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From the Ukraine to Syria, Russian Orlan-10 and Eleron-3SV drones in Syria's skies



Recently published images of two drones that fell near the village of Ruveysli near Kasab and Arafit near Jisr al-Shughour in the Lattakia Governorate on the 20th of July 2015 reveal that either Russia has supplied the regime with state-of-the-art unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) or that Russia has embarked on a small-scale drone surveillance programme over Syria. If the latter turns out to be the case, it could be part of their greater intelligence programme to provide the Syrian regime with up-to-date information on the rebels' status and strength, which first became known to the world after the capture of the Центр С - المركز س - Center SSIGINT (Signals Intelligence) facility near al-Hara, Daraa Governorate.

The UAV that crashed near Ruveysli, believed to be a yet unnamed variant of the Orlan-10 reconnaissance drone, is nearly identical to a previously seen type in the Ukraine, were at least one crashed in Ukrainian-held territory in May 2014. The basic Orlan-10 was also seen over the Ukraine, and several other types  were also recovered after having crashed. The new variant of the Orlan-10 drone found in the Ukraine was sighted for the first time, and its technical details therefore remain yet unknown.

While the introduction of this type of UAV and its subsequent crash is noteworthy by itself, stunning coincidence has it that another recently acquired type of UAV crashed nearly forty-kilometers away just moments later. The second UAV, a Russian-made Eleron-3SV reconnaissance drone, was damaged by an onboard fire and crashed near the JaN-held town of Arafit, and despite the fire-damage was still relatively intact.



The sudden appearance of two types of Russian unmanned aerial vehicles shows the extent of support from the Russians to the Syrian regime, and is likely a result of the loss of Idlib Governorate to the rebels and the city of Tadmur (Palmyra) and its surroundings to the fighters of the Islamic State in the past months, after which many Pro-Assadists already claimed that the recent setbacks would herald a new chapter of Russian and Iranian support to the regime.

The extent of involvement of the Russians in this new Syrian drone programme is open to debate. Although one could argue that the Syrian Armed Forces or one of the Syrian Intelligence Agencies are operating these drones, Russian involvement in operating these UAVs should not be ruled out. First and foremost, it seems implausible the regime would acquire two completely new and expensive platforms, requiring extensive training to operate them and to process the acquired data into useful information for the forces on the ground, when they can already deploy Iranian-delivered and operated Mohajer, Yasir and Shahed 129 drones currently present in Syria to the Lattakia Governorate with little effort.Secondly, Russia's involvement in the Syrian intelligence field continues to be greatly underestimated, the sudden discovery of Center S last year serving as a testament to that fact. Thirdly, the fact that both drones have been produced post-2010 for the Russian military and subsequently used over the Ukraine makes it seem unlikely they were exported to Syria this quickly, not in the least because it would mean exposing some of their newest technologies in the UAV field.

Center S, jointly operated by the Russian Osnaz GRU radio electronic intelligence agency, Iranian and Syrian Intelligence Agencies, was to provide Syria and Iran with situational awareness of the Middle East and Israel in particular, but focussed increasingly on Syrian domestic affairs shortly after the revolution and start of the Civil War. Center S became responsible for recording and decrypting radio communications from rebel groups inside Syria, providing the Syrian Arab Army (SyAA) with up-to-date information on the strength and upcoming offensives of rebels, and the Syrian Arab Air Force (SyAAF) with information on rebel meetings. Center S was thus at least partially responsible for the series of killings of rebel leaders by SyAAF airstrikes. Unsurprisingly, its loss to the fighters of the Free Syrian Army served the regime a heavy blow.

It is therefore highly likely that Russians are involved one way or the other in operating the recently delivered Orlan-10s and Eleron-3SVs in Syria.The establishment of an UAV unit with Russian equipment and specialists as opposed to the Iranian-led UAV units might have been offered to the regime after the recent loss of Idlib Governorate, which if progressed further, could seriously have threatened the regime's heartland: Lattakia.



The new variant of the Orlan-10 has a set of twelve cameras located in its fuselage, identical to the example that crashed in the Ukraine. With these cameras, the Oran-10 can create 3D maps of the battlefront to provide extremely detailed information on enemy movements and strongholds. It is believed that the equipment used on the Orlan-10 can be changed depending on the mission, for instance to accommodate a night vision apparatus.


The cover of the camera was blown off on the example found near Ruveysli in Syria but still intact on the one recovered in the Ukraine seen below:



A civilian Olympus camera was among the equipment found onboard the crashed Eleron-3SV.




Piloted by Russians or not, the presence of even a limited number of Oran-10s and Eleron-3SVs could turn out to be a true asset on top of the already operated drones for the regime forces fighting in the Lattakia Governorate, or if deployed elsewhere, in Syria as a whole.

The ever rising death toll and the indiscriminate use of banned weaponry including chemical ordnance evidently serves as no deterrent for Russia to continue delivering anything from small arms to tanks, multiple rocket launchers, spare parts for the SyAAF's fleet of fighter-bombers and now unmanned aerial vehicles.

Special thanks to Green lemon.

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From Russia with Love, Syria's OSV-96s



The OSV-96, the first type of anti-materiel rifle to ever have been acquired by Syria, continues to see service with numerous factions in the now four-year long Civil War. Although the presence of the OSV-96 before the start of the Syrian Civil War was very limited, it has by now become the Syrian Arab Army's (SyAA) second most popular anti-materiel rifle after the Iranian AM.50.

A limited number OSV-96s were acquired by the Syrian Arab Army shortly before the Civil War as part of the ambitious modernisation programme aimed at improving the protection and firepower of a portion of its infantry force at the time. This programme, cut short due to the outbreak of the civil war, also included the acquisition of various other types of Russian-made small arms such as the AK-74M, 9A-91 and the VSK-94, the latter two of which will be covered in seperate articles in the future.



Renewed interest in the OSV-96 was shown in early 2013, when the Army Supply Bureau of the High Command of the Syrian Arab Republic requested one-hundred 12.7mm sniper rifles along with 10000 12.7mm rounds and one-hundred night vision sights from Russia's Rosoboronexport in early 2013. This request was fulfilled by the delivery of not only the OSV-96s, but also by 6S8 anti-materiel rifles.

The OSV-96 was originally developed as the V-94 by the Tula Instrument Design Bureau in the early 1990s, and a limited number subsequently entered service with the Russian Army in the mid 1990s. The rifle then underwent a number of changes in the late 90s and was rebranded as the OSV-96 in 2000. Due to its length, the rifle can be folded to allow for easier transportation. The OSV-96's 12.7x108mm rounds, sharing the calibre with the 6S8, come in a five-round magazine.

Due to its range advantage over many other sniper rifles and relatively large calibre, the OSV-96 functions as an effective counter-sniper weapon in the marksmen-rich environment of the Syrian battlefield, capable of penetrating walls and engaging light armour.

As the OSV-96s came with night vision sights, the OSV-96 potentially has a great advantage over the popular Iranian HS.50, for which the SyAA and National Defence Force (NDF) mostly lack night vision sights. Although available to the regime, these night vision sights are often only handed out to specialised units or bought by individual soldiers.



With the recent introduction of the 6S8, it remains unknown if more batches of the OSV-96 will be acquired. But with new Russian-made weaponry reaching Syria nigh continuously, an increasing presence of the OSV-96 would be little surprising.

The Islamic State going DIY, from armoured recovery vehicle to battle bus




Iraq's war on the Islamic State has seen the birth of a myriad of DIY designs, mostly initiated by Shiite militias looking to improve their firepower in order to gain the advantage over the enemy. The Islamic State is certainly no exception however, and it relies virtually exclusively on the ingenuity of their many arms workshops to turn the huge arsenals captured in and around Mosul into deadly weapons for use on the ever changing battlegrounds of Syria and Iraq, or simply for producing counter-measures against the Coalition's aircraft, which have so far denied the use of heavy weaponry by the Islamic State in several offensives.

The conversion of a BTS-5B armoured recovery vehicle (ARV) to a battle bus is such an example to turn an otherwise useless (to the Islamic State) vehicle into a potent weapons platform. Iraq acquired a number of BTS-5Bs in 2006 to serve alongside Iraq's increasing fleet of T-72s, but due to the inefficiency of the Iraqi Army the ARVs spent most of their service time languishing in forgotten corners of their bases. As a result, the Islamic State captured several ARVs near Mosul, including the WZT-2 and and BTS-5B seen below.

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Of little use to the Islamic State in its original role, the BTS-5B was heavily modified to transport an armoured cabin over its original body. For this purpose, the crane, the snorkel and various crates containing additional tools were removed. The dozer blade and winch were retained however.

Blocks of armour and plating were installed on top of the newly erected platform while rubber side skirts were fitted to protect the tracks. Combined, it provides the occupants with protection against most light and heavy small arms fire from the front and sides. As a result of the blockage of the driver's hatch by the support beams of the platform, the driver had to enter his seat by a hatch on the floor of the platform. The support beams also blocked the driver's viewing port, forcing the driver to stick his head out while maneuvering the vehicle. Armoured glass was installed to make up for this increase of vulnerability however.

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Armament consists of a shielded pintle-mounted 12.7mm DShK and several mounts for light-machine guns. The occupants also made use of M16s and AKMs to complement the single DShK during the vehicle's first and only use on the battlefield. All in all, the conversion was an impressive project which must have cost the Islamic State a large amount of man hours to accomplish, which is also why its poor battlefield career comes as somewhat as a surprise.






The battle bus could have been put to good use in urban environments, where the vehicle would have been used as a heavily armoured battering ram capable of providing fire-support to advancing troops. Its flexible, albeit light, armament would have been ideally suited for targeting elevated areas such as higher floors of flats, with its armour warding of retaliatory fire. Instead, the fighters of the Islamic State used the battle bus on the open plains near Shekhan, Nineveh Governorate, where the Islamic State waged an offensive against entrenched Peshmerga forces on the 25th of January 2015.

Shekhan was the site of a series of heavy attacks by the fighters of the Islamic State. The typical pattern of such an attack would include one vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED) followed by an attack with M-1114s, Badger ILAVs or M1117 ASVs. As Peshmerga forces held the high-ground, and saw the vehicles coming from miles away, the exact logic behind these attacks remains unclear, especially after MILAN ATGMs reached the Peshmerga forces. It might serve as a testimony to the fact that although the fighters of the Islamic State are often quick to adapt to any combat situation, including operating armoured fighting vehicles in coordinated attacks, comprehension of suitable tactics in this situation remained beyond the Islamic State fighters' grasp in this region.

During the attack on Shekhan, several (up-armoured) M-1114s, one up-armoured Badger ILAV, one M1117 ASV and the battle bus moved up to the nearby mountain. Although under heavy fire from anything from small arms to RPGs and even tank fire, most of these rounds either missed or ricocheted from the vehicle's improved DIY armour. As a result, several vehicles managed to advance close to the mountain before being taken out. The battle bus on the other hand got stuck in a ditch, was hit by an RPG and probably also a mortar round, killing its exposed crew. Although this ended the career of a potent DIY armoured fighting vehicle, it also serves as a good example of the extent of the Islamic State's efforts towards increasing the firepower of its combatants. Footage of the failed attack can be viewed here.



Images by Matt Cetti-Roberts.

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From Russia with Love, Syria's PKP Pechenegs



The PKP 'Pecheneg' machine gun is undoubtedly one of the most elusive types of firearms currently in use in the Syrian Civil War. With only one-hundred Pechenegs believed to have been ordered and delivered to Syria back in 2013, it has not yet been sighted in use with regime forces on the Syrian battlefields in any image or video available to the public. Although the low numbers of PKPs delivered is at least partially responsible for its elusiveness, the Pecheneg has only been adopted by Syria's secretive special forces, whose operations have so far mainly been limited to the shadows.

The list of weapons, ammunition and equipment requested by the Army Supply Bureau of the High Command of the Syrian Arab Republic to Russia's Rosoboronexport in early 2013 included one-hundred ''PK'' machine guns with a bipod, almost certainly referring to the PKP instead of the older PKM. The Pechenegs were believed to have been delivered a some time later along with five million 7.62x54mmR rounds destined to be used by the PKP and PKM.

Along with the AK-104 carbine, the ВПО-205-03 (Vepr-12) fully automatic shotgun and a host of other weapons, the PKP Pecheneg was also believed to have been inspected by the Syrian military delegation visiting the 2012 Russian weapons expo, which in turn led to the acquisition of a wide range of small arms optimized for the highly versatile combat environment seen in Syria in the past four years.








The PK series of machine guns remains incredibly popular throughout the world, with the many factions involved in the Syrian Civil War being no exception. Apart from serving in its traditional role as a general-purpose machine gun, other variants currently also see use as coaxial machine guns in tanks, IFVs and APCs and even as door-mounted machine guns in helicopters.

Bearing close resemblance to the design of its older brother on which it is based; the PKM. The Pecheneg was designed with the experiences from Afghanistan and Chechnya in mind. Chambered in 7.62x54Rmm, the PKP is claimed to be capable of a sustained rate of fire of up to 600 rounds without overheating and potentially damaging the barrel. The PKPs delivered to Syria are of the 6P41N 'Pecheneg-N' variant, meaning they come with a special mounting rail for night-vision sights.

The continuous flow of both offensive and defensive Russian-made weaponry that reaches Syria on a regular basis will assuredly lead to new sightings of even more advanced weapons and equipment never thought to have reached Syria in the past.

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Houthis continue to fire ballistic missiles at Saudi Arabia


After launching a R-17 Elbrus/Hwasŏng-5/6 (Scud-B) on the 6th of June 2015 against Khamis Mushait in Saudi Arabia and another R-17 Elbrus/Hwasŏng-5/6 against al-Sulayyil missile base on the 29th of June 2015, elements of the Yemeni Army loyal to former president Ali Abdullah Saleh and the Houthis again fired a ballistic missile at Saudi territory. This operation, carried out on the 20th of August 2015, saw a Tochka missile being fired at the Saudi Naval Base near Jizan, the results of which remain as of yet unknown.

Although all of Yemen's Transporter Erector Launchers (TEL) used for launching ballistic missiles were thought to have been destroyed along with the existing stock of R-17 Elbrus, Hwasŏng-5/6 and Tochka missiles at the site housing the Group of Missile Forces of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Yemen, footage coming out of Yemen's 'Amran Governorate on the 17th of May 2015 showed a battered but intact MAZ-543 TEL transported towards the Saudi border in broad daylight. This confirmed the rumours that some TELs were hidden away from the ballistic missile site in order to escape destruction by Coalition airstrikes.

Despite the fact that the TEL missed two of its wheels, it apparently succeeded in launching two missiles against Saudi territory. Both of the missiles were succesfully intercepted by Patriot batteries of the Royal Saudi Air Defense however, resulting in the destruction of both missiles before hitting their intended targets. The single MAZ-543 TEL was then said to have been destroyed by Coalition airstrikes, which explains the fact that that no R-17 Elbrus/Hwasŏng-5/6 has been launched since.

Despite this, sources claimed that no less than twenty ballistic missiles were fired at Saudi territory, only 40 percent of which intercepted by the Royal Saudi Air Defense Patriot batteries.[1] These additional launches have not taken place however, and the official might have been confused by counting 122mm BM-21, 220mm BM-27 and DIY al-Najim al-Thaqib rocket strikes as ballistic missile strikes.

Other reports stated that the Royal Saudi Air Force (RSAF) commander Muhammad bin Ahmed al-Shaalan was killed when a R-17 Elbrus/Hwasŏng-5/6 missile hit Khamis Mushait, although he actually passed away due to a heart attack while on a work trip abroad. The to be expected 'dozens of Israeli officers alongside dozens of Saudi counterparts were killed when a Scud missile hit Khamis Mushait' rhetoric deserves no further attention.






As with the filmed R-17 Elbrus/Hwasŏng-5/6 launch, great effort has been put into hiding the exact location of the launcher, which has to be very close to the Saudi border considering the limited range of Yemen's Tochka missiles. The OTR-21 launcher itself must have been transported up North in the previous weeks or months, remaining out of sight of the Coalition's aircraft. The launcher, reading the Houthi's slogan of 'Death to America, Death to Israel, Cursed be the Jews and Victory for Islam' (which can also be heard in both launch videos), appears completely intact.

It is unknown how large the Houthi's stock of Tochka missiles still is, but given the fact the Houthis already managed to transport a R-17 Elbrus/Hwasŏng-5/6 missile to its associated TEL twice, only constant monitoring of the roads in Northern Yemen will prevent further launches. Alternatively, more Tochka missiles are already present at the launch site, requiring destruction of the TEL to prevent any further launches.

The sudden appearance of the OTR-21 came completely unexpected, and makes one wonder if this is the last of the intact launchers. However, due to the Tochka's limited range, other major Saudi cities remain out of firing range. Although looking impressive, the launch mainly serves as a propaganda stunt, and will in no way deter the Coalition to abandon its campaign.

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The Islamic State going DIY, from earthmover to earthbreaker




The vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED) has been made famous by the fighters of the Islamic State in Syria and Iraq over the past two years. One could even argue the Islamic State perfectionized the concept by constantly building and deploying better protected and even larger variants on the battlefields of Syria and Iraq. From using radio-controlled toy cars to even tanks and self-propelled artillery to carry explosives, the Islamic State has done it all.

The VBIED in Islamic State service functions somewhat the same as airstrikes, artillery fire and rocket barrages in conventional military forces. Apart from having the potential to inflict heavy damage on the convoy or base, it also serves as a psychological weapon, terrifying and demoralizing any defenders still alive after the blast. In its assaults on well-defended bases, the Islamic State relies heavily on VBIEDs before initiating the final push. With this in mind, the Islamic State has now begun using massive earthmovers as VBIEDs.

Images coming out of Islamic State-held al-Quaryatayn, located in between Damascus and T4 airbase shows one of such massive earthmovers in its new role as earthbreaker.

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In an effort to protect the driver and the front wheels, the earthmover was equipped with very rudimentary DIY armour consisting of armour plates and what one could call slat armour. To ensure good situational awareness with such a heavy vehicle, the windows of the earthmover are extremely large, exposing the driver of the already giant vehicle to machine-gun fire. To protect him, a window was cut in the armour plate with 'slat-armour' installed in front.

The observant viewer of the Islamic State's offensive into Central Syria in late May 2015 will have little problems recognizing the earthmovers, which were captured at the Khunayfis Phosphate mine when it was overrun by the Islamic State. Around a dozen earthmovers were present at Khunayfis when the fighters of the Islamic State took over the mine, ensuring a steady supply of more earthmovers for conversion to VBIEDs for the time to come. A row of earthmovers at the mine can be seen below.

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This particular example was used against the al-Mafraq checkpoint North-East of al-Quaryatayn, a mere fifty-kilometers drive from Khunayfis. Although located only thirty-five kilometers away from T4 airbase, housing three fighter-bomber squadrons and a detachment of Mi-8/17 helicopters, the giant earthmover apparently arrived at its destination 'safely' and was put into use against the checkpoint at night, the results of which remain and will undoubtedly remain unknown. The resulting blast however can be seen below.

The giant basket of the earthmover allows for an almost unlimited amount of explosives to be carried towards its target. In fact, the question is if the fighters of the Islamic State stationed near Khunayfis and al-Quaryatayn are able to scrounge enough ordnance together to completely fill at least one of the baskets in the first place.

With around a dozen earthmovers captured, of which about half still in operational condition or in a sate to be made operational, and with plenty of targets in Central Syria left, we might see more of such giants rolling through the vast Syrian desert. Although capable of carrying enough explosives to create a second al-Hota, its large size will likely result in it being target practise for any well-defended checkpoint.

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From Russia with Love, Syria's BTR-82As


Just days after the sighting of several BTR-80 variants among other military equipment bound for Syria onboard the Russian Navy ship Nikolay Filchenkov, an Alligator-class landing ship of Russia's Black Sea Fleet, more advanced Russian-made weaponry has apparently found its way to Syria, with the sighting of BTR-82s being the latests in a series of ill-reported weapon deliveries to the war torn country.

Footage of the Lattakia offensive shows the presence of at least one BTR-82A infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) taking part in the offensive aimed at recapturing previously lost territory in North-Eastern Lattakia. The offensive is conducted jointly by the National Defence Force (NDF), Syrian Arab Army (SyAA), and the Republican Guard, the latter of which only recently deployed to the Syrian Coast in such large numbers. Along with its T-72s, BMP-2s and 152mm 2S3 Akatsiya self-propelled howitzers, the Republican Guard arrived here in mid June 2015. It can be expected that the delivery of BTR-82s to the Republican Guard occured at the same time. The arrival of the Republican Guard greatly boosted the firepower of the National Defence Force, tasked with defending the region and mostly armed with ageing weaponry that was previously stored. In fact, the NDF was even forced to use 100mm KS-19 anti-aircraft guns as conventional artillery during previous offensives.

Syria was known to have received a limited number of BTR-80s from Russia in late 2013 or early 2014 under the chemical weapons removal deal, although none of the vehicles tasked with transporting and defending the chemical weapons were ever returned to Russia. At least two different versions of BTR-80s were previously sighted in Syria, with several BTR-80s of an unknown variant spotted onboard theNikolay Filchenkov. The previously unknown delivery of BTR-82s thus makes up either the third or fourth BTR-80 variant to have entered Syrian service.

The camouflaged BTR-82A comes with the tacitcal number ''111''. This opposed to the identification system seen on Syrian military vehicles already in service for longer periods of time. The BTR-80s delivered under the chemical weapons deal were all painted olive drab without any tactical markings. 


Delieveries of military equipment to Syria are undertaken by Russian Navy landing ships, sailing from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean on a regular basis. While opposed to the Assad regime, almost all of the military equipment delivered to the regime passes right through Turkey's largest city. Just 3 days ago, on 20 August, landing ship Nikolay Filchenkov passed through Istanbul carrying trucks and armoured vehicles on its deck. The presence of the vehicles on deck was notable, as equipment was previously only carried in the cargo bay and thus out of sight when passing the Bosphorus. This likely means that the batch of vehicles being sent to Syria under this deal was so big that it simply didn't fit in the cargo bay alone!

The long-barrelled 2A72 30 mm autocannon easily distinguishes the BTR-82A from the standard BTR-80 armed with 14.5 mm KPVT heavy machine gun. The differences with BTR-80A, an older model with the same 2A72 cannon are of a more subtle nature.

The main difference is the presence of the TKN-4GA-02 night-vision device on top of the BTR-82's turret, replacing the BTR-80's TPN-3 night-vision device. A second identification point is the different exhaust, which can also be seen below.

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The recent delivery of BTR-82s to Syria will not have any significant impact on the day-to-day operations on the battlefields of Syria. While fairly capable for a wheeled IFV, the BTR-82A is only protected against small arms fire and thus anti-tank guided missiles (ATGMs) such as the TOW will have no problems pentrating its paper-thin armour.

The delivery mainly serves as a reminder of Russia's commitment to support the Assad regime, meaning deliveries of other vehicles and weapons systems are likely in the future. With the supply of brand-new looking T-72AVs still sporting all explosive reactive armour (ERA) titles appearing infinite, the Syrian Arab Air Force (SyAAF) remaining capable of supressing rebel groups and flying desperate revenge strikes on recently lost towns in addition to the string of articles of recently delivered Russian weaponry seen below, Russia's commitment to keeping the Assad regime in power continues to be greatly underestimated and might be far larger than anyone previously expected.

Special thanks to PFC_Joker, Laszlo Miko and Bosphorus Naval News.

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New evidence proves Russian military directly engaging in Syrian Civil War

The regime's offensive in the Lattakia Governorate continues to reveal previously unknown details about Russia's involvement in the Syrian Civil War. Apart from the sighting of recently delivered Russian BTR-82A infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs), new evidence now confirmes Russian military personnel has a key role in leading the offensive on the ground.

Sound fragments heard in a news report from the Media Wing of the National Defence Force (NDF) covering the offensive in Lattakia, which was also the first to reveal the presence of BTR-82As in Syria, confirm earlier accounts of Russian military personnel being sent to Lattakia in support of the ongoing regime operations in this area. Together with the Syrian Arab Army (SyAA) and the recently arrived Republican Guard, the NDF launched a new offensive aimed at recapturing territory previously lost to the rebels in North-Eastern Lattakia. If it proves successful, the offensive will greatly enhance the regime's control over its currently endangered heartland, and provide a serious blow to rebel forces.

The conversation is difficult to hear due to the booming noise coming from the BTR-82A's 30mm 2A72 autocannon, yet certain phrases can be made out, including calls to resume fire support and at some point "Павлин, павлин, мы выходим", which translates to "Peacock, Peacock, we are moving out" (Peacock presumably being a callsign).

A translation from 2:03 to 2:30 of the video is provided below:

2:03: ''Давай!'' - Give me/Come on!

2:06: ''Бросай!'' - Throw!

2:10: "Ещё раз! Ещё давай!'' - Once again! Do it again!

2:30: "Павлин, павлин, мы выходим" - Peacock, Peacock [callsign], we are moving out.

Although only little of the conversation is heard, it appears to be directed at the crew of the BTR-82A, implicating the vehicle was in fact operated by Russian military personnel.However, when the subject of Russian personnel being sent to Syria was raised on the 4th of August to Vladimir Putin's press secretary, following comments made by the head of Russia's Airborne Troops, he reportedly denied requests of such nature had been made by the Syrian regime.

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Interestingly, this is not the first indication of Russian ground involvement in the Syrian Civil War this month. The news website Souria Net reported on the 12th of August that Russian military personnel was dispatched to the village of Slanfah (some 30 kilometres East of Lattakia) to defend against the rebels' advance on the primarily Alawite ground.

Consequently, the pro-regime newspaper al-Watan ("The Homeland") published an article on the 26th of August claiming Russia is expanding its presence in Syria by constructing a new military base in Jablah, a coastal city in the Lattakia Governorate some 25 kilometres South of Lattakia itself. The same article mentions a variety of rumours and conspiracy theories regarding Western and Russian meddling in the Syrian Civil War including the much-publicised but ultimately false story of the deliveryof six Russian MiG-31 interceptors last month, as well as the supposed start of handing satellite imagery to pro-regime forces by Russia. Although no evidence towards the the provision of satellite imagery has been found before, it is known that Russia supported the Syrian regime both prior to and during the Civil War with signals intelligence (SIGINT) through its Center-S, S-2 and (presumably) S-3 intelligence gathering facilities, the first of which was captured on the 5th of October 2014.

The news also coincides with an upsurge of sightings of Russian-made drones in Syrian skies, further indicating the initiation ofnovel intelligence programmes in recent months.

While the fact that Russian military contractors have operated in Syria before might lead one to argue the conversation in Russian might not have been made by Russian military personnel, it should be noted that the probability of such contractors operating an advanced weapons system like the BTR-82A are very slim. Additionally, the Russian government actually forbids the deployment of contractors in Syria, and the FSB detained the leadership of the so-called Slavonic Corps upon return to Russia (which was in October 2013). Of course, the statements made by Syrian media corroborate the notion of Russian enlisted personel in Syria, further undermining any arguments that could be made towards the theory that the exchange in the video was made by private military contractors.

Obviously, this evidence of secretive Russian military involvement in Syria does not represent an isolated occurance: much-publicised reports of Russian military personnel operating in the Ukraine and years of unabating (even increasing) support to the Syrian regime serve as a testament to Russia's dedication towards protecting its foreign interests, even if this means getting directly entangled in open conflict. The fact that such a stealthy intervention now appears to be occurring once again increases the uncertainty of Syria's future, and may spell the onset of much wider Russian participation in a war that nears its half-decade mark.

Special thanks to PFC_Joker.


The fall of Abu ad-Duhor airbase, the Civil War's longest siege comes to an end



After having been beleaguered for close to three years, Abu ad-Duhor airbase has finally been captured by rebels, mainly of the al-Nusra Front, on the 9th of September 2015. Battling the longest siege of the Syrian Civil War, the fall of the airbase ultimately proved to be inevitable. Abu ad-Duhor is now the eight airbase to have fallen to the numerous factions opposing the regime, and leaves the Syrian Arab Air Force (SyAAF) with fifteen operational airbase to conduct sorties from.

Although often rumoured to still be housing operational aircraft and helicopters flying sorties over Syria's Idlib Governorate, the last operational airframes left Abu ad-Duhor months prior to its fall. Fully aware that the fall of the airbase was imminent, and with tactical insight normally not seen within the ranks of the Syrian military's high command, the decision was made to evacuate the remaining few operational MiG-23MFs, MiG-21MFs and MiG-23bis's to Hama airbase. Although an impressive sight, most of the more eighteen derelict airframes seen on Google Earth as well as in images and videos were abandoned ten to fifteen years ago. The fall of Abu ad-Duhor will thus have little to no effect on the SyAAF's ability to exercise control over the Syrian skies.

As Abu ad-Duhor was completely cut off from the rest of regime-held territory, the task of resupplying the airbase was in the hands of the SyAAF, which mainly used An-26s and Mi-8/17s to bring in anything from food to weapons, an ever more hazardous taskover time as rebels continued to move closer to the perimeter of the airbase. Several helicopters were shot down, destroyed or damaged throughout the years, along with the loss of two MiG-21s and one An-26.

The storming of Abu ad-Duhor airbase coincided with the huge freak sandstorm blazing through the Middle East, which prevented the SyAAF from flying sorties in support of the defenders. Even still, it was the constant bombardment, the attrition caused by the nearly three years of besiegement and the numerical superiority of the rebels that ultimately led to the capture of the airbase. While the majority of the defenders were captured or killed, a small part fled towards regime-held territory. The commander of Abu ad-Duhor, Ihsan al-Zuhouri, was reportedly killed in action.



Abu ad-Duhor was home to 678 Squadron flying the MiG-23MS, MiG-23MF and MiG-23UB, and to an unknown Squadron flying the MiG-21MF, MiG-21bis and MiG-21UM. Originally received in 1973 and undoubtedly one of the worst military aircraft in history, the MiG-23MS was at the end of its (already stretched) lifespan at the turn of the century. 678 Squadron slowly winded down operations throughout the early 2000s and the MiG-23MS was formally decommissioned around 2005, leaving just a couple of MiG-23MFs, MiG-23UBs and the MiG-21s as the only operational assets at the airbase. One of the MiG-23MS's '1614' in better times can be seen below.

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The first serious attempt to capture Abu ad-Duhor already occurred on the 30th of April 2013, when fighters of the Free Syrian Army managed to penetrate the perimeter of the airbase. The defenders succeeded in repelling the Free Syrian Army however, ending the first attempt that infiltrated the airbase. The defensive lines were reinforced immediately thereafter, and fenced off every assault in the following months. The fighters of the Free Syrian Army struck the airbase with an 9M131 (9K115-2 Metis-M) ATGM on the 7th of March 2012, damaging one of the already inoperational MiG-23MS's, which was later encountered again when Free Syrian Army fighters stormed the base. 

Nearly five-kilometers in length, the perimeter of Abu ad-Duhor was almost impossible to defend without any high structures overlooking the flat terrain surrounding the airbase. Much of of the villages and farms around the airbase were already leveled to deny the rebels any cover. The thirteen Hardened Aircraft Shelters (HAS), most of which now empty, were turned into strongholds, holding groups of defenders with various light and heavy weaponry. Heavy machine-guns and ATGMs were installed on top of the HAS's, providing the defenders with a clear field of fire. The presence of these HAS's played a significant role in the airbase's nearly three year long survival.

The defenders could count on the support of several tanks and armoured fighting vehicles attached to the several checkpoints along the perimeter, which could also be deployed as a
quick-reaction force. Indeed, although besieged, the defenders of Abu ad-Duhor left the airbase several times to conduct raids against enemy positions, mostly to neutralise the rebels' artillery. In their attacks on the airbase, al-Nusra Front (including many Tribesmen from rural Deir ez-Zor who fled from the Islamic State) lost several tanks to the defenders, some of which were then turned against their previous owners.




Although the airbase won't provide the rebels with large amounts of weaponry and ammunition, the capture does represent a serious boost of morale for the rebels. The sight of a captured MiG aircraft, operational or not, remains a symbol of victory. In terms of (useful) ghaneema (spoils of war), Abu ad-Duhor provided the rebels with several tanks, armoured fighting vehicles, one ZSU-23, several 130mm M-46 field-guns, anti-aircraft guns, trucks and small arms and ammunition. As taking images of aircraft and helicopters is more popular than taking images of vehicles, and as it remains unknown how much of the vehicles and equipment was evacuated by the fleeing defenders, real numbers on the captured equipment are hard to come by. Ten ATGMs captured in one of the HAS's are actually empty canisters, comprising three 9M111 Fagots, five 9M113 Konkurs, and two 9M131 Metis-Ms.









As could be expected, much of the fleet of vehicles and equipment once used for operating jet aircraft was also captured. The damage and rust on these vehicles show that operating fighter aircraft ultimately became nigh impossible here, and was aborted with little care.


The many rocket pods and air-to-air missiles once used by Abu ad-Duhor's resident MiG-21s and MiG-23s were also found littered throughout the Hardened Aircraft Shelters. As the fuel that would have been used should they have chosen to evacuate these rocket pods and missiles is more valuable than the equipment itself, they were left at the airbase. As a result, dozens of UB-16 and UB-32 rocket pods were found still standing besides their former mounts. Although perfect to install on trucks to be used as ground-based MRLs, none of the associated 57mm S-5 rockets were believed to have been captured, rendering the UB-16/32s useless.








As can be seen below, about a dozen multiple ejector racks (MERs) were captured as well. 


Semi-active radar homing R-23R and infrared guided R-23T air-to-air missiles can be seen below. Once arming Abu ad-Duhor's MiG-23MFs, most were still wrapped in their protective cover they arrived in when they were delivered roughly 35 years ago.




The MiG-23MF's secondary armament, short-ranged R-60M air-to-air missiles. Once to be used in a war against Israel, they are now collecting dust as the Civil War has completely taken away their use.


Several of the SyAAF's indigenously designed chaff/flare launchers along with boxes holding even more air-to-air missiles and rocket pods. Numerous drop tanks for the MiG-21s and MiG-23s were also found, most of them apparently used as target practise.


Undoubtedly the most interesting yet least useful spoils of war are the seventeen fighter-jets and two helicopters found at Abu ad-Duhor, a find which is on a par with the eighteen MiG-21 airframes captured by the fighters of the Islamic State at Tabqa. The condition of the airframes range from cut into half to roughly intact and everything in between.

678 Squadron provides the bulk of the airframes, with eleven MiG-23MS', two MiG-23UBs and one MiG-23MF found in the North-Western part of the airbase. It is here where the majority of the MiG-23s were dumped since their decommissioning in the 2000s.



MiG-23UB '1750' was recently moved from the other scrapyard (a part of which seen above) to the larger aircraft dumping area. Supposedly deemed still operational by the rebels, it was hit by an ATGM, further damaging the already derelict airframe. Two holders for chaff/flare launchers can be seen on the MiG-23MS in front. 

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Arguably the most worn airframe of all, with even its camouflage pattern completely washed out, can be seen below. As evident by the symbol left of its nose, this MiG-23MS was once overhauled by 'The Factory', the SyAAF's overhaul and maintenance facility at Neyrab airbase/Aleppo IAP.






MiG-23MF '3677' was the only aircraft of this type that was not evacuated to Hama months ago. The remaining technicians were likely unable to repair its tail after it was hit by an ATGM, and decided to leave it as it would be largely useless to its captors anyway. This was the third airframe to have been hit by an ATGM, with every missile striking the tail of the aircraft. Of course, as both other aircraft were already inoperational when they were struck, it is also the only case where the ATGM strike achieved its goal.



A total of four MiG-21s were captured at Abu ad-Duhor (excluding the MiG-21F-13 gateguard), comprising two MiG-21MFs, one MiG-21bis and one MiG-21UM. All were inoperational for at least one and a half year, and thus unable to evacuate to Hama as well.

Seen above and below is MiG-21MF '1518', one of the more intact looking aircraft found at Abu ad-Duhor. The sole MiG-21UM can be found in the left shelter of the HAS below. In the second picture, MiG-21MF '1942'.


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The single MiG-21bis found in the other part of the HAS. All aircraft had their guns removed prior to the fall of the airbase, presumably cannibalised and flown to Hama for use in the few remaining operational MiG-21MFs and MiG-21bis'.

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Two Mi-8s were also encountered, one of which, Mi-8 '1282' was fitted with a minelaying system and probably saw action near Abu ad-Duhor before ending up on the local scrapyard after getting damaged in combat. In the back, the same MiG-23MS described earlier, clearly showing its tail end scattered apart in the grass.



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The other Mi-8, victim of an ATGM attack or mortar fire. The ensuing fire that consumed the airframe made sure it would never fly again. 


Despite the amount of airframes found at the site, the capture of the airbase itself won't have any significant effect on the SyAAF's aerial campaign over Syria. In fact, one could argue the capture actually gives the SyAAF some much needed breathing space, considering it is now relieved of the task of supplying the sizeable garrison which was stationed at Abu ad-Duhor. However, the fall of the airbase is an important reminder of the fact that survival, let alone victory, is far from secured for the Assad-regime: a fact that has not gone unnoticed to its supporters abroad.

Sighting of R-166-0.5 signals vehicle affirms inflow of Russian military into Syria

The past few days have seen a steep increase of evidence revealing the true extent of direct military involvement by the Russian military on the ground in Syria. The sighting of recently delivered Russian UAVs and Russian BTR-82A infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs) in addition to sound fragments confirming Russian military personnel directly participated in one of regime's offensives in the Lattakia Governorate all proved Russia was deeper involved in the Syrian Civil War than many previously thought.

The true extent of Russia's commitment in aiding the regime was further revealed by the frequent transits of a large number of Russian landing ships bound for Syria through the strait of Bosphorus along with at least fifteen flights made by Russian Air Force An-124s strategic airlifters to Lattakia. These ships and aircraft brought large numbers of vehicles, equipment and personnel to Syria. In order to house the Russian contingent, Hmeemeem/Bassel al-Assad IAP has been turned into a Russian military base and is currently being reconstructed to allow the deployment of land and air assets.

Newly published images showing a Russian R-166-0.5 (ultra) high-frequency signals (HF/VHF) vehicle driving through Syria's coastal region now leaves little to no doubt on Russia's intentions in Syria. The R-166-0.5 provides jam-resistant voice and data communications over a long range, enabling Russian troops to communicate with their bases in the coastal strongholds of Tartus and Lattakia while operating far inland.

The vehicle can be seen escorted by Syrian military personnel, likely belonging to the National Defence Force (NDF). Far more interesting however is the soldier sitting near the open hatch of the vehicle. Seemingly unaware that a photo is being taken, he is wearing the Russian Army's standard digital flora uniform, once again proving that we're truly dealing with Russian military personnel.

On the rear of the vehicle, darker olive paint has been used to conceal the tactical number of the R-166-0.5, eliminating any chance to identify the brigade the vehicle belongs to. Concealing the tactical number or any other identification marks became standard practice during the Ukrainian conflict.



According to an unofficial Russian Army brigade TOE (Table of Organization & Equipment), a total of eight R-166-0.5 signals (HF/VHF) vehicles equip the communications battalion of a brigade. The sighting of the R-166-0.5 thus means that a brigade HQ or, at least, a reinforced battalion (so-called Battalion Tactical Team) of Russian combat troops has recently arrived in Syria.

Some of the specifications of the R-166-0.5 (an example operated by the Russian Army can be seen below) as translated from this Russian Army fact-sheet:

Max range:

HF, stationary (with deployed antenna) – up to 1000 km
HF, on the move – up to 250 km
UHF, stationary – up to 70 km
UHF, on the move – up to 25 km

Frequency range:

HF – 1.5-29.99999 MHz
UHF – 30-107.975 MHz"


As new information on Russia's secretive operation in Syria continues to come to light, the deployment to Syria is yet to be strongly condemned by any nation. Although the U.S. has so far been watching with growing concern, warning Russia that its operation might further escalate the Syrian Civil War, it appears to have no real answer to the Russian operation in Syria. Unwilling to provide the Free Syrian Army with MANPADS, and with the majority of the mere sixty U.S. trained FSA fighters already out of action, the U.S. might have sidelined itself in Syria for good.

Yemeni fighting vehicles



This list only includes vehicles and equipment in service with Yemeni factions. Vehicles and equipment operated by the United Arab Emirates Army, Royal Saudi Land Force, the Saudi Arabian National Guard or other Coalition partners are not included in this list.

Note that because of the war currently raging in Yemen a lot of military equipment is being destroyed as well as acquired and created, meaning some entries listed here may soon no longer be appropriate. Instead of predicting the composition of the post war armed forces of Yemen, the goal of this list is to comprehensively catalogue the prewar Yemeni military as well as clarify what military equipment is currently available to Yemeni parties on the battlefield.

Civilian trucks towing military trailers are not included in the list.

Last updated on 21-9-2015.

Tanks

 

Armoured fighting vehicles

 

Infantry fighting vehicles

 

Armoured personnel carriers

 

Command vehicles

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    Soviet Union
    BTR-60PU
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    Soviet Union
    R-145BM

Military engineering vehicles

 

Tank destroyers


Towed artillery

 

Self-propelled artillery


Multiple rocket launchers (MRLs)

 

 Ballistic Missiles

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    Soviet Union
    9K52 Luna-M (All believed to have been decommissioned)
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    Soviet Union
    R-17 Elbrus "Scud-B" (Most destroyed during Operation Decisive Storm)
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    Hwasŏng-5/6 "Scud-B/C'' (Most destroyed during Operation Decisive Storm) 
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    Soviet Union
    OTR-21 Tochka(Most destroyed during Operation Decisive Storm)

 

Towed anti-aircraft guns

 

Self-propelled anti-aircraft guns

Self-propelled SAM systems

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    Soviet Union
    9K12 Kub (Most destroyed during Operation Decisive Storm)
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    Soviet Union
    9K31 Strela-1

 

Static SAM systems

 

Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs)

 

Radars

 

Trucks

 

Jeeps and MRAPs



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Russian Air Force joins Syrian War, advanced fighter-bombers spotted over Syria



Amid a range of reports of sightings of Russian military personnel and equipment used in combat in Syria, Russia's role in the conflict escalated sharply with the confirmation of Russian aircraft and armoured vehicles being flown in by the dozens. Coinciding with the renovation of Hmeemeem/Bassel al-Assad IAP for use as a Russian military base,Il-76 strategic airlifters or (more likely) Il-78 aerial refuelling planes have been sighted escorting military aircraft such as the Su-30SM and Su-24M2 over Syria, together with An-124 strategic airlifters reportedly carrying at least two Mi-17 and two Mi-24/35 helicopters amongst a range of other weaponry.

The airfield, formerly housing around a dozen Syrian Arab Air Force (SyAAF) Mi-14 and Ka-28 naval helicopters until their departurein recent weeks, is swiftly being expanded both in size by the construction of new helicopter pads and a taxiway as well as in its defensive structure to cope with the influx of Russian aircraft and equipment and help secure the base from any future rebel offensive. Although this expansion was previously noted by various media, it was not until the 19th of September that satellite imagery confirmed the presence of Russian fighter aircraft sitting unprotected on the runway, their shelters not having been built yet.

Aside from the four Su-30SM advanced jet fighters photographed at the time, video footage shows what appear to be another four Su-24 fighter-bombers closely escorting an Il-78 and possibly four more Su-27/30 aircraft flying in similar fashion above Northern Homs on the 20th and 19th of September respectively, highly likely heading for Hmeemeem/Bassel al-Assad IAP in closeby Lattakia as well. Because their flight to Syria takes them over airspaces closed to Russian military aircraft, such as that of Bulgaria and Turkey, the jets fly in close formation next to the accompanying Il-78, thereby avoiding detection by most radar systems. Another possibility is that the aircraft flew over the Caspian sea, through Iran and Iraq, a theory which would explain the approach taken by the planes over Homs but which would seem like a risky strategy considering the large amount of foreign aircraft currently active over Iraq and Syria. It is known the first batch of four Su-30SMs crossed Greek airspace however, so it is likely both routes are used.

An unconfirmed image from the 18th of September as well as comments made by a U.S. official on the deployment of four Russian Air Force Sukhoi jets to Syria suggest at least three batches of aircraft have so far been flown in: Together comprising four Su-30SMs, four Su-24M2s and another four as of yet unidentified aircraft, possibly also of the Su-30SM type. 







The Su-30SM brings with it capabilities previously unavailable to the SyAAF, and will allow the Russian Air Force (RuAF) to closely follow any offensives or defensive actions. Information acquired can be relayed back to ground-forces, the Su-30SM thus acting as a flying command platform. The wide array of both guided and unguided weaponry available to the Su-30SM makes it an extremely versatile aircraft well suited to the Syrian battlefield. However, the fact that these aircraft represent some of the most modern fighters in use by the RuAF, capable of both ground-attack sorties as well as air-to-air engagements, might allude to another reason for their choice. Having just concluded the first talks with U.S. counterparts on the Syrian conflict right before the first sighting of these fighters, their presence in Syria delivers a strong message to the world.

Although less capable than the Su-30SM, the stationing of Su-24M2s is little surprising given the SyAAF is also operating this variant, which were all recently upgraded from MK standard to M2 standard in Rzhev, Russia. 819 Squadron, responsible for operating the Su-24M2 in Syrian service, continues to fly with eleven operational airframes based at T4, Central Syria. The possible housing of RuAF Su-24M2s at this airbase would help ease logistics, and making use of the extensive infrastructure already available there would be a sensible choice.

This combined force has the capability of quickly changing the situation on the ground by mass bombardments, depending on the ultimate amount of aircraft stationed in Syria. Any rebel offensive could be stopped dead in its tracks, or their defences could be blown away during one of Russia's or the regime's offensives.

Other heavy equipment is reportedly being flown in at the same time, with previous satellite imagery dating back to September 15th reportedly showing some 26 APC/IFVs, 6 MBTs, four new helicopters and large amounts of trucks and other equipment scattered across the airfield. Photographs taken on the 17th of September at Novosibirsk show two Mi-24/35 helicopter gunships and at least one Mi-17 transport helicopter being loaded into an An-124 transport aircraft (serial RA-82035), which was subsequently tracked over Syria on the 18th before landing at Mozdok again in the evening, suggesting an intensive air bridge is currently active. The presence of Il-76 and An-124 transport planes on the satellite imagery of September 15th and reports of the dozens of flights to Syria such aircraft have been making the past month supports this theory, meaning the current inflow of weaponry might just be the start of a massive deployment of Russian forces to Syria.


The news of increased military involvement by the Russian Federation in the Syrian conflict certainly does not come out of the blue: A flurry of reports ranging from the downing of Russian drones in late July to the delivery of (likely Russian-operated) Pantsir-S1 air defence systems earlier this month all testify of what is shaping up to be a major surge in backing for the Syrian regime. Interestingly, videos first showing a recently delivered Russian BTR-82A IFV, later of an R-116-0.5 signals vehicle and now of two T-55s (one with a North Korean laser-range finder) in the Lattakia governorate all seem to show equipment being operated by (or in the last case, simply ridden by) Russian military personnel, indicating the Russian Army will be directly involved in combat situations. From these developments it is clear that Russia will not allow the regime to succumb from rebel offensives, and despite the fact that the war is far from being fought, it would appear the reality is that Assad will remain in power for the foreseeable future.

Further Russian Air Force reinforcements arrive in Syria, Su-25 'Frogfoots' join the fray




After the sighting of Su-30MS' and Su-24M2s over Syrian airspace just days ago, new satellite imagery acquired by Stratfor and AllSource Analysis dating from the 20th of September has now revealed the presence of twelve Su-25 'Frogfoots' being assembled at Hmeemeem/Bassel al-Assad IAP for a total of twenty Russian combat aircraft now confirmed to be deployed in Syria. Around the same time, U.S. officials claimed that no less than twenty-eight combat aircraft and up to twenty helicopters have now been stationed in Syria as part of wider Russian deployment of military personnel in Syria.

The aerial strength of this Russian expeditionary force now totals an impressive twelve Su-24M2 and four Su-30SM fighter-bombers and another twelve Su-25 ground-attack aircraft in addition to up to twenty helicopters, mainly Mi-24/35s and a few Mi-17s and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). The Su-24M2s have however not yet been seen on satellite imagery of Hmeemeem/Bassel al-Assad IAP, which may appear on later satellite imagery or have since been stationed elswhere, T4 being a logical choice considering it already houses the SyAAF's Su-24 fleet.

Reports of UAVs operating from Hmeemeem/Bassel al-Assad IAP are not surprising given the sheer size of the Russian contingent deployed in Syria. The first Russian UAVs were already spotted over Syria on the 21st of July 2015, a mission which might now have been expanded with larger types of UAVs.

Although inferior in numbers, the quality of Sukhoi strike force far extends that of the Syrian Arab Air Force (SyAAF), which now operates eleven Su-24M2s, around a dozen of MiG-29SMs and the remainder of the Su-22, L-39, MiG-21 and MiG-23 fleet. Despite still being a force to be reckoned with, it soldiers on in ever decreasing numbers, with remaining airframes becoming more worn by the day.

While the exact goals behind the mass deployment of Russian military personnel, equipment, vehicles and aircraft remain unknown, a sudden offensive spearheaded by Russia might result in completely different results then one undertaken by the regime. Another possibility is that Russia will refrain from a large scale deployment of troops to the frontline and instead will participate with its aerial assets first, which might reach up to fifty aircraft and helicopters in size in the coming days.




The Su-25s, all nicely lined up, represent an excellent Close Air Support (CAS) force, and could utilise their large payloads to provide continuing support to ground forces during any offensive. Especially when equipped with modern Russian guided munitions, these aircraft greatly improve upon the SyAAF's own ground attack capabilities, and are rugged enough to endure most of the light anti-air weaponry most parties in Syria can throw at it.

Jaish al-Islam has meanwhile been busy trying to strike the airbase with Grad rockets, already claiming to have hit a Russian transport aircraft on the 18th of September. It is unlikely however that any of the rockets fired in the direction of the airbase will actually hit it considering the distance to the base and accuracy of the rockets used. Given the fact all of the aircraft at the airfield are lined up neatly outside, it appears Russia does not worry too much about any rocket strikes yet. A threat to the civilian population of Lattakia, these multiple rocket launchers (MRLs) might be one of the first targets to be taken out however.

One can safely say that the deployment of Russian military forces to Syria means that the regime will be able to hold on to power, with any transition to a unity-government without Assad highly unlikely. Although appearing to be a military operation only, the deployment forces the opposition back to the negotiation table under much less favourable terms, a fact resounded in the so far mild international response to the move.

Syrian Special Forces spotted with British Accuracy International AWM sniper rifles



With Russian military support to the Assad party in Syria having been brought to an entirely new level in the past month and international media focussed on the influx of aircraft and armoured vehicles to Bassel al-Assad, little has yet been uncovered about the extent of new small arms deliveries to the regime. However, the Russian Vesti state-owned news channel aired footage of Syrian soldiers equipped with British-made Accuracy International Arctic Warfare Magnum (AWM) sniper rifles on the 27th of September, revealing a wider procurement policy than previously thought.

The Vesti reporter follows special forces elements as they launch their offensive into rebel-held parts of Harasta, a suburb of Damascus which has been the scene of heavy fighting since Jaish al-Islam launched its own offensive here in early September. The footage shows several tanks and armoured fighting vehicles firing at suspected rebel positions in conjunction with special forces sporting a variety of new weaponry and gear.



The specific rifle seen in the video sports a pistol-grip skin which was launched by Accuracy International in 2012, further emphasising the fact that the introduction of this type is indeed a recent development. Chambered in .338 Lapua Magnum, the AWM bolt-action sniper rifle was designed in 1996 and has since entered use with a range of countries including Russia and the United States. A testament to the weapon's capabilities, it was used by a British sniper team in Afghanistan in 2009 to set the current record for longest confirmed sniper kill on two Taliban fighters, at a distance of 2475 metres. The new pistol-grip skin mounted on the example found in Syria aims to incorporate the ergonomics of the newer AX series sniper rifles by trading the Chassis System stock for a more conventional pistol grip, losing weight in the process. The weapon's effective range is somewhat diminished by the suppressor seen attached to the muzzle brake in the video, but in the sniper-heavy environment of the Syrian battlefield it will surely help its operator remain undetected for much longer.



Other parts of the video show the usage of PKP 'Pecheneg' light machine guns by special forces members. At least one-hundred PKPs were believed to have been delivered to Syria back in 2013 for use by these special forces, but the 'Pecheneg' has been largely successful in avoiding public appearance, only being sighted in one instance before the airing of the new footage.



It appears that the regime's recent acquisitions were not limited to small arms however. Much of the individual gear of the soldiers appears to have been sourced from no other country than the U.S., and the American Under Armour sports clothing and accessories company in particular. While the choice for U.S. gear might seem awkward at first, plenty of U.S. and other Western-made firearms and gear still enter Syria on a daily basis, much of it through the black market in Lebanon. These Western firearms are mostly acquired by Alawites in the Coastal region, which have been preparing to defend themselves against any possible rebel incursion for years.

With small arms now flowing towards Syria from all corners of the world, it has become one of the most diverse battlefields in recent history, blending modern Russian-made shotguns and LMGs with British sniper rifles to American assault rifles and World War 2 era antiques. Given access to so many different types of weaponry, it is unlikely any party in the conflict will soon be running out of ways to combat its adversaries.


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Russia's participation in the Syrian War, the Su-34 'Fullback' has arrived

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The arrival of the Su-34 'Fullback' fighter bomber to Syria could be seen as imminent since the initial deployment of the first combat assets to Syria, and has now finally confirmed to have occurred in recent days. Six Su-34s are now believed to have joined the four Su-30SMs, twelve Su-24M2s and twelve Su-25s already present at Hmeemeem/Bassel al-Assad IAP, Lattakia Governorate.

In addition to thirty-four combat aircraft, up to twenty Mi-17s and Mi-24/35s, two Il-20s and at least three types of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) are now deployed in Syria. Especially the UAVs have been active in flying reconnaissance sorties over Idlib Governorate, indubitably soon to be if not already joined by the electronic intelligence (ELINT) configured Il-20s. Although already sighted over Idlib, the Su-24M2s have so far refrained from engaging rebel positions. The twelve Su-25s are currently being assembled and are busy with test flights after their delivery by An-124 strategic airlifters just a week ago.

The Su-34s on the other hand managed to reach Hmeemeem/Bassel al-Assad IAP on their power. The two examples seen below, both carrying a centreline drop tank allowing for extended range are believed to have been part of the contignent deployed to Syria. Both aircraft were photographed while flying over Mozdok on their way to Syria via the Caspian Sea, Iranian and Iraqi airspace.



Another image, this time from Syria, shows what looks like six fighter-bombers alongside an airliner over Idlib or Hama Governorate. The airliner appears to be a Russian Air Force (RuAF) Tu-154, likely used for escorting the six Su-34s on their way to Hmeemeem/Bassel al-Assad IAP.


Designed to deliver a wide range of both guided and unguided munitions, the Su-34 will provide the Russian expeditionary force with an excellent fighter-bomber with the range and capabilities to strike any target anywhere in Syria. In fact, the sheer quality of the Sukhoi force currently present in Syria is such an improvement over the assets currently available to the Syrian Arab Air Force (SyAAF) that it could be said the regime's aerial capabilities have entered another league entirely.

As construction works at Hmeemeem/Bassel al-Assad IAP continues and UAVs and Il-20s are meanwhile busy collecting data on the strength and location of rebel positions in Idlib Governorate, the RuAF's aerial assets are being prepared for their first sorties, and it seems that a first move by the Russian expeditionary force is just a matter of time.

Special thanks to Luftwaffe A.S. and ain92ru.


British Accuracy International AWM sniper rifles in Syria, From Russia with Love?

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While an earlier article already revealed the presence of British-made Accuracy International Arctic Warfare Magnum (AWM) sniper rifles with elements of Syria's secretive special forces in Harasta, Damascus, new information indicates these British sniper rifles were most likely delivered to Syria from Russia.

The example used by the Syrian Special Forces is different from the standard AWM seen in use with militaries and law-enforcement agencies throughout the world. Instead of the Chassis System (AICS) stock, it comes with a pistol-grip skin which was launched by Accuracy International in 2012. The skin incorporates the ergonomics of the newer AX series sniper rifles by incoprorating a conventional pistol grip, losing weight in the process.

While acquiring several AWM sniper rifles, albeit via the black market, would already prove a challenge for the Syrian military, acquiring these with the rare and very new pistol-grip skin would undoubtedly be beyond the capacities of the Army Supply Bureau of the High Command of the Syrian Arab Republic, which has so far limited its orders to Russian and Iranian sniper and anti-materiel rifles.

Unsurprisingly, Russia has so far been the only confirmed customer of the pistol-grip skin for the AWM, acquiring a limited amount for its special forces units. The AWM below is an example of a rifle equipped with this skin in Russia, lacking the suppressor seen mounted in Syria but with the same additional rails near the muzzle not usually seen on this weapon.

Aside from the attached suppressor, the example seen in Syria differs from the weapon above by its new desert paintjob, well suited to the terrain found around Damascus.The suppressor itself is another indication of the adjustments made to increase its effectiveness on the Syrian battlefields: remaining undetected for as long as possible is imperative in the sniper-heavy environment.




The fact that a one rare, recently introduced pistol-grip skin equipped AWM only confirmed to be operated by Russia turns up in Syria at the height of Russian involvement in the Syrian War is unlikely to be coincidence. As with the sighting of Italian Iveco LMVs operated by Russians, Western nations once interested in delivering weapons to Russia as part of their warming relationship might now look back with regret.

Special thanks to Abraxas Spa.

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Temporary suspension of posting


Dear reader,

You might already have noticed a lack of content this month, a situation which unfortunately will continue to perpetuate for some time to come. This is because we're currently fully committed to finishing our book on the North Korean military by the title of The Armed Forces of North Korea, on the path of Songun, which deprives us of most of the time normally spent on writing articles for Oryx Blog. Regular posting is expected to resume a few months into 2016, when most work on the book should be finished. We hope you can understand, and look forward to finally completing the culmination of years of extensive study of the DPRK and its armed forces.

Kind regards,

The authors of Oryx Blog

''North Korea’s Armed Forces: On the path of Songun seeks to bring order and coherence to the chaotic state of affairs in the intelligence community of North Korea-watchers, as well as to disprove the much-echoed stance that there is little to fear from the DPRK by providing information on a plethora of never-before described weapons systems and modernisation programmes.

North Korea’s Armed Forces maps the most important events from the inconclusive ceasefire struck at the end of the Korean War, throughout the Cold War until modern day, and an especially heavy emphasis is placed on the current status of the Korean People's Army by examining their wealth of indigenously designed weaponry. In the course of the book not only will many of the Korean People's Army’s most secret projects and tactics be unveiled, but also new light will be shed on the deadly flare-ups between the North and the South, and novel evidence on tragic incidents such as the Cheonan sinking and Yeongpyeong bombing of 2010 is brought forth. Moreover, an up-to-date, comprehensive listing of the equipment holdings of several branches of the Korean People's Army is included, offering a numerical assessment of its naval and aerial capabilities. From the recently introduced stealth missile boats, ballistic missile submarines and main battle tank families to their often-ignored indigenous aircraft industry, virtually all indigenous weapons systems are discussed extensively.

This exclusive content is illustrated by over forty detailed color artworks and various maps put together through exhaustive research and analysis, as well as around 170 unique images, many of which have never before been seen by the general public. Through scrutiny of satellite footage, the observation of North Korean propaganda outlets and by carefully examining information from the United States Department of Defense, the DPRK's advances in each of the Korean People's Army's respective branches are uncovered. Nearly all of the ’hermit kingdom’s’ military exploits are included and an accurate picture of the North's capabilities in both symmetrical and asymmetrical warfare is provided. This book was written specifically for anyone interested in North Korea's military capabilities or looking to find answers to many questions raised by the minefield of contradictory statements and misinformation that make up current intelligence about this reclusive nation.''

The Islamic State going DIY, 122mm D-30 howitzers used as anti-aircraft guns



Imagery recently released by the Islamic State's media office of Wilayat Ninawa in Iraq (Nineveh governorate) shows truck-mounted 122mm D-30 howitzers of the al-Farouq Platoon (of the Wilayat Ninawa Air Defence Battalion) firing at U.S. (E)P-3 maritime surveillance aircraft used for SIGINT missions over Mosul. The use of this weaponry, ordinarily used as conventional artillery against ground targets only, is highly notable, and highlights the Islamic State's severe lack of means to counter the Coalition's overwhelming air assets.

The images, captured in and around Mosul, the largest city under the Islamic State's control, depict U.S.-made Navistar International 7000 Series and M-35 trucks which have been modified to carry the Soviet-legacy 122mm D-30 howitzer. The M-35-based example appears to be housed in a hardened bunker, only being moved outside when a potential target appears. Furthermore, the truck has been outfitted with stabilisers and a mount to lower the howitzer into travel position. Other images show more conventional assets of the al-Farouq Battalion, including a 14.5mm ZPU-2, 23mm ZU-23-2, 37mm Type-65 and 57mm AZP S-60, all of which mounted on a variety of trucks.

Also shown are two shots fired by the truck mounted howitzers missing their intended target: A U.S. (E)P-3 Orion. These planes are being used for intelligence gathering and electronic warfare over Mosul, seriously hampering the Islamic State's ability to coordinate operations in Iraqi territory. The slow-flying (E)P-3s, often flying in circles over the city, must be a thorn in the eye of the Islamic State, which, in contrast with fast flying jets also used in the region, must appear as though they have a chance of shooting them down. Despite the fact that the high-powered artillery is capable of reaching the altitude at which these aircraft operate, the fact that their High Explosive (HE) munition lacks any type of anti-aircraft fuse means they have to score a direct hit on their target in order to disable it, an almost impossible feat to accomplish.


Although this practise might thus appear to be a waste of time and munition, the Islamic State is not the first to resort to such tactics. Indeed, the Mujahideen is known to have employed mortar- and RPG-fire against Soviet helicopters during the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and Iranian artillery targeted low-flying Iraqi helicopters during the Iran-Iraq War as well. Of course, neither of these cases resulted in any reported aircraft losses or even minor damage being done, most likely because the use of such weaponry (lacking time fuses) only results in either a complete destruction of the target or a complete miss.

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Still, the Islamic State is arguably the most inventive faction currently battling in Syria and Iraq, especially considering the fact that most of their weaponry is quickly targeted by Air Forces operating over the conflicted battlespace. Although certainly a desperate attempt to shoot down slow-flying enemy aircraft, it once again demonstrates the willingness of the Islamic Stateto dedicate resources to continue the fight, no matter the costs. Future posts will shed more light on DIY projects conducted by the Islamic State to improve its fighting capabilities, which have so far been severely underreported.




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North Korean Type-73 LMG sighted in Syria



After the sighting of North Korean Type-73 light machine guns (LMGs) in Iraq, it now appears several examples of this rare firearm have made their way to Syria with the deployment of the Iraqi Shiite militia Kata'ib al-Imam Ali to this country. Kata'ib al-Imam Ali's involvement in Syria has been centered around the regime's offensive in Northern Aleppo in February 2016, aimed at cutting off rebel forces North and North-East of Aleppo.

While it was already known the large number of Iraqi Shiite militias deployed to Syria brought their own equipment in from Iraq (even including U.S. M-1114s), the chances of one or more Type-73 LMGs being amongst these weapons was deemed to be quite small, especially when considering Iraq never was an operator of the Type-73. Indeed, it was Iran who supplied limited numbers of these LMGs to the various Shiite militias operating under the Popular Mobilization Forces umbrella organisation.

Iran originally received its Type-73s during the Iran-Iraq war in the early eighties, which forced Iran to look for a supplier that could provide Iran with various types of weaponry that could quickly be delivered: North Korea. Although the Type-73 served alongside its older brother, the PK(M), it appeared to have been discarded after enough Iranian PKMs were produced. One Type-73 with a stick magazine next to a PK(M) can be seen in the image below, taken during the Iran-Iraq War.

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The Type-73 is largely based on the Soviet PK light machine gun, but has been fitted with a very different feeding system capable of accepting both box and stick magazines, chambered for same the 7.62x54R cartridge used by the PK, ensuring munition for it is always available in conflict areas such as Syria and Iraq. While a large number were produced for the Korean People's Army, where it still sees use today, the machine gun's only documented export success is Iran. Other examples have been spotted in Zimbabwe and more recently Iraq, where it was in the hands of various Iran-backed militias including the aforementioned Kata'ib al-Imam Ali, which can be seen pictured with another Type-73 while posing next to dismantled IEDs below.



The images come amidst a flurry of newly confirmed North Korean armament in the Middle East, and shows just how pervasive the North's influence on the international arms trafficking market continues to be even as sanctions constrain its abilities more and more. When or where new evidence of North Korean weaponry will pop up next can only be guessed at, but the fact that it will is undeniable.

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North Korean HT-16PGJ MANPADS in Syria

By Stijn Mitzer and Joost Oliemans

Subject to severe sanctions for almost a decade, the proliferation of North Korean conventional armament on the international arms market is an often underreported topic, and many arms deals of the past are completely undocumented. Nonetheless, the traces of these deals still mark many of the world's conflict areas, and every once in a while new footage confirms North Korea's involvement in the international arms trade.

Alongside main battle tanks upgraded by the DPRK, various types of artillery, anti-tank guided missiles (ATGMs) and light machine guns (LMGs) already present in today's conflict hotspots, analysis of imagery of weaponry used in the Syrian Civil War shows the presence of North Korean man-portable air-defence systems (MANPADS) amongst various factions opposing the regime of president Bashar al-Assad. The sighting of this system has become common enough to suggest the scale of their initial delivery to the Assad regime was sizeable, although the fact that they are consistently identified as the similar Soviet Igla-1E (SA-16) system also used in Syria means they have largely remained unnoticed to this date.

A single example was first identified in August 2014 in the hands of a fighter of the Islamic State at Ksesh (which was captured from Jaish al-Islam in the summer of 2014), but further research has unveiled an entire batch of at least 18 launchers and their associated systems was captured by the Free Syrian Army and Kateeba al-Kawthar (originally an al-Qaeda-linked group) at Brigade 80 in Aleppo in February 2013. While no aircraft or helicopters are explicitely known to have been shot down by these missiles, their continued presence on the battlefield, most recently in the heavily embattled Lattakia Governorate suggests they are still functional.

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North Korean HT-16PGJ MANPADS with cap removed at Ksesh airbase, August 2014.


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Stash of North Korean HT-16PGJ MANPADS captured in Aleppo, February 2013.



















































Although MANPADS in general appear to be referred to as Hwaseong-Chong (Arquebus) in North Korea, it is thought the specific type exported to Syria is of their third or fourth indigenously developed generation. Early types copied from the Soviet 9K32 Strela-2 (SA-7) MANPADS (which might have donned the designation PGLM or CSA-3A) were likely developed in the 1980s, and what appears to have been an indigenous variant of the 9K34 Strela-3 (SA-14) was spotted as early as 1992. Development has ultimately resulted in a system which has only been identified in recent years, and which seems to have been derived from the Russian 9K38 Igla (SA-18). However, the MANPADS currently seen in Syria shares the most resemblance with the older 9K310 Igla-1 (SA-16) system, but with the characteristic tricone nose mounted on the missile replaced with the more modern aerodynamic spike also seen on the 9K38 Igla (SA-18) and 9K338 Igla-S (SA-24) systems it is likely its performance has been improved. The most significant other difference that allows the North Korean system to be discerned from it Soviet/Russian counterparts is the foreward placement of the thermal battery which powers the MANPADS. This component also determines whether the system is still operable; its depletion means the MANPADS has become useless, leading to several cases where factions desperate for anti-air defence have attempted to jury-rig their own batteries.

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North Korean HT-16PGJ MANPADS in Lattakia, 26th of November 2015. Right: The same MANPADS seen in a North Korean military parade.

Further imagery analysis reveals that the North Korean system spotted in Syria carries the designator
HT-16PGJ (the missiles alone HG-16), and that the specific examples captured at Brigade 80 were part of a contract dated the 1st of January 2004, meaning it is unlikely the shelf-life of the thermal batteries has yet run out. It is possible reports based on Western intelligence of a 2003 delivery by an unknown supplier (said to be Belarus) concerning some 300 Igla MANPADS actually refer to a deal surrounding the North Korean system, especially since the Igla has not yet been seen in Syria. If this is the case, it is likely even more MANPADS were acquired than reported as deliveries would have continued into the start of 2004. Indeed, careful study of the box containing the missiles reveals that no less than three-hundred boxes were delivered, containing two missiles each for a total of 600 HT-16PGJ MANPADS.

Despite the fact that the Syrian War has seen its fair share of MANPADS variants, ranging from Soviet-legacy Strela-2M, Strela-3s and Igla-1s to Chinese FN-6s supplied by Qatar through Sudan and Russian Igla-S' provided a few years before the start of the conflict, anti-air defence from the multitude of factions currently roaming the Syrian skies remains scarce. This has forced certain parties to go to extreme lengths to improvise some semblance of anti-air capabilities, and any MANPADS is to be considered a precious asset. Due to the capabilities of these systems, the West was reluctant to provide them to moderate Syrian rebels earlier in the war, fearing they might be smuggled out of the country and used to shoot down commercial airliners. Although such aircraft usually cruise at higher altitudes than can be reached by most MANPADS, a missile fired shortly after takeoff or before landing has shown to be a genuine threat in the past.

Although unlikely to be the most capable MANPADS system currently to be found on the Syrian battlegrounds (a title which belongs to the Russian Igla-S system), it is certainly more effective than the older Strela-2, Strela-3 and Igla-1 systems, and possibly even the Chinese FN-6, which was found to be unreliable by the rebels that used them. As the Russian Air Force continues to remain at the forefront of the aerial campaign against Assad's opponents throughout Syria, including the Lattakia governorate, any type of air-defence systems will be gladly embraced by rebel groups, no matter what their origins are. Whether more of these systems will pop up in the future of course remains to be seen, although the full extent of North Korean exports to nations across the world has likely to only just have begun to unravel, and development of new weaponry including MANPADS that could one day end up on the illegal arms trafficking market is still in progress.

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MANPADS' in use with the Korean People's Army. First three MANPADS from the left: Igla-1, North Korean HT-16PGJ also seen in Syria, Strela-3.


Special thanks to 'BM-21 Grad'.

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