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The Oryx Handbook of Iranian Drones

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The goal of this list is to comprehensively catalogue Iran's past and current inventory of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and their armament. In an effort to streamline the list and avoid unnecessary confusion, this list only includes military drones associated with Iran's defence industry or military-grade UAVs with at least some chance of entering service.

Notes: 

- If several configurations of a drone with one designation are known, they are added as such. 

- The part within the apostrophes refers to other designations or an unofficial designation.

-  UAVs that did not enter service or have yet to enter service are located in the prototype category.

- When a type is dual-capable, it is added in both respective categories.

- Dubious claims are referred to as ''claimed to be capable''.

- The foreign service section of this handbook only includes UAVs confirmed to be in service with a state or non-state actor other than Iran, not those operated by Iranian personnel inside Syria or elsewhere.

Although a great deal of effort has been put into ensuring the accuracy of this list, any updates or corrections to this list are most welcome.

(Click on the equipment to get a picture of them in Iranian service)


Surveillance Unmanned Aerial Vehicles - Operational


Surveillance Unmanned Aerial Vehicles - Prototypes

 

Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicles - Operational

 

Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicles - Prototypes


Loitering Munitions

 

Target Drones


UAV Helicopters

 

Documented But Not Yet Seen UAVs

  • Iran Hazem-I ''Haazem-I'' (Documented by a few sources, not yet seen)
  • Iran Hazem-III ''Haazem-III'' (Documented by a few sources, not yet seen)
  • Iran Homa ''Homa B'' (Documented by a few sources, not yet seen)
  • Iran Hodhod-3 (Documented by a few sources, not yet seen)
  • Iran Nasr-1001 (Documented by a few sources, not yet seen)
  • Iran Orooj-4 (Documented by a few sources, not yet seen)
  • Iran Piroozi-8 (Documented by a few sources, not yet seen)
  • Iran Qaem (Documented by a few sources, not yet seen)
  • Iran Shahed-1 (Documented by a few sources, not yet seen)
  • Iran Siraf (Documented by a few sources, not yet seen)
  • Iran Sofreh Mahi (Documented by a few sources, not yet seen)
  • Iran Tizpar (Documented by a few sources, not yet seen)
  • Iran Zohal (Documented by a few sources, not yet seen)
  • Iran Roham VTOL (Documented by a few sources, not yet seen)
  • Iran Koker-1 VTOL (Documented by a few sources, not yet seen)

 

Iranian UAVs in Foreign Service

 

Captured UAVs


Special thanks to Adam Rawnsley.

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Back and Forth: How the Islamic State retook Tadmur

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The ancient city of Palmyra has become a symbol in the world's fight against the Islamic State. It represents one of the few places where every (non-IS) party agrees on the ultimate fate of the city and its archaeological ruins, this in sharp contrast to other cities and locations elsewhere in Syria and Iraq. Indeed, Palmyra holds a special place in the hearts of many, and preserving this symbol of civilisation is not only in the interest of Syrians, but for mankind in general. Despite its cultural significance, the ancient ruins are a mere collection of bricks in the face of civilian casualties during the course of the Civil War, which are thought to range in the hunderds of thousands. The regime's decision to prioritise the ruins of Palmyra (Tadmur) over strategic targets in March 2016 would ultimately result in failure, losing control over Tadmur for the second time on the 11th of December 2016.

The sudden fall of Tadmur came as a surprise to many following the Syrian Civil War, as there appeared to be no imminent threat to the city less than a week before its fall. Taking place less than nine months after the recapture of Tadmur by units of the Syrian Arab Army, Hizbullah, Shiite militias and the Russian Armed Forces, and one-and-a-half years after the Islamic State captured Tadmur for the first time, the speed and relative ease by which the Islamic State captured the town in less than three days must even have surprised the Islamic State itself, recapturing much of the ground it previously lost in May 2015. The large concentration of Islamic State fighters in and around Tadmur then threatened installations deeper into regime-held Syria, including T4 airbase. Despite this threat, it should be mentioned that Fortress T4 is among the best defended military installations in Syria, and the Islamic State indeed proved unable to overcome its strong defences once again.

The capture of Tadmur by the Islamic State came as the latest in a string of events swiftly unfolding throughout Syria at the end of 2016. In Aleppo, much of the rebel-held areas have been brought back under regime control, with the remaining rebel pocket crushed after vast artillery strikes just a day after the fall of Tadmur. Meanwhile, further North the Free Syrian Army backed by Turkey recently captured the Islamic State stronghold of al-Bab. While one could argue these events are directly related to the Islamic State's decision to attack now, rumours about the departure of much of the remaining contingent of defenders in the days before the capture might have played a more important role in the Islamic State's decision to act now. Having a clear view of the city from the mountainous area around Tadmur, it is at least possible that the Islamic State closely followed the situation inside the city before launching an offensive. Either way, many of the fighters involved were relocated from elsewhere in Islamic State held territory, suggesting the planning for the offensive had already been underway for quite some time.

The developments provided the Islamic State with the perfect opportunity to shift away attention from its recent setbacks in Mosul, where the Iraqi Army along with Shiite militias are engaged in a gruelling campaign aimed at taking back the largest city currently under Islamic State control. Being in control of Tadmur also gave the Islamic State another opportunity to prolong its control over parts of Syria, as larger cities such as Tadmur can be extremely time-consuming and costly to recapture once its fighters are dug in. In similar fashion, the Islamic State currently still attempts to gain complete control over Deir ez-Zor, but remains and in the future will likely remain unable to do so. Nonetheless, the prospect of a relief of the city by regime forces, prerequisites for which are control of Tadmur and al-Sukhna, had once again been set back massively, and the situation in Deir ez-Zor was looking all the more dire for it as a result. The capture of large amounts of weaponry, vehicles and other equipment will also have been a great bounty for the Islamic State, as such equipment can be easily distributed to its fighters elsewhere. Furthermore, the Islamic State soon continued its efforts to demolish the ancient ruins of Palmyra, attempting to use them as a propaganda tool for revenging its recent defeats and deterring its opponents from advancing further.Indeed, satellite imagery dating from January revealed that the Islamic State had begun demolishing several ancient structures, including the Tetrapylon and the Roman Theater. The heavy damage done to the latter is an unfortunate result of the 'Praying for Palmyra - Music revives ancient ruins' concert held here by Russia in March 2016, after which the Islamic State promised to demolish the theater upon return to the city.



Before going into detail on the capture of Tadmur itself, it is insightful to consider the regime's own offensive to recapture the city back in March 2016, which ended in success after over two weeks of fighting. Although promising at first, with the prospective of clearing a path to the besieged city of Deir ez-Zor looming, the offensive halted after pushing the Islamic State just out of the city's borders (liberating the city itself but little of the surrounding terrain), and the front had since then remained more or less stationary. This allowed the Islamic State to maintain a presence on the outskirts of the city, from where they even had a view of Tadmur airbase. During this time sporadic clashes continued, but no large scale offensive were undertaken by either side. Despite the lack of Islamic State attempts to retake the city, the defence of the city was a costly task in terms of manpower required to garrison it, and considering the fact these forces were direly needed in other parts of the country the value of the offensive was questionable in the first place. Indeed, the Islamic State had made no serious attempts to push further into regime-held territory after failing to overcome the extensive regime fortifications present around T4 airbase after it first captured Tadmur in May 2015, and from this location the area could have been kept secure until a full scale offensive against the Islamic State proper would have become a possibility. This optimism was reflected by the subsequent attempt at marching on Raqqa, which also failed disastrously after much of the forces involved fled from an Islamic State counter-attack.

Surprisingly, the Islamic State left large parts of the ancient city intact during its one year rule of Tadmur, and its subsequent capture by the Syrian Arab Army (SyAA), Hizbullah, Shiite militias and the Russian Armed Forces was hailed as a victory for mankind. Indeed, the recapture of Tadmur was an extremely well-orchestrated PR-stunt, aimed at showing the world that with Russia involved, terrorism on Syrian soil would be eradicated. To mark the success of the offensive, a triumphal concert was broadcasted into the world, hailing the victory over the Islamic State.

Despite Tadmur's vulnerability, significant forces were stationed around the city at the time of capture, supported by copious amounts of artillery, tanks and the Russian and Syrian air forces. Nonetheless, the mountainous terrain surrounding Tadmur can work both to the advantage and disadvantage of defending forces by giving a clear view of the city and its landscape. While in the hands of the defenders they can enhance the defensive overview of the battlefield, when lost to the enemy they provide an ideal position from which to attack the city. Losing one of these positions could quickly result in the city being overrun, which was exactly what happened during the Islamic State's December offensive.

The supposed arrival of hundreds or even thousands of Islamic State fighters from Mosul directly through Coalition patrolled territory prior to the start of the offensive was reported by the regime, but serves as nothing more than a poor excuse to hide the regime's own lack of anticipation on the deployment of Islamic State forces outside of Tadmur. Indeed, the relocation of large numbers of Islamic State forces and armour should have been easily noticable to Russian and Syrian intelligence forces prior to the attack as many of the units directly came from Raqqa. Even if the unlikely mass exodus of Islamic State fighters from Iraq to Tadmur took place, this should have become known to the regime well in advance of the Islamic State's offensive.

Defending Tadmur were numerous units part of the National Defence Force (NDF), remnants of the Syrian Arab Army's 11th and 18th divisions, elements of the Afghan Liwa Fatemiyoun brigade (de-facto part of Iran's Revolutionary Guards) and a small number of Tiger Forces, supported by an unknown number of Russian soldiers left in the city. Two major defensive positions surrounded Tadmur, comprising the mountainous area North of the city and the grain silos East of the city. If any of these were to fall, especially the position North of the city, the fall of Tadmur itself would essentially be inevitable. The regime was more than aware of this fact, and diverted much attention to the defence of the Northern and Eastern flanks of Tadmur. Although bolstering the defence of the city with large amounts of heavy weaponry, the lack of a well-led harmonious force in charge of defending the city was to leave its traces during the subsequent Islamic State offensive.

This brings us back to the actual offensive, where the attack would, in true Islamic State fashion, commence with the use of VBIEDs (the Islamic State's morbid equivalent of an airstrike). This type of suicide vehicle is not only effective in its destructive power, but even more so as a psychological weapon. This had its intended effect, and regime forces stationed Northeast of Tadmur were routed en masse in the resulting chaos. The Islamic State forces that followed mounted an offensive from this position and despite reports of heavy shelling and airstrikes continued to push closer to Tadmur itself. Most of the troops that fled appear not to have regrouped at Tadmur but instead fled directly to 'Fortress T4' itself, an indication of the poor state of the regime's military in this region. During the conquest for the city weaknesses in the Syrian and Russian air forces were apparent, diminishing the regime's chances of holding onto the city. Largely reliant on iron bombs and hindered by poor coordination, little impact was made by airstrikes in the early stages of the battle, contrasting with battles such as the conquest for Kobanê, where effective use of airpower prevented the Islamic State from capturing the city in a turning point in the war. Later heavy Russian air strikes would apparently temporarily halt the Islamic State's advance on Tadmur forcing them to regroup, but these efforts would prove to be too little too late. The ease with which the Islamic State can move through the open desert undetected remains a serious problem for the regime, and the loss of Tadmur could directly be attributed to this fact.



Although the actual number of Islamic State fighters that participated in the Tadmur offensive remains unknown, the presence of numerous tanks upgraded by the 'The Workshop' hinted at a significant redeployment of personnel and equipment from Raqqa to Tadmur. 'The Workshop' is the Islamic State's largest armour workshop in Syria, and has produced a wide range of armour upgrades for the around two-hundred tanks captured and operated by the Islamic State since 2014.

The defenders could count on around forty armoured fighting vehicles (AFVs), around thirty of which tanks. Interestingly, most of the tanks were held back in the city itself, likely to be used in a future regime offensive to advance deeper into Islamic State held Central Syria. Instead of deploying these tanks in the defence of the city, most appear not to have moved since the Islamic State commenced its attack. While one could blame the defenders for not deploying these tanks on the city's perimeter, the exodus of regime forces out of Tadmur left the remaining defenders with numerous tanks, but no personnel to move them.

Interestingly, some of the fighters that had previously fled to T4 airbase returned to Tadmur, reinforcing the remnants of the NDF, the Liwa Fatemiyoun brigade, the 18th and 11th Division and the Tiger Forces that stayed behind. While a welcome addition to the by then badly depleted defenders, their arrival would ultimately turn out to be too little support, too late. The region around Tadmur was also put under pressure, preventing these positions from offering assistance to the defence of the city.

The defence of the other major obstacle for the Islamic State on the road of Tadmur, the Grain Silos, was in the hands of Liwa Fatemiyoun, an AfghanShiite militia part of Iran's Revolutionary Guards. Liwa Fatemiyoun took part in the regime's first offensive to drive the Islamic State out of Tadmur and its surroundings, and had maintained a presence here ever since. Although their performance throughout Syria has been mixed, the Liwa Fatemiyoun contingent stationed near the Grain Silos proved incapable of anticipating the scale and speed of the Islamic State's offensive.

It is thus unsurprising that the other major obstacle for the Islamic State on the road to Tadmur would ultimately fall, opening the way up to the city. Further checkpoints guarding the perimeter of the city had already been abandoned by that time, ensuring a smooth entrance into the city for the Islamic State. While one could argue the decision to retreat from here was a cowardly one, it actually made tactical sense. There was no plan for defending the city using these checkpoints only, and if the regime forces would have held ground here, it was still extremely unlikely that they could have defended the city, especially considering it was largely uninhabited. If the defenders at the checkpoints had stood their ground, it would only have been a matter of time before the Islamic State would enter the city, where the house-to-house combat would have worked in the disadvantage of the defenders. While the loss of the city and its archaeological ruins was highly unfortunate, after losing the major defensive positions guarding the city retreating was the logical choice, especially considering the fact that conditions in the city were already close to untenable before the Islamic State assault.




Indeed, although the city and its defences were stocked with heavy weaponry, basic equipment such as enough radios and generators to charge them was lacking. Where there were generators, there was barely enough fuel to charge them. Food and water rations were not only insufficient, but of extremely poor quality. This had a serious effect on the morale of defenders, further worsening the situation. The image below details such a ration, which was supposedly meant to feed five people for one full day.





The Russian Army, which maintained a limited presence in Tadmur, had departed shortly before the fall of the city. Although Russians had been active in capturing the city in the first place, some were left behind to clear the many mines and IEDs in the city or to guard those that were doing so. For this purpose, sappers and special equipment were deployed, including several Uran-6 mine-clearing robots.


Although the Russian base appeared abandoned, with several of the original structures missing, tents were still seen standing, including what appeared to be the camp's kitchen with food still on display. Personal items such as a Russian credit card were also found. Tinkoff Bank, which had issued the credit card, swiftly blocked it after it featured in an Islamic State video from the base.




A Russian BPM-97 and two up-armoured Ural-4320s were some of the more notableamong the vehicles captured in Tadmur. Although both types are in use with the Russian Armed Forces contingent in Syria, small numbers also entered service with elements of the Syrian military. It is thus more likely that these vehicles were operated by Syria's Tiger Forces rather than the Russian Armed Forces.




A list of captured armour, artillery and vehicles featured in footage and images released by the Islamic State from Tadmur. The amount of heavy weaponry claimed to have been captured by the Islamic State included at least forty tanks and seven BMP-1s, which would make this the second-largest heavy arms haul of the Syrian Civil War after the capture of Brigade 93 by the Islamic State in August 2014, which was believed to have provided the Islamic State with no less than fifty tanks and just under twenty howitzers.

The amount of vehicles captured at Tadmur likely ended up higher however, and footage from te the Islamic State's march on T4 showed several tanks captured at Tadmur that weren't included in Islamic State footage from the city. The capture of a single T-72B, a single BPM-97, two armoured Ural-4320s, one UR-83P mine-clearing line charge and numerous AK-74s is notable, as these have all been provided to the Syrian military by Russia in the past few years.

- 7 T-55As
- 6 T-55Ms
- 4 T-62 Mod. 1967s
- 6 T-62 Mod. 1972s
- 1 T-72M1
- 1 T-72AV
- 1 T-72B
- 5 BMP-1s
- 1 ZSU-23
- 1 AMB-S
- 1 BPM-97
- 1 VT-55KS
- 7 122mm D-30 howitzers
- 2 130mm M-46 field-guns
- 1 152mm ML-20 howitzer
- 3 122mm BM-21 multiple rocket launchers
- 1 UR-83P mine-clearing line charge
- 1 14.5mm ZPU-4
- 6 23mm ZU-23s
- 1 37mm M-1939
- 1 57mm AZP S-60
- 3 S-125 surface-to-air missile (SAM) launchers
- 1 SNR-125 ''Low Blow'' (For the S-125)
- 7 Tatra (815)s
- 3 GAZ-33088
- 2 ZiL-131s
- 2 Armoured Ural-4320s
- 2 Ural-4320s
- 1 V3S
- Numerous technicals with associated anti-aircraft guns

The list includes at least twenty-six tanks, most of which captured within the perimeter of the city itself. Interestingly, most tanks appeared not to have been moved out of their bases, confirming that their crews had already fled well in advance of the Islamic State's takeover of the city. While this already poses a serious issue, the fact that none of them were then demolished by the remaining defenders or the Syrian or Russian Air Forces allowed the Islamic State to further strengthen its forces and could have led to serious consequences for T4 airbase later on.


Nonetheless, other tanks were seen parked at one of the several checkpoints guarding the city. While this may seem to make a lot more tactical sense than the situation described in the previous paragraph, the checkpoint the tanks were spotted at actually faced away from the Islamic State's advance. While Tadmur was thus packed with heavy weaponry, only a small part of that was actually available to the defenders on the frontline.




Boosted by the large amount of weaponry and ammunition captured in and around Tadmur, the fighters of the Islamic State then set their eyes on T4 airbase, which had proved an obstacle too ambitious to take on after the Islamic State captured Tadmur for the first time in May 2015. Indeed, the Islamic State's second attempt at taking T4 bears heavy resemblance to their previous effort. After capturing Tadmur on the 11th of December, the road to 'Fortress T4' was practically open, allowing for significant progress at advancing closer to the airbase.

T4, sharing its name with the nearby pumping station, is the Syrian Arab Air Force's (SyAAF) most important airbase. The remains of two fighter-bomber squadrons, a detachment of L-39s, one helicopter squadron, other helicopter detachments and Russian assets are currently operating out of T4, including the pride of the SyAAF: Its Su-24MK2s. Despite being Syria's largest airbase, T4 only has one runway, making the airbase's aircraft vulnerable in case it gets taken out. Given its status, it is unsurprising that the airbase is extremely well defended, now also including elements of the Russian military.

While the Islamic State had previously found itself unable to overcome T4's strong defences, its second attempt was carried out by a much stronger force, further bolstered by weaponry previously captured in Tadmur, which exceeded that of the previous capture in numbers. Before reaching the airbase's line of defensive, large swaths of open terrain surrounding the Eastern and Southern part of the T4 had to be overcome however. This is where the Islamic State's previous attempt came to a grinding halt, a place that would prove to be just as troublesome for its fighters this time around.





While the Islamic State could count on an increased number of fighters and weaponry, T4's defences were meanwhile quickly reinforced with elements of the Syrian military, including the first elements of the 5th Corps, and Russian special forces in addition to the experienced defenders already present. As the flat terrain worked heavily in the favour of the defenders, the Islamic State's best option was to attempt to encircle the airbase and try to achieve a breakthrough at a place less well defended. With reinforcements for the defenders underway, time was of the essence.

To deny the regime the ability to bring in these additional reinforcements, cutting the road connection between T4 and government-held territory was necessary to prevent a safe passage to the airbase. A strong Islamic State presence on the West side of T4 would also force the defenders to reinforce this part of the airbase, which is naturally less easily defended. This, in combination with Islamic State attacks on the Eastern and Southern part of T4 could have presented the Islamic State with the much needed weak spot that could then be exploited by the main force following behind. Images showing just how close the Islamic State had meanwhile gotten to T4 airbase can be seen below.




While the fighters of the Islamic State succeeded in temporarily disputing the major road leading to the airbase, they once again proved unable to maintain the encirclement of the airbase, allowing the regime to bring in further reinforcements. The Islamic State's armour also proved unable to place themselves into positions allowing for supression of the defenders due to the presence of anti-tank guided missiles (ATGMs), which knocked out several Islamic State tanks that attempted to do so. Russian ATGM teams armed with 9M133 Kornet ATGMs were also active at T4.

Further help came from an unexpected corner, as Coalition aircraft reportedly struck fourteen tanks, three howitzers, two buildings and two vehicles, supposedly killing at least thirty-eight Islamic State fighters in the vicinity of T4 airbase, denying the Islamic State the ability to build up sufficient forces needed for attempting a breakthrough. In the meantime, the weather took a turn for the worse and temporarily covered the surrounding area in snow, as depicted below.



Although continuing to exert heavy pressure on the Northern, Eastern and Southern part of T4, even capturing a S-125 surface-to-air missile site on the Northern flank, the Islamic State failed to find the weak spot needed to have any serious chance at infiltrating the airbase, at which point its offensive effectively ended. It had taken heavy losses while attempting to advance further into government-held territory, and much of the remaining Islamic State contingent left the area for Deir ez-Zor. The Islamic State was now on the defence, which would soon reveal a major weakness due to the unabating attrition its forces face.

This article is to be followed by another article detailing the subsequent offensive by the Syrian military to recapture Tadmur, which it succeeded in doing on the 2nd of March 2017.

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List of Iranian Arms and Equipment Supplied to Houthi Militants in Yemen since 2015

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This list only includes Iranian-supplied arms and equipment supplied to Houthi militants in Yemen or interdicted on the way to Yemen after the 2015 Saudi Arabian-led intervention in Yemen.

Notes:

- Iran has set up a network of smuggling routes through Oman, the Arabian and Red Sea and Somalia to transport arms and equipment to Houthi militants in Yemen.

- While some of the ships containing Iranian-supplied arms and equipment intended for Houthi militants list Somalia as their ultimate destination, most of the weaponry is delivered by ship-to-ship transfers in the Arabian and Red Sea. Deliveries to Somalia and then onward to Yemen make up the rest of the transfers.

- This list only contains a small fraction of the true numbers of arms and equipment that reached Yemen, and Iranian efforts in arming the Houthis should not be underestimated.

- This list does not include items such as cables or specific components of missiles or equipment.

(Click on the equipment to get a picture of them in Houthi service or after being captured during transport to Yemen.)

Assault Rifles (7489 seized on the way to Yemen)

  • Soviet AKM(Part of a batch of 1,989 rifles seized by Australia, February 2016 on the way to Yemen)
  • Chinese Type-56(Part of a batch of 3,489 rifles seized by Coalition forces, February, April 2016 on the way to Yemen)
  • Romanian AIM(Part of a batch of 1,989 rifles seized by Australia, February 2016 on the way to Yemen)
  • Bulgarian AKK(Part of a batch of 1,989 rifles seized by Australia, February 2016 on the way to Yemen)
  • ''Iranian KLS''(Part of a batch of 1,989 rifles seized by Australia, February 2016 on the way to Yemen)
  • ''Brand-new AK-47''(At least 3000 seized by the United States, August 2018 on the way to Yemen)

Machine Guns (81 seized on the way to Yemen)

  • Russian PKM (At least 49 [including 39 spare barrels] seized by Australia, February 2016 on the way to Yemen)
  • North Korean Type-73 (At least 11 seized by Coalition forces, February and March 2016 on the way to Yemen)
  • Soviet DShK (At least 21 seized by by the United States, April 2016 on the way to Yemen)

Sniper Rifles (64 seized on the way to Yemen)


RPGs (300 seized on the way to Yemen)


Mortars (20 seized on the way to Yemen

  • ''60mm mortar tubes'' (At least 20 seized by by Australia, February 2016 on the way to Yemen)


ATGMs (81 seized on the way to Yemen)

 

Man-Portable Air-Defence Systems

  • 23px-Flag_of_Yemen.svg''Iranian modified Strela-2'' (Usage reported by USCENTCOM)

    Surface-to-Air Missiles (1 seized on the way to Yemen)

    • 23px-Flag_of_Yemen.svgIranian Sayyad-2C (At least one seized by Saudi Arabia, early 2018 on the way to Yemen)

     

    Multiple Rocket Launchers

      

    Cruise Missiles


      Ballistic Missiles


      Unmanned Aerial Vehicles


      Ammunition

       

      Miscellaneous Items


      Iranian Involvement but not Delivery - Proven

      • Conversion of fast boats to Water-Born Improvised Explosive Devices (WBIEDs)

      Iranian Involvement but not Delivery - Likely but as of yet Unconfirmed

      •  Production and or assembly of (Badr-1) Fajr-series unguided rockets inside Yemen
      •  Conversion of C.801s ship-borne anti-ship missiles (AShMs) to ground-launched AShMs
      •  Conversion of R-27T and R-73 air-to-air missiles (AAMs) to surface-to-air missiles (SAMs)
      • Conversion of Scud and Hwasŏng-5/6 ballistic missiles to Borkan 1/2/2H series of ballistic missiles
      • Conversion of S-75 SAMs to Qaher series of ballistic missiles
      •  

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      Notes:

      - If several configurations of a missile, rocket or launcher are known, they are added as such.

      - The part within the apostrophes refers to other designations or an unofficial designation.

      - When available, the date of inception and range are added. As this list mostly relies on data reported by Iranian sources, the date of inception and range should be used as a rough indication rather than a precise estimate.

      Although a great deal of effort has been put into ensuring the accuracy of this list, any updates or corrections to this list are most welcome.

      (Click on the equipment to get a picture of them in Iranian service)

      Short-Range Ballistic Missiles (SRBM)

       

      Medium-Range Ballistic Missiles (MRBM)


      Anti-Ship Ballistic Missiles (ASBM)

       

      Anti-Radiation Ballistic Missiles (ARBM)

       

      Ballistic Missiles - Documented But Not Yet Seen

      • Iran Ghadr-S ''Qadr-S'' (Documented by a few sources, not yet seen)
      • Iran Oghab (Documented by a few sources, not yet seen)
      • Iran Samen ''Ghadr-101 or M-9'' (Documented by a few sources, not yet seen)
      • Iran Sejjil-3 (Documented by a few sources, not yet seen)
      • Iran Shahab-3C (Documented by a few sources, not yet seen)
      • Iran Shahab-3D (Documented by a few sources, not yet seen)
      • Iran Shahab-4 ''IRIS'' (Documented by a few sources, not yet seen)
      • Iran Shahab-5 (Documented by a few sources, not yet seen)
      • Iran Shahab-6 (Documented by a few sources, not yet seen)
      • Iran Project Kowsar ''Koussar'' (Documented by a few sources, not yet seen)
      • IranMeshkat (Documented by a few sources, not yet seen)
      • Iran Samid (Documented by a few sources, not yet seen)
      • Iran Yasser (Documented by a few sources, not yet seen)

      Artillery Rockets

       

      Artillery Rockets - Documented But Not Yet Seen

      • Iran Naze'at-4 ''Mushak'' (Documented by a few sources, not yet seen)
      • Iran Naze'at-5 ''Mushak'' (Documented by a few sources, not yet seen)
      • Iran Zelzal-1A ''Mushak-160'' (Documented by a few sources, not yet seen)

       

      Cruise Missiles

      • IranSoumar [2015]
      • IranHoveyzeh [2019] [Range: 1350km]
      • IranQuds [2018] (Supplied to Houthi militants in Yemen. Used in the 2019 Abqaiq–Khurais attack on Saudi Arabia)
      • Iran Meshkat [2012] (Did not enter production)  
      • Iran Ya Ali (Documented by sources as used in the surface-to-surface role, not yet seen in this configuration)


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      See the Mobile Battle Fortresses Islamic State used around Mosul

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      The war against Islamic State in Iraq has seen a myriad of DIY designs come to life as factions attempted to improve their firepower to gain the advantage over the enemy. The Islamic State (IS) is certainly no exception, and its forces in Iraq relied virtually exclusively on the ingenuity of their many arms workshops to turn the huge arsenals captured in Mosul into deadly weapons for use on the ever changing battlegrounds of Iraq.

      The conversion of Ukrainian BTS-5B armoured recovery vehicles (ARVs) to mobile battle fortresses is such an example to turn otherwise useless (to the Islamic State) vehicles into a potent weapons platforms. In an effort to better support its fleet of Soviet-era T-72s, the Iraqi Army received a small number of BTS-5Bs (itself also based on the T-72) in 2006, but the collapse of the Iraqi Army in Mosul in 2014 meant that several ARVs were captured by IS in working order, including the Polish WZT-2 and and BTS-5B seen below.


      The first appearance of a BTS-5B armoured recovery vehicle (ARV) converted to a mobile battle fortress back in January 2015 certainly raised eyebrows, not least because it quicklygot stuck in a ditch and was then destroyed. While thus not very successful in its intended role, it took less than a year for its successor to appear on the plains of Iraq. First seen in December 2015, this first iterationcombines lessons learned from its predecessor with technology not widely used by the Islamic State until that point.

      But before going into detail on the specifics of the first iteration, it is insightful to consider the conversion of the first battle fortress. Of little use to the Islamic State in its original role, the BTS-5B was heavily modified through the addition of an armoured cabin over its original body. For this purpose, the crane, the snorkel and various crates containing additional tools were removed. The dozer blade and winch were retained however.

      Armament consists of a shielded pintle-mounted 12.7mm DShK heavy machine gun and several mounts for light-machine guns. The occupants also made use of M16s and AKMs to complement the single DShK during the vehicle's first and only use on the battlefield.


      Large blocks presumably filled with sand concrete were installed on top of the newly erected platform to act as armour plating while large rubber side skirts were fitted to either side of the battle fortress. Combined, they provided the occupants with protection against small-arms fire, explosive fragments and perhaps the occasional rocket propelled grenade (RPG) from the front and sides.

      As a result of the blockage of the driver's hatch by the support beams of the platform, the driver had to enter his position by a hatch on the floor of the platform. The support beams also blocked the driver's viewing port, forcing the driver to stick his head out while maneuvering the vehicle. Armoured glass was installed to make up for this increase of vulnerability however.

      All in all, the conversion was an impressive project which must have cost the Islamic State a large amount of man hours to accomplish, which is also why its poor battlefield career comes as somewhat as a surprise.


      The battle fortress could have been put to good use in urban environments, where the vehicle would have been used as a heavily armoured battering ram capable of providing fire support to advancing troops. Its flexible, albeit light, armament would have been ideally suited for targeting elevated areas such as higher floors of flats, with its armour warding off most retaliatory fire.

      Instead, the fighters of the Islamic State used the battle bus on the open plains near Shekhan, Nineveh Governorate, where the Islamic State waged an offensive against entrenched Peshmerga forces on the 25th of January 2015. Footage of the failed offensive can be watched here.

      Shekhan was the site of a series of heavy attacks by the fighters of the Islamic State. The typical pattern of such an attack would include one vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED) followed by an attack with captured U.S. M-1114s, Badger ILAVs or M1117 ASVs. As Peshmerga forces held the high-ground, and saw the vehicles coming from miles away, the exact logic behind these attacks remains unclear, especially after MILAN ATGMs reached the Peshmerga forces.


      During the attack on Shekhan, several (up-armoured) M-1114s, one up-armoured Badger ILAV, one M1117 ASV and the battle fortress moved up to Peshmerga positions, but quickly came under under heavy machine gun, mortar, and tank fire from the high ground. Most of these rounds either missed or ricocheted from the vehicles' additional DIY armour. As a result, several vehicles managed to advance close to the mountain before being taken out.

      The battle fortress on the other hand got stuck in a ditch, was hit by an RPG and probably also a mortar round, killing its exposed crew and ending the career of the first mobile battle fortress.


      The first iteration made its first and only appearance in the Islamic State propaganda video 'The Dabiq Appointment', which covered an exercise of an IS armoured formation in Wilayat Ninawa (Nineveh Governorate) in Mosul, Iraq. The 'Dabiq Appointment' refers to the town of Dabiq in Northern Syria, where according to the Islamic State, the final battle between righteousness (Islamic State) and wrongness (everything not the Islamic State) will take place.

      Contrary to what one might expect, a large scale deployment of Coalition forces near this town and a resulting battle is what the Islamic State desperately wanted. It is thé way the Islamic State wants to confront the 'Crusaders' (the Coalition), referring to its air attacks and drone strikes as acts of cowardness. Nonetheless, the small town was quietly captured by Turkish-backed Free Syrian Army forces from Islamic State in October 2016. To further add to its threat, the video also includes a shot of an Islamic State tank marching on the Colosseum in Rome, Italy.


      Featuring in the 'Dabiq Appointment' is the 3rd al-Farouq armoured brigade, which together with the 'Shield Battalion' and 'Storming Battalion' is responsible for operating most armoured fighting vehicles (AFVs) in Wilayat Ninawa. The 3rd al-Farouq armoured brigade is seen training for the ''imminent'' battle at Dabiq, shooting up targets and storming positions while employing a host of armoured fighting vehicles including 2 T-55s, 1 Type-59, 2 MT-LBs, 2 Badger ILAVs MRAPs, 1 battle fortress and 1 BTR-80UP in junction with well-equipped infantry.

      The image below shows the seal of 3rd al-Farouq Armoured Brigade, reading: ولاية نينوى - الجند (?) لواء الفاروق المدرع الثالث - 'Wilayat Ninawa - Soldiers (?) - al-Farouq Armoured Brigade - 3rd'. The second part of the Shahada: محمد رسول الله - 'Muhammed is Allah's prophet' is seen on the right. This is sometimes seen on Islamic State operated vehicles and is believed to be applied for decorative purposes only.


      As with its predecessor, this BTS-5B was heavily modified for its new role as an armoured fighting vehicle. The crane, snorkel and various crates normally mounted on top of the vehicle were removed. Although unlikely to ever see use, the dozer blade was retained however. To compensate for the removed headlights, the light beams of which would have been blocked by the slat armour, two new headlights have been installed on the front mudguards.

      While the previous version had to do with simple blocks of armour installed around its newly erected platform, the new vehicle comes with slat armour installed around the hull and around its raised platform. Although certainly impressive by its looks, the strength of the protective slat armour and the firmness of its supportive mounts look marginal at best, and the driver's view is likely seriously hampered by the slat armour installed in front of him. No rubber side skirts are seen mounted this time, which was however a feature of the first battle fortress.


      Armament has been much improved from the previous version, which only donned a single 12.7mm DShK in addition to several mounts for light-machine guns. The new battle fortress comes with the same 12.7mm DShK, this time mounted on the commander's cupola, and a 14.5mm KPV in an armoured cupola taken from an ex-Iraqi Army M-1114 placed on top of the raised platform. While providing an easy target for the enemy, the elevated position of the 14.5mm KPV offers it a great view of its surroundings, and enables it to fire at practically any target with a Line Of Sight (LOS) to the vehicle.


      Contrary to the previous version, which was more of a heavily armoured battering ram carrying infantry than it was a real AFV, this vehicle is much more akin to a true armoured fighting vehicle. The sheer size of the erected platform serves both as an advantage as well as an disadvantage as it makes the vehicle an ideal target for ATGMs and RPGs.


      While the eventual fate of the second battle fortress remains unknown, the vehicle could just as well have been sent off against Peshermerga positions around Mosul. Indeed, both vehicles might serve as a testimony to the fact that although the fighters of the Islamic State were often quick to adapt to most combat situations, comprehension of suitable tactics regarding the operation of armoured fighting vehicles remained beyond the Islamic State fighters' grasp in this region.

      Images four and five by Matt Cetti-Roberts via The Kurds Are Close to Mosul—And in No Hurry to Get There

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      Photo Report: The Syrian Arab Army (1)

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      By Stijn Mitzer

      The following images were taken during Syrian Arab Army exercises over the past several years, including the large-scale exercise involving all branches of the Syrian Armed Forces in 2012. This exercise was carried out amid an increasingly deteriorating security situation in Syria, leading to calls from the international world for an intervention similar to the one seen in Libya. In response, the Syrian Armed Forces launched a several day long exercise to show its strenght to the outside world.

      The T-72AV, also known as the T-82 in Syria, seen during an exercise in the Rif Dimashq Governorate. Although the fleet of 'T-82s' has suffered heavily due to the large-scale proliferation of rocket propelled grenades (RPGs) and anti-tank guided missiles (ATGMs) in Syria, a sizeable amount of tanks remain operational. Fully intact T-72AVs still sporting all of their explosive reactive armour (ERA) blocks as seen below have become an increasingly rare sight however.


      Operating alongside the T-72AV is the T-72 'Ural', the first and also the least numerous T-72 variant to have been acquired by Syria before the start of the Civil War. The tanks can be seen equipped with a laser engagement system for training uses only. The T-72 'Ural' can easily discerned from other T-72 variants by the TPD-2-49 optical rangefinder protruding from the turret and by its flipper-type armoured panels instead of the rubber side-skirts seen on later types.


      A row of 130mm M-46 field-guns take aim at a target during the 2012 exercises. Although several other types of artillery guns have been delivered or pulled out of storage over the course of the Civil War, the 130mm M-46 and the 122mm D-30 remain the primary artillery guns of the Syrian Arab Army. A limited number of 130mm M-46s have been mounted on Mercedes-Benz trucks under a programme aimed at increasing their mobility and effectiveness. Chinese 130 mm BEE4 rocket assisted projectiles (RAP) were specifically acquired for use with this platform, and greatly increased the operational potential of the 130mm M-46. Although the conversion of large numbers was planned, the start of the Civil War prevented the commencement of full scale production, and therefore they remain a relatively rare sight.


      A convoy of three T-55(A)MVs and a single BMP-1 underway during an exercise in 2010. Although the Syrian Arab Army's immense fleet of tanks and BMPs were once destined to jointly operate on the plains of the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights, many are now individually attached to the various units and militias wrestling for control over Syria. Only the 4th Armoured Division and parts of the Republican Guard continue to operate their armour in organised fashion and (sometimes) with infantry support.


      The Syrian Arab Army's fleet of T-55(A)MV has traditionally been concentrated along the Golan Heights, and although outdated when compared to Israeli armour currently in service, one could argue their combat effectiveness could surpass that of the T-72 'Ural' and T-72M1. The T-55(A)MV features Kontakt-1 explosive reactive armour (ERA), a KTD-2 laser rangefinder, smoke grenade launchers, an upgraded engine and the capability to fire the 9M117M Bastion anti-tank missile. The costs of just a few of these missiles is higher than the actual price of the T-55 launching them, and they have seen only limited action in Syria's Quneitra Governorate.


      A soldier takes aim with his RPG-29, without a doubt the most feared type of RPG currently fielded in the world. The PG-29V's 105mm tandem warhead has so far caused tremendous losses under the SyAA's fleet of tanks, mainly the T-72. Although the T-55(A)MV and T-72AV are both equipped with ERA aimed at increasing the survivability of the tank, the tandem warhead was specifically designed to counter such armour and faces little problems penetrating it.


      Although the procurement of large numbers of AK-74Ms was planned to replace the AK(M) and other (foreign) derivatives, the Civil War put a halt to this large scale re-equipment programme. The AK-74M was reportedly pitted against several other contenders including the Iranian KH-2002, all but two of which malfunctioned. Several new batches of AK-74Ms were received during the course of the Civil War however, alongside several other types of modern Russian weapons. Nonetheless, weapons such as the AK(M)-47 and PKM  have remained the most prevalent small arms amongst pro-Assad forces.



      A convoy of BMP-1 infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs) underway to their operational zone. Having suffered heavy losses during the war, the BMP-1 continues to see service with the many factions spread throughout Syria. The vehicle has served as the basis for many DIY modifications, and even a BMP-1 based multiple rocket launcher was recently sighted in service with the 4th Armoured Division.


      Although many hoped for the reintroduction of the T-34/85 on today's battlefield, sightings of this legendary tank in Syria in recent years has so far remained limited to just five examples, two of which belonged to a batch of T-34/85s converted to T-34/122 self-propelled howitzers armed with the 122mm D-30, which was retired long before the Civil War. Two other (intact) T-34/85s were seen in Syria's Quneitra province, used as static pillboxes facing Israel. It is likely these tanks were operational until quite recently. The T-34/85 below was seen during an exercise shortly before the start of the Civil War. While the T-34/85, or T-34/76 for that matter, indeed continues to be used in oeprational capacity across the globe, their presence nowadays remains limited to Yemen and North Korea.


      160mm M-160 mortars seen during the 2012 exercises. Seeing heavy use during the early stages of the Civil War, when many of the protests and armed uprisings that followed were still contained in the cities, these and other heavy mortars were often deployed just outside the city perimiter for the shelling of neighbourhoods that had revolted. In more recent years, the M-160s are believed to have been supplemented by additional 240mm M-240s with rocket-assisted projectiles.


      Two BMP-1s during a recent training exercise simulating a combined assault on an enemy position with armour and infantry. Although this makes for great propaganda footage, such coordinated assaults are only being (correctly) carried out a limited amount of pro-Assad units during today's war. On the opposing side, al-Nusra Front (which recently rebranded itself as Jabhat Fateh al-Sham) makes heavy use of mainly T-72s and BMP-1s operating together during assaults on regime-held parts of Aleppo.


      Syrian Arab Army soldiers run towards the infantry compartment of their BMP-1 IFV during an exercise. All soldiers appear relatively well equipped compared to the hodgepodge of uniforms and equipment regime soldiers are outfitted with today. The SyAA had acquired large numbers of Chinese-produced combat gear, including helmets and bullet proof vests, shortly before the start of the Civil War, but simply ran out of stock when it started amassing an increasing number of new recruits in order to gain the upper hand on the battlefield.



      A BM-21 fires one of its forty 122mm rockets towards a new target. The BM-21 is by far the most numerous multiple rocket launcher (MRL) in service with the Syrian Armed Forces. The type previously operated alongside a sizeable number of North Korean 122mm BM-11 MRLs before these were donated to Lebanon along with Syria's remaining stock of T-54 and older T-55 variants. With an increasing number of Volcanoes and 220mm, 300mm, 302mm multiple rocket launchers at hand, the Syrian Arab Army has somewhat compensated for the loss of large numbers of BM-21s by a substantial increase in qualitative firepower. Rebels operating in Northern Syria recently received BM-21s acquired from Eastern Europe by one of the Gulf States, further increasing the proliferation of this system in Syria.


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      The Oryx Handbook of Iranian Fighting Vehicles

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      By Stijn Mitzer

      The goal of this list is to comprehensively catalogue Iran's past and current inventory of vehicles and equipment. In an effort to streamline the list and avoid unnecessary confusion, civilian trucks towing military trailers or military trucks on which missiles, rockets or radars are based are not included in the list. As this author keeps an updated list of all military trucks in service with Iran's Armed Forces, please feel free to direct any questions regarding the information in this list to oryxspioenkop[at]gmail.com.

      Notes: 

      - If several configurations of a vehicle with one designation are known, they are added as such. 

      - The part within the apostrophes refers to other designations or an unofficial designation. 

      - When available, the date of inception and range are added. As this list mostly relies on data reported by Iranian sources, the date of inception and range should be used as a rough indication rather than a precise estimate.

      - To avoid confusion over the names of certain SAM systems, names of the missiles used on these SAM systems are sometimes included in this list. The Taer-2A, 2B and 2C missiles listed have been identified and confirmed to be in use on the specific launcher also listed.

      - Vehicles captured or produced during the Iran-Iraq war and subsequently only used for a short period of time are not included in this list. 

      Be sure to check out this link for an overview of Iran's unmanned aerial vehicles. For a more complete overview of Iran's ballistic missiles and artillery rockets please click here.

      Although a great deal of effort has been put into ensuring the accuracy of this list, any updates or corrections to this list are most welcome.

      (Click on the equipment to get a picture of them in Iranian service)

      Tanks - Operational

       

      Tanks - Prototypes

      • IranT-72 ''Khorramshahr'' (Ukrainian upgrade of the T-72M1, did not enter production)
      • IranSabalan [2014] (Iranian upgrade of the M47M, not destined to enter service)
      • IranTiam [2016] (Iranian upgrade of the M47M, not believed to be destined to enter service) Prototype: (1)
      • IranSamsam [2013] (Iranian upgrade of the M60, not destined to enter service) Three configurations: (2)(3)
      • IranZolfaghar ''Zulfiqar-1, A and B'' (Not destined to enter service) Two configurations: (2)
      • IranZolfaghar ''Zulfiqar-2, 3, C and D''(Not destined to enter service) Four configurations: (2)(3)(4)
      • IranZolfaghar-E ''Zulfiqar-3''(Not destined to enter service)
      • IranUnnamed T-55 upgrade (1) (Did not enter production) Two configurations: (2)
      • IranUnnamed T-55 upgrade (2) (Did not enter production)
      • IranKarrar (Yet to enter mass production)
      • IranRakhsh (Revolutionary Guards upgrade of the T-72M1/S, yet to enter mass production)

       

      Armoured fighting vehicles - Operational

       

      Armoured fighting vehicles - Prototypes

       

      Infantry fighting vehicles - Operational

       

      Infantry fighting vehicles - Prototypes

       

      Armoured personnel carriers - Operational

       

      Armoured personnel carriers - Prototypes

       

      Infantry Mobility Vehicle (IMV)

       

      Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP)



      Military engineering vehicles - Operational

       

      Military engineering vehicles - Prototypes

       

      Unmanned ground vehicles (UGV) - Prototypes

       

      Command vehicles

       

      Heavy mortars - Operational

       

      Self-propelled mortars - Operational

       

      Tank Destroyers - Prototypes

       

      Towed Artillery

       

      Self-propelled artillery - Operational

       

      Self-propelled artillery - Prototypes

       

      Multiple Rocket Launchers

       

      Towed anti-aircraft guns - Operational

       

      Towed anti-aircraft guns - Prototypes

       

      Self-propelled anti-aircraft guns - Operational

       

      Self-propelled anti-aircraft guns - Prototypes

       

      Static SAM systems

       

      Self-propelled SAM systems - Operational

       

      Self-propelled SAM systems - Prototypes

       

      Artillery Rockets

       

      Cruise Missiles

      • 22px-Flag_of_Iran.svgSoumar [2015]
      • 22px-Flag_of_Iran.svgHoveyzeh [2019] [Range: 1350km]
      • 22px-Flag_of_Iran.svgQuds [2018] (Supplied to Houthi militants in Yemen. Used in the 2019 Abqaiq–Khurais attack on Saudi Arabia)
      • 22px-Flag_of_Iran.svg Meshkat [2012] (Did not enter production)  
      • 22px-Flag_of_Iran.svg Ya Ali (Documented by sources as used in the surface-to-surface role, not yet seen in this configuration)

       

      Coastal Defence Missile Systems

       

      Anti-Ship Ballistic Missiles (ASBM)

       

      Short-Range Ballistic Missiles (SRBM)

         

        Medium-Range Ballistic Missiles (MRBM)


        Anti-Radiation Ballistic Missiles (ARBM)


        Jammers and Deception systems

         

        Radars and Sensors

         

        Trucks


        Jeeps and Vehicles


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        Back and Forth: How the Islamic State retook Tadmur

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        By Stijn Mitzer

        The ancient city of Palmyra has become a symbol in the world's fight against the Islamic State. It represents one of the few places where every (non-IS) party agrees on the ultimate fate of the city and its archaeological ruins, this in sharp contrast to other cities and locations elsewhere in Syria and Iraq. Indeed, Palmyra holds a special place in the hearts of many, and preserving this symbol of civilisation is not only in the interest of Syrians, but for mankind in general. Despite its cultural significance, the ancient ruins are a mere collection of bricks in the face of civilian casualties during the course of the Civil War, which are thought to range in the hunderds of thousands. The regime's decision to prioritise the ruins of Palmyra (Tadmur) over strategic targets in March 2016 would ultimately result in failure, losing control over Tadmur for the second time on the 11th of December 2016.

        The sudden fall of Tadmur came as a surprise to many following the Syrian Civil War, as there appeared to be no imminent threat to the city less than a week before its fall. Taking place less than nine months after the recapture of Tadmur by units of the Syrian Arab Army, Hizbullah, Shiite militias and the Russian Armed Forces, and one-and-a-half years after the Islamic State captured Tadmur for the first time, the speed and relative ease by which the Islamic State captured the town in less than three days must even have surprised the Islamic State itself, recapturing much of the ground it previously lost in May 2015. The large concentration of Islamic State fighters in and around Tadmur then threatened installations deeper into government-held Syria, including T4 airbase. Despite this threat, it should be mentioned that Fortress T4 is among the best defended military installations in Syria, and the Islamic State indeed proved unable to overcome its strong defences once again.

        The capture of Tadmur by the Islamic State came as the latest in a string of events swiftly unfolding throughout Syria at the end of 2016. In Aleppo, much of the rebel-held areas have been brought back under government control, with the remaining rebel pocket crushed after vast artillery strikes just a day after the fall of Tadmur. Meanwhile, further North the Free Syrian Army backed by Turkey recently captured the Islamic State stronghold of al-Bab. While one could argue these events are directly related to the Islamic State's decision to attack now, rumours about the departure of much of the remaining contingent of defenders in the days before the capture might have played a more important role in the Islamic State's decision to act now. Having a clear view of the city from the mountainous area around Tadmur, it is at least possible that the Islamic State closely followed the situation inside the city before launching an offensive. Either way, many of the fighters involved were relocated from elsewhere in Islamic State held territory, suggesting the planning for the offensive had already been underway for quite some time.

        The developments provided the Islamic State with the perfect opportunity to shift away attention from its recent setbacks in Mosul, where the Iraqi Army along with Shiite militias are engaged in a gruelling campaign aimed at taking back the largest city currently under Islamic State control. Being in control of Tadmur also gave the Islamic State another opportunity to prolong its control over parts of Syria, as larger cities such as Tadmur can be extremely time-consuming and costly to recapture once its fighters are dug in. In similar fashion, the Islamic State currently still attempts to gain complete control over Deir ez-Zor, but remains and in the future will likely remain unable to do so. Nonetheless, the prospect of a relief of the city by regime forces, prerequisites for which are control of Tadmur and al-Sukhna, had once again been set back massively, and the situation in Deir ez-Zor was looking all the more dire for it as a result. The capture of large amounts of weaponry, vehicles and other equipment will also have been a great bounty for the Islamic State, as such equipment can be easily distributed to its fighters elsewhere. Furthermore, the Islamic State soon continued its efforts to demolish the ancient ruins of Palmyra, attempting to use them as a propaganda tool for revenging its recent defeats and deterring its opponents from advancing further.Indeed, satellite imagery dating from January revealed that the Islamic State had begun demolishing several ancient structures, including the Tetrapylon and the Roman Theater. The heavy damage done to the latter is an unfortunate result of the 'Praying for Palmyra - Music revives ancient ruins' concert held here by Russia in March 2016, after which the Islamic State promised to demolish the theater upon return to the city.


        Before going into detail on the capture of Tadmur itself, it is insightful to consider the regime's own offensive to recapture the city back in March 2016, which ended in success after over two weeks of fighting. Although promising at first, with the prospective of clearing a path to the besieged city of Deir ez-Zor looming, the offensive halted after pushing the Islamic State just out of the city's borders (liberating the city itself but little of the surrounding terrain), and the front had since then remained more or less stationary. This allowed the Islamic State to maintain a presence on the outskirts of the city, from where they even had a view of Tadmur airbase. During this time sporadic clashes continued, but no large scale offensive were undertaken by either side. Despite the lack of Islamic State attempts to retake the city, the defence of the city was a costly task in terms of manpower required to garrison it, and considering the fact these forces were direly needed in other parts of the country the value of the offensive was questionable in the first place. Indeed, the Islamic State had made no serious attempts to push further into government-held territory after failing to overcome the extensive regime fortifications present around T4 airbase after it first captured Tadmur in May 2015, and from this location the area could have been kept secure until a full scale offensive against the Islamic State proper would have become a possibility. This optimism was reflected by the subsequent attempt at marching on Raqqa, which also failed disastrously after much of the forces involved fled from an Islamic State counter-attack.

        Surprisingly, the Islamic State left large parts of the ancient city intact during its one year rule of Tadmur, and its subsequent capture by the Syrian Arab Army (SyAA), Hizbullah, Shiite militias and the Russian Armed Forces was hailed as a victory for mankind. Indeed, the recapture of Tadmur was an extremely well-orchestrated PR-stunt, aimed at showing the world that with Russia involved, terrorism on Syrian soil would be eradicated. To mark the success of the offensive, a triumphal concert was broadcasted into the world, hailing the victory over the Islamic State.

        Despite Tadmur's vulnerability, significant forces were stationed around the city at the time of capture, supported by copious amounts of artillery, tanks and the Russian and Syrian air forces. Nonetheless, the mountainous terrain surrounding Tadmur can work both to the advantage and disadvantage of defending forces by giving a clear view of the city and its landscape. While in the hands of the defenders they can enhance the defensive overview of the battlefield, when lost to the enemy they provide an ideal position from which to attack the city. Losing one of these positions could quickly result in the city being overrun, which was exactly what happened during the Islamic State's December offensive.


        The supposed arrival of hundreds or even thousands of Islamic State fighters from Mosul directly through Coalition patrolled territory prior to the start of the offensive was reported by the regime, but serves as nothing more than a poor excuse to hide the regime's own lack of anticipation on the deployment of Islamic State forces outside of Tadmur. Indeed, the relocation of large numbers of Islamic State forces and armour should have been easily noticable to Russian and Syrian intelligence forces prior to the attack as many of the units directly came from Raqqa. Even if the unlikely mass exodus of Islamic State fighters from Iraq to Tadmur took place, this should have become known to the government well in advance of the Islamic State's offensive.

        Defending Tadmur were numerous units part of the National Defence Force (NDF), remnants of the Syrian Arab Army's 11th and 18th divisions, elements of the Afghan Liwa Fatemiyoun brigade (de-facto part of Iran's Revolutionary Guards) and a small number of Tiger Forces, supported by an unknown number of Russian soldiers left in the city. Two major defensive positions surrounded Tadmur, comprising the mountainous area North of the city and the grain silos East of the city. If any of these were to fall, especially the position North of the city, the fall of Tadmur itself would essentially be inevitable. The regime was more than aware of this fact, and diverted much attention to the defence of the Northern and Eastern flanks of Tadmur. Although bolstering the defence of the city with large amounts of heavy weaponry, the lack of a well-led harmonious force in charge of defending the city was to leave its traces during the subsequent Islamic State offensive.

        This brings us back to the actual offensive, where the attack would, in true Islamic State fashion, commence with the use of VBIEDs (the Islamic State's morbid equivalent of an airstrike). This type of suicide vehicle is not only effective in its destructive power, but even more so as a psychological weapon. This had its intended effect, and government forces stationed Northeast of Tadmur were routed en masse in the resulting chaos. The Islamic State forces that followed mounted an offensive from this position and despite reports of heavy shelling and airstrikes continued to push closer to Tadmur itself. Most of the troops that fled appear not to have regrouped at Tadmur but instead fled directly to 'Fortress T4' itself, an indication of the poor state of the regime's military in this region. During the conquest for the city weaknesses in the Syrian and Russian air forces were apparent, diminishing the regime's chances of holding onto the city. Largely reliant on iron bombs and hindered by poor coordination, little impact was made by airstrikes in the early stages of the battle, contrasting with battles such as the conquest for Kobanê, where effective use of airpower prevented the Islamic State from capturing the city in a turning point in the war. Later heavy Russian air strikes would apparently temporarily halt the Islamic State's advance on Tadmur forcing them to regroup, but these efforts would prove to be too little too late. The ease with which the Islamic State can move through the open desert undetected remains a serious problem for the regime, and the loss of Tadmur could directly be attributed to this fact.


        Although the actual number of Islamic State fighters that participated in the Tadmur offensive remains unknown, the presence of numerous tanks upgraded by the 'The Workshop' hinted at a significant redeployment of personnel and equipment from Raqqa to Tadmur. 'The Workshop' is the Islamic State's largest armour workshop in Syria, and has produced a wide range of armour upgrades for the around two-hundred tanks captured and operated by the Islamic State since 2014.

        The defenders could count on around forty armoured fighting vehicles (AFVs), around thirty of which tanks. Interestingly, most of the tanks were held back in the city itself, likely to be used in a future government offensive to advance deeper into Islamic State held Central Syria. Instead of deploying these tanks in the defence of the city, most appear not to have moved since the Islamic State commenced its attack. While one could blame the defenders for not deploying these tanks on the city's perimeter, the exodus of regime forces out of Tadmur left the remaining defenders with numerous tanks, but no personnel to move them.


        Interestingly, some of the fighters that had previously fled to T4 airbase returned to Tadmur, reinforcing the remnants of the NDF, the Liwa Fatemiyoun brigade, the 18th and 11th Division and the Tiger Forces that stayed behind. While a welcome addition to the by then badly depleted defenders, their arrival would ultimately turn out to be too little support, too late. The region around Tadmur was also put under pressure, preventing these positions from offering assistance to the defence of the city.

        The defence of the other major obstacle for the Islamic State on the road of Tadmur, the Grain Silos, was in the hands of Liwa Fatemiyoun, an AfghanShiite militia part of Iran's Revolutionary Guards. Liwa Fatemiyoun took part in the regime's first offensive to drive the Islamic State out of Tadmur and its surroundings, and had maintained a presence here ever since. Although their performance throughout Syria has been mixed, the Liwa Fatemiyoun contingent stationed near the Grain Silos proved incapable of anticipating the scale and speed of the Islamic State's offensive.

        It is thus unsurprising that the other major obstacle for the Islamic State on the road to Tadmur would ultimately fall, opening the way up to the city. Further checkpoints guarding the perimeter of the city had already been abandoned by that time, ensuring a smooth entrance into the city for the Islamic State. While one could argue the decision to retreat from here was a cowardly one, it actually made tactical sense. There was no plan for defending the city using these checkpoints only, and if the regime forces would have held ground here, it was still extremely unlikely that they could have defended the city, especially considering it was largely uninhabited. If the defenders at the checkpoints had stood their ground, it would only have been a matter of time before the Islamic State would enter the city, where the house-to-house combat would have worked in the disadvantage of the defenders. While the loss of the city and its archaeological ruins was highly unfortunate, after losing the major defensive positions guarding the city retreating was the logical choice, especially considering the fact that conditions in the city were already close to untenable before the Islamic State assault.





        Indeed, although the city and its defences were stocked with heavy weaponry, basic equipment such as enough radios and generators to charge them was lacking. Where there were generators, there was barely enough fuel to charge them. Food and water rations were not only insufficient, but of extremely poor quality. This had a serious effect on the morale of defenders, further worsening the situation. The image below details such a ration, which was supposedly meant to feed five people for one full day.



        The Russian Army, which maintained a limited presence in Tadmur, had departed shortly before the fall of the city. Although Russians had been active in capturing the city in the first place, some were left behind to clear the many mines and IEDs in the city or to guard those that were doing so. For this purpose, sappers and special equipment were deployed, including several Uran-6 mine-clearing robots.


        Although the Russian base appeared abandoned, with several of the original structures missing, tents were still seen standing, including what appeared to be the camp's kitchen with food still on display. Personal items such as a Russian credit card were also found. Tinkoff Bank, which had issued the credit card, swiftly blocked it after it featured in an Islamic State video from the base.


        A Russian BPM-97 and two up-armoured Ural-4320s were some of the more notableamong the vehicles captured in Tadmur. Although both types are in use with the Russian Armed Forces contingent in Syria, small numbers also entered service with elements of the Syrian military. It is thus more likely that these vehicles were operated by Syria's Tiger Forces rather than the Russian Armed Forces.


        A list of captured armour, artillery and vehicles featured in footage and images released by the Islamic State from Tadmur. The amount of heavy weaponry claimed to have been captured by the Islamic State included at least forty tanks and seven BMP-1s, which would make this the second-largest heavy arms haul of the Syrian Civil War after the capture of Brigade 93 by the Islamic State in August 2014, which was believed to have provided the Islamic State with no less than fifty tanks and just under twenty howitzers.

        The amount of vehicles captured at Tadmur likely ended up higher however, and footage from te the Islamic State's march on T4 showed several tanks captured at Tadmur that weren't included in Islamic State footage from the city. The capture of a single T-72B, a single BPM-97, two armoured Ural-4320s, one UR-83P mine-clearing line charge and numerous AK-74s is notable, as these have all been provided to the Syrian military by Russia in the past few years.

        - 7 T-55As
        - 6 T-55Ms
        - 4 T-62 Mod. 1967s
        - 6 T-62 Mod. 1972s
        - 1 T-72M1
        - 1 T-72AV
        - 1 T-72B
        - 5 BMP-1s
        - 1 ZSU-23
        - 1 AMB-S
        - 1 BPM-97
        - 1 VT-55KS
        - 7 122mm D-30 howitzers
        - 2 130mm M-46 field-guns
        - 1 152mm ML-20 howitzer
        - 3 122mm BM-21 multiple rocket launchers
        - 1 UR-83P mine-clearing line charge
        - 1 14.5mm ZPU-4
        - 6 23mm ZU-23s
        - 1 37mm M-1939
        - 1 57mm AZP S-60
        - 3 S-125 surface-to-air missile (SAM) launchers
        - 1 SNR-125 ''Low Blow'' (For the S-125)
        - 7 Tatra (815)s
        - 3 GAZ-33088
        - 2 ZiL-131s
        - 2 Armoured Ural-4320s
        - 2 Ural-4320s
        - 1 V3S
        - Numerous technicals with associated anti-aircraft guns

        The list includes at least twenty-six tanks, most of which captured within the perimeter of the city itself. Interestingly, most tanks appeared not to have been moved out of their bases, confirming that their crews had already fled well in advance of the Islamic State's takeover of the city. While this already poses a serious issue, the fact that none of them were then demolished by the remaining defenders or the Syrian or Russian Air Forces allowed the Islamic State to further strengthen its forces and could have led to serious consequences for T4 airbase later on.


        Nonetheless, other tanks were seen parked at one of the several checkpoints guarding the city. While this may seem to make a lot more tactical sense than the situation described in the previous paragraph, the checkpoint the tanks were spotted at actually faced away from the Islamic State's advance. While Tadmur was thus packed with heavy weaponry, only a small part of that was actually available to the defenders on the frontline.


        Boosted by the large amount of weaponry and ammunition captured in and around Tadmur, the fighters of the Islamic State then set their eyes on T4 airbase, which had proved an obstacle too ambitious to take on after the Islamic State captured Tadmur for the first time in May 2015. Indeed, the Islamic State's second attempt at taking T4 bears heavy resemblance to their previous effort. After capturing Tadmur on the 11th of December, the road to 'Fortress T4' was practically open, allowing for significant progress at advancing closer to the airbase.

        T4, sharing its name with the nearby pumping station, is the Syrian Arab Air Force's (SyAAF) most important airbase. The remains of two fighter-bomber squadrons, a detachment of L-39s, one helicopter squadron, other helicopter detachments and Russian assets are currently operating out of T4, including the pride of the SyAAF: Its Su-24MK2s. Despite being Syria's largest airbase, T4 only has one runway, making the airbase's aircraft vulnerable in case it gets taken out. Given its status, it is unsurprising that the airbase is extremely well defended, now also including elements of the Russian military.

        While the Islamic State had previously found itself unable to overcome T4's strong defences, its second attempt was carried out by a much stronger force, further bolstered by weaponry previously captured in Tadmur, which exceeded that of the previous capture in numbers. Before reaching the airbase's line of defensive, large swaths of open terrain surrounding the Eastern and Southern part of the T4 had to be overcome however. This is where the Islamic State's previous attempt came to a grinding halt, a place that would prove to be just as troublesome for its fighters this time around.


        While the Islamic State could count on an increased number of fighters and weaponry, T4's defences were meanwhile quickly reinforced with elements of the Syrian military, including the first elements of the 5th Corps, and Russian special forces in addition to the experienced defenders already present. As the flat terrain worked heavily in the favour of the defenders, the Islamic State's best option was to attempt to encircle the airbase and try to achieve a breakthrough at a place less well defended. With reinforcements for the defenders underway, time was of the essence.

        To deny the government the ability to bring in these additional reinforcements, cutting the road connection between T4 and government-held territory was necessary to prevent a safe passage to the airbase. A strong Islamic State presence on the West side of T4 would also force the defenders to reinforce this part of the airbase, which is naturally less easily defended. This, in combination with Islamic State attacks on the Eastern and Southern part of T4 could have presented the Islamic State with the much needed weak spot that could then be exploited by the main force following behind. Images showing just how close the Islamic State had meanwhile gotten to T4 airbase can be seen below.


        While the fighters of the Islamic State succeeded in temporarily disputing the major road leading to the airbase, they once again proved unable to maintain the encirclement of the airbase, allowing the regime to bring in further reinforcements. The Islamic State's armour also proved unable to place themselves into positions allowing for supression of the defenders due to the presence of anti-tank guided missiles (ATGMs), which knocked out several Islamic State tanks that attempted to do so. Russian ATGM teams armed with 9M133 Kornet ATGMs were also active at T4.

        Further help came from an unexpected corner, as Coalition aircraft reportedly struck fourteen tanks, three howitzers, two buildings and two vehicles, supposedly killing at least thirty-eight Islamic State fighters in the vicinity of T4 airbase, denying the Islamic State the ability to build up sufficient forces needed for attempting a breakthrough. In the meantime, the weather took a turn for the worse and temporarily covered the surrounding area in snow, as depicted below.


        Although continuing to exert heavy pressure on the Northern, Eastern and Southern part of T4, even capturing a S-125 surface-to-air missile site on the Northern flank, the Islamic State failed to find the weak spot needed to have any serious chance at infiltrating the airbase, at which point its offensive effectively ended. It had taken heavy losses while attempting to advance further into government-held territory, and much of the remaining Islamic State contingent left the area for Deir ez-Zor. The Islamic State was now on the defence, which would soon reveal a major weakness due to the unabating attrition its forces face.

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        This was the Islamic State's Beast of Mosul

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        By Stijn Mitzer

        There it was, what looked to be a tram or an armoured battle wagon parked under a tree in the town of Bawiza, North of Mosul in November 2016. Abandoned by its previous owners, this behemoth previously made an appearance in the now infamous Islamic State offensive near Naweran, North of Mosul, a video which went viral due to the rather comical performance of several fighters involved in the offensive. While Abu Hajaar became the inspiration of memes across all corners of the internet, the Islamic State's usage of up-armoured trucks and other vehicles involved in this offensive was of particular interest for others.

        While many of the Islamic State's DIY creations were often very crude in nature, merely consisting of metal plates slapped onto a vehicle's hull, a large industry aimed at converting vehicles to better suit the Islamic State's needs did exist, and produced several designs perfectly suited for the type of warfare encountered in the Syrian and Iraqi theatre. The armour workshops responsible for these designs were located through Islamic State held territory, with the largest workshops located near Tabqa in Syria and Mosul in Iraq.


        Shortly after the capture of Mosul, the Islamic State established several armoured formations to operate the masses of vehicles and equipment left behind by the Iraqi Army and Police during their retreat from Mosul. While a portion of the vehicles was immediately deployed in the Iraqi and Syrian theatre of operations with virtually no modifications, others were modified for use as VBIEDs or as armoured fighting vehicles to be used on the plains of Mosul with the 'Storming Battalion'.

        In their role as Inghimasi – shock troops tasked with penetrating enemy lines without any expectation to come back alive – the 'Storming Battalion' mainly made use of faster wheeled vehicles as opposed to heavier and slower tracked armoured fighting vehicles. While small numbers of tanks were in fact operated in an offensive role by the Islamic State in Iraq, most of these belonged to the 'al-Farouq Armoured Brigade' and 'Shield Battalion'. Thus, it is mainly the 'Storming Battalion' that made use of improvised and up-armoured AFVs.


        Many of the vehicles converted for use with the 'Storming Battalion' were essentially armoured personnel carriers (APCs), featuring a cabin for the fighters to stand in and shoot from. Owing to the suicidal nature of the Islamic State's offensives around Mosul (more on which can be read here and here), the 'Storming Battalion's' offensives almost exclusively lead to the destruction of the vehicles before reaching their objective. But with plenty of trucks and other vehicles at hand for conversion, the production of vehicles for the 'Storming Battalion' continued and even standernised somewhat, with only marginal differences found on vehicles of essentially the same class. In the case of the battle tram, three examples are confirmed to have been produced, serialed '201' and '202' and likely '200'. Seen below is '202' (right) and '200' (left and bottom image), the latter of which was lost under unknown circumstances.


        The battle trams feature a heavily armoured front cabin, which is (with a little imagination) somewhat reminiscent of a bird-like face or even a character from Thomas the Tank Engine depending on the variant, inspiring the designator "battle tram". Spaced armour covers the fighter's compartment while metal plates protect the wheels, eight of which are present on this vehicle. Indeed, the battle tram is almost certainly based on the modified chassis of a Soviet BTR-80 APC, several of which were captured around Mosul back in 2014.

        Although certainly a curious choice for the conversion to what is essentially a truck, previous attempts at producing such large armoured personnel carriers resulted in a host of impressive but awkward looking vehicles based on dump trucks. Contrary to these examples, the battle tram appears to be relatively well-balanced in its design.


        The armament of the battle trams remain unchanged from their monstrous predecessors, compromising an heavily armoured cupola in which a light or heavy machine gun can be fitted. Interestingly, battle tram '202' appears to be equipped with four rams on the front, two of which might also serve as structural reinforcement. Although these rams could be effective for breaking through certain obstacles, it would also make the vehicle prone to get stuck while navigating uneven terrain, not to mention that the debris from a collapsing obstacle would end up on the fighters' heads in the infantry compartment. No ladders for scaling trenches for climbing up Peshmerga positions were seen installed on '202', despite being a feature of '200' and '201'.

        The cabin of the battle tram is largely similar to those of other vehicles used by the 'Storming Battalion'. Instead of seatbels found on smaller vehicles, metal handlebars were installed to provide support to the fighters inside during high speed operations. No pintle-mounts for light or heavy machine guns are present, forcing the crew to fire their weapons either without stabilisation or from the metal handlebars,which proved far from successful when used by inexperienced fighters.Battle tram '202' has a slightly different cabin layout than '200' and '201', with the small exit door located on the rear, and not on the side as with battle trams '200' and '201'.


        The first battle tram featured in the now (in)famous Islamic State offensive near Naweran, North of Mosul. This offensive, apart from Abu Hajaar, Abu Abdullah and Abu Ridhwan in their up-armoured M1114, saw the participation of several highly modified trucks and other vehicles by the 'Storming Battalion'. This included the first battle tram '201', seen here shortly before the commencement of the offensive and shortly after the conclusion of the failed offensive.


        The battle tram, along with the rest of the 'Storming Battalion's' vehicles, was effectively trapped when the bulldozer tasked with filling the huge trench in front of the Peshermerga positions was taken out. Shortly after, the battle tram was hit and subsequently abandoned by its operators, similar to what happened to the vehicle of Abu Hajaar. The presence of spaced armour installed on the sides of the vehicle is clearly visible here, and was apparently effective in stopping at least one hit before the vehicle was abandoned.


        Seen above: Battle tram '201' underway near Naweran filmed out of Abu Hajaar's M1114. An RPG gunner stands in the armoured cabin of the battle tram aiming his next shot. Despite all of the increased weight because of the extra armour, the truck appears to have little problems crossing the field at reasonable speed. The large size of the vehicle is well apparent compared to the up-armoured M1114 behind, and makes for an easy target for Peshmerga ATGM teams or RPG gunners. Indeed, the usage of such a vehicle on the plains of Mosul is bound to end in failure due to the aforementioned reasons, and it would possibly be better suited for usage in urban environments.


        The Islamic State's efforts to self-produce several types of armoured fighting vehicles has resulted in a myriad of highly specialised vehicles well adapted to the type of assaults typically carried out by the Islamic State. The profileration of ATGMs and the presence of Coalition aircraft and helicopters in the air over any major Islamic State offensive has however made these AFVs completely out of place on the Iraqi battlefield. Nonetheless, a true belief in the possibility of success has led to attempt after attempt, each time ending with the same result: annihilation. While the Islamic State's efforts in the field of design and production were certainly impressive, producing large numbers of vehicles for use in offensives that are practically doomed right from the start is in sharp contrast to the operations of the Islamic State performed elsewhere, a luxury it wouldn't be able to afford for much longer.

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        Striking from the Dark, Jaish al-Islam fires Iranian Zelzal-2 rockets

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        By Stijn Mitzer

        Jaish al-Islam has once again secured its place in the spotlight after firing at least two Iranian Zelzal-2 artillery rockets against regime positions in Syria on the 6th of March 2017. Jaish al-Islam had previously deployed one of its Zelzal-2s in retaliation for the continued airstrikes on Jaish al-Islam held Eastern Ghouta on the 31th of August 2015, and although the target and results of the underreported attack remain unknown, the strike confirmed that the threat of a non-state party firing off long-range rockets was very real. A video of the March 2017 launches can be seen here.

        The current deployment of Zelzal-2s, dubbed 'Islam-5' by Jaish al-Islam, likely serves the same goals of deterrent and revenge as it did back in August 2015. Indeed, shortly before the launch of the first Zelzal-2 a member of Jaish al-Islam reads the following statement:

        ''In response to attacks by regime forces on civilians in the districts of Qaboun and Tishreen in Eastern Damascus as well as on Eastern Ghouta, we Rocket and Artillery regiments of Jaish al-Islam in the Qalamoun area, declare the launch of missile shelling campaign on regime positions.''

        The first deployment of the Zelzal-2 came as a surprise to many as Jaish al-Islam was previously unknown to be in the possession of such sophisticated weaponry. Indeed, the capture of these missiles was not featured in any of the rebel's press releases or videos. Although the exact story on how Jaish al-Islam acquired Iranian Zelzal-2s remains unclear, these artillery rockets were believed to have been captured in Syria's Qalamoun region by elements of the Free Syrian Army in 2013, which subsequently sold the Zelzal-2s (thought to total at least five in number) to Jaish al-Islam. As no launcher was believed to have been captured, Jaish al-Islam subsequently engineered its own launch platform.


        The one-and-a-half year gap between the two launches confirms a pattern that has been typical of the usage of Jaish al-Islam's military assets throughout the course of the Syrian Civil War. Instead of utilising its assets to their full potential in the Civil War as they become available, Jaish al-Islam is deploying them mainly as a deterrent, threatening their use to force the regime to reconsider its military actions against Jaish al-Islam and Eastern Ghouta.

        This strategy first became apparent with Jaish al-Islam's usage of its three 9K33 mobile surface-to-air missile (SAM) systems, which have only been used on several occassions in the past several years despite the fact that plenty of missiles are available to Jaish al-Islam. With no missiles confirmed to have been fired for more than two years in between the last two launches despite an abundance of targets, it appears Jaish al-Islam is indeed unwilling to constantly operate these systems in a conventional role.


        The Zelzal-2 is a 610mm unguided artillery rocket originally developed by Iran during the 1990s, which became the subject of controversy after it was reported that Hizbullah was in possession of the system, thereby putting large parts of Israel in its range. Although it remains unknown if Hizbullah ever did possess the Zelzal-2s, their presence in Lebanon is unlikely. In the meantime, Iran was in the process of setting up an assembly line for Zelzal-2 artillery rockets and Fateh 110 ballistic missiles in Syria. The missiles were first seen in 2011's rocket and missile exercises, which were held in an effort to project Syria's strength to the outside world amidst the increasingly deteriorating security situation in the country.

        Although often confused for a ballistic missile, the Zelzal-2 is in fact an unguided artillery rocket. Although the CEP (circular error probable) of the Zelzal-2 is currently unknown, the spin-stabilized projectile is anything but a precise weapon, and is best aimed at larger targets such as airbases. The Zelzal-2's 600 kilogram heavy warhead is capable of striking targets up to an impressive range of 200 kilometers, and possibly even beyond.

        Interestingly, in Syria artillery rockets and missiles are seen as weapons of revenge and thus purposely named after military defeats suffered at the hands of foreign powers. Accordingly, the Zelzal-2 became the 'Maysalun', referring to the Battle of Maysalun, where the Arab Kingdom suffered a defeat at the hands of the French Army in 1920. The Fateh 110 became known as the 'Tishreen', which in turn refers to the October War. Along the same lines, the Scud is referred to as 'Joulan', in reference to the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights.

        Only a limited number of Iranian Zelzal-2s and Fateh 110s are believed to have been fired against rebel targets throughout the course of the Syrian Civil War. Instead, regime forces have made heavy use of Soviet R-17 'Scud' and 9M79(-1/M) 'Tochka-U' missiles against rebel held villages, almost exclusively resulting in civilian casualties. Russia is reported to have delivered additional missiles for these systems as Syria is believed to have run out of its original stock of 9M79M missiles. The Maysalun (left)and the Tishreen (right)can be seen in the images below.


        Despite their significance, the introduction of the Zelzal-2 'Maysalun' and the Fateh 110 'Tishreen' into Syrian service and the setting up of a production line for these weapons was especially notable due to the fact that they were but a part of a much larger Iranian-Syrian agreement to turn Syria into a weapons depot for Hizbullah. In this role, a large portion of the heavy weaponry destined for Hizbullah would be held back in Syria awaiting a future potential conflict with Israel. This included and still includes multiple rocket launchers, artillery rockets and ballistic missiles, but also anti-ship missiles.

        The reason for this peculiar deal has to do with the inability to safely store and defend larger weapons systems in Lebanon. Buildings containing such high value targets are extremely vulnerable without an integrated network of surface-to-air missile systems (SAMs), something which Hizbullah lacks.Syria could be said to perform much better in this department with the planned acquisition of S-300PMU-2s, Buk-M2s, Pechora-2Ms and Pantsir-S1s, although the delivery of the first has been postponed and is ultimately believed to have been cancelled. This dense network of surface-to-air missiles should have deterred the Israeli Air Force from targeting these weapons depots, yet it has so far proved unable to counter the continued aerial intrusions and airstrikes by the Israelis.

        This agreement was first put to the testin 2006, when Syrian 220mm and 302mm Khaibar-1 multiple rocket launchers (MRLs) crossed the border with Lebanon and positioned themselves throughout the country in preparation of striking targets in Israel. While Hizbullah was responsible for the covert transportation and operations of these MRLs in Lebanon, Syria's 158th Missile Regiment is believed to have operated the Khaibar-1s in close cooperation with Hizbullah. At least one Khaibar-1 was destroyed by the Israeli Air Force during the course of the war. A large-scale possible deployment of Syrian MRLs and ballistic missiles vehicles in Lebanon is also the reason why all vehicles are based on brightly coloured civilian trucks, which can move through Lebanon relatively unnoticed and quickly be reconfigured to a more civilian look shortly after launching their deadly payload.

        Yet Syria's participation is believed to have gone much further than supplying Hizbullah with arms and ammunition (including 9M133 Kornets) and operating multiple rocket launchers on behalf of Hizbullah. Similar to its involvement in operating these systems, it is also believed to have been the primary culprit behind the attack on the INS Hanit, an Israeli Sa'ar 5 class corvette, which killed four crew members. This ship was hit by a Chinese C-802 or its Iranian derivative; the launcher and personnel employed were likely supplied by Syria.


        Although nowadays completely overshadowed by those of the Islamic State, Jaish al-Islam's accomplishments during the course of the Civil War have been nothing short of spectacular. It was the first faction to operate its armour and infantry in a single mechanised force, as opposed to the poor coordination between the two often seen with other forces. Also, as mentioned before it can be said to be the only rebel faction to successfully maintain air defenceforces. In late 2013, Jaish al-Islam even established its own air force based at Kshesh airbase. While none of its L-39s ever flew operational sorties, it proved what Jaish al-Islam was capable of.

        Similarly, it remains the only rebel faction to operate weapons in the Zelzal-2's class, even if it is uncertain how many missiles are in their arsenal. Despite the fact that the inaccuracy of this weapon makes it unlikely it actually managed to destroy anything, Jaish al-Islam's warning of a continued shelling campaigns should not be taken lightly, and only the future will tell if they are capable and willing of following through on it.

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        Book Review: MiG-23 Flogger in the Middle East by Tom Cooper

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        By Stijn Mitzer

        Although many military enthusiasts spend hours scrounging local markets and shops for any interesting books on past and current military affairs to add to their evergrowing collection of books, not nearly enough know about Helion's @War series (which is divided into Africa, Asia, Europe, the Middle East and Latin America) covering mainly post-World War II conflicts.

        As three of our four upcoming books on North Korea's Armed Forces (1: Army, Special Operations Force, 2: Air Force, Navy and Strategic Rocket Force and 3: Foreign Intelligence Agencies) will be included in the Asia@War series, our interests have obviously been drawn to the other volumes as well.

        In this new segment we'll be covering some of our favourite @War series books, with the aim of increasing public awareness of their existence and occasionally sneaking in some shameless self-promotion as well. As I'm a firm believer in a review concept that generates curiosity and encourages further reading rather than trying to explain a whole book from cover to cover, I'll try to keep every review brief and spoiler-free.

        We'll be kicking off with 'MiG-23 Flogger in the Middle East' written by Tom Cooper and published by Helion & Company.

        Title: MiG-23 Flogger in the Middle East, Mikoyan i Gurevich MiG-23 in Service in Algeria, Egypt, Iraq, Libya and Syria, 1973-2018
        Date of publication: June 2018
        Binding: Paperback
        Paper size: A4
        Pages: 72
        Photos: 91 black-and-white photos and three full-colour photos
        Artworks: 20
        Text comprehensibility for non-native English readers: Excellent

        But before beginning the review, it is insightful to consider the background of the @War series. Following the pattern set up by the Africa@War book series, the @War series has expanded to cover Asia, Europe, the Middle East and Latin America to provide a series of in-depth studies of military forces and armed conflicts on these continents.

        With each instalment, the @War series has meanwhile grown to such an extent that there really is something for everybody, from forgotten wars in South America prior to and after the Second World War to current conflicts like the Syrian Civil War and Yemeni Civil War that bring you up to speed with the latest developments and of course soon, all you ever wanted to know about the Korean People's Army and its branches.


        The philosophy of the @War series by Helion & Company is simple: It seeks to popularise expert knowledge by reaching out to historians and analysts (or vice versa) and asking them to bring their research into print, which in some cases would otherwise have remained confined to a hardrive. Indeed, while the number of books covering the Second World War is virtually endless, research on conflicts in forgotten corners of the world tend to get ignored by most other publishers out of fear the resulting books would generate insufficient profits. The @War series seeks to challenge this perception.

        Neatly packed in an A4 format book usually consisting of 40.000+ words (larger subjects tend to get split into multiple books) and supported by excellent colour profiles and often never before published photographs (most of which in black-and-white), they provide an easily accessible manner of familiarising oneself with a topic more thoroughly than any online resource ever could.

        As the vast majority of our loyal readers have a specific interest in equipment and battle reports, you should be feeling right at home with the @War series, which focuses on the organisational structure of militaries, their equipment, capabilities, tactics and combat operations. Each volume is richly illustrated by colour profiles of aircraft, vehicles, ships and nowadays even infantry (and soon A4 artworks thanks to yours truly).


        So how do you introduce a topic like the MiG-23 in the Middle East? Where do you start when covering an aircraft that formed the backbone of several air forces in the Middle East and North Africa in the past and present? Algeria? Egypt? Iraq perhaps? No, Tom Cooper starts off with the requirements set out by the Soviet High Command that would eventually lead to the MiG-23, and why this design philosophy not necessarily matched that of the soon-to-be operators in the Middle East and Northern Africa. This makes you really understand how the MiG-23 came to be and why the resulting aircraft performed the way it did in the various air forces around the world in which it was commissioned.

        Used in large numbers the Iran-Iraq War on the Iraqi side, but also facing off against foes such as Israel and in Libyan service even the US Navy, the MiG-23's history in the Middle East dates back as far as the mid-1970s. More recently, it has been deployed for combat in the Libyan and Syrian Civil Wars, with sporadic use continuing to this day.

        While considering its combat history, the combat specifics of the MiG-23 variants that entered service with MENA air forces is covered, from the dreadful MiG-23MS to the much-loved MiG-23ML(D) and arguably the most dashing variant of them all: The MiG-23BN. As Libya, Iraq and Syria were recipients of all major MiG-23 variants exported during the Cold War, useful comparisons can be made between the features and combat history of early- and late-generation Floggers. While newer variants of the MiG-23 brought with them updated avionics and radar amongst a range of other improvements, its MENA operators engaged in almost constant conflict with neighbouring countries were often the first to test the new equipment in combat. With North Korea currently being the largest operator of MiG-23s in the world, their findings are still very much relevant even today!

        The book also provides information on (highly successful and less successful) modernisation programmes of the MiG-23 carried out by Syria and Iraq, such as the mating of French Exocet anti-ship missiles to the venerable Flogger and the upgrade of MiG-23MLs with equipment taken from French Mirage F1s and stored Su-22 fighter-bombers, which in turn prevented several MiG-23MLs from being hit by U.S. AIM-120 AMRAAMs during aerial combats over and near the Coalition-established Iraqi no-fly zones during the 1990s.

        While one could argue that the combat history and specifics of the MiG-23 variants used in the Middle East and North Africa manages to touch on several niche subjects in one go, Tom does a great job at mating them with enough background information to understand what is going on without getting sidetracked too much and deviate from the subject at hand. The resulting text not only gives you an idea of the MiG-23's combat history in the Syrian Civil War, but also provides a unique insight into the whole of the SyAAF. Two for the price of one!

        The text is further supported by twenty beautifully drawn artworks showing the various MiG-23 variants in the camouflage patterns of their operators. Apart from being a delight to look at, these can go on to reveal interesting details about their loadouts, which not always consisted of your standard Soviet RBK and FAB bombs. Did you know that Algeria armed its MiG-23BNs with U.S. designed Mk.81 and Mk.82 bombs manufactured in South Africa? No? I didn't think so.


        Locations and tactics mentioned and explained in the text are well supported by illustrations and maps. Although a map of Syria dedicated to the Syrian Civil War theatre of operations is lacking, this isn't really a problem with Google Maps installed on just about every phone nowadays.


        All in all, MiG-23 Flogger in the Middle East is an exceptionally complete thesis on its subject matter, but manages to present its richly informative content in a way that's pleasant to read a commendable achievement for books of this type. We can only hope that more of such volumes will released in the future. With the list of @War books growing year on year, this is certain to happen!

        MiG-23 Flogger in the Middle East can be ordered for just £16.95 at Helion's own website. Mind you that buying your books directly from Helion means that more money ends up in the hands of the author and publisher rather than online stores, which further supports their work and increases the chances of more books being released.

        Syria Rearms: Russian deliveries of BMP-2s and 2S9s arrive

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        By Stijn Mitzer

        After the first deliveryof T-62Ms and BMP-1s to the Syrian Arab Army earlier this year, new imagery coming out of Syria has now revealed that more types of armoured fighting vehicles have recently been sent to the country onboard Russia's 'Syria Express'. These new deliveries come as government forces are currently making major gains in Eastern Homs against the fighters of Islamic State, and the new vehicles will likely be deployed here to bring the fight back to the Islamic State once and for all.

        The delivery of large amounts of weaponry and vehicles is part of the de-facto re-establishment of the Syrian Arab Army, with the aim of creating a unified army incorporating some of the many militias that are currently active throughout Syria. The driving force behind this processis the newly established 5th Corps, which is to serve as a counterweight to the increasing strength of the aforementioned militias that have largely taken over the role of the Syrian Arab Army (SyAA) in the past six years.

        In accordance with Russia's role in the reinstatement of the Syrian Arab Army, it is also Russia that is responsible for training and equipping the new force. Although this led some to believe that Syria would soon receive additional T-72s, T-90s or even BMP-3s, all of which would be more advanced than the current armour composition of the regime forces, the deliveries until thus far have mostly included older weaponry excess to requirements or no longer in service with the Russian Army itself.

        Nonetheless, many of these delivered vehicles and weaponry are ideally suited for the Syrian Arab Army in their current operations against the many factions fighting over control of parts of Syria. In addition to the delivery of small arms and large numbers of Ural, GAZ, KamAZ and UAZ trucks and jeeps, other deliveries so far have encompassed T-62Ms, BMP-1(P)s and 122mm M-1938 (M-30) howitzers, and now also including BMP-2s infantry fighting vehicles and 120mm 2S9 self-propelled mortars.

        The delivery of BMP-2s and 2S9s is of interest as previous deliveries to the 5th Corps amounted to less advanced equipment such as BMP-1s and World War 2-era 122mm M-30 howitzers. The fact that more advanced equipment is now arriving in Syria might be a sign that Russia deems the rearmament programme a success, and could potentially step up the delivery of more advanced equipment as the conflict continues to develop in favour of the current government.


        Despite the relative scarcity of the BMP-2 in footage and images of the Civil War, this vehicle is certainly no stranger to the Syrian battlefield. Indeed, Syria continues to operate the survivors of the around 100 BMP-2s it had previously acquired in the late eighties, all but a few of which are in service with the Republican Guard in operations mostly in and around Damascus. In addition to the BMP-2s already in service since the 1980s, a limited number of BMP-2s along with T-72Bs and BMP-1s were received from Russia in 2015 to take part in operations near Tadmur. At least one but possibly two of these BMP-2s were subsequently destroyed here.

        The vehicles that are currently being delivered can easily be discerned from the BMP-2s already operating in Syria by their dark green camouflage and more importantly, by the presence of anti-radiation lining installed on the turret, which is only present from the BMP-2 Obr. 1984 variant and onwards. The BMP-2s that Syria had previously received in the late eighties were of the older Obr. 1980 variant and lack such anti-radiation lining, as well as other incremental improvements.

        The BMP-2 improves significantly upon the capabilities of the BMP-1, which has served as the Syrian Arab Army's main infantry fighting vehicle ever since its introduction in the 1970s. Originally designed for use on the plains of Europe, the armament of the BMP-1 was quickly found to be inadequate for supporting infantry and incapable of targeting heavily armoured armoured fighting vehicles. In addition, the BMP-1's mediocre gun elevation, lack of armour and inability to fire accurately while on the move makes it woefully outdatedfor use in today's conflicts.

        Incorporating many of the lessions learned from the BMP-1, the BMP-2 does away with several of these serious drawbacks. Most notably is the replacement of the 73mm 2A28 cannon with a fast-firing 30mm 2A42, which is very well-suited for supporting infantry and suppressing enemy positions thanks to its high elevation. The BMP-2 also comes with an anti-tank guided missile (ATGM) launcher for the 9M113 Konkurs as opposed to the BMP-1's unwieldy 9M14 Malyutka, which is rarely fitted let alone used.


        The delivery of the 2S9 is also notable as this vehicle was previously not in service with the Syrian Arab Army, which had until thus far has never operated any type of self-propelled mortars. The 2S9 is armed with a 120mm breech-loaded 2A51 mortar that can lob shells over a distance of eight kilometers with conventional ammunition, and over 12 kilometers with a rocket assisted projectile. A guided mortar round has also been developed for the 2S9, but is unlikely to have been deployed to Syria.

        While the Syrian Arab Army continues to operate large numbers of 122mm 2S1s and 122mm BM-21s in addition to several types of towed artillery guns for artillery support, the high elevation of the 2S9 makes it perfect for engaging entrenched Islamic State positions on mountains and ridges regime forces are currently facing in Eastern Homs. While some might be quick to note that the 2S9 is air-droppable, it is unlikely that any will be sent to Deir ez-Zor this way. As the 2S9 is the first of its type to have entered service with regime forces, it is likely that crews will first have to be trained on the vehicle, which is true for the BMP-2 as well (albeit to a lesser extent) so it might take some time before they show up on the frontline.

        As regime forces are currently making major gains, mainly against the Islamic State, Russia appears intent on affirming its support for the Syrian government, further consolidating its stakes in a conflict that has so far seemed to continue on endlessly. For Syria, the actual delivery of these vehicles is possibly much less significant than the trend it represents. With an ally that is essentially capable of indefinitely replenishing the Syrian Arab Army's stocks and that despite economic hardships is willing to pay the checks required to bring about its return as a coherent fighting force, eventual victory for the pro-regime forces seems likely, barring any unexpected twists and turns in the future course of the war. Whatever the case, the current developments are certain to affect the strategic balance between force battling over Syria significantly, and could well have far-reaching consequences for the ultimate outcome of the Syrian War.

        Special thanks to Morant Mathieu.

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        Replenishing the Stocks: Russian deliveries of T-62Ms and BMP-1s reach Syria

        Rearming Syria: Russian deliveries of T-62MVs and BRM-1Ks arrive

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        By Stijn Mitzer

        After the deliveryof T-62Ms, BMP-1s, BMP-2s and at least one 2S9 to the Syrian Arab Army since early 2017, new imagery and combat footage coming out of Syria's Idlib Governorate has now revealed that more variants of these types have been sent to the country onboard Russia's 'Syria Express'.

        In accordance with Russia's role in the reinstatement of the Syrian Arab Army, it is also Russia that is responsible for training and equipping the new force. Although this led some to believe that Syria would receive additional T-72Bs, T-90s or even BMP-3s, all of which would be more advanced than the current armour composition of the regime forces, the deliveries until thus far have mostly included older weaponry excess to Russian requirements.

        Nonetheless, many of these delivered vehicles and weaponry are ideally suited for the Syrian Arab Army for their simplicity and ease of operating. In addition to the delivery of small arms and large numbers of Ural, GAZ, KamAZ and UAZ trucks and jeeps, other deliveries so far have encompassed T-62Ms, BMP-1(P)s and World War II-era 122mm M-1938 (M-30) howitzers in addition to smaller numbers of T-72s, T-90s and BMP-2s delivered in 2015.

        Although the newly-delivered T-62s are less advanced than some of the more modern T-72 variants also employed by the Syrian military, the delivery of these AFVs are still a welcome addition to the badly-depleted vehicle park of the Syrian Arab Army. While not equipped with any active protection systems such as the Shtora found on the T-90, the capabilities of the T-62M are a vast improvement over those of the T-55 and earlier T-62 variants. The BRM-1Ks offer little novel in the area of offensive or defensive capabilities, but could well end up being valuable assets for the reconnaissance capabilities they bring with them.


        The T-62M is an upgrade programme aimed at upgrading several variants of the T-62, which by the early 1980s had become severely outmatched by their more modern Western counterparts, to a common standard. The programme aimed to adress the T-62's shortcomings in the field of firepower, protection and mobility, greatly improving the capabilities of the until then underperforming tank.

        To utilise the full potential of the powerful 115mm gun the 'Volna' fire control system module with a KTD laser rangefinder (LRF) was installed. The tank also gained the capability to launch the tube-fired 9M117 (9K116-2) Sheksna ATGM, which are unlikely to have been delivered to Syria. For this purpose, both the gunner and commander received new sighting systems, now also allowing for much increased efficacy during night combat. The increased armour protection was achieved by the installment of BDD appliqué armour on the turret front and upper and lower glacis plates, increased armour protection against anti-tank mines, rubber side skirts and anti-radiation lining on parts of the turret. The T-62MV received Kontakt-1 explosive reactive armour (ERA) on the turret, side skirts and glacis plate instead of the BDD appliqué armour installation. The resulting increased weight was compensated by a new 620hp V-55U diesel engine. In addition to all this, the tank was equipped with a new stabiliser, a thermal sleeve for its 115mm gun, a new radio and a block of smoke grenade launchers on each side of the turret.

        While several variants such as the T-62 Obr. 1967 and T-62 Obr. 1972 were upgraded to the common T-62M standard, both are still easily discernible by the lack of the 12.7mm DShK on the T-62 Obr. 1967. Interestingly, Syria received both Obr. 1967s and Obr. 1972s upgraded to T-62M standards but also non-upgraded T-62 Obr. 1972s and now T-62MVs. At least one of the non-upgraded T-62 Obr. 1972s, still complete with the Russian H22-0-0 rail transit marker that was applied in Russia before shipment to Syria, was already captured by rebel forces near Barsah, Idlib Governorate in mid-January this year. Also note the protective cover around the TSh-2B-41 gunner sight, a local modification more often seen fitted to T-72s.


        Despite its age, the T-62M(V) has only just been retired from active service by the Russian Army after decades of counter-terrorism operations in the Caucascus. Following their active-duty career,  the remaining tanks joined those already stored in Russia's massive military depots located in the Central and Eastern Military Districts, most notably in the Republic of Buryatia, suggesting most were never to see service again.

        Nevertheless, a sizeable number of T-62s are being restored to working conditions to take part in military exercises simulating Russia's capability to reactivate large numbers of tanks and other armoured fighting vehicles in case of an all-out war. With literally thousands of more modern tanks currently in reserve status, there is little reason in returning the tanks to their storage depots. And with an ally that suffers a high attrition rate in combat operations, a match was found.

        Before their appearance in Syria, some of the T-62Ms were already spotted throughout Russia while underway to a harbour for transport to Syria. These vehicles were then shipped onboard the 'Syria Express' towards Tartus. [1] [2]


        While images coming out of Russia suggest that the first shipment of T-62MVs was already prepared for transport to Syria in May 2018 [3], it wouldn't be until August 2019 when the first evidence of the T-62MV's presence in Syria surfaced, when a single T-62MV was damaged and then captured by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS). [4] The eventual fate of this vehicle remains unknown, and it's entirely possible that the (also Russian-delivered) MRO-A RPG fired at it damaged it beyond repair.

        The image below, dating from October 2019, shows desert-camouflaged T-62M(V)s in Syria that likely belonged to a batch of some 40 tanks seen in Tartus harbour in September 2019. [5] Contrary to these tanks, most of the unpainted tanks operating in Syria can still be seen with the H22-0-0 rail transit markers that were applied in Russia before shipment to Syria.


        In addition to the T-62M(V)s, a limited number of BRM-1K reconnaissance variants were received from Russia in early 2017 to take part in operations near Tadmur, which was successfully recaptured from Islamic State in early March 2017.


        The delivery of BRM-1Ks is perhaps even more notable as this vehicle type was previously not in service with the Syrian Arab Army. The BRM-1K is armed with the same 73mm 2A28 cannon of the BMP-1, but has a wider turret moved further to the rear, not unreminiscent of the one seen on the BMP-2. In adordance with its new role, the BMP-1's autoloader and ATGM launcher were foregone and the ammunition loadout was reduced from 40 to 20 rounds for its 73mm cannon. In their place, a laser rangefinder, a range of navigation and detection devices, a mine detector, and additional radios and day/night observation devices are fitted. In case of detection by the enemy, six 81 mm 902V "Tucha" smoke grenade launchers can temporarily mask the vehicle's location, potentially allowing it to escape.

        The BRM-1K also comes with a PSNR-5K "Tall Mike" ground surveillance radar that can detect armoured fighting vehicles from roughly 7 kilometres away and movement of personnel from 2 kilometres. The addition of the new equipment necessitated an increase to 6 crewmembers, as a result of which its infantry capabilities are greatly diminished to two just soldiers (which would take the place of the observators). How much of the original equipment is still fitted to the vehicles shipped to Syria, or if the vehicle is actually used in its intended role rather than as a light tank is unknown, but the latter scenario appears likeliest.


        While the number of BRM-1Ks delivered to Syria is unknown, three have already been captured by opposing forces in Idlib, two of which in the raid on Barsah that also rewarded its capturers with the Russian-delivered T-62 Obr. 1972 described earlier in this article. At least one of these vehicles was then put to use by HTS on the 6th of February this year, ironically in role of IFV/APC with no less than four people cramped into the rear compartment. [6]

        In an effort to provide some additional protection to the BRM-1K's weak side armour, slat armour was installed by HTS prior to its use on the battlefield. Note that the driver of the vehicle already wrecked the right door within minutes after heading out to the battlefield. While keeping the doors open (which also function as the vehicle's fuel tanks) is common practice on BMP-1s in Syria, the lack of space in the BRM-1K makes it a definite requirement in order to hold four man.


        For Syria, the delivery of additional T-62M(V)s and BRM-1Ks is possibly much less significant than the trend it represents. With an ally that is capable of indefinitely replenishing the Syrian Arab Army's stocks and bring about its return as a coherent fighting force, eventual victory for government forces in Idlib seems certain, barring any unexpected twists and turns in the future course of the war.

        Special thanks to Morant Mathieu and Calibre Obscura from calibreobscura.com.

        [1] #PutinAtWar: Soviet Tanks Reactivated in Russia’s East https://medium.com/dfrlab/putinatwar-soviet-tanks-reactivated-in-russias-east-a81a111051a1
        [2] Russia has dug out another trainload of T-62M and T-62MV tanks from their depots. This time near Ulan-Ude https://russia.liveuamap.com/en/2019/27-may-russia-has-dug-out-another-trainload-of-t62m-and-t62mv
        [3] https://twitter.com/MathieuMorant/status/1193848312283185152
        [4] https://twitter.com/calibreobscura/status/1167187591843733505
        [5] https://twitter.com/obretix/status/1185924505413308423
        [6] https://twitter.com/Danspiun/status/1225539780118827009 

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        The Idlib Turkey Shoot: The Destruction and Capture of Vehicles and Equipment by Turkish and Rebel Forces

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        By Stijn Mitzer in collaboration with Calibre Obscura

        Turkish air and ground strikes which commenced late on the 27th of February 2020 on positions of the Syrian Arab Army (SyAA) and affiliated forces hit a large number of targets throughout Idlib and Aleppo, leading to the complete collapse of government forces along this part of the frontline and allowing rebel forces to continue their advance after recapturing the strategic town of Saraqib. Launched in retaliation after the killing of 33 Turkish soldiers in an airstrike, Turkey has now entered a new phase in its war in Syria, and at present the long-term implications can only be guessed at.

        To purposely strike a Turkish military position only to get completely annihilated in retaliatory strikes raises the issue of whether the current organisation in charge of regime operations is capable of dealing with the situation it faces. The catastrophic outcome of the regime's (and Russia's) attempt at directly challenging Turkey's resolve must have not only amazed those following the offensive, but also the regime's military itself. Completely misjudging the impending danger and incapable of properly anticipating Turkey's retaliatory strikes, the Syrian military totally collapsed in the face of drones and artillery. Instead of engaging or at least deterring Turkish aircraft and drones from freely striking government forces on the ground, the Syrian Arab Air Force (SyAAF) and Syrian Arab Air Defence Force (SyAADF) have so far done nothing to stop the Turkish Air Force from penetrating into Syrian airspace.

        What is certain is that for rebel forces Turkey's new phase could not have come at a better time. As the tide of the war is now in favour of the regime, rebel forces lost theoffensive posture many groups managed to cling on to for much of the war. With rebel forces in Idlib everywhere on the defensive and losing, Idlib has largely been cut off from the largest supplier of weaponry and ammunition to factions opposing the Syrian government: The Syrian Arab Army. The latter's failure to redistribute, protect, or at least destroy major arms depots like Ayyash ensured a seemingly endless supply of vehicles, weaponry and ammunition to opposing forces in Syria. Nowadays mostly relying on small batches of munitions purchased on the black market or received from foreign powers, the only way for rebels in Idlib to stock up on heavier equipment like tanks is through smash and grab attacks on poorly defended but overstocked regime positions and now, a Turkish-backed offensive launched against the city of Saraqib.

        A detailed list of the destroyed and captured vehicles, weaponry and ammunition and can be seen below.

        This list only includes captured vehicles and equipment of which photo or videographic evidence is available. Therefore, the amount of equipment destroyed by Turkey and captured by Idlibi rebel forces is undoubtedly higher than recorded here. Small arms and munitions are currently not included in this list, but will be added after the release of Calibre Obscura's list tomorrow.

        This list will be updated as additional footage becomes available.

        (Click on the numbers to get a picture of each individual captured or destroyed vehicle)

        Tanks (35, of which destroyed: 22)

         

        Infantry fighting vehicles (19, of which destroyed: 7)

         

        Self-propelled artillery (20, of which destroyed: 20)

         

        Multiple rocket launchers (9, of which destroyed: 9)


        Mortars (3, of which destroyed: 1)

         

        (Self-propelled) anti-aircraft guns (3, of which destroyed: 1)

         

        Surface-to-air missile systems (2, of which destroyed: 2)

        •  1 Pantsir-S1: (1, reported to have been destroyed at Kweres or Abu ad-Duhor)
        •  1 Buk-M2 (1, reported to have been destroyed at Kweres or Abu ad-Duhor)

         

        Aircraft and Helicopters (10, of which destroyed: 10)

        •  2 Su-24MK2s (downed on the 1st of March 2020)
        •  5 Mi-8/17s (1, 2, 3, reported to have been destroyed at Kweres and Abu ad-Duhor, 4 and 5 shot down by MANPADS on the 11th and 14th of Feburary respectively)
        •  3 MBB 223 Flamingos (Hit in a hangar at Kweres. Likely already derelict and used as a source of spare parts)

        Trucks, vehicles and engineering equipment (28, of which destroyed: 17)


         Strategic locations hit


        Anti-tank guided missiles (35, of which 10 launchers and optics)


        Special thanks to Morant Mathieu, MENA_Conflict, Jakub Janovsky and Monitoring.

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        In aid of Juche: how Cuban anti-submarine helicopters ended up in North Korea

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        By Joost Oliemans and Stijn Mitzer

        Novel information featured in one of our articles for NK News detail the procurement of at least six anti-submarine helicopters from Cuba, once again showing North Korea ensures its armed forces remain well equipped in an era of sanctions and economic hardship.

        In aid of Juche: how Cuban anti-submarine helicopters ended up in North Korea

        The DPRK attempted to rectify its rudimentary ASW capabilities by dealing with Havana in the early 2000s.

        ''Throughout the Cold War, the DPRK's anti-submarine warfare (ASW) capabilities were largely rudimentary, relying mainly on surface combatants and outdated technology to counter this developing threat. Starting in the early 2000s, it attempted to partly rectify this situation by the acquisition of at least half a dozen ASW helicopters and their equipment from Cuba in a deal that has long gone unnoticed. Nowadays, their operational status is uncertain.

        Apparently first receiving overhauls in Russia, four Mi-14s and at least two Ka-28s (the export variant of the Ka-27) were exported in the years 2002 to 2004, at a rate of two per year.''

        ...

        The full analysis can be found at the NK News website here: https://www.nknews.org/2020/05/in-aid-of-juche-how-cuban-anti-submarine-helicopters-ended-up-in-north-korea/

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        SyrianAir's Boeing 747SPs, A Rare Beast Disappears

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        By Stijn Mitzer

        As SyrianAir continues its operations out of the war-thorn country of Syria, the airline's venerable Boeing 747SP aircraft have been notable absentees on the few remaining routes and destinations SyrianAir continues to serve. While the airline had originally operated two Boeing 747SPs (a shorter variant of the Boeing 747-100 designed for ultra-long ranges) delivered in 1976, both aircraft were effectively grounded in 2008 as U.S. sanctions prevented the aircraft from receiving their extensive D-checks, forcing SyrianAir to retire the Boeing 747SP after 32 years of service.

        A short-lived thaw in the relationship between the United States and Syria saw the former giving green light for the delivery of the spare parts required for the D-checks of both Boeing 747SPs (YK-AHA 'November 16' and YK-AHB 'Arab Solidarity'), and Syria subsequently struck a deal with the Saudi Alsalam Aircraft Company to perform the D-Checks as well as overhauling the aircraft's Pratt & Whitney JT9D-7 engines and landing gear. Under the contract signed on the 16th of December 2010 in Damascus, both aircraft were slated to re-enter service in late 2011.

         
        In April 2011, SyrianAir's Managing Director & CEO visited the Alsalam Aircraft Company, which had previously conducted maintenance on SyrianAir's now retired fleet of Boeing 727s, to check on the status of the overhaul, where she expressed ''her appreciation to Alsalam team and their efforts to meet the target completions date''. Although it appears that the project was still on schedule at that time, neither aircraft would return to Syria, and remain at the Alsalam Aircraft Company facilities in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia to this day.

        Although the exact reason behind the cessation of work on the Boeing 747SPs remains unknown, it is likely that the outbreak of hostilities in Syria that led the United States to reconsider its stance against the Syrian government was the primary factor that forced Alsalam to halt all further work on the aircraft.

        As part of the new U.S. stance signed into effect by former President Obama in August 2011 with Executive Order 13582, which amongst others included a ban on ''the exportation, reexportation, sale, or supply, directly or indirectly, from the United States, or by a United States person, wherever located, of any services to Syria.''. As the overhaul of SyrianAir's Boeing 747SPs required U.S.-made components, Order 13582 would have prevented Alsalam from continuing work on the aircraft.

        With the D-checks unfinished, most of its paint removed and with components taken away from both aircraft, the Boeing 747SPs were now stuck in Saudi Arabia with no prospect of returning to Syria. Collecting dust on the tarmac of Alsalam, both aircraft were moved to a remote corner of the Alsalam facilities in 2013. While the loss of the Boeings was partly compensated by the fact that most of SyrianAir's routes were now terminated anyway due to the implementation of sanctions, their absence was to be felt in the years that followed.


        With only 45 Boeing 747SPs produced over a time span of fourteen years, this rare aircraft was renowned for maintaining the classic 747 characteristics despite its shortened fuselage, which allowed for a greater range than any other aircraft at that time. As a result of its impressive range and appearance, the aircraft became popular as the transport of choice of several Arab heads of state. South African Airways exploited the range of its six examples to circumvent countries thad had banned the airline from using its airspace during the times of Apartheid.

        SyrianAir had acquired its two examples in anticipation of launching a direct service to New York in the late seventies. When this failed to materialise however,SyrianAir was left with the longest-range airliner in the world on a network almost exclusively featuring short-haul destinations. The lack of any appropriate ultra-long range routes, the aircraft's high maintenance costs and high fuel consumption gave the Boeing 747SP the status of a white elephant within SyrianAir's fleet of smaller aircraft. Whenever they weren't employed alongside their much smaller brethren on regular flights, theBoeing 747SPs in service with SyrianAir saw irregular use on routes to Europe and the Middle East.


        As the aircraft could only be sold at a huge loss, the Boeing 747SPs eventually soldiered on until 2008 and after their last D-checks would have operated for several more years, at least until their replacement by more modern aircraft. Yet fate demanded these impressive machines would find their untimely end abandoned on the smouldering tarmac of in Saudia Arabia.

        Third image by Aviafan.

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        Sanctions Busting, SyrianAir acquires A340 passenger jet via Iran
         

        SyrianAir’s A340 marks two years of successful operations

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        By Stijn Mitzer

        With SyrianAir's sole A340 aircraft marking more than two years of successful operations to destinations in North Africa, the Middle East and Russia, photos posted on SyrianAir's website reveal interesting details on the operations of an airline that had nearly succumbed to years of sanctions. After years of scaling back its operations due to a slow degradation process that would see SyrianAir retiring ever more aircraft as spare parts became increasingly difficult to acquire, SyrianAir is now expanding its operations amidst an increasingly stable security situation in all of Syria's major population centres.

        The airline's rejuvenation is in no small part due to Iran's Mahan Air, which wet-leased one of its Airbus A300-600R passenger jets to SyrianAir in August 2016, circumventing the sanctions implemented against Syria. The wet-lease of an Airbus A300 was only a temporarily solution to SyrianAir's problems, yet it allowed SyrianAir some much needed breathing space until a permanent solution to the airline could be found. The search and subsequent acquisition of an Airbus A340 would involve countries like Iran, Chad and Kazakhstan in a prime example of 'Sanctions Busting', and can be read in more detail here.

        The newly acquired A340 'YK-AZA' made its inaugurational flight to Dubai on the 12th of April 2017, an event not only well attended by Syrian press, but also by various government officials including Syria's Minister of Transport Ali Hammoud, who stated the following:

        ''Today Airbus 340 is taking off from Damascus International Airport to Dubai in the first flight after it was rehabilitated by the Syrian Ministry of Transport. This big achievement is an indicator of the resilience and vigor of the Syrian people and their ability to produce solutions.''

        ''Steps are underway to revamp and re-equip all facilities in the airport to allow for an increase in the number of planes and more air traffic. The economic blockade imposed on Syria had badly affected our ability to repair the equipment in the airport. However, we are working with partners to secure more equipment needed to re-operate the airport. In addition to its role in securing more revenue for the state, this step is a message to the world that the air transport sector in Syria is recovering despite the relentless war being waged on Syria.''


        The A340 acquired is of the 300 series, the initial variant of this type produced by Airbus. Equipped with CFM 56-5C3 engines, the aircraft's official designation is A340-312 (A340 300-series with CFM 56-5C3 engines). Although the A340 is gradually being phased out by most airlines operating the type in favour for more fuel-efficient aircraft, the type's fuel consumption is somewhat offset by its low purchase price as excess airframes are now flooding the market.

        Currently the largest (operational) aircraft in SyrianAir's fleet, the airline's A340 seats up to 300 passengers in a two-class layout with 275 economy-class seats and 25 business-class seats. As the A340 is used on the same routes usually flown by SyrianAir's two remaining operational A320s, which also operate in a two cabin configuration (144 economy-class seats and 6 business-class seats), it is seems unlikely that the A340 is fully booked on most flights.

        Indeed, on the inaugural flight between the coastal city of Latakia and Sharjah International Airport (IAP), UAE in May 2018 the A340 had an occupancy of just 170 passengers. [1] In this regard, it would appear as if using an A320 on this route would be more economically viable. Nonetheless, the Latakia-Sharjah and Latakia-Abu Dhabi routes are almost exclusively flown by the A340 [2], making a compelling case for a steep rise in passenger numbers in the past year. This could be in no small part due to Latakia IAP now serving not only the cities along the coast but also the cities of Hama and Aleppo, the latter of which has not yet seen any international flights since its reopening in early 2017.


        Perhaps not by coincidence, the seats themselves appear similar to those installed in some of Mahan Air's fleet of Airbus aircraft. These same seats were also used in the A300 SyrianAir previously wet-leased from the same airline, making a compelling case for further assistance provided by Mahan Air in this field well. Presumably in an effort to minimise costs, none of the seats have seatback TV screens, not even in Business Class. Rather than installing TV screens in seats, there are three large screens located towards the front, although it is likely that only those sitting in the two front rows will benefit from them. Economy class doesn't feature any TV screens, although this is unlikely to be a problem for the roughly three to four hour flight to the UAE and back.


        While the seats appear to have been installed in Iran, the painting of the aircraft in SyrianAir took place at the company's facilities at Damascus IAP. Had the A340 departed from Tehran in full SyrianAir colours, Iran's role in the acquisition scheme of the A340 would have been more evident. Also note the decomissioned Boeing 727 and wet-leased Mahan Air A300 seen in the background of the lowermost image. The A300 would return to Mahan Air shortly after the arrival of the A340.


        Another important aspect of flying is the in-flight food served to passengers. SyrianAir is serving up a menu that is perhaps reflective of the ongoing conflict in Syria, with a focus on leaf vegetables and pickled peppers rather than meat and actual meals. Not to worry though: the compulsory bread roll with butter is present!

        On SyrianAir's website the following is stated:

        ''On every flight, two types of meals are provided that are comprised of red white meat giving passengers the choice of selecting a meal that matches their taste. A variety of light meals based around a collection of sandwiches are also provided on short routes after the main meal.

        Business Class meals are prepared from three selections of red meat, white meat, or both along with appetizers, salads and Damascene sweets using ingredients of the highest quality. These come in addition to western pastries and breakfast meals made up of cheese, honey and other complimentary sweets such as cakes, gateau, etc.''

        Some of the meals served by SyrianAir will be covered in a future photo report on the operations of this airline.


        Other images show some of the A340's crew, which leave a modern impression as expected from SyrianAir. Indeed, while it's only years ago that the Islamic State reigned over large parts of Syria, a significant portion of the Syrian population is part of a modern society with clear Western aspirations.


        Although there have been some speculations that the A340 would be used on new routes to China and Venezuela, it is unlikely that any new routes to these destinations will be launched in the foreseeable future, at least until more aircraft are acquired to relieve SyrianAir's current fleet of aircraft.

        Fuel-inefficient and too large for the mostly short routes the aircraft flies on, the acquisition of the A340 is a curious feat for a country hampered by chronic fuel shortages. While a satisfying explanation will probably forever remain beyond our grasp, the A340 might simply have been chosen for its attractive purchase price or even a lack of a better alternative. At least for now, the A340 will continue to connect the isolated country with major cities throughout the Middle East: certainly an important task.


        [1] ''The resumption of flights between Lattakia and the Emirate of Sharjah'' http://iuvmpress.com/25528
        [2] Flightradar24 data

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        The Fight For Nagorno-Karabakh: Documenting Losses on The Sides Of Armenia and Azerbaijan

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        By Stijn Mitzer in collaboration with Jakub Janovsky

        Armed clashes which commenced early in the morning of the 27th of September 2020 over the disputed territory of Nagorno-Karabakh have so far caused considerable human and materiel losses on both sides. The renewed clashes are an extension of the three decades long Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, and at present the short-term implications can only be guessed at. While solid information regarding materiel losses is scarce, rumours fly wildly – and unconfirmed and false reports are readily repeated for propaganda purposes. This article will attempt to break down all confirmed material losses by carefully studying the footage made available by both warring parties.


        The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is an ethnical and territorial conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan over the disputed region of Nagorno-Karabakh and seven surrounding districts, which are controlled by the self-declared Republic of Artsakh, but are internationally recognized as belonging to Azerbaijan. The status of Nagorno-Karabakh has been disputed since 1918, when Armenia and Azerbaijan declared independence from the Russian Empire. In the early 1920s, the predominantly Armenian-populated region of Nagorno-Karabakh became an autonomous oblast within the Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic. In 1988, the regional legislature in Nagorno-Karabakh voted in favour of joining the Armenian Soviet Socialist Republic, a move that found little support in Moscow.Following the 1991 dissolution of the Soviet Union, Armenian separatists backed by Yerevan took over control of large parts of Nagorno-Karabakh, home to a significant Azerbaijani minority, as well as seven adjacent Azerbaijani districts.In the ensuining fighting, an estimated 25.000 to 30.000 people were killed with many more displaced from their homeland. The seperatists declared independence as the the Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh. In February 2017, the disputed Nagorno-Karabakh Republic officially became the Republic of Artsakh.

         

        Despite a Russian-brokered ceasefire agreement in place since 1994, violations of the ceasefire occur at regular intervals, the most significant of which took place in 2016 and July 2020, resulting in the deaths of hundreds of soldiers and civilians. From July to September 2020, Azerbaijan conducted a series of military exercises with the participation of Turkey's ground and air forces, which likely strengthened Azerbaijan's perceived power and resolve to end the Karabakh conflict in its favour.


        In addition to providing military training and equipment to Azerbaijan's military, Turkey has also begun exporting drones (and likely electronic warfare equipment) to Azerbaijan. [1] Dozens of Armenian soldiers awoke to this new reality this morning when Bayraktar TB2 UCAVs started releasing MAM-L Smart Munitions over Armenian positions, striking at least six 9K33 Osa and three 9K35 Strela-10 mobile surface-to-air missile systems. These systems appeared just as unaware and incapable of tackling the drone threat overhead as the Russian Pantsir-S1s in Syria and Libya, and all were destroyed without ever knowing what hit them. Turkey's highly efficient use of drones and supporting electronics warfare systems has boosted its increasingly assertive international role and growing political and military weight (Bayraktar Diplomacy). It has now reached the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, and will certainly influence the outcome of the current round of fighting.

         


        A detailed list of the destroyed and captured vehicles of both sides can be seen below. This list will be updated as additional footage becomes available.

        This list only includes captured vehicles and equipment of which photo or videographic evidence is available. Therefore, the amount of equipment destroyed is undoubtedly higher than recorded here.

         

        In an effort to streamline the list and avoid unnecessary confusion, losses on the side of Armenia and the Republic of Artsakh are listed together.  

         
        (Click on the numbers to get a picture of each individual captured or destroyed vehicle)

         

        Armenia / Republic of Artsakh


        Tanks (7, of which destroyed or abandoned: 5)


        Infantry fighting vehicles (5, of which destroyed or abandoned: 5)


        Surface-to-air missile systems (9, of which destroyed: 9)


        Trucks (7, of which destroyed or abandoned: 7)


        Strategic locations hit (2)

        • military base: (1)
        • munitions stockpile: (1)


        Azerbaijan


        Tanks (5, of which destroyed or abandoned: 1)


        Infantry fighting vehicles (6, of which destroyed or abandoned: 5)

         

        Engineering equipment (1, of which destroyed or abandoned: 0)


        Helicopers (1, of which destroyed or abandoned: 1)



        [1] Azerbaijan buys the deadly Turkish Bayraktar TB2 mid-range strike UAV https://bulgarianmilitary.com/2020/06/27/azerbaijan-buys-the-deadly-turkish-bayraktar-tb2-mid-range-strike-uav/


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        Inconvenient arms: North Korean weapons in the Middle East

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        By Joost Oliemans and Stijn Mitzer
         
        Over time, stories detailing North Korea's arms exports to countries in the Middle East have become more and more common. Though any military link to the DPRK is hardly something nations have been likely to boast about, the actors in these stories are familiar and, in a certain sense, unsurprising. Egypt and Yemen were willing customers in the past, but Iran and Syria (and the non-state actors they support) maintain quite well documented links to the present day. Exposing the extent of these links is by no means trivial and definitely an interesting subject of its own; today however we shed light on a subject that is much less familiar.

        Maintaining military parity with your regional neighbours has long been an important consideration in the Middle East, and often an objective bought at considerable expense. Mere monetary costs aren't the only way in which a nation might end up paying for its arms procurements however, and weaponry that at first seemed a bargain has over time become an inconvience to some nations. While it may be long forgotten now, there was a time when North Korean armament was quite advanced compared to what was available on the open market (insofar as that was ever a thing), and their near monopoly on ballistic missile exports to non-(Western- or Soviet-)aligned gave them a significant revenue boost. 
         

        Take the case of the United Arab Emirates. Like surprisingly many countries across the globe, it was at one point quite eager to invest in the latest technology on offer by the DPRK, yet it has carefully avoided making this fact known to observers since. Preciously few images of North Korean arms in the UAE are publically available, and there exist even fewer written sources that detail the history of the deals that were conducted. Yet what little information is available tells an intriguing tale. At the end of the 1980s, the UAE entered negotiations with the DPRK for an arms deal that would alledgedly end up including the transfer of Hwasong-5 missiles (a copy of the R-17E "Scud-B"), anti-aircraft guns, self-propelled artillery, multiple-rocket launchers and munitions in 1989, at a cost of 160 million U.S. dollars. Of course, it is the missiles that are of most interest to international observers, and therefore also the sole aspect about which anything of substance is known. Although a U.S. national intelligence estimate in 1991 suspected between 18 and 24 missiles had been delivered (and an unknown number of launchers), this number was apparently revised upwards to 25 by the time of the 106th Congress on U.S. Policy toward North Korea in 1999. The conventional story is that the UAE was dissatisfied on the quality of the Hwasong-5, and quickly put them in storage awaiting dismantlement. This politically convenient tale doesn't hold up to scrutiny very well however, as we will see later.

        In the meantime, it can only be assumed that the rest of the weaponry was inducted into the UAE's armed forces without a hitch, as North Korean artillery systems have been wont to do in a myriad of other militaries in the past. And indeed, somewhere along the way the wrong piece of footage of a military exercise made its way to the public domain, providing us with a first look at what the UAE got for its money.
         
        North Korean 240mm MRLs firing during a UAE armed forces exercise.

        These 240mm multiple rocket launchers (MRLs) are well known in the DPRK and such countries as Iran, Myanmar and Angola. At the time of their introduction in North Korea they were some of the longest ranged and heaviest MRLs in existence, capable of lobbing a warhead of 90 kilogrammes at targets up to 43 kilometres away. In the variant received by the UAE, each truck carries twelve tubes, meaning a typical barrage from four vehicles can saturate a target with 48 rockets. The trucks in question are peculiar, and it would take a long time for better footage to emerge that allowed their identification. Of course, one could not expect the UAE itself to be forthcoming with such footage, and in the meantime these particular pieces of armament underwent a transformation that would secure their obscurity for quite some time longer. 

        In early June 2020, soldiers of Libya's Government of National Accord (GNA) finally wrestled over control over Tarhuna, which had been held by Haftar's Libyan National Army (LNA). In the process, they encountered a number of MRLs that were at the time completely unknown. Tarhuna had been a major LNA stronghold in Western Libya, and since the LNA has received military support from the UAE, a link was easily established. The launch tubes themselves were identified easily enough; they were of the same type delivered by Turkey's Roketsan to be installed on the massive Jobaria Defense Systems Multiple Cradle Launcher. The truck and erection mechanism were more of a conundrum however, unless one has prior knowledge of North Korea's arms deliveries to the UAE. Indeed, the erection mechanism is then easily identified as the one used on North Korean twelve-tube 240mm MRLs – which are notably different from those used by other nations. The truck is also of note, being an uparmoured variant of the Italian Iveco 260/330.35 (apparently also known as the ACP90). This type isn't operated by North Korea, but the fact that it for a long time lacked a proper heavy truck industry to support its military needs meant that it often improvised by adapting foreign imported designs. In this case, it would appear that they simply did not deliver the trucks at all, possibly assisting in modifying suitable platforms to carry the MRLs.

        The mystery MRL encountered by the GNA upon capturing Tarhuna.
         
        A UAE armed forces-operated Iveco 320.45 WTM tank transporter. The highly similar Iveco 260/330.35 is also thought to be in service.

        Since it's unknown how many MRLs the DPRK delivered to the UAE, and the UAE subsequently to the LNA, it is certainly possible that a number still serve in the UAE's armed forces. However, the fact that their unique 240mm munition (which in recent years has seen upgrades to extend their range to 60 or even 70 kilometres, and to include GPS guidance for high-precision targeting) can no longer be delivered without incurring the ire of multiple sanctions regimes means that likely all were modified to fire the Turkish 122mm munition. 
         
        What about the other equipment delivered in 1989? Though the DPRK produces and operates a plethora of self-propelled guns (SPGs), there is just one that would have been very interesting to the UAE in 1989. The so-called Koksan (or Juche gun, in North Korean parlance), was at the time of its introduction a truly unique beast. With an indigenous two-piece munition of 170mm in diameter and an absolutely massive barrel length, it was capable of attaining ranges of some 50 kilometres, the longest of any artillery system of the time. The older 1973 variant was previously exported to Iran, which used it to shell Iraqi-held positions and oil fields in Kuwait (as punishment for their support of Iraq) from outside retaliation range during the Iran-Iraq war. The variant obtained by the UAE is the newer 1989 Koksan however, as rare images from a secluded section at the 2005 IDEX in the UAE betray. Showcased alongside a North Korean ZPU-4, this artillery gun is still one of the most powerful in existence – and certainly in the DPRK. 
         
        The "M-1989" Koksan as displayed at the IDEX 2005 in the UAE.

        Is there more? Possibly. A recent documentary by Danish filmmaker Mads Brügger that unraveled the inner workings of North Korean arms deals through the use of a mole included photographs of some North Korean weapons systems. One of these, found in an arms brochure, appears to show an early Hwasong-5 in desert colours. Remarkably, the traditional MAZ-543 transporter-erector-launcher (TEL) has been swapped for one based on the German MAN KAT-1 truck. As we've noted before, the North Koreans had difficulty with producing trucks such as these TELs and thus resorted to importing them, as noted in a 1993 New York Times article. Nevertheless, the camouflage of this particular TEL and its surroundings indicate that this image was not taken in the DPRK. The usual suspects, Iran, Libya or Syria are certainly possible (the latter standing out specifically), but in each of these nations the TEL would have stood out in available imagery. The latter two nations have had their Scud TELs thoroughly exposed by a decade of nation-wide fighting, and the former has always been remarkably open in showing its holdings, rare North Korean TELs included. This leaves the possibility of the photo originating from a nation like the UAE (or even, as we will see, Saudi Arabia), which unlike the aforementioned countries is a prolific user of MAN trucks.

        A Hwasong-5 based on a MAN KAT-1 TEL, as seen in a North Korean arms brochure showcased in The Mole: Infiltrating North Korea.

        Whatever is the case, the 1989 deal did not quite spell the end for the UAE's North Korean adventures, because despite their supposed dissatisfaction with the Hwasong-5s, they soon entered negotiations for yet another round of ballistic missiles. Delivered in 1999, these systems promptly triggered a U.S. review of the possibility of emplacing sanctions on the UAE under U.S. missile sanctions laws, though the matter was kept under tight wraps. In response, the UAE's Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces Mohammed bin Zayid (MbZ) personally assured the U.S. government in response that the total number of ballistic missiles was fewer than 30, divided roughly evenly amongst the Hwasong-5 and Hwasong-6 (an upgraded "Scud-C" which can reach targets up to 500 kilometres away), and that no additional systems would be acquired. MbZ then apparently saw an opportunity to turn the situation to the UAE's advantage, and started negotiations for the procurement of MGM-140 ATACMS tactical missiles and MQ-1B Predator UCAVs, in exchange for handing over its ballistic missiles and entering the Missile Technology Control Regime (MCTR). The number of Scuds he acknowledged the UAE had at the time was 38 – a notable increase since the previous count, yet one likely to have been caused not by new deliveries but merely by a lack of accuracy of the first count. When the U.S. wasn't forthcoming with these systems (instead offering unarmed Predator UAVs, and later ATACMS at a price that was considered too steep), the UAE also backed off from the deal and simply retained its missile force. 

        Some have speculated that a third delivery of ballistic missiles occurred in the 2000s, but so far there is no conclusive evidence to prove this is indeed the case. Nevertheless, there are reports that indicate a continued involvement from the North Koreans to modern day. Despite U.S. inquiries about the matter, UAE representatives in August 2008 visited the DPRK, just months before a similar visit from a Myanmarese delegation (which, it should be mentioned, even took a look at a "Scud missile factory"). Whether this resulted in any purchase is of course unknown, but as recently as 2015 it was clear relations had not abated much. Through an intermediary, the UAE purchased close to 100 million U.S. dollars' worth of armament in support of the Saudi-led military intervention in Yemen, including machine guns, rifles and rockets. The fact that the Houthis which they are fighting there are themselves equipped with various types of North Korean armament (though none acquired directly in recent years) is perhaps not purely ironic: the UAE's continued purchases of North Korean arms may also be aimed at discouraging the DPRK from providing weaponry to its adversaries. Surprisingly, this did not trigger hefty sanctions on the UAE, which can presumably only be explained by its preferential position as one of the U.S.' staunchest allies on the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). 
         
        It is truly remarkable what may be occluded from public knowledge if the interests of the parties involved align to make it so. There is little doubt that the UAE's ventures are by no means unique, yet so long as no new information or imagery leaks chances of these events coming to light are slim. As such, OSINT analysts are reduced to speculation and vague inferences. An interesting case in point is Saudi Arabia, whose strategic capabilities are also one of the most opaque in the world. Their acquisition of Chinese DF-3A intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs) in 1988 was publically affirmed when they showcased them during a massive military parade in 2014. Much more recent developments are documented sporadically in a variety of sources, but none mention the delivery of Scud-type missile systems to the kingdom. It is therefore quite significant that the former deputy defence minister of Saudi Arabia was presented a glass case with three models of ballistic missiles on visiting the country's strategic missile force in 2013, two of which were not known to be in the Saudi inventory.

        Prince Fahd bin Abdullah bin Mohammed Al Saud being presented models of three ballistic missiles presumably in Saudi service in 2013.
         
        The largest of the three was clearly an accurate representation of the DF-3A, and taking the model to be at scale the smallest makes for a close match with the R-17 "Scud", or its North Korean Hwasong-5/6 derivatives. The middle missile is the greatest mystery of the three, featuring what appears to be a distinctive triconic nosecone such as the ones seen on the Hwasong-7 ("Nodong-1") and Hwasong-9 missiles, and the former's foreign variants. Based on such scarce evidence a link with North Korea can hardly be established. Nevertheless, it is clear that some transfer of ballistic missiles yet unknown occurred in Saudi Arabia's murky past – a transfer which it is less comfortable highlighting then that of its Chinese DF-3A IRBMs. The list of countries willing to supply Scud-type systems to Saudi Arabia in this time period is surprisingly short, especially when one considers the indications that a larger, more advanced system was also delivered. 

        As arms deals conducted in the previous century remain a matter of extreme secrecy to these nations, there is little hope of conclusively uncovering the full history of North Korean arms sales in the Middle East any time soon. Given the potential embarrassment to the parties in question, these inconvenient weapons are kept securely in military bases behind high fences and bunker doors, or are otherwise dismantled before anyone ever could find out. Will we ever find out the full story? Perhaps. 
         
        Perhaps however, if they are careful enough, the truth will simply die in these dark places.

         

        The Navy That Sank Itself - Guinea’s Soviet Bogomol Class Patrol Boats

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        By Stijn Mitzer

        Guinea-Conakry, officially the Republic of Guinea, is a French-speaking country located in West Africa. Although plagued by poor economic prospects, Guinea has a rapidly growing population of some 12.4 million that inhabit an area slightly larger than that of the United Kingdom, yet remains an underdeveloped nation. Guinea is a Muslim-majority country, with Muslims making up roughly 85% or more of the population.

        In addition to being the world's second largest producer of bauxite, Guinea has the dubious honour of having its whole combat fleet sank not by enemy fire, but by pure negligence. At the center of this astonishing feat have been its relatively advanced Soviet Bogomol class patrol boats, which will be the subject of this article.

        The Project 02065 Vikhr-III (NATO designation: Bogomol Class) is a class of patrol boats designed and built in the Soviet Union in the late 1980s. Based on the Project 206MR Vikhr (NATO designation: Matka) class of missile boats, only nine ships were completed before production came to an end in 1989. [1] Armed with a rapid-firing 76mm AK-176 cannon and a 30mm AK-630 close-in weapon system (CIWS), both guided by a MR-123 fire control radar located on top of the bridge, these patrol boats are still potent platforms in the role they were designed for even today.

        Interestingly, instead of delivering the Bogomol class boats to countries like Cuba, Vietnam or Yemen, all relatively capable of maintaining and operating advanced naval vessels by the 1980s, the Soviet Union exported four of the nine craft to Guinea and Iraq. Guinea, with a proven track record of negligence and carelessness when it comes to maintaining naval vessels, received arguably the most modern naval vessels of the entire West African coast at a crucial point in history: the fall of the Soviet Union. With its traditional supplier of weaponry, spare parts and technical aid gone, the vessels soon fell in a state of disrepair.


        As one of the first French colonies to gain independence (1958) Guinea became a particularly early recipient of Soviet military aid, which first began arriving in the late 1950s. Having established close ties to the Soviet bloc, Guinea's strategic location was fully exploited by both the Soviet Union and Cuba, which used Guinea as a staging base to support independence movements of neighbouring countries that had not yet achieved independence from their colonial rulers. Nonetheless, as a result of fear that close ties to the Soviet Union could leave Guinea vulnerable to attacks by foreign powers, relations with the Soviet bloc waned throughout much of the 1960s. This lasted until closer ties were again established in the late sixties as a result of President Ahmed Sékou Touré's increasing paranoia over an imminent invasion by Portugal. In turn, Portugal became increasingly irritated by Guinea's support for independence movements fighting against Portuguese colonial rule in Guinea-Bissau. [2]

         
        Touré's fears were not for nothing, as in November 1970 a Portuguese commando force consisting of some 200 Portugese-Guinean soldiers and 100 Guinean dissidents commanded by Portugese officers ouright invaded Guinea. Their goal was to overthrow Touré's regime, to kill Guinea-Bissau's independence leader Amílcar Cabral and free 25 Portuguese prisoners, only the latter of which succeeded. [2] Following the Portugese attack, Touré reestablished close ties to the Soviet Union, resulting in the delivery of additional MiGs, tanks and anti-aircraft guns to fend off possible future Portuguese incursions.
         
        To dissuade the Portuguese from ever setting foot on Guinean soil again, a Soviet naval patrol consisting of several naval ships was frequently called to the region. This would turn out to be a precursor of a constant Soviet naval deployment off West Africa, which also included several Tu-95RT maritime surveillance aircraft that periodically deployed to Conakry. Then, in January 1973, following the assassination of Amílcar Cabral in Guinea, a Soviet destroyer moored in Conakry gave chase and captured the perpetrators responsible for the attack and handed them over to Guinean authorities. [3]
         
        As Portugal recognized Bissau's independence in 1974 and slowly began to withdaw from its colonies (except for Macau, which returned to Chinese control in 1999), Touré had little left to fear from the Portuguese. With a large Soviet naval presence becoming a liability rather than an effective defence policy, Touré began to curtail the activities of the Soviets. In 1977, Touré cancelled Soviet access for Tu-95RTs; in late 1978 most of the Soviet and Cuban advisors were sent packing and in early 1979 Guinea posed further restrictions on the movement of Soviet warships in Conakry. This would ultimately put an end to the Soviet hope of building a much larger and permanent naval base in Guinea. [3]

        For several years relations remained cool because of disputes over Soviet fishing rights in Guinean territorial waters and the lack of Soviet willingness to provide meaningful economic assistance to Guinea. [4] When Touré died in March 1984, a military coup brought General Lasana Conté to power, who went on to rule Guinea until his death in 2008.
         
         
        The close relations with the Soviet Union had a profound impact on the fragile Guinean navy. Trained and equipped in the likeness of a Soviet client state directly after its founding, all of the navy's inventory was of Soviet origin. Following Portugal's incursion, the Guinean navy was to be expanded from 150 to 300 men, with another expansion of 150 announced in 1972 [5]. In the same year, personnel began training in China in anticipation for the acquisition of several Chinese patrol boats, the delivery of which never appears to have materialized. [5]
         
        In the early 1970s Guinea's naval inventory consisted of four Poluchat-I class patrol boats armed with two twin 12.7mm heavy machine guns, several P-6 torpedo boats armed with two 533mm torpedo tubes and two dual 25mm cannons and two MO-VI submarine chasers armed with two dual 25mm cannons and side throwing mortars, as well as depth charges for anti-submarine warfare (!). [5] Inadequate maintenance had already led to the sinking of two ships by 1967, with a Soviet technical mission having to intervene in 1971 to prevent the other ships from meeting a similar fate. [5] Even though this improved the operationality of the fleet, most of the ships seldomly left port, with Guinea complaining about a lack of reliability of their equipment and an inadequate supply of spare parts to properly maintain them. [3]

        Rather than addressing these issues, the Guinean navy was to undergo the largest upheaval in equipment since its foundation through the delivery of three or four Shershen class patrol boats with the torpedo tubes removed and a single T-43 class minesweeper, which was modified for service in the tropical West African climate. [3] The delivery of these ships marked the last major naval acquisition before the delivery of the Bogomol class ships, which quietly entered service in the late 1980s or early 1990s before being retired several years later. Nonetheless, Guinea continued to receive military equipment worth tens of millions each year from the mid-to-late 1980s, including MiG-21bis fighter aircraft and 9K35 Strela-10 surface-to-air missile systems. [6]

        February 2007, although already fallen into disuse, both ships are still securely moored to their pier.

        December 2007, the stern of the first ship is already underwater, with the increasing weight slowly dragging the ship further down to the bottom.

        August 2008, with high tide only the bridge and radar mast can still be seen protruding above water. The other ship has been moved to the adjacent side of the pier.

        December 2009, with low tide more of the first ship's superstructure is visible, including the AK-176 cannon. Several more sunken ships can be seen throughout the harbour.

        March 2013, water pressure has caused the AK-176 cannon to detach from the ship. Also note the floating dock on the left.

        August 2019, the second Bogomol class has also began taking on water, with only the bow and superstructure still above the waterline. The floating dock that was still in use in 2013 has meanwhile also sunk.

        February 2020, the second ship appears to have been saved from its certain fate for now. Waiting to sink again, Guinea would be the only country in the world to have two Bogomol class patrol boats sink three times.

        While still of a relatively advanced standard for export clients like Iraq, bringing with it a rapid-firing 76mm AK-176 cannon and AK-630 CIWS, both guided by radar, the Bogomol class was and still is completely in excess to the requirements of a small navy like Guinea. Perhaps unsurprisingly, their replacement ships consisted of series of small boats armed with light machine guns only, which are both easier to maintain and operate.
         
        Although Guinea's neighbour Guinea-Bissau is also reported to have received two Bogomol patrol boats in 1988-1990, there is currently no public evidence to suggest this delivery indeed took place. [1] [7] That's not to say that no delivery took place, as these ships could easily have been scrapped or resting on the bottom of a habour even before the advent of commercial satellite imagery. The only other confirmed recipients of Bogomol class ships have been Iraq and Iran (which took over one Iraqi example in 1991), which will be covered in a future article. In Russian service, the ships would eventually be superseded by the more modern Project 10410 (Svetlyak class), and just two are still believed to be in service with Russia's Pacific fleet (PSKR-726 and PSKR-727).

         
        The Sinking of the Bogomols - a saga that demonstrates the Soviet Union's failed policy of delivering advanced weaponry to client states unable to operate and maintain that equipment without significant financial and materiel aid. The results of this policy are still rusting all throughout Africa, either resting at the bottom of a harbour or awaiting disassembly; a painful, yet crumbling, monument to failed ambitions and a past that is slowly fading.
         

        [2] MEMORANDUM SOME REPERCUSSIONS OF THE RAID ON GUINEA https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/document/cia-rdp85t00875r002000110005-8
        [3] IMPACT OF SOVIET NAVAL PRESENCE IN THIRD WORLD COUNTRIES https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/document/cia-rdp84t00658r000100030004-5 

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