As the now almost four-year-long Syrian Civil War continues, equipment previously unknown to have been operated by Syria still comes to light, including ATGM carriers. The reason for the slow introduction of Syria's anti-tank guided missile (ATGM) carriers has much to do with their intended role: destroying enemy armour from longer ranges. As the rebels only operate limited numbers of armoured vehicles, deploying ATGM carriers to the battlefield would have little use.

It was only recently that numerous ATGMs were distributed to the NDF in an effort to increase their firepower. Some NDF batallions directly facing rebel-held towns are now able to immediately return fire with their ATGMs after being fired upon, making it hard for the rebels to employ armour or artillery in and near these towns.

Therefore it has only been recently that Syria's large fleet of ATGMs has seen use with the Syrian Arab Army and the National Defence Force (NDF) in the Civil War, mostly fired at houses in an effort to clear the rebel presence inside. Due to their precision, ATGMs are well suited, albeit very expensive, for this task. Because of the low building quality in Syria, most houses can be easily penetrated by ATGMs.

This swift change of tactics also means a new dawn for the Syrian Arab Army's 9P148 ATGM carriers. Based on the chassis of theBRDM-2, the 9P148 can fire both the 9M113 'Konkurs' and the older 9M111 'Fagot' and is a considerable improvement over the older 9P122 and 9P133, both still firing the Malyutka ATGM.

Although the 9P148 still sees active use, most of the Syrian Arab Army's 9P122s remain in storage. The delivery of thousands of modern ATGMs meant there was a decreasing need for the ageing 9P122s, and most were placed in reserve shortly before the Civil War began. In their intended role, striking Israeli Merkava tanks on the occupied Golan Heights, the 9P122 would have been as good as chanceless anyway. It is interesting to note the Malyutka missile itself still remains in active use in Syria, and more modern Iranian variants continue to be delivered even today.













Distributing the ATGM carriers amongst entrenched forces facing towns and vast swaths of open land is an effective way to enchance their capability to deny the possible deployment of heavy weaponry by the rebels. As the Syrian Arab Army and the National Defence Force (NDF) are increasingly forced to look for other means to ensure superiority in firepower, these mobile ATGM carriers might be just at the beginning of their career.




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To everyone's surprise, the Syrian Arab Air Force (SyAAF), often incorrectly abbreviated to SAF or SAAF, has been able to maintain a high pace of operations in the now almost four-year long war. Orginally destined to engage in a fierce but short war with Israel, it never anticipated to fight what is essentially a war of attrition between the Assad-led party and its adversaries, and has found its role in the conflict through trial and error. The SyAAF saw a large part of its aircraft and helicopters upgraded in the Ukraine and Russia before and during the Syrian Civil War, and as all aircraft were safely returned, the SyAAF has been able to enjoy a "fresh start".

Apart from some negligible combat missions in the early days of the revolution, it was only in the end of July 2012 that the SyAAF became actively involved in suppressing the rebellion. This was done mostly by deploying L-39ZAs on bombing runs over Aleppo and its suburbs. These sorties resulted mostly in civilian targets such as hospitals and schools being hit, and unsurprisingly led to numerous civilian casualties. The months that followed saw MiG-21s, MiG-23BNs, Su-22s and a limited number of Su-24s also joining the fray, leading to a far increased amount of sorties throughout the country. The number of L-39 sorties gradually decreased over time however, and completely came to a halt in May 2013.



The first setback occurred on the 25th of November 2012, when Majr as-Sultan heliport was overrun, resulting in the capture and destruction of five Mi-8/17s. This was followed by the fall of Taftanaz on the 11th of January 2013, which saw at least fifteen Mi-8/17s and one Mi-25 being captured or destroyed. Next in line was Kshesh(commonly known as Jirah) on the 12th of February 2013, which apart from more than fifty inoperational MiG-15/17s and L-29s gave the rebels an opportunity to work on establishing their own air force, as at least eight intact L-39s were capture. This opportunity was later utilised by Jaish al-Islam. Dhab'ah (commonly known as Al-Qusayr) was captured on the 18th of April, and although several MiG-21s were found here, all were inoperational. Stocks of air-to-air missiles found here were later used as provisional rockets by the rebels. Abu ad-Duhor was stormed on the 30th of April 2013, but the defenders managed to fence off the assault. This marked a turning point in the rebels' advances on SyAAF airbases, all of which subsequently came to a halt. Only the already surrounded heliport of Mennegh fell on the 6th of August 2013, where several Mi-8s were captured or destroyed. The latest airbase that fell was Tabqa on the 24th of August 2014. As much as eighteen MiG-21s, ranging from operational examples to piles of scrap, were captured by the Islamic State here. Of these eighteen only three were in operational condition as the few remaining airworthy MiG-21s escaped Tabqa before the base was given up.

As Kshesh and Mennegh were used for the training of fighter pilots and helicopter pilots respectively, their capture greatly hindered the training of future pilots. The complete encirclement of Kweres, the SyAAF's main training base, made matters only worse for the SyAAF.

Apart from the several aircraft captured or destroyed at their home bases mentioned above, losses during this time were limited to five MiG-21s, two MiG-23s, one Su-24M2, two L-39s and six Mi-8/17s. And although these losses would gradually increase over time, they failed to hurt the SyAAF just yet. 

Much more worrisome for the SyAAF was the increased amount of sorties that had to be undertaken by its fighter-bombers each day. Most of Syria's MiG-21s date from the early seventies, the MiG-23BNs were all manufactured in the late seventies and the Su-22M-3/M-4 fleet dates from the eighties. Apart from the Su-22M-4, all were nearing the end of their lifecycle and were destined for replacement in this decade. Instead of enjoying their last few years in calmness, these aircraft now found itself at the forefront of the fight.




This was much less of a problem for the now twenty-strong Su-24 fleet, which forms the core of the SyAAF's fighter-bomber department and are considered to be the pride of the SyAAF. Twenty Su-24MKs were ordered from the Soviet Union in 1988 and delivered in 1990 and one Su-24MK and one Su-24MR were donated by Libya in the mid 1990s.  

Just in time to participate in the Civil War, the twenty-one Su-24MKs were upgraded to M2 standard by the 514 ARZ Aircraft Repair Plant in Rzhev in Russia between 2010 and 2013. The M2 upgrade brought the Su-24s on the same standard as the Russian Su-24M2. The upgrade provides for improved targeting, navigation and fire control systems by replacing the plane's old control systems. The plane was also made compatible with newer versions of the KAB-500/1500 and for Kh-31As, Kh-31Ps, Kh-59s and R-73s, adding to theFAB, OFAB and RBK bombs, Kh-25s, Kh-29Ls, Kh-29Ts, Kh-31s and Kh-58s guided missiles, KAB-500s and KAB-1500s guided bombs, S-24 and S-25 air to ground rockets, rocket pods and R-60 air-to-air missiles already carried.

While the upgrade was supposed to 'stay below the radar', 514 ARZ workers publicly speaking about the presence of Syrian Su-24s at this plant, satellite imagery footage of Rzhev showing Syrian Su-24s and an image of a Syrian Su-24 being worked upon on the 514 ARZ's official website did not work in its favour.

Back to the battered fighter-bomber fleet, which saw its target lists growing while the number of operational airframes continued dwindling. However, the then-imminent collapse of the SyAAF's fighter-bomber fleet curiously never took place, leading to the conclusion Syria can still count on spare parts from Russia to keep its aircraft operational. This theory is strengthened by the upgrade of MiG-23MLDs, MiG-29SMs, Su-24M2s, Mi-25s and Ka-28s in Russia and the Ukraine (with after-sale support likely to have been included in the deals), the Russian Aircraft Corporation MiG opening an office near Mezze airbase in Damascus, the transition to a more modern maintenance system with help of Russian Aircraft Corporation MiG, the large flow of Russian arms that still reaches Syria every month and the regular sighting of the SyAAF's Il-76s in Russia. Although in Syrian Air colours, the Il-76s are de-facto under air force command.

SyAAF personnel, along with numerous soldiers and officers of the Syrian Arab Army and Republican Guard, continue their training in Russia. A SyAAF pilot can be seen in front of a Russian MiG-29 below.

The first case of continuing weapon deliveries to the SyAAF became apparent in October 2013, when Mi-25s, MiG-29s and Su-22s employed B-8 rockets pods for the first time. The 80mm S-8 rockets fired from the B-8s already hit the Lebanese village of Arsal in June 2013, which marked the first use of the S-8s by the SyAAF. The Mi-25 and fighter-bomber fleet was until then still armed with UB-32 rocket pods using 57mm S-5 rockets, which lacked the penetration and firepower to destroy housing or personnel in cover.



The presence of B-8 armed MiG-29s usually indicated an absence of larger numbers of the wearing MiG-23BN or Su-22M-3/M-4 fleet, which has to be overhauled regularly in order to keep the aircraft operational. Temporarily grounding large amounts of its fighter-bombers to have them replaced by fighters has become a standard tactic within the SyAAF, and allows for some much needed rest for certain airframes. For example, during November 2014 not a single Su-22 was spotted over Syria, as increasing numbers are temporarily grounded or even completely phased out, as witnessed by the growing Su-22 graveyard at Dmeyr.^[1]



This tactic allows the SyAAF to maintain a high number of sorties without putting all the burden on the MiG-23BNs and Su-22M-3/M-4s. Although MiG-29s regularly got involved in replacing some of the fighter-bombers from late 2013, the MiG-29s rarely take part in the Civil War nowadays. Only a few MiG-29s appear to be used to deliver precision-guided munitions (PGMs) throughout Syria.

Instead, the SyAAF's MiG-23MF and in lesser extent the MiG-23ML and MiG-23MLD fighters began flying air-to-ground sorties over Syria. Mostly armed with two UB-16 and two UB-32 rocket pods, two B-8 rocket pods or iron bombs, they joined the MiG-23BNs and Su-22M-3/M-4s over the Syrian sky. As Syria still operates plenty of MiG-23MFs, MiG-23MLs and MiG-23MLDs, this tactic can easily be continued in the upcoming years.





















A part of the MiG-23ML and MiG-23MLD fleet was upgraded in the Ukraine and Russia from 2008 until 2011 or 2012, and all aircraft returned to Syria virtually unnoticed in the same year. While the world was busy trying to stop a freighter carrying three Mi-25s returning from an overhaul in Russia, several batches of MiG-23s, MiG-29s and Su-24s entered Syria without any media attention: tunnel vision and hypocrisy at its finest. One of the MiG-23MLDs (lacking chaff/flare launchers) overhauled abroad can be seen below.





Unknown to many, the MiG-23 fleet was reinforced by some thirty examples in the past few years. Thirty-three MiG-23s, comprimising around thirty MiG-23MLDs and a few MiG-23UBs, were delivered by Belarus to Aleppo IAP/Neyrab airbase in 2008. While at first the intention of the deal was unclear, it soon appeared all were to be overhauled by 'The Factory', the SyAAF's overhaul and maintenance facility at this airbase.

Four MiG-23s were deemed unsuitable for overhaul because of their bad condition and remained at Neyrab, and two of them were struck by TOW ATGMs here.^[2][3] As these aircraft were destined to never fly again, these strikes serve little purpose.

'The Factory', as it's known as within the ranks of the SyAAF, is responsible for overhauling and maintaining the SyAAF's combat and helicopter fleet. All of Syria's combat aircraft, except for the Su-24, have been overhauled here. 'The Factory' also produces indigenously designed chaff/flare launchers for on the SyAAF's MiG-21s, MiG-23s and Su-22s. After finishing its overhaul, the aircraft or helicopter in question gets the factory's logo applied to it. With Neyrab in ATGM range, movement of aircraft is now limited. Two freshly overhauled L-39s were recently destroyed by a TOW missile^[4], once again showing the vulnerability of the airbase. While Neyrab even used to overhaul MiG-29s in the past, it is obvious the security situation doesn't allow the SyAAF's most advanced aircraft to be maintained here.

Nonetheless, Syria's MiG-29s have always been heavily reliant on foreign assistance to remain operational. Reportedly, this assistance also included help in solving cracks in the fuselage and wings. A number of MiG-29s also received a new camouflage pattern during overhaul at 'The Factory' at Neyrab Airbase. The total number of MiG-29s acquired by Syria in 1988 still remains somewhat of a mystery. The much-reported claim of forty-eight is likely to have been exaggerated, and only twenty-two to twenty-four are actually believed to have been delivered. Although this was enough to equip one squadron, plans for a second squadron with these fighters had to be shelved. Around fifteen to twenty MiG-29s should still be operational with 697 Squadron based at Seen (commonly known as Sayqal). A few planes are permanently detached to T4 (commonly known as Tiyas) airbase.

Russian Aircraft Corporation MiG continues to actively fulfill its contractual agreements with Syria (designated as customer 760). August 2010 saw the delivery of four flight simulators of an unknown type under contract number '776041110116'. In a secret agreement fulfilled in 2011 four SyAAF MiG-29B were upgraded to MiG-29SM standard, adding to Syria's airborne ground attack capabilities. As the MiG-29B uses the 9-12 airframe which differs from the MiG-29SM's 9-13M airframe, Mikoyan developed a special variant (likely lacking the Gardenia jammer) to suit Syria's needs, as it did for India with the MiG-29UPG.

The development of this variant cost a total of 531,1 million Russian rubles, as opposed to the 925,7 million rubles used for developing the MiG-29UPG. Mikoyan's 2011 report containing information about the upgrade was taken down and later re-uploaded with the information about the recipient of this deal, Syria, removed, emphasising the secretive nature of the deal.

The MiG-29SM features many improvements over the MiG-29B, such as an upgraded N-019ME radar, the capability to carry a larger payload and many more smaller upgrades to cockpit displays and navigational and communication systems. Arguably the most important upgrade, considering the MiG-29's current use in Syria, comes in the form of an expanded arsenal of air-to-ground weaponry, such as the Kh-29T(E), Kh-31A/P missiles and KAB-500-Kr/OD guided bombs. Delivery of these weapons was included in the MiG-29SM contract.

Lastely it enables the aircraft to carry the dreaded R-77 (AA-12 'Adder') air-to-air missile, which poses a considerable threat to foreign aircraft intervening in the conflict. MiG-29s have already been spotted in Syria carrying the AKU-170E launch rails used to carry this missile, as seen in the image below.

Yet another two deals included the repair of Syrian MiG-23MLDs and the transition to a more modern maintenance system. Traditionally, Soviet aircraft have to undergo checks, maintenance and overhauls after a certain amount of time. Certain aircraft components qualified for only a certain amount of time are usually removed during such overhauls. During recent times, a more modern maintenance system came into use, enabling certain components to continue use if deemed to be still in working order after passing a certain amount of time. The Russian Aircraft Corporation MiG aided the SyAAF in transitioning to this more modern maintenance system in 2009. This couldn't have come at a better time for the SyAAF, as they greatly benefit from this new maintenance system in the Civil War.

This deal, along with the delivery of around thirty Belarussian MiG-23MLDs proves the SyAAF still relies heavily on these aircraft. One of the overhauled ex-Belarusian MiG-23MLDs equipped with chaff/flare launchers can be seen in the image below.



After two L-39s were struck at Meyrab air base, at least one L-39 was deployed to Deir ez-Zor where it took part in the counter-offensive against the Islamic State. As the L-39s are easy to operate and maintain, they can be easily deployed throughout Syria. The L-39 seen below was also recently overhauled at 'The Factory', where it received a new coat of paint.



Several L-39s were also wired for the carriage of the recently delivered 80mm B-8 rocket pods, a weapon not supported by the original L-39. A B-8 equipped L-39ZO deployed at Hama airbase can be seen below.

While the L-39s saw much action in the early stages of the Syrian Civil War, one of its bases was overrun by Jaish al-Islam, which later attempted to get at least four L-39s based at Kshesh operational. This project was supposedly continued by the Islamic State after their capture of the airbase.^[5]

Bashar al-Assad's regime then cleverly used this news report for its own gains, and went on to claim the Syrian Arab Army had destroyed both aircraft on the ground.^[6]

"Regarding ... that terrorists control three jets in al-Jarrah military air base in Aleppo, there are three old aircraft that the terrorists were testing so the Syrian Arab Army immediately destroyed two of them on the runway as they were landing."

As the Syrian Arab Army has no presence anywhere close to Kshesh, any action against the Islamic State's aircraft should have been carried out by the SyAAF. But as Kshesh is littered with around sixty plane wrecks, it is highly unlikely the SyAAF ever managed to find or hit the aircaft, which spend most of their time hidden in a Hardened Aircraft Shelter anyway. While the presence of two operational L-39s in rebel hands was already known back in November 2013, it was completely ignored by the SyAAF. Around a year later, when the Islamic State was reportedly working on getting the two L-39s operational again, these aircraft suddenly became a priority target. A great PR stunt nonetheless.

Two of the L-39s in question can be seen below, shortly after their capture by the Islamic State.



Syria's most iconic interceptor, the MiG-25, hasn't seen much action in the past couple of years however. The exact number of MiG-25s delivered remains unknown but is thought to be around forty. Versions are believed to include MiG-25P (later upgraded to MiG-25PDS) and MiG-25PD interceptors, MiG-25R and RB reconnaissance aircraft and MiG-25PU conversion trainers. Much of the mighty MiG-25 fleet was phased out by 2011, with as much as twenty-eight decommissioned MiG-25s visible at T4 in November 2013. A part of the fleet has been towed into the desert, suggesting most are never to fly again. A reason for the mass-retirement of the MiG-25 fleet might be the type's vulnerability to Israeli jamming.

Nevertheless, a video released by rebels on the 8th of August 2012 confirmed some MiG-25s might still be operational at Tadmor (commonly known as Palmyra). The MiG-25s reappeared in March 2014, and again in April 2014, during which a MiG-25PD(S) fired two infrared homing R-40TD air-to-air missiles at the village of Aqaribat in the Hama Governorate. The first R-40 failed to detonate after hitting the ground while the second R-40 exploded in mid-air at around five kilometers distance from the other one. A week later, other MiG-25s launched four other R-40s, then four more launches followed in the same period. While the practice of launching R-40 air-to-air missiles at ground targets was already reported in 2013, it yielded the same results at every launch: a failure. What the SyAAF hoped to achieve here will always remain a question.




In short, several MiG-25PD(S) interceptors, MiG-25RB reconnaissance-bombers and associated MiG-25PU trainers are likely to be still be in use with the SyAAF. A pre-civil war photograph of a MiG-25PD(S) interceptor armed with two R-40s can be seen in the image below.

Contrary to the fixed-wing fleet, the helicopter fleet doesn't enjoy the same luxurious position to rotate different squadrons and aircraft. Surviving Mi-8 and Mi-17s find themselves performing every task from supplying besieged Syrian Arab Army garrisons with food, weapons and munitions to dropping barrel bombs over towns, which started in August 2012.

Heavy attrition has meant that the surviving helicopters have to work even harder, and although this is exactly what the Mi-8s and Mi-17s were originally designed for, one can see their versatile tasks leaves little time for repainting.


The Mi-25 fleet largely remains intact and sees sporadic use throughout Syria. Two Mi-25s were detached to Tabqa in an effort to maintain control of this strategical airbase. While the Mi-25s were highly successful in striking convoys and positions of fighters of the Islamic State, Tabqa was already lost when it became completely encircled. Some twenty Mi-25s are still believed to be operational with 767 Squadron and another unknown Squadron based at Bley (commonly known as Marj Ruhayyil). Several Mi-25s are permanently detached to other airbases however.







The Mi-14s and Ka-28s have found little use in the conflict. As both were designed to hunt and destroy submarines or perform search and rescue duties, their use in the Civil War has until now been limited.

Mi-14s did take part in the dropping of SADAF-02 naval mines over Syria on several occasions, possibly in an effort to test if they would explode on impact.^[8]Unsurprisingly, this project yielded the same results as the R-40 fiasco did. Several Mi-14s recently joined the Mi-8/17s in bombing villages in an effort to partially relieve the dwindling Mi-8/17 fleet from this task.^[9]

A Mi-14 was also used to transport the coffin of a SyAAF pilot (KIA) to his burial. Although the SyAAF's helicopters regularly take part in flypasts in commemoration of fallen SyAAF pilots over their families houses, this was uncommon even for SyAAF standards. Six Mi-14s and four Ka-28s (of which two recently overhauled in the Ukraine) are still believed to be operational with 618 Squadron based out of Hmeemeem/Bassel al-Assad IAP.



The defence of Tabqa also saw the combat debut of the SA-342 'Gazelle', which were only used on a limited amount of reconnaissance missions until then. The open desert surrounding the airbase proved to be the perfect combat environment for these helicopers. Armed with HOT missiles, they saw heavy action against vehicles of the Islamic State. Around ten SA-342s are still believed to be operational with 976 Squadron based at Mezze, with a few helicopters permanently detached to other airbases. It is likely several SA-342s operate out of T4 in aid of Suqur al-Sahara (Desert Falcons) combating fighters of the Islamic State in the nearby desert.






An overview of Syria's airbases can be seen below. Map made by Luftwaffe A.S.



Most airbases currently have at least one or two Mi-8/17 sassigned to them, which makes the current organisation of the helicopter squadrons incredibly hard to find out. Almost all of the SyAAF's Squadrons currently have several of their aircraft detached to other airbases. Nevertheless, the SyAAF's order of battle (ORBAT) can be seen below.

(Click on the aircraft to get an image of them in Syrian service. Click on the airbases to view them in Wikimapia)

Airbase and runway lenght in feet	Squadron	Types of Aircraft
Abu ad-Duhor 9,900 feet	678 Squadron ? Squadron	- MiG-23MFand MiG-23UB - MiG-21MF,MiG-21bisand MiG-21UM 20x HAS. Several Mi-8/17s present.
Bley 9.280 feet	767 Squadron ? Squadron	-Mi-25 Hind -Mi-25 Hind 24x HAS, 26x Helicopter hardstands.
Damascus IAP 11.800 feet	522 Squadron 565 Squadron 575 Squadron 585 Squadron	-Il-76 and An-26 - Yak-40 - Falcon 20E and Falcon 900 - Tu-143B-3 16x HAS
Deir ez-Zor 11.000 feet	8 Squadron	- MiG-21MF, MiG-21bisand MiG-21UM 4x HAS  Several Mi-8/17s and about a dozen inoperational MiG-21s can be observed here. L-39s and sometimes MiG-23BNs based here
Dmeyr 10.335 feet	54 Squadron ? Squadron ? Squadron	- MiG-23ML, MiG-23MLD and MiG-23UB - MiG-23ML, MiG-23MLD and MiG-23UB -Su-22M-3 42x HAS, 10 sheds. Used to house several MiG-25s.
Hama 9.232 feet	679 Squadron ? Squadron ? Squadron	- MiG-21MF, MiG-21bis and MiG-21UM - MiG-23MFand MiG-23UB - Mi-8/17 16x HAS. Several L-39s present. SAA BM-30s also based here.
Hmeemeem/Bassel al-Assad IAP 9,177 feet	618 Squadron	- Mi-14PS, Mi-14PL andKa-28
Khelkhleh 9.925 feet	945 Squadron 956 Squadron	- MiG-21MF, MiG-21bisand MiG-21UM - MiG-21MF, MiG-21bisand MiG-21UM 30x HAS.
Kweres 8.305 feet	3 Flying Training school ? Squadron	- MBB-SIAT 223K1 Flamingo and PAC MFI-17 Mushshak - L-39ZO and L-39ZA 11x HAS.
Mezze 8,258 feet	909 Squadron 976 Squadron ? Squadron	- Mi-8/17 - SA-342L Gazelle - Tu-143, Mojaher 4, Yasir and Shahed 129   19x HAS. Mi-25s present.
Nasriyeh 9.847 feet	695 Squadron 698 Squadron	- MiG-23BN and MiG-23UB - MiG-23BN and MiG-23UB 16x HAS
Nayrab/Aleppo IAP 9.547 feet	'The Factory' maintenance centre	- Several L-39s, Mi-8/17s along with the four remaining MiG-23MLDs present.
Qamishli 11.800 feet	-	Used for resupplying the SAA and NDF fighting in Al-Hasakah Governorate.
Seen 9.820 feet	697 Squadron	- MiG-29SM and MiG-29UB 36x HAS, 10x Smaller shelters. Numerous derelict MiG-21s, MiG-23s and Su-22s present.
Sh'eirat 9.843 feet	675 Squadron 677 Squadron 685 Squadron	- MiG-23ML, MiG-23MLD and MiG-23UB - Su-22M-4 - Su-22M-4 38x HAS. Used to house several MiG-21s, Su-22Ms and MiG-25s.
Tadmor 9.449 feet	? Squadron	- MiG-25PD(S) and MiG-25PU 16x HAS.
T4 10.410 feet	1 Squadron 5 Squadron 819 Squadron ? Squadron	- MiG-25PD(S), MiG-25RB andMiG-25PU  - MiG-25PD(S), MiG-25RB andMiG-25PU - Su-24M2 - Su-22M-4 58x HAS, 2x Large hangers. Most MiG-25s are phased out. Several MiG-29s present here.
Dhab'ah 10,000 feet	-	Abandoned. 16x HAS. 4x shelters and various hardstands. Captured by the Free Syrian Army, later recaptured by Hibzullah. No activity since 2009. Derilict MiG-21s and crop-dusters present.
Qabr as Sitt 650 feet	-	Abandoned in light of the Rif Dimashq offensive. Formerly occupied by 532 Squadron flying Mi-8/17s. Three derilict Mi-8s present.
Tha'leh 9,868 feet	-	Abandoned. 16x HAS. Helicopters present in 2004.

The much-reported deliveries of brand-new Russian aircraft are unlikely to take place in the near future. Although certain media outlets reported in May 2014^[6] that Russia was ready to send the first batch of Yak-130s to Syria in late 2014, this was merely a mistranslation of the original statement made by a source close to Russia's Rosoboronexport.

What the source actually said:

''Правда, по оценке источника "Ъ", близкого к ФСВТС, сверстанный план является "очень оптимистичным". "Он делался исходя из технологических возможностей производителя самолетов — Иркутского авиастроительного завода — и никаких политических аспектов не учитывает,— говорит собеседник "Ъ".— Сложно предсказать, каким образом будут развиваться события, но планировать свою работу мы все равно должны".''

[The newspaper's source says: ] "The plan is very optimistic - it takes into account only technological capabilities of the Irkut aircraft plant, and doesn't account for any political aspects. It's hard to predict what can happen, but we should have some plan anyway".

So while the Irkut aircraft plant might produce Yak-130s for Syria, there's no guarantee the Russian government will allow the aircraft to be delivered to Syria. The exact same story applies for the MiG-29M2s, of which a few already have been produced. One of the examples can be seen below.



This means the SyAAF has to do with what it currently has,which, considering its unexpected resilience, should not prove to be much of a problem. But as Syria's rebels get squeezed between the Islamic State and the regime of Bashar al-Assad, and the once-strong hope of succeeding in completing the revolution is further away than ever, the world might turn a blind eye to deliveries of aircraft and helicopters to combat the Islamic State.

The Boyevaya Mashina Pekhoty (Infantry Fighting Vehicle), better known as BMP and often incorrectly called BMB throughout the Middle East, remains the most prolific infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) series in the world. Syria acquired two products of this series, the BMP-1 and BMP-2. Syria used its (at the time brand-new) BMP-1s during the 1973 October War and by doing so became the first nation to deploy the BMP-1 in a real conflict.

Syria reportedly ordered no less than 2300 BMP-1s from the Soviet Union in 1977, with deliveries continuing until 1989.^[1]Not only are both the date of order and delivery impossible due to the fact that Syrian BMP-1s already had their combat debut in 1973, the given figure is also greatly exaggerated. The actual number of BMP-1s received by Syria is believed to be closer to 1000. Syria acquired its last batch of BMP-1s in the late eighties. Contrary to the other BMP-1s, these late BMP-1s were equipped with 81mm 'Tucha' smoke grenade launchers at the back of their turret.

The BMP-2, despite the fact that only modest numbers were acquired, remains Syria's most iconic infantry fighting vehicle. Although indirectly, Syria has had a large stake in the development of the BMP-2. The 1973 October War saw the combat debut of the BMP-2's predecessor, the BMP-1, where it performed below expectations. Although this was partly because of badly trained crews and wrong usage of the BMP-1, which was used as a truck instead of actually supporting the infantry, Soviet teams responsible for the development of IFVs were sent to Syria to evaluate the performance of the BMP-1 in this war to see in what ways the design could be improved.

The lessons learned from the evaluation of the BMP-1 in the October War greatly helped the replacement program for the BMP-1, the product of this program of course being the BMP-2. So by deploying the BMP-1 in combat, Syria unintentionally took part in the development of the BMP-2.

Syria reportedly ordered 100 BMP-2s from the Soviet Union in 1987, which were delivered between 1987 and 1988.^[2] The actual number of BMP-2s acquired is believed to have been slightly lower however. Almost all were subsequently assigned to the Republican Guard, which operated them alongside their T-72As (later upgraded to T-72AV standard). Syria's BMP-2s gained fame during the Republican Guard's operations as part of the Rif Dimashq offensive, especially in the neighbourhood of Darayya. The Republican Guard also has access to a limited number of BMP-1s in Deir ez-Zor.


The late eighties also saw the delivery of several BREM-2 armoured recovery vehicles (ARV) from the Soviet Union. Syria was one of the few non-Warsaw Pact countries to receive this type of ARV. Designed to both perform repairs and recover other BMPs, the BREM-2s joined the Syrian Arab Army only in limited numbers. All were detached to divisions already operating the standard the BMP-1. The Syrian Civil War saw the disintegration of these divisions and the BREM-2s were thus collecting dust until a decision was made to arm them, which will be covered later in this article.

Large numbers of AMB-S armoured ambulances were also acquired from Czechoslovakia. The AMB-S has provision for four stretchers to evacuate the wounded. In Syria the vehicle sees active use with the Republican Guard, which mainly uses it to deliver supplies to the frontline. The vehicles in service with the Syrian Arab Army have seen little use in the Civil War, and often remain stored at their bases.



The advantage of the BMP-2 over the BMP-1 is undoubtedly its 30mm 2A42 cannon. The BMP-1 uses the slow-firing 73mm 2A28 Grom, which although quite effective against armoured vehicles, is inadequate to provide fire-support to infantry. While originally designed to support infantry on the plains of Europe, the armament of the BMP-1 was focused at combating enemy armoured vehicles. The BMP-1's 2A28 cannon is also unable to fire accurately while on the move due to a lack of stabilisation, and its maximum gun elevation of just 15 degrees makes it impractical for operating in an urban environment to say the least.


The fast-firing 2A42 on the other hand is extremely well suited for supporting the advancing infantry. Not only can it fire up to five-hundred rounds a minute for a short amount of time, the gun is also stabilised, allowing it to fire accurately while on the move. The 2A42 also has a maximum elevation of 75 degrees, which makes it highly useful for operating in an urban environment. The BMP-2 also comes with an ATGM launcher for the 9M113 Konkurs on the roof opposed to the BMP-1's 9M14 Malyutka.

Given the BMP-1's drawbacks concerning its armament, it is quite surprising no decision has been made to remove the the slow-firing 73mm 2A28 Grom and install a 14.5mm ZPU-4, a 23mm ZU-23, a 37mm M1939 61-K or even a 37mm Type 65 instead. Such a vehicle would be an excellent addition to the Syrian Arab Army or National Defence Force (NDF). This type of conversion has proven to be extremely popular in Iraq and Afghanistan, and even the Greek Army recently converted a part of its BMP-1 IFVs to fire-support platforms armed with a 23mm ZU-23.



Relatively few BMP-2s have been lost in the almost four-year-long war, especially when compared to the Syrian Arab Army's BMP-1s. The number of actually confirmed destroyed BMP-2s amounts to less than a dozen.This is mostly due to the superior tactics and skill seen in the Republican Guard.

The situation is quite different with the BMP-1 fleet, of which a large part has been destroyed due to bad tactics employed by the Syrian Arab Army (SAA) and poorly trained conscripts manning the BMP-1s. At least 350 BMP-1s have been destroyed, with another 175 captured by the various groups fighting for control over the country. While in service with the SAA, the BMP-1 was often used as a tank or battering ram charging through cities and villages without any tank or infantry support, thus being an easy prey for the rebels' anti-tank weapons.



The Republican Guard on the other hand operates the BMP-2 in conjunction with T-72AVs, which are high on the rebels' anti-tank teams target list. The presence of the T-72AVs thus draws away the attention from the BMP-2s, which are often carrying infantry, wounded personnel or supplies to the frontline.

Also an important factor in the BMP-2s low attrition rate is the superior skill and competence of Republican Guard's BMP-2 crews. These crewman are all well-trained, actually operate as a team and coordinate their operations with other vehicles nearby. The Republican Guard's personnel are also often more motivated and dedicated to their mission than the conscripts often comprising the SAA's crews.


The BMP-2s have been present in every Republican Guard offensive in Damascus, its suburbs and villages close to Damascus such as Yabroud. However, none are operated by the Republican Guard's 104th Brigade operating in and around Deir ez-Zor. The contingent deployed here was supplied with a limited amount of older T-72 Urals, T-72M1s, a couple T-72AVs, BMP-1s and some ZSU-23s taken from other units instead.

Despite this, the 104th uses its limited amount of armour to its full potential. Its BMP-1s are used in their intended role and covered by infantry, T-72s and ZSU-23s. The infantry carried inside the BMP-1s disembark and clear the buildings, again supported by BMP-1s, T-72s and ZSU-23s and this process gets repeated again and again. Footage of such a operation can be seen here.

One of the BMP-2's current area of operations is Jobar, although their operations here are on a more limited scale than was seen in Darayya.

Surprisingly, several BMP-2s were assigned to the Syrian Arab Army shortly after their arrival in Syria. The SAA stationed these vehicles in Aleppo, where limited numbers likely continue to see action. Two BMP-2s were captured by the Free Syrian Army (FSA) when they overran Aleppo's Infantry School and another was destroyed in the fight for Aleppo's Central Prison.^[3][4]Neither were sighted in use with the FSA and were likely left here. The last confirmed sighting of BMP-2s near Aleppo was on the 13th of June 2013. The vehicle in question, together with a BMP-1, can be seen in the header image.

As often seen with vehicles operated by the Republican Guard, some BMP-2s have been decorated with the head of Hafez al-Assad on their searchlights. The Republican Guard was founded on the orders of Hafez al-Assad, and all of its members still hold him in high esteem.











Numerous other groups in Syria also continue to operate the BMP-1, of which the Islamic State is the largest operator with at least twenty-four BMP-1s captured in Syria and another four in Iraq. The examples captured in Iraq were all immediately destroyed after their capture however. The BMP-1 has been present in nearly all of the the Islamic State's offensives in Nothern Syria, and two were used as vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (VBIED).^[5][6] The latter was used in an effort to clear out the remaining defenders of Mennegh in the assault on this heliport.

Three BMP-1s were later modified by the Islamic State. One BMP-1 was spotted with a 12.7mm DshK and associated magazine over its main gun which can be fired from the inside. This BMP-1 saw action against the YPG in Nothern Syria.



A BMP-1 spotted in Azaz had its armour strengthened by the addition of metal piping, similar as seen on one of the VBIED BMP-1s used by the Islamic State South of Azaz, at Mennegh.



Another modification was spotted in Deir ez-Zor, where this particular vehicle was captured by the NDF. The BMP-1's turret has been removed and a shielded 23mm ZU-23 was installed instead. The vehicle is also protected by a combination of slat armour and several pieces of metal alligned around the body and turret. The back of the BMP-1, which actually holds two fuel tanks has also been reinforced by slat armour. Sandbags on the front complete the upgrade.




The Ansar al-Haq Battalion was seen using a BMP-1 armed with just a single 14.5mm KPV a couple of weeks earlier. The vehicle participated in the assault and capture of Wadi Deif, where the BMP-1 charged to the frontline giving cover to members of the battalion on foot. 

Ahrar al-Sham meanwhile 'reinforced' the armour of one BMP-1 by adding several Kontakt-1  explosive reactive armour (ERA) blocks from two T-72AVs to its body and turret.

While this seems like an effective way to reinforce the BMP-1's paper thin armour, which can even be penetrated by heavy machine guns, applying ERA on any BMP-1 or BMP-2 actually achieves the opposite. Namely, tests conducted by the Soviets showed that the explosion of the Kontakt-1 shattered the thin hull armour of the BMP-1 and would actually inflict heavy injuries to those inside.

The BMP-1 modified by Ahrar al-Sham was destroyed shortly after the first photo was taken. Unsurprisingly, the Kontakt-1 tiles did not save the vehicle.










First seen in Libya, several Syrian rebel groups installed the BMP-1's turret on a range of other vehicles, such as the Toyota Land Cruiser.^[7][8]As the 73mm 2A28 Grom has little to no recoil, it makes an ideal weapon for such conversions. One rebel group was also seen operating a truck with only the 2A28 cannon installed.





Numerous BREM-2s, lacking any weapons by design, were also subject to several modifications in order to increase their usefulness in the Civil War. The rear end of the hull was cleared to make place for a platform used to mount an anti-aircraft gun on. The example below, armed with a 14.5mm ZPU-4 was captured by Jaish al-Islam at Battalion 559, one of the Syrian Arab Army's tank depots. No machine guns were installed on this BREM-2 at the time of capture.


Another ZPU-4 armed BREM-2 was seen in action near Mleha, Eastern Ghouta. This BREM-2 had a protective shield around the gun to cover the otherwise extremely exposed gunner and also had its now pointless crane removed. One of such vehicles was captured by the Sham Unified Front, part of the Free Syrian Army, near Sheikh Miskin. Only two of the ZPU-4's guns were installed, a common sight in Syria as the need for these guns for installment on NDF technicals is now higher than ever.







The Republican Guard's and NDF's offensive near Mleha also featured a BREM-2 armed with a single 37mm M1939 61-K. These anti-aircraft cannons were all in storage before the Syrian Civil War began, but are now re-entering service due to the high need for such weapons. This particular vehicle was later seen driving through Mleha after the capture of this town.



On the other side side of Mleha, Jaish al-Islam converted its only AMB-S to an armoured personnel carrier armed with one 14.5mm KPV.

But much more impressive are the upgrades performed on its BMP-1s so far. When still operating under the name of Liwa al-Islam, it bought two BMP-1s along with two T-72s from a corrupt officer within the Army's elite 4th Armoured Division, and captured several others. The use of armoured fighting vehicles by Jaish al-Islam, compared to other rebel groups in the Syrian theatre, can be seen as revolutionary, being the only group which operates various types of armour and infantry in a mechanised force, fully exploiting their potential. Jaish al-Islam operates its own armour school and armour repair shop, both located in Eastern Ghouta.

The first upgrade was seen in one of Jaish al-Islam's armour convoys, and consists of several blocks of Kontakt-1 ERA aligned around the turret and two new steel contraptions installed over the normal doors holding fuel tanks. Although the turret of the BMP-1 is the heaviest armoured part of the vehicle, the alignment of the ERA blocks is just as dangerous as on the example operated by Ahrar al-Sham.

Another version saw a better alignment of the ERA blocks, giving the BMP-1's turret almost 360 degree coverage. A steel plate behind the blocks decreases the chance of the explosion of the Kontakt-1 literally backfiring into the turret. This vehicle was also equipped with the steel contraptions, albeit looking slightly different than seen above. The vehicle also has provision for extra armour on its sides, although none was installed at the time of recording. This BMP-1 can be seen in action here.








A more heavily modified variant still sports the ineffective ERA blocks on the turret, but its armour was enhanced by the addition of spaced and slat armour in combination with rubber side skirts. The wide gap between the slat armour and BMP-1 also allows for the fitting of numerous sandbags, further increasing the chance to deform incoming warheads. The ability to fire through the BMP-1's firing ports was made impossible due to these additions however. The front of the vehicle also sports slat armour and a new mudguard. The steel contraptionsover its doors are also once again present. This vehicle can be seen in action here.


The ultimate modification fielded so far looks much like its predecessor, but features some small improvements. Most notably, it doesn't feature any ERA blocks on its turret, with slat armour providing protection instead. The slat armour on the hull, again backed up by sandbags was also installed in a different pattern, decreasing the chance of any RPG grenade slipping through. Further changes include longer rubber side skirts and the addition of four smoke grenade launchers taken from a T-72. The vehicle also comes with the steel contraptions over its doors and inability to fire through the BMP-1's firing ports.






The number of modified BMP-1s operated by the Syrian Arab Army is not as high as seen with the rebel groups, with just one simple upgrade spotted. The vehicle below, seen in Damascus during the the early days of the Syrian Civil War, had its armour locally improved by the addition of several tires filled with sandbags, all held together by several pieces of rope.


A limited number of BMP-2s that lost their sideskirts also received improvised armour additions during their operations. These armour additions are installed in the BMP-2's operational area, are quite rudimentary and vary between each BMP-2. As of now, no nation-wide upgrade program for the BMP-2 has been initiated, but such a program can't be ruled out for the future.

The first upgrade seen on the BMP-2 consists of rudimentary spaced armour filled with bricks. As the RPG enters the first layer of armour, the warhead will be deformed and slowed down, giving it a smaller chance to enter the second layer of armour (bricks) and ultimately the armour of the BMP-2 itself.


The second upgrade consisted of the installment of even more rudimentary slat armour. This variation is easier to produce and install and thus more common than the spaced armour.









The BMP-1, despite its numerous weaknesses, can still turn out to be valuable asset in the Syrian Civil War: upgrading them with anti-aircraft guns and slat armour will turn them into effective fire-support vehicles. It depends on the willingness of the Syrian Arab Army and National Defence Force to make such modifications, and that decision will have a large impact on the BMP-1's future in Syria.

As the Republican Guard is slowly mopping up what's left of the rebel presence inside Damascus and its neighbourhoods, it will undoubtedly set it eyes on other battlegrounds in Syria. Future operations undertaken by the Republican Guard outside Damascus will likely see the involvement of BMP-2s, which proves their career in the Syrian military is far from over.

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The continuing rebel offensive in Syria's Dara'a Governorate saw the capture of a 9K12 Kub ''SA-6 Gainful'' surface-to-air missile system and associated radars and equipment by Harakat al-Muthanna near the town of Sheikh Miskin, also known as Sheikh Maskin or Shaykh Maskin.

The town was originally surrounded by no less than six 9K12 SAM sites, of which five were still active at the beginning of the Syrian Civil War. However, the Civil War saw the total disintegration of the Syrian Air Defense Force, and with it, much of its SAM sites. Just one of the five sites was still manned in early 2014, with all other SAM sites abandoned.

This follows a pattern seen everywhere in Syria. For example, three of the four 9K12 SAM sites present around Deir ez-Zor were forced to retreat for the then advancing rebels, and one of these was destroyed while en route to Syrian Arab Army held territory. Another 9K12 site abandoned one of its inoperational 9K12 launchers, which was later captured by fighters of the Islamic State. Numerous other SAM sites also fell in the hands of rebels throughout Syria, mainly in the vicinity of Damascus.

The disintegration of the Syrian Air Defense Force mainly effected the S-75s, S-200s, 9K12 Kubs and to a lesser extent the S-125s. All ageing, eating up precious manpower and unlikely to even detect Israeli aircraft flying over Syria, let alone firing at them, most were decommissioned with their personnel continuing their career as normal soldiers instead. Many of the mobile 9K12s were evacuated to safer territory and placed in reserve while most of the static S-75s, S-125s and S-200s are now simply collecting dust.

Two of the 9K12 sites surrounding Sheikh Maskin were moved to a nearby radar site at some point in the Civil War, and this might be the location where the 'lone' 9K12 was captured. To back up this claim, Google Earth footage reveals what appears to be six 9K12 launchers present here at 5-1-2014. Two other vehicles could be the associated SURN 1S91 "Straight Flush" mobile radar stations. Without these, the 9K12s are unable to operate.



If this radar site turns out to be the true location where the 9K12 was captured, the rebels operating in Southern Syria just captured two SAM sites. However, it is not even remotely likely that the rebels would be able to operate the battered 9K12s, which require specialized training for both the launchers and radar to succesfully operate.

This contrary to the single 9K33 Osa operated by Jaish al-Islam in Eastern Ghouta, which fortunately for the Syrian Arab Air Force (SyAAF) has now run out of missiles. The 9K33 combines both the radar and launcher in one vehicle, and is easier to operate. None are stationed in Syria's Dara'a Governorate however.

Fresh tracks in the ground possible indicate the crew was still planning on leaving, or that this 9K12, numbered 95703, was still partially active.



A video uploaded on the 27th of January 2015 confirmed the capture of at least one 1S91 mobile radar station, associated equipment and more than a dozen 3M9 missiles used by the 9K12.













It is yet to be seen if Harakat al-Muthanna indeed managed to capture all the equipment intact and in working order. Whatever the outcome may be, the 9K12s surely won't have any impact on the push on Damascus.

Following local experiments with spaced and slat armour on T-72AVs and BMP-2s, the Republican Guard initiated a small-scale upgrade programme for its armour in the summer of 2014. After upgrading several of its T-72M1s and bulldozers with additional armour, the Republican Guard is now also operating at least one ZSU-23-4 self-propelled anti-aircraft gun (SPAAG) upgraded in the same fashion.

The goal of the upgrade programme was to increase the chances of survivability of armoured fighting vehicles by adding additional armour, which consists of spaced and slat armour, further reinforced by metal chaines. Altogether, it provides an impressive 360 degree coverage against regular RPGs.Heavier RPGs like the RPG-29, the M79 Osa or later generation RPG-7 warheads have less trouble penetrating such armour however.

The first vehicles upgraded as part of this programme were several T-72M1s, which were then deployed to Jobar in order to test the actual combat value of the new armour package. These first missions did not end well as one of the upgraded T-72M1s got stuck and was subsequently abandoned by its crew, while another was completely destroyed after entering Jobar: a tragic start for the ambitious programme.^[1][2]

This however did not deter the Republican Guard from pressing on with the upgrade programme, and several upgraded T-72M1s continued to join units in Jobar, Eastern Ghouta and even Aleppo in the months that followed. The factory responsible for the programme is located in Adra, north of Damascus.




A similar armour package, developed and produced by the same factory, was applied on bulldozers in use by the Republican Guard.

The bulldozer earned its position in most of the offensives taking place in the neighbourhoods of Damascus and Eastern Ghouta where they're used to transport soldiers to the frontline, clear obstacles, raise sand barriers to cover infantry and tanks and clear suspected minefields. When they were still operating without these armour packages, they were an easy prey for the rebels' anti-tank teams, anti-materiel rifles and even machine gun fire, even when equipped with locally applied DIY armour.

Apart from small factory differences or minor field modifications, two variations are known to exist. These variations give a clear indication of how the designs and production of these armour packages have progressed over time.

The example below was active in Jobar, where it was mainly used to transport troops and clear minefields. It was destroyed in late December 2014 after being caught in the open by fighters of Failaq al-Rahman, also known as the Rahman corps, while supposedly trying to clear a minefield.

The bulldozer was only immobilized after receiving multiple hits from an RPG-7 and being fired upon by an anti-materiel rifle. Failaq al-Rahman then dug a tunnel to the abandoned bulldozer, and placed a satchel charge underneath it to prevent the recovery of the vehicle. The subsequent explosion breached its hull and started a fire, rendering it useless for future use.^[3][4]









The next vehicle to receive the armour upgrade was the ZSU-23-4. Combat experience gained in Darayya showed the need for a vehicle capable of engaging high-located rebel positions in flats and apartments, almost always out of reach of the T-72s.

Following the lead of several other nations in the past, Syria began to use its large fleet of ZSU-23-4s to support tanks and infantry. The biggest weakness of the ZSU-23-4 in this role is its weak armour. Originally designed to engage aircraft and helicopters while operating behind tanks and infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs) on the plains of Europe, the armour of the vehicle is anything but well suited for engaging enemy hideouts from up close. The recent capture of Brigade 82 near Sheikh Miskin serves as a heavy-handed reminder of this fact.^[5]

The installation of the armour package will largely address the ZSU-23-4's vulnerability to a range of small arms and RPGs, and will allow the vehicle to provide fire-support closer to the battle than before. With its extremely high rate of fire, large calibre and a range of elevation that covers any potential target, it is the ideal city conquest support vehicle made perfect; a warmachine completely adapted to the hostile environment that has made up the Syrian battlefield for close to four years.







After the metal chaines on the front of the T-72M1s proved to be incapable of stopping RPGs, most of the upgraded T-72M1s saw their metal chaines replaced by additional spaced armour or simply a piece of metal. These conversions were done in the T-72's operational area, as the factory responsible for the armour packages strangely enough still produces them with metal chains on front of the T-72.

Since the active conflict provides a myriad of combat reports on weaknesses and strenths of various types of equipment, it is likely subsequent variants of the upgraded armour will address these issues and thus become increasingly effective.








The combat value of the armour package was believed to be minimal after two of the upgraded T-72M1s were destroyed in Jobar. This however is in no way representative of the actual combat performance of the new armour. It is possible that the new armour package gave crews a feeling of invincibility, leading to the crews taking larger risks than normal and thus resulting in their vehicles being destroyed. One image from Eastern Ghouta confirms its effectiveness in combat however, showing one upgraded T-72M1s still intact after receiving several hits from an RPG.

While it is clear that single instances of the new armour pitted against unknown types of anti-tank weaponry hardly make a case for the up- and downsides of the armour package, it is obvious the Republican Guarddeems it effective enough to allocate significant resources to it.




The upgrades performed on these vehicles prove the Syrian Arab Army and Republican Guard are not running out of steam just yet. Although the installation of this armour package is impossible on T-72 'Urals' due to the location of its rangefinder, it is expected more and more armoured fighting vehicles will be upgraded in the same way. The Republican Guard's BMP-2s may very well be next in line.

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Syria's battered Mi-17s have been on the forefront on the Syrian Arab Air Force's aerial campaign against the rebels for pretty much the entire duration of the now almost four-year long Civil War. Together with the Mi-8s, these versatile platforms perform every task from supplying besieged Syrian Arab Army garrisons, dropping barrel bombs over towns and even flying attack sorties against rebel positions. This while under threat of MANPADS, heavy machine guns, anti-aircraft guns and even your occasional TOW ATGM targeting helicopters while landing.

It now appears several Mi-17s have been upgraded with armour plates and even a forward looking infrared (FLIR) camera, allowing for even greater flexibility while flying attack sorties. The Mi-17 seen in the header, armed with a UPK-23 gun pod, is one of examples to have been upgraded in this fashion. The image, taken at the 20th of May 2013 at Mezze, likely features a Mi-17 from the resident 909 Squadron.

Although one would expect more examples are slated to be upgraded in this way, just a couple of Mi-17s were seen equipped with armour plates and FLIR.

It is unclear if this Mi-17 was upgraded by 'The Factory', the SyAAF's overhaul and maintenance center at Neyrab/Aleppo IAP. 'The Factory' is responsible for maintaining and upgrading most of the SyAAF's inventory of aircraft and helicopters, including its Mi-8s and Mi-17s. If the armour plates and FLIR were installed before the Civil War, this would have taken place at 'The Factory', and their logo would definitely be present on the cockpit of the Mi-17. A puzzle impossible to solve without a clear view of the other side of the cockpit.

To add to the confusion: a large part of the Mi-17 fleet also underwent periodic maintenance at 'The Factory', so the logo could instead refer to just a regular overhaul.

Alternatively, a limited amount of Mi-17s were upgraded early in the Civil War by Russian or Iranian experts based here. The Mezze-based examples are generally in a better condition than the rest of the Mi-17 fleet, so it makes sense they were chosen to be upgraded.

Mezze is also home to much of the Iranian and Russian activity inside Syria. It serves as the main base for UAV operations undertaken by Iran's Revolutionary Guards inside Syria, and the Russian Aircraft Corporation MiG just opened an office blocks away from Mezze's runway.

The armour plates (designed and produced by Russia) aligned around the cockpit were thus likely provided by Russia to the SyAAF in the past years. The same armour plates but on a Serbian operated Mi-17 can be seen here.

The origin of the FLIR remains unknown, but could have been acquired via Russia or Iran, or on the civilian market via several front companies. Its unusual placement to the back of the fuselage clearly distinguishes it of many production variants with FLIR cameras usually mounted to the front.

An additional insightinto the upgrade was provided by the Free Syrian Army when they captured Taftanaz heliport on the 11th of January 2013. One FLIR along with its control console fell in the hands of the FSA here. At least fifteen Mi-8s and Mi-17s were captured at Taftanaz, of which at least one was an upgraded example, which can be seen here. This Mi-17 comes with the logo of 'The Factory'.



The Mi-17 has not been upgraded with new flare and chaff dispensers to counter the threat of MANPADS. This might indicate the SyAAF is still satisfied with the current dispensers already in use on the Mi-17 fleet, and does not deem the rebels' anti-air capabilities to be significant enough to spend valuable resources on. These indigenously designed dispensers were installed on the Mi-17s well before the start of the Civil War, and can be seen on the tail boom of every SyAAF operated Mi-17.



The addition of armour plates and a FLIR camera to the already present flare and chaff dispensers turns the Mi-17 into an even more proficient attack platform, with the means to continue operations at night with largely undiminished capabilities. One could argue their new outfit makes them better suited for a range of combat roles in this conflict than other rotorcraft like the Mi-25.



Special thanks to Luftwaffe A.S.

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An Echorouk News TV report on the Libyan Air Force's (LAF) activities in Al Watiya airbase confirmed that work has been put into reintroducing the Su-22 into the arsenal of the Libyan Air Force, a rumour that had been floating around since early December 2014.

The Libyan National Army (LNA) and LAF almost unanimously sided withGeneral Khalifa Haftar, who is part of the internationally recognised government currently residing in Tobruk. Haftar strives to eliminate any Islamist terrorist organisation within Libya as part of Operation Dignity. He is opposed by Libya Dawn, which is fighting for Libya's unrecognised parliament and currently in control of Benghazi and the capital Tripoli, together with various other Islamist factions, Ansar al-Sharia and even the Islamic State. A complicated matter to say the least.

Libya Dawn can be considered the strongest opponent to Khalifa Haftar, and its forces even succeeded in establishing their very own air force. At least four Soko G-2 Galebs are currently present at Misrata and one or two MiG-23s should have been made operational at Mitiga, but were reported to have left the airbase some time later.^[1] Libya Dawn also claimed to have an operational MiG-23 at Misrata and, even though the base doesn't house any aircraft of the type, even claimed to be working on a MiG-25 here.^[2] It remains unknown if the operational MiG-23 is actually one of the examples formerly based at Mitiga. To add to all this, Libya Dawn is also in control of Tripoli International Airport (IAP) and Benina airbase/IAP.

The almost complete annihilation of the Libyan Air Force by the NATO-led airstrikes and heavy attrition in the past years has diminished the Libyan Air Force's firepower to an all time low. However, it continues to operate several MiG-23MLs and MiG-23UBs, three MiG-21MFs donated by Egypt, several MiG-21bis and numerous helicopters. Amongst these are numerous Mi-8s, at least three of which donated by Egypt, and several Mi-25s and Mi-35s, some of the latter originally acquired from Sudan. The LAF was also reported to have acquired four Su-27s from Russia, although this rumour was quickly dismissed as misinformation.^[3]

A lack of sufficient operational airframes, which are already spread thin throughout Libya, forced the LAF to look for other solutions to acquire aircraft and helicopters to support the Libyan National Army from the air. While Egypt delivered three MiG-21s and three Mi-8s, this wasn't enough, and these aircraft are unable to cover the whole of Libya.

The LNA is currently fighting against Libya Dawn, Ansar al-Sharia and the Islamic State on multiple fronts. The heaviest battles take place in Benghazi, where they are fighting with Libya Dawn for  control of the city. The LNA is also poised to retake Libya's capital, Tripoli, where the next offensive will surely take place soon.

Al Watiya airbase, also known as al-Watya or al-Zintan, remains the only airbase in Libyan Air Force hands located near Tripoli, and is thus vital for any future offensive aimed at recapturing the capital. Al Watiya was originally constructed by the French, and was believed to house a part of Libya's  Mirage fleet before their gradual withdrawal due to a lack of spares, caused by the imposed arms embargo. Al Watiya was also home to a squadron of Su-22s (S-32MK) and a part of the Su-22M-3 fleet. All of Libya's Su-22M-3s were destroyed by the NATO-led airstrikes during the Libyan Civil War, which also targeted Al Watiya airbase. Two Hardened Aircraft Shelters (HAS) housing Su-22M-3s as well as several munition depots were targeted here. Libya's Su-22s (S-32MK), stored in some of the remaining forty-three Hardened Aircraft Shelters were already decommissioned long before the revolution, and thus escaped unharmed as they were not on the NATO's target list.

Only one operational aircraft is currently stationed at Al Watiya, and this MiG-23UB has already been busy targeting munition depots and other targets of interest in and around Tripoli. Just a single MiG-23UB is completely insufficient to provide the much needed fire support for the Libyan National Army in any future offensive around Tripoli however.

Although the MiG-23UB is originally a twin-seat training variant, it can be armed with UB-16 and UB-32 rocket pods for the 57mm S-5 rocket and various types of bombs, all carried on the MiG-23UB's four hardpoints.




The only other aircraft available at Al Watiya are ten to twelve Su-22s decommissioned at least two decades ago, none of which are in flying condition. But as overhauling older aircraft is the LAF's only chance to regain some of the firepower it lost over the years, these old Su-22s have to do for the time being. Libya is believed to have received two squadrons of Su-22s, and even more Su-22M-3s in the late seventies and early eighties, some of which were even sent to the Gulf of Sidra to take on U.S. F-14 Tomcats in 1981.

An interview with Colonel Muhammad Abdul Hamid Al-Satni (3:44) revealed the Libyan Air Force's plans for the Su-22s:

''We … [inaudible] Su-22 aircraft, they were almost non-functional, but thanks to Libyan military personnel, all Libyans, no foreigners, we have been trying to put one or two of the ten to twelve aircraft back into service. This is the first one we managed to repair and it will be deployed in a week or ten days in the battle to liberate Tripoli.''

One or two Su-22s are thus supposedly being made operational again, likely by cannibalising the other Su-22s. But while the Colonel says the operational Su-22 is right behind him, both of the aircraft are covered in a thick layer of dust, and still have their green Jamahiriya roundel and flag applied to their fuselage and tail, creating some confusion about their supposed overhaul.




This however doesn't mean the Libyan Air Force is not working on getting one or two examples operational again, and might be related to the security situation instead.The activities of the Echorouk News TV team were strictly monitored by LAF personnel, as it is forbidden to take images in the airbase so as not to reveal the exact location of the precious aircraft on the airfield. While this might seem exaggerated with forty-three Hardened Aircraft Shelters to hide them in, Libya Dawn is poised to destroy the MiG-23UB, and even tried to find its exact location by sending a Schiebel Camcopter S-100 UAV over Al Watiya, which was subsequently shot down by personnel of the airbase.^[4]

Therefore the actual overhaul of the Su-22(s) is likely taking place elsewhere in the airbase, with the two Su-22s in the video acting as the examples worked upon to hide the real location of the supposed operational Su-22(s).

The AK-74M has slowly earned its place as the most popular assault rifle currently in use with the various factions fighting for control over Syria. While originally acquired only in small numbers by Syria, recent deliveries ensured a now solid presence of this rifle in the war-torn country. The AK-74M is not only popular with forces of the Syrian Arab Army and the Republican Guard, but also with various other groups fighting for control of the country.

Syia acquired its first batch of AK-74Ms in the late 90s, albeit in very small numbers. This very first batch was believed to have been part of a deal struck with Russia in 1996, which would renew the military and technological cooperation with Russia after this had dwindled due to the collapse of the Soviet Union.

The deal envisaged the delivery of a wide selection of small arms, anti-tank missiles, night vision equipment and ammunition for weaponry already in use by Syria. Included in the package were large numbers of AKS-74Us, smaller numbers of AK-74Ms, RPG-29s, PG-7VR warheads for the RPG-7 but also 9M113M Konkurs anti-tank guided missiles (ATGMs) and even 9M117M Bastion gun-launched anti-tank guided missiles for use by Syria's at that point recently upgraded T-55MVs.

Disagreements over Syria's insistence on lower prices and extended payment schemes for future purchases and its debt to Russia led to the failure of a deepened relationship between the two countries. Nonetheless, much of the ordered weaponry did ultimately reach Syria.





The first public appearance of the AK-74M in was in 2000, when it was spotted being carried by a guard in front of the National Progressive Front (NPF) headquarters in Damascus. This AK-74M belonged to the first batch, and these along with AKS-74Us were mainly distributed to special units and personnel guarding places of high value. The amount of AK-74Ms was still too small to allow a wider distribution.

The second attempt to acquire AK-74Ms (at a more ambitious scale this time) took place in the years leading up to the Syrian Civil War. The Syrian Arab Army (SAA) launched an ambitious modernisation programme aimed at improving the protection and firepower of a part of its infantry force during this time.




The SAA tested two assault rifles as part of this future soldier programme in 2008, the AK-74M and the Iranian KH-2002 'Kheybar', chambered in 5.45×39mm and 5.56×45mm respectively. For this purpose, the Iranian Defense Industries Organisation (IDIO or DIO) sent ten KH-2002s along with several representatives to Syria.

All but two of the ten KH-2002s malfunctioned during the tests, resulting in a chuckle from the Syrian side at the expense of the ashamed Iranian representatives. Unsurprisingly, the AK-74M was thus declared the winner of the 'competition'.

After Uruguay's interest in the KH-2002 also vanished, the programme was cancelled in 2012. The failure to attract any export orders and a lack of interest from the Iranian Army to purchase the rifle doomed one of the few serious attempts to design and produce an indigenous assault rifle in Iran.


The programme also saw the manufacturing of two types of 'new' camouflage patterns, both exact copies of the US M81 woodland camouflage pattern, which is also worn by fighters of Hizbullah. Furthermore, large numbers of bulletproof vests and helmets were ordered and delivered from China, and a limited number of night vision devices for special forces were received from an unknown source. The soldier seen below depicts how the final product would have looked like. Note that his AK-74M comes equipped with an Alpha-7115 night laser sight and a GP-30M under-barrel grenade launcher.







Russia continues to prove it's a staunch and reliable supporter of the Assad regime, and the Civil War evidently serves as no deterrent for Russia to continue delivering anything from small arms to tanks, multiple rocket launchers and even spare parts for the Syrian Arab Air Force (SyAAF). To no one's surprise, several large batches of AK-74Ms also found their way onboard Russian Navy Ropucha-class landing ships to Syria in the past years.


Once arrived in Syria, these batches allowed for a wide distribution of the AK-74M within the Syrian Arab Army and, to a lesser extent, the Republican Guard. The National Defence Force (NDF) still has to make do with the old AK-47, Type-56 and AKM however, although Western firearms or 'pimped' AKs acquired via the black market in Lebanon are also available.

The Republican Guard's 104th Brigade, under the command of Brigadier General Issam Zahreddine, received a sizeable batch of AK-74Ms and AKS-74Us when heading off to Deir ez-Zor to take on the fighters of the Islamic State.


The AK-74M is also the weapon of choice of Saqr al-Harath (seen below on the left), who serves as Issam Zahreddine's personal bodyguard in Deir ez-Zor. Although Zahreddine's personal firearm is the AKS-74U, he has also been seen using the AK-74M on more than one occassion.

The Islamic State is the largest AK-74M operator of the groups fighting for control over Syria. Surprisingly, and contrary to the usual weapons flow which mainly sees captured M16s and M4 rifles and carbines transferred to Syria from Iraq, numerous AK-74Ms also ended up with fighters of the Islamic State in Iraq.


The AK-74M itself is a modernised variant of the AK-74, and entered production in 1991. It not only provides more versatility compared to the AK-74, but is also lighter and features a new synthetic side-folding stock. This opposed to the earlier AKS and AKMS, which both use the typical under-folding stock.







Various types of Russian optical sights can be fitted to the AK-74M to ensure more precise targeting. These sights are fitted to the standard mounting rail on the left side of the receiver. In Syria, AK-74Ms equipped with such sights are more common than AK-74Ms using the standard iron sight.

The quantity of optical sights and under-barrel grenade launchers received by Syria in the past years was large enough to allow installment on numerous AK-47s, Type-56s and AKMs. 



A number of AK-74Ms were also equipped with NSPU night vision sights. Only a limited number of such sights are available in Syria, and they have seen sporadic use throughout the course of the Civil War.


The AK-74M can also be equipped with a single-shot 40mm under-barrel grenade launcher, two types of which were acquired by the Syrian Arab Army to date: the GP-25 and the GP-30M. The first is intended for use on older generation rifles while the GP-30M was designed for more modern assault rifles such as the AK-74M or AK-103.

The GP-30M can engage targets in a range of 100m to 400m and is capable of firing fragmentation grenades and smoke grenades. It is aimed by the means of a quadrant sight.


The AK-74M: A rifle both dreaded and loved on the Syrian battlefield, and sure to continue to play a large role in the course of the war now that peace seems ever more distant.

Libya under the rule of Muammar Gaddafi was once considered as one massive arms depot. In fact, the amount of weaponry in store far surpassed Libya's own needs. This allowed Gaddafi to use a part of this weaponry to supply various groups throughout the world opposing the West, or to donate it to countries in the Middle East and Africa. The donation of arms to the latter was mainly a sweetener in the hope that these counties would later support his idea for a United States of Africa, of which Gaddafi would 'of course' have been the leader.

The many arms depots found in Libya have provided the many forces now fighting for control over Libya easy access to sophisticated weaponry. The lack of spare parts and technical personnel has meant that only a portion of such heavy weaponry re-entered service however. The imposed arms embargo on Libya's internationally recognised government prevents the acquisition of new arms and spare parts for Libya's Armed Forces. This while one of the many opposing factions, Libya Dawn, is known to receive arms from several countries in the MENA region.

This forced the Libyan National Army (LNA) to look for creative solutions to provide the required amount of firepower for its troops. And while the Libyan Conflict has seen the birth of many outright strange vehicle conversions over the years, the LNA in Benghazi took the contest to a whole new level by installing 30mm naval guns on trucks.

The first product of this limited series (seen above) combined a recently delivered Kamaz 6x6 with a double-barreled 30mm AK-230 naval gun originally found on Soviet fast attack craft, minesweepers and frigates. The AK-230's original task was to shoot down incoming missiles and aircraft while guided by a MR-104 Drum Tilt radar.

To allow for easier access to the guns and munition, the turret was removed. The two 30mm NN-30 cannons are belt-fed, with each belt holding five-hundred rounds. Reloading the two cannons is extremely time-consuming, even for an experienced crew.



The Libyan National Army is currently fighting Libya Dawn in Benghazi, where the latter is currently entrenched in the hope to hold the city. Libya Dawn was in control of most of Benghazi, but never managed to capture the port, which also serves as a base to to the Libyan Navy.

Benghazi's Naval Base was home to the Koni-class frigate 212 Al Hani, the Nanuchka-class corvette 416 Tariq-Ibn Ziyad, one of the few remaining Natya-class minesweepers and an inoperational Foxtrot-class submarine. However, the Al Hani left Benghazi a couple of years ago and the Tariq-Ibn Ziyad was set on fire by artillery and subsequently sunk.

The single Natya-class minesweeper already sunk close to a year before due a lack of maintenance, but not before it was deprived of both of its AK-230 gun emplacements, which were subsequently installed on the Kamaz and Scania trucks. The remains of the unfortunate Natya-class minesweeper can be seen below.









Both trucks are operated by the 309 Battalion, part of the Libyan National Army. The text seen on the front of the AK-230 armed Scania seen below reads: 'Board of the General Staff - The National Army K 309'.

Wether or not this design is more practical than a 23mm ZU-23 or 30mm M1980 installed on a technical remains to be seen as both can achieve more or less the same fire rate and impact on the target, but the AK-230 is far harder to aim.


With no ceasefire or end of the arms embargo on Libya's National Army in sight, more interesting conversions are sure to see the light of day as the conflict continues.

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The 6S8 bullpup anti-materiel rifle, more commonly known as the KVSK, the AVSK or as the Kord sniper rifle, is one of the many types of small arms still flowing into Syria on a regular basis. It sees service alongside the OSV-96 and the Iranian AM.50, both of which now in widespread use in Syria. The 6S8 entered service in limited numbers however, and appears to have been adopted only by a few elite units within Syria's Armed Forces.

The first anti-materiel rifle that reached Syria was the OSV-96, of which a limited number were acquired shortly before the start of Syrian Civil War. The continuing deliveries of Russian OSV-96s and Iranian AM.50s, which started after Iran intervened in the Civil War, ensured a solid presence of anti-materiel rifles in the war-thorn country. From that perspective, either increasing the volume of OSV-96 deliveries or acquiring more AM.50s would have made more sense.

Nonetheless, a limited number of 6S8s were shipped to Syria in 2014. A request made by the Army Supply Bureau of the High Command of the Syrian Arab Republic to Russia's Rosoboronexport in early 2013 revealed Syria's interest in one-hundred 12.7mm sniper rifles, but it's likely that this actually refers to the OSV-96 instead.

This theory is strengthened by the fact that several Syrian soldiers recently received lessons on the 6S8 in Russia as part of their training here. Good experience gained with the 6S8s might have been the reason Syria ordered these rifles. One of the Syrian soldiers undergoing training on the 6S8s in Russia can be seen in the image below.


The 6S8 was originally marketed as KSVK, then as ASVK, but was officially adopted as the 6S8 by the Russian Army. To add to all the confusion, it is currently marketed as the 'Kord sniper rifle' by the Degtyarev Plant, which is responsible for the design and production of the anti-materiel rifle. Just like the OSV-96, the 6S8 is chambered in 12.7×108mm, allowing for the penetration of armoured vehicles and public housing.

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After receiving three MiG-21MFs and three Mi-8s from Egypt just half a year ago, it appears the Libyan Air Force is now further strengthened by two MiG-21MFs from the same source. The former Egyptian Air Force (EAF) mounts are a welcome addition to the under-equipped Libyan Air Force, which is currently waging a war against Libya Dawn, Ansar al-Sharia and even the Islamic State, the latter centered around the Libyan city of Derna.

The spread of extremism so close to Egypt's borders has led to great concern in Egypt, a feeling further strengthened by the beheading of twenty-one Egyptian Copts in Libya in early February 2015. Egypt subsequently launched airstrikes against the Islamic State in Libya, mainly targeting training camps and weapon depots.

Egypt's strategy in helping Libya's internationally recognised government in Tobruk combating Libya Dawn, Ansar al-Sharia and the Islamic State has mainly focused on the transfer of military equipment to the ill-equipped Libyan National Army (LNA) and Libyan Air Force. For example, only one MiG-23UB is available for operations over and around Libya's capital Tripoli.

The situation in Eastern Libya is slightly better, with several ex-Egyptian MiG-21MFs, MiG-21bis, Mi-35s and Mi-8s available here. Most of these assets are currently stationed at Gamal Abdul El Nasser, also known as Tobruk International Airport.

The three ex-Egyptian MiG-21MFs, serialed 18, 26 and 27, are now joined by MiG-21MF '22' and another example that is yet to receive its Libyan roundel, flag and serial number. All MiG-21MFs continue to operate in their Egyptian style camouflage pattern.





Egypt originally acquired large numbers of MiG-21s in the 60s and 70s, and still continues to operate a part of the MiG-21MF fleet. But as more modern aircraft are being acquired by the EAF, all are slated to be decommissioned in the coming years. Selling some of the MiG-21s for a soft price or donating them to the Libyan Air Force contributes to the Libyan Air Force's firepower and ability to quell the rise of Libya Dawn, Ansar al-Sharia and the Islamic State, without costing Egypt valuable assets.

In order to maintain the now five-strong fleet of MiG-21MFs, associated munitions and spare parts were also delivered to Libya. The two bombs below, reading 'Present to the hero martyr Abdullah al-Fakih' and 'Present to the soul of ....' can be identified as 250kg NASR-250 general-purpose bombs, produced by Egypt.



The Libyan Air Force, previously only operating the MiG-21bis and MiG-21UM variants, can count on experienced pilots and technicians to keep the now increasingly large MiG-21MF fleet operational. A stable flow of spare parts and ammuniton from Egypt will enable the fleet to provide the much needed fire support for the Libyan National Army in Eastern Libya.

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Iraq's fight against the fighters of the Islamic State is one not only fought by Iraq's Armed Forces and the Peshmerga, but also by an increasing number of Shiite militias, most of which receive extensive support from Iran. Iraq's equivalent of the Lebanese Hizbullah movement, Kata'ib Hizbullah, is without a doubt the strongest and most influential of all Shiite militias currently present in Iraq. This has come to be so mostly thanks to Iranian funding, lethal aid and the presence of Iranian advisors on the ground.

Iran has supplied these militias with anything from 12.7mm AM.50 anti-materiel rifles, 40mm Nasir grenade launchers, Safir jeeps equipped with 107mm multiple rocket launchers (MRLs), recoilless rifles and even 122mm HM-20 MRLs, all of which produced in Iran. The amount and type of weaponry supplied depends on the size of the militias in question.

However, the rumoured presence of Iranian tanks with militias in Iraq could until now not be confirmed. These rumours quickly made their way around the world each time any vehicle with tracks on a tank transporter driving close to the Western border of Iran was sighted. Now photograpic evidence has finally arisen of Iranian tanks that have joined the fight against the Islamic State in Iraq, and are busy driving their fighters out of the town of Tikrit.





Seen above is an Iranian T-72S, clearly distinguishable from Iraq's own T-72 'Urals' and T-72M1s by the presence of attachments allowing for the installment of 155 Kontakt-1 explosive reactive armour blocks (ERA), all surprisingly missing on this example, and the smoke grenade launchers on the side of the turret instead on the front as seen with the T-72M1.

While one could argue that this particular T-72S could have been part of a recently struck arms deal between Iraq and Russia that has not been uncovered, the Iranian camouflage pattern on the tank leaves no doubt about the true origin of the tank. For comparison, an Iranian T-72S (with ERA titles) during a parade can be seen below.


It is currently unknown if the T-72S pictured near Tikrit is crewed by Iranians and part of Kata'ib Hizbullah's arsenal, or if it is actually in service with the Iraqi Army. Kata'ib Hizbullah is known to operate just one tank, an M1 Abrams which was left behind by the Iraqi Army, and thus lacks the heavy fire-support essential for close combat fighting in towns such as Tikrit. Iran supplying a limited amount of T-72s drawn from Iranian army or Revolutionary Guard stocks makes perfect sense in this light.

Whatever effect they may have on the ultimate course of the war, it is certain that the influence of the Iran on conflicts in the Middle East and elsewhere is not to be underestimated. With Iran now using its military industry to exert influence in a host of Middle Eastern nations ranging from Iraq, Syria and Yemen to even Libya, its intentions of expanding its sphere of influence become ever more clear, and it's certain Iran is not to be underestimated when devising policies on the Middle East.

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More photograpic evidence revealing the presence of Iranian tanks in Iraq has emerged. Newly released images show what is believed to be the same T-72S as the one seen near Tikrit, while arriving in the town of Samarra, South of Tikrit. The new images come just a day after the first confirmed sighting of an Iranian T-72S tank in Iraq.

The T-72S is inspected by Qassem al-Araji (standing in the middle), the right hand of Hadi al-Amiri, head of the Badr Organization. When asked about who was to help Iraq in its fight against the Islamic State Qassem al-Araji previously stated ''We Want Help from Iran, Not U.S., in our fight against ISIS'' and that Iran has played "a major role in supporting our military forces,''.

This support now clearly also includes the transfer of Iranian T-72S tanks, at least one of which entered Samarra on an Iraqi Army tank trailer escorted by fighters of the Badr Organization.



But contrary to what was first believed, the tank is operated by the Iraqi Army, not by Kata'ib Hizbullah or the Badr Organization, which are the most influencialof the many Shiite militias currently fighting in Iraq. A source within the Badr Organization close to Qassem al-Araji says that ''Badr doesn't have a mechanized unit. Tanks are operated by Iraqi ISF (Iraqi Security Forces) but operators may be Badr sympathizers.''

As the T-72S is more advanced than the Iraq's older T-72 'Ural' and T-72M1 variants, it seems plausible that Iraqi personnel received training on the T-72S in Iran, once more indicating the strong bond that has come into being between the two nations.


Special thanks to Green lemon

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The Syrian Arab Air Force (SyAAF), entangled in a bloody civil warthat will soon reach its four-year mark, relies heavily on Russia and Iran to keep attrition from diminishing its firepower. After having upgraded several SyAAF Mi-17s with armour plates and FLIR cameras, stationing Mojaher 4, Yasir and Shahed 129 UAVs in Syria and even providing an Il-76TD to the SyAAF on behalf of Syrian Air, Iran is now further consoldating its stake in the conflict by the delivery of ten Su-22s to Syria.

These ten aircraft, part of a batch of 40 flown to Iran during Operation Desert Storm for safekeeping, were finally overhauled in recent years after idly standing around at Shiraz airbase for decades while their fate was decided upon. Initially regarded as "guests" and maintained only to keep them in good condition, they were formally put into Iranian possession in July 1993 but could not be made operational due to budgetary constraints: A team of Ukrainian technical advisors were contracted to overhaul the Su-22s, but at the time this proved to be too expensive for the ill-funded Islamic Republic of Iran Air Force (IRIAF). Instead, the IRIAF was to restore the ten Su-22M-3 and Su-22M-4s to operational condition without any foreign help by using other Su-22s and Su-20s as a source for spare parts. This programme only commenced in 2013, when the Revolutionary Guard's Pars Aviation embarked on the task of bringing the first Su-22s back to operational condition.


Back to the midst of the war in Syria, where the SyAAF fighter-bomber fleet continuously finds itself flying an increasing amount of sorties while the number of operational airframes continues to dwindle. The SyAAF, originally geared towards fighting a fierce but short war with Israel, never anticipated to get tangled up in a war of attrition between the pro-Assad party and its adversaries.As a result, all of Syria's MiG-23BNs and most of the Su-22s originally destined for replacement in this decade are now on the forefront of the aerial bombing campaign against rebel positions and villages. This led to a decreasing availability of the MiG-23BN and Su-22 fleet, which in turn are grounded for weeks at a time to allow for some much needed maintenance for certain airframes, their role being temporarily taken over by fighters such as the MiG-23MF, MiG-23ML(D) and MiG-29.

The fate of Iran's Su-22s was also sealed in the meantime: The fleet was to join the Aerospace Wing of the Revolutionary Guards (IRGCASF) instead of the IRIAF. At least six Iranian pilots were subsequently converted to the Su-22 in Syria, and later sent to Belarus for further training on simulators in preparation of the introduction of the Su-22. The programme took a surprising turn after it was suddenly cancelled several months ago, and on the direct order of Khamenei, the ten Su-22s were put onboard Il-76s and flown to Syria. By this time, only the Su-22's fuselages had been completely overhauled, and once arrived in Syria, the SyAAF completed the process.

The first of these new Su-22s was spotted while bombing the town of Talbeesa, Homs Governorate, on the 9th of March 2015. The title of the video claims ''New type of warplanes bombing Talbeesa in Homs''. The aircraft donned a new camouflage scheme that appears to have been applied recently, and although it has not been seen on Syrian Su-22s in the past, it bears some resemblance to that of the SyAAF's overhauled L-39s.

The sighting of the aircraft comes amidst a series of discoveries about Iran's increasing military presence and exports in Yemen, Sudan, Libya, Iraq and of course Syria, and follows a widely covered exercise in which a mock-up aircraft carrier was destroyed by anti-ship missiles and fast attack craft.

The continued stream of military support to Syria shows the extent of the Iranian determination in their effort to support the Syrian regime, and once again shows how far the conflict is from finally reaching a conclusion.

Special thanks to Tom Cooper and ACIG. 

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The Saudi-led airstrikes which commenced late on the 25th of March on Yemen reportedly hit a large number of targets throughout the country, yet mainly focussed on the single S-125, three S-75 and two 2K12 SAM sites around the capital of Sana'a. Also hit early on was the airbase of al-Dailami, which shares the runway with Sana'a International Airport. Although the assets available to the coalition of nine nations is undoubtedly the most high tech in the region, a neighbouring housing block got tragically obliterated, killing at least 18 civilians.

It is as of yet unknown wether all of Yemen's air and anti-air assets were destroyed, but Saudi Arabia claims all SAM sites as well as four aircraft on the ground were neutralised. Although Houthi media reports that two Royal Saudi Air Force (RSAF) and two United Arab Emirates Air Force (UAEAF) aircraft were shot down, considering the state of the Yemeni air defense apparatus (which was taken over by the Houthis in recent months) and the fact that no images of these alleged shoot downs have been released this seems very unlikely.

Now pictures have emerged showing one of the main hangars on the part of al-Dailami housing a part of the Yemeni Air Force's (Y.A.F.) U.S.-delivered aircraft in ruins after a strike by the Saudi-led coalition. Among the equipment destroyed in this raid are at least one AB.412 helicopter, one UH-1H helicopter and one CN-235 military transport aircraft.



A total of four ex-U.S. UH-1H-IIs were donated to Yemen in 2010 as part of an aid deal worth $27 million. The UH-1Hs were upgraded to UH-1H-II standard before their delivery and safely arrived in Yemen in early 2011. While originally delivered to aid Yemen's Saleh government in its fight against terrorism, they spent most of their time on the ground as the Y.A.F. found its brand new Russian Mi-171Shs more suitable for the task.

The order for the CN-235 was placed in early 2011 under a $38 million military aid grant, and was thus paid for entirely by the U.S.A. While the aircraft was ready for delivery at the end of 2012, it remained in storage in Spain and was only transferred to Yemen by the end of 2013, underscoring Yemen's lack of enthusiasm about receiving the aircraft. The CN-235 entered service in 2014, and was used to ferry materiel and manpower around the country.

The completely burned-out wreckage of the CN-235 (title image) now lays sadly in it hangar, an ironic reminder of how the geopolitical field can swiftly make a ridicule of past relations. This is especially true in Yemen, where situations often develop faster than the media can track them, which has now culminated in yet another open Middle Eastern war.

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New footage released by the Royal Saudi Air Force (RSAF) shows Yemen's soleballistic missile storage depot to be the latest target hit by Saudi aircraft in a bombing campaign that enters its third consecutive day. The warehouses seen obliterated by large explosions in the video below are located in the Republican Guard's base on a hill just outside of the capital of Sana'a, and stored a large portion of Yemen's R-17 Elbrus (Scud-B) missiles and Transporter Erector Launchers (TEL).


The site was hit for a second time on the 30th of March 2015. The resulting explosions ultimately caused the destruction of all ballistic missile systems. The video of the explosions can be seen here.

The Group of Missile Forces of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Yemen, located in Sana'a, is responsible for operating Yemen's ballistic missiles. Due to the large amount of changes the Missile Forces were subject to over the past twenty-five years, it is nigh on impossible to find their exact structure and naming.

The People's Democratic Republic of Yemen, more commonly known as South Yemen, acquired its ballistic missiles in 1978, when one Scud-B brigade with twelve TELs was delivered by the Soviet Union. Also acquired was a brigade of 9K52 Luna-M artillery rockets, allowing for the establishment of two missile brigades. The Yemen Arab Republic, also known as North Yemen, introduced its first surface-to-surface missile assets only in the late eighties, when a brigade with eighteen of the more modern OTR-21 Tochka TELs and associated missiles was acquired.




The 1994 Yemen Civil War saw forces in the former People's Democratic Republic of Yemen deploying its Scuds against Sana'a, the capital of unified Yemen. While aimed at the Presidential Palace, many of the quite inaccurate missiles predictably missed their intented target, hitting civilian areas instead. Forces in the Yemen Arab Republic immediately replied to the rain of Scuds, and moments later, several Tochka missiles launched by the 1st Missile Brigade were on their way to Aden, the capital of People's Democratic Republic of Yemen. This exchange of warheads lobbed into ballistic trajectories continued throughout the rest of the civil war.

The two missile brigades of the former People's Democratic Republic of Yemen were captured after the defeat of its forces, and were taken to Sana'a to be incorporated in the Armed Forces of unified Yemen. New Missile Brigades were subsequently established, and apart from the 9K52 Luna-M operating Missile Brigade, which was disbanded at the turn of the 21st century, they remained in service until this day.The rockets formerly used by the 9K52 Luna-Ms were left to rot in the open, and were only disposed of in 2012.

On the South side: A row of BAZ-5921 TELs used for the OTR-21 Tochka. On the East side: Discarded 9K52 Luna-M artillery rockets.

The Missile Brigades remained heavily dependant on foreign experts to operate their Scuds and OTR-21s throughout the 90s and 21st century however, and several Belarusians and Russians were permanently attached to the missile brigades to ensure they would remain operational. The amount of operational Scud TELs had meanwhile diminished to ten, with the operational status of the OTR-21s not being much better. Although Yemen reportedly acquired several North Korean produced missiles to be launched from its Scud TELs, no definite proof of such a deal has ever surfaced.^[1]

A warehouse on top of Faj Attan mountain (Sana'a), the home of Yemen's missile forces, with a single R-17 Elbrus (Scud-B) in front of it.

When the Houthis continued their assault on Yemen's capital Sana'a and ousted the government of President Hadi in January 2015, they quickly took control of all the military facilities located in and around the capital. This included the Republican Guard's bases, one of them housing Yemen's ballistic missiles. While it remains unknown how much of the technical personnel remained at their posts, and if any of the foreign experts were still present, it is unlikely that the Houthis were able to continue operating these sophisticated systems without help from foreign experts or Iran.

Saudi Arabia took no riskwith these dangerous systems however and decided to destroy the site and the warehouses holding Yemen's Scud-Bs. Although no footage has been released showing the OTR-21 holding area being bombed, it is certain these were not exempt from the bombing run.

As the Saudi-led coalition continues bombing Houthi targets in Yemen and gears up to a limited ground deployment to ensure the city of Aden does not fall into Houthi hands, more and more of Yemen's strategic military equipment is destroyed. Wether or not this will mean the coalition is capable of achievings its goals remains to be seen.




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Although several news outlets and even a spokesman for the Saudi-led coalition were quick to report on the total destruction of the Yemeni Air Force (Y.A.F.) by the coalition's airstrikes, it now appears that the series of attacks on Yemen's airbases were never aimed at neutralising the Yemeni Air Force, but rather to serve as a warning to the Y.A.F. not to enter the conflict on behalf of the Houthis instead.

The first raid on al-Dailami airbase, which shares the runway with Sana'a International Airport, saw the runway and a hangar housing one CN-235, one Beechcraft Super King Air, one AB-412 and one UH-1H destroyed, not the most important assets of the Yemeni Air Force to say the least.^[1]On the contrary, these four aircraft had already been stored as the Y.A.F. was dependent on Saudi Arabia and the U.S. for spare parts, which now refused to deliver them out of fear the Y.A.F.'s assets would end up serving the Houthis' goals. The other U.S.-designed products still in service with the Yemeni Air Force, such as the F-5Es, were on their last legs due to a lack of newly delivered spare parts, and had to be cannibalised to keep at least a part of the fleet running.

This first attack could thus be seen as a warning to the Y.A.F. not to participate in the conflict, and to remain dormant at its airbases instead. If Hadi returns to his post, he will surely need the air force as a tool to strike numerous pockets of resistancein a country in chaos. This could mean the Saudi-led coalition will want to spare the Y.A.F.'s precious airframes as much as possible while simultaniously preventing they enter the war on the Houthis' behalf.



The runway was repaired within a day after the initial strike however, which made it possible for the Yemeni Air Force to take off again. In reply to the Houthis' decision to repair the runway and the fact that the Y.A.F. still continues to move its assets around the airbase, making it look as though they're gearing up for a fight, a second raid was flown against al-Dailami. This raid, flown on the 29th of March 2015, saw Royal Saudi Air Force (RSAF) fighter-bombers targeting eleven adjacent shelters designated to house the pride of the Yemeni Air Force: Its MiG-29s. Footage of the raid (2:09) can be seen below.


However, the image showing the freshly repaired runway of al-Dailami indicates at least six of the shelters were empty instead of housing MiG-29s. Yemen's MiG-29s, numbering just under 20 airframes, are divided between their main hub al-Dailami airbase and al-Anab (al-Anad) airbase, which sees a permanent detachment of a couple of MiG-29s. This means that not all of the aircraft shelters on the MiG-29 part of al-Dailami airbase are actually occupied by MiG-29s.

The Y.A.F. has experienced increased problems with keeping their fleet of aircraft operational; especially the highly sophisticated MiG-29s have suffered due to a lack of funding and maintenance. A mass exodus of personnel not interested in serving Yemen on behalf of the Houthis put a bigger strain on the already fragile Y.A.F. In 2013 only a part of the fleet remained operational, with the others stored in the hangar where they usually receive maintenance, meaning only a part of the twenty shelters were actually housing aircraft. It is likely that the targeted shelters were in fact not housing any aircaft, but that the MiG-29s were instead housed here.

The second raid should thus again be interpreted as a warning seeing as it has clearly been proven by now that the Saudi-led coalition is able to strike any target they deem necessary, but still these targets haven't included Yemen's combat aircraft and helicopters yet.

A spokesman of the Saudi-led coaltion had the following to say about the last raid:

''Through our constant reconnaissance of Yemen’s territory, we knew that the Houthis moved some aircraft to an airbase outside Sanaa. We targeted them in the past 24 hours and they were completely destroyed as is shown in the video.''

This statement likely acts as a cover for the real intentions of the Saudi-led coaltion, which is to save the Yemeni Air Force from total destruction for possible use in future scenarios. This theory is strengthened by the fact that the Y.A.F.'s assets are still intact, and that the Houthis have no problem showing just that.













As the Yemeni Air Force remains spared by the Saudi-led coalition, it might be set to play a role in regaining stability in Yemen. If the Y.A.F. and the Houthis are prepared to play along remains to be seen.

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Sudan's commitment to the Saudi-led Operation Decisive Storm, aimed at regaining stability in Yemen and bringing the internationally recognised government of President Hadi back to power, perfectly represents the current foreign policy of the Sudanese government. Sudan floats somewhere in between being Iran's major ally in Africa, and the other end of the spectrum where it is trying to present itself as an ally of Gulf countries, in particular Saudi Arabia, in a bid to get not too distanced from these economically important countries. A difficult political game to play, especially so in the increasingly restless Middle Eastern landscape.

Sudan can be seen as Iran's most trustworthy ally in Africa, and probably one of its most important allies in the whole world. Sudan first opened its arms for Iranian economic and military aid in the late eighties, and both countries continue to enjoy a warm relationship, which expresses itself mainly in the form of military cooperation nowadays. This close relationship between the two countries has been a source of much worry to Saudi Arabia.

Sudan has always denied the presence of any Iranian military advisors in the country, and continued this policy on an official visit to Saudi Arabia in May 2014. A leaked audio-recording of a high level meeting between the Sudanese Minister of Defence and several generals in September 2014 revealed that Iranians not only serve as advisors to the Sudanese Armed Forces, but are in fact mainly concerned with trafficking arms throughout Africa and the Middle East, with most of the weaponry destined for Hamas and Libya Dawn.^[1][2]

Members of Iran's Revolutionary Guard in Sudan take care of the weapons shipments from the point they arrive in Sudan until they travel to Gaza via Egypt. Sudan functions as a middle man here, as they allow the shipments to arrive and agree to see them transported over Sudanese soil. A number of past Israeli raids on ships transporting the weapons to Sudan and on convoys and storage depots inside Sudan thus comes as no surprise.

But an unexpected recipient of some of the arms makes the whole situation even more complicated, as Sudan reportedly also provided arms to the Houthis in Yemen, the exact same forces it is targeting now as a part of Operation Decisive Storm.




The following was said by the Sudanese Minister of Defence, Abdul-Rahim Mohamed Hussein:

''We have a problem with Saudi Arabia because they found out about the weapons we sent by way of the Red Sea to Abd al-Malik Al-Houthi’s Shia group in Yemen,” said Major General Hashim Abdalla Mohammed in the meeting.''

The leaked audi-recording also covers Sudan's relationship with Iran in detail:

''I shall start with our relationship with Iran and say it is a strategic and everlasting relationship. We cannot compromise or lose it.

...

They opened the doors of their stores of weapons for us, at a time the Arabs stood against us. The Iranian support came when we were fighting a rebellion that spread in all directions. The Iranians provided us with experts and they trained our Military Intelligence and soldiers. 

...

There is one full battalion of the Republican Guard still with us here and other experts who are constructing interception and spying bases in order to protect us, plus an advanced Air Defence system.''

The military officials agreed to ''maintain good relations with the Gulf States in principle, yet work strategically with Iran, in total secrecy and on a limited scale, through the Military Intelligence and security.'' General Siddiq Amer stated: ''We will not sacrifice our relations with the Islamists and Iran for a relationship with the Saudis and the Gulf States. What is possible is a relationship that serves our mutual economic interests in terms of investment and employment. We must have a foothold in both camps.''

Another perfect example of this complicated foreign policy was the sale of man-portable air-defense systems (MANPADS), anti-tank guided missiles (ATGMs) and ammunition to Qatar, which subsequently delivered them to Syrian rebels via Turkey. This while Sudan's longtime ally Iran is the primary reason the regime of Bashar al-Assad is still in power, and even supplied Su-22 fighter-bombers to the Syrian Arab Air Force.

Back to Operation Decisive Storm, which now also includes a contingent of four Sudanese Air Force (SuAF) aircraft based at the massive King Khalid airbase. The aircraft (one of them seen in the header), likely totaling four Su-24Ms, were put under the command of the Royal Saudi Air Force (RSAF). Sudan also pledged to deploy 6.000 troops to Saudi Arabia for a possible ground invasion of Yemen.

Omar al-Bashir, president of Sudan stated the following:

''Sudan expresses unlimited support to the coalition supporting the legitimacy and confirms its active participation on the ground amongst the coalition forces in order to maintain peace and stability in the region''

Colonel Al-Sawarmy Khaled Saad, spokesman of the Sudanese Armed Forces said the goal of the operation was ''protecting Islamic holy sites and protecting the region''.

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Satellite imagery of Misrata and Mitiga airbase confirm that Libya Dawn has recently gotten at least one MiG-25 operational, or is in the progress of making it operational. Although it is still unknown if the example is of the interceptor variant or reconnaissance-bomber variant, it confirms the longstanding rumour that Libya Dawn was indeed working on restoring one of Libya's mighty Foxbats.This news comes just as it has been confirmed that the Libyan Air Force is now working on making at least one Mirage F.1AD fighter-bomber operational.

Libya Dawn, fighting for Libya's unrecognised parliament currently residing in the capital of Tripoli, is in terms of personnel and equipment the second-strongest force currently fighting in Libya. The most powerful force remains the Libyan National Army (LNA), fighting for Libya's internationally recognsed government residing in Tobruk. A strange situation inherited from what was originally a political problem. But with no political or military solution in sight, this situation will likely continue for quite some time to come.

Libya Dawn is in control of a vast amount of land in Libya, including Libya's capital Tripoli and large cities like Misrata and parts of Benghazi. It also controls Tripoli International Airport and strategically important airbases such as Mitiga, Misrata and al-Jufra, the last of these housing a large part of Libya's now decommissioned MiG-25 fleet and all of Libya's decommissioned Tu-22 bombers. Thanks to the aircraft and equipment found on these airbases, Libya Dawn succeeded in establishing their very own air force consisting of at least two Soko G-2 Galebs, one J-21 Jastreb, a couple of L-39s and two MiG-23MLDs in addition to several Il-76s, SF-260s and a small number of helicopters. Libya Dawn is currently also working on bringing one MiG-23UB and two Soko G-2 Galebs operational at Mitiga, with more airframes likely to follow.

One of the MiG-23MLDs operating out of Misrata was shot down by an Igla-S fired from a Strelets launcher while bombing the airstrip of al-Zintan on the 23th of March 2015, with its pilot KIA. This was the first loss for Libya Dawn's air force,but obviously had a large impact considering the small size of the fleet they'd gotten operational. Surprisingly, it now turns out this fleet also includes at least one MiG-25 that has only recently been restored. Libya Dawn already claimed to have been working on a MiG-25 at Misrata several months ago, but it is only now that the aircraft appeared on satellite imagery.^[1] It first makes an appearance on the 31th of January 2015 at Misrata, and it was seen for a second time on the 24th of February at Mitiga. It is likely that this is actually the same aircraft that's simply switched bases, which is also common practice with Libya Dawn's MiG-23s.







Although Mitiga once housed active MiG-25s, all squadrons flying the type ceased operations around 2003, when the large stock of spare parts for the type had run out. Mitiga's resident 1035 Squadron was one of the last to continue flying the type, and only ceased operations in 2004. Its aircraft remain stored on the Southern part of the airbase.

The largest amount of MiG-25s was located at Al-Jufra, with 1005 Squadron and 1025 Squadron being stationed here. As al-Jufra is located in the dry desert, the aircraft stationed here are generally in a much better condition than those found in Mitiga, which are fully exposed to the salty air of the Mediterranean sea just two kilometers away.

Although none of the MiG-25s were destined to ever return to Libya's skies and as a result were not serviced anymore, most of the airframes stored at al-Jufra were left in their Hardened Aircraft Shelters (HAS), and were thus pretty well protected against the elements. The eleven aircraft that can be found outside are in the worst condition,and their green Jamahiriya roundel and flag, anti-glare panel and serial number are now slowly fading away under the relentless sun.



Recent imagery of al-Jufra showed that four MiG-25s had been towed out of their shelters at the Southern part of the airbase, indicating that the airframes were being examined to see if they could be overhauled. Unfortunately, no new imagery of the Northern part of the airbase was released, and thus it remains unknown if the same happened here.


The MiG-25 in the best condition was subsequently picked out and either overhauled at al-Jufra or more likely, flown to Misrata onboard an Il-76 to be overhauled there. The overhaul was conducted by a team of foreign experts and local mechanics, which allowed the aircraft to fly its first sortie on the 11th of February 2015, likely piloted by a former Libyan MiG-25 pilot. Although the nationality of the foreign experts cannot be confirmed independently, the sudden presence of a number of Ukrainians at Mitiga and Misrata leaves little doubt on the matter. The presence of Sudanese mechanics at Misrata was also reported, but this might have been related to the overhaul of other airframes instead.

Although it remains unknown if the MiG-25 is of the interceptor variant or the reconnaissance-bomber variant, one would expect Libya Dawn has chosen for the latter. When equipped with multiple ejector racks (MERs), the reconnaissance configured MiG-25RB(T) can be turned into a bomber armed with up to eight FAB-500Ts, albeit suffering from extremely bad accuracy. Although there is no evidence that Libya ever received MERs, these racks could easily have been acquired from the Ukraine.

As al-Jufra was home to all of Libya's Tu-22s, flown by 1022 Squadron, Libya Dawn can count on a large stock of bombs originally destined for use by the Tu-22s. This large stockpile is littered around the airbase seemingly at random, and considering the current status of Libya it seems unlikely they will be properly disposed of any time soon.



The MiG-25PD(S) interceptor would make use of R-40 and R-60 air-to-air missiles, which were acquired by Libya in the late seventies and early eighties and ran out of shelf life decades ago. Although this doesn't mean all of the missiles are completely unusable, it could seriously hamper their performance.

The NATO-led coalition was apparently afraid that some of al-Jufra based MiG-25s were in a good enough condition to return to the sky in 2011, and several munition depots housing the MiG-25's air-to-air missiles were destroyed in preemptive strikes. This was easier than targeting all the Hardened Aircraft Shelters housing the MiG-25s, which would have been an expensive endeavour. As a result of the violent explosions, R-40 missiles were scattered across the base, leaving a minefield of unexploded ordnance in their wake.




So if the now active MiG-25 would be of the interceptor variant, it would have to draw its missiles from the stocks formerly used by 1035 Squadron based at Mitiga, which faces the same shelf life problem as the missiles seen elsewhere in Libya.

It is thus far more likely that the aircaft in question is an MiG-25RB(T), which can be used for reconnaissance and bombing sorties. Although the accuracy leaves much to desire, it will enable Libya Dawn to strike large targets like oilfields and airports while high above the range of MANPADS. With a large pool of airframes available at al-Jufra and Mitiga and the involvement of foreign experts, the MiG-25's career in Libya might be far from over. Depending on the condition of the airframes and Libya Dawn's ability to find enough technical personnel and pilots to operate MiG-25s, more Foxbats might let out their mighty roar above Libya's skies once again.