Quantcast
Channel: Oryx
Viewing all 604 articles
Browse latest View live

Libya's MiG-25s, the mighty Foxbats fly again (2)

$
0
0


After recent satellite imagery confirmed that Libya Dawn has recently gotten at least one MiG-25 operational, or was in the progress of making it operational, a picture of the aircraft in question has now finally surfaced. In addition to this, satellite imagery confirms that Libya Dawn is working on making at least three other MiG-25s operational at Misrata. While previous analysis predicted Libya Dawn was likely to pick one of the ubiquitous MiG-25RB(T) or MiG-25PD(S) aircraft, the former of which can be equipped with multiple ejector racks (MERs) for carrying up to eight FAB-500Ts and the latter of which can carry R-40 and R-60 air-to-air missiles (AAMs), it now appears they instead went for one MiG-25PU twin-seat conversion trainer for the MiG-25PD(S).

The MiG-25PU by design has no radar or combat capabilities, and therefore seems like an odd choice for Libya Dawn's engineers to say the least. However, as the MiG-25PU's intended role is to prepare pilots to fly the MiG-25PD(S), it features two seats instead of one (one for the pilot and one for the instructor), resulting in an additional pair of eyes in the sky. It is also likely that the twin-seat conversion trainers are generally found in the best condition, and have flown the least number of flight hours of all MiG-25 variants formerly in Libyan service. The new twin-seater aircraft will not be the only trainer variant of their tiny fleet, which also features at least two Soko G-2 Galebs and several L-39s and is soon to be enlarged with one MiG-23UB and two Soko G-2 Galebs, all of which are twin-seater aircraft.

The newly overhauled aircraft seems to have only one pylon on each side (despite being originally outfittedwith two), carrying just a single FAB-500T for a total of two of the 500kg general purpose bombs, limiting the operational capabilities of the aircraft. However, the main problem it may face during bombing runs arises from the terrible accuracy usually associated with MiG-25 bombers, which was partially countered for MiG-25RBs outfitted for bombing runs by linking the navigation system with a bombing computer (also, as the MiG-25RB was originally supposed to deliver nuclear weapons only, accuracy wasn't of too great importance).

Satellite imagery of Misrata airbase, previously showing just one MiG-25 on the 31th of January 2015, now depicts no less than three MiG-25s on the 28th of February 2015. All the aircraft are believed to have been taken from al-Jufra, which housed the largest amount of MiG-25s when the type was still in active service. When the MiG-25's career in Libya ended in the 2003-2004 timeframe, most of the airframes remained stored in good conditionin their Hardened Aircraft Shelters (HAS), and were thus well protected against the relentless sun.


The aircraft formerly seen at Misrata was believed to have switched bases and was seen on the 24th of February at Mitiga. It was again seen on the 25th of March 2015 along with another example. This particular example is likely placed here as a decoy, and was previously seen stored on another part of the airbase.







The overhaul of these aircraft is conducted by a team of foreign experts and local mechanics, but with an increased amount of MiG-25s becoming operational, Libya Dawn might have to rely on more foreign expertise to keep the fleet of aircraft running. Although Libya Dawn can count on a number of former Libyan MiG-25 mechanics and pilots, it is unknown if it can continue to find enough pilots to fly the MiG-25s.

As was mentioned in the first article on the subject, the nationality of the foreign experts cannot be confirmed. However, the sudden presence of a number of Ukrainians at Mitiga and Misrata makes it highly likely they are the ones responsible for the sudden appearance of operational MiG-25s

With little other types available, reintroducing MiG-25s to the Libyan theatre will have to make do for Libya Dawn, and will surely provide them with an extremely powerful aircraft, albeit with severely limited accuracy. Thanks to the aid of Ukrainian personnel and financial funding from some of Libya Dawn's international supporters, more MiG-25s will surely roar through North Africa's skies once again.

Recommended Articles

Libya's MiG-25s, the mighty Foxbats fly again (1)
Libya's Mirage F.1AD fighter-bombers, back from the grave? 
The Libyan Air Force, refurbishing its old Su-22 fighter-bombers?
Is Egypt providing aircraft and helicopters to the Libyan Air Force?
Further Egyptian MiG-21 deliveries to the Libyan Air Force

The Libyan Air Force, refurbishing its old Su-22 fighter-bombers? (2)

$
0
0


New images released by the Libyan Air Force provide an interesting glimpse of the current operational assests at Al Watiya airbase, but more importantly, also indicate that the Su-22 reportedly undergoing overhaul is not an Su-22 (S-32MK) as previously thought, but rather a more modern Su-22M instead. The news comes just as it's been confirmed that Libya Dawn now has one MiG-25PU operational, and is in the progress of bringing another three MiG-25s back to operational condition at Misrata.[1][2]

Apart from this particular Su-22, still donning its green Jamahiriya roundel, and Libya Dawn's four MiG-25s, another icon once presumed to have found its final resting place is now being refurbished to fight once more: The Mirage F.1AD, one of which is currently also being restored by the Libyan Air Force at Al Watiya.[3] 

The Su-22M, undergoing overhaul in one of Al Watiya's forty-two remaining Hardened Aircraft Shelters (HAS), is one of the two reportedly being serviced in order to bring them back to operational condition. According to Libyan Air Force personnel present at Al Watiya, the first example was originally destined to fly in mid-February, but it seems that this claim was either overoptimistic, or that new problems arose during the overhaul.

According to Libyan Air Force Colonel Muhammad Abdul Hamid Al-Satni, this Su-22 is one of twelve remaining Su-22s present at Al Watiya.

''We … [inaudible] Su-22 aircraft, they were almost non-functional, but thanks to Libyan military personnel, all Libyans, no foreigners, we have been trying to put one or two of the ten to twelve aircraft back into service. This is the first one we managed to repair and it will be deployed in a week or ten days in the battle to liberate Tripoli.'' (3:44)

The Libyan National Army's push on Tripoli, which remains in the hands of Libya Dawn, is supported by just one MiG-23ML and one MiG-23UB operating out of Al Watiya, which itself was recaptured by the Libyan National Army on the 9th of August 2014. These airframes are currently engaged in a war of attrition with Libya Dawn as both sides continuously bomb each other's airbases and munition depots. Although this hasn't resulted in any air-to-air combat yet, one of Libya Dawn's MiG-23MLs crashed after bombing the airstrip of al-Zintan on the 23th of March 2015, leaving just one MiG-23ML operational. The Libyan Air Force currently has two MiG-23MLs operational: 6472 based at Benina and 6132 based at Al Watiya, the latter can be seen below.



The Libyan Air Force is thus desperately in need of more operational airframes to support the Libyan National Army in its push on Tripoli. The Libyan National Army encountered a huge stock of aircraft after recapturing Al Watiya, including at least one squadron of Su-22s (S-32MK), what was left of the Su-22M fleet, an unknown number of Mirage F.1s and Mi-25s. This airbase therefore provides an excellent source for aircraft, with plenty of aircraft to cannibalise for spare parts.

Al Watiya saw only three of its Hardened Aircraft Shelters (HAS) housing Su-22Ms in addition to several munition depots being destroyed by the NATO-led airstrikes during the Libyan Civil War. Other aircraft present on the base were inoperational and thus not considered a threat to the Libyan people and NATO. The aircraft currently being refurbished is in good hands with the Libyan Air Force's experienced mechanics, however, because of the fact that the airframe has been grounded for over a decade (and even lacks its 30mm cannons and ejection seat), it will surely prove to be a challenge to get it operational.


However, if they manage to pull it off the aircraft will indubitably be of great value during any upcoming offensive to recapture Tripoli. Wether it will be enough to tip the scales and give the LNA operational advantage over its foes only time will tell.

Recommended Articles

The Libyan Air Force, refurbishing its old Su-22 fighter-bombers? (1)
Libya's MiG-25s, the mighty Foxbats fly again (1)
Libya's MiG-25s, the mighty Foxbats fly again (2)
Libya's Mirage F.1AD fighter-bombers, back from the grave? 
Is Egypt providing aircraft and helicopters to the Libyan Air Force?
Further Egyptian MiG-21 deliveries to the Libyan Air Force

Libya Dawn going DIY: Oerlikon GDF naval guns mounted on trucks

$
0
0

The Libyan National Army and Libya Dawn, entangled in a seemingly unending conflict, are both forced to look for creative solutions to provide their troops with the maximum amount of firepower required to gain the edge over each other. While the many arms depots present in Libya provided an impressive amount of sophisticated weaponry to the many forces now fighting for control over Libya, a lack of spare parts has meant that only a part of this equipment could enter service, with the majority cannibalised in order to keep a part of the fleet running.

The situation is only worsened by the arms embargo imposed on Libya, which officially prevents the acquisition of military equipment by the forces fighting in Libya. As arms embargoes are often little more than a few noneffectual words on a piece of paper, both Libya's Armed Forces and Libya Dawn do still receive some military equipment from their supporters abroad, but this flow of arms remains too small to give one or the other a decisive advantage on the ground.

This led to parties scrounging for whatever advanced weaponry could be found in Libya's arms depots and airbases. The most remarkable results of this were the use of Kh-29 air-to-surface missiles, originally destined for use by Libya's Su-24s, as unguided rockets by Libya Dawn and the installment of AK-230 naval guns on trucks by the Libyan National Army.

A similar project was initated by Libya Dawn around the same time the Libyan National Army completed its first truck armed with a naval gun. Libya Dawn managed to get its hands on numerous of such guns once equipping Libyan Navy frigates, corvettes and fast attack craft after capturing the depot the weaponry was stored in. Libya was unable to service all these vessels in the nineties because of the arms embargo, and eventually scrapped them all. The weaponry formerly equipping these ships was subsequently stored.

The 412 Wadi Mirah and her three sister ships were among the ships scrapped in the 90s, all having served just over ten years. Their 76mm OTO Melaras, 35mm Oerlikon GDFs, torpedo tubes, Otomat anti-ship missiles and associated fire-control systems were all stored.


This huge arsenal of stored naval weaponry not only included anti-ship missiles such as the Otomat Mk.1, Mk.2 and the Exocet, but also various types of naval guns such as the 76mm OTO Melara and 35mm and 40mm anti-aircraft guns, in addition to a large array of Soviet-designed weaponry.

Much of this already obsolete Soviet-designed weaponry was stripped for spare parts to allow guns that were still installed on ships to continue service. The Western-designed naval guns, barely used in their short career, were still in prime condition however, yet were now rotting away with no apparant future use. The procurement plans of the Libyan Navy under Gaddafi mainly included Russian-designed ships which had no possibility to mount the stored Western weaponry, which effectively sealed their fate.

However, a part of the weaponry was brought out of storage by Libya Dawn in late 2014 for installment on trucks. These early conversions proved a success and work was initiated to convert more naval guns for land use.


The system under construction (seen in the header) donned a double-barreled 35mm Oerlikon GDF naval gun taken from the British-built frigate Dat Assawari, a ship that was also scrapped in the 90s. Half of the turret was cut away to allow for easier aiming and access to the guns and their munitions.Due to the relatively high calibre of the naval gun and the fact that the truck was not designed to be used in such a way, prolonged fire is likely not possible and stability would be best achieved if the gun were firing backwards as opposed to towards the sides.

The finished product included the muzzle brakes on the 35mm guns, but saw the entire turret removed. The minimal protection it provided apparantly did not weigh up against the increase  in stealth and situational awareness acquired when equipped with a (partial) turret.

Surprisingly, a truck belonging to Libya Dawn driving through Libya in early April carried one complete 76mm Oto Melara gun system, an empty 76mm Oto Melara turret and an empty 40mm DARDO close-in weapon system (CIWS) turret. Although one can only guess at the way these particular weapons systems will be converted for land-use, it clearly shows the parties in the conflict are gearing up for the long haul, and will go to great lengths to boost their weapon inventory.





Special thanks to Joseph Dempsey

Recommended Articles

The Libyan National Army going DIY: AK-230 naval guns mounted on trucks
Kh-29 air-to-surface missiles used as unguided rockets in Libya
Libya's MiG-25s, the mighty Foxbats fly again (1)
Libya's MiG-25s, the mighty Foxbats fly again (2)

Libya Dawn going DIY: S-125 SAMs used as surface-to-surface missiles

$
0
0



A lack of spare parts for Libya's sophisticated weaponry has resulted in a number of interesting conversions by the Libyan National Army and Libya Dawn, both poised to get the edge over the other party. Recent examples of such conversions have included the installment of Oerlikon GDF naval guns on trucks by Libya Dawn and the installment of AK-230 naval guns on trucks by the Libyan National Army.

Libya Dawn, currently in control of Libya's captital Tripoli and other large cities like Misrata , inherited a large number of surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) found in the vast swats of land it controls in the west of Libya. As there is little to no need to use the SAMs in their originally envisioned role, Libya Dawn began investigating the feasibility of turning some of the SAMs into surface-to-surfacemissiles. The militant group already gained experience with such conversions when they used several Kh-29 air-to-surface missiles, once equipping Libya's Su-24s, as unguided rockets near Tripoli.

In a quite surprising move, Libya Dawn transferred at least two complete S-125 SAM brigades along with associated misssiles and equipment to Tripoli in early December 2014 and in early March 2015.[1][2] While the initial move behind these transfers remained unknown, images now reveal Libya Dawn has begun using the S-125s as surface-to-surface missiles.

The missiles, still installed on their (now mobile) original launcher, had their fins at the front removed for a more stable flight path in the unguided surface-to-surface role. More interestingly, the nose was lengthened, possibly to increase the size of the warhead. The original missile only packs a 60 kilograms heavy warhead, which is enough to heavily damage or destroy a potential aerial target but far too light for doing any substantial damage when used in the surface-to-surface role. The warhead might also have been replaced by a regular high explosive one, which is more effective than the original high explosive fragmentational warhead designed to wreck aircraft. Finally, it seems the proximity fuse usually associated with the system has been replaced by more appropriate ones for use against ground targets.


The conversion of SAMs to function in the surface-to-surface role by Libya Dawn is actually not a first in the world. Back in 1988, Iraq converted several S-125s to ballistic missiles with an intended range of 200 kilometers. The missile, called al-Barq, was modified to suit the surface-to-surface role by removing the features which enable the S-125 to be such a manoeuvrable missile: the missile's canards and the radio fuse in the warhead were removed, and the missile's self-destruct mechanism was disabled.

This conversion proved to be everything but easy as the S-125's warhead is part of the airframe, and was difficult to modify. Work on the missiles progressed slowly, and although several flight tests were indeed carried out, the achieved range totalled only 117 kilometres with a circular error probable (CEP) of several kilometres. Because of the unsatisfactory results, the project was subsequently terminated in 1990.


Obviously, it is highly implausible Libya Dawn could cobble something together from dusty leftover missiles that would manage to achieve the range or accuracy of even the failed al-Barq, meaning the field conversions likely suffer from both abysmally short range and crippling inaccuracy. However, with more than enough S-125s to scavengeand a civil war that does not appear to be going anywhere, conversions like these will undoubtedly continue.







Recommended Articles

Libya Dawn going DIY: 2K12 SAMs used as surface-to-surface missiles
Kh-29 air-to-surface missiles used as unguided rockets in Libya
The Libyan National Army going DIY: AK-230 naval guns mounted on trucks
Libya's MiG-25s, the mighty Foxbats fly again (1)
Libya's MiG-25s, the mighty Foxbats fly again (2)

Libya Dawn going DIY: 2K12 SAMs used as surface-to-surface missiles

$
0
0








The surprising move by Libya Dawn that resulted in the conversion of several S-125 surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) into surface-to-surface missiles is not the only of its kind in Libya. Indeed, initiated at roughly the same time, Libya Dawn also worked on the conversion of 2K12 SAMs to the surface-to-surface role. The first contraption, seen above, combines an Italian produced Puma 6x6 APC with the launch section of a Soviet designed 2K12 SAM system.

The Puma had been part of a batch of at least twenty vehicles donated by Italy to the fledgling Libyan National Army back in 2013, but has now been modified for a wholely different role by its new owners. Unlike the S-125 conversion, the missiles have no apparant signs of modifications, although they will certainly be extremely ineffective when used with the original 59 kilograms heavy high-explosive fragmentational (HE-frag) warhead. Moreover, the missiles might not function at all if the original fuse and guidance system is not replaced by a more suitable alternative.








As mentioned in the previous article on Libya Dawn's SAM conversions, Iraq was the first to experiment with the idea of converting SAMs to the surface-to-surface role. Apart from converting several S-125s for this role, Iraq too modified 3M9 missiles from the 2K12 to serve as surface-to-surface missiles under the name of Kasir. Initiated in early 1989, the goal was to achieve a range of 100 kilometres.

The 2K12's 3M9 missiles proved, much like the S-125's V-600s, to be extremely difficult to modify for the surface-to-surface role. In addition to the problems encountered with the S-125 conversion such as the inability to modify the solid propellant booster of the missiles to achieve the desired range, the Iraqi engineers encountered several problems with modifying the 3M9's more complex guidance and control systems.

Despite this, two test flights took place throughout 1989, reaching a dissappointing range of 62 kilometres with a far too large circular error probable (CEP), resulting in the termination of the project by the end of 1989.

Libya Dawn's conversion of 2K12 SAMs will undoubtedly not fear any better than its Iraqi counterpart, and might only be of use when fired at a large target within direct sight of the operators. They do represent the increasing number of DIY projects in Libya however, and are certain not to be the last.

Recommended Articles

Libya Dawn going DIY: S-125 SAMs used as surface-to-surface missiles
Kh-29 air-to-surface missiles used as unguided rockets in Libya
The Libyan National Army going DIY: AK-230 naval guns mounted on trucks
Libya's MiG-25s, the mighty Foxbats fly again (1)
Libya's MiG-25s, the mighty Foxbats fly again (2)

From Russia with Love, Syria's AK-104s

$
0
0




The delivery of AK-104 carbines to the war-thorn country of Syria remains largely unreported, and their impact on the ground so far has been negligible. Nonetheless, they represent the increasing flow of Russian-made weaponry that continues to reach Syria on a regular basis. Syria is believed to be the first export customer to have received the carbine, which has been in limited production since the 90s. The Syrian Civil War could thus very well be the combat deput of the AK-104.

Contrary to the popular AK-74M, most of which are distributed to Syrian Arab Army and to a lesser extent the Republican Guard, the small numbers of AK-104s have largely been handed out to the so-called order keeping forces, once the Syrian equivalent of the riot police. While originally mostly a Sunni force armed with batons, shields and tear gas deployed to stadiums and during demonstrations, the leftovers were reorganized shortly after the outbreak of the revolution. Trusted elements were subsequently rearmed with more lethal weapons and now have a wide range of tasks involving maintaining order in regime-held terriority.

While the older AK-47, AKM and Type 56 would be perfectly suitable for these roles, the Syrian high command thought otherwise and allocated the carbines to the public order troops. As the size of the weapon makes it perfect for close-quarters combat, it can be expected that if larger numbers come available, they will be issued to combat troops.

Syria's interest in the AK-104 first came to light in 2012, when a Syrian military delegation was informed on the capabilities of the rifle during a visit to a Russian weapon expo. The visit resulted in particular interest in the carbine, and an undisclosed number were subsequently bought. A member of the Syrian delegation inspecting the AK-104 can be seen below.


The origin of the AK-104 can largely be traced back to the AK-74M, out of which the larger calibre AK-103 was developed. The AK-102, AK-104 and AK-105, chambered in 5.56×45mm, 7.62×39mm and 5.45×39mm respectively were then designed as compact versions of the AK-103, making them perfect for fighting in urban environments. The muzzle brake is similar to the one installed on the AKS-74U.

The AK-104 seen in the hands of the order keeping forces soldier uses the AKM's magazine instead of the plastic magazine usually associated with the AK-104. As seen with the AK-74M, the AK-104 features a new side-folding stock instead of the under-folding stock seen on the earlier AKS and AKMS.



Wether the continued supply of (heavy) weaponry to Syria will be enough to save a military that is increasingly dependent on foreign Shiite fighters remains to be seen. The small numbers of AK-104s will undoubtedly have little impact on the outcome of the civil war. However, these carbines represent the flow of Russian arms reaching Syria, a trade that will assuredly continue to fuel a war which has now entered its fourth year.

Recommended Articles

From Russia with Love, Syria's AK-74Ms
From Russia with Love, Syria's 6S8s

Battlefront Syria: Kweres airbase

$
0
0
Kweres airbase, also known as Rasm al-Abboud, Quweires and a host of other names, has reportedly been under heavy pressure by the fighters of the Islamic State since early May 2015, which seek to capture the airbase. A social media censorship imposed by the Islamic State have caused its fighters to refrain from posting any images or information on the offensive, making it difficult to understand what is actually going on at Kweres. The censorship was a result of the painful lesson learned from the assault on Tabqa airbase, during which the defenders could pinpoint the location of the fighters of the Islamic State by the information they posted online,and is nowadays enforced during every major offensive undertaken by the Islamic State.

Kweres airbase is one of the seventeen airbases that remain active while under the control of the Syrian Arab Air Force (SyAAF) and Syrian Arab Army (SyAA). Kweres has little value as an airbase however and has already been under constant siege since December 2012. But against all odds, the airbase remains operational. While originally completely surrounded by the Free Syrian Army, the siege was taken over by fighters of the Islamic State after their rapid expansion in Eastern Syria just shy of a year ago. The fighters of the Islamic State have stormed the base on a number of occasions, but these attacks were likely focused at probing the airbase's defences rather than capturing the base. Nonetheless, the SyAAF has flown plenty of sorties to protect the airbase and at least one Fateh 110 'Tishreen' surface-to-surface missile has been fired at the airbase's belligerants in order to boost morale.[1]

Despite the fact that the airbase remains fully operational, its military value is currently the lowest of the SyAAF's airbases. This and the fact that Kweres comes close to being an impenetrable fortress was apparently also understood by the Islamic State, which never made any serious attempt to capture the airbase even though they surround it completely. Although sporadic artillery, mortar and rocket fire frequently hit the base, this is not known to have caused any serious losses. Surprisingly, fighters of the Islamic State also utilise UAVs to spot targets for the U.S. made 155mm M198 howitzers captured in Iraq, which are being now used to shell the base and its surroundings.[2] The Islamic State's tactics for dealing with Kweres has until thus far largely been the same as those of the Free Syrian Army, which lacked the manpower to storm the base. A SANA TV crew was the last to have visited the airbase in February 2014, a video and images of which can be seen here, here and here. No TV crew has been sent to document the current offensive, as the last time SANA did such a thing, the airbase in question (Tabqa) fell just one day after it was proudly stated that the fighters of the Islamic State were held off.

Exactly why the Islamic State is now making a move on the airbase can be explained by the fact that IS is frantically looking for large propaganda stunts to retain the detterence it once boasted, and capturing an airbase provides exactly that. The Islamic State's offenses in Syria are currently not achieving their intended goals as the fighters of the Islamic State have so far proven unable to capture Deir ez-Zor and T.4 airbase, which are even more fortified than Kweres airbase. The summer of 2014 saw Division 17, Regiment 121, Brigade 93, Tabqa airbase and the Shaer gas field all falling for the then seemingly invincible fighters of the Islamic State, but apart from Shaer, all were already surrounded for a long time with the soldiers trapped inside waiting for the imminent final assault. Deir ez-Zor and T.4 are a whole different story, and their capture, if at all possible, would require such a large amount of manpower that it would present nothing more than a pyrrhic victory for the Islamic State.

Kweres, the entry sign of which can be seen above, was originally constructed by Poles in the early sixties to serve as the SyAAF's main training base. It officially remains home to the Aviation Academy of the Syrian Arab Air Force (SyAAF), comprised of the Basic Flying School, using the MBB-SIAT 223K1 Flamingo and the PAC MFI-17 Mushshak, and the Advanced Flying School, using the L-39ZO and the L-39ZA. Most SyAAF pilots once got their wings here, which makes the airbase of high symbolic value.

The Basic Flying School quickly wound down operations after the start of the Civil War however, and its aircraft remain stored in various parts of the airbase. The SyAAF has thus been unable to train new pilots in Syria itself, further increasing the burden on the already tired and often depressed pilots, most of which are fully aware that more often than not civilians are on the receiving end of the rockets and (barrel) bombs. Another training facility; Mennegh, once home to the Helicopter Flying School, was already overrun on the 5th of August 2013. A limited form of advanced training was continued on L-39s and helicopters present elsewhere in Syria.

Kweres's resident L-39s had the dubious honour of being the first aircraft to become actively involved in suppressing the rebellion in the end of July 2012, when the Advanced Flying School deployed its L-39ZOs and L-39ZAs on bombing runs over Aleppo and its suburbs. These sorties resulted mostly in civilian targets such as hospitals and schools being hit, and unsurprisingly led to numerous civilian casualties. The number of L-39 sorties over Aleppo gradually decreased over time however, and completely came to a halt in May 2013.


As the number of L-39 sorties gradually decreased in number, so did the L-39 fleet in size, which suffered a heavy blow when Kshesh, nowadays known for being the site of Syria's first rebel air force, was captured on the 12th of February 2013. The surviving L-39s were then distributed between Hama, Tabqa and Aleppo International Airport/Neyrab, where some were overhauled and modified to carry 80mm B-8 rocket pods. The fleet of L-39s based at Kweres, originally numbered at around forty, remained mostly intact in terms of numbers, but was heavily affected by a lack of spare parts and mortar fire from both the Free Syrian Army and the Islamic State over the years, resulting in just over a dozen examples remaining operational in 2013.

However, when examining Kweres using satellite imagery taken on the 26th of May 2013one can spot no less than 89 aircraft and 12 helicopters. If the base were captured, the endless rows of aircraft and helicopters will therefore still surely provide the propaganda pictures the Islamic State is craving. The condition of the impressive number of aircraft varies from operational to derelict, and the just over a dozen British-built Meteors also present at the base were abandoned here more than half a century ago. One of two MiG-23 fighters present at Kweres, both once used as instructional airframes, can be seen below.

Enough of Kweres' L-39s remained operational to aid in the defence of the airbase however, reportedly sometimes flying up to twenty sorties a day to strike Islamic State positions around the airbase. The town of Ayn al-Jamajimah, an Islamic State strongpoint, was heavily hit in particular. One L-39 crashed during one of these sorties on the 20th of April 2015.[3]

The defence of Kweres is in hands of an unknown number of SyAA, NDF and SyAAF soldiers, airmen and mechanics, most of which present at the airbase since the start of the revolution. It is believed that the garrison was reinforced in the summer of 2014 after the Free Syrian Army was forced to abandon its positions around the airbase in light of the Islamic State's advance.

An S-125 surface-to-air missile (SAM) battery located closely to Kweres evacuated all its equipment and personnel to Kweres to prevent being overrun by the Free Syrian Army somewhere in the 2012-2013 timeframe. Although the SAM battery was subsequently re-activated at Kweres and remained operational as of 2013, it is deemed unlikely that the battery currently remains active. No threat from the air is present and the personnel manning the battery would likely be of more value defending the airbase from ground attacks.

As Kweres is completely surrounded by the Islamic State, the only lifeline between the airbase and the rest of regime-controlled Syria is the SyAAF's helicopter fleet, which continuously supplies the airbase with anything ranging from food to weaponry and their munitions.One squadron of Mi-8s was permanently detached to Kweres in part to aid in this task.



The defenders of Kweres almost solely rely on light weapons in the defence of the airbase. The state of the SyAAF and the fact that large cargo planes present perfect targets for the fighters of the Islamic State surrounding the base has meant that no heavy weaponry could be flown in: The weapons that are available to the defenders were flown in by helicopter.This weaponry included SVD 'Dragunov' marksman rifles, Iranian 12.7mm AM.50 anti-materiel sniper rifles, (heavy) machine-guns, RPG-7s, ATGMs and a number of Russian night sights intended for the AKM to enable the defenders to better fight at night.

The twenty-six anti-aircraft guns present at the airbase (two from the nearby S-125 SAM site) provide the heavy firepower as no tanks or artillery are stationed at the airbase. This meant the defenders had to be creative, and the 14.5mm ZPU-4s, 23mm ZU-23s and 57mm AZP S-60s taken from four anti-aircraft emplacements were strategically placed throughout the airbase to attain the maximum amount of tactical value, sometimes even on top of Kweres' eleven Hardened Aircraft Shelters (HAS). It is interesting to note that most of the ZPU-4s had two of their four barrels taken away, which were then put on DIY mounts so as to increase the amount of ground covered by heavy weaponry.




The flat terrain surrounding the airbase is greatly in favour of the defenders, a tactical advantage which forces the fighters of the Islamic State to run through empty fields without much cover in order to reach the airbase. This advantage is especially apparent in the North, East and South. Surprisingly, attacking the North-Eastern corner was exactly what the fighters of the Islamic State did. The fighters even succeeded in capturing two of the Hardened Aircraft Shelters, but were quickly driven out again. The photos of three 57mm AZP S-60 gun emplacements below give an idea of the flat terrain, and clearly show that any attempt to cross the vast empty fields would result in heavy losses.




To further strengthen the perimeter, the defenders have made great use of the eleven Hardened Aircraft Shelters located at the Northern and Eastern part of the airbase. These Hardened Aircraft Shelters have literally been turned into fortresses, and most have either one anti-aircraft gun or heavy machine-gun installed on top. They have also been designed to withstand large bombs dropped by aircraft, so the Islamic State has no chance to destroy them for instance by using artillery. Trenches on and surrounding the HAS provide cover for the garrisons of soldiers tasked with the protection of their assigned corridor. Plenty of ammunition present inside the Aircraft Shelters guarantee trying to capture one would prove to be an extremely arduous task. In addition, huge sand barricades erected throughout the base cover any movement by the defenders, which makes it easier to resupply each garrison. The defenders also operate a number of technicals armed with ZU-23s and heavy machine-guns, which are utilised as a quick-reaction force and can be deployed at any part of the base should the need arise.

It should not be forgotten that the airbase is already completely surrounded since two-and-a-half years, which gave the defenders plenty of time to perfect their defences. Numerous small attacks mostly carried out by the Islamic State will thus only have helped the defenders in learning to properly keep the airbase secured.


Heavy fighting has also been going on in the Military Housing Block, located West of the airbase and seen in the sattelite imagery below. Heavy artillery shelling by the Islamic State has destroyed much of the complex, and the remaining structures and trenches are subject to intense house-to-house fighting. As the Complex (pictured below) is an important key in the defence of the Western side of the airbase, the defenders will have to continue to allocate resources in orderto hold the Housing Complex, or otherwise risk endangering the entire base.




If the Military Housing Block proves unable to hold, the second (and also last) defensive line will have to stop the fighters of the Islamic State to prevent the fighters from flooding into the airbase. This last line, satellite imagery of which can be seen below, too consists of heavily fortified buildings, trenches, anti-aircraft guns and heavy machine guns.



Although Kweres is completely surrounded, SyAA and NDF troops stationed on the Eastern side of Aleppo could theoretically mount an offensive in an effort to prevent the airbase being overrun. However, it is extremely unlikely that such an offensive would ever be carried out by the already overstretched troops based in Aleppo as Kweres simply doesn't have enough strategic value to justify the waste of precious manpower and resources.

It is more likely that if the situation at the airbase becomes too critical, the defenders will attempt to fight their way out in the direction of Aleppo, perhaps aided by the SyAAF's fighter-bombers and helicopters.

In an effort to convince the defenders of Kweres that they were indeed going to be overrun, the Islamic State made pamflets offering the defenders a chance to repent and thus supposedly escape the fate of mass execution. 

''Allah ruled that you must be killed by the sword. We swear that we will have no mercy for anyone of you, so repent and break with this infidel regime. We accept your repentance if you surrender before we come over to you, by then the tyrant (Assad) will not be able to help you. Keep in mind the fate your comrades in Tabqa Airbase met.

Contact the Islamic State's men on the following telephone numbers:
0937699604
0935007806
WhatsApp: 00905378489193''

It is highly unlikely that any of the defenders will seriously consider defecting to the Islamic State. The morale in the airbase remains high and the men, most of which have already living together for more than four years, will probably rather die than surrender to the Islamic State.


A photo collage of some of the fallen defenders was published on the 7th of May 2015 by one of the defenders, commemorating eleven KIAs so far, including the commander of Kweres: General al-Muhanna.





Of course, the Syrian Civil War has in its four years of fighting shown many a time how erroneous certain predictions about which party is going to win which battle can turn out to be. However, considering the extensive defences and other aspects in favour of the base's current occupants outlined in this article, it can be expected that Kweres airbase will not fall into the Islamic State's hands any time soon.








In conclusion, any move on Kweres by the Islamic State comes more out of the need for asymbolic victory than from military strategy. If the Islamic State's offensive on Kweres proves to be as large as is claimedby some sources, and should its fighters succeed in capturing the airbase, it will very likely provide the Islamic State with what they're looking for.

Recommended Articles

Battlefront Syria: Deir ez-Zor
The Syrian Arab Air Force, beware of its wings

From Russia with Love, Syria's MTs-116Ms

$
0
0







No less than six different types of Russian marksman rifles, sniper rifles and anti-materiel rifles have reached the shores of Syria since the start of the Civil War, of which the MTs-116M is one. Due to the fact that the MTs-116M is poorly known throughout the world, the sniper rifle's combat debut in Syria has only received little attention.

The presence of the MTs-116M in Syria became publicly known after it was shown in use with a women battalion of the Republican Guard deployed to Jobar for propaganda purposes. Although the video shows the women engaged in an exchange of fire with rebels located just metres away from the frontline, the battalion does not participate in the Republican Guard's incursions into Jobar, and is instead used to guard a calm part of the Jobar front. As a result, the battalion suffered its first and only KIA in Darayya in mid-April 2015.

The first MTs-116M delivery to Syria occurred just months before it was first spotted, and was subsequently used to fill the gap between marksman rifles such as the SVD and G3, and anti-materiel rifles such as the 6S8, OSV-96 and AM-50. A steady supply of the sniper rifle has ensured a solid presence in the embattled nation, and it is mostly seen in use with high-tier units.



Unsurprisingly, the MTs-116M sniper rifle bears close resemblance to the design of its older brother on which it is based; the MTs-116. The inception of the MTs-116M came to be after the MTs-116's accuracy was deemed to be satisfactory to such a degree that a military version optimised for law-enforcement agencies for use during counter-terrorism operations was developed.

Chambered in 7.62x54, the MTs-116M accepts both a five-round magazine and a ten-round magazine (as opposed to the single-shot function of the MTs-116), the latter of which also used by the SVD 'Dragunov'.



The MTs-116M accepts a wide range of Russian optical sights, including night vision sights. When equipped with such sights, the rifle has an effective range of up to 800 metres. While this doesn't offer much improvement over the SVD, the MTs-116M's shots are much more likely to hit their intended targets.


Recommended Articles

From Russia with Love, Syria's AK-104s
From Russia with Love, Syria's 6S8s
From Russia with Love, Syria's AK-74Ms

Are Yemen's Houthis still capable of launching ballistic missiles?

$
0
0
Recent footage coming out of Yemen's 'Amran Governorate indicate that despite the heavy bombing of Yemen's ballistic missile depots by the Saudi-led Coalition, the Houthis might still have the means to launch ballistic missiles at their disposal. The site housing the Group of Missile Forces of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Yemen was heavily hit as part of Operation Decisive Storm, and the resulting explosions were thought to have resulted in the destruction of all of Yemen's ballistic missiles and associated launchers.

In fact, the Saudi Defense Ministry went as far to claim that it had ''successfully eliminated the threat to the security of Saudi Arabia and neighboring countries'', and was thus ending Operation Decisive Storm, replacing it by the more humanitarian-oriented Operation Restoring Hope.[1]

But now it appears that the threat, while however greatly diminished, is not yet completely eliminated. A video, depicting one of Yemen's Transporter Erector Launchers used for launching R-17 Elbrus (Scud-B) or Hwasŏng-5/6 ballistic missiles on a tank trailer underway in the 'Amran Governorate, North of Sana'a, during the Saudi-declared humanitarian truce leaves little doubt on that some launch systems have survived the Saudi-led bombing campaign, possibly while stored in residential areas if rumours prove to be true.

Jordanian security officials, one of the best, if not the best informed on security matters in the Middle East, recently claimed that Iran succeeded in supplying Yemen's Houthi rebels with ballistic missiles, reportedly of the Scud-B and Scud-C type.[2] This possible Iranian delivery in combination with the North Korean delivery of Hwasŏng-5 or Hwasŏng-6 missiles and launchers in the early 2000s means that the amount of ballistic missiles present in Yemen thus might have been much larger than originally thought, increasing the chances that at least some of the systems and missiles have indeed survived the bombing campaign, and may still be in operational condition.






Strangely enough, the Transporter Erector Launcher (TEL) seen in the video is missing two of its four wheels on the right sight of the MAZ-543, which would greatly hinder or even prevent the launch of a ballistic missile.

Getting a missile to the TEL undetected will surerly also pose a great challenge for the Houthis, and increased monitoring of Yemen's major roads might prevent transport in broad daylight. Alternatively, the TEL might actually be underway to a location holding one or more missiles, instead of the other way around.

Although it remains to be seen if the Houthis are indeed capable of transporting and mating a missile to the handicaped TEL, and have the technical personnel or Iranian 'advisors' to get it all to work, the sudden appearance of the TEL in broad daylight makes one wonder what other equipment still survives, and serves as an indication that this war is still far from over.

Recommended Articles

Saudi aircraft demolish Yemeni ballistic missile site
Sudan's commitment to Operation Decisive Storm, navigating the restless Middle Eastern political landscape
Is the Saudi-led coalition sparing the Yemeni Air Force? 
Saudi aircraft pound al-Dailami airbase, destroying U.S. delivered aircraft

Islamic State captures Tadmur (Palmyra) in new sudden streak of offensives

$
0
0


In a surprising new streak of offensives launched at targets in both Iraq in Syria, the Islamic State has managed to capture the ancient city of Palmyra, known today as Tadmur. With the strategically important town of al-Sukhna falling just over a week before, and the Iraqi city of Ramadi just days before Tadmur, it appears the Islamic State is far from being under control, and possibly attempting to revive the seemingly unstoppable upmarch of last summer.

Tadmur, which is also home to Tadmur airbase, is of high strategic importance due to its position at the base of the vital M20 highway, which leads through the recently fallen al-Sukhna to the regime's last holdout in the East of the country: Deir ez-Zor. Without access to this highway and with little prospect of retaking both of the Islamic State's newest gains, the Assad-regime will face extreme difficulty in keeping its troops in Deir ez-Zor supplied, and the fall of the city and associated airbase might soon become inevitable.

The town of Tadmur is best known for the ancient Roman monuments and ruins, which, given the Islamic State's history with the destruction of historical sites, is now feared to be a target for vandalism. Although this aspect will likely incite a lot of coverage from Western media, it should not be forgotten that there are also thousands of lives at stake, with hundreds of casualties reported so far and many dead, despite earlier reporting from Syrian State Media that citizens were being evacuated.Of course, with mainstream media eager to find new stories that might interest a diverse public, events such as renewed poison gas attacks and the current offensive are less likely to be covered than a story on ancient Roman ruins in danger of destruction.

Also of great importance are the massive weapon depots located in Tadmur, one of the largest in Syria. While the exact contents of the depots remain unknown, there are reports of ballistic missiles being stored here. Should this be the case, it is likely images of such missiles in Islamic State's hands will surface again soon, even though it is unlikely that they will get any to work. Perhaps more of interest is the fact that many other types of weaponry captured by the fighters of Islamic State as Ghaneema (spoils of war) will provide the means for future offensives, allowing the Islamic State to exert pressure on fronts throughout the region.


Hundreds of ammunition boxes captured during the early phase of the Islamic State's offensive on the town just a few days ago give a clear indication of the amount of weaponry that is still likely to be present in the many storage bunkers littered around Tadmur.




Tadmur also serves as an important link in the production and distribution of a large portion of Syria's gas supplies. Whoever is in control of Tadmur has easy access to the numerous gas fields and pipelines running through the area, all of which now also under control of the Islamic State. And without access to gas fields, the Assad-led regime could face a huge problem in keeping Damascus, Lattakia and Tartus supplied with enough gas.

The ease with which the Islamic State managed to capture Tadmur is a clear sign of the increasingly worn military force that has been spread thin over regime-controlled Syria, and is now slowly running out of men willing to give their lives for the regime. While the situation for the regime has been already been dire before, Iran's and Hizbullah's involvement in the Syrian Civil War managed to stall the Free Syrian Army's advance throughout Syria, and eventually stabilised the situation for the regime early in the Civil War. However, this source of manpower is still finite, and Iran and the regime are increasingly forced to rely on other foreign fighters for their offensives, often Iranian jailed Afghan criminals and refugees, to carry the burden.

The offensive at Tadmur came as a surprise to many, and the quick victory must even have surprised the fighters of the Islamic State, which were until thus far unsuccessful in capturing any major towns, installations or army bases in Central and Eastern Syria since the fall of Tabqa in August 2014.



Tadmur was defended by the 18th Tank Batallion of the Syrian Arab Army (SyAA), the National Defence Force (NDF) and troops of Suqour al-Sahraa' (The Desert Falcons). No attack on the town or the region was expected, and as a result, the regime's miltary presence in Tadmur was minimal. With no reserves or reinforcements available, the regime's troops in Central Syria simply collapsed. Caught completely off-guard, the regime never had any real chance to hold the town against the fighters of the Islamic State, and Tadmur was thus lost as soon as the Islamic State attacked it.

Although the fighters of the Islamic State reportedly freed the remaining prisoners in Tadmur's prison, made infamous by the 1980 Massacre and after its reactivation in 2011 again one of the most notorious in Syria, it remains unknown how many of the prisoners actually surived. Executing any remaining prisoners before retreating has become a common practice for the regime, and Tadmur's prison is unlikely to be different.



Tadmur airbase, strategically located in Central Syria, has traditionally been home to an unknown squadron operating the iconic MiG-25PD(S) interceptor and MiG-25PU two-seat trainer. The airbase lost much of its value after the gradual retirement of the Syrian Arab Air Force's (SyAAF) MiG-25 fleet however, partially made-up by an increasing number of civilian flights. Nevertheless, the unknown squadron based at Tadmur was one of the last to continue flying the mighty MiG-25 'Foxbat'. A video released by the Free Syrian Army on the 8th of August 2012 confirmed some MiG-25s might still have been operational at Tadmur until 2013, or perhaps later. It is likely that the surviving aircraft remain stored in the sixteen Hardened Aircraft Shelters (HAS) found at the airbase.

The airbase also served as an important link in the transfer of arms and munitions to Deir ez-Zor. This role will now have to be taken over by T.4 airbase, located West of Tadmur and likely the next target of the advancing fighters of the Islamic State. Three radar systems, a JY-27, a P-14 and a P-12/18, located at the airbase were responsible for guarding the airspace above Central Syria, a capability that is now lost. This means the SyAAF won't be able to detect any aircraft in Central and Eastern Syria, a serious blow to the already crippled air defences.

The central location of Tadmur makes the town an important link in Syria's road network, and the capture of the town opens the gates for the Islamic State to expand their base of operations deeper into Syria. The next targets for the Islamic State will undoubtedly be T.4 airbase and/or Deir ez-Zor. Although it is also possible that the fighters of the Islamic State will march in the direction of Homs, or even Damascus, capturing Syria's most important airbase or consolidating its grip on Deir ez-Zor would make more sense.



The fall of Tadmur paints a dire picture for the regime's grip on the Eastern half of the country, and should their last base in this area (Deir ez-Zor) also succumb to the increased pressure stemming from a lack of supplies and constant attacks from fighters of the Islamic State, the image of the regime's firm grip on the largest part of the country will be destroyed. Due to the strategical position of Tadmur the fall of the city also means the Islamic State now has direct road access to many of Syria's largest provinces, including the city of Homs and the capital of Damascus.

World War II era German howitzers continue to see use in the Syrian Civil War

$
0
0



The Syrian Civil War has presented itself as a perfect opportunity for nations to test their newest weaponry in an unforgiving combat environment, and this large influence of modern weaponry has seen everything from assault rifles to laser-guided bombs and drones undergoing their combat debut. Nonetheless, it has also seen the return of weapons once presumed to have found their final resting place, but which are now brought out to fight once more.

One of these weapons is the German 10.5 cm leFH 18M light field howitzer, which already made a brief appearance earlier in the conflict, but is now seen again in use with Ahrar al-Sham targeting regime-held positions near Ariha, South of Idlib. This ancient piece of weaponry, an improvement of the earlier 10.5 cm leFH 18, mostly saw use on the Eastern Front during the Second World War but was also exported to Syria by Czechoslovakia after the war had ended. Other German weaponry that also reached Syria included the 7.5 cm PaK 40 anti-tank gun, StuG III and Jagdpanzer IV tank destroyers, the 15cm Hummel self-propelled howitzer, the Panzer IV and even large numbers of StG-44 assault rifles.

Indeed, the 10.5 cm artillery piece is not the first weapon originally produced in Nazi Germany to see action in the Syrian Civil War. In Aleppo, August 2012, a batch of some 5000 StG-44 assault rifles and associated ammunition was captured by Liwa al-Tawhid, which went on to use them in limited quantities, even hooking one up to a remote controlled weapon station.[1]

The extremely wide range of weaponry originating from a plethora of sources and dates currently in use in Syria and Iraq make the international conflict one of the most diverse ever, with factions simultaneously using post-2000s and World War II vintage weaponry. A prime example of the fact that when times are dire and munition is rare, every bullet counts.

Special thanks to PFC_Joker.

The Islamic State's spring offensive: al-Sukhna

$
0
0



Al-Sukhna, a small yet vital town in the middle of the vast Syrian desert, was captured by the fighters of the Islamic State in a swift, unexpected one-day long offensive on the 13th of May 2015. While the fighters of the Free Syrian Army, Jaish al-Islam, Jabhat al-Nusra and the Islamic State (still called ISIS at the time) had already captured the strategically located village back in October 2013, they never succeeded in holding it for long, and al-Sukhna was back under regime-control after just one week.

While the largely Sunni town of al-Sukhna itself isn't home to any important military sites, and military presence had previously only been negligible, the town is located next to the highly important M20 highway, making it a crucial link in the road running all the way from Damascus to Tadmur (Palmyra) and ultimately Deir ez-Zor. This highway is absolutely vital for the Assad regime as it allows for resupplying its troops in Deir ez-Zor, and without control of the road, the regime won't be able to continue its struggle to keep it out of IS's hands, making the fall of the city a very plausible reality.

The town, much like Tadmur, also serves as an important link in the production and distribution of a large portion of Syria's gas supplies. As the Islamic State is now occupying both Tadmur and al-Sukhna, it has easy access to and thus control over the numerous gas fields and pipelines running through the area, denying the Assad-regime much-needed resources.

While the regime quickly recaptured al-Sukhna back in October 2013, it remains to be seen if the National Defence Force (NDF) and Suqour al-Sahraa' (Desert Falcons) have the will, manpower, resources and equipment to establish a new line of defence and hold off the Islamic State's advance in Central Syria after the fall of Tadmur, let alone to once again retake the area. The victory at al-Sukhna and Tadmur will likely decide the ultimate fate not only of Central and Eastern Syria, but also might have far-reaching consequences on the regime's grip on Homs and Damascus.



Tadmur (Palmyra) and al-Sukhna are both claimed by the Islamic State as part of the Wilayat al-Badiya province, but after the Islamic State withdrew most of its troops from the region in the summer of 2014, their (at the time still limited) reign in the region largely ended, and Wilayat al-Badiya was unofficially incorporated in the Wilayat Homs province.

Wilayat al-Badiya de-facto thus ceased to exist, and the Islamic State ceased its offensive in the region to focus on other, then more important, frontiers. The months that followed did see a series of renewed fierce clashes between the fighters of the Islamic State, the NDF and Suqour al-Sahraa' throughout Central Syria. Heavily supported by the Syrian Arab Air Force (SyAAF), the NDF and Suqour al-Sahraa' managed to push the fighters of the Islamic State away from the outskirts of Syria's most important airbase: T.4, home of the SyAAF's dreaded Su-24M2s.

These clashes symbolise the situation in Central Syria, where regime-controlled towns, gasfields and military bases were only defended by small numbers of NDF and SyAA soldiers, the latter manning the heavy weaponry attached to the NDF. The fact that it is nigh on impossible to completely control the vast Syrian desert, combined with the dire lack of soldiers, means the regime is forced to rely on very light mobile units to stop the fighters of the Islamic State before they reach the often ill-defended but strategically important towns and gasfields.


Patrols conducted by Suqour al-Sahraa' and the SyAAF's SA-342 'Gazelles' were the regime's first line of defence in Central Syria. Tasked with finding the Islamic State's convoys travelling through the vast Syrian desert, reinforcements were called in when such a convoy was spotted. More Suqour al-Sahraa' fighters, fighter-bombers, helicopterswere sent in to destroy the convoys. This tactic had so far paid off, but should just one IS convoy make it through undetected, the result can be devastating: al-Sukhna being a case in point.

The failed offensive on T.4 had somewhat calmed the situation in Central Syria, meaning the Islamic State's recent offensive caught the regime's troops in Central Syria completely off-guard. As there were no reinforcements available anywhere close, they simply collapsed under this unexpected pressure. It seems likely that even the fighters of the Islamic State didn't expect to push through the regime's defences in Central Syria so easily. Especially when considering the fact that IS is still publishing media in the area through the Wilayat Homs outlet, indicating that the Islamic State had not even planned a new administration for Wilayat al-Badiya. Of course, with the recents gains in Central Syria, it will now indubitably reappear as an independent province.


Tasked with the defence of al-Sukha was the NDF, mostly consisting of Alawites from Homs, and a limited number of fighters from Suqour al-Sahraa', further strenghtened by a detachment of handful T-72M1s from the 18th Tank Batallion of the Syrian Arab Army (SyAA), originally stationed in Tadmur. The various checkpoints littered around the town were manned by the NDF while the higher ground was held by a contingent from Suqour al-Sahraa'. Contrary to what has often been observed during the conflict, the T-72M1s were not used as static pillboxes, but rather utilised as a quick-reaction force deployed in between the defender's positions.

Fire support for the fighters of the Islamic State  consisted of three tanks (one T-55, one T-62 and one T-72M1), a number of technicals, one 122mm D-30, various 122mm DIY MRLs, a number of mortars and ATGMs. Most of the heavy weaponry was brought in on tank trailers and unloaded just outside the town before the assault begun. A video covering the assault can be seen here (WARNING: GRAPHIC).

The amount of IS fighters involved in the offensive is not believed to have been higher than a few hundred, and were seperated into two groups, one tasked with storming the checkpoints, while the other group was to provide fire-support for the former. In an effort to help the latter group distinguish the assaulting IS fighters from regime forces, the first group wore blue head bands.



As is nowadays often the case during the Islamic State's offensives, its fighters made clever use of UAVs to scout the positions of the defenders before initiating the assault. These positions were subsequently targeted with tank, artillery, rocket, mortar and heavy-machine gun fire, keeping the regime forces pinned down and unable to return fire. As an unsurprising result of this heavy supressive fire most of the around forty casualties on the side of the Islamic State were suffered as a direct result of the close quarters combat that followed the storming.

The first defensive position that was overrun was that of Suqour al-Sahraa'. The majority of the soldiers stationed here fled to the remaining checkpoints, and in usual disorderly SyAA fashion, left the heavy weaponry looking out over the town intact. Now aimed at their former operators, the captured 107mm MRL and 122mm D-30 were immediately put to use and hit the remaining regime positions shortly thereafter. The situation brings to light once again the shrining problem of incompetence in its ranks that has cost the regime battles on more than one occasion.




The detachment of T-72M1s, now fully aware of the assault, rushed to the remaining regime-held ground to aid in the defence of the checkpoints. Aware of the presence of several tanks, the fighters of the Islamic State set up positions on the high ground overlooking the checkpoints, and subsequently ambushed and destroyed the two T-72M1s present with 9M113 Konkurs and MILAN F2 ATGMs. The impact of the 9M113 was strong enough to cause the main gun of the T-72M1 to fire, while the MILAN hit completely destroyed the other T-72, causing the turret to fly off.








This sight must have demoralised the remaining regime forces to such an extent that they abandoned their positions and ran away on foot. Unfortunately for these fleeing regime forces, the fighters of the Islamic State already took position next to their escape route, resulting in a turkey shoot with many casualties under the defendless regime forces.

In this manner the offensive, lasting not more than a few hours, ended the regime's presence in al-Sukhna. In hindsight, it is obvious that the defenders never had any real, sound plan to keep the town from falling, and were definitely not prepared to fight until the end for it. The fact that al-Sukhna was of very high strategic importance makes this knowledge all the more astounding.

The first effects of the fall of al-Sukhna will indubitably be felt in Deir ez-Zor, where the regime's forces continue to battle the fighters of the Islamic State for control of the largest city in Eastern Syria. The situation for the NDF, the SyAA and the 104th Airborne Brigade of the Republican Guard, which, despite rumours to the contrary, is still present in Deir ez-Zor, has suddenly turned for the worse now that the vitally important M20 highway has been lost to the Islamic State. Together with a limited airbridge, the road was the regime's only way of resupplying its forces in Deir ez-Zor.

Indeed, as the SyAAF's transport aircraft are unable to transport any kind of heavy weaponry , the regime-forces in Deir ez-Zor now have no means to replace any damaged or destroyed tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, artillery or MRLs, which were previously all brought in via the M20 highway.






Even though the contingent defending al-Sukhna only had access to a limited number of heavy weapons, the capture of the town also proved to be quite profitable in terms of Ghaneema (spoils of war). Although underwelming compared to some of the Islamic State's previous scores, the captured weaponry will certainly aid the Islamic State in any future offensives in Central and Eastern Syria. As is often seen, the amount of weaponry that was available to the defenders far surpassed their needs and capabilities.

The Ghaneema mainly included small arms and ammunitions, but also a few technicals, anti-aircraft guns, artillery and multiple rocket launchers (MRLs).


The fighters of the Islamic State involved in the capture of al-Sukhna later participated in the Tadmur offensive, and if the current upmarch (that has also seen the fall of Tadmur, T.3 pumping station, al-Tanf border post, al-Hail gas field and Iraqi Ramadi in recent days) continues in the same pace, they will indubitably soon be fighting at T.4 airbase.

Recommended Articles

Islamic State captures Tadmur (Palmyra) in new sudden streak of offensives
Battlefront Syria: Deir ez-Zor
Battlefront Syria: Kweres

Iranian delivered North Korean Type-73 machine guns joining the fight against the Islamic State in Iraq

$
0
0


Iraq's war on the Islamic State has seen a myriad of both light and heavy weaponry from all sources around the world in use with the numerous groups pitting it out against the Islamic State for control over Iraq. From Iranian multiple rocket launchers (MRLs) to World War II howitzers, the war in Iraq has so far provided it all.

As the war is now about to enter it's second year, the need for more weapons has everything but diminished, and all involved parties continue to scrounge the list of regional and international supporters that will fuel the war for years to come. Weaponry once presumed to have found its final resting place is dug up, dusted off and once more put to use.

One of these weapons is the North Korean Type-73 light machine gun (LMG), an extremely rare piece of equipment never thought to have been produced for export in any significant quantities. While North Korean designed and produced weaponry had a great impact on Iran's wars in the past and present, these machine guns were not thought to have survived the turbulent 80s. Numerous examples now showing up with Shiite militias operating under the Popular Mobilization Forces umbrella organization is thus highly suprising.

Indeed, North Korean influence on the equipment of the Islamic Republic of Iran Army has in the past been substantial, but had yet to make a significant appearance in the Iraqi theatre, especially when put into perspective with the masses of other foreign equipment that roam the Iraqi battlegrounds.

The early 80s saw the height of military cooperation between Pyongyang and Tehran. During this time, the DPRK delivered anything from ballistic missiles and artillery to small arms and even aircraft to aid Iran in its fight against neighbouring Iraq. Cooperation in later years mainly focused on the transfer of technology from the DPRK to Iran, enabling Iran to produce various types of ballistic missiles, missile boats and submarines originally of North Korean design.

However, numerous North Korean Bulsae-2 anti-tank guided missiles (ATGMs) have recently popped up in the Gaza Strip with the Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades, the military wing of Hamas and the al-Nasser Salah al-Deen Brigades. The Bulsae-2, an indigenous variant of the 9K111 Fagot, is believed to have been delivered to the Gaza Strip by Iran through an elaborate network of smugglers and backdoor channels ranging from Sudan to the Gaza Strip. More on the presence of North Korean Bulsae-2 ATGMs with Hamas can be read here.


The Type-73, seen with Iranian troops during the Iran-Iraq war in the image above, is largely based on the Soviet PK ligh machine gun, but has been fitted with a very different feeding system capable of accepting both box and stick magazines, chambered for the 7.62x54R cartridge. While a large number were produced for the Korean People's Army, where it still sees use today, the machine gun's only documented export success is Iran.

With North Korean designed weaponry continuing to appear in various conflicts throughout the world, it is clear that even in its extremely isolated state of today the DPRK's ability exert influence on conflicts abroad is substantial.

Special thanks to Green lemon.

Recommended Articles

Iran's expanding sphere of influence: Iranian T-72 tanks in Iraq (1)
Iran's expanding sphere of influence: Iranian T-72 tanks in Iraq (2)

The spoils of Tadmur (Palmyra) airbase, captured by the Islamic State

$
0
0




Images from the recently captured Tadmur airbase reveal some of the Ghaneema (spoils of war) gained by the Islamic State during their spring offensive, which led to the capture of a number of strategically located towns and gasfields in Central Syria. Tadmur (Palmyra) itself was captured on the 20th of May 2015, opening the path for the fighters of the Islamic State to further push into regime-controlled ground, threatening major cities, T4 airbase and the last remaining gas fields under control of the regime.

While one could have expected large amounts of aircraft to now be under the control of the Islamic State, Tadmur airbase housed no operational aircraft or helicopters at the time of capture, and its fall thus won't hurt the Syrian Arab Air Force's (SyAAF) ability to exercise control over the Syrian skies.

The loss of the airbase, and of Tadmur in general, will have a great impact on the regime's operations in and around Deir ez-Zor however. Tadmur was the primary lifeline to Deir ez-Zor, and without access to the road and airbase, prospects for the regime to hold the largest city in Eastern Syria have suddenly turned very grim. Il-76s from Iran's Revolutionary Guard also frequently visisted the base, bringing in weapons and ammunition.

The only operational assets that remained at Tadmur airbase were several radar systems, tasked with guarding the Central Syrian airspace. The importance of these radar systems at Tadmur was greatly increased after the fall of Tabqa, which housed another large radar base. With both of these airbases now lost, the regime is now as good as blind in Central and Eastern Syria, and therefore unable to detect any aircraft in this half of the country.



Although Tadmur airbase was formerly home to a squadron flying the MiG-25PD(S) interceptor and the MiG-25PU two-seat trainer, the MiG-25 fleet was gradually withdrawn near the end of the previous decade. Tadmur's resident squadron was one of the last to continue flying the mighty Foxbat, sporting three MiG-25PD(S) and one MiG-25PU in its ranks until late 2013. These aircraft were then likely flown to T4, where they joined the remainder of the MiG-25 fleet already stored here.

This explains the lack of any aircraft stored in one of Tadmur's sixteen Hardened Aircraft Shelters (HAS) pictured below. Instead, in similar fashion to what is seen in other airbases in Syria, some of the now redundant HAS's have been turned into barracks. While originally housing some of the SyAAF's most powerful aircraft, they now functioned as the homes of the resident garrison until the 20th of May 2015, when Tadmur was overrun by the Islamic State.





Several other HAS's were used as weapon depots, storing ammunition, field guns and even Kh-28 anti-radiation missiles, at least twelve of which can be seen in the images below. This is a surprising discovery as Tadmur never housed any aircraft capable of carrying the Kh-28. The reason for the presence of these missiles could be explained by improper military planning, resulting in the delivery of the missiles to this base without any plans of ever distributing them further through the country.

Tadmur saw heavy use by the Soviet Union for the delivery of sophisticated weaponry to Syria in the 70s and 80s. As transporting sophisticated weaponry by boat carries too much risks, such weaponry was always directly flown in by Soviet transport aircraft. These Kh-28s were among the many weapons to have followed this route, and were destined to be used by the SyAAF's Su-22M3/M4s, Su-22UM-3Ks and Su-24MKs based at the nearby T4 airbase.

While these missiles thus should have been moved to T4 more than thirty years ago, the fuel used in the 'staggering' sixty kilometers ride to T4 was apparently deemed more important than the twelve Kh-28 missiles, which therefore never left the HAS they were stored in after their delivery. Although the missiles will have no use to the Islamic State in their original role, their 140kg heavy warhead will indubitably be put to use as the basis of IEDs or possibly even DIY surface-to-surface missiles.






The weapons depots present at the airbase provided the fighters of the Islamic State with large amounts of Ghaneema, including ammunition, numerous anti-aircraft guns and at least two 130mm M-46 field guns, all left intact by the retreating regime forces.






While the ammunition and artillery pieces seem like logical targets for the SyAAF's Su-22M4 and Su-24M2 fighter-bombers, both equipped with sophisticated precision guided weaponry, yet none of the depots were targeted by the SyAAF, which instead focussed on quite randomly bombarding the city of Tadmur itself. Ultimately, the US-led coalition stepped in and destroyed six anti-aircraft guns and one artillery piece captured in Tadmur.[1]

Also found at Tadmur airbase were the remains of two abandoned Mi-17s that were left to rot after being cannibalised for spare parts.





Several images were dedicated to the various types of radars captured at Tadmur, none of which appeared to have suffered any kind of damage. A total of six radars were captured in total, a heavy blow to Syria's air defences, nowadays all under control of the SyAAF.

One PRV-13 ("Odd Pair") height-finding radar, supporting a single JY-27 surveillance radar which lacks a height finding capability:


One P-14 1RL113 ("Tall King A") 2D early warning radar:

A P-15 ("Flat Face"), P-15M2 ("Squat Eye") and a P-12 ("Spoon Rest A") radar:

Lastly, a mobile air traffic control tower was also captured, undoubtedly the least useful amongst the systems captured:




Images of a massive stash of boxes of 12.7mm ammunition are a good indicator of the size of the stockpiles left behind to be captured at Tadmur. In the munition-hungry environment that's common to the Syrian battleground these new supplies will surely be very welcome to the Islamic State.

Recommended Articles

Islamic State captures Tadmur (Palmyra) in new sudden streak of offensives
The Islamic State's spring offensive: al-Sukhna
Battlefront Syria: Kweres

The Islamic State's spring offensive: Hulayhilah

$
0
0





Hulayhilah, located in between Tadmur and al-Sukhna, was captured on the 13th of May 2015 by fighters of the Islamic State. The industrial town of Hulayhilah is a support facility for the gasfields and pipelines located throughout Central Syria, and served as their administrative and industrial heart. After the fall of al-Sukhna in October 2013, Hulayhilah became a stronghold for regime forces, which launched a successful counter-attack from here while supported by artillery then recently moved to Hulayhilah.

Although al-Sukhna was already back under regime control after just one week in 2013, and the fighters of the Islamic State never pushed into the direction of al-Sukhna after that, the heavy weaponry present at Hulayhilah never left the industrial town. While deploying heavy weaponry near a potential hot zone just in case does indeed make sense, stationing this kind of equipment in small, hard to defend towns creates needlessly large risks. The establishment of numerous large and well-guarded forward operation bases would likely serve the regime better instead.

Thus, in typical SyAA fashion, the town was massively overstocked with arms and ammunition, far surpassing the needs of the defenders. In terms of firepower, Hulayhilah was the greatest of all regime bases from the East of Tadmur to the West of Deir ez-Zor.

Apart from housing several tanks, artillery and MRLs, Hulayhilah also saw use as a forward operating base for Suqour al-Sahraa' (Desert Falcons), a detachment of which was present during the assault. More importantly, the town served as a communication hub to communicate with regime forces, mostly Suqour al-Sahraa', patrolling the vast Syrian desert. The loss of such modern equipment is a heavy blow to the Syrian Arab Army (SyAA), yet slightly softened by the fact that the regime has nobody to communicate with in Central Syria anymore.

The assault on Hulayhilah was believed to have been conducted at around the same time as the assault on al-Sukhna and Arak, leaving the regime troops no chance to warn and aid each other. The fact that the recent offensive came at a time when the Islamic State was thought to have partly been brought to a halt under pressure from coalition airstrikes and assaults on the Syrian and Iraqi fronts must also have played a role in the regime's incompetence in defending their positions in Cental Syria. A video covering a part of assault on al-Hail, Arak, Hulayhilah and T3 can be seen here (WARNING: GRAPHIC).


The tactics used during the assault on Hulayhilah were strikingly similar as the same as the ones used during the assault on al-Sukhna; First, the high ground opposite to Hulayhilah was targeted, stormed and then captured, and the 14.5mm KPV and 122mm D-30 howitzer found here immediately used against the defenders of Hulayhilah itself.





Although the defenders of Hulayhilah could count on more men and heavy weaponry than their adversaries, the fighters of the Islamic State were already too close to the town to be hit with artillery. Instead of utilising the remaining weapon systems, or making a last ditch effort to counter and possible stop this sudden assault by the fighters of the Islamic State while entrenched in the many buildings in Hulayhilah, most entered the nearest vehicle they could find and drove off or fled on foot, leaving their comrades behind.

The fighters of the Islamic State subsequently chased some of the fleeing regime forces down, which stood no chance in the vast and empty desert. Others that didn't flee fought to their deaths or were captured and executed, some of them after being found hiding in two vehicle pits.





The large arsenal present at Hulayhilah thus saw no action during the the Islamic State's spring offensive. The resident garrison was simply not aware of any assault going on in the al-Sukhna region, and as a result, none of the weapons systems were manned, let alone turned into the right direction. Even though Hulayhilah was well stocked and equipped to engage any enemy movement in the al-Sukhna region, the defenders never expected any assault on the town itself and therefore couldn't defend themselves against the relatively small force of Islamic State fighters.

One of the Syrian Arab Air Force's (SyAAF) Su-22M4s from the nearby T4 airbase attempted to raise the moral of the defending regime forces from the air but its ordnance missed the Islamic State's fighters. This single sortie marked the end of the SyAAF's 'aerial campaign' in the al-Sukhna region offensive.


The timing of the Islamic State's attack proved crucial, as capturing both al-Sukhna and Hulayhilah at the same time prevented regime forces at Hulayhilah using their artillery to support the defenders of al-Sukhna, and prevented regime forces at al-Sukhna to use their tanks to support the defenders of Hulayhilah.




Advanced communications equipment, such as the Chinese TS-504 troposcatter pictured below, was among the equipment captured. This is the second loss of such a system in a month, only a small number of which were delivered at the end of the previous decade.


















The Ghaneema (spoils of war) consisted of various types of light and heavy weaponry, some of which seen below. Large caches of small arms and munitions were found at the site, including PG-7 warheads, large amounts of artillery shells for the resident artillery and a rare machine gun which was not yet seen in Syria before: the Hungarian KGK general purpose machine gun.

Among the heavy equipment captured were at least two 122mm D-30 howitzers, two 130mm M-46 field guns and one Iranian produced 107mm Fajr-1 single-barelled multiple rocket launcher (MRL). The graffiti on the D-30 reads: من أملاك الدولة الإسلامية - ''Owned by the Islamic State'' while the text on the M-46 reads: دولة الخلاف  - ''The Caliphate''.




Self-propelled artillery included one 122mm 2S1 self-propelled howitzer and one 122mm BM-21 MRL. At least one tank was also captured; one T-72M1, rendered useless by the fact that the barrel of its 125mm main gun has been destroyed, likely caused by a malfunction of the gun system.







Recommended Articles

The Islamic State's spring offensive: al-Sukhna
Islamic State captures Tadmur (Palmyra) in new sudden streak of offensives
The spoils of Tadmur (Palmyra) airbase, captured by the Islamic State

From Russia with Love, Syria's Vepr-12s

$
0
0


The last two decades have seen a complete resurrection of civilian owned weaponry in Syria. The trend of owning and dealing weapons quickly declined after the 1982 Hama Massacre, after which fear arose that having a gun could have you linked to the uprising. Strict gun laws enforced shortly after the failed uprising also made it harder to acquire and own weapons. The fear slowly faded away during the 80s, and the shotgun, now tolerated by the regime, became increasingly popular as a hunting tool in rural areas throughout the 90s, much of which had to do with their favourable price.

Despite this, being in the possession of an automatic assault rifle was strictly forbidden after 1982. While some politically reliable farmers and shepherds were able to get a security clearance which allowed them to be in the possession of an automatic assault rifle before 1982, this clearance was too expensive for the general farmer. Illegally owning an assault rifle would generally result in two to six years imprisoment, and a fine of anything between 2000 to 10.000 USD before the revolution. This didn't deter some to get hold of an AKMS to ward off thieves raiding 'someone's' pistachio trees however.

Back to the shotgun, the use of which within the Syrian Arab Army (SyAA) and National Defence Force (NDF) remains limited. The Syrian military doctrine never focused on house-to-house fighting, and as a result specialised weaponry for such situations was never acquired. Limited numbers of military grade shotguns, such as the Italian SPAS-15, did find their way to private individuals in the Syrian coast in the past years however.

The Syrian Civil War and the widespread house-to-house combat through which it is often fought brought the need for weapons optimised for close-quarters combat, and a Syrian military delegation was sent to Russia to purchase such weapons. It is believed that the ВПО-205-03, along with the AK-104, was among the weapons inspected by the Syrian military delegation during a Russian weapons expo in 2012, which in turn led to the acquisition of a limited batch of ВПО-205-03 fully automatic shotguns, the military-grade variant of the Vepr-12.


The shotguns of the Vepr-12 series bear heavy resemblance to the AK-74M and AK-100 series, and one could mistake it for an assault rifle, especially with the conventional magazine in place. The picatinny rail with which it is outfitted, as opposed to the standard side mount seen on the AK series, accepts a wide variety of optical sights, vertical forward grips, IR pointers and flashlights.

The already compact ВПО-205-03 can be further shortened by the side-folding stock, making it an ideal weapon for close-quarters combat. Like most of the world's shotguns, the weapon fires standard 12-gauge shells.

As is commonly seen with deliveries of sophisticated weaponry to Syria, none of these shotguns found their way to the battlefront. Instead, all were immediately distributed to various important figures and parties in the coastal area. While the ВПО-205-03 would be a godsend for the regime forces fighting in for example Deir ez-Zor, corruption prevents the use of such weaponry in places most needed. Of course, in this case it concerns just the use of a single new type of shotgun, but ultimately such policies could end up costing the regime the war.

Recommended Articles

From Russia with Love, Syria's MTs-116Ms
From Russia with Love, Syria's AK-104s
From Russia with Love, Syria's AK-74Ms
From Russia with Love, Syria's 6S8s

Syria's R-330P communications jamming stations, from Russia with Love?

$
0
0


After the first sighting of the SPR-1 proximity fuse jamming station in Syria, a second type of jamming platform has been revealed to be in service with the Syrian Arab Army (SyAA). While the R-330P was already believed to be in Syrian service since the late eighties, it now seems that Syria has received another batch of these highly specialised vehicles in more recent years, likely delivered by Russia.

The R-330P 'Piramida-I', based on the chassis of an MT-LBu, is utilised for detecting, intercepting and jamming voice and data communications. Equipped with two antennas, one is tasked with detecting and intercepting very high frequency (VHF) bands used by communication systems while the other antenna jams these frequencies, disabling any communication systems within a range of 25 kilometers that use these frequencies.

The presence of just one of these vehicles could have a significant impact on the ground, making it impossible for the rebels to coordinate their attacks and communicate with each other over the radio, thus possibly thwarting any rebel offensive. A deadly tool in the hands of trained personnel.

Syria is believed to have received its first R-330Ps at around the same time as the delivery of the first SPR-1s, which occurred in the late eighties. Both types are operated by the same electronic warfare unit, believed to be based near Damascus. The R-330Ps operated by this unit remain in their original camouflage, and show clear signs of rust and worn-out paint, such as the example below, reading: الجيش  - ''The Army'' and ٣٩٧١٧٩ - ''397179''.





The sudden appearance of a brand-new, well-maintained and green camouflaged R-330P in Syria is therefore highly surprising, and points at this vehicle being part of a more recent acquisition, parallel to deliveries of other highly specialised systems that have reached Syria in the past few years, such as the UR-77 mine-clearing vehicle and the 300mm BM-30 'Smerch' multiple rocket launcher (MRL).

Even in the face of recent setbacks for the Assad regime, it is clear that not all cards have been played yet. While the R-330P platform is not a directly lethal weapon, the far-reaching consequences of utilising such a system is affirmed by rebel offensive successes in Eastern Ukraine, which reportedly made heavy use of electronic warfare (EW) systems and thus completely denied their opponents the ability to communicate and coordinate operations.

Recommended Articles

Syria's SPR-1 mobile jammers, staying in the shadows
From Russia with Love, Syria's Vepr-12s
From Russia with Love, Syria's MTs-116Ms
From Russia with Love, Syria's AK-104s
From Russia with Love, Syria's AK-74Ms
From Russia with Love, Syria's 6S8s 

Fortress T4: An Airbase at War

$
0
0


The Islamic State's offensive in Central Syria has not only allowed the fighters of the Islamic State to expand their operations into areas previously out of reach, but it now also threatens the regime's gas supplies, its presence on numerous fronts, its control over the only road leading to the vitally important T4 airbase and the airbase itself, the largest of its kind in Syria.

T4, sharing its name with the nearby pumping station, is more commonly (yet incorrectly) known as Tiyas and a whole host of other names. After the fall of Tadmur airbase, it is now one of sixteen operational airbases under control of the Syrian Arab Air Force (SyAAF), and its defence is essential to the SyAAF's ability to exercise control over the Syrian skies. No less than three fighter-bomber squadrons and one helicopter squadron are currently operating out of T4, including the pride of the SyAAF: its Su-24M2s. The airbase is also home to the now decommissioned MiG-25 fleet, largely phased out in the previous decade. Despite being Syria's largest airbase, T4 only has one runway, making the airbase extremely vulnerable in case this single runway gets taken out.

In anticipation of an Islamic State offensive on T4 after their lightning advance throughout Central and Eastern Syria in mid and late 2014, the airbase's assets were heavily reinforced by a temporarily detachment of L-39s, formerly deployed to the then recently overrun Tabqa airbase and by one detachment of at least four Mi-8/17s.

Fully aware of the high military value of T4, the regime has made extensive efforts to defend the airbase, making it come close to being an impenetrable fortress. 'Fortress T4' also serves as a barrier between the now Islamic State controlled Tadmur, and regime controlled Homs, further adding to its importance. The regime forces defending T4 have clashed with the fighters of the Islamic State on numerous occasions throughout the past year, with the latest offensive coming close to the officer's housing and T4 pumping station. According to various reports by Islamic State related Twitter accounts, T4 was targeted with artillery in late May 2015, although it remains unknown if this caused any damage to the airbase.

While the airbase itself is not in imminent danger of falling to the fighters of the Islamic State, the control over the only road leading to T4 is disputed, and will likely completely be under the control of the Islamic State if they continue their push towards Homs. This would isolate T4 and make access by road impossible, leading to significant problems in the long run. Resupplying the airbase would then be in the hands of the SyAAF's transport aircraft and helicopters, but such an airlift would have serious drawbacks as it would be unable to bring in any heavy weaponry and fuel, not to mention the fact that it would also cost the regime loads of precious resources.



The resident fleet of aircraft and helicopters has the potential of being a major eyesore to the fighters of the Islamic State, and has the ability to thwart the Islamic State in any of its future offensives undertaken in the Homs Governorate. But as the SyAAF remains largely unable to respond to actual developments, and often only joins the fray after the battle on the ground has been fought, better coordination between regime forces on the ground and SyAAF aircraft and helicopters in the sky is required to fully optimise the assests available at T4. Furthermore, the desperate revenge strikes flown by the SyAAF on recently lost towns could be stopped to spare not only the life of the many innocent civilians killed during these sorties, but also the precious airframes used in these useless sorties, with the wasted flight-hours instead allocated to supporting the regime's ground forces.

For example, only one symbolic sortie from T4 was flown in aid of the defenders of Hulayhilah, while the defenders of al-Sukhna, al-Hail, Arak and the numerous other towns and gasfields recently captured by the fighters of the Islamic State received no aerial support whatsoever. The SyAAF also largely stood by when Tadmur was captured, only flying some aimless sorties to boost moral of the regime forces on the ground. The town was heavily hit only after it was captured by the Islamic State, with the ordnance used randomly dropped on residential areas.

The huge weapons depots and airbase present at Tadmur provided the fighters of the Islamic State with large amounts of weaponry and associated ammunition, a logical target for the SyAAF's fighter-bombers, which can be equipped with sophisticated precision guided weaponry. However, none of the depots were targeted by the SyAAF, and it was the US-led coalition that had to step in to destroy six anti-aircraft guns captured at Tadmur.[1] This while the majority of the aircraft capable of deploying precision guided munitions is stationed at T4, located only sixty kilometers from Tadmur.

While extensive in terms of types, Syria's numerically limited stock of precision guided missiles has seen little use throughout the Civil War, making it likely that the majority is still being withheld for a possible future conflict with the U.S. or Israel. But as the war has now entered its fourth year, one would question if such weaponry wouldn't be better off used in this conflict instead. While the SyAAF's current arsenal of precision guided weaponry would be quickly depleted, it could be quickly replenished by Russia; the continuous flow of Russian-made weaponry that reaches Syria on a regular basis is a testament to that fact.

When examining T4 using the latest (public) satellite imageryavailable one can spot a large number of seemingly inoperational aircraft spread around the airbase, with as much as thirty-two decommissioned MiG-25s visible at T4 in October 2014. While certainly an impressive sight, it marks the end of an era for the once mighty 'Foxbat' fleet. The fleet of MiG-25s was slowly decommissioned throughout the previous decade, with only a few examples remaining operational by the turn of the century.

The exact number of MiG-25s Syria received is thought to be around forty. Versions are believed to include MiG-25P (later upgraded to MiG-25PDS) and MiG-25PD interceptors, MiG-25R and RB reconnaissance aircraft and MiG-25PU conversion trainers. A reason for the retirement of the MiG-25 fleet might not only be its age and the increasing costs to keep the aircraft operational that come with it, but also the type's vulnerability to Israeli jamming.

The career of some MiG-25s appeared to have been revived on several occasions throughout the Syrian Civil War; the last confirmed sorties were flown in March and April 2014, during which a MiG-25PD(S) launched R-40 air-to-air missiles at ground targets. These sorties, to no one's surprise, yielded no beneficial results.

The last to operate the MiG-25s was an unknown squadron at Tadmur, sporting three MiG-25PD(S) and one MiG-25PU in its ranks until late 2013. These aircraft were then likely flown to T4, where they joined the remainder of the MiG-25 fleet already stored here.




The majority of the active aircraft operating out of T4 are housed in the airbase's fifty-eight Hardened Aircraft Shelters (HAS), including the SyAAF's Su-24M2s. T4 has traditionally been the home of Syria's Su-24s, with most located in the South-Eastern part of the airbase. A few examples are also detached to Seen at any given time. The Su-24s are undoubtedly the most important assets of the SyAAF, and have seen heavy usage in the past four years.

Although T4 is located closely to Islamic State held territory, 819 Squadron flying the Su-24s rarely participates in sorties flown against the fighters of the Islamic State. Instead, the Su-24 serves as the SyAAF's long arm, mostly striking villages throughout all of Syria. From Deir ez-Zor to Quneitra and even testing the reaction time of the Royal Air Force based at Akrotiri, Cyprus, the Su-24s done it all.

Contrary to earlier reports, the transfer of one Su-24MK and one Su-24MR by Libya to Syria in the mid 1990s might have not taken place, and has been disclaimed by several SyAAF pilots and the former base commander of T4. This means that the number of Su-24s Syria received stands at just twenty. However, nineteen of these Su-24MKs were upgraded to M2 standard by the 514 ARZ Aircraft Repair Plant in Rzhev in Russia between 2010 and 2013. Just in time to participate in the Civil War, all aircraft returned to Syria relatively unnoticed.



The upgrade provides for improved targeting, navigation and fire control systems by replacing the plane's old control systems. The plane is also made compatible with newer versions of the KAB-500/1500 and with Kh-31As, Kh-31Ps, Kh-59s and R-73s, adding to theFAB, OFAB and RBK bombs, Kh-25s, Kh-28s, Kh-29Ls, Kh-29Ts and Kh-58s guided missiles, KAB-500s and KAB-1500s guided bombs, S-24 and S-25 air to ground rockets, rocket pods and R-60 air-to-air missiles it can already carry. In Syrian service, all but the R-73 are available to the Su-24M2s, which are reserved for the SyAAF's MiG-29SMs instead.








Out of the twenty Su-24s originally acquired by the SyAAF, eleven examples remain operational as of June 2015. All but one loss incurred during the Civil War, with one airframe damaged beyond repair after suffering an accident before it had commenced. One was shot down with a MANPADS by the Free Syrian Army above Daret Izzah on the 28th of November 2012, another was shot down by an Israeli Patriot surface-to-air missile (SAM) after having strayed into the airspace over the occupied Golan Heights on the 23th of September 2014 and another fell near Nahtah on the 11th of June 2015, likely due to premature detonation of its ordnance. One Su-24M2 was heavily damaged by anti-aircraft fire in May 2015, after which its pilot managed to guide the airframe to T4 despite the condition it was in. However, it crashed while on approach to the runway after it became apparent that the damage done to the aircraft would prevent a safe landing. Both the pilot and navigator ejected safely. An additional two Su-24s were believed to have been destroyed in an accident on the 28th of May 2015, during which an explosion occured while both aircraft were being rearmed for another sortie, resulting in the death of at least five and wounding another dozen. Additionally, two Su-24s are out of service after having been hit by ground fire. While the damage on both of these aircraft is minimal and can be repaired, the SyAAF currently lacks the resources to do so. The fleet of available airframes has thus almost been cut in half, and each loss is a heavy blow to the SyAAF.


A second fighter-bomber squadron based at T4 operates the Su-22M4, all of which are located in the North-Western and South-Western part of the airbase. 827 Squadron has seen heavy use against the fighters of the Islamic State in the past year, mainly flying in support of Suqour al-Sahraa' (Desert Falcons) units patrolling the Syrian desert.

The Su-22M4 is outfitted for the carriage of S-24 and S-25 air-to-ground rockets, unguided rocket pods, FAB, OFAB and RBK bombs, KMGU-2 munitions dispensers, Kh-25, Kh-28, Kh-29L, Kh-29T and Kh-58 air-to-ground missiles and R-60 air-to-air missiles. The Su-22M4 has almost exclusively been used to deliver unguided weaponry in the Syrian Civil War: its potential to deliver guided weaponry again being ignored.


Although its Su-22s are often targeted by anti-aircraft guns of the Islamic State, 827 Squadron has suffered relatively light losses in the past four years, with only one Su-22M4 shot down by the fighters of the Islamic State near the Shaer gas field on the 30th of November 2014. As seen with the Su-24M2s, a couple of airframes are awaiting repair after having suffered some form of combat damage.

In the mid to end of 2014, T4's aerial assests were further strengthened by the deployment of a detachment of L-39s. Although nowadays rarely sighted in Syria's skies, the remainder of the SyAAF's L-39 fleet remains active on nearly every front, the L-39ZOs and L-39ZAs almost exclusively flying their sorties in the night in the Aleppo and Damascus region.

The L-39s based at T4 were among the examples overhauled at 'The Factory', the SyAAF's repair and maintenance center located at Neyrab/Aleppo International Airport. The overhauled examples were distributed between Syria's remaining operational airbases, including Tabqa before it fell to the fighters of the Islamic State on the 24th of August 2014. The L-39s now present at T4 are believed to have been formerly based at Tabqa. These aircraft have thus followed the fighters of the Islamic State as they carried out their offensives in Syria.

In an effort to boost the firepower of the L-39s, all of the overhauled airframes were rewired for the carriage of 80mm B-8 rocket pods, a weapon originally not destined to be used on the L-39. A B-8 equipped L-39ZO now stationed at T4 airbase can be seen below. The carriage of B-8 rocket pods greatly enchances the L-39's capabilities, which previously could only be armed with 57mm rocket pods and bombs.



Recent satellite imagery of T4 shows the presence of at least five L-39s at any given time, most sitting on the tarmac formerly used by the SyAAF's MiG-25s or by the double HAS, now acting as a support facility for the L-39s.



A detachment of Mi-8/17s now based at T4 act in support of the remaining regime forces in the region, and as a liaison between the airbase and the rest of regime-controlled Syria.

Four Mi-8/17s can be spotted on recent satellite imagery, stationed right next to the L-39s.




Many of the HAS's now empty after the decommissioning of the MiG-25 fleet have been turned into barracks, weapon depots and defensive strongholds. Two HAS's located on the North-Eastern side of the airbase and one HAS located on the South-Eastern part of the airbase have seen specifically much activity around them, with several trucks present in or near the HAS's at any given time.





A tank company, now stationed in the centre of T4, further strengthens the airbase's defences.




Satellite imagery also shows the many destroyed buildings in the officer's housing quarters located East of the airbase. This location was the scene of heavy fighting back in November 2014, which also spread to the nearby T4 pumping station. The defenders succesfully managed to push the fighters of the Islamic State back from both locations however.



Russian contractors from the Slavonic Corps, sent to protect the oilfields around Deir ez-Zor, also passed by T4 on their journey to the city. The contractors, apparantly spending more time posing for photos than actually fighting, were routed after being ambushed by rebel forces near the town of al-Sukhna on the way to Deir ez-Zor, and swiftly returned to Russia afterwards, where the owners of the Slavonic Corps was subsequently imprisoned by the Federal Security Service (FSB) because the operation was deemed illegal by the Russian government. Five contractors together with Su-24M2 '2514' can be seen below.



The two S-75 and three S-125 surface-to-air missile (SAM) sites surrounding the airbase remain active, and regularly change positions to throw off their adversaries. Although they are unlikely to be of much use during a potential Coalition air campaign against the Assad-regime due to their outdated nature, they would force the flight ceiling of coalition aircraft up in the early stages of such a campaign and might deter stand-alone strikes by other parties. The systems tasked with directing these SAMs to their targets are two P-18 ''Spoon Rest D'' and two P-35/37 ''Bar Lock'' radars, which are responsible for detecting any plane flying in this part of Central Syria, a crucial task now that Tadmur airbase and its many radars have been captured by the Islamic State. One RSP-7 radar and one Parol Identification friend or foe (IFF) system also present at T4 guide the aircraft that are coming in to land.

The latest offensive of the Islamic State on this vital airbase has once again been stopped before reaching the airbase, and with the recent setbacks for the Islamic State, this might have been their last chance to take it. Fortress T4, as large as it is important, will indubitably continue to serve as a major hub for the Syrian Arab Air Force.



Written in collaboration with R.S from Luftwaffe A.S. Satellite imagery by finriswolf.

Recommended Articles

The Syrian Arab Air Force, beware of its wings

The Syrian Arab Army going DIY, 57mm AZP S-60 anti-aircraft guns mounted on 2K12 SAM launchers

$
0
0



The ongoing Civil War in Syria has led to plenty of DIY projects in a bid to enhance the firepower of the involved factions. The infamous rebel Hell Cannon, the regime's IRAMs and barrel bombs are perfect examples of DIY projects that have become 'succesful' enough to be produced in significant numbers. The latter two of these projects, along with the armour modifications applied to a part of the Republican Guard's armour fleet, are in fact so popular that theymight be classified more fittingly as factory standardised upgrades rather than DIY modifications.

DIY projects often depend on the ingenuity and motivation of the local commander, the crew and available resources. These conditions differ greatly throughout Syria, considering some factions and regions have sufficient weaponry and ammunition while others are forced to go DIY to ensure they have enough firepower available to gain the edge over their opponents, or even to just prevent their downfall.

The installment of 57mm AZP S-60 anti-aircraft guns on trucks is a DIY modification that has become extremely popular in Syria, being relatively easy to perform yet providing troops with a fast-firing support gun for long distances. The only drawback of this conversion is the limited firing arc of the gun, which due to obstruction by the truck cabin is blocked in the front. The truck of choice for such conversions is often a garbage truck, as these provide the operators some degree of cover against small arms fire.

Installing the same gun on the GM-578 chassis of the 2K12 Kub mobile surface-to-air missile (SAM) system solves this problem, and allows the gunner to swing the gun fully around. A limited number of such conversions have recently been produced for the Syrian Arab Army (SyAA), and more vehicles might be converted in the near future.




At least one of the converted 2K12s is currently participating in the offensive for the strategically located Qalamoun region, which is jointly conducted by Hizbullah and the Syrian regime. The Syrian Arab Army and Republican Guard provide the bulk of the fire-support to infantry forces mainly composed of Hizbullah fighters.









The vulnerability of lone SAM sites scattered throughout Syria led to the decision to redeploy the most vulnerable of them to safer and stronger regime-held positions, where most SAM batteries were reactivated. For some, the reactivation was short lived however, as a lack of spares and the need to deploy the personnel for other roles meant the batteries are either minimally staffed or abandoned all together. A number of 2K12 batteries underwent the same fate, such as the launchers below, reading: الجيش - ١٠٦٠٥٥٨ ''The Army - 1060558''. The converted 2K12s were among the abandoned examples, and converting them into fire-support platforms rather than letting them collect dust makes sense.


Although this cost-effective conversion is mobile and therefore capable of advancing alongside regime fighters, the limited amount of ammunition that can be carried in the steel construction which protects the crew against small-arms fire will likely limit its role to just a fire-support platform. However, another DIY project initiated by Libya Dawn in Libya shows the 2K12 SAM system can be converted for use in other roles as well. With some relatively simple modifications, the 600kg 3M9 can be repurposed to surface-to-surface role, albeit to highly unreliable effect. Wether such a modification might soon also see use on the Syrian battlefield remains to be seen.


Recommended Articles

The Republican Guard's armour upgrades: Products of a Four Year War
Libya Dawn going DIY: 2K12 SAMs used as surface-to-surface missiles
Libya Dawn going DIY: S-125 SAMs used as surface-to-surface missiles
Onwards to the front, Syria's BMPs
Syria's Steel Beasts: The T-55
Syria's Steel Beasts: The T-62
Syria's Steel Beasts: The T-72

Libya Dawn going DIY: S-125 SAMs used as surface-to-surface missiles and mounted on T-62 tanks

$
0
0



The ever demanding combat environment of the Libyan battlefield has forced parties on all sides to resort to using their creativity to find new use for once abandoned and neglected systems, and in so doing spawned a host of interesting contraptions already, such as those that resulted from the Libyan National Army and Libya Dawn mounting AK-230 and Oerlikon GDF naval cannons on trucks. As the conflict still appears to be far from reaching a conclusion, such DIY continue to see the light of day, as is witnessed by the inception of another improvised mobile surface-to-surface missile system by Libya Dawn.

Libya Dawn, which has put effort into basing 2K12 SAMs converted to the surface-to-surface role on Italian Puma 6x6s as well as adapting S-125 SAMs to do the same from towed launchers in April this year, now appears to have continued this path of development, despite little positive results on the capabilities of these systems. The new mobile system, using a T-62 Model 1972 as Transporter Erector Launcher (TEL) as a basis and a single modified S-125 mounted on top of the cupola as its main ordnance. The conversion of 2K12 SAMs to the surface-to-surface role on an Italian Puma 6x6 can be seen pictured below.

In control of Libya's capital Tripoli as well as Misrata, Libya Dawn is the largest operator of T-62s in Libya, having used the tanks in various battles, including those near Tripoli. The mainstay of Libya's T-62 fleet was operated by the Hamza battalion in Misrata before the revolution, during which the base it was operating from was struck by the NATO-led coalition. It now provides Libya Dawn with tens of T-62s in operational condition and a host of others in various states of decay that can be cannibalised for spare parts.

As could be observed from photos of Libya Dawn's previous projects to convert S-125 SAMs to the surface-to-surface role, the frontal fins have been removed in an attempt to increase the stability of the missile during its unguided flight. Similarly, the nosecone was lenthened, possibly to increase the payload (which ordinarily is just 60 kilograms) or to swap the standard high explosive fragmentational warhead designed to wreck aircraft for a more conventional high explosive one. While not easily discernible in the new imagery, it is likely the standard proximity fuse has once again been replaced with one designed for surface-to-surface use.



Libya Dawn is not the first to meddle with converting surface-to-air missiles for other roles; Ba'athist Iraq experimented with the same concept near the end of the Iran-Iraq War, with unsatisfactory results. More on this project can be read here.

The conversion of S-125s to the surface-to-surface role will, despite being placed on a mobile launcher, remain of limited value, and rather serves a psychological purpose than a tactical one.

Recommended Articles

Libya Dawn going DIY: S-125 SAMs used as surface-to-surface missiles 
Libya Dawn going DIY: 2K12 SAMs used as surface-to-surface missiles
Libya Dawn going DIY: Oerlikon GDF naval guns mounted on trucks
Kh-29 air-to-surface missiles used as unguided rockets in Libya
The Libyan National Army going DIY: AK-230 naval guns mounted on trucks
Viewing all 604 articles
Browse latest View live