''Совместная обработка информации российскими и сирийскими офицерами''and''معالجة مشتركة للمعلومات بين الضباط السوريين والروس'' - Joint processing of information by Russian and Syrian officers.



''Начальники "Центра-С" - Chiefs of Center S. The six lines beneath reveal the ranks of the Russian chiefs, their names and dates when they commanded the Center. All six seem to have rank of Полковник - 'Colonel'. Surnames are not readable.


''Визит советника МО РФ Куделиной Л.И. в Центр''and''زيارة مستشار وزارة الدفاع الروسية كوديلني لي للمركز'' - Counselor to the Minister of Defence of Russian Federation Kudelina L.I. visiting the Center. 'Kudelina L.I.' is likely an error as the name should be 'Kudelina L.K'.



''Рабочий визит начальника ГУ МВС ВС РФ'' - Visit by the chief of the Main Directorate of International Military Cooperation of the Armed Forces of Russian Federation.


''Объекты и источники северного военного округа ВС Израиля'' - Bases and sources of Northern Military District of Israeli Armed Forces. 'Sources' indicates sources of radio signals.




"Карта радиоэлектронной обстановки" - Radio electronic situation map.

After the initial news about the Russian spy facility Center S, more information on the now infamous Russian espionage network in Syria has become available, and it turns out Center S isn't the only Russian operated espionage facility in Syria. While the existence of a second facility, Center S-2, was quickly confirmed by a badge commemorating the ten year anniversary of this base, it now appears there's a third facility around.

A high resolution photo of one of the maps in the operations room of Center-S reveals the location of three marked places inside Syrian held territory, connected by double lines. Oddly enough, a secondary set of lines continues to Cyprus through Lebanon and even to Amman, Jordan. It is currently unknown what these lines are supposed to signify.

Center S, located near Al Hara, can be seen in middle, which leaves the Northern and Southern bases unaccounted for. As other Syrian military bases are not marked on the map, it suggests only SIGINT (Signals Intelligence) bases are shown.

The one to the North brings us to a hill near Jaba.


While the one to the South brings us to another hill, near the town of Nawa.


Interestingly, all three facilities are based on and (presumably) in hills, a rare sight in Syria's Southern West. As Center S and S-2 account for two of these bases, this leaves a third possible candidate, (likely named Center S-1 or Center S-3), proving Russian involvement in espionage activities in Israel to be significantly larger than originally thought.

The departure of the Russians from Center S is described in an article written for The Daily Beast;

''Firas Al Hawrani, the official spokesman for the FSA in southern Syria, told The Daily Beast Monday that FSA forces had seen about 15 Russian personnel operating in the Al Harah area before the FSA took the facility, but they left before the area fell out of regime control. “The Russians who were at the Al Harah mountain, the regime took them to Damascus by plane two weeks ago,” he said.''

No reports are available on the status and exact function of the other two bases, but it is presumed both are still being operated by the Russian Osnaz. Nevertheless, in light of the Free Syrian Army's advance in the Quneitra region Moscow seriously has to reconsider its stance on keeping the other two bases operational,

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In early October 2014, the Republican Guard was seen using a vehicle not believed to be in Syrian service for the first time, in an attempt to clear the rebel stronghold of Jobar, Damascus.

The UR-77 'Meteorit', once designed to breach minefields with its two mine-clearing line charges to make way for assaulting infantry and armour saw heavy use in Chechnya, blowing whole houses and apartments suspected to house Chechen rebels away. It also saw use in Angola, which acquired a limited number for its fight against UNITA.

As the vehicle wasn't part of the standard Soviet client state vehicle park, it was never believed to have been exported to any nation but Angola. It is certain that the UR-77 has never been sighted in the now three-and-a-half year long war. This while the Republican Guard was desperately in need for such a vehicle as they had to use T-72AV tanks and 2S3 self-propelled howitzers to engage housing believed to be harbouring rebels, leading to huge and unnecessary losses of valuable T-72AVs.



The fact that it was reportedly flown to Mezze on an Il-76, offloaded and rushed to the neighbourhood of Jobar ^[1] does not correspond with the theory of the UR-77 already being in Syrian service. As the Republican Guard already started its offensive on Daraya back in 2012, losing many tanks in the progress, the need for this vehicle was already apparant two years ago. Although much can be said about the Pro-Assadists's tactics, waiting two years to transfer this important vehicle from one part of Syria to Damascus does not make sense.

Much more likely is that the UR-77s and associated munitions were sold to Syria by either Russia or (less likely) Belarus, subsequently loaded onto an Il-76 and flown to Mezze. As the UR-77 was most likely never operated by Syria, it is possible foreign personnel are in fact manning the UR-77s currently used in Jobar.

In a video provided by Wassim Issa, the operator of the UR-77 is blurred. This while all the other faces of the fighters around him remain perfectly visible. One shot of the operator gives a part of his face away, but as soon as the camera zooms in, it immediately gets blurred.

Although the unblurred shot and footage later on shows the operator's caucasian look, this doesn't tell us much about the origin of the operator. He is later seen in a direct conversation with a soldier of the Republican Guard, and despite the heavy usage of hand signals, the soldiers seem to understand him perfectly.





Although the Assad regime is deprived of hard currency, the capabilities that come with the UR-77 outweighs the costs. The mine-clearing line charges of the UR-77 are a definite improvement over the several types of IRAMs (also known as Volcanoes) and Iranian made Falagh (or Falaq) rockets in use with Pro-Assadist forces such as the National Defence Force (NDF) and Hizbullah. Although few UR-77s are believed to have been acquired, they will likely be a common sight in Pro-Assadists's offensives around Damascus from now on.

News spread by the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (SOHR), Reuters and other media indicate the commencement of Islamic State jet operations from Kshesh Air Force Base.

A video uploaded after the first news spread proved to show the planes being operated by the Islamic State. However, the first part shows fighters of Ahrar al-Sham inspecting the hardened aircraft shelters housing L-39s after just capturing Kshesh on 12th of February 2013, the second part shows Jaish al-Islam operating two of the L-39s and the last part shows a L-39 from the Syrian Arab Air Force (SyAAF) on a bombing sortie over Aleppo early in the Syrian Civil War.

Kshesh (also known as Jirah or Jarrah) was once home to the SyAAF's 2 Squadron operating L-39ZAs and one unknown squadron operating L-39ZOs. After being captured by Ahrar al-Sham on 12th of February 2013, it saw the birth of the first rebel air force in Syria.

Jaish al-Islam managed to get at least two of the around dozen remaining L-39s operational and briefly showed them in a video. Although aided by former SyAAF personnel, Jaish al-Islam was never reported to have conducted any sorties with the L-39s and the base was abandoned in light of the Islamic State's advance in the Aleppo Governorate in early 2014. After the capture of Kshesh by the Islamic State, the base was transformed into a training base for fresh IS recruits.

According to the original report ^[1], Iraqi personnel formerly serving in the Iraqi Air Force (IrAF) under Saddam Hussein aided in the training of IS fighters to operate the three planes at Kshesh. And while the IrAF indeed owned L-39s, most of the fleet was already inoperational after the first Gulf War in 1991. Nonetheless, the L-39 is one of the easiest jet aircraft to fly and maintain, making it ideally suited for groups like Jaish al-Islam and the Islamic State.

Given their past experience, the theory of Iraqi personnel solely working on the planes seems much more plausible than the Iraqis giving training to other fighters how to maintain and operate the three L-39s.

However, witnesses reportedly told the SOHR that the planes appeared to be MiG-21s or MiG-23s. But as none of these were ever stationed at Kshesh, this can be quickly dismissed. As every fighter aircraft in Syria automatically gets branded as a MiG, it is likely the witnesses were clueless about the exact type and MiG-21 or MiG-23 got added later on.

Seen below are from top to bottom; The L-39, a MiG-21 and a MiG-23.
















The claim of three aircraft being operated by the Islamic State also comes as a suprise as Jaish al-Islam, with aid of personnel formerly stationed at the base, was only known to have managed getting two L-39s in operational condition. As there was no flow of spare parts, Jaish al-Islam likely cannibalized the other L-39s presence at Kshesh to make this happen.

But even if Jaish al-Islam departed the airbase without sabotaging their L-39s, it still doesn't explain the presence of a third aircraft. If the Islamic State really managed to get a third aircraft operational, which should have been non-operational since early 2013, it truly shows the ingenuity and willingness of the group to to turn every possible weapon against its former owners.

The photo below, showing three fighters of the Islamic State (now both KIA) inspecting a L-39 shortly after the capture of Kshesh from Jaish al-Islam indicates that at least one of the two L-39s formerly operated by Jaish al-Islam was, although looking worn-out due to weather elements or bad quality paint, still reasonably intact. The presence of a protective cover suggests the plane wasn't sabotaged by Jaish al-Islam.


According to other testemonies of witnesses ^[2], the planes clearly took off from Kshesh. If true, and linked to the base while in the hands of the Islamic State and not Jaish al-Islam, L-39s operating from the nearby Kweres airbase, which is already being under siege since December 2012, can be definetely ruled out.

Most flights of aircraft only lasted for about five to ten minutes according to witnesses. The short flightime was likely for tests and out of fear to be intercepted by the Syrian Arab Air Force (SyAAF).

For combat missions, L-39s can carry up to 1.290 kg worth of UB-16 rocket pods for 57mm rockets, bombs or fuel tanks distributed over four pylons. The L39ZA's outer two pylons are wired for R-60 short tange air-to-air missiles. Although in widespread use by Syria, none were seen at Kshesh or Tabqa.

It's difficult to tell if and to what degree the Islamic State is envisaging fast jet operations from either Kshesh or Tabqa, especially with the U.S.-led bombing campaign now in force. Known is that if definite proof of IS operating jet fighters arrives, Kshesh might finds itself on the receiving end of the U.S.-led airstrikes.

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As the significance of the Russian espionage network in Syria becomes clearer, exclusive information suggests Center S wasn't only housing Russian SIGINT (Signals Intelligence) experts before its capture, but also Iranian experts in this field.

An ex-SAA conscript now residing in Turkey and speaking on the basis of anonymity told Oryx Blog he frequently visited the base as part of his conscription in 2006 and 2007 and not only saw Russians there, but also Iranians. He stated that the base housed Iranian equipment, which was regularly checked and maintained by Iranian personnel usually staying there for around ten days.

He goes on that Russian experts used to visit the facility every three or six months, but does not recall if these were replacements for other Russian experts working there or just personnel providing maintenance for the equipment at the base.

This new information shows the signifance of the joint spy effort on Israel in the light of escalating tensions in the Middle East. As the Syrian Civil War is once again pushed further from the prospect of a possible ceasefire with the rise of the Islamic State, both Iran and Russia appear to be consolidating their stakes in the Assad regime, as possible new Russian equipment showing up in Damascus testifies.

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After launcing a renewed offensive on Shaer, near Homs and Palmyra, the Islamic State is once again in control of this important gas field and associated facility, providing the bulk of the gas to Syria's energy sector. The capture comes as the world remains distracted by the Islamic State's offensive for control of the now infamous city of Kobanê.

While Shaer was already captured by the Islamic State in the mid of July, it was recaptured in the end of July following a series of heavy offensives and airstrikes. The fighting left hundreds of deaths and the Pro-Assadists lost at least a dozen tanks during these battles.

The Islamic State subsequently shifted its focus on Regiment 121, Brigade 93 and Tabqa and thus, Shaer remained firmly in the hands of the Pro-Assadists. The facility was reinforced by the National Defence Force (NDF) along with associated tanks and vehicles. Unsurprisingly, most the troops defending Shaer belonged to the NDF.

The defending troops were also promised support of the Syrian Arab Air Force (SyAAF), which was to come to the aid of the NDF when needed.





Although the SyAAF held its promise and came to the aid of the troops defending the facility, most of the soldiers were forced withdraw. At least two dozen were killed however. The capture also saw at least three T-62 Model 1972 and one T-55 destroyed.



Captured at the base were at least six tanks, two BMP-1s, two VT-55KS armoured recovery vehicles (ARVs), one ZSU-23, one 2S1 Gvozdika, numerous technicals equipped with 14.5mm KPV heavy machine guns, several 9M133 Kornet missiles along with one asscociated 9P163-1 launcher, heavy mortars, RPG-7s and RPG-18s, machine guns, small arms and asscociated munitions.










It is yet to be seen if the Pro-Assadists will counterattack to try to retake the facility once again. As it provides large parts of Syria with energy, they likely will. If so, the battle for control of Shaer will likely end up as an attrition war. While the Pro-Assadists have the advantage of superior weapon systems and the presence of the SyAAF, losing dozens of soldiers and tanks in such attacks will only speed up the process of deplenishing available resources, with questionable results.

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The recent Islamic State offensive in Homs supposedly now also threatens Syria's largest and most important airbase; T4. Sharing the name of the nearby pumping station, T4 is often incorrectly named Tiyas or even Tayas, Tayfur, Al Tifor or Al Tifour due to the Arabic rendering of 'T4'.

The release of a video by a Pro-Assadist YouTube channel confirms daily operations still continue at T4. The video, intended to boost the morale of regime fighters, reflects the tense situation North of the airbase.When a similar video showing Tabqa airbase remaining firmly in regime hands was released, the base was overrun just a day later.

T4 houses a total of fifty-eight Hardened Aircraft Shelters (HAS) and two additional large hangars. Most of the HASes, once built to protect the legacy MiG-25 fleet from the Israeli Air Force, now remain empty, but could be used as strongholds to be used in the event of a possible attack by fighters of the Islamic State.

The airbase is currently home to a large portion of the Syrian Arab Air Force's (SyAAF) fighter-bomber fleet and the now decommissioned MiG-25 fleet, of which thirty-two can be seen on satellite imagery. Although the MiG-25's career was shortly revived in the midst of the Syrian Civil War, reintroduction of the fleet of MiG-25PDS interceptors, MiG-25RBT reconnaissance-bombers and associated MiG-25PU trainers has not taken place and most remain stored around the airbase.



T4 also used to see regular detachments of MiG-29SMs, flown by 697 Squadron based out of Seen (sometimes also incorrectly described as Sayqal). It is unknown if these detachments still continue during the now almost four-year long Syrian Civil War.

Most importantly, it is home to the SyAAF's 819 Squadron flying Su-24M2s, the most important air asset of the Assad regime. The once twenty-two aircraft strong Su-24 fleet (including two examples given by Libya in the nineties) suffered the loss of two aircraft, leaving twenty aircraft. The whole fleet was recently upgraded by Russia to M2 standard. The upgrade provides for improved targeting, navigation and fire-control systems and compatibility with newer versions of the KAB-500/1500 guided bombs, Kh-31A, Kh-31P and Kh-59 air-to-ground missiles and R-73 air-to-air missiles in addition to the Kh-25, Kh-29L, Kh-29T and Kh-58 air-to-ground missiles and R-60 air-to-air missiles already carried. The carriage of S-24 and S-25 air-to-ground rockets, unguided rocket pods, FAB, OFAB and RBK bombs and KMGU-2 munitions dispensers is also possible.





A second Squadron (677 Squadron or 685 Squadron) operates Su-22M4s, another important strike asset of the SyAAF. This plane is also rigged for the carriage of S-24 and S-25 air-to-ground rockets, unguided rocket pods, FAB, OFAB and RBK bombs, KMGU-2 munitions dispensers, Kh-25, Kh-29L, Kh-29T and Kh-58 air-to-ground missiles and R-60 air-to-air missiles. One Su-22M4 armed with two B-8 rocket pods, two KMGU-2 munitions dispensers and two fuel tanks can be seen taxiing at T4 below. Another shot shows two of them parked in a double HAS.









While the SyAAF should have no problem evacuating most of the Su-22M4s and Su-24M2s if the Islamic State attacks, it is yet to be seen if they would manage to evacuate the extensive stock of spare parts, armaments and irreplaceable personnel also present at the base. If not, it is unlikely the SyAAF would ever recover from such a major loss.

As seen at Tabqa, the SyAAF had great difficulty evacuating the remaining personnel and weapon systems, and failed even in destroying the MiG-21s undergoing maintenance, which would have prevented possible future use by the Islamic State.

T4's direct line of defence is provided by various checkpoints manned by the National Defence Force (NDF) and numerous anti-aircraft gun emplacements that can be used to slow down assaults by the Islamic State. As seen at Tabqa, fighter-bombers stationed at the airbase or detached SA-342 Gazelles and Mi-25s can provide another layer of protection from the skies.

Two S-75 and three S-125 SAM sites are tasked to defend T4's air space, although their operational readiness can be questioned. One RSP-7, two P-12/18 ''Spoon Rest'' and two P-35/37 ''Bar Lock'' radars are responsible for detecting any plane flying in mid-Syria.






The fighter-bombers and the possible deployment of SyAAF attack helicopters at T4 complicates any future offensive undertaken by the Islamic State in the Homs Governorate and makes T4 a priority target for the Islamic State to take out.

Even though it remains to be seen if T4 will be attacked soon, the offensive in the Homs province, leading to the capture of the vital Shaer gas field, comes at a time when the rest of the world remains distracted by the Islamic State's offensive on the city of Kobanê and once again shows the flexibility of the Islamic State to carry out offensives on multiple fronts.

Syria's BM-27s: While their 220mm rockets have found their targets around Damascus multiple times, the launcher was yet to be spotted, leading to speculation the rockets were actually fired by some of Syria's indigenously designed multiple rocket launchers (MRLs).

However, a photo published on a Pro-Assad Facebook page finally reveals the presence of the ZiL-135 based launchers inside Syria. Although the launchers could have been supplied by Russia in the midst the Syrian Civil War, it is more likely that they were already part of the Syrian arsenal before the Civil War began. Thirty-six BM-27s, ordered in 1986 and delivered between 1987 and 1988, were reported to be in Syrian service, and this number has presumably not increased.^[1]

This opposed to the UR-77s and BM-30s also used by the Republican Guard on various occasions. Not known to have been ever received and operated by Syria before the Civil War, both are believed to have been recently delivered by the Russian Federation.

The photo could have been taken on Mount Qasioun or one of its surrounding mountains. Located near Damascus, Mount Qasioun is undoubtedly the most important hill in Syria. Home to much of the Pro-Assad forces around Damascus and serving as the main base for the Republican Guard and the 4th Armoured Division, it also houses numerous surface-to-air missile (SAM) sites and Brigade 155, equipped with various guided and unguided ballistic missiles and artillery rockets.

Rebel-held neighbourhoods in Damascus such as Jobar have seen heavy shelling of MRLs in the past years. While initially many of the 122mm rockets used came from BM-21 Grad MRLs, heavier rockets, such as those fired by the BM-27, have frequently been sighted during the past couple of months.

BM-27s can also be used to encircle rebel groups by laying minefields to block their advance or retreat. Rockets with a cluster warhead contain up to 312 submunitions, meaning that with one BM-27 firing up to sixteen rockets, you can lay a minefield of almost five-thousand mines over a range of thirty-six kilometers. Although this tactic was extensively used by the Soviets in Afghanistan, it hasn't yet been seen used in Syria.

The remains of a 220mm rocket fired at Jobar can be seen below.






Strangely enough, indigenously designed MRLs have not yet been documented as used during the Syrian Civil War. At least three different versions are known to exist, of which one, the 302mm Khaibar-1, was captured by the Free Syrian Army and two others, 220mm or 230mm and 302mm, were sighted during live firing exercises conducted by the Syrian Arab Army.

Special thanks to PFC_Joker.

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After launcing a coordinated attack on the town of Nawa, the Free Syrian Army and some elements of Jabhat al Nusra are now in control of the city of Nawa and its vicinity. The attack apparently took the Pro-Assadist forces by suprise, as almost all fled, leaving their heavy weaponry behind. Following the capture of Nawa, the town was immediately bombed by the SyAAF.

Nawa was one of three keypoints in a defensive line South of Damascus. Tasked with protecting the Southern belly of Syria's capital, it has now crumbled with the capture of this key town. Although Nawa was already once captured by rebel groups in early 2014, the town was recaptured after a fierce regime offensive in May.

The recapturing of the town may lead to a review of how to handle the Free Syrian Army's advance in the South. What's certain; another regime offensive as seen in February 2014 will require lots of manpower, equipment and fuel, all practically unavailable.

The capture of Nawa also strengthens the firepower of the rebel groups (most united under the banner of the Free Syrian Army) in the South. Heavy weaponry and associated munitions can now be used to push further in the direction of Damascus, or other key objectives in the region. The weaponry captured once equipped one Tank Battalion, two Artillery Battalions, at least two Infantry Battalions and one or two Anti-Aircraft Artillery Battalions, all part of Brigade 112.

Captured equipment includes two T-54s, one T-55, ten BMP-1 infantry fighting vehicles, a BMP-1 training facility, three BRDM-2s armoured fighting vehicles, one BTR-152 and two BTR-60s armoured personnel carrier , two VT-55KS armoured recovery vehicles, one AMB-S armoured ambulance, three 122mm D-30 howitzers, one 130mm M-46 field gun, several 9M14 Malyutka, 9K111 Fagot and 9K115-2 Metis-M anti-tank missile systems, one ZSU-23 self-propelled anti-aircraft gun, four 14.5mm ZPU-4, one 23mm ZU-23, one 37mm M-1939 and two 57mm AZP S-60 anti-aircraft guns. The associated munitions to use all of this equipment was also captured.

Much of the weaponry and muntions can be seen here.

As most of the weaponry was immediately moved away, the Free Syrian Arms seems eager to use the equipment against its former owners as fast as possible.




Nawa was also believed to house yet another Russian SIGINT (Signals Intelligence) facility similar to the one captured near Al Hara. As no footage from the hill is available yet, the identity of the facility remains a mystery.

This list only includes captured vehicles and equipment of which photo or videographic evidence is available. Therefore, the amount of equipment captured by the Islamic State may be higher than recorded here.

Although some of the tanks and artillery fielded by the Islamic State in recent offensives such as Kobanê were captured from Brigade 93 and Regiment 121 respectively, a great deal of effort has been put into avoiding double listings.

As almost all of the trucks captured at the various bases in Northern Syria were already derelict years before their capture, they're not included in the list.

Tanks (82)

• 56 T-55: (1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6)(7, 8 and 9)(10 and 11)(12 and 13)(14)(15)(16)(17)(18)(19)(20)(21)(22)(23)(24)(25)(26, 27 and 28)(29, 30, 31, 32, 33 and 34)(35, 36 and 37)(38)(39)(40 and 41)(42)(43)(44)(45)(46)(47)(48)(49)(50)(51)(52)(53)(54)(55)(56)(57)
• 4 T-62 Obr. 1967: (1)(2)(3)(4)
• 10 T-62 Obr. 1972: (1 and 2)(3)(4)(5)(6)(7)(8)(9)(10)
• 7 T-72 Ural: (1)(2)(3)(4, 5, 6 and 7)
• 5 T-72AV: (1)(2)(3)(4)(5, later modernized by the addition of new mud guards, side skirts and different ERA layout)

 

Armoured fighting vehicles (6)

• 5 BRDM-2: (1)(2)(3)(4)(5) 
• 1 AMB-S: (1)

 

Infantry fighting vehicles (17)

• 17 BMP-1: (1)(2)(3)(4)(5)(6)(7)(8)(9)(10)(11)(12)(13)(14)(15 and 16)(17, modernized by the addition of a DshK) 

 

Military engineering vehicles (4)

• 4 VT-55KS: (1 and 2)(3)(4)

 

Jeeps and Trucks (40)

• 1 UAZ-469: (1, captured in Iraq)
• 2 MAZ-6317: (1)(2)
• 1 KrAZ-6322: (1, captured in Iraq)
• 24 M-1114: (1, 2 and 3)(4, 5, 6 and 7)(8 and 9)(10 and 11)(12 and 13)(14 and 15)
• (16)(17)(18)(19)(20)(21)(22)(23)(24, all captured in Iraq)
• 1 M-1152: (1, captured in Iraq)
• 5 M35: (1, 2, 3 and 4)(5, all captured in Iraq)
• 3 MTVR: (1, 2 and 3, all captured in Iraq)
• 3 Navistar International 7000 series: (1)(2)(3, all captured in Iraq)

 

Recoilless rifles (4)

• 2 82mm B-10: (1)(2)
• 2 105mm M40: (1)(2)

 

Anti-tank missiles (21)

• 1 9M14M Malyutka-M: (1)
• 2 9M111M Faktoriya: (1 and 2)
• 2 9M113 Konkurs: (1)(2)
• 8 9K115-2 Metis-M: (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8)
• 1 9M133 Kornet: (1)
• 3 I-RAAD: (1 and 2)(3)
• 4 HOT: (1, 2, 3 and 4, associated launch platform not captured)

Towed artillery (52)

• 1 122 mm (M-30) howitzer M-1938: (1)
• 1 122mm (D-74) Field Gun: (1, captured in Iraq)
• 17 122mm (D-30) howitzer 2A18: (1, 2 and 3)(4, 5, 6, 7 and 8)(9)(10)(11)(12)(13)(14)(15)(16)(17)
• 30 130mm (M-46) field gun M-1954: (1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6)(7, 8 and 9)(10)(11)(12)(13)(14)(15)(16)(17, 18 and 19)(20)(21)(22)(23)(24)(25)(26)(27)(28)(29)(30)
• 3 155mm M198: (1, 2 and 3, captured in Iraq)

 

Self-propelled artillery (3)

• 3 122mm 2S1 Gvozdika: (1)(2)(3)

Multiple rocket launchers (26)

• 15 57mm UB-16: (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12)(13 and 14)(15, associated launch platforms not in use, could be mounted on pickup trucks instead)
• 2 107mm Type 63: (1)(2)
• 9 122mm BM-21: (1)(2)(3)(4)(5)(6)(7 and 8)(9, 122mm launcher mounted on a Navistar International 7000 series captured in Iraq)

 

Ballistic Missiles (1)

• 1 Scud-B: (1, not operational)
   

Anti-aircraft guns (69)

• 19 14.5mm KPV: (1)(2)(3 and 4)(5)(6)(7)(8, 9, 10 and 11)(12)(13)(14)(15)(16)(17)(18)(19)
• 2 14.5mm ZPU-2: (1)(2)
• 34 23mm ZU-23: (1)(2)(3)(4)(5 and 6)(7)(8)(9)(10)(11)(12)(13)(14)(15)(16)(17)(18)(19)(20)(21, 22 and 23)(24)(25)(26)(27)(28)(29)(30)(31)(32)(33)(34)
• 1 37mm Type 65: (1) 
• 13 57mm AZP S-60: (1 and 2)(3 and 4)(5)(6)(7)(8)(9)(10)(11)(12)(13, mounted on a Navistar International 7000 series captured in Iraq)

 

Self-propelled anti-aircraft guns (2)

• 2 23mm ZSU-23-4: (1)(2)

 

MANPADS (1)

• 1 Hwaseong-Chong: (1)

  

Static SAM systems (3)

• 3 S-125 Pechora ''SA-3'': (1)(2)(3)

 

Self-propelled SAM systems (1)

• 1 2K12 Kub ''SA-6'': (1, not operational. Associated missiles and radar not captured)

 

SAM missiles (14)

• 1 V-750: (1, for the S-75, not operational. Associated launch platform not captured)
• 13 V-600: (1, 2, 3 and 4)(5, 6, 7 and 8)(9, 10, 11 and 12)(13, for the S-125)

 

Radars (11)

• 1 P-12 ''Spoon Rest A''(1)
• 1 P-14 ''Tall King'': (1)
• 2 P-15 ''Flat Face A'': (1)(2)
• 1 P-35/37 ''Bar Lock'': (1)
• 3 PRV-13 ''Odd Pair'': (1 and 2)(3)
• 1 RSP-7: (1)
• 1 SNR-125 ''Low Blow'': (1)
• 1 JY-27: (1)

Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) (1)

• 1 Phantom FC40: (1)

Aircraft (21)

• 3 L-39ZA Albatros: (1, a total of three reported) 
• 1 MiG-21M: (1, not operational)
• 9 MiG-21MF: (1, operational)(2, not operational)(3, not operational)(4, not operational)(5, not operational)(6, 7 and 8, not operational)(9, not operational)
• 1 MiG-21bis: (1, operational)
• 7 MiG-21UM: (1, operational)(2, not operational)(3 and 4, not operational)(5, not operational)(6, not operational)(7, not operational)

Air-to-air missiles (14)

• 10 R-3S: (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 and 10, associated launch platforms not in use)
• 4 R-13M: (1, 2, 3 and 4, associated launch platforms not in use)

(Special thanks to Luftwaffe A.S. and Memlik Pasha)

Much has been said on Egypt's involvement in the ongoing conflict between the Libyan National Army and several Islamist factions, and anything from small arms deliveries to airstrikes on weapon depots is mentioned. The extent of Egypt's assistance to Libya is now finally revealed by a series of photos showing aircraft formerly operated by the Egyptian Air Force now in Libyan Air Force service.

Fear of the Libyan Islamist uprising blowing over to Egypt has already led to great concern within the Egyptian government. Supplying heavy weaponry to Libya's outgunned military, almost all of which loyal to General Khalifa Haftar, increases the chances of the uprising being defeated, something of great importance for the Egyptian government of Abdel Fattah el-Sisi.

The Libyan Air Force was practically annihilated by the NATO-led airstrikes during the Libyan Civil War. The airstrikes saw all of Libya's Su-22s and Su-24s destroyed, leaving only a few outdated Mirage F1s, L-39s, MiG-21s and MiG-23s in service, most in desperate need of an overhaul.

While the Libyan Air Force was subsequently reinforced by two Mi-35 attack helicopters from Sudan, one crashed, leaving only one in service. Further losses resulted in only a couple of MiG-21s, MiG-23s and a few helicopters remaining operational, not enough to provide sufficient air cover the Libyan National Army.

It now appears the Libyan Air Force was aided by Egypt to regain some of the lost firepower. Three, possibly four former EAF mounts, consisting of two MiG-21MFs and one or two Mi-8s, were recently spotted in use with the Libyan Air Force.




The two MiG-21MFs, serialed 26 and 27, were first spotted in early November. As Libya previously only operated the MiG-21bis, and both came with a camouflage pattern not yet seen on any Libyan aircraft, both aircraft had to come from abroad.

The camouflage pattern is exactly the same as seen on most of Egypt's MiG-21s (as seen in the photo below), leaving little to no doubt on the origin of the two MiG-21s.





Egypt operates a large fleet of MiG-21s, all slated to be decommissioned in the coming years. Selling them for a low price or even donating them to Libya makes perfect sense in light of Egypt's stance on the conflict in Libya.

The other former Egyptian Air Force mount now operated by Libya is the Mi-8. While Libya previously operated dozens of Mi-8/17s, it never acquired any examples that could be armed. A photo taken on the 27th of October 2014 shows a Mi-8 with UB-16 rocket pods while sporting the exact same colour as seen on Egypt's Mi-8s.


The similarity in appearance to Mi-8s currently operated by Egypt is illustrated by the image below.


As Libya never operated any armed Mi-8s, the helicopter came in the the same colour as seen on Egyptian Mi-8s and the Mi-8 belongs to an older batch, nowadays rarely sold for export, it is safe to say this helicopter was also supplied to Libya by Egypt.

The only notable differences in the two photos are the lack of a winch and the removal of the armour plating on each side of the cockpit; the empty spot now showing رعد - Raa'd, meaning Thunder.


As the Libyan Air Force has operated MiG-21s and Mi-8/17s for decades, plenty of pilots and technicians can be found to keep them operational. The move is certainly a smart investment by Egypt to ensure its own security.

It is yet to be seen if Egypt continues delivering heavy weaponry to Libya. If so, it might help the Libyan military to get the edge over the Islamist factions.

Special thanks to ACIG.

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This list only includes captured vehicles and equipment of which photo or videographic evidence is available. Therefore, the amount of equipment captured and destroyed by the Islamic State may be higher than recorded here. Some civilian vehicles such as Toyota Hilux pickup trucks are not included in this list. A great deal of effort has been put into avoiding double listings.

Tank operations by the Islamic State in Iraq are virtually nonexistent, and only one instance is known in which the Islamic State used a tank. The M1A1s that were captured intact were stripped of their machine guns and associated ammunitions before set on fire.

The Islamic State never captured any FIM-92 Stinger MANPADS as Iraq only operates Stingers on AN/TWQ-1 Avenger self-propelled surface-to-air missile systems, all stationed far away from the battlefield.

The Islamic State never captured any Blackhawks at Mosul as Iraq doesn't operate any Blackhawks. Google Earth footage showing numerous Blackhawks stationed at Mosul shows U.S. Blackhawks stationed here in 2004. All flying assets are believed to have been evecuated before the fall of the airbase.

A list showing vehicles and equipment captured and operated by the Islamic State in Syria can be found here.

Tanks (35, of which destroyed: 14)

• 6 T-55: (1)(2)(3)(4, destroyed)(5, destroyed)(6, destroyed)
• 1 T-72M: (1)
• 19 Type 69: (1, 2, 3, 4 and 5)(6, 7 and 8)(9, 10 and 11)(12)(13)(14)(15)(16)(17)(18, captured, later destroyed)(19, destroyed)
• 9 M1A1 Abrams: (1, captured, later destroyed)(2, captured, later destroyed)(3, destroyed)(4, destroyed)(5, destroyed)(6, destroyed)(7, destroyed)(8, destroyed)(9, destroyed)

 

Armoured fighting vehicles (33, of which destroyed: 12)

• 12 MT-LB: (1)(2)(3)(4)(5)(6)(7, 8, 9 and 10, later destroyed)(11, destroyed)(12, destroyed) (At least two transferred to Syria)
• 21 M1117 ASV: (1, 2 and 3)(4)(5)(6)(7 and 8)(9)(10)(11)(12 and 13)(14)(15)(16, captured, later destroyed)(17, destroyed)(18, destroyed)(19, destroyed)(20, destroyed)(21, destroyed)

 

Infantry fighting vehicles (4, of which destroyed: 3)

• 4 BMP-1: (1)(2, later destroyed)(3, destroyed)(4, destroyed)

 

Armoured personnel carriers (72, of which destroyed: 21)

• 2 BTR-80UP: (1)(2, destroyed)
• 2 BTR-4: (1 and 2)
• 68 M113: (1, 2 and 3)(4 and 5)(6)(7)(8)(9)(10)(11)(12)(13 and 14)(15)(16)(17)(18 and 19)(20)(21)(22)(23)(24)(25)(26)(27)(28)(29 and 30)(31 and 32)(33)(34)(35, 36 and 37)(38 and 39)(40)(41)(42 and 43)(44)(45, used as VBIED)(46, used as VBIED) (47, destroyed)(48, destroyed)(49 and 50, destroyed)(51, destroyed)(52, destroyed)(53, destroyed)(54, destroyed)(55, 56, 57, 58 and 59 destroyed)(60, 61, 62, 63 and 64, destroyed)(65, destroyed)(66, destroyed)(67, destroyed)(68, destroyed)

 

Military engineering vehicles (6)

• 1 Type 653: (1)
• 3 WZT-2: (1 and 2)(3)
• 1 BTS-5B: (1)
• 1 M88A1: (1)

 

Command vehicles (3, of which destroyed: 3)

• 3 M577: (1, destroyed)(2, destroyed)(3, destroyed)

 

Trucks (221, of which destroyed: 23)

• 9 Ural-4320:(1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9)
• 10 KrAZ-6322: (1)(2 and 3)(4)(5, transferred to Syria)(6, 7, 8 and 9, destroyed)(10, destroyed)
• 1 Ford 3530: (1)
• 46 M35: (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8)(9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23 and 24)(25)(26)(27)(28)(29)(30)(31 and 32)(33, 34, 35, 36, 37 and 38)(39, 40, 41 and 42)(43, captured, later destroyed)(44, destroyed)(45, destroyed)(46, destroyed) (At least five transferred to Syria)
• 119 Navistar International 7000 series: (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22 and 23)(24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36 and 37)(38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48 and 49)(50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63 and 64)(65 and 66)(67)(68)(69)(70)(71)(72)(73)(74)(75)(76)(77)(78)(79)(80)(81 and 82)(83)(84)(85)(86)(87)(88 and 89)(90 and 91)(92 and 93)(94, 95, 96 and 97)(98 and 99)(100, 101 and 102)(103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113)(114)(115, destroyed)(116, destroyed)(117 and 118, destroyed)(119, destroyed) (At least three transferred to Syria)
• 6 MTVR: (1, 2 and 3)(4, 5 and 6) (At least three transferred to Syria)
• 2 M-548: (1)(2)
• 11 Ashok Leyland: (1 and 2)(3)(4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 and 11, destroyed)
• 1 Mercedes-Benz Atego: (1)
• 11 Daewoo Novus: (1)(2, 3, 4 and 5)(6, 7, 8, 9 and 10)(11)
• 2 Armoured trucks: (1)(2)
• 3 Armoured bulldozers: (1)(2, destroyed)(3, destroyed)

 

Jeeps (630, of which destroyed: 230)

• 10 UAZ-469: (1 and 2)(3)(4)(5 and 6)(7, transferred to Syria)(8, transferred to Syria)(9, destroyed)(10, destroyed)
• 4 M-1114: (1 and 2)(3)(4)
• 323 M-1114: (1)(2)(3)(4)(5)(6)(7)(8)(9 and 10)(11 and 12)(13)(14)(15)(16)(17 and 18)(19 and 20)(19)(20)(21)(22 and 23)(22 and 23)(24, 25 and 26)(27)(28)(29)(30)(31)(32)(33)(34 and 35)(36, 37 and 38)(39)(40)(41)(42)(43)(44)(45)(46)(47)(48)(49)(50, 51 and 52)(51)(52)(53)(54)(55, 56 and 57)(58)(59)(60 and 61)(62)(63 and 64)(65 and 66)(67)(68, 69, 70 and 71)(72 and 73)(74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80 and 81)(82, 83, 84, 85 and 86)(87)(88)(88, 89, 90, 91, 92, 93)(94)(95, 96, 97, 98 and 99)(100)(101)(102)(103, 104 and 105)(106)(107)(109, 110, 111)(112)(113)(114 and 115)(116)(117 and 118)(119)(120) (121, 122 and 123)(124, 125, 126, 127 and 128)(129, 130 and 131)(132, 133 and 134)(135) (136)(137)(138)(139)(140)(141 and 142)(143)(144)(145)(146 and 147)(148)(149)(150)(151)(152)(153)(154)(155)(156)(157)(158, used as VBIED)(159, later destroyed) s (160, later destroyed)(161, later destroyed)(162 and 163, later destroyed)(164 and 165, later destroyed)(166, later destroyed)(167 and 168, destroyed)(169, destroyed)(170, destroyed)  (171, destroyed)(172, destroyed)  (173, destroyed)(174, destroyed)(175, destroyed)(176, destroyed)(177, destroyed)(178, destroyed)(179, destroyed)(180, destroyed)(181, destroyed)(182, destroyed)(183, destroyed)(184, destroyed)(185, destroyed)(186, destroyed)(187 and 188, destroyed)(189, destroyed)(190, destroyed)(191, destroyed)(192, destroyed)(193, destroyed)(194, destroyed)(195, destroyed)(196, destroyed)(197, destroyed)(198, destroyed)(199, 200, 201, 202, 203, 204, 205, 206, 207 and 208, destroyed)(209, destroyed)(210 and 211, destroyed)(212, destroyed)(213 and 214, destroyed)(215, 216, 217 and 218 destroyed)(219, destroyed)(220, destroyed)(221, 222, 223, 224, 225, 226 and 227, destroyed)(228, destroyed)(229, destroyed)(230, destroyed)(231, destroyed)(232, destroyed)(233, destroyed)(234, destroyed)(235, destroyed)(236, destroyed)(237, destroyed)(238 and 239 destroyed)(240, destroyed)(241, destroyed)(242, destroyed)(243, destroyed)(244, destroyed)(245, destroyed)(246, destroyed)(247, destroyed)(248, destroyed)(249 and 250, destroyed)(251, destroyed)(252, destroyed)(253, destroyed)(254, destroyed)(255, 256, 257, 258 and 259, destroyed)(260, destroyed)(261, destroyed)(262, destroyed)(263, destroyed)(264, destroyed)(265, destroyed)(266 and 267, destroyed)(268 and 269, destroyed)(270, destroyed)(271, destroyed)(272, destroyed)(273, destroyed)(274, destroyed)(275, destroyed)(276, destroyed)(277, destroyed)(278, destroyed)(279, destroyed)(280, destroyed)(281, destroyed)(282, 283, 284 and 285 destroyed)(286, destroyed)(287, destroyed)(288, destroyed)(289 and 290 destroyed)(291, destroyed)(292, destroyed)(293, destroyed)(294, destroyed)(295, 296 and 297 destroyed)(298, destroyed)(299 and 300, destroyed)(301, destroyed)(302, destroyed)(303, destroyed)(304, destroyed)(305, destroyed)(306 and 307, destroyed)(308, destroyed)(309, destroyed)(310, destroyed)(311, destroyed)(312, destroyed)(313, destroyed)(314, destroyed)(315, destroyed)(316, destroyed)(317, destroyed)(318, destroyed)(319, destroyed)(320 and 321 destroyed)(322, destroyed)(323, destroyed) (At least thirty-four transferred to Syria: (1, 2 and 3)(4, 5, 6 and 7)(8 and 9)(10 and 11)(12 and 13)(14 and 15)
• (16)(17)(18)(19)(20)(21)(22)(23)(24)(25)(26 and 27)(28)(29)(30 and 31)(32)(33)(34))  
• 1 M-1152: (1, transferred to Syria)
• 2 Ford F-150: (1)(2)
• 190 Ford F-350: (1)(2)(3)(4, 5, 6, 7 and 8)(9)(10)(11)(12)(13)(14)(15)(16)(17, 18 and 19)(20)(21 and 22)(23)(24)(25 and 26)(27)(28)(29)(30 and 31)(32)(33)(34 and 35)(36)(37)(38 and 39)(40)(41, 42 and 43)(44 and 45)(46)(47)(48)(49)(50)(51)(52)(53)(54)(55, 56 and 57)(58)(59)(60 and 61)(62, 63, 64, 65, 66 and 67)(68)(69, 70 and 71)(72)(73)(74)(75)(76 and 77)(78)(79)(80)(81)(82)(83 and 84)(85)(86)(87 and 88)(89)(90)(91)(92)(93)(94)(95)(96)(97)(98)(99)(100 and 101)(102)(103)(104 and 105)(106)(107)(108 and 109)(110)(111)(112, 113, 114, 115, 116, 117, 118, 119, 120, 121, 122, 123)(124)(125 and 126)(127 and 128)(129, 130 and 131)(132)(133)(134)(135)(136)(137)(138)(139)(140)(141)(142)(143)(144)(145)(146)(147)(148)(149)(150, captured, later destroyed)(154, captured, later destroyed)(155, 156, 157, 158, 159 and 160, destroyed)(161, 162, 163 and 164, destroyed)(165, destroyed)(166, destroyed)(167, destroyed)(168, destroyed)(169, destroyed)(170, destroyed)(171, destroyed)(172, destroyed)(173, destroyed)(174, destroyed)(175 and 176, destroyed)(177, destroyed)(178, destroyed)(179, destroyed)(180, destroyed)(181, destroyed)(182, destroyed)(183, destroyed)(184, destroyed)(185, destroyed)(186, destroyed)(187, destroyed)(188, destroyed)(189, destroyed)(190, destroyed)
• 21 Chevrolet Silverado: (1)(2)(3)(4)(5)(6)(7)(8)(9)(10 and 11)(12)(13)(14)(15)(16)(17)(18)(19)(20, destroyed)(21, destroyed)
• 19 Badger ILAV: (1)(2)(3)(4 and 5)(6)(7, later destroyed)(8, destroyed)(9, destroyed)(10, destroyed)(11, destroyed)(12, destroyed)(13, destroyed)(14, destroyed)(15 and 16, destroyed)(17, destroyed)(18, destroyed)(19, destroyed)
• 3 Range Rover: (1 and 2)(3) 
• 19 Otokar Akrep: (1 and 2)(3)(4)(5)(6)(7)(8)(9)(10)(11)(12)(13, used as VBIED)(14, destroyed)(15, 16 and 17, destroyed)(18, destroyed)(19, destroyed)
• 2 Reva: (1, destroyed)(2, destroyed)
• 6 Dzik 3 ''Ain Jaria 1'': (1)(2)(3, destroyed)(4 and 5, destroyed)(6, destroyed) 
• 30 Toyota Land Cruiser: (1)(2)(3)(4, 5 and 6)(7)(8)(9)(10)(11)(12)(13)(14)(15)(16)(17)(18)(19)(20)(21)(22)(23)(24)(25)(26)(27 and 28)(29)(30, destroyed)

 

Recoilless rifles (13)

• 12 73mm SPG-9: (1)(2)(3)(4)(5)(6)(7)(8)(9)(10)(12)
• 1 105mm M40: (1)

 

Anti-tank missiles (4)

• 3 9M17 Skorpion: (1, 2 and 3, associated launch platforms not captured)
• 1 9M133 Kornet: (1, transferred from Syria)

 

Towed artillery (12)

• 6 122mm (D-74) Field Gun: (1, 2 and 3)(4)(5)(6) (At least one transferred to Syria)
• 6 155mm M198 Howitzer: (1, 2 and 3)(4, 5 and 6) (At least three transferred to Syria)

Multiple rocket launchers (41)

• 2 107mm Type 63: (1)(2)
• 37 107mm Fath: (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 14, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33 and 34)(35 and 36)(37)
• 2 122mm rocket: (1)(2)

 

Anti-aircraft guns (109)

• 74 14.5mm KPV: (1)(2)(3)(4)(5)(6)(7)(8)(9)(10)(11)(12)(13)(14)(15)(16)(17)(18 and 19)(20 and 21)(22)(23)(24)(25 and 26)(27)(28)(29)(30)(31)(32)(33)(34)(35)(36)(37)(38)(39)(40)(41)(42)(43)(44)(45)(46, 47 and 48)(49)(50)(51 and 52)(53)(54)(55)(56)(57, 58 and 59)(60)(61)(62)(63)(64)(65)(66)(67)(68 and 69)(70)(71)(72)(73)(74)
• 7 14.5mm ZPU-1: (1)(2)(3)(4)(5)(6)(7)
• 25 23mm ZU-23: (1 and 2)(3)(4)(5)(6)(7)(8)(9)(10)(11)(12)(13)(14)(15)(16)(17)(18)(19)(20)(21)(22)(23)(24)(25)
• 2 37mm Type 65: (1)(2)
• 1 57mm AZP S-60: (1)

 

MANPADS (4)

• 3 9K32 Strela-2 ''SA-7'': (1)(2)(3, all transferred from Syria)
• 1 FN-6: (1, transferred from Syria)

 

Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) (4, of which destroyed: 3)

• 1 Phantom FC40: (1)
• 3 Mohajer-4: (1, destroyed)(2, destroyed)(3, destroyed)

Helicopters (4, of which destroyed: 4)

• 1 Mi-17V-5: (1, destroyed)
• 2 Mi-35M: (1, destroyed)(2, destroyed)
• 1 IA-407: (1, destroyed)

Aircraft (3)

• 3 MiG-21FL: (1, not operational)(2, not operational)(3, not operational)

(Special thanks to Memlik Pasha)

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Vehicles and equipment captured and operated by the Islamic State inside Syria

The now almost four-year long Civil War continues to impact Syria's tank fleet and the way it operates. It is now scattered across Syria, providing fire-support to many factions in the conflict. In this new series Syria's steel beasts will be put in the spotlight.

Who actually operates Assad's tanks in Syria remains somewhat unclear: although many believe the Syrian Arab Army (SAA) remains responsible for all combat tasks within Syria, the SAA saw much of its manpower and equipment transferred to the National Defence Force (NDF) and other militias. However, the Syrian Arab Army still remains responsible for a number of brigades and for the many garrisons dotted around Syria. Any tanks found there remain under the command of the Syrian Arab Army.

The tank fleet can be divided into three major types: the T-55, the T-62 and the T-72. Two additional types, the T-54 and the PT-76, were also once in Syrian service, but most of the surviving T-54s were donated to Lebanon and others remain stored. The PT-76 fleet is believed to have been scrapped at the end of the last decade.

It is commonly believed Syria was in the possession of nearly 5000 tanks, roughly divided between 2000 T-54/55s, 1000 T-62s and 1500 T-72s, before the Civil War began. However, these figures are largely distorted, and the actual number of tanks operated by Syria at the start of this decade lays closer to 2500, divided between around 1200 T-55s, 500 T-62s and 700 T-72s. Not all 2500 tanks were active at the same time, with large portions of the T-55 and T-62 fleet in reserve and stored.

Of these 2500 tanks, over 1000 have been lost over the course of the Civil War. While the majority of these have been T-55s, the large size of that fleet makes up for these losses. An estimated 700 T-55s maintain their operational capabilities as of late 2014.  Many groups fighting for control over Syria also continue to operate various T-55s. A notable operator is the Islamic State, which became a major user after capturing dozens at Brigade 93. Much of the Brigade 93's inventory was later fielded in the Islamic State's offensive on Kobanê.

The T-55s can be divided into four variants: the standard T-55A, the North Korean upgraded T-55, the T-55AM and the T-55AMV. Of these, the T-55A is most numerous type in service, followed by the North Korean upgraded examples, the T-55AMV and the T-55AM. The T-55A and the North Korean upgraded T-55s are mostly found with the NDF, while the remaining T-55AMs and T-55AMVs continue to soldier on with the SAA.

The North Korean variants feature a North Korean designed laser rangefinder (LRF) and some even smoke grenade launchers and a 14.5mm KPV heavy machine gun. At least two North Korean produced LRFs are known to be installed on Syrian T-54/55s. The upgrade for these tanks, based on lessons learned in the 1973 war, was carried out in the early seventies and eighties as a cheaper alternative to the Soviet T-55 upgrade, which brought a part of Syria's fleet up to T-55AM standard. This upgrade included the KTD-2 laser-range finder, side skirts and smoke grenade launchers. The addition of BDD appliqué armour for the turret and front of the hull was ommited due budget constrictions however. A T-55AM operated by the rebel Ghurabaa' Houran Battalion operating in the Dara'a Governorate can be seen below.

The T-55AMV is by far the most modern T-55 variant in service within Syria, one could argue their combat effectiveness would even surpass that of Syria's T-72s. The Syrian T-55AMV fleet was upgraded in the Ukraine in the 90s. Opposed to Syria's T-55AMs, the T-55AMVs were fully upgraded, including a new engine and explosive reactive armour (ERA) blocks for increased armour protection against rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs).

Syrian T-55AMVs are also equipped with the 9M117M Bastion anti-tank missile fired through the T-55's 100mm main gun. Although the 9M117M was previously unknown to be in Syrian service, rebels captured around a dozen of them near Tel Ahmar, Quneitra Governorate. Quneitra has traditionally been home to the T-55AMV fleet, and these missiles would have been a nasty suprise for Israeli armour in case of war. Due to the cost of these missiles, each tank only carries a few. Most of the missiles remain stockpiled in ammunition depots, like Tel Ahmar, along the Golan Heights for possible future use against Israeli armour.



Some T-55AMVs also received a mysterious device mounted over the laser-range finder. This device most likely functions as a sort of camera. A similar looking device was also spotted on an BMP-1 upgrade offered by the Ukraine. Only footage showing the interior of the tank can provide definitive proof.






Similar to what has already been seen on the Republican Guard's T-72s, the T-55 fleet is now gradually receiving cage armour reinforced by sandbags to improve protection against RPGs. A T-55 with such cage armour can be seen below. Most upgraded T-55s only received cage armour around the turret however.

While the NDF continues to operate its T-55s in an offensive role engaging rebel strongholds from a safe distance, the Syrian Arab Army uses most of its T-55s as static pillboxes, making them an easy prey for the rebels' anti-tank missiles. A large part of the tank losses in Syria are a direct result of this often fruitless attempt at strenghtening local garrisons and checkpoints.

Due to the large size of the T-55 fleet, there's no immediate threat to the Syrian Arab Army and the National Defence Force of running out of tanks to provide fire-support to its soldiers. The biggest threat to the Syrian tank fleet is the harrowing lack of fuel. Most of the available fuel goes to units like the Republican Guard or Suqur al-Sahara (Desert Falcons).

The lack of fuel already forced the widespread use of tank trailers, as there simply isn't enough fuel for the tanks to drive to their deployment zone by themself. A situation that likely isn't going to improve unless the oilfields around Deir ez-Zor are recaptured.

The T-62, a technological marvel at its time of inception because of its advanced 115mm smoothbore tank gun. Nevertheless, the tank inherited much of the T-55's problems and even introduced a host of new problems to boot. The 115mm gun, once feared by NATO, became redundant when more modern ammuniton for the T-55's 100mm gun came available. This combined with the horrendous fire rate of just four rounds a minute made the T-62 somewhat of a black sheep later on in its career.

Apart from Bulgaria, Warsaw Pact countries were all but interested in the T-62, and opted for the procurement of more T-55s instead. The tank was widely exported to Soviet client states in the Middle East and North Africa however. Egypt and Syria were keen on testing the T-62 in combat and subsequently used them in the 1973 Yom Kippur war, where it performed below expectations.

Syria is believed to have received up to 800 T-62s in the late sixties and throughout the seventies. Of these, a little under 500 are still believed to be operational, in reserve or stored. An additional batch of 300 T-62s supposedly delivered in 1982 was misreported and actually consisted of T-72As instead. In similar fashion, a batch of 200 T-62s delivered by Libya in the late seventies is sometimes reported but cannot be independently confirmed.^[1]

Both the T-62 Model 1967 and T-62 Model 1972 were delivered to Syria, of which the Model 1972 is the most numerous in Syrian service. It comes with a 12.7mm DshK heavy machine gun for increased protection against air threats or possible use against ground targets, something which the Model 1967 lacked.

The T-62 fleet also saw action in the 1982 war, and while the Syrian tank fleet performed better than in the 1973 war, it lost around 200 T-62s to Israeli infantry, tanks and helicopters. Much more successful were the dedicated hunter-killer anti-tank teams armed with RPG-7s, RPG-18s, 9K111 Fagots and MILANs. Operating in and around Beirut, they used narrow streets to their full advantage.

Interestingly, one Syrian T-62 Model 1967 ended up with the South African Defence Force, which already operated a squadron of PT-76s and T-55s for OPFOR (opposing force) training and evaluation for possible future encounters with these tanks in Angola.

Contrary to Syria's T-55s, the T-62s never received any large-scale upgrade programs to improve their combat capabilities. Instead, a part of the T-62 fleet was stored in the 90s. The T-62s that remained operational were all stationed far away from the occupied Golan Heights and were mostly operated by reserve units.

A small scale upgrade program did see a few T-62s enhanced by the addition of a wind sensor. As the amount of upgraded tanks was so low, they likely featured as protypes for a possible future upgrade program which never saw light. At least one of these tanks was captured by rebels during the Syrian Civil War. The tank, which can be seen below, is decorated by two texts that read بشار - Bashar and منحبك يا بشار - We love you Bashar.





The Syrian Civil War marked the third combat debut of the T-62 in Syrian service. Most remain operated by the Syrian Arab Army, with some tanks permanently detached to the National Defence Force (NDF) and Suqur al-Sahara (Desert Falcons). A part of the T-62 fleet remains stored as a strategic reserve. This means the Syrian government can still call upon a few hundred tanks to replace combat losses, a comfortable thought for the Syrian Arab Army as the tank fleet continues to shrink.

A couple of T-62s saw heavy use at Tabqa where they covered the runway for long enough to allow the remaining operational aircraft and helicopters to depart the airbase. Other T-62s are involved in Suqur al-Sahara's offensives in the desert, although it's unknown if these tanks have come under the command of Suqur al-Sahara or if they remain under Syrian Arab Army control.

A small number of T-62s have received local armour additions, these upgrades usually depend on how much effort has been put into it by the operators and vary from everything from the example seen below to simple sandbags. While such provisional adaptations might have some use against your standard RPG round, it is unlikely that they will aid the T-62 in withstanding the highly volatile anti-tank climate of the Syrian battlefield.

As the war keeps eroding Syria's fleet of steel beasts and operational numbers continue to dwindle, the T-62 is likely to play an ever larger role in its most challenging conflict yet.

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Deir ez-Zor is perhaps Syria's most underreported city; while originally largely under Free Syrian Army control after the start of the civil war, the city was taken over by the Islamic State in early July, which subsequently faced a little-reported Republican Guard offensive aimed at encircling the city. In early December, the Islamic State made a push in the direction of Deir ez-Zor's airbase, a vital lifeline to the city.

Deir ez-Zor is perhaps best known for its oilfields, and previously much of the fighting around the city involved fighting for control over these strategically important objectives. As the oilfields used to provide much of the fuel for the Syrian Arab Army, the Republican Guard, the National Defence Force and Suqur al-Sahara (Desert Falcons), their takeover about a year ago was a serious blow to all forces loyal to Assad and endangered the fuel supply badly needed to mount new offensives. While Russian contractors belonging to the Slavonic Corpswere intially sent to protect these oilfields, they did not even manage to reach Deir ez-Zor.

The dwindling fuel supplies already forced the widespread introduction of tank trailers, as there simply isn't enough fuel for the tanks to drive to their deployment zone by themself. A situation that isn't going to improve unless the oilfields around Deir ez-Zor are recaptured.

A number of reasons explain why there's still a large Syrian military presence in Deir ez-Zor. Firstly, Deir ez-Zor was reinforced by elements of the Republican Guard's 104th Brigade led by Brigadier General Issam Zahreddine in early 2014. Secondly, the airbase is still in government hands; it has proven vital to quickly resupply the city and fighter-bombers stationed there also provide much of the air support to forces in and around the city. Thirdly, the Damascus - Palmyra - Deir ez-Zor highway remains under government control. This highway is used to ferry reinforcements and supplies to the city. Lastly, the high ground around the city remains in the hands of the Syrian Arab Army (SAA). The SAA positioned numerous howitzers, field guns and multiple rocket launchers (MRLs) here, which can fire at any target within the city and also cover the approaches to the airbase.


The Republican Guard's 104th Brigade was intially rushed to Aleppo to launch a new series of offensives in the hope of regaining some of the lost ground in and around Aleppo, but saw itself transferred to Deir ez-Zor in early 2014 to reinforce the remainder of the Syrian Arab Army garrison. It is unknown if the entire 104th or only a part of it was transferred to Deir ez-Zor. As the amount of Republican Guard fighters in Deir ez-Zor remains low, the latter seems more likely. The contingent currently deployed in Deir ez-Zor is led by Issam Zahreddine, a Druze and undoubtedly the most popular general found within Syria. The reason for his popularity is that he personally leads his soldiers into battle, can always be found on the frontline and shares the same priviliges as his soldiers, even if that means sitting in a BMP-1 driving towards the frontline.

The 104th is sometimes classified as the 104th Airborne Brigade of the Republican Guard, and while a few soldiers in the brigade were indeed trained as what one would call paratroopers, and others were learned how to deploy from low-flying helicopters, the 104th is believed to have been "airborne" only in name, displaying the characteristics of a mechanised brigade instead. The fact that Syrian military doctrine does not envisage airborne operations supports this theory.

Nonetheless, the contingent deployed to Deir ez-Zor only managed to acquire a limited amount of older T-72 Urals, T-72M1s, BMP-1s and some ZSU-23s from other units. A couple of Falaq-2 launchers are also operated. The 104th using T-72s in Deir ez-Zor marked the first deployment of this type in the city, as the 137th Mechanized Brigade had only been operating T-55s.

During the initial operations in Damascus, the 104th operated several TURMS-T equipped T-72s (Syria's most modern tanks) but all appear to have been transferred to another unit within the Republican Guard. While the brigade thus lacks large amounts of modern tanks, it did receive a sizeable batch of Sayyad-2 anti-materiel sniper rifles and AK-74Ms, Syria's most modern assault rifle.




Unsurprisingly, the 104th Brigade contingent boosts a significant amount of Druze fighters. Issam Zahreddine's bodyguard unit is also believed to consist mainly of Druzes. The need for bodyguards is a direct result of his popularity in Syria and more importantly, the $200,000 bountyon Zahreddine's head.



The 104th came to Deir ez-Zor with two important tasks: Securing the airbase by pushing back the fighters of the Islamic State and encircling them within the city centre so a new offensive on the oilfields could be initiated. The first goal was accomplished quite quickly after the 104th arrived. After Tabqa fell, Issam Zahreddine remarked: ''Deir ez-Zor airbase is not Tabqa airbase. We will bury IS here.''

Ground forces already operating in Deir ez-Zor were limited to 137th Mechanized Brigade, which already lost most of its fighting power and tanks during two years of heavy fighting, yet remained in control of parts of the city and the strategic hills. Along with NDF troops, made up of civilians, reservists and a few regular soldiers they were already busy with defending the remaining parts of the city and airbase, and did not have the power to launch an offensive themselves.

The 104th contingent deployed to Deir ez-Zor was also quite small, and was forced to carefully balance its troops in order to be able to fend off any assauls on its flanks during its own offensives. So while much of the 104th was mostly on the offensive, a part was distributed along the city permiter to reinforce the SAA and NDF soldiers already present here. The battles fought within the city centre were extremely fierce. Local offensives usually saw both sides fighting for housing blocks, during which neither sides could really advance. The Islamic State also made extensive use of tunnels, some of which were ultimatelydestroyed. The SAA and NDF could count on artillery support from the nearby hills, which subsequently destroyed most of the city and due to the close proximity of both sides, did also occasionally result in SAA casualties.^[1] Footage of the fighting inside Deir ez-Zor can be seen here.





The underreported offensive was aimed at cutting off the city centre from Islamic State-held territory at the opposite side of the river. The 104th was split into two, with both parts attacking from a different direction.







As seen in the map, one part attacked from Al Filat while the other part crossed the river to Saqr (Saqer) Island. Contrary to the fighting in the city, the battle for Saqr Island was fought between thick layers of trees, bushes and crops. Footage from the Battle of Saqr Island in chronological order can be seen here and here.

During his operations, Issam Zahreddine used tactics the SAA and NDF could only dream off, especially in the early stages of the Syrian Civil War. T-72s moving up while followed by infantry and covered by other T-72s and ZSU-23s, the infantry clears the housing, again supported by T-72s and ZSU-23s and the process is repeated again and again. This in sharp contrast to the use of tanks in the early days of the Civil War, when they were used as battering rams charging through cities, often falling prey to RPG fire. One of the T-72M1s deployed to Deir ez-Zor can be seen below. The flag seen on the right belongs to the Druze community.

The ultimate goal of the Al Filat - Saqr Island offensive was to encircle the fighters of the Islamic State within Deir ez-Zor itself, after which the 104th could be used in a new offensive to regain the lost oilfields scattered around Deir ez-Zor. The fighting for the city would be left to the Syrian Arab Army, the National Defence Force and a new militia called the National Security.^[2] Trained at the base of the 137th Mechanized Brigade, it would have consisted of people not yet fighting with the Syrian Arab Army or National Defence Force.

The downside of this offensive for the SAA, NDF and 104th was that it exposed the weak flanks even more. As the forces were already stretched thin here, it was just a matter of time before the Islamic State would attempt to benefit from this situation.

Although some suggest the push on the airbase is a direct result of the stalemate in Kobanî, which brought the need for another victory, this can be quickly dismissed as Kweres airbase would be better suited for a quick victory. Kweres, formerly the main training base of the Syrian Arab Air Force (SyAAF), has been under siege since December 2012 and is now nothing more than a runway littered with plane wrecks and troops only capable of defending the base.











Deir ez-Zor's airbase is home to the SyAAF's 8th Squadronoperating the MiG-21. Around a dozen decommissioned MiG-21s can be seen on satellite imagery, suggesting 8th Squadron received more MiG-21s from other Squadrons within Syria to stay operational. 8th Squadron also suffered several losses because of ATGM teams around the airbase, which destroyed at least two MiG-21s within their hardened aircraft shelters (HAS). This forced the SyAAF to hide most its planes behind raised sand covers.





Deir ez-Zor also sees regular deployments of Mi-8/17s, Mi-25s and even MiG-23BNs. Furthermore, the 104th can call upon the SyAAF's 819thSquadron, flying recently upgraded Su-24M2s, for precision attacks.^[3][4] These aircraft have been frequently spotted over Deir ez-Zor.

Deir ez-Zor used to house four 2K12 SAM sites for the protection of the airbase and city. While one of these was destroyed by the Free Syrian Army while retreating to regime-held territory and another inactive site was overrun by the Islamic State (one of the inoperational captured launcher units can be seen below), two still remain under regime control. Of these two, only one remains partially operational.



The Damascus - Palmyra - Deir ez-Zor highway, which was used by the 104th to reach Deir ez-Zor, also remains under government control and has proven to be of vital importance as it is the city's second lifeline. Convoys still use this road to resupply the SAA, NDF and 104th as a cheaper alternative to the SyAAF's airbridge constructed by An-26s and Il-76s.

Holding on to this road, the strategic airbase and surrounding hills is of great importance for the SAA, NDF and 104th in and around Deir ez-Zor. Previously gained ground might have to be abandoned to free up forces for the defence of Deir ez-Zor's airbase. The SAA, NDF and 104th's ability to call in air support and artillery due to their control of the high ground might be just enough to ensure their presence in Deir ez-Zor is there to stay.

But as the magnitude of the Islamic State's offensive remains unknown, it is as of yet impossible to judge if they've embarked on a large scale offensive aimed at finishing the regime's presence in Deir ez-Zour once and for all, or if they're simply probing the defences of the SAA, NDF and 104th around the airbase, hoping to gain a direct line of sight of the runway via the neigbourhoods of Jaffra and Al-Mari’iyya, making it impossible for the SyAAF to take off. It is also possible the assault is a diversion for a future offensive aimed at retaking some of the ground it lost in the recent months, thus preventing possible encirclement.

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Israeli airstrikes on targets in Syria remain shrouded in secrecy, and are often subject to speculation about what has been hit this time. For instance, the recent raids on Syrian territory, during which just one Popeye air-to-surface missile was intercepted by a Syrian Pantsir-S1 SAM system, saw depots near Damascus being hit by Israeli jets, although the content of these is unknown. The actual locations and targets reported to have been hit do often not correspond with the truth. This post will try to make clear why Israel is bombing Syria and why it is getting away with it.

Syria has direct access to the Mediterranean Sea and is a neighbouring country of Israel and Lebanon, and thus very attractive to any country wanting to enjoy both political and military influence in this region. One of these countries is, to no one's surprise, Iran.

Iran's involvement in financing and arming Hamas and Hizbullah is substantial, and often greatly underestimated. For example, the military wing of Hamas (the Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades) frequently receives Iranian-made weaponry or weaponry acquired by Iran. These shipments usually include various sorts of lighter weaponry that is generally more suitable for Gaza's urban environment. It was also supposed to acquire C-704 anti-ship missiles, which were confiscated by the Israeli Navy onboard the freighter Victoria, and Syrian made 302mm Khaibar-1 'M-302' rockets, which were also intercepted by the Israeli Navy near Sudan's Red Sea coast. Members of Iran's Revolutionary Guards present in Sudan take care of the weapon shipments as they travel from Sudan to Gaza via Egypt. Sudan functions as a middle man here, as they allow the shipments to arrive and agree to see them transported over Sudan's soil. A number of past Israeli raids on such convoys and storage depots inside Sudan thus comes as no surprise.

Back to Syria,which employs a similar method. Iran also functions as the supplier or financial backer of the weaponry here, with Syria being both the "middle man" and the party who receives the weaponry. Syria transfers a part of the received weaponry to Hizbullah or keeps it in storage sites within its borders awaiting a future potential conflict with Israel, after which it also gets transferred to Hizbullah.

The reason why a part of the weaponry is held back has to do with the inability to safely store and defend larger weapons systems in Lebanon. Buildings containing such weaponry can only be defended by an integrated network of surface-to-air missile systems (SAMs), something which Hizbullah lacks. Syria on the other hand had one of the most dense air-defence networks in the Middle East before the start of the Civil War. While Syria's SAM network has never managed to shoot down any of the Israeli aircraft striking locations in Syria, it does prove more of a deterrence than having no SAMs to defend your weapons systems at all.

Syria's most modern SAM units, some of which strategically positioned around such storage sites, all remain active. Most of these systems were ordered and received in the past couple of years. Should the SAM network have been completed, these storage sites would have been defended by S-300PMU-2s, Buk-M2s, Pechora-2Ms and Pantsir-S1s. It is unknown if Iran provided funding to allow Syria to buy so much high-grade equipment from Russia, but it at least seems likely.

The first time the Syrian method of smuggling armament was put to test was in 2006. Yet Syria's role in this war went further than just supplying some of the weaponry to Hizbullah; it also actively participated in firing rockets at Israel and might even be responsible for the attack on the INS Hanit, an Israeli Sa'ar 5 class corvette.

The most famous documented usage of Syrian weaponry by Hizbullah was the use of 9M133 Kornet ATGMs to destroy at least five Merkava tanks during the 2006 war. 9M133 missile containers captured by the IDF revealed the true origin of the shipment:Syria.



Direct involvement of Syria in the 2006 conflict came through the use of 302mm Khaibar-1 multiple rocket launchers (MRLs), an indigenous product of Syria. These MRLs, operating from within Lebanon, were responsible for much of the damage done on Israel's infrastructure. While it was initially thought these launchers were only provided by Syria to Hizbullah, all the Khaibar-1s were actually operated by Syria's 158th Missile Regiment in close cooperation with Hizbullah. At least one Khaibar-1 was destroyed by the Israeli Air Force.



Syrian-produced 220mm MRLs also saw use in Lebanon, where they were used by Hizbullah. Most of the launch platforms used for the 220mm and 302mm Khaibar-1 rockets are based on brightly coloured civilian trucks, which can be quickly reconfigured to a more civilian look shortly after launch.

The usage of such trucks is perfect for Hizbullah, as they're very mobile and its deadly weaponry is easy to hide. For example, this Falaq-2 used by Syrian troops in the Syrian Civil War was reconfigured to resemble a civilian truck within minutes after launching its rocket.


The relative ease of driving these trucks around in Lebanon is what caused another major incident: The assault on the INS Hanit by a C-802 (or the Iranian-produced copy by the name of Noor) anti-ship missile fired by Hizbullah, likely aided by members of the Revolutionary Guards. In order to fire a C-802, you need a launch platform, which is either a ship, a plane or a truck. The first two possibilities can be eliminated immediately as Hizbullah doesn't operate any fighter jets or missile boats. This leaves a truck-based launcher as the only remaining option.

Syria is known to have acquired a truck-based C-802 coastal defence system, which was shown in a live firing exercise by the Syrian Navy in 2012. This raises the question if Syria might have been involved in the assault on the C-802 at the INS Hanit.

While Syria was already in the possession of a C-802 based launcher, Hizbullah was not yet familiar with such a system, and would have had trouble storing it within Lebanon. Much more likely is that it was actually Syria who transported one of its C-802 launch platforms (as seen with the 220mm and 302mm rockets) to Lebanon disguised as a civilian truck, and subsequently used it to strike the INS Hanit in cooperation with Hizbullah and the Revolutionary Guards, after which the launch platform safely returned to Syria.


To ease the flow of such sophisticated weaponry, Iran established a production line for Zelzal-2 artillery rockets and Fateh 110 ballistic missiles inside Syria. These production lines are likely based in the undergound facilities of the Al Safir and Hama missile facility sites. In Syria, the Zelzal-2 is known as the 'Maysalun', referring to the Battle of Maysalun which was won by the French. The Fateh 110 is known as the 'Tishreen', which in turn refers to the October War. Syrian artillery rockets and missiles are seen as weapons of revenge and thus always purposely named after military defeats. The Maysalun and the Tishreen can be seen in the images below.


Iran even went as far as to claim that Hizbullah already received weapons with ''pinpoint accuracy", which would make the next war "much tougher for the Israelis".^[1] As the Zelzal-2 is an artillery rocket, a type which is not known for its pinpoint accuracy, such a statement could only point at the Fateh 110. Israel was already known to have bombed a shipment of ''game-changing weaponry'' which was being supplied to Hizbullah, also likely to be Fateh 110s.^[2]

As weapons such as the Zelzal-2, Fateh 110 and C-802 would require a whole new Israeli strategy to cope with such threats, taking out some of the advanced weaponry destined for use with or alongside Hizbullah seems exactly what Israel is doing. By taking out advanced equipment before it even reaches its destination, Hizbullah is derived of offensive capabilities that could otherwise inflict serious damage on the Israeli military, yet while running a low risk of actually provoking a war or suffering losses itself.

If Syria would retaliate by firing ballistic missiles on Israel, it would undoubtedly result in a direct war, which the already battered Syrian military simply isn't capable of waging at this point. Such a war would see the whole Syrian Arab Air Force (SyAAF) destroyed by Israel, leaving a gap easily exploited by groups such as the Free Syrian Army and the Islamic State. This imbalance in military capabilities essentially means has Israel can roam free through Syrian airspace without having to fear serious retaliations.

Syria's inability to protect these shipments against Israeli attacks is the only hitch in the method of covertly providing arms to Hizbullah. As the Israeli Air Force makes heavy use of electronic countermeasures and deploys weapon systems outside the range of Syrian SAM systems, Israel can freely continue to roam over the Syrian skies, at least until Syria receives its first S-300PMU-2.

Buk-M2 SAM systems and Bastion-P coastal defence systems were reported to have been struck out of fear of these weapons falling in the hands of Hizbullah. This has much to do with Israel's fear of a repetition of the INS Hanit scenario.Yet it remains unlikely Syria would use its most advanced Russian SAM systems and coastal defence systems in Lebanon in the foreseeable future. In turn, transferring such large weapon systems to Hizbullah would likely meet fierce resistance from Russia, and thus seems unlikely.

In case of a future war with Israel, we might see an increasing amount of Iranian and Syrian weaponry being used by Hizbullah and by Syria itself within Lebanon. Advanced weaponry such as the Igla-S and Fateh 110 missiles will surely change the way any future war in the region will be fought. 

Essentially, both parties are waging a covert war spanning a large period of time. Syria (as well as Iran for that matter) use Hizbullah and other anti-Israel groups in the Middle East as a proxy to fight the war on their own terms, whereas Israel manages to strike at its enemies without any retaliation.

The T-72, after the T-55 the most prolific tank series of the post-World War II era with an estimated production run of up to 30.000 vehicles. In Syria, the tank largely owes its fame due the participation in the Battle of Darayya, which was extensively covered on camera, and the large amount of videosshowing the turret fly off due to an internal explosion after getting hit by a RPG. As a result, both the highest flying T-72 turret and the most destroyed T-72 were recorded inside Syria.

Nonetheless, it remains at the forefront in the Syrian Civil War and undoubtedly is Syria's most popular tank, so much even that a captured T-72 is considered as a sort of treasure by the rebels. Around 300 are still believed to be operated by mainly the Republican Guard and the Syrian Arab Army's elite 4th armoured division.

Although it's commonly believed Syria operated around 1500 T-72s, Syria actually acquired just over 700 T-72s in three (or technically four) batches. The first batch consisted of around 150 T-72 'Urals' ordered from the Soviet Union and delivered in the late seventies, a total of 300 T-72As delivered in 1982 make up the second batch and an order for 252 T-72M1s placed in Czechoslovakia was only partially completed when the country was separated into two. While 194 examples were already delivered by Czechoslovakia in 1992, the order was continued by Slovakia and the remaining 58 T-72M1s were delivered in 1993.^[1]


The T-72 'Ural', seen in the image below, was released for export in the late seventies, and apart from Syria, nations like Algeria, Iraq and Libya also received the type. Especially Syria was keen to field the T-72 after the poor performance of the T-62 during the 1967 and 1973 war. The combat history of the T-72 in the 1982 Lebanon war remains subject to debate, with sources claiming everything from the T-72s destroying M60s to Merkavas and yes, even the U.S. M1 Abrams.^[2]

The most widely accepted theory involves the majority of the T-72s being held back in Syria as a strategic reserve, and that only a few T-72s did clash with M60s and Israeli Magach derivatives near Rashaya. Most sources agree the T-72s performed well, and one officer was subsequently decorated for his achievements with the type.^[3]

Hafez al-Assad is even said to have made the famous quote of calling the T-72 'Ural'''the best tank in the world''. As a token of appreciation, Hafez donated (or more conviently traded) a captured Magach-5 to the Soviet Union, which was extensively tested here. Especially the Blazer explosive reactive armour (ERA) found on the Magach-5 was of great interest to the Soviet Union.



Syria greatly benefitted from this arrangement, as it subsequently received the first of a total of 300 much improved T-72As in 1982. What makes Syria receiving this tank so special is that the T-72A was never cleared for export by the Soviet Union, with even the most trusted Warsaw Pact countries receiving the downgraded T-72M1 instead. The first country outside the former Soviet Union to receive T-72As was Hungary in 1996, which acquired them from Belarus fourteen years after Syria received theirs!

Syria's T-72As, produced only one year before they were delivered, came directly from Soviet Army stocks. In Syria, these tanks became known as T-82s, with 82 referring to the year of delivery. The use of this designation continues even today, and neither T-72A or T-72AV was ever used to refer to this tank in Syria. To avoid confusion, only the foreign designations are used in this article.

The T-72A can be discerned from the T-72M1 by the presence of anti-radiation lining over its turret, as witnessed by the T-72AV without ERA seen below.



The 300 T-72As were split between the Republican Guard and the 4th armoured division. The T-72s operated by the Republican Guard were always seen in a desert livery, while the T-72s of the 4th armoured division were usually plain green, which operated alongside a limited amount of 'desert' T-72s.

Numerous BREM-1 armoured recovery vehicles were also acquired mainly for the Republican Guard, and all remain in widespread use today. In fact, the BREM-1s is the only type of ARV that is actually used as an ARV in Syria, with other ARVs either stored or used as gun-platforms.



Apart from acquiring T-72As, Syria also received the more modern 3BM-44 anti-tank round for the T-72's 125mm cannon. Believed to have never been exported to any other country under Soviet influence, it remains in use alongside the older 3BM-23 anti-tank round. The complete ammunition loadout of a standard Syrian T-72 in Syrian service can be seen below.




All of Syria's T-72As were later upgraded to AV standard, aimed at increasing the T-72A's protection against RPGs by the installment of Kontakt-1 explosive reactive armour blocks (ERA). Opposed to the T-55MV upgrade, which happened in the Ukraine, the upgrading of the T-72As took place in Syria. The Kontakt-1 ERA was bought from one of the former Soviet Republics (believed to have been Ukraine) and was supposedly installed by Armenian contractors. The upgrade to AV standard didn't change anything to the designation of the T-82 however.





Although almost all of the tanks got their Kontakt-1 ERA installed the way it was intended, at least some of the 'T-72AVs' can be seen with a different installment of the ERA blocks on the turret, a contraption likely originating from one of the Armenian contractors responsible for installing the ERA.





The 252 T-72M1s were the latest additon to the Syrian tank fleet, and although inferior to the T-72AVs, they are Syria's most newest tanks, having rolled out of the factory over ten years later than Syria's T-72AVs. As most were delivered in 1992, they are sometimes referred to as T-92s by Syrians.Yet the original designation of T-72M1 also remains in use in Syria, resulting in some confusion around the Syrian designation system. To add to all the confusion, the T-72 'Ural' is also believed to have acquired an indigenous name, which would likely be T-79.

Although all were believed to have been distributed to units within the Syrian Arab Army, most can now be found under the command of the Republican Guard in an effort to replace the battered T-72AVs it lost over the recent years.

A large part of the T-72M1 fleet was originally slated to be upgraded to what was believed to be T-72M1M standard by Russia at the start at this decade. However, this plan was abandoned after the start of the Civil War alongside several other ambitious modernisation programmes for the Syrian military.

The T-72M1's hull seen below provides a good comparison between the different roadwheels of the T-72M1 and T-72 'Ural'. The green camouflaged roadwheel was taken from a T-72 'Ural' after this particular T-72M1 got damaged in battle. This T-72M1 also features improvised armour additions.



In agreement with Galileo Avionica of Italy, 122 T-72s were upgraded with the TURMS-T (Tank Universal Reconfiguration Modular System T-series) fire-control system (FCS) between 2003 and 2006.^[4]

Strangely enough, instead of upgrading 122 of its most modern tanks, the T-72AV and T-72M1, Syria opted for dividing the TURMS-T systems between its T-72 'Urals', T-72M1s and T-72AVs instead. The exact reason for this remains unclear even today. It might have something to do with the units that were slated to be equipped with T-72 TURMS-Ts, that could haveaccidentally brought their T-72 'Urals' forward to be upgraded instead of their more modern incarnations.The quality of the TURMS-T installment varies on every tank, but seems to be of lesser quality on the T-72 'Urals'.








The TPD-2-49 optical rangefinder found on the T-72 'Ural' was closed up as opposed to removing it altogether, which would have left a hard to fill gap in the armour, not to mention the amount of needless work it would have cost.










Surprisingly, T-72 'Urals'and T-72M1s were also the only ones sighted with the panoramic sight also belonging to the TURMS-T system. As upgrading all of its 122 T-72s with the panoramic sight was deemed too expensive, only a limited amount of T-72s received the system. A special mount ensured the T-72s remained capable of carrying the 12.7mm NSV. The gunner's sight originally used on these tanks was removed as it became redundant and was now blocking the TURMS-T system.




Interestingly, all the TURMS-T equipped tanks in Syria got the 'S' added to their designation, resulting in T-79S/T-72S, T-82S/T-72AVS and T-92S/T-72M1S. While this may seem confusing at first hand, the 'S' stands for Saroukh (صاروخ) meaning missile, indicating all are capable of launching the 9M119(M) guided anti-tank missile through their barrel. 1500 of such missiles were believed to have been acquired in 2005. None have been seen in captured T-72 TURMS-Ts however, likely because the need for 9M119(M)s in the Syrian Civil War is minimal and all remain stored in depots.^[5]


Of the once 122 strong TURMS-T fleet, some one hundred still remain in service. As these tanks are by far the most modern examples found in Syria, most are held back on Mount Qasioun near Damascus, the Republican Guard's base. Some of the T-72M1s equipped with the panoramic sight were tasked to monitor rebel activity in the villages around Mount Qasioun, as seen with the T-72 here, facing the village of Moadamiya.

Some TURMS-T equipped T-72s also saw heavy action in and around Damascus in the early days of the Syrian Civil War, during which a number were lost. Some were still seen in and around Damascus in 2013, but their usage in Damascus appears to be minimal. A few TURMS-T equipped T-72s belonging to the 4th armoured division were deployed to checkpoints throughout the country, and at least two were destroyed at the Jassim National Hospital near Nawa.
















Out of around 700 acquired T-72s, some 300 are still believed to be operational. Rumours of more T-72 deliveries in the past years continue until this day, and although larger numbers of green camouflaged T-72AVs continue to appear, this can't be verified. With sufficient numbers of T-55 and T-62s at hand, and tanks being superseded by truck based anti-aircraft guns used for fire-support, there's no real need to acquire new batches of T-72s for use in the war yet. With Syria's limited budget for the acquisition of new weaponry, UR-77s and BM-30s have absolute priority.

Lots of T-72s were destroyed while used as battering rams charging through cities in the early days of the war. The usage of advanced RPGs such as the RPG-29 and M79 Osa by opposing forces didn't work to the T-72's advantage either. Subsequently, the T-72 fleet suffered the largest relative losses compared to the T-55 and T-62 fleet.

While the use in Darayya looked great on camera, it resulted in unnecessary losses with questionable results. The insurgency here was only suppressed after infantry was deployed into the now destroyed neighbourhood.

The tank was also used in situations where a simple T-55 or T-62 would also have sufficed, again leading to unnecessary losses. The sighting of T-72 'Urals' is now especially getting rare. The T-72M1 is now the most numerous T-72 in Syrian service, followed by the T-72AV.

Nonetheless, new personnel is still training on the T-72s. The high attrition of tank crews and the need for skilled mechanics to quickly repair battle-damaged T-72s is now higher than ever.



The T-72 has meanwhile seen use on every front. Deir ez-Zor, previously only home to T-55s, saw numerous T-72s operating here because of the arrival of the Republican Guard's 104th brigade. Some TURMS-T equipped T-72AVs are now also attached to Suqur al-Sahara (Desert Falcons), and saw use against the Islamic State near the Shaer gas field.

A limited number of T-72s also operate around Aleppo. All of these belong to the 4th armoured division and operate alongside BREM-1 ARVs. They mainly operated around the neigbourhood of Al-Layramoun in late 2013.

Due to their heavy usage, many T-72AVs were soon left without their Kontakt-1 covered side skirts. Indeed, this was one of the complaints of tankers of the Republican Guard. An interview with one of them can be seen here. One hit by an RPG often results in the whole side skirt falling off, leaving the tank with almost no protection on this side. Some T-72AVs were subsequently used as a source for Kontakt-1 blocks, but Syria might still receive limited quantities of such blocks from one of the former Soviet Republics even today.





Various other groups also continue to operate the T-72, of which the Islamic State is by far the largest operator with thirteen T-72 'Urals' and six T-72AVs in operation. Six T-72 Urals and three T-72AVs joined the ranks of the Islamic State after Liwa Dawood, the largest operator of tanks of all the rebels at the time, defected to the Islamic State.

At least one T-72 was later modernized by the addition of new mud guards, side skirts and different ERA layout, allowing for a wider coverage on the tank's side skirts. This particular T-72 participated in the assault on Brigade 93, in Northern Syria.



Another notable operator is Jaish al-Islam, which bought two T-72s from a corrupt officer within the Army's elite 4th Armoured Division and captured at least another six, of which one T-72M1 TURMS-T. Jaish al-Islam's usage of its T-72s can be seen as quite revolutionary compared to other rebel groups in the Syrian Civil War, being the only group in Syria which operates various types of armour and infantry in a mechanized force, fully exploiting their potential. At least one 'T-72AV' was upgraded with additional armour on its glacis plate and rear by Jaish al-Islam.



Liwa Dawood, which later defected to the Islamic State, is claimed to have the dubious honour of participating in Syria's second tank duel, footage of which can be seen here. The duel resulted in the complete destruction of a T-72AV (the remains of which can be seen below) by a T-72 'Ural' from Liwa Dawood. Although the presence of numerous ATGMs in the area could soften the tank duel claim, the T-72AV seems in a great hurry to leave the area, possibly because it became aware of the T-72 Ural.

The poor protection of the ammunition almost always results in a fire and explosion inside the turret followed by the turret being detached from the hull. As the crew is sitting right on top of the 125mm shells, it almost always results in their death.



Most Syrian T-72s lost their 12.7mm NSV heavy machine gun in the course of the Civil War. As these guns require the commander to leave the safety of the turret, thus leaving him greatly exposed to gunfire, they rarely saw use and were often dismounted to be mounted on pickup trucks instead.S ome of the NSVs were subsequently used to cover T-72s from RPG teams after being handed over to soldiers operating in the same theatre as the T-72s. This tactic is mostly seen in Jobar.






A limited amount of T-72s were also upgraded by a protective shield for the commander to aid when operating the NSV heavy machine gun. These shields likely came with the Kontakt-1 ERA blocks also purchased. One of such shields can be seen below.




To address some of the armour weaknesses, several programs have been initiated to improve the T-72's protection against RPGs and ATGMs. These programs were first witnessed on the Republican Guard's T-72AVs, most of which received slat armour filled with bricks. Simple bricks were sometimes also used to replace lost Kontakt-1 blocks, the actual combat value of which is highly questionable.






While these early upgrades were very rudimentary and varied between each tank, Syria has now implemented a nation-wide upgrade program for its precious T-72s. At least three major variants are known, which can be further divided into numerous subvariants.

The first upgrade consists of several pieces of metal alligned around the turret and one large plate of metal on each side of the tank strenthened by shell casings from the T-72's 125mm gun. In some cases, sandbags are also seen around the turret.














The second upgrade includes the installment of slat armour on the glacis plate, turret, hull and the back, providing a 360 degree coverage. This type of armour is only seen on TURMS-T equipped T-72 'Urals' operating in and near Aleppo.


The third upgrade, by far the most rigorous and effective, was first seen in late August, 2014. The consisted of the installment of additional armour on the T-72M1's side skirts, glacis plate and around the turret, further reinforced by slat armour and metal chaines, also providing a 360 degree coverage.

Some examples were immediately rushed into combat in Jobar, where at least two were destroyed.^[6][7] Other examples see service in Aleppo. However, the actual combat performance of the armour package remain unknown. It is expected more T-72s will receive this armour package.









At least one TURMS-T equipped T-72M1 also received such armour additions, albeit in a slightly different configuration than seen otherwise.

The T-72: Its combat successes are open to debate, its legacy is indisputable. It remains both loved and feared by friend and foe alike. Whatever the outcome of the Civil War, this tank has left its imprints on both the Syrian battlefield and battlefields across the world, and will continue to do so long after it has ended.

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With the fighting in Deir ez-Zor raging on, it seems the SyAAF's L-39s are now finally back after a long absence. A video from Al Mayadeen, on a visit to Deir ez-Zor, shows some of the aircraft currently deployed at Deir ez-Zor's airbase.

Apart from the obvious MiG-17 gate guard, a Mi-8, an inoperational MiG-21UM and one of the remaining MiG-21UMs at Deir ez-Zor, it also gives us a glimpse at a L-39.

While the L-39 fleet was the most active in the early stages of the Syrian Civil War, one of its main bases was overrun by Jaish al-Islam, which later attempted to get at least two aircraft operational. The other base operating L-39s, Kweres, has been under siege since December 2012. However, a quick relief of the siege allowed the main training base of the SyAAF to evacuate some of its aircraft, and together with other surviving L-39s, these subsequently underwent overhaul at 'The Factory', the SyAAF's repair and maintenance center at Nayrab/Aleppo International Airport.







At least five L-39s were spotted here at any given time in late 2013, awaiting their overhaul.

A subsequent series of TOW strikes, which also destroyed an inoperational MiG-23MLD, destroyed one or possibly two L-39s. A huge slap in the face for the SyAAF, as these two precious airframes were just freshly overhauled by 'The Factory'.

The remaining examples were subsequently distributed between Syria's airbases. As the L-39s are easy to operate and maintain, they can be easily deployed throughout Syria. The deployment of L-39s to Deir ez-Zor is a perfect example of this tactic.

The remaining MiG-21s at Deir ez-Zor's airbase, strengthened by the deployment of the SyAAF's 819thSquadron flying the recently upgraded Su-24M2s already have their hands full stopping the Islamic State's attempts to capture the airbase and eliminate the Syrian Arab Army and Republican Guard in and around Deir ez-Zor. Therefore, L-39s are a welcome sight for the garrisons deployed here and show that Deir ez-Zor hasn't been abandoned just yet.

Interestingly, the overhaul also expanded the capabilities of the L-39s by adding the cability to carry 80mm B-8 rocket pods. These B-8s were believed to have been received from Russia last year. The L-39 was previously unknown to be capable of using the B-8, carrying the 57mm UB-16 rocket pod instead. The B-8 equipped L-39 seen below is currently deployed at Hama airbase.

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Apart from the well known T-series tanks and BMP infantry fighting vehicles, Syria also operates various lesser-known vehicles for use in conflicts home and abroad, one of which is the SPR-1 mobile jammer.

The SPR-1's appearance in the world today is so rare that not much is known on this elusive vehicle. Only Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary and Russia were known to have operated the SPR-1 in limited numbers, with East Germany only acquiring two!

Based on the chassis of the GT-MU multipurpose armoured vehicle, the SPR-1 is tasked with disabling mortar grenades and artillery shells through jamming their proximity fuses. The jamming is performed by two powerful antennas,which sends targeted pulses generating interference with the proximity fuses of the mortar grenades and artillery shells, leading to their explosion in mid-air before hitting their intended target.




As both vehicles can be seen in typical Syrian camouflage, and Syria always had a special relationship with the Soviet Union and Russia concerning electronic warfare and jamming systems, it is most likely these vehicles were received in the late 80s or early 90s, albeit in very limited numbers.

The two SPR-1s, one with its antennes deployed, likely make up a large part of the SPR-1 fleet inside Syria. It is possible some saw action near the Presidential Palace on Mount Qasioun near Damascus, due to the repeated targeting by mortars early in the Syrian Civil War. Their current theatre of deployment remains unknown however.

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Newly acquired images finally reveal the presence of the infamous BM-30 'Smerch' multiple rocket launcher (MRL) in Syria. While their 300mm 9M55K rockets were documented to have been used in Kfar Zita and al-Tah North of Hama, images of the launchers were yet to be seen. The reason for the long wait has to do with the ban on taking photographs of or near high-tech weaponry such as the Buk-M2, the Pantsir S-1 or the BM-30 to avoid revealing the locations of these systems.

Syria received several BM-30s in the midst the Syrian Civil War from either Belarus or more likely Russia, which delivered them in early 2014. Months later, the UR-77 'Meteorit' mine clearing vehicle appeared in Jobar, Damascus, once again emphasizing Russia's willingness to supply Assad with any kind of weaponry.

As seen on Syria's BM-27 Uragans, which were likely already in Syrian service before the start of the Civil War, the BM-30s also spot a green livery, making them ideally suited for the lush terrain seen in the Hama Governorate.












Although one would think deploying these BM-30s to Damascus would be logical, all were stationed near Hama in an effort to stop the rebel advance here. Hama is of strategic importance to Assad because of the city's strategic location, its airbase and the underground missile factories South of the city.

Damascus is also served by numerous BM-27 Uragans, IRAMs and because much of the fighting takes place at a short distance from Mount Qasioun, the Republican Guard's base, artillery also regularly comes into play, reducing the need for BM-30s.

As all the fighting in and around Hama is done by the Syrian Arab Army, National Defence Force (NDF) and several other militias, all of Syria's BM-30s fall under the command of the Syrian Arab Army, not the Republican Guard. The image below shows the remains of a 9M55K rocket fired by a BM-30, in al-Tah.

The 9M55K rocket is just one of the rockets that can be fired by the BM-30, but remains popular due to its deadly effect against infantry exposed in the open, each rocket carrying seventy-two 9N235 fragmentation submunitions.


As operations shift throughout Syria, these BM-30s will have no shortage on work in the foreseeable future, and might be deployed to other locations within Syria. The delivery of the BM-30s once again demonstrates Russia's support to the Assad regime, a relationship strengthening over time. BM-30s, UR-77s and several other weapon systems recently delivered to Syria might just be a sign of what is yet to come.

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