heavier 37mm, 57mm and 122mm (anti-aircraft) guns.





The strength of the 'Storming Battalion' during the attack on Telskuf is said to have consisted of more than 300 fighters supported by several dozens of up-armoured AFVs and pickup trucks. The remains of least 154 Islamic State fighters were counted as of the 6th of May 2016, with at least 25 AFVs and pickup trucks confirmed to have been destroyed or captured. In return, the Peshmerga lost at least ten fighters (but likely more) and one U.S. Navy Seal was also killed in action when an RPG hit the armoured SUV he was sitting in. Ten to fifteen Navy Seals were believed to have been present during the counter-offensive, footage of which can be seen here. The casulties among the Assyrian militia also defending the town are unknown.

In typical fashion, the attack was preluded by a barrage of artillery and mortar fire on defensive positions around the town. The first wave of VBIEDs from the 'Suicide Battalion' followed about an hour later, clearing the way for the first elements of the 'Storming Battalion' which arrived soon after. The attack was said to have come from at least three, possibly four directions, with more than ten VBIEDs being used in total. Apart from using bulldozers to fill trenches with sand to allow vehicles to cross, the 'Storming Battalion' now also employed a dedicated bridgelayer. This vehicle was not seen in any footage however, making it unknown if a real armoured vehicle-launched bridge (AVLB) captured in Mosul or a DIY contraption was used for this task. To give a clear indication of the width of some of these trenches, the main trench around Naweran with an up-armoured 'Storming Battalion' bulldozer on the right can be seen below. This bulldozer was to fill the huge trench with sand while under heavy fire from Peshmerga positions nearby and unsurprisingly was knocked out before completing its task.

Faced with a nummerically superior enemy, the defenders made the choice to retreat rather than defend their positions to the last bullet. Their organised retreat allowed them to reorganise on the outskirts of Telskuf and then counterattack with U.S. ground and air support. This decision paid off hugely, and limited the casualties on the side of the Peshmerga. If the defenders were to remain in the town, they would undoubtedly have been beaten back by the superior numbers of the 'Storming Battalion'. The ensuing fight would also have taken place in Telskuf itself, which would have been thoroughly wrecked by U.S. airstrikes as a result. Instead, the 'Storming Battalion' advanced further into Peshmerga held territory after capturing large parts of the town, exposing itself to the U.S. airstrikes in open ground, leading to huge losses on their side. The remains of an Islamic State convoy, including a single M1114 and several pickup trucks, can be seen below.




The armoured fighting vehicles of the 'Storming Battalion' were externally similar to those used in the attack on Naweran on the 16th of December 2015. The photo report released by the Islamic State covered the main assault group, which was better equipped than the other groups who took part in the offensive. The composition of AFVs of the main assault group was roughly the same as that of the group that assaulted Naweran, this time consisting of one up-armoured MT-LB, at least five up-armoured M1114s, several Badger ILAVs and armed pickup trucks.

Several 'improvements' over previous iterations of the M1114s are apparent, all now boasting angled armour to better protect the front of the vehicle against large-calibre machine guns and RPGs. A hatch for better access to the engine was also cut out in the front. Interestingly, at least two of the M1114s sported firing ports for assault rifles or light-machine gun in use with the crew, the lack of which proved 'unfavourable' during the attack on Naweran. The firing port in the front right side window was retained, allowing an additional gunner to sit in the front. The M1114's doors on at least one of the vehicles were replaced by DIY armoured doors. In common with previous versions, all up-armoured M1114s featured a cabin over the body of the vehicle, allowing for the carriage of up to three fighters. At least one vehicle was armed with a Chinese 12.7mm W85 heavy machine gun, also seen during the attack on Naweran on two of the 'Storming Battalion's' vehicles.

In typical DIY fashion, none of the vehicles are exactly the same. Confusingly, some of the vehicles were painted in black, a colour normally seen on AFVs operated by the 'Shield Battalion'. The black-painted AFVs participating in the assault on Telskuf were all believed to have been subordinate to the 'Storming Battalion' however, which normally camouflages its vehicles with colours more adaptive to the local terrain. Two of the up-armoured M1114s that participated in the attack on Telskuf can be seen in the image below, with one of the M1114s used during the assault on Naweran seen in the bottom for comparison.



Another image shows the same row of vehicles but now photographed from the other side. The vehicle seen next to four Islamic State fighters in front is the up-armoured MT-LB, which would later be captured intact by the Peshmerga. Both of the M1114s visible come with a ladder inside their compartment to allow the crew to storm Peshmerga positions located on high ground. Two of the VBIEDs of the 'Suicide Battalion' can be seen on the right. These vehicles, always painted in black, are often serialled, the vehicle on the right being '502'. The image at the bottom shows another three VBIEDs, the vehicle in front serialled '1004'. One of the VBIEDs failed to detonate its deadly load and was later captured intact.





Having access to the large amount of equipment and gear the Iraqi Army left behind as they fled Mosul, the soldiers of the 'Storming Battalion' are among the best-equipped fighters of the Islamic State. Therelatively sophisticated weaponry and large amounts of munition they bring with them don't make up for a lack of training and combat experience however, which became painfully clear during the attack on Naweran, involving the likes of Abu Hajaar and Abu Abdullah.



While the 'Storming Battalion' thus managed to achieve its initial objective, it was soon left to the mercy of the F-15Es and A-10s from the U.S. Air Force and AH-64 Apaches from the U.S. Army. Two UH-60 Blackhawks also participated to retrieve the body of the U.S. Navy Seal that was killed in action. Unable to defend itself against aerial attacks, the whole 'Storming Battalion' contingent was then wiped out in open ground, with the crews of some vehicles leaving their vehicles and fleeing the scene.








The next image shows one of the 14.5mm KPV armed pickups firing against U.S. aircraft. The installation of the 14.5mm KPV allows the gunner to only fire one shot at the time, making this weapon practially useless against anything but ground targets. This particular pickup was part of a convoy that was later hit by an airstrike while on the main road of Telskuf, resulting in the destruction of the vehicle.











A 'pickup of the 'Storming Battalion' captured by Peshmerga forces. The seal, present on most vehicles operated by armoured formations operating out of Mosul, reads: Wilayat Ninawa- The Soldiers Storming Battalion - Abu Laith al-Ansari's Sector. A brightly painted Islamic State operated M1114 after being captured by the Peshmerga can be seen in the bottommost image.





The main spoils were later displayed in the town itself, including some of the vehicles that participated in the attack. The up-armoured MT-LB can be seen on the right, next to another up-armoured M1114. The bottommost image shows another Tabuk (Zastava M70) rifle converted to fire DIY rifle grenades. This weapon was used by Abu Ridhwan in the video published by VICE, and now appears to have been fitted with a handgrip for better aiming.




One of the 'Storming Battalion's' up-armoured M1114s wrecked after the failed offensivecan be seen below. This image clearly shows the professional-looking armoured cabin, complete with two firing ports in front and two viewing ports on the side. The firing port of the gunner sitting next to the driver can be seen in the bottommost image. Although this exampleis very similar to one of the M1114s seen in the images above, the vehicle is slightly different in certain details.






While previous attacks resulted in defeat after defeat, this attack is believed to have been the first of its kind to have proven succesful during its initial stage. The DIY modifications to the Islamic State's vehicle park and the tactics employed by these vehicles showed that at least some lessons were learned from their previous failures. However, the presence of coalition airpower over the plains of Iraq prevents the Islamic State from using armoured fighting vehicles to their full advantage. While the initial phase of this attack can be deemed a success, the resulting defeat due to U.S. airstrikes makes this attack nothing less than a waste of men and materiel in the end.

The past two years have shown that advancing beyond the currently-held territory North of Mosul is not possible. Even when successfully overrunning Peshmerga positions, coalition airpower will always be decisive in this region of Iraq. The Islamic State can throw everything it has into battle, it can use tactics not seen before and ever more advanced DIY AFVs, but it won't be able to counter the guided-bombs and missiles launched at them. The fact that the Islamic State's military leadership in Mosul has so far failed acknowledge this has once again resulted in the death of roughly 150 fighters (as well as the loss of a significant amount of equipment), and as the situation in Western Iraq appears to be anything but poised to change anytime soon, further offensives and large losses of life are to be expected in the future.

Images two and twenty-two by Operation Valhalla.

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While many of our posts have been devoted to the MENA's attempts to locally 'improve' its armour, we have never touched upon on the YPG's DIY armour upgrades. Not that there has been a lack of DIY armour upgrades coming from Northern Syria, but mainly because these local conversions were often so hideous we'd rather continue the trend of leaving other sites to cover them.Nonetheless, there have been a number of interesting projects coming from the YPG-held territory lately, which will be covered in this post.

Carrying out the YPG's armour upgrades is the responsibility of two major armour workshops located in Afrin, Aleppo Governorate (Afrin Canton) and the Hasakah Governorate, the latter of which is supported by several smaller workshops located throughout the Hasakah Governorate. Interestingly, this closely mirrors the Islamic State's methods in Syria, which also established two major armour workshops further supported by several smaller workshops elsewhere in Islamic State held territory.

But compared to other major factions involved in the Syrian Civil War, the YPG (Yekîneyên Parastina Gel - People's Protection Units) is the least rich in armour. To compensate for this gap in its capabilities, the YPG became very active in the production of  DIY armoured vehicles, usually based on tractors or trucks. For true armour, the YPG is reliant on vehicles captured from the Islamic State, vehicles left behind by the Syrian Arab Army (SyAA) and equipment turned over by the SyAA in return for a save passage (for example after retreating from Mennagh airbase in 2014). The latter provided the YPG with three T-72 'Urals' and one T-55A, a major haul for the YPG. But apart from just operating its captured vehicles in their initial configuration, the YPG also performs upgrades on most of its armour. From simple things like replacing barrels of a ZSU-23 with those of a ZU-23 to producing complete armour packages, the YPG has done it all.

By taking over former SyAA bases, the YPG also gained a limited number of BTR-60s decommissioned from service shortly before the start of the civil war. Sometimes used as a static pillbox by the defenders, most of these vehicles were left to rot in various corners of the base by the SyAA. Because repairing these vehicles, almost all suffering from flat tires, was not worth the effort in the eyes of many of their other capturers, the YPG quickly became the largest operator of operational BTR-60s in Syria.

At least two of these BTR-60s were then upgraded by the addition of additional armour around the body of the vehicle and by the addition of skirts and mudguards covering the tires. Interestingly, one example uses a 12.7mm DShK as a replacement for the 14.5mm KPVT normally present in the BTR-60's turret. This vehicle, seen below, also received a new engine (as can be witnessed by the presence of a bulge in this location), likely because the original engine was damaged beyond repair.  Unfortunately for the YPG, after the intensive effort it put in upgrading this vehicle, it got stuck in a ditch while fleeing from an Islamic State attack in the Hasakah Governorate, during which an upgraded BMP-1 was also captured. The crew removed the 12.7mm DShK before abandoning the vehicle however, denying the enemy valuable ghaneema (spoils of war).






Another rarity that serves with the YPG is the MT-LB multi-purpose armoured vehicle, of which only six have so far been documented in Syria. Two are in service with the Islamic State in the Deir ez-Zor Governorate while the other four are used by the YPG in the Hasakah Governorate. All six examples came from Iraq, where the Islamic State captured them from the Iraqi Army. Although Syria acquired nearly any armoured fighting vehicle (AFV) available for export from the Soviet Union, it never acquired the MT-LB. The YPG-operated examples were already believed to be in Kurdish hands before the start of the Syrian Civil War.

Interestingly, the MT-LB seen below was one of the examples upgraded by the addition of wider tracks by Ba'athist Iraq. These vehicles are sometimes designated as MT-LBVs. Two of the YPG's MT-LBs can be seen in the row of AFVs on the bottommost image, which also includes two T-55s upgraded by the addition of a gunshield, stowage boxes and mudguards and one armoured earthmover equipped with the turret of a BMP-1 infantry fighting vehicle (IFV).







Opposed to the Afrin Canton, which has to do with just one T-55, YPG forces in the Hasakah Governorate now operate a respectable amount of T-55s captured from mainly the Islamic State. While some are immediately employed on the battlefield by the YPG, most T-55s get sent to Hasakah's workshops for overhauling and upgrading. The extent of these upgrades vary on every tank, which likely has to do with the state the tank is in: Tanks that require relatively little work are more likely to be sent back to the front as quick as possible.

Most of these upgrades are comprised of the addition of a gunshield for the loader-operated 12.7 mm DShK, new stowage boxes, new mudguards and a fresh coat of paint, resulting in plenty of colourful T-55s on the battlefield of Northern Syria. At least one T-55 has also been upgraded by the addition of slat armour to the sides of the tank, once again showing the improvised nature of these armour upgrades.






Not all AFVs captured on the battlefield are completely salvageable however. A damaged turret or a lack of traditional means to replace defective parts can result in a tank that is still able to drive, yet is completely useless in its intended role due to its defective armament. While in Syria this more than often means that the tank will be written off, the YPG generally refuses to let these scarce armoured platforms go to waste, and DIY light turrets are a common occurrence on YPG vehicles as a result.

Two such examples based on T-55s equipped with a 12.7mm W85 and 2x 14.5mm KPVs as well as two BMP-1s that had their 73mm 2A28 Grom turret replaced by one containing a 12.7mm DShK have been spotted so far. This resulted in a vehicle with extremely similar looks to that of the Czechoslovak OT-90 APC, which is equipped with the turret of an OT-64A, armed with a single 14.5mm KPVT and a single 7.62mm PKT. Curiously, the second BMP-1 features another light turret on the rear, which has yet to be fitted with any weaponry.


In order to accommodate the first T-55 to its new turret, the original one was removed and the turret ring gap welded shut so a smaller cupola could take its place. Also of interest is the vehicle's bow armour, which has been reinforced resulting in an even more sloped front than before. Lastly, a stowage box has been added to the rear of the tank. This vehicle was seen in a VICE documentary covering foreign fighters that joined the YPG and also in a training video where its new machine gun turret was being tested.


Another image of the same vehicle can be seen below, this time next to one of the YPG's M1117 Armored Security Vehicles (ASV) it operates in Syria. Several of these vehicles were taken over from the Iraqi Army while others were captured from the Islamic State and subsequently transferred to Syria for use by the YPG. This particular M1117 has been armed with a single 14.5mm KPV in a rudimentary turret and has been up-armoured by the addition of metal plating to protect the gunner and skirts to protect the wheels.

The second T-55 based AFV was first seen in the al-Shaddadi offensive last February, where it featured alongside several 'true' T-55s. This offensive was aimed at capturing the remainder of the Hasakah Governorate and the town of al-Shaddadi from the fighters of the Islamic State, and was successfully concluded in a week.

Although clearly based on the version seen above, the second example features several modifications over the previous iteration, most notably a new and larger turret. Interestingly, this turret looks extremely familiar to that of the North Korean 323 APC. Its actual origin is less exotic however, as similar looking turrets were already seen on earlier DIY AFVs produced by the YPG.^[1][2]

The new turrets now boosts two 14.5mm KPVs instead of a single 12.7mm DShK. This, along with the addition of side skirts and a radio antenna are the only visible external differences. A camouflage pattern instead of the black finish on the first example was also introduced, a welcome change when operating in the lush area around al-Shaddadi.











The armour situation in the Afrin Canton is even more critical, where the YPG operated no AFVs until the fall of Mennagh airbase, after which they received three T-72 Urals, one T-55A with DPRK LRF and later one BMP-1. These were also subsequently upgraded to various degrees, and recently saw use in YPG's offensive against the Free Syrian Army in Northern Aleppo. Currently two T-72 Urals, the T-55A and BMP-1 as well as a newly captured T-62 which will likely be upgraded in the near future remain in YPG hands here.

The single BMP-1 present in the Afrin Canton was upgraded by the addition of additional armour and unsurprisingly, stowage boxes. The new armour is comprised of additional plating covering the engine deck, further supported by slat armour on the front of the vehicle. The turret also received an additional layer of armour, resulting in similar looks to the 'Kovriki' armour seen on later-generation BMP-2s. The addition of sideskirts and a stowage box on the side of the vehicle make the vehicle surprisingly similar to the Ba'athist Iraqi BMP-1 'Saddam'.








Also handed over by the SyAA and subsequently upgraded by the YPG was a T-55A, one of the examples that was upgraded by the North Koreans decades ago. This T-55A was part of the convoy that fled Mennagh for Kurdish held territory, where the tanks were subsequently handed over to the YPG. This example, the only T-55 to operate in the Afrin Canton, received new mudguards, sides kirts, stowage boxes, camouflage and slat armour protecting the rear of the tank.


Even the YPG's most important AFV assets receive a variety of upgrades. All three of the T-72 Urals operated in the Afrin Canton were upgraded, and two received a complete cage of slat and spaced armour to enhance their protection against shaped charge warheads, comparable to the kits created by the Republican Guard and Islamic State. At least two of the T-72s appear to have been crewed entirely by females.

The first, which can be seen below, appears to make do with slat armour on the rear only, as well as the addition of side skirts.The other two feature mostly identical slat and spaced armour upgrades all around the turret and hull, and can only be distinguished by their camouflage and the fact that on one example the IR searchlight was damaged and replaced by three regular truck lamps bundled together.







Unfortunately for the YPG, one of these upgraded T-72s was destroyed by a TOW ATGM fired by the Free Syrian Army on the 29th of March 2016. The TOW penetrated the vehicle and caused the 125mm main gun to fire, indicating the tank has indeed been destroyed. At least one crewmember was seen moving around the tank shortly before impact, but the two others were believed to be present inside the tank at the time of impact and were undoubtedly KIA.



With practically all factions waging war in Syria now having committed themselves to upgrading various types of armoured fighting vehicles to increase their survivability, and with little chance of foreign supplies of large numbers of AFVs in the near future, the Syrian battlefields are rapidly transformed into the birthing grounds of ever more wild contraptions. The YPG's contributions in this area, while formerly mostly limited to outlandish DIY monstrosities, are now swiftly increasing in significance, and have secured their rightful place amongst the plethora of DIY projects out there.

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The Sudanese Air Force has had a turbulent history ever since its founding in January 1956, the year that the Sudan gained independence from the British. Originally trained and equipped by Egyptians and the British, it acquired aircraft and helicopters from the Soviet Union in the late 1960s, followed by Chinese examples several years later. The Sudanese Air Force (SuAF) then sought to purchase aircraft from France, but ended up acquiring U.S. F-5Es and C-130s. In the late 1980s it began receiving military aid in the form of aircraft and helicopters from Libya, followed by the delivery of more Chinese aircraft shortly after, which would continue to deliver aircraft in the last two decades. In more recent years the SuAF's core is made up by aircraft acquired from Belarus, Russia and unsurprisingly, China. This is not all however, as the SuAF also operates or used to operate aircraft sourced from a variety of countries such as Germany, Switzerland, the Netherlands and Canada.

While operating such a diverse fleet of aircraft ranging from several sources is already a logistical and financial nightmare, the political instability in Sudan during the 1960s to the early 1990s meant that Sudan frequently switched governments, all with different political orientations and thus different foreign policies. This meant the SuAF was unable to acquire spare parts for aircraft it had only recently acquired, resulting in decreased operational capability and eventually even the grounding of much of its fleet since its founding in 1956.

The Sudan has in recent decades enjoyed a more stable political and economical landscape, largely due to the discovery and large-scale exploitation of large oil reserves, allowing the country to purchase more advanced aircraft and equipment for the SuAF. Sudan also succeeded in establishing a facility that would allow it to overhaul certain types of aircraft and helicopters in the country itself with the aid of China, Iran, Russia and companies based in the United Arab Emirates (UAE). The Safat Maintenance Center (more commonly known as the Safat Aviaton Complex, part of the larger Safat Aviation Group) was first opened in 2004, and began work on overhauling its first aircraft in 2006.


While SAFAT initially almost exclusively relied on foreigners to perform overhauls on mainly Soviet aircraft and helicopters, increasing numbers of Sudanese have largely replaced other nationalities. Although SAFAT is now capable of independently overhauling several types of aircraft and helicopers, it still relies on the assistance of foreigners on most (major) projects however. The overhaul of Chinese aircraft sees heavy involvement of Chinese technicians, the overhaul and maintenance of Soviet-era aircraft is done with the assistance of mainly Russians and Ukrainians while Iran provides personnel and expertise on most other projects. In agreement with Ethiopia's Dejen Aviation Industry (Formerly known as DAVEC, Dejen Aviation Engineering Complex), Ethiopians aided SAFAT with overhauling its Soviet-era helicopters, transport aircraft and even MiG-23s, both in the Sudan and in Ethiopia. Nonetheless, the SuAF continues to send some of its aircraft and helicopters abroad for overhaul, indicating SAFAT is not yet able to cope with the demands of the SuAF. The images below provide a look into the helicopter maintenance hangar of SAFAT, showing Mi-24P '912' as well as four BO-105s in the background.









The sighting of these four BO-105s was the first indication the Sudan was working on bringing several examples of the type back to operational condition after years of being stored. Sudan had originally ordered twenty BO-105s from West Germany in 1977, which were all believed to have been delivered just a year later. At least twelve of these helicopters were destined for the Sudanese Police Force, with the other eight going to the SuAF at some point during their career. The examples operated by the police can easily be identified by their civilian paintjob, while BO-105s operated by the SuAF wore a camouflage pattern more adaptive to the Sudanese terrain.







While the BO-105s were brand new at the time of delivery, the Sudan plunged into an even deeper crisis in the early eighties, which began to take its toll on the SuAF and Sudanese military as a whole. The social unrest, the back-to-back wars and the political instability of the country would eventually result in another coup, bringing the current President Omar al-Bashir into power, which was quick to shift Sudan's alliance away from the West and towards Iran and Libya. This drastic shift meant that the SuAF was now unable to acquire spares for its fleet of Western aircraft however, resulting in the grounding of F-5s, C-130s and other aircraft over the next years. This also included the fleet of BO-105s, which were believed to have been flown only rarely during their short career. Most of the surviving airframes were then stored at the Sudanese Air Force's largest airbase, Wadi Sayyidna, which would likely become their final resting place.



With SAFAT's expertise growing, allowing it to service an increasing number of aircraft and helicopters (albeit with foreign help), SAFAT began to overhaul several types formerly operated by the SuAF of which it was once believed they would never fly again, including BO-105s. Four helicopters of this type, comprising three former SuAF mounts and one BO-105 operated by the police, were overhauled in 2012 with the assistance of the IHSRC (Iranian Helicopter Support and Renewal Company, commonly known as Panha), likely by cannibalising other airframes for spare parts or by acquiring these via the black market. The work on all four helicopters was believed to have been finished in late 2012 or early 2013, when four BO-105s were spotted on satellite imagery on the the tarmac outside one of SAFAT's maintenance hangers. These helicopers would continue to show up on satellite imagery here well into 2014, possibly indicating they were still undergoing test flights or were simply waiting for their handover to the SuAF. One of the now once again operational BO-105s can be seen below.







All of Sudan's BO-105s can be armed with rocket pods containing 28x 50mm SNIA rockets and gun pods with two 7.62mms, which can be seen in the image below. Of course, compared to dedicated gunships such as the Mi-24/35s also operated by the SuAF this weaponry amounts to very little.TheMi-24/35 has secured its position as the SuAF's primary gunship, and the type's ruggedness, range and payload makes it an ideal platform for the SuAF. The BO-105 is a completely different platform however, lacking the range and armour for effective use over the hostile battlefields of Sudan. It could instead be used as an armed reconnaissance helicopter or even handed over to the police for more peaceful duties.



While the BO-105s are unlikely to significantly bolster the Sudanese Air Force's capabilities, they can be brought back to flying condition with minimal effort, presenting the SuAF with at least another four helicopters. Perhaps more importantly, the rotarcraft also represent an important step for the Sudan, one that could allow the country to become even more self-reliant in overhauling aircraft and helicopters in the future.

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The regime's recent offensive against the Islamic State aimed at clearing large parts of desert in Syria's Raqqa Governorate of Islamic State presence took a drastic turn when a counter-attack spread chaos and fear among the forces spearheading the offensive. Completely misjudging the impending danger and incapable of properly anticipating the Islamic State's counter-attack, the offensive collapsed and instead of capturing large swaths of territory, the remaining regime forces were forced on the defensive, eventually being beaten all the way back to their starting point. The outcome of the offensive came as a surprise to many, not in the least because its exact goals remained unclear for some.

While some were quick to state the offensive was an attempt to capture the Islamic State's capital Raqqa or even to reach the besieged garrison in Deir ez-Zor, the actual goal of the offensive was to capture Tabqa airbase and from there to move on to the actual town of Tabqa itself. Much of the confusion originated from the unofficial name tied to the offensive: ''To Raqqa'', which actually meant this offensive was only the beginning of regime operations in the Governorate of Raqqa rather than directly capturing Raqqa itself. If the attempt at capturing Tabqa would have proved successful, this would have completely cut off the remaining road connections to the Islamic State from the outside world, and allowed the regime to use Tabqa as a staging base for future operations into the Islamic State's heartland. Thanks to the ambitious nature of the offensive, it could be seen as a gauge indicating the measure to which regime forces are capable of coordinating after the severe transformations it has been forced to undergo in the previous years. This is especially true after President Bashar al-Assad vowed to liberate 'Every Inch of Syria from Terrorism' in a speech adressed to Syria's parliament on the 7th of June, five days after the offensive had started.

The offensive appeared to have been timed perfectly to coincide with another major operation taking place against the Islamic State in Northern Syria. This offensive, carried out by the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), was aimed at capturing the town of Manbij and the nearby Manbij Pocket. Holding this region is absolutely crucial for the Islamic State, as losing it could also result in losing the last remaining road connection to Turkey. It was previously thought that the Islamic State would prove unable to commit sufficient forces to two entire different fronts so close to each other, but time would eventually show just how false this belief was.

While a successful conclusion of the offensive thus would have seriously hampered the Islamic State's capabilities to bring in supplies and foreign fighters via Turkey, not to mention the fact that cutting off the Islamic State's sole remaining road connection to Turkey in general would be a major propaganda victory for the regime, neither the current military situation on the ground nor the state of the regime's military allowed for such a zealous undertaking. In fact, one could argue that the very existence of this offensive in the first place rather than its catrastophic outcome is representative of the poor state of the regime and its armed forces.


The regime's intentions of taking the fight to the Islamic State rather than repelling and counter-attacking Islamic State offensives throughout Syria first became clear in early 2016, when the National Defence Force's (NDF) Golan Regiment arrived in the town of Ithiriya, from where the offensive would later be launched. The area around the town would see sporadic engagements aimed at testing the Islamic State's capabilities and willingness to defend this area in the months that followed. This would later prove a catrastophic miscalculation, as the initial situation encountered around Ithiriya was in no way representative of the Islamic State's true strength and willingness to defend this important location.

Due to the sheer length of the front the Islamic State currently has to defend against a variety of factions, it can't commit large numbers of fighters to a particular location. This is especially true for the area around Ithiriya, which due to the flat terrain and lack of easily defended obstacles (such as towns and oilfields) is nigh on impossible to defend. Concentrating large numbers of Islamic State fighters here would be senseless, as they wouldn't have any location to fall back to when routed, forcing them to flee into the open desert as easy targets for chasing regime forces.

Instead, the garrison deployed around Ithiriya, defending the crucial Ithiriya-Raqqa highway, only consisted of a small contingent of Islamic State fighters. This contingent was beaten back by the regime's first 'probing offensive' in February and March, which was halted after the Islamic State launched a diversionary attack near Khanasir. As the Syrian Arab Army (SyAA), National Defence Force and Shiite militias stationed here proved incapable of handling Khanasir alone, all effort went into defending and later recapturing lost positions around Khanasir, effectively ending operations near Ithiriya.



It was only during May 2016 when large numbers of regime forces started arriving in Ithiriya, ultimately said to be totalling up to 5000 soldiers, although the actual number is believed to be slightly lower. This is when the first major problem came into being. As the five-year long war has starved the regime's military of equipment, supplies but foremost manpower, gathering such a large amount of soldiers can nowadays only be achieved by pulling several brigades, regiments and militias together. These are then supposed to act as a unified army, but the past five years have shown us that such 'unified' formations are usually extremely inefficient in their operations.

This is only worsened by the decentralisation of the Syrian military into the National Defence Force (NDF) and dozens of other large and small militias nowadays responsible for regime operations throughout the country. The large numbers of soldiers that defected from the Syrian Arab Army (SyAA) and the sheer ineffectiveness of what remained led to the partial dissolvement of the SyAA. Although the SyAA remained in control of the many bases littered throughout Syria, much of its remaining offensive capabilities were stripped and subsequently handed over to the various militias, with the NDF receiving much of the manpower and equipment. This practically meant the end for Syria's once prestigious mechanised brigades, previously boasting up to 2500 tanks.

While transferring manpower and equipment to various militias that were deemed more trustworthy and loyal to the regime appeared logical at the time, it ended up creating a whole host of major problems that could potentially spiral out control in the future. While the move was absolutely necessary for the survival of the regime, it showed that the army that was once estimated to be one of the most powerful in the Middle East was actually completely dysfunctional. The results of decades of sectarianism, corruption and bad management on every level became painfully clear, and had simply eroded the SyAA to the point of total inoperability.





While the creation of numerous small militias proved to be extremely successful, spawning various highly-motivated regiments standing their ground in most fights, the expansion of the NDF recreated the problems encountered with the SyAA on several occasions, and sometimes actually worsened them. The NDF was originally established with the aim of raising up units willing to defend their town or neighbourhood against incursions by rebels. Such NDF units were composed of armed locals tasked with manning checkpoints and patrolling their neighbourhood or town. In essence, it obeyed the pure definition of a militia in its founding days. With the partial dissolvement of the SyAA, the NDF further expanded and partially replaced the SyAA as the regime's army. New units were erected and existing ones expanded, now including everything from convictees, men that solely enlisted for money and soldiers using the original equipment from what was once the SyAA.

This meant that a militia once comprised of local volunteers now inherited soldiers and equipment from various SyAA units, and saw its tasks expanding from guarding neighbourhoods to undertaking offensives elsewhere and guarding towns, gasfields and other strategic installations on the other side of Syria. This meant that once highly-motivated men that enlisted to defend their neighbourhood against Sunni rebels could now be manning checkpoints in Sunni-dominated towns. As these men often enlisted with the sole reason of protecting their minority neighbourhood, they have zero interest in defending a Sunni-dominated town from rebels, leading to a situation that is very prevalant in Syria, where defending regime forces flee instead of defending their designated town because they see no personal benefit in holding it. This is why countries ordinarily employ armies composed of professional soldiers, which when undertaking operations don't base their actions on their private reasoning, but on the reasoning on the state it serves. These soldiers defend gasfields because they're ordered to, knowing that the continuing flow of gas generates income for the country, which will eventually help it win the war.

While this already renders large parts of NDF units combat ineffective for anything but manning checkpoints, the Syrian High Command made the crucial mistake of individually attaching armoured fighting vehicles (AFVs) to militias instead of letting them operate in pre-existing armoured formations, albeit attached to the NDF. This results in some NDF regiments consisting solely of individual components rather than a well-oiled machine of interconnecting units.




But perhaps the most serious problem with the different forces fighting for the regime is that some units have become so powerful that these are now essentially private armies. Many of these elite units consist mainly of Alawites originating from Syria's coastal region or minorities (mostly Druzes) and are extremely sectarian as a result. These units make up much of the regime's offensive capabilities, and received the largest share of Russian-supplied weaponry in the past year, including T-90s. The now infamous Tiger Forces, led by Suheil 'The Tiger' al-Hassan and Suqour al-Sahraa' (The Desert Falcons) are the best-known examples of these private armies, and appear to be neither under SyAA or NDF command, but rather taking orders straight from the Syrian High Command or President Bashar al-Assad. This means that if one of these two units operate alongside SyAA or NDF units, different commanders from different branches of the regime's military are issuing different orders while both pursuing the exact same objective. It does occasionally happen that either of the two units take command and issues orders to forces of other branches, but this creates a whole host of other problems as many of the (semi-)independent militias are anything but keen to receive orders from a different branch (which was indeed a common complaint heard during the offensive on Tabqa). This proved to be less of a problem at Tadmur, where the Russian Armed Forces had considerable influence upon the whole operation.

Another not unimportant shortcoming in the regime's tactics is the fact that it constantly moves its most capable units (Suqour al-Sahraa' and the Tiger Forces) throughout Syria when another position is about to run over or has been run over, forcing either of the two units to abandon their current operations. This has led to a string of unfinished offensives costing precious fuel, equipment and manpower. This also applies to the capture of Tadmur (Palmyra), the capture of which would have been justified if it had been taken with the aim of further advancing towards the besieged town of Deir ez-Zor. But instead of chasing the Islamic State all the way to the gates of Deir ez-Zor, which would have proved to be relatively easy as there were no major Islamic State strongholds between Tadmur and Deir ez-Zor, the regime halted its operations after seizing Tadmur. As the town of Tadmur and its archaeological remains had little military value to the regime, its capture turned out to mostly part of a PR-stunt likely aimed at showing the world the Syrian regime and Russia were defeating terrorism in Syria.



While the SyAA and NDF have recently begun advancing in the direction of al-Sukhna, located in between Tadmur and Deir ez-Zor, the units participating in these assaults consist of poorly trained units operating a hodgepodge of equipment and arms. Although supported by the Russian Army, it recently took huge losses when an Islamic State vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED) managed to reach their positions, resulting in the death of a Russian serviceman and large numbers of regime fighters. The large amount of time between the capture of Tadmur and renewed operations in this region gave the Islamic State plenty of time to construct defensive fortifications, and any serious offensive aimed at overtaking them would require the deployment of either the Tiger Forces or Suqour al-Sahraa'. Had regime forces advanced immediately they could've taken advantage of the fact that IS forces were routing with little order or coordination, and possibly break open the road towards Deir ez-Zor in one fell swoop.

This brings us back to the Tabqa offensive, where all of the points mentioned above in combination with a gross underestimation of the Islamic State's capabilities, poor planning, greatly exposed flanks and a lack of Russian support which was desperately needed to make such an operation succeed led to a veritable disaster.

The force tasked with capturing Tabqa airbase and the town of Tabqa itself consisted of no less than eleven different branches and factions out of three (technically four) different countries, comprising Suqour al-Sahraa', the Syrian Arab Army (further divided into at least two regiments, at least believed to have been part of the 4th Armoured Division), the Syrian Arab Air Force, the National Defence Force (further divided into the Golan Regiment and several smaller regiments), the Syrian Social Nationalist Party (SSNP), the Ba'ath Brigades, the Arab Nationalist Guard, the Republican Guard, Hizbullah, the Russian Army and the Russian Air Force, each operating its own tanks and equipment. In addition, the Syrian Navy Seals also took part in the operation, although it remains unknown under what branch this unit serves. No Shiite militias are believed to have taken part in the fighting, likely due to their preoccupation with holding the front in Southern Aleppo.


This force could call upon large numbers of tanks, artillery, multiple rocket launchers (MRLs), the Syrian Arab Air Force's (SyAAF) assets, including fighter-bombers and attack helicopers, the Russian Army's 291th artillery brigade operating 152mm 2A65 Msta-Bs and the Russian Air Force's (RuAF) Mi-24s forward deployed at Kweres airbase. The composition of tanks used by the various branches and factions involved in the conflict give a clear image of the current state of the regime's military and the logistical nightmare in equipping each and every tank with the right type of ammunition and spare parts. Participating in the offensive were: T-90s, T-72Bs, T-72AVs, a T-72AV 'TURMS-T', T-72M1s, T-62 Model 1967s and T-62 Model 1972s, T-55As, T-55Ms and T-55(A)MVs and BMP-1s. Artillery support was in the hands of truck-mounted anti-aircraft guns, Syrian-manned 122mm D-30 howitzers and 130mm M-46 field-guns and truck-mounted 107mm MRLs, 122mm BM-21s, IRAMs and 220mm BM-27s. The Russian Army provided one battery of 152mm 2A65 Msta-B howitzers. Surprisingly, the Russian Air Force limited its support to several Mi-24s, leaving the SyAAF to provide fast jets for aerial support to the advancing troops. The SyAAF however remains incapable of providing the same degree of air support as the RuAF has been doing over the past year. The SyAAF's SA-342 and Mi-25 attack helicopters also made an appearance over the battlefield, but ended up seeing almost no use during the offensive. Whether this was due to a lack of coordination between the SyAAF and the forces on the ground or due to a lack of sufficient operational airframes in the area remains unknown.




Altogether, these units posed an impressive force on paper. While the aerial support provided by the RuAF and the SyAAF was not up to the same standards seen during the offensive on Tadmur, the largely flat terrain around Tabqa was a huge advantage to the regime, sharply contrasting the mountainous area surrounding Tadmur. The force was mobilised for the upcoming offensive on the 1st of June, which was launched a day later. Spearheading the offensive was Suqour al-Sahraa', which deployed its Russian-delivered T-90s, T-72Bs, GAZ Tigers, Iveco LMs and armoured Ural-4320s, along with Russian advisors. Behind Suqour al-Sahraa' came the rest of the force, with the more experienced units operating closer to Suqour al-Sahraa' than the poorly trained units operating in the back and flanks. This immediately proved to be a problem however, as communication between such large numbers of units taking part has to be excellent in order to advance at the same time, inform other units about possible incoming attacks and to coordinate a possible retreat. Communication between all units was completely inadequate however, which would eventually result in the catastrophic defeat.

Another major issue was the location of the offensive, which cut right through Islamic State-held territory alongside the Ithiriya-Raqqa highway. This left the main force exposed on two sides, leaving them extremely vulnerable to counterattacks. Additionally, the forces designated to protect these flanks were poorly trained and equipped. Although this was indeed a potential recipe for disaster, and source of worry for many following the offensive over the past weeks, the Islamic State efforts at flanking regime forces proved problematic, but ultimately not the reason for its actual defeat.

The offensive, launched on the 2nd of June 2016, made its way from Ithiriya through territory previously captured during February. The Islamic State had mined the road plentiful before the start of offensive, which would prove a nuisance for the regime forces early on, but grow perpetually more problematic over time. While some IEDs were carefully camouflaged or even disguised as rocks, the placement of mines often left much to desire. A map showing the strategic situation before the offensive can be seen below, including the territory previously captured East of Ithiriya back in February 2016. All maps by Peto Lucem, click on them to enlarge.

The offensive had only been going on for two days before it was already hailed as a major success. Namely, it had managed to enter Raqqa Governorate, of high symbolic value for any major party fighting in the Syrian Civil War. Elements of the Syrian Arab Army (SyAA) and Syrian Arab Air Force (SyAAF) were kicked out of Raqqa Governorate just under two years ago, when fighters of the Islamic State captured Division 17, Brigade 93 and Tabqa airbase, thereby completely ending the regime's presence in this part of the country.

The regime forces encountered only sporadic resistance in the first days, allowing it to further advance towards Tabqa airbase with relative ease. This has much to do with the terrain, which due to a lack of prominent terrain features or towns was extremely difficult to defend. The Islamic State deployed several T-55s, technicals, truck-based VBIEDs and artillery to counter or at least slow down the regime's advances, but these lone units made easy targets for the regime's superior firepower. The resulting battles saw the destruction of one T-55, another example captured intact, one 122mm BM-21 captured (originally captured at Shaer back in July 2014) alongside a single 122mm D-30 howitzer, one seizure of a truck-based VBIED, one BMP-based VBIED and several technicals. Interestingly, the Islamic State also deployed several UAVs to the theatre, at least two of which were shot down by the use of 14.5mm ZPU-4s and 23mm ZU-23s.^[1][2]

The contingent spearheading the offensive meanwhile captured the small settlement of Abu al-Elaj on the 4th of June. This is where the Islamic State made its first true stand and even attempted a counter-attack to take the village back after losing it. This would have cut the the road between Ithiriya and the contingent speadheading the offensive, showing how vulnerable the whole operation was. In spite of their efforts, Abu al-Elaj and its surroundings remained in regime control during the offensive.


The sighting of the first BMP-based VBIED on the 3rd of June, the driver of which was killed before coming in a range close enough to detonate its deadly payload, revealed a now familiar identification marking. This black square reads: الدولة الإسلامية - 'Islamic State', جيش الخلافة - 'The Caliphate Army' (Jaish al-Khilafa) followed by a unique serial number. While many thought this black square referred to the particular tank or VBIED being in service of an Islamic State unit called 'Jaish al-Khilafa', the black square is actually applied on any armoured fighting vehicle (AFV), including VBIEDs, overhauled by the Islamic State's armour workshop in Raqqa, whose conversions will be covered in a future article.


At least three BMP-based VBIEDs would be sent off against advancing regime forces during the course of the offensive. Remarkably, not one managed to actually detonate its payload, and all three were captured intact, comprisingvehicles with serial numbers '212', '202' and '222'. Only '222' was immobilised after being hit, which severely damaged the vehicle and blew off its tracks.


While some might find using the BMP-1 as an VBIED an absolute waste of a precious AFV, this has proved to be an extremely popular conversion in the Islamic State. Not only is the vehicle perfectly suited for this role due to the spaciousness of its troop compartment, the BMP-1's 73mm 2A28 Grom main gun is next to useless in long range engagements so often seen in the Syrian desert anyway, often reducing the vehicle's role to a mere battle taxi when used conventionally. This effectively means that the Islamic State immediately converts captured BMPs to VBIEDs in desert areas, while continuing to operate them as an AFV in urban areas.

After having cleared Abu al-Elaj and its surroundings, the contingent spearheading the offensive further advanced along the Ithiriya-Raqqa highway, securing several other small settlements along the road. Traces of previous fighting when the Islamic State first captured this area were evident throughout the offensive. Most of these settlements were then fortified to prepare for a potential surprise attack by the Islamic State. Footage showing the chaotic advance of regime forces along the highway gave the impression of an immense and well-equipped militia rather than that of a true army.

Despite this, regime forces reached and cleared the crucial Safiya crossroad and the nearby Sufyan oilfield just over a week after launching the offensive. The main contingent was now to leave the highway leading to Raqqa and head North to Tabqa airbase. But instead of continuing the offensive and thus giving the Islamic State no time to strenghten their positions along the road heading to Tabqa and Tabqa airbase itself, the whole offensive came to a grinding halt. While this also gave regime forces time to fortify their previous gains and further secure the highway, it would ultimately prove to be a fatal mistake. Namely, while this short lull might have been an attractive choice for a variety of reasons, it allowed the Islamic State to gather forces for a counter-attack, which is exactly what occurred. Fighters and vehicles from Raqqa immediately began arriving in Tabqa, where they joined units already present here. Largely consisting of foreign fighters, these well-equipped forces would prove to be determined enough to be capable of stopping the offensive dead in its tracks.

Although deeply infiltrated in most other major rebel forces, the Syrian regime has so far proved incapable of infiltrating in the Islamic State on a large scale. While the lack of intelligence could be countered by the regime's aircraft, helicopters and UAVs by conducting aerial reconnaissance between Raqqa and Tabqa, these sorties were never flown and thus this build-up of troops remained unnoticed to the regime forces.


With only limited resistance encountered during the previous weeks, a large part of the contingent spearheading the offensive was pulled out of the theatre for deployment elsewhere, leaving behind well trained troops with only light equipment and poorly trained troops with heavy equipment. The force that stayed behind was apparently deemed capable of reaching the operation's intended objectives with consideration of the limited resistance encountered so far. This analysis excluded the newly arrived Islamic State forces from Raqqa however, which despite its small size compared to the thousands of regime fighters previously present here, boasted not only armoured fighting vehicles, but also plenty of U.S. arms and equipment originally captured in Mosul back in the summer of 2014. This force would prove to be more than capable of reversing the regime's gains it made in the weeks prior.

Unaware of the impending danger, the Syrian Navy Seals made their way to Thawra oilfield on the 18th of June. Being not particularly well defended, Thawra was captured shortly after. Although now only around fourteen kilometers away from Tabqa airbase, this would prove to be the last advance of regime forces during this offensive.

Although capturing Thawra oilfield with relative ease, the Syrian Navy Seals soon clashed with the vanguard of the newly-arrived Islamic State unit from Raqqa, leading to fierce fighting on the outskirts of Thawra. In no position to defend the oilfield, the Syrian Navy Seals then retreated and called in fire support, which came in the form of a barrage of artillery shells as well as cluster bombs delivered by the SyAAF raining down on the fighters of the Islamic State. Completely clueless about what kind of unit they just had run into to, the Syrian Navy Seals made another attempt at advancing, only to find themselves ambushed by the Islamic State, which responded with ATGM strikes against the Syrian Navy Seals' technicals and trucks. These strikes resulted in the destruction of several vehicles, including a Russian-delivered armoured Ural-4320. Although the partial remains of two T-72M1s were encountered at Thawra, these were likely present since the Islamic State first took over the oilfield, once again showing how mere visual observation of wreckage from available footage does not provide an entirely accurate picture of losses.








Graffiti on a wall inside the compound Thawra oilfield of reading صقور الصحراء - 'The Desert Hawks', a limited number of which were still believed to have been present during the assault.

Outmanoeuvred and outgunned, the Syrian Navy Seals then quickly retreated to the Safiya crossroad and the nearby Sufyan oilfield, where instead of anticipating and preparing for the impending assault, most regime forces simply fled. Although it remains unknown what triggered the regime forces to flee, the whole situation was reminiscent of the total collapse of regime forces in al-Sukhna, T3 pumping station, Arak, Hulayhilah, and Tadmur in May 2015. Within hours, the remaining regime forces packed their gear and fled along the same road it had advanced on in the previous weeks, in what was described by regime sources as an ''organised retreat''. Although part of the retreat indeed gave the impression of being relatively well organised, the mere fact that it did not actually include all forces stationed here is a testament to the poor communication between units within the offensive. The bewildered part of the contingent that was left behind was quickly overwhelmed by the superior Islamic State forces.



Images showing vehicles and equipment used by fighters of the Islamic State near the Safiya crossroad. The T-72M1 has been upgraded with additional armour on the front of the turret and additional side skirts on both sides of the tank. A U.S. M1114 from Iraq can be seen in the second image, although it remains unknown if it was used by or instead captured by the Islamic State. The latter seems more likely as it appears to have been abandoned and faces towards Islamic State held territory rather than the other way around.



After securing the Safiya crossroad, the fighters of the Islamic State began advancing along the same road the regime forces had previously fought for. This convoy moved through the open desert at high speed, completely untouched by the Syrian Arab Air Force. According to several regime sources, this was the case due to a sandstorm which prevented the SyAAF from striking the advancing fighters of the Islamic State. The images below however show no such no sandstorm taking place during the Islamic State's advance from Safiya along the Ithiriya-Raqqa highway.


While having captured several armoured fighting vehicles and a 122mm BM-21 Grad MRL weeks before, the regime forces now left behind more than they had originally captured from the Islamic State. These forces here must have left in a hurry, as one abandonded BM-21 suffered only from a flat tire, which could simply have been ignored or replaced by the spare tyre located at the back of the truck's cabin.










The remains of several vehicles hit early on during the regime's offensive were also found alongside the road. The T-62 below fell victim to an ATGM strike while the technical got hit by an IED. The blast responsible for taking it out was so powerful that it not only blew the front of the vehicle away, but also activated the airbags of the driver and passenger seats.






Interestingly, these vehicles also included the remains of a Russian KAMAZ-63501AT artillery towing truck used by the 291th artillery brigade deployed to the theatre in support of the regime's forces. One of the trucks drove over an IED during the initial stages of the offensive, resulting in its destruction. Although the Islamic State claimed this led to the death of three Russian servicemen, this claim couldn't be independently verified.

With no serious opposition encountered until this point, the Islamic State then pressed on to the settlement of Abu al-Elaj and the SyriaTel towers along the Ithiriya-Raqqa highway. Such isolated positions, while often overstocked with arms, have proven to be extremely vulnerable to rebel and Islamic State attacks during the course of the war. Along the highway, these outposts were defended by relatively poorly trained troops, which were in no way capable of stopping the more experienced fighters of the Islamic State.




An Islamic State convoy leaving the highway for the SyriaTel towers. Even though they represented easy targets for the Syrian Arab Air Force, the SyAAF was nowhere to be found after initially striking the fighters of the Islamic State when capturing Thawra oilfield and the Safiya crossroads.




Several vehicles were destroyed near the SyriaTel towers. Although heavy usage of VBIEDs by the Islamic State was reported during their counter-attack, these were not seen in footage shot by the Amaq News Agency covering the offensive.


Ghaneema (spoils of war) from the regime's positions near the SyriaTel towers included one BMP-1, multiple trucks, ATGMs, small arms and the equipment such as the tents the contingent defending the positions were sleeping in. At least two regime soldiers were captured alive, although their final fate remains unknown.










And as such it happened to be that a small group of Islamic State fighters along with associated vehicles and just two tanks had completely reversed an offensive undertaken by thousands of men with dozens of tanks, artillery and air support. Not only did they manage to take back all the territory the Islamic State had lost during the regime's offensive,the fighters of the Islamic State even gained new territory and is now marching on the town of Ithiriya. Of course, it is unlikely that they will be capable of actually taking Ithiriya for now, but the mere fact that it is now being threatened shows the degree to which the once daring offensive has now backfired.

In an effort to defend the catastrophe of Tabqa, the regime and its supporters went to entirely new lengths to put the blame on anything but the military's incompetence. Some argued the offensive was nothing more than a probing attack, to see what the Islamic State's military response would be like. Russia was blamed for not providing the much-needed air support, although the extent to which it would be participating was already known to the regime before launching the offensive. The whole undertaking was said to be an idea of Russia, in which the regime was forced to take part. Others claimed weather conditions had supposedly prevented the SyAAF from striking the Islamic State, despite the fact that the weather was in favour of the regime during the entirety of offensive. Some even claimed the Islamic State's ''hundreds of VBIEDs'' simply proved too much for the forces taking part in the offensive, attributing the failure purely to the suicidal nature of the Islamic State's tactics.But worst of all, the various branches of the regime's military blamed each other for the failed offensive. Suqour al-Sahraa' blamed the SyAA and militias taking part in the offensive for not actually taking part in the offensive, while the SyAA and militias blamed Suqour al-Sahraa' for taking part in the offensive and then suddenly not taking part in the offensive anymore, leaving poorly trained troops to fight for themselves.


The catastrophic outcome of the regime's attempt at directly challenging the Islamic State's heartland must have not only amazed those following the offensive, but also the regime's military itself. Once thought to be amongst the most powerful armies of the Middle East, the biggest enemy of the Syrian Arab Army didn't prove to be Israel or Ba'athist Iraq, but the Syrian regime itself. The sectarianism, corruption and complete denial of reality so deeply embedded in its way of governing not only contributed to dragging Syria into an endless Civil War, but also completely debilitated the Syrian Armed Forces as an effective fighting force. In the past five years of conflict the regime's military has so far proven to be entirely incapable of adapting to the type of warfare necessary to operate in the Syrian Civil War. As the core issues of the Syrian Arab Republic have only worsened over the past five years, it appears unlikely that the Syrian Arab Army will ever manage to present itself as a properly functioning military as long as the Ba'ath Party remains in power.

The failure atTabqa plunged the Syrian Arab Army into an all time low, not only because it was made painfully clear that President Bashar al-Assad's vision of bringing back 'Every Inch of Syria' under its control is currently a completely absurd notion, but also because it increased hostilities between the various forces participating in the offensive. With the regime's military proven to be an unreliable partner for Russia, and with Syria's role as a weapons depot and supply line for Hizbullah well secured for Iran and Hizbullah, it is not unlikely that the regime's inability to conquer and secure more territory will lead to increased calls and pressure to allow for self-governing of certain parts of Syria. In any case, the needless waste of manpower, equipment and perhaps most of all morale shines a poignant light on the fact that there's still no end in sight for Syria's devastating war.

Although many military enthusiasts and analysts spend hours scrounging social media pages for any interesting images of Syrian Arab Army, Air Force or Navy equipment, it now appears that a wealth of never-before-seen images has been uploaded to the official page of the Syrian Armed Forces. Most of these images, taken over the past six years, have gone completely unnoticed to the general public.

While you can be sure to find plenty of articles with a better balance of visual content to text on this blog, the sheer amount of images, their high quality and the fact that most of the images were never seen before allow for an exception to the rule. We can only hope that more of such photo reports will released in the future.

We'll be kicking off with the Syrian Armed Forces Calendar for 2015, which, although little under two years late, still makes for an interesting bundle of high-definition images.

January:



February:



March:



April:



May:



June:



July:



August:



September:



October:



November:



December:



Special thanks to SyrianMilitaryCap from Syrian Military Capabilities.

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Photo Report: The Syrian Arab Navy

The Syrian Arab Navy is without a doubt the least well known branch of the Syrian Armed Forces, largely due to its marginal role in the Syrian Civil War. It however operates an interesting mix of ships most of which already long retired by other naval forces around the world. This photo report shows various Syrian Arab Navy vessels and units that participated in the 2012 exercise. This exercise featured all branches of the Syrian Armed Forces and was aimed at showing the outside world Syria was a force to be reckoned with.

A Syrian Arab Navy Petya III class frigate, two of which remain in service. Although the largest combat capable vessels of the navy, the Petya III class was designed almost exclusively for anti-submarine warfare. As a result, the capabilities of these ships against anything other than submarines is marginal. This is worsened by the introduction of newer types of submarines by the Israeli Navy, which already renders these ships next to useless in their original role. While still officially operational, both ships spend most of their time rusting away at their pier in the port of Tartus.








The now de-facto disbanded Syrian Naval Infantry in front of the cadet training ship 'al-Assad'. This ship has a dual role of training future naval personnel and acting as a landing ship for the Syrian Naval Infantry, which then disembark and make their way to the coast in dinghies.









A Syrian Arab Air Force (SyAAF) Ka-28 performing a flyby over Syrian Naval Infantry. Four Ka-28s were delivered to the SyAAF in the late eighties to replace its aging Ka-25s. At least two examples were overhauled in the Ukraine shortly before the start of the Syrian Civil War. All four were previously based out of Hmeemeem/Bassel al-Assad IAP before diverting to a new heliport to make way for the Russian Air Force contingent arriving at Hmeemeem in September 2015.


The launching of a 4K44 Redut missile from its associated SPU-35V launcher. Syria operates several coastal defence systems (CDS), including the modern K-300P Bastion-P. These CDS's present the most modern systems in the Syrian Arab Navy, which largely had to do without new acquisitions over the past decades.

The Osa class missile boats still represents the mainstay of the Syrian Arab Navy. Together with the Korean People's Navy, Syria is the only remaining country to operate the Osa I class missile boat. The ship below is of the more advanced Osa II class however, which can be discerned from the Osa I by its tube-shaped launchers opposed to the box-shaped launchers of the Osa I.




Syrian Arab Navy personnel standing at attention. Unsurprisingly, the average age of navy personnel is much higher than seen in other branches of the Syrian Armed Forces. This age gap is likely to only grow larger as conscripts are almost exclusively drafted into the National Defence Force and what remains of the Syrian Arab Army since the start of the Civil War.


The most recent addition to the Syrian Arab Navy consists of six Iranian TIR II (IPS 18) missile boats delivered to Syria in 2006. Based on a North Korean design, these boats can be armed with two C-802s (or the Iranian-produced copy by the name of Noor) anti-ship missiles and normally operate out of Minat al-Bayda naval baselocated North of Lattakia.

This photo report is to be followed by an article covering the history, inventory and current status of the Syrian Arab Navy later this year.






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The Syrian Arab Air Defence Force, once a proud independent service of the Syrian Armed Forces, has suffered tremendously under the five-year long Civil War. While losing dozens of surface-to-air (SAM) and radar sites to the various factions fighting for control over Syria was already a serious blow to its capabilities, Syria's poor financial situation and the transfer of large numbers of personnel from the Syrian Arab Air Defence Force (SyAADF) to the Syrian Arab Army and National Defence Force effectively gave the killing blow to the SyAADF.

The following images were taken during a large-scale exercise involving all branches of the Syrian Armed Forces in 2012. This exercise was carried out amid an increasingly deteriorating security situation in Syria, leading to calls from the international world for an intervention similar to the one seen in Libya. In response, the Syrian Armed Forces launched a several day long exercise to show its strenght to the outside world.

The 9K317E Buk-M2E, which together with the Pantsir-S1 is the pride of what once was the Syrian Air Defence Force. The 9A317 transporter-erector-launcher and radar (TELAR), seen below, is capable of independent operations thanks to its 9S36 radar. Several of these systems are deployed around Damascus and Syria's coastal region. Although the arrival of highly modern air defence equipment from Russia was much anticipated after an Israeli airstrike on a suspected nuclear reactor in Deir ez-Zor in 2007, the newly arrived Buk-M2Es, Pantsir-S1s and Pechora-2Ms proved just as incapable of shooting down Israeli aircraft as the systems they replaced.




A 9M317 missile speeds off after having been launched from a 9A316 transporter-erector-launcher (TEL). The 9A316 carries four reloads instead of a radar, which means it's incapable of operating independently. Under normal circumstances, a Buk battalion consists of six TELARs and three TELs, which can be further divided into three batteries with two TELARs and one TEL each. Every battalion also included a target acquisition radar, a command vehicle and trucks carrying more reloads.




A Pantsir-S1 fires off one of its twelve 57E6 surface-to-air missiles. As with the Buk-M2E and Pechora-2M, these systems are mainly concentrated around Damascus and Syria's coastal region. In order to better blend in with their surroundings along the coast, many Pantsir-S1s have traded in their desert-environment finish for locally applied camouflage patterns.


The 2012 exercise provided the first visual confirmation of Syria operating the 9K35 Strela-10. Opposed to many other Strela-10 operators, Syria placed these systems around airbases instead of providing ground forces with a mobile SAM system. Although most 9K31 Strela-1s were placed into storage, all of Syria's 9K35 Strela-10s are still believed to be in active service.




Having never retired any SAM system, Syria continues to operate both the dual and quadruple S-125 launchers. The more modern quadruple variant is more common, and can be found located  throughout Syria. The dual launchers were mainly concentrated around Damascus, where one site was overrun by Jaish al-Islam in 2012.






In addition to operating both the dual and quadruple S-125 launchers, Syria also acquired several Pechora-2M surface-to-air missile batteries from Russia at the turn of the decade. This system combines a quadruple S-125 launcher (albeit with two missiles) on a Belarusian MZKT-8022 chassis, with greatly improved performance against enemy aircraft and cruise missiles. Several sites housing the Pechora-2M have been identified around Damascus and in Syria's coastal region, where they frequently relocate to different sites in order to keep an element of suprise.

Smoke rises as two 9M33 missiles are fired from a 9K33 Osa SAM system. While Syria already fielded the 9K33 in Lebanon during the eighties, the system was thrown into the spotlight after Jaish al-Islam captured several launchers in Eastern Ghouta in 2012. These 9K33s were then, and are still being used, to engage SyAAF helicopters flying over Jaish al-Islam held territory.

The 2K12 surface-to-air missile system gained legendary status while in service with Egypt during the 1973 October War (Yom Kippur War), which used them against the Israeli Air Force with great success. In fact, the system was so feared it quickly earned itself the nickname 'Three Fingers of Death'. The system was less successful in Syrian service however, and was completely outplayed along with the rest of the SyAADF and SyAAF during during Operation Mole Cricket 19 over Lebanon's Bekaa valley in 1982 and during Israeli Air Force raids into Syria over the past years.



An article covering what remains of the Syrian Arab Air Defence Force, its equipment and organizational structure will be published on this blog at a later date.


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The Sudanese Air Force has operated several types of combat aircraft acquired from multiple sources since its founding in 1956. While current types such as the MiG-29SEh, Su-25 and Su-24 are well known for their involvement in the Sudanese Civil War and Operation Decisive Storm, older types such as the F-5E and MiG-23MS have been poorly documented while in the Sudanese Air Force ever since their inception in the 1980s.

Although the Sudanese Air Force (SuAF) is no stranger to Soviet-manufactured combat aircraft, the Sudan actually never ordered any MiG-23s from the Soviet Union. Instead, the SuAF received its MiG-23s from Libya, which deployed up to twelve Libyan Arab Air Force (LAAF) examples to Sudan in the late eighties. This deployment was accompanied by a large number of Libyan pilots and technicians responsible for operating the aircraft while in Sudanese service.
 
When the Libyan contingent departed Sudan about two years later, the Sudanese Air Force was left with aircraft it couldn't really fly nor maintain. And thus, after just several years of operations, the survivors were placed in storage at Sudan's largest airbase, Wadi Sayyidna. Here they joined an increasing number of MiG-21Ms, J-6s and F-5Es also placed in storage due to a lack of spare parts. It wasn't until two decades later when the MiG-23s resurfaced again.

Starting from the end of 2010, up to four MiG-23s could be seen parked on the tarmac outside one of Safat Maintenance Center's hangers on satellite imagery. All four aircraft were previously moved here to clear space in the hangars used by the Sudanese Air Force. But with an increasing number of projects on its hands, SAFAT soon found itself in lack of space too, forcing the technicians to move the MiG-23s outside when other aircraft had to be serviced in the hangar housing the MiG-23s.

These movements allowed one of the many Belarusian or Russian pilots and technicians present at Wadi Sayyidna to aid the SuAF with operating its fleet of MiG-29s, Su-25s and Su-24s, to pose with one of the three remaining MiG-23MS's. The aircraft shows clear traces of long-time storage, with the aircraft's roundel and flag slowly fading away to reveal the original Libyan markings. The serial number '09055' was originally assigned to this aircraft by the Libyan Arab Air Force and simply left in place by the Sudanese.







While Libya was in a state of war with the Sudan during the early eighties, mainly related to Sudan's support for Chadian rebels fighting against the Libyan Army operating in Northern Chad, it was quick to establish a close relationship with its former foe after the ousting of President Nimeiry in 1985. Having bombed Sudan's largest city Omdurman with a Tu-22 and having provided both financial and materiel support to rebels fighting the Sudanese Army in Northern Sudan and Southern Sudan, it now held talks for a possible merger between the two countries. While this merger never occured, the newly forged relationship between the Sudan and Libya would prove extremely beneficial for the Sudan, and the Sudanese Air Force in particular.

Starting from 1987, Libya began donating large amounts of military equipment to the Sudan. This mainly included desperately needed reinforcements for Sudanese Air Force, which by then was on its last breath due to a sharp decline of its operational capabilities. Within a year, the SuAF was strengthened by the addition of up to twelve MiG-23MS', as well as at least one MiG-23UB, several Mi-25s and two MiG-25R(B)s flown and maintained by Libyan pilots and technicians. This contingent was to form the core of Sudanese Air Force, and was quickly put to the test when the Sudanese People's Liberation Army (SPLA) launched a series of offensives in 1987 and 1988.

In response, the Sudanese Air Force retaliated with airstrikes based on intelligence gathered by the MiG-25R(B)s, which flew reconnaissance sorties over Southern Sudan. These sorties were followed by airstrikes conducted by MiG-23MS' and Mi-25s against SPLA-held villages and camps. The skies above Southern Sudan proved particularly unhealthy for the MiG-23MS' however, with only six airframes still believed to be operational after a year of operations. After the Libyan contingent withdrew in 1989 or 1990, the four remaining MiG-23MS' were soon stored, likely to never fly again. The two MiG-25R(B)s remained Libyan possession throughout their stay in Sudan and both returned to Libya. The remaining Mi-25s continued operations until replaced by newer Mi-24s and Mi-35s sourced from Eastern Europe in the late 1990s and early 2000s, with their career ending at the military side of Khartoum International Airport (IAP). For more information on Libya's involvement in the Sudanese Civil War, click here.

Although the Libyan contingent did not prove to be particularly successful in increasing the operational capabilities of the SuAF in the long term, it set a precedent for further donations made by Libya to several air forces across Africa, which are to be covered in a future article. The partial remains of an ex-Libyan MiG-23MS '06918' that made a crash landing in Jonglei State, (what is nowadays known as) South Sudan can be seen below. The poorly applied Sudanese markings quickly washed out under the Sudanese sun, thus revealing the original Libyan markings.



The MiG-23MS is a prime example of the so-called 'monkey models'; downgraded equipment sold by the Soviet Union to friendly nations in the Middle East and Africa. These 'monkey models' included everything from tanks to naval ships and aircraft, which had sensitive equipment removed, lacked modern weaponry or had inferior armour compared to their Soviet counterparts. In order to create an export derivative of the MiG-23M, the Soviets went to entire new lengths to create what many deem the worst combat aircraft ever to have been made, basically resulting in a powerful engine with an aircraft built around it. Equipped with electronics already deemed useless after years of conflict in the Middle East and armed with the infamously incapable R-3S air-to-air missile, the aircraft proved both a nightmare to fly and maintain.

While the air forces of Egypt, Iraq and Syria, left without an answer to the Israeli F-4E Phantom II, were eager to get their hands on new aircraft matching the F-4E's performance, they were less than impressed with their new mount. When Libya began its search for large quantities of weapons during the 1970s, the Soviet Union soon offered the MiG-23MS to Libya. But contrary to the delivery and training of Iraqi pilots on the MiG-23MS, which spend most of their time on the ground instead of flying the aircraft to its extremes, the Soviet Union not only marketed the aircraft as an adversary to the F-4 Phantom, but also to the F-14 Tomcat. The LAAF was angered by the gap between promised capabilities and reality, and invested considerable time and resources into increasing the combat capabilities of the squadrons operating the MiG-23MS. The delivery of MiG-23MS was amongst the reasons for the break of relations with the Soviet Union.

Despite its abysmal records, there is still some argument to make for the MiG-23MS' reintroduction into the Sudanese Air Force. Having enjoyed the fruits of the large oil reserves present in Southern Sudan, the Sudan lost its primary means of income after the separation of South Sudan in 2011. This not only meant the Sudan had less to spend on its military, it also meant the Sudan was now unable to buy weaponry in exchange for oil. With no significant financial boost in sight, the SuAF is unlikely to amass sufficient funds to acquire more modern combat aircraft in the near future, and has to soldier on with what its got.

Furthermore, the establishment of the Safat Maintenance Center (more commonly known as the Safat Aviaton Complex, part of the larger Safat Aviation Group) allowed the Sudan to overhaul an increasing number of aircraft and helicopters locally. Although most of these projects are undertaken with foreign technicians and help, it is considerably cheaper than transporting these aircraft to the Ukraine, Belarus or Russia for overhaul there. This means the Sudan can overhaul aircraft that would otherwise be deemed not worth the effort due to the costs involved in transporting these aircraft back and forth from maintenance centers abroad.




With this in mind, the SuAF began looking to overhaul several types of aircraft previously in storage. Once thought to have been grounded for the rest of their days, the MiG-23s were to receive an extensive overhaul after decades of storage. As the Sudan never truly operated nor maintained the MiG-23MS, SAFAT lacked the technical expertise to overhaul the MiG-23 all by itself, which forced it to look for assistance abroad. A partner was found in neighbouring Ethiopia, whose Dejen Aviation Industry proved capable of performing the required maintenance.

Dejen (formerly known as DAVEC, Dejen Aviation Engineering Complex) is responsible for the overhaul of a wide range of aircraft in service with the Ethiopian Air Force, and is one of the few maintenance centers to be fully qualified in overhauling the complex Su-27. Dejen, then still called DAVEC, was originally founded to allow Ethiopia to maintain its fleet of Soviet aircraft (mainly MiG-23BNs, MLs and UBs) locally, and thus has plenty of experience in overhauling this type of aircraft. The Tumansky R-29 engine of one of the four MiG-23s after undergoing revision at SAFAT can be seen below.





For the purpose of overhauling the aircraft at least ten Ethiopians from Dejen were present at Sudan's SAFAT, and Ethiopia also provided the pilots for the flight testing of the newly refurbished airframes, stressing the large role it played in bringing the MiG-23MS back to operational status. Additionally, as no Sudanese are currently believed to be trained in flying the MiG-23, it is likely Ethiopia will also provide training and spare parts (such as the new cockpit canopies already installed) for the aircraft.


The choice of armament for Sudan's MiG-23MS' is limited, consisting of several types of unguided bombs and UB-16 and UB-32 rocket pods for 57mm rockets. Although the SuAF once possessed stocks of R-3S air-to-air missiles for its MiG-21Ms, it is unlikely that any of these missiles still survive. Although theoretically Libya's donation of the aircraft to Sudan could have been accompanied by R-3S air-to-air missiles from Libyan stocks, the shelf-life of these missiles ran out decades ago. Thus, the MiG-23MS's role is restricted to fighter-bomber in Sudanese service. While the delivery of weapons by the MiG-23MS is unlikely to be even remotely accurate, a lack of accuracy has never posed a problem to the SuAF during the decades long conflicts ranging in the country.

Unfortunately for the SuAF, one of the four overhauled MiG-23s made a crash-landing at Wadi Sayyidna shortly after a test-flight. The aircraft caught fire and was subsequently dumped into a corner of the airbase. While not even back in operational service, the SuAF was already one MiG-23 down. It remains unknown if the airframe was a UB or a MS, but the loss of their only MiG-23UB would force the SuAF to purchase another airframe from abroad, making this project significantly more expensive.





While the overhaul of the MiG-23s provided the SuAF with four airframes at only marginal costs, the complicated nature of the MiG-23MS raises the question if it was really worth the effort. Already one aircraft down due to a crash-landing, and with more airframes sure to be lost in flying this highly complex aircraft, the MiG-23MS's second career in Sudan could turn out to be a short one.

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Jaish al-Islam has once again deployed one if its 9K33 Osa mobile surface-to-air missile (SAM) systems in an effort to shoot down a Syrian Arab Air Force (SyAAF) helicopter flying over Eastern Ghouta, Damascus on the 26th of June 2016. Although Jaish al-Islam quickly announced it had successfully shot down the helicopter with a single 9M33 missile, the damaged Mi-25 managed to return safely to Damascus International Airport. In the following days, the SyAAF lost several aircraft flying over or near Jaish al-Islam held territory, once again putting the spotlight on Jaish al-Islam's 9K33 Osa.

The latest deployment of this system came as a surprise to many as Jaish al-Islam was previously thought to have run out of missiles for the 9K33 Osa, with the Russian Ministry of Defence claiming it had successfully destroyed a 9K33 Osa system operated by the ''Islamic State terrorist group in Eastern Douma'' on the 15th of October 2015 and again on the 30th of December 2015. Although the results of these strikes, or if they were ever executed in the first place, remain unknown, the reports gave the false impression that the threat to the Syrian Arab Air Force's assets flying over Eastern Ghouta was effectively neutralised.

Namely, while Jaish al-Islam is often credited for capturing one 9K33 Osa in Eastern Ghouta on the 6th of October 2012, opposition fighters in Eastern Ghouta had in fact captured no less than five 9K33 Osas in less than two months. Of these five systems, three were captured in operational condition, while two inoperational examples were encountered at a Syrian Arab Air Defense Force (SyAADF) maintenance and storage complex. The lack of information on the actual number of 9K33s captured and operated by Jaish al-Islam once again shows the importance of accurate intelligence gathering in conflict zones around the world.



Although the month of October 2012 saw opposition fighters capturing several surface-to-air missiles sites, radar systems and associated equipment in Eastern Ghouta, most of this equipment consisted of ageing Soviet-era systems that had been abandoned for some months. Apart from a limited number of ZSU-23-4s, trucks and command vehicles, this equipment proved to be largely useless for the rebels. The capture of three operational 9K33 Osa mobile SAMs would later have huge complications for the SyAAF however, and the decision not to immediately strike these systems after their capture was nothing short of a major blunder.

While fighters opposed to the regime of President Bashar al-Assad have captured surface-to-air missiles before, much of the often derelict equipment captured proved too complicated to use. The highly-mobile 9K33 Osa is an easier system to master however, aided by the availability of digital simulators that can be downloaded on the internet. Perhaps more importantly, because the radar is directly integrated into the launch vehicle the system is far more convenient in its use for rebel forces, and is capable of relocating and hiding quickly in order to avoid being targeted by airstrikes. Yet it was the fact that these systems were captured by Jaish al-Islam (then Liwa al-Islam) specifically that eventually resulted in the first operational rebel SAM systems in Syria.

Although nowadays completely overshadowed by those of the Islamic State, Jaish al-Islam feats during the course of the Civil War have been nothing short of spectacular. It was the first faction to operate its armour and infantry in a mechanized force opposed to the poor coordination between the two seen with other forces. In late 2013, Jaish al-Islam even established its own air force based at Kshesh airbase. While none of its L-39s ever flew operational sorties, it proved what Jaish al-Islam was capable of. Just shy of two years later, Jaish al-Islam would pull off another first for the rebels by launching an Iranian Zelzal-2 unguided artillery rocket from Eastern Qalamoun in September 2015. The rocket, dubbed ''Maysalun'' in Syria, was supposedly aimed at civilian centers in Syria's coastal region. The results of this underreported attack, which was likely intended as a retaliation for airstrikes conducted by the SyAAF on Eastern Ghouta, are unknown, but Jaish al-Islam remains the sole rebel party have executed an attack with such a weapon.

Given its feats, funding from abroad and its strong leadership under the late Zahran Alloush, Jaish al-Islam was the designated faction to operate the captured 9K33 Osas. Indeed, in the following months after their capture, Jaish al-Islam was already preparing to utilize the systems against Syrian Arab Air Force assets flying over Eastern Ghouta.

The 9K33 Osa was originally developed during the 1960s with the aim of creating a system that could provide air cover for advancing armoured units operating on the plains of Europe. But contrary to previous designs, the 9K33 incorporated both the launching system and the radar in one vehicle, meaning the transporter erector launcher and radar (TELAR) can independently operate without having to rely on other (radar) systems. Despite this, linkage to long-range radar systems greatly improves the system's situational awareness and combat capability. A TELAR consists of the 9A33B launching platform on a BAZ-5937 chassis and six 9M33 missiles, which together form one complete system designated 9K33 Osa (Wasp). These are further assisted by 9T217BM loaders, two of which are present in each battery. The 9T217BMs are responsible for reloading the 9M33 missiles on the TELARs and carry twelve reloads each.

Exported to nations friendly to the Soviet Union in large numbers, the 9K33 Osa has seen action in several conflicts since its inception in 1971. The former South African Defence Force (SADF) was the first to encounter the 9K33 Osa on the battlefield, and even captured an intact example during Operation Moduler in 1987, after which intelligence services lined up to to inspect the system. The U.S. would also get its hands on examples for its own, capturing several 9K33 Osas during Operation Desert Storm in 1991. This offensive made painfully clear that the system was incapable of seriously challenging fast flying jet aircraft in the heavy ECM environment seen during that war. This became clear once more during the Libyan Civil War, when all operational Libyan 9K33 Osas around Benghazi got destroyed without launching a single missile in return.

The 9K33 would see a much more successful career in Syrian service however, proving the Osa was indeed very much capable system when used in less hostile environments. Syria received its first 9K33 Osas in early 1982, all being of the 9K33M2 'Osa-AK' variant, lacking the characteristic IFF (identification friend or foe) antenna seen on the improved 9K33M3 'Osa-AKM' variant. These systems were quickly pressed into service for deployment to Lebanon's Bekaa Valley during the Lebanon War, where they were responsible for the downing of an Israeli Air Force F-4E Phantom II and a U.S. Navy LTV A-7E Corsair II fighter-bomber.

The 9K33M2 Osa-AK's 9M33M2 missiles have a range of up to 10 kilometers, after which its 19kg warhead either detonates by its proximity fuze or by command of the TELAR's crew. An electro-optical tracking system is also present on the vehicle in case of electronic countermeasures jamming the 9K33's radar. In Syrian service, this system was replaced with an infrared (IR) tracking system from an unknown source during the early to mid-2000s. This modification also included the installment of new electronics within the 9A33B launcher itself. The new IR tracking device can be seen installed on the TELAR below. A new display, the screen through which the operators follow the missile's trajectory towards its target, can also be seen. This display has so far featured prominently in every video published by Jaish al-Islam, and is often the only evidence to see if a target has been hit.



Syria's 9K33 Osas would however prove far less successful against Israeli Air Force raids into Syria, the number of which rapidly increased in the past years. These strikes, mainly targeted at weapon depots around Damascus, have so far met with little resistance from Syria due to heavy use of electronic countermeasures by Israel. In fact, even Syria's brand-new Buk-M2s, Pantsir-S1s and Pechora 2Ms have so far proved incapable of intercepting and shooting down Israeli aircraft.
During the course of the Syrian Civil War, the SyAADF's operational capabilites would quickly diminish, eventually leading to the de facto disbandment of the once proud Syrian Air Defense Force. Although newly acquired systems such as the Buk-M2, Pantsir-S1 and Pechora 2M remain active, much of the other surface-to-air missile sites were abandoned with its equipment stored or simply left to rot. The 9K33s fared no better, with most batteries being deactivated and it systems placed in storage. As a result, most of the seven previously active 9K33 sites (six located around Damascus, one in Burj Islam) are now empty.

An Israeli airstrike carried out on the 2nd of February 2013, supposedly targeting Buk-M2s about to cross the border with Lebanon to be delivered to Hizbullah, saw the destruction of three 9K33 Osa-AKs instead. It is likely that Israel was afraid that the deployment of these launchers so close to the Lebanese border could indicate a possible transfer of these systems to Hizbullah in Lebanon. While it certainly seemed like a plausible scenario, the targeted 9K33 Osas actually arrived to this location after evacuation from their previous site. Although a transfer to Hizbullah was thus not meant to happen, the targeting does show the intelligence capabilities and a subsequent quick reaction from the Israeli side.





Back to the 5th of October 2012, when fighters of Jaish al-Islam began an operation in Eastern Ghouta's countryside aimed at clearing two major air defence positions of regime presence. These positions comprised a S-125 surface-to-air missile site and a weapons storage depot for surface-to-air missiles. Only poorly defended, both sites quickly fell in the hands of Jaish al-Islam. Months before, an isolated Syrian Arab Air Defense Force 9K33 battery located here, was ordered to relocate to the larger and thus more secure S-125 site just under three kilometers away, located here. This battery arrived on its new location on 1st of August 2012, comprising 9K33 Osa '275195', '275196' and '275197', 9T217BM '275189' and another unknown serial, a BTR-60PU-12 command vehicle and several trucks carrying personnel and associated equipment. The fourth 9K33 Osa launcher '275198' had previously been damaged by gunfire and would not be transferred to the S-125 site. '275198' was instead driven to a SyAADF maintenance and storage complex located inbetween Marj as-Sultan and Deir Salman.

After arriving at its new location, '275195', '275196' and '275197' were stationed in the many bunkers littering the complex. Although all three remained intact, this move meant the end of the operational status of the battery, and the TELARs would remain in their bunker until their capture by Jaish al-Islam on the 6th of October. The move to relocate the 9K33 Osas to a more safe location thus proved to be entirely futile. In hindsight, only the evacuation of all SyAADF assets from Eastern Ghouta would have prevented Jaish al-Islam from capturing large amounts of air defence equipment.



Before opposition fighters captured the S-125 site, now also including the 9K33 battery, the whole site was subject to a barrage of small arms fire,which setfire to several vehicles and damaging some of the air defence equipment. The 9K33s remained in the site's storage bunkers however, and thus escaped unharmed. Footage showing 9K33 '275196' being driven out of its shelter was the first glimpse of what exactly the opposition fighters had captured.


The footage of opposition fighters on 9K33 '275196' already revealed the presence of a second example, which was 9K33 '275197' (in the background on the second image). Images of the third 9K33 '275195' would only be posted on social media, thus evading sighting by the general public. The whole site, including the S-125s and associated equipment were moved away from the location they were captured afterwards in order to avoid destruction by possible artillery fire or airstrikes by the Syrian Arab Air Force. The site was then converted to farmland for agricultural use.




Also found at the site were the burning remains of one of the two 9T217BMs stationed here. This vehicle was likely hit by Jaish al-Islam during the assault on the base, resulting in its destruction. Located further away from the site was the battery's second 9T217BM loader, which although captured intact and moved away, was later set on fire and also destroyed.


On the 25th of November 2012, rebels captured a SyAADF maintenance and storage complex located next to Marj al-Sultan heliport. Amongst the equipment found here were not only dozens of trucks, armoured fighting vehicles, tools and training aids, but also two more 9K33 Osas, comprising '275198' and another example with an unknown serial. Both had previously been hit by rebel fire, causing several bullet holes in the engagement and tracking antennas of one vehicle, while the other suffered a fire which also damaged the engagement and tracking antennas, effectively rendering both examples useless for future use. It is believed that one of the examples was previously stationed at the site where Jaish al-Islam captured its three examples, only to be captured less than two months later in a different location.


When opposition fighters overran a maintenance and storage complex located near Harasta al-Qantara in the same month, they would not only capture dozens of trucks and command vehicles, but also another 9T217BM loader '270405'. Although it was aside from minor damage still relatively intact, the 9T217BM had no missiles onboard and was thus practically useless. The eventual fate of the only intact 9T217BM remains unknown, but is unlikely to be in use with Jaish al-Islam.


Altogether, opposition fighters in Eastern Ghouta had captured at least five 9K33 Osas and two 9T217BMs. Of these vehicles, only three 9K33 Osas would prove to be of any use for Jaish al-Islam. As it remains unclear if the transfer of the 9K33 Osa battery to their new location included the transfer of reloads, and if the six missiles of 9K33 Osa '275198' were also encountered, the amount of 9M33 missiles captured by opposition fighters remains a topic of debate, and ranges from eighteen to forty-eight.

At least six of these missiles are confirmed to have been launched at SyAAF helicopters flying over Eastern Ghouta, resulting in the destruction of one Mi-17 and one Mi-8/17, and the damaging of another Mi-8/17, and a Mi-25. While additional launches and shootdowns are sometimes reported (and are indeed likely to concern this system), these events cannot be independently confirmed.

While allowing rebels to capture such sophisticated weaponry was a critical blunder, the complete absence of any efforts to track and destroy these systems shortly after their capture serves as a painful reminder of the incompetence of the regime's military apparatus. When looking at the capture of dozens of weapon depots since, one can only come to the conclusion that little to no lessons have been learned from these repeated failures.

After their capture on the 5th of October 2012, it would take just under a year for Jaish al-Islam to employ the system for the first time, which occurred on the 29th of July 2013. This occasion saw the apparent downing of a Syrian Arab Air Force Mi-8/17, marking the beginning of a serious threat to SyAAF helicopters flying over or near Eastern Ghouta. A video showing the launch in the cover of the night, and subsequent downing can be seen here. The media department of Jaish al-Islam released a statement shortly after the downing of the helicopter.

''Joyful news circulated by social media pages today which is the news of the heroes of brigade of Islam using of air defense missile system batteries gained in one of the raids almost a year ago, during which they worked unremitting efforts to decipher the codes of the system and run it, and after many attempts and insistence of the operators of the project to continue till they achieve the success they hoped for after many engineers failed to decode its codes till God graced them to try it yesterday at the Battle of mills which the regime tried to retrieve desperately after it was dominated by the Mujahideen so the Mujahideen of Brigade of Islam shot down a helicopter by the Russian-made OSSA system resulted in the death of two colonels and an officer on board of the helicopter.''

The press release confirmed that significant problems had been encountered in turning the 9K33 Osa system from a sophsticated surface-to-air missile system to an operational system that could actually be used by Jaish al-Islam, and hinted that none of the operators had previous experience on the system. Although it is certainly possible that its operators mastered the system by learning-by-doing, the presence of former 9K33 operators within the ranks of Jaish al-Islam should not be ruled out however.

Another launch was documented in the weeks or months that followed, though the actual date remains unknown. Despire the fact that the missile exploded in the vicinity or likely even hit its intended target, the extent of damage or if it crashed was not reported. From the first launch onwards, it would take another six months before a new launch was officially revealed, although additional launches (in addition to the one mentioned above) in the meantime cannot be ruled out. This launch resulted in the destruction of the targeted Mi-17, footage of the launch can be seen here. Occurring during broad daylight on the 16th of January 2014, a single 9M33 missile found its way to just above the helicopter and exploded, resulting in the loss of both its rotors and tailboom. Dramatic footage of the Mi-17 tumbling to the ground was caught on tape in Darayya, and once again confirmed that the threat of Jaish al-Islam's 9K33 Osas was still very much alive.

A video of another 9K33 Osa launch was uploaded on the 18th of January 2014, just days after the previous launch. Although the outcome of this launch is unclear due to the obstruction of several houses and trees, it is believed that the 9M33 missile missed its intended target and self-destructed 25-28 seconds after launch at the edge of its range.










The number of launches and the dates on which they occur became extremely difficult to track after the latest launch on the 18th of January 2014. While no videos showing additional launches are believed to have been uploaded shortly after, Jaish al-Islam subsequently released a video in March showing all past launches, including two which were previously unknown (this included the launch mentioned above). The other event saw the launch of a single missile against a Mi-8/17. Although exploding in the proximity of the helicopter, the footage stops directly after the explosion, making it likely the 9M33 missile only damaged the helicopter.

The video released by Jaish al-Islam also revealed the use of the 9K33's radar by Jaish al-Islam, which further aids in the detection range of the surface-to-air missile system. Although such usage seems logical, it increases the chances of detection and possibily destruction by the Syrian Arab Air Force. This particular launcher is shown with a full load of six missiles, including one empty canister.




The same video also shows one of the launchers, fitted with new headlights, driving through Eastern Ghouta in full daylight, a testimony to the lack of aerial surveillance over this part of the country. The presence of members of the much feared Air Force Intelligence in Eastern Ghouta is incredibly likely, and was likely responsible for the airstrike that killed Jaish al-Islam's previous leader Zahran Alloush. The group responsible for operating the 9K33 Osas is believed to be small however, and by refraining from accepting new members it is thus practically impregnable.




The 18th of January 2014 launch would be the last documented use of the 9K33s for over two years. While it is possible additional launches indeed occurred in the meantime, no statement or video was released by Jaish al-Islam during this period, hinting at a possible hiatus of more than two years. The absence of the 9K33 Osa led to wild rumours that the systems had finally been destroyed, or that Jaish al-Islam had run out of missiles for them.

Others used this oddity to claim foreign states had delivered additional 9M33 missiles to Eastern Ghouta, or that at least one system was moved from Ghouta to Eastern Qalamoun to target aircraft flying in the vicinity of Seen airbase, where the SyAAF's MiG-29SMs and some of the Su-24MK2s are currently based. Many of the crashes in this area were subsequently attributed to a 9K33 supposedly operating here, most of which were debunked as technical faults later however. None of these rumours can be confirmed, and are thought to be unlikely.

With no missiles confirmed to have been fired for more than two years, it does raise the question whether Jaish al-Islam is willing to constantly harass Syrian Arab Air Force helicopters flying over Eastern Ghouta. Indeed, from this point on it began to increasingly look like Jaish al-Islam was using the assets it captured mainly as a deterrent rather than utilising their full potential in the Civil War. 




While the territory Jaish al-Islam controls has significantly shrinked over the past few years, this has yet to pose a problem for the operations of the 9K33s. Although the location of the launchers is a well kept secret, with the launchers believed to have been stored at seperate locations throughout Eastern Ghouta, the approximate location of one 9K33 Osa has meanwhile been found. The launchers are operated by just one crew, still consisting of the same members that operated them shortly after their capture.

This crew surprised many when they were confirmed to be back in action once again on the 26th of June 2016. Although suffering heavy damage to its fuselage tailboom, the targeted Mi-25 managed to make an emergency landing at Damascus International Airport. While awaiting repair here, a Mi-8/17 carrying a reserve Mi-25 tailboom crashed not far from Damascus IAP, making it likely this tailboom was destined for the damaged Mi-25.


Whether this launch was an isolated event or will soon be followed up by subsequent strikes is unknown, but considering the 9K33's past deployment the latter seems more likely. Whatever the case, it is clear the threat from these systems is anything but subdued. As such, they continue to threaten the skies of Eastern Ghouta, impeding the regime's aerial operations in the area until they are taken out.

Special thanks to Morant Mathieu from Military in the Middle East.

The 4th Armoured Division is well known for operating several types of tanks and other armoured fighting vehicles upgraded with additional armour throughout the Damascus theatre of operations. Having performed these armour upgrades on a range of armoured fighting and support vehicles, the 4th Armoured Division (4th AD) has now expanded its arsenal once more by introducing a new type of multiple rocket launcher (MRL), popularly known as 'Shams', meaning Sun in Arabic. It's thought its nickname was derived from that of the aesthetically similar Russian TOS-1A 'Solntsepyok, which has been referred to as 'Sun' during its deployment in Syria.

This vehicle continues the trend of highly professional upgrades performed on the armoured fighting vehicles (AFVs) of the 4th AD. Located in Adra, Rif Dimashq Governorate, the first of such upgraded vehicles appeared in late 2014, when at least two of the up-armoured T-72M1s were shown destroyed shortly after their deployment to Jobar. This however did not deter the 4th AD from pressing on with the programme and in the years that followed, several types of up-armoured AFVs would be sighted on the battlefield.

Elsewhere in Syria, factions fighting for control over the country have begun upgrading several of their armoured fighting vehicles to better suit the type of warfare encountered on the battlefield. This has included everything from implementing measures to reduce visibility from the air to converting tanks to vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (VBIEDs). The BMP serves as the basis for many of these DIY modifications, and has proven a popular platform despite its obvious limitations and weaknesses.

While many DIY modifications of this vehicle thus exist, the conversion from an infantry fighting vehicle to an MRL is the first of its kind in Syria, and arguably the most sophisticated fire-support platform based on the chassis of a BMP in the entire world. Previous experiments throughout the world included the installation of 23mm gunpods and 80mm B-8 rocket pods taken from aircraft and helicopters on the BMP's turrets while Cuba has recently begun converting several of its BMPs to the fire-support role, fitting them either with a 100mm anti-tank gun or a 122mm D-30 howitzer.

The following images were taken during Syrian Arab Army exercises over the past several years, including the large-scale exercise involving all branches of the Syrian Armed Forces in 2012. This exercise was carried out amid an increasingly deteriorating security situation in Syria, leading to calls from the international world for an intervention similar to the one seen in Libya. In response, the Syrian Armed Forces launched a several day long exercise to show its strenght to the outside world.

The T-72AV, also known as the T-82 in Syria, seen during an exercise in the Rif Dimashq Governorate. Although the fleet of 'T-82s' has suffered heavily due to the large-scale proliferation of rocket propelled grenades (RPGs) and anti-tank guided missiles (ATGMs) in Syria, a sizeable amount of tanks remain operational. Fully intact T-72AVs still sporting all of their explosive reactive armour (ERA) blocks as seen below have become an increasingly rare sight however.







Operating alongside the T-72AV is the T-72 'Ural', the first and also the least numerous T-72 variant to have been acquired by Syria before the start of the Civil War. The tanks can be seen equipped with a laser engagement system for training uses only. The T-72 'Ural' can easily discerned from other T-72 variants by the TPD-2-49 optical rangefinder protruding from the turret and by its flipper-type armoured panels instead of the rubber side-skirts seen on later types.



A row of 130mm M-46 field-guns take aim at a target during the 2012 exercises. Although several other types of artillery guns have been delivered or pulled out of storage over the course of the Civil War, the 130mm M-46 and the 122mm D-30 remain the primary artillery guns of the Syrian Arab Army. A limited number of 130mm M-46s have been mounted on Mercedes-Benz trucks under a programme aimed at increasing their mobility and effectiveness. Chinese 130 mm BEE4 rocket assisted projectiles (RAP) were specifically acquired for use with this platform, and greatly increased the operational potential of the 130mm M-46. Although the conversion of large numbers was planned, the start of the Civil War prevented the commencement of full scale production, and therefore they remain a relatively rare sight.



A convoy of three T-55(A)MVs and a single BMP-1 underway during an exercise in 2010. Although the Syrian Arab Army's immense fleet of tanks and BMPs were once destined to jointly operate on the plains of the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights, many are now individually attached to the various units and militias wrestling for control over Syria. Only the 4th Armoured Division and parts of the Republican Guard continue to operate their armour in organised fashion and (sometimes) with infantry support.







The Syrian Arab Army's fleet of T-55(A)MV has traditionally been concentrated along the Golan Heights, and although outdated when compared to Israeli armour currently in service, one could argue their combat effectiveness could surpass that of the T-72 'Ural' and T-72M1. The T-55(A)MV features Kontakt-1 explosive reactive armour (ERA), a KTD-2 laser rangefinder, smoke grenade launchers, an upgraded engine and the capability to fire the 9M117M Bastion anti-tank missile. The costs of just a few of these missiles is higher than the actual price of the T-55 launching them, and they have seen only limited action in Syria's Quneitra Governorate.




A soldier takes aim with his RPG-29, without a doubt the most feared type of RPG currently fielded in the world. The PG-29V's 105mm tandem warhead has so far caused tremendous losses under the SyAA's fleet of tanks, mainly the T-72. Although the T-55(A)MV and T-72AV are both equipped with ERA aimed at increasing the survivability of the tank, the tandem warhead was specifically designed to counter such armour and faces little problems penetrating it.

Although the procurement of large numbers of AK-74Ms was planned to replace the AK(M) and other (foreign) derivatives, the Civil War put a halt to this large scale re-equipment programme. The AK-74M was reportedly pitted against several other contenders including the Iranian KH-2002, all but two of which malfunctioned. Several new batches of AK-74Ms were received during the course of the Civil War however, alongside several other types of modern Russian weapons. Nonetheless, weapons such as the AK(M)-47 and PKM  have remained the most prevalent small arms amongst pro-Assad forces.


A convoy of BMP-1 infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs) underway to their operational zone. Having suffered heavy losses during the war, the BMP-1 continues to see service with the many factions spread throughout Syria. The vehicle has served as the basis for many DIY modifications, and even a BMP-1 based multiple rocket launcher was recently sighted in service with the 4th Armoured Division.






Although many hoped for the reintroduction of the T-34/85 on today's battlefield, sightings of this legendary tank in Syria in recent years has so far remained limited to just five examples, two of which belonged to a batch of T-34/85s converted to T-34/122 self-propelled howitzers armed with the 122mm D-30, which was retired long before the Civil War. Two other (intact) T-34/85s were seen in Syria's Quneitra province, used as static pillboxes facing Israel. It is likely these tanks were operational until quite recently. The T-34/85 below was seen during an exercise shortly before the start of the Civil War. While the T-34/85, or T-34/76 for that matter, indeed continues to be used in oeprational capacity across the globe, their presence nowadays remains limited to Yemen and North Korea.




160mm M-160 mortars seen during the 2012 exercises. Seeing heavy use during the early stages of the Civil War, when many of the protests and armed uprisings that followed were still contained in the cities, these and other heavy mortars were often deployed just outside the city perimiter for the shelling of neighbourhoods that had revolted. In more recent years, the M-160s are believed to have been supplemented by additional 240mm M-240s with rocket-assisted projectiles.






Two BMP-1s during a recent training exercise simulating a combined assault on an enemy position with armour and infantry. Although this makes for great propaganda footage, such coordinated assaults are only being (correctly) carried out a limited amount of pro-Assad units during today's war. On the opposing side, al-Nusra Front (which recently rebranded itself as Jabhat Fateh al-Sham) makes heavy use of mainly T-72s and BMP-1s operating together during assaults on regime-held parts of Aleppo.


Syrian Arab Army soldiers run towards the infantry compartment of their BMP-1 IFV during an exercise. All soldiers appear relatively well equipped compared to the hodgepodge of uniforms and equipment regime soldiers are outfitted with today. The SyAA had acquired large numbers of Chinese-produced combat gear, including helmets and bullet proof vests, shortly before the start of the Civil War, but simply ran out of stock when it started amassing an increasing number of new recruits in order to gain the upper hand on the battlefield.



A BM-21 fires one of its forty 122mm rockets towards a new target. The BM-21 is by far the most numerous multiple rocket launcher (MRL) in service with the Syrian Armed Forces. The type previously operated alongside a sizeable number of North Korean 122mm BM-11 MRLs before these were donated to Lebanon along with Syria's remaining stock of T-54 and older T-55 variants. With an increasing number of Volcanoes and 220mm, 300mm, 302mm multiple rocket launchers at hand, the Syrian Arab Army has somewhat compensated for the loss of large numbers of BM-21s by a substantial increase in qualitative firepower. Rebels operating in Northern Syria recently received BM-21s acquired from Eastern Europe by one of the Gulf States, further increasing the proliferation of this system in Syria.



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By Stijn Mitzer and Joost Oliemans

Exclusive new images featured in one of our articles for NK News Pro have revealed the construction of four 77 metres long corvettes is in an advanced stage, once again showing rearmament of the ill-equipped Korean People's Navy is continuing at an unexpected pace.

Although unfortunately, our full analysis is behind a paywall, an NK News article featuring various experts in the field of North Korean weapon proliferation on the new corvettes is available for free. Alternatively, you could wait for the full analysis in our upcoming book: The Armed Forces of North Korea: on the path of Songun. 

A Navy reborn: New warships spotted in North Korea

Exclusive HD photos reveal secretive new class of large warships with advanced capabilities set to enter service

''Four new large naval combatants are being constructed in the DPRK, set to become the new centerpieces of a fleet that has seen a range of new projects slowly replace the obsolete equipment from the Cold War. Although progress on the new corvettes, two of which have been under assembly since 2011, has been slow and disorderly, new images show their entry into service may not take much longer. At a length of 77 meters each, the new vessels constitute the largest naval project undertaken by the Korean People’s Navy (KPN) in decades, bringing new capabilities to the table that represent a tangible threat to opposing navies in the region.''

The full analysis of these vessels, which incorporate a variety of the latest technologies available to the KPN, can be found at the NK Pro website here: https://www.nknews.org/pro/a-navy-reborn-new-warships-spotted-in-north-korea/

A free NK News article featuring various experts in the field of North Korean weapon proliferation on the new corvettes can be read here: https://www.nknews.org/2016/11/exclusive-new-low-visibility-corvette-spotted-in-north-korea/

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