By Stijn Mitzer

The following photos were taken during a visit of a Russian journalist to a small armour repair facility in the suburbs of Damascus in June 2017. While already several years old – with several of the armoured fighting vehicles pictured likely having been lost to combat damage since – the images nevertheless provide an interesting insight into the inner workings of a small Syrian tank workshop.

Even though a job as a mechanic in a conflict is usually a guarantee of relative safety, this particular workshop was unique in that it served both as an armour repair facility and as a defensive structure to stop any rebel incursions from Jobar. In fact, the facility was located (33°32'2"N 36°20'11"E) only some 300 metres away from the actual frontline! Fortunately for the mechanics serving at the facility, no such surprise raids took place before the last pocket of resistance in Jobar was neutralised in March 2018. As a result, the images we discuss here are the rare exception where we get to examine such a workshop while it is still operational.


In the image below, the sad remains of a T-55(A)MV lay in front of a pile of rusty BMP-1 tracks. Having been stripped of most of its components, including nearly all of the Kontakt-1 explosive reactive armour (ERA) tiles on the turret and hull, it appears that this particular T-55 ended its career as a donor vehicle: keeping other vehicles of the same type running, presumably after suffering some type of irreparable damage in combat. Also note the collapsed roof in the background, which really drives home the run-down status of this facility.


Three T-55As still in pristine condition stand guard outside the repair facility. Their good condition is a far cry from the T-55 above or most other T-55s still operational in Syria for that matter. While the vehicles might look ready to head out to the frontline, satellite imagery shows that these tanks were parked in the exact same location from 2015 to early 2018, making it likely they belonged to a resident unit that was tasked with defending the workshop and the area that surrounds it against possible attacks coming from rebel-held Jobar.


Note that the headlights, infrared searchlight and sighting systems are all protected by sandbags in an attempt to protect them from shrapnel from shell or rocket fire landing nearby. As visible on the building behind, the facility came under repeated attacks of small arms and presumably mortar fire, which could inflict serious damage on the otherwise unprotected optical/electrical devices.


Next we see two T-72s that couldn't be more different in the task they fulfill. On the left, a T-72 'Ural' that has been converted into a towing vehicle to haul AFVs that can't move on their own around the facility – on the right, a Syrian T-72AV deprived of all its Kontakt-1 explosive reactive armour. This T-72AV is likely operated by a training unit, with the explosive reactive armour removed for use with other tanks serving on the frontline which obviously need it more direly.


The workshop's motor pool quietly gathers dust in one of the storage halls of the facility. Having largely abandoned its aging fleet of Soviet trucks in favour of Russian-delivered GAZ, Ural and KamAZ trucks as well as more reliable and fuel-efficient commercially available vehicles, trucks like the ZIL-131, ZIL-157 and Ural-375 that once formed the backbone of the Syrian Arab Army's vehicle park now rust away in abandoned corners of SyAA bases all throughout Syria.


A SyAA T-55(A)MV has its engine reinstalled after thorough maintenance in the main hall of the armour workshop. Interestingly, while the cannabilised T-55(A)MV earlier in this article has at least some of its ERA tiles still in place, this particular tank was completely stripped of it. This in sharp contrast to the turret of another T-55(A)MV seen further to the rear in the same image, the DIY armour placement of which even saw the installation of ERA tiles on the rear of the turret.

Although the markings on the rear of the tank seen in the second image indicate that the tank once belonged to the 5th Mechanized Division, it is not unplausible that the tank was actually operated by a different unit by the time it entered the workshop for some much needed maintenance.


A BMP-1 is shown undergoing depot-level maintenance, which clearly depicts how cramped the interior of the vehicle is even when the benches for the infantry have been removed. With such a small internal space, it is perhaps unsurprising that the designers of the BMP-1 had to come up with ingenious solutions of where to place the fuel tanks. Unfortunately for the infantry riding inside the BMP, these became the compartments in between the benches and the rear doors respectively. With APCs and IFVs capable of carrying infantry in high demand and with the BMP-1's ruggedness allowing long periods on end of maintenance neglect and abuse on the battlefield, depot-level maintenance must be a rarity for any BMP-1 in Syrian service.


The turret of a T-55(A)MV – likely taken from the hull seen in the above image – undergoes internal maintenance. Equipped with an advanced fire-control system and some even with an indigenous thermal imaging device, one could argue that the T-55(A)MV presents a more potent adversary than the early-generation T-72 variants (T-72 'Ural', T-72M and T-72M1 respectively) also in Syrian service.

The T-55(A)MV was also the only tank in Syrian service confirmed to be equipped with gun-launched anti-tank guided missiles (GLATGMs) in the form of the 9M117M missile, at least until the delivery of more advanced T-72B variants and T-90s (which in Syrian service are equipped with the 9M119 Svir GLATGM) in 2015.

Another feature of the T-55(A)MV is an extensive array of Kontakt-1 ERA tiles on its turret, hull and sideskirts. Although most remaining operational tanks of this type still have the original configuration, this particular tank had all of its ERA reinstalled in a different fashion. Although this DIY placement certainly looks less professional than the original one, it likely doesn't much effect the protection value that these ERA tiles bring. Also note the row of T-72 roadwheels lined up against the wall just behind the turret.


A collection of tires and truck engines gathers dust in an abandoned corner of the facility, suggesting most are never to be used again.


A battered T-72AV receives some much-needed attention to the wrangled flaps that used to hold the Kontakt-1 ERA-equipped side skirts, which have already fallen off this vehicle. Due to their heavy usage, many T-72AVs were soon left without these side skirts. Indeed, this was one of the more common complaints of tankers of the Republican Guard. One hit by an RPG often results in the whole side skirt falling off, leaving the sides of the tank dangerously exposed to enemy RPG fire. As a simple measure to improve the turret armour, this tank received a bucket of welded metal bars that both acts as slat armour and allows for the stowage of sandbags or other materials to further increase the armour protection.


A mechanic works on the 300 horsepower UTD-20 engine of a BMP-1. With Syria's armoured forces having been engaged in continuous fighting since 2012, there is often little time to undertake crucial repairs, in turn leading to a higher rate of breakdowns in the field. Indeed, regular maintenance of vehicles and equipment has proven to be an overlooked factor in the Syrian Civil War, or in almost any conflict for that matter. As with any sophisticated equipment, components have to be regularly inspected, tested, repaired or even replaced. Considering these facts, the Russian deliveries of more dated equipment like T-62M(Vs) and BRM-1(Ks) is more sensible than delivering more advanced equipment that needs to be more regularly maintained (which also drains manpower) to remain combat efficient.


Stay tuned for articles covering the Syrian Arab Army's major tank and artillery repair workshops in Hama Governorate in the near future!

Armour in the Islamic State, the Story of 'The Workshop'
Armour in the Islamic State, the DIY works of Wilayat al-Khayr 
The YPG going DIY, armour upgrades in Northern Syria
 

Left: Minister of Defence Major General Oleg Obruchkov, Middle: Current President Vadim Krasnoselsky, Right: First President of Transnistria Igor Smirnov

''I would like to emphasize that it [COVID-19] slowed down, but did not stop the development of the republic. We continue to build and modernize social infrastructure, attract investors, and make our Transnistria modern. Time has shown that any difficulties can only be overcome together. The unity, solidarity, courage of our people helped to withstand and win the Great Patriotic War, and in the early 1990s - to create and defend the Transnistrian state, - said the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces. - We, Pridnestrovians, are a wise people who knows how important and important memory is, the continuity of generations. Remembering the past, creating the present, we together build our future on our land and according to our laws. So it was, so it will be. On this day, I express the warmest words of gratitude to the Russian Federation. Thank you for fraternal friendship, support and peace."

Beginning in August this year, practice runs for the parade were held on the taxiways of Tiraspol airbase, which is also home to Transnistria's small army aviation unit (which will be covered in a future article on this blog). Footage of the soldiers and vehicles in training in preparation for the parade can be viewed here, here and here. The parade can be watched in its entirety here.




As you might already have noticed, the uniforms of the Transnistrian Army are indiscernible from those of the Russian Army. Both the digital flora and gorka uniform suits are currently in use. Also note the small Transnistrian velcro shoulder patches.

Troops belonging to the Special Rapid Response Unit (SOBR), who act as an rapid-reaction military force available to the regular police in case of emergencies. These are another inheritance of the Soviet era.


Well-equipped peacekeeping forces (MC = миротворческих сил [peacekeeping forces]) march with AK-74Ms in their hands. As Transnistria remains an unrecognised state, the question of where these peacekeepers would deploy is perhaps left unanswered.

Officers of the Ministry of Defence and cadets of the Military and Tiraspol Law Institute show off their flashy uniforms and typical Soviet military caps.


A ceremonial T-34/85 leads the vehicle segment of the parade, rumbling past a Kebab shop in the background. Although the aim of displaying these tanks in parades is solely to pay tribute to Second World War veterans, it should be mentioned that the T-34/85 remains in active service with nations like Yemen and North Korea. More on the T-34's service and upgrades performed on them in North Korea can be read in our book!
The crew of the T-34/85 displays the flag of the 79th Guards Rifle Division, which took part in operations along the Dniester in Transnistria in 1943 and continued to serve postwar as part of the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany until being disbanded in Samarkand, Uzbekistan in 1992. Also note the five marks of excellence painted on the barrel of the tank.


The next entry to the parade consisted of several indigenous buggies armed with a single 7.62mm PKT machine gun taken from an armoured vehicle. These unarmoured buggies rely on their small silhouette and speed to avoid being hit, and see service with Transnistria's special forces.

GAZ-66 trucks and UAZ-452 off-road vans carry the same 120mm 120-PM-38/43 mortars.
The 'Pribor-1' multiple rocket launcher (MRL) closed off this year's vehicle section of the parade. This MRL (referred to as 'Pribor' for the plant which produced it but likely offically known as 'S1T' or '1ST') combines a ZiL-131 truck with an indigenous launching erector system for 122mm rockets similar in operation to that of the BM-21. However, the biggest difference is a 50% reduction in the total rockets the vehicle can fire in one salvo, from 40 on the BM-21 to just 20 on the Pribor-1.

The Pribor-1 is now to be superseded by the more capable Pribor-2 (offically known as 'S2T' or '2ST'), which was another notable absentee during the parade. As opposed to the Pribor-1's 20 launching tubes, the Pribor-2 can fire the impressive amount of 48 122mm rockets in one salvo. Based on a commercially available KAMAZ-4310, the Pribor-2 stands out compared to other MRL designs for its interesting arrangement of 4x12 122mm rockets and backwards installed launch tubes. Our article on the Pribor-2 can be read here.


The celebrations were concluded with ceremonial gunfire by eight 85mm D-44 anti-tank guns, blasting loud bangs and sparks throughout the sky over Tiraspol.


Transistria's Victory Day parade is certainly a little less glamorous than contemporary parades elsewhere, but what it lacks in glamour it all the more makes up for in the colourful composition of the military hardware it parades. Whether Moldova and Transnistria will ever be able to move beyond the status quo is unknown, but in the writer's opinion, this tradition should certainly survive.

By Stijn Mitzer

A video uploaded by the National Front for Liberation shows off spectacular drone footage as fighters of the National Front for Liberation (NLF) and Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) fight their way to the regime-held town of Abu Dafna located to the northeast of Maarat al-Numan, Idlib Governorate, on the 19th of January 2020. The attack offers a glimpse into the attacks that government forces have been facing ever since launching the Idlib offensive in April 2019, and clearly shows some of the strengths and weaknesses of the parties involved during the battle. This video doesn't offer the whole story however, and because the early stages of this attack are documented extremely well, we will attempt to break down the footage released and paint a clearer picture of these attacks using Abu Dafna as an example.

But before going into detail about the actual battle itself, it is important to understand the background of similar 'local overmatch/smash and grab' attacks mostly taking place in Idlib and to a lesser extent, West Aleppo. Since years incapable of directly challenging government forces and the aerial superiority they bring with them, Idlib's rebel and jihadist groups (henceforth both referred to as rebels) instead rely on a series of hit-and-run attacks to help them maintain the status quo. By launching coordinated attacks on exposed flanks of government-held territory, rebels are able to seriously influence the situation on the ground by making every town captured by the regime a potential (local) catastrophe for the forces now tasked with defending it.

While the smash and grab attacks don't lead to any lasting territorial (re)gains as a rule, the goals of these mini-offensives are in fact different from those of more conventional offensives that aim to neutralise an enemy force or capture a contested area:

- With no real prospect of holding any town in the face of heavy artillery bombardments and airstrikes without suffering extensive losses or pouring precious resources and manpower into constructing fortifications and tunnels, putting up a fight for every town only to lose it with the loss of most of its defenders is a 'luxury' rebels are no longer able to afford, and thus not a viable tactic for anti-Assad forces in Idlib. In this regard, it makes perfect sense for rebel factions to preserve their manpower for later use in hit-and-run tactics that have the potential to inflict heavy casualties among regime forces, stall its future offensives and capture weaponry and ammunition with much fewer casualties in return.

- As recently captured towns often serve as the vantage point from which new government offensives are launched, routing the soldiers who occupy it means that any planned government offensive in that area has to abandoned until its soldiers recapture the lost ground, establish new defence positions and restock weaponry and supplies. While this merely accomplishes stalling regime forces rather than outright defeating them, the prospect of victory for rebel forces is now perhaps more distant than it has ever been, with the situation on the ground hugely in favour of the Syrian government. With no other front requiring a major troop buildup to prevent it from falling as was common during earlier stages of the war, the Syrian regime is currently in a position where it can comfortably commit most of its forces to Idlib until victory is achieved or a political settlement is reached. With President Bashar al-Assad having vowed to liberate ''Every Inch of Syria from Terrorism'' on multiple occasions, an attempt at the former scenario seems increasingly likely.

- As the tide of the war slowly shifted in favour of the regime, rebel forces lost theoffensive posture many groups managed to cling on to for much of the war. With the rebels everywhere on the defensive, Idlib has largely been cut off from the largest supplier of weaponry and ammunition to factions opposing the Syrian government: The Syrian Arab Army. The latter's failure redistribute, protect, or at least destroy major arms depots like Ayyash ensured a seemingly endless supply of vehicles, weaponry and ammunition to opposing forces in Syria. Nowadays mostly relying on small batches of munitions purchased on the black market or received from foreign powers, the only way for rebels in Idlib to stock up on heavier equipment like tanks is through smash and grab attacks on poorly defended but overstocked regime positions. One such raid on a SyAA position near Barsah, some four kilometres away from Abu Dafna, in mid-January this year yielded one T-62, two BRM-1(K)s, one BMP-1, two anti-tank guided missile (ATGM) launchers and missiles amongst various other spoils. [1] [2] Although a far cry from earlier heavy-arms hauls like Brigade 93, which rewarded its capturers with at least 32 T-55 tanks, the spoils gained in such attacks are apparently enough to outweigh any losses inevitably taken. [3]


While on full display in Idlib, the Idlibi 'local overmatch/smash and grab' are anything but new to the Syrian conflict.Indeed, these tactics are remarkably similar to those employed by the Islamic State, which had to defend large swathes of seemingly indefensible desert territory in Central Syria.As IS lacked the manpower to properly defend each frontline of its shrinking territory,it instead deployed small numbers of local fighters that conducted stalling tactics until reinforcements arrived.By allowing its opponents to slowly advance, often encountering only symbolic resistance,it could muster a force large enough to beat back the offensive. Often relying on the element of surprise to achieve maximum effectiveness, IS would appear seemingly out of nowhere, laying ambushes and sending in VBIEDs in the ensuing confusion, usually then followed up by a (counter)offensive of its own to revert all gains made and even take a shot at pushing through the routing enemies' defences, as displayed in the government's disastrous Tabqa offensive in 2016. [4]

Perhaps even more valuable is the comparison withthe Islamic State's defence of the towns and villages surrounding Azaz near the Turkish border during the ill-fated Northern Aleppo offensive in March-June 2016. Faced with a U.S.-equipped force of Free Syrian Army (FSA) fighters supported by Turkish artillery and U.S. close air support, IS fighters undertook organised retreats during the day, only to return to the same area under the cover of darkness at night. These surprise raids often caught FSA fighters completely unaware, with significant losses in manpower and equipment as a result. [5] Although IS would lose control of this region as a result of a joint FSA-Turkish offensive launched in September the same year, it not only managed to stall and repel the earlier offensive launched against them in March, but its own counteroffensive nearly wiped out the FSA's foothold in this part of Syria.


The major obstacle for any 'local overmatch/smash and grab' attack are precision-guided bombs and missiles wrecking havoc from above. While this proved to be less of a problem for the small bands of Islamic State fighters roaming through Azaz at night, the attacks in Idlib - almost always carried out during daytime - usually see the deployment of technicals, armoured personnel carriers (APCs) and sometimes tanks, which present an easy target for preying eyes in the sky. As they are doing so, the RuAF is often already present over the battlefield, observing and later striking the attackers with its unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and aircraft. These precision airstrikes proved to be decisive in determining the outcome of several 'smash and grab' raids already. [6] In a raid on the village of Hamamiyat, the entire convoy tasked with capturing it got annihilated by Russian bombs, leading to the loss of three T-55-based APCs, five technicals and a bulldozer, with human casualties undoubtedly very severe. [7] In mid-February this year, an entire rebel armoured convoy on the offensive near Miznaz, West Aleppo met the same fate, with devastating results. [8]


Another obstacle these attacks usually have a fair chance of running into are strategically placed mines or small clusters of mines placed on roads to block off avenues of approach. In addition to forcing rebel vehicles to drive around them (which for technicals often is an impossible feat in the muddy fields of Idlib), they have occassionally taken out vehicles as well, such as the ACV-15 APC seen below (mines are marked by black squares).


In its normal configuration, a 'smash and grab' raid consists of several squads of inghimasi (shock troops) carried to the frontline in one or more T-55/T-62-based APCs and up-armoured technicals that have also been converted to APCs. In typical fashion, most attacks are preluded by a barrage of artillery and rocket fire, with VBIEDs sometimes preceding the attack to soften up enemy defences. With no effective means to counter or at least disrupt Russian airpower, the rebels' best defence against bombs is simply bad weather preventing fighter-bombers from effectively operating in the skies of Idlib, as was the case during the attack on Abu Dafna.

This leads us to the attack depicted in the video, one in the series that ended up resulting in high losses for the rebels (said to have included the death of at least 20 fighters and the destruction of numerous vehicles) and literally no spoils captured. The casualties among regime forces defending the town are believed to have amounted to roughly a dozen. Its poor results set aside, the footage gives us a great insight into the development of the attack.

The strength of the rebels during the attack on Abu Dafna, jointly conducted by the NLF, HTS and Incite The Believers Operations Room, is wholly unknown. As indicated by footage shot by Syrian state television after the conclusion of the attack, rebels appear to have mounted their attack on the town from two different approaches, only one of which would even make it to Abu Dafna itself (which is the one followed by the drone).

The strength of the government forces located in and around Abu Dafna is similarly unknown, but at least 36 soldiers could be seen fleeing from one defensive position alone. This, combined with the presence of five tanks, six BMP-1s and a single ZSU-23 in and around the town, makes it likely that sizeable contingent was indeed present, likely in preparation for a future offensive in this area or because a fresh unit had just rotated into the town.


The attack was preluded by a barrage of rocket fire on defensive positions around the town. At least ten elephant rockets (popularly known as thicc grads, which pair a standard artillery rocket with a much larger warhead) would be used in addition to regular artillery to pound government positions.

 
The first clue of an impending attack occurs at 0:14, when an artillery round lands some 150 metres away from the parked AFVs, and even closer to a group of soldiers walking down the road. Although one would expect that this would have alerted regime forces further inside Abu Dafna, these later appear to be caught completely unpreprared for the attack on the town.


The next shot, starting at 0:19, shows one of the attacking fighters preparing for battle. In an effort to help friendly forces distinguish the assaulting fighters from defending government forces, the first group wore arm bands identifying them as friendlies. In addition to being equipped with a GoPro camera, this fighter wears a knit cap from the Dutch Hardware store-chain GAMMA.


Next is the departure of the T-55-based APC, which has been converted to hold an open-topped armoured cabin instead of the turret, mirroring developments in several other nations that have begun converting tanks to APCs. Apparently well received by its operators, nearly all of the Idlib rebels' T-55 and T-62 tanks (and at least a single T-72AV) would be sacrificed for the conversion to APC, a process that quickly became standardised. This process would entail the installation of a dozer blade and the removal of the turret, with the resulting cabin space large enough to hold roughly five occupants, their weaponry and ammunition and often a pintle-mounted 12.7mm DShK heavy machine gun. Most vehicles also received additional armour consisting of spaced and slat armour, and sometimes even a roof to shelter its occupants from shell fragments and the environment.

A top-down view of the T-55 APC shows that a lack of space forces two of the fighters to sit on the engine deck rather than inside the armoured structure. As the newly added side skirts severely limit the driver's view, he can be seen sticking his head out to help him navigate the terrain. Although the chances of the driver getting hit by small arms fire are extremely small, any well-trained sniper team would likely have little problems neutralising him as he drives straight towards an enemy position. This would have stopped the APC dead in its tracks, making it an easy target for (anti-)tank fire or RPGs.


Unfortunately for the attackers, the smoke plumes created by the T-55's diesel engine are quickly carried away by the wind to the wrong side, thus offering little protection to the Toyotas. Before the installation of smoke grenade launchers on later generation (or upgraded early generation) Soviet T-series of tanks, older models already possessed the ability to lay down a smoke screen by injecting vaporised diesel fuel into the exhaust system.

1:22 shows the impact of the 'thicc grads' raining down on the town. It does not appear to have hit any structures actually used in its defence. Of course, using an oversized warhead on a 122mm rocket, the fact that one actually landed in the town itself is already a minor miracle.

The placement of mines also left much to desire, as they were placed too close to the defence position and could be easily avoided by the T-55-based APC simply by driving around them, and by the Toyotas by stopping in front of them and unloading their passengers there (which was already close enough to the defensive positon anyway). Note the mines in the lower left corner, which should have been deployed much further down the road, preferably spaced 100 metres apart.

The extremely poor placement of mines is again clearly evident here, with the T-55-based APC simply having driven around them to go to the same place it wanted to go to. Because the T-55-based APC acts as a transport vehicle rather than an infantry fighting vehicle that can fight alongside the troops it just delivered to the frontline, the vehicle stops its advance here and isn't seen again throughout the rest of the video.


The 30+ soldiers that manned the defensive position flee along with the BMP-1 IFV. They aren't seen again throughout the duration of the video, likely indicating that they fled deeper into the town than the rebels managed to advance.


Rebel fighters meanwhile arrived at the now abandoned defence fortification that was meant to stop them in the first place.

Regime forces continue their retreat further into the town. Had the defenders established a second defensive line closer to the first one, they could have fallen back to their secondary positions while still holding on to the edge of town, in turn averting deadly house to house combat by preventing the enemy's entry into the town.


This drone footage gives a good view of the limited visibility during the battle, which surely played into the advantage of the rebels. Also note the berms erected around the edge of town, which would have prevented the attackers from using the many trees and bushes here as cover for their advance had the defenders committed to holding their position.

The crew of a ZSU-23-4 SPAAG stationed in the town decides it has had enough and flees the scene. In danger of being outflanked and with its field of fire severely limited by the abundance of buildings and vegetation, this was probably a wise decision. Although the position of this vehicle during the earlier stages of the attack is unknown, had this vehicle been deployed in an effective position near outpost covering the main road leading into Abu Dafna, its four 23mm cannons could have covered much of the approaches used by the forces storming the town.

 

A soldier is narrowly missed by an RPG grenade that was aimed at the T-72 tank stationed just in front of him.


Unlike the ZSU-23, the T-72 holds its position at the edge of town and even moves forwards to give the gunner a better firing position for his next shot. When it moves backwards again, rebels (which can be seen below while entering a house under construction in the lower left corner) are already close to outflanking the tank. The soldier just right of the house unintentionally walks straight into the view of the rebels, and is shot.


As the T-72 reverts back into town, a wounded soldier is dragged away to safety by his comrade, putting himself at great risk of getting shot as well by the rebels that meanwhile took positions in the unfinished building and vineyards south of the tank.

Footage shot by Syrian state television shows the aftermath of the attack, including some of the vehicles destroyed during their advance towards Abu Dafna. Also seen again are the up-armoured Toyota-based APCs, one of which was appears to have been completely wrecked by a 125mm tank round fired from the T-72 that took up position in the town, and in doing so smartly covered the approach of the attack covered in this article.


Although not seen during the attack itself, the remains of two more disabled Toyota pickup trucks that were converted to APCs can also be seen.


More interesting however are the remains of what appears to be an improvised armoured fighting vehicle, as this destroyed vehicle is in fact one of at least three highly modified BTR-60 APCs seen undergoing modifications in early January this year.

While most factions have so far refrained from deploying BTR-60s in any serious numbers, rebels in Idlib are meanwhile forced to make the most out of their badly depleted inventory of armoured fighting vehicles, as several of its T-55/T-62-based APCs have already been lost to anti-tank fire, Russian precision-guided munitions or simply due to being abandoned in the field.

This particular BTR-60 was upgraded by the addition of slat armour around the body of the vehicle, rubber pannels added to cover the weak spot between the panels and wheels and through new armoured windows, replacing the bulletproof windshields onto which steel covers could be lowered. Unfortunately for its operators after the effort they put in upgrading this vehicle, it got completely destroyed during this attack.


Another variant was actually based on the R-145BM turretless communications vehicle variant of the BTR-60, with the same layout of armour, but with the slat armour on the front of the vehicle removed, presumably after it fell off or was found to block the view of the driver too much. Their attachment points can still be seen, however.


It apparently redeployed to al-Bab some time later, and would later be destroyed near Miznaz village, West Aleppo.


In the end, the attack paints a clear picture of the 'smash and grab' mini-offensives and the widely different outcomes that they result in. Although this offensive ended in failure, a necessity to maintain the status quo will undoubtedly result in more attacks of this type being carried out in the future, at least until a permanent ceasefire finally determines the situation in and around Idlib. Until then, further offensives and large losses of life are to be expected, continuously increasing the type of warfare that has come to typify this stage of the Syrian War.


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Having lost a significant part of its military inventory as a result of the Iraqi invasion, Kuwait spent much of the 1990s rebuilding its military. Interestingly, rather than acquiring U.S. M270 MRLS with MGM-140 ATACMS like Bahrain, Kuwait again turned to Russia and acquired the Russian 300mm BM-30 Smerch MRL instead. Of course, with a larger range, twelve times the number of rockets and much increased accuracy at the cost of a slightly smaller warhead compared to the Luna-M, the BM-30 offers a considerable increase in firepower to the Kuwaiti Land Forces, who will undoubtedly appreciate it for these properties. While it once had its place and a role to play in the Middle Eastern military balance, the Luna-M, striking beast though she was, is now relegated to the annals of history.

And as normal operations by Libyan airlines faced their demise and the destruction of commercial aircraft became a common sight as a result of continued infighting throughout the country, the future for the An-124s in Libyan service began to look increasingly grim. This however appears to have not deterred Libyan Air Cargo staff from replacing the green Jamahiriya flag with the new Libyan flag.

When the war broke out, the Armenian Army was still in the process of modernising its vehicle park by replacing its Soviet-era trucks and jeeps with more modern mounts. As part of this modernisation effort, large numbers of Ural and KAMAZ trucks and UAZ jeeps were purchased from Russia to replace older versions of these same brands already in the inventory of Armenia. A large part of this modernisation was already carried out, likely meaning that Armenia now has to place follow-up orders to compensate for the huge amount of vehicles lost during the war.

An article covering trains on Oryx Blog? Yes, you're not mistaken. We know what you are thinking: Where are the tanks, aircraft or ships? But actually, trains are kind of interesting – or some of them at least. Take Japan's Chūō Shinkansen for example, which holds the train world speed record of 603 km/h. Or the Krajina Express, an improvised armoured train used by the Krajina Serb army during the 1990s that looked like a veritable battle fortress. Still not convinced? Then how about Gaddafi's personal Italian high-speed train that's technically still owned by Denmark?

But this was all about to change when Turkey intervened on behalf of the internationally-recognised government in the summer of 2019. Supplying the GNA with a small fleet of Bayraktar TB2s, its forces could now target any structure at al-Watiya with pinpoint accuracy using MAM-L (fitted with a thermobaric warhead) and MAM-C (fitted with a high-explosive warhead) munitions. That the LNA and UAE had never anticipated this development is putting it lightly, as both had failed to install even a basic air defence capability to the vicinity of the base. Even when increasing number of Emirati Pantsir-S1s began to arrive in Libya, almost all of these ended up southeast of Tripoli, where they would ultimately prove incapable of tackling the drone threat overhead. The hunter soon became the hunted, and at least six of them were destroyed by Bayraktar TB2s.
Unbeknownst to most, GNA forces in fact recovered several Pantsir-S1s left behind on the battlefield. While some of these were extensively damaged by the MAM-L munitions that hit them, others escaped with relatively minor damage to the operator's cabin and radar. It is thus possible that Turkey donated the system in the best condition to the US, while retaining other systems for its own use. In any case, the Pantsir-S1 has at this point been completely compromised to Western intelligence and militaries. Ironically, this is thanks to the efforts of the UAE, which by its liberal deployment and donations of the system helped the US and NATO to an opportunity to acquire the once dreaded asset, with operator's manual and all.

The only other type of aircraft encountered at al-Watiya in significant numbers was the Mirage F1. Libya had originally acquired 38 Mirage F1s in the late seventies, comprising 16 Mirage F1AD fighter bombers, 16 Mirage F.1ED interceptors and six Mirage F1BD trainers. [8] These aircraft entered service with 1011 and 1012 Squadron based at al-Watiya airbase, and saw intensive use over Chad and the Gulf of Sirte. In the latter case they were pitted in dogfights against U.S. Navy F-14 Tomcats that sought to challenge Libya's claim over the Gulf of Sirte, which Gaddafi had claimed in 1973 as Libyan territorial waters.

Also found at al-Watiya were the remains of the few aircraft that were actually operated by the LNA out of the airbase, including a single Su-22 and one Mi-24P. Although no detailed information regarding the loss of the Mi-24P is available, the Su-22 was destroyed by a Bayraktar TB2 drone on the 19th of June 2019. While it remains unknown whether the Su-22 was specifically targeted or rather a target of opportunity, its loss made it painfully clear to the LNA that aerial operations out of al-Watiya had become nigh on impossible.


Several other wrecks appear to be leftovers from the NATO-led airstrikes during the 2011 Libyan Civil War. These include several Su-22s that could have challenged the United Nations Security Council approved no-fly zone in Libya before their destruction by precision-guided bombs.


Two more badly damaged Su-22s were found in a Hardened Aircraft Shelter that had clearly been consumed by fire, presumably after having been struck by a MAM-L munition fired from a Bayraktar TB2 drone in March 2020. [6] While it appears that both aircraft were inoperational at the time of their destruction (even still sporting the Gaddafi-era green Jamahiriya roundel), it is possible that the GNA acted on intelligence indicating that both aircraft were to be overhauled or cannabilised for spare parts by the LNA, which the strike obviously prevented.


As could be expected, much of the equipment once used for operating aircraft and helicopters was also captured. Although all show serious signs of wear, some of these will surely be put to good use in restarting operations from the airbase if the GNA is to deploy some of its aerial assets to al-Watiya in the future.

Footage of massive stashes of crates are a good indicator of the size of the munition stockpiles left behind by the LNA. In the munition-hungry environment of the Libyan battlegrounds these new supplies will surely be very welcome to the GNA.

Much of the captured ammunition was quickly taken away by at least 30 pickup trucks loaded to the brim with crates, presumably for distribution between the various fronts the GNA is fighting at, or to be sold on the black market. Although certainly less glamorous than the aforementioned rows of aircraft and helicopters, it is sure to serve its capturers more effectively.

North Korea’s Armed Forces: On the path of Songun attempts to bring a measure of clarity to the often unclear and complicated state of affairs in the intelligence community of North Korea-watchers. In the process, it seeks to disprove the much-echoed stance that there is little to fear from the DPRK's conventional military capabilities by providing information on a plethora of never-before described weapons systems and modernisation programs. Nonetheless, a full accounting which includes many new findings related to its infamous strategic arsenal also features prominently, as the Korean People's Army today can no longer be properly assessed seperately from its extensive WMD capabilities.

North Korea’s Armed Forces maps the most important events from the inconclusive ceasefire struck at the end of the Korean War, throughout the Cold War until modern day. An especially heavy emphasis is placed on the current status of the Korean People's Army by examining their wealth of indigenously designed weaponry. In the course of the book not only will many of the Korean People's Army’s most secret projects and tactics will be covered, and its conflict history with the South and the world at large is put into new context. Moreover, an up-to-date, comprehensive assessment of the equipment holdings of several branches of the Korean People's Army is included, offering a numerical estimate of its naval and aerial capabilities. From the recently introduced stealth missile boats, ballistic missile submarines and main battle tank families to their often-ignored indigenous aircraft industry, virtually all indigenous weapons systems are discussed extensively.

This exclusive content is illustrated by over 75 detailed color artworks and various maps put together through exhaustive research and analysis, as well as around 450 unique images, many of which have never before been seen by the general public. Through scrutiny of satellite footage, the observation of North Korean propaganda outlets and by carefully examining information from the United States Department of Defense, the DPRK's advances in each of the Korean People's Army's respective branches are uncovered. Nearly all of the 'hermit kingdom’s' military exploits are included and an accurate picture of the North's capabilities in both symmetrical and asymmetrical warfare is provided. This book was written specifically for anyone interested in North Korea's military capabilities, or looking to find answers to the many questions raised by the minefield of contradictory statements and misinformation that make up current literature about this reclusive nation.


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Fully remote-controlled and aimed by the means of a thermal sight, the only human intervention required would be reloading the SPG-9 after each shot and the ZPU-2 after firing off the 2400 rounds stowed in the guns' two huge magazines. Like the PKT machine guns, the ZPU-2s too had been retired from active service in Armenia. However, much in common with most other Armenian indigenous military projects, any further development and an eventual introduction into the armed forces appears to have been prevented by a lack of budget.

Another type of 12.7mm AMR designated as Khatef

Two 14.5mm Ashtars (left and middle) and a 23mm Zolfhagar-1 (right) AMR

A rear view of the two Ashtar AMRs

Vehicles:

Much of the captured ammunition was quickly taken away by their capturers, with technicals literally filled to the brim with ammunition crates and arguably more worryingly, mortar and artillery rounds that were taken out of their protective boxes.

Some 175 rounds of 122mm rocket ammunition for BM-21 multiple rocket launchers (MRLs) were encountered in a storage hall. Contrary to keeping the rockets safely stowed in their wooden boxes, all of the rockets were dumped on big piles: a clear disregard for even the most basic of safety measures.

Two Brazilian EE-9 Cascavel armoured cars were also captured. These were originally delivered to Libya in the late 1970s along with a batch of EE-11 Urutu APCs and saw heavy action during the Chadian–Libyan conflict before being retired somewhere in the early 2000s. After 2011, several of the factions warring for control over Libya managed to reactivate some EE-9s, and will surely continue to operate them as long as the supply of spare parts obtained from cannibalising other vehicles lasts.

Also captured were no less than 23 BMP-1s, although only a small number of these were operational at the time of capture, with most others likely requiring an overhaul and spare parts to become operational again. Given the numbers captured which could serve as a source of spare parts, reactivating some should be well within the GNA's abilities.


Two South African Ratel APCs (one being a Ratel 60, the other believed to be a Ratel 20), likely part of a batch delivered to Libyan rebels during the 2011 revolution. Both bear traces of extensive use, but noticably don't suffer from any flat tires. The Ratel 60 appears to have received a direct hit on its turret, but might still have been operated in a support role.


Also encountered were nine towed artillery pieces, including six 130mm M-46 field guns and two 122mm D-30 howitzers. These all appeared to be in working order, and were quickly taken away by their capturers.


A more interesting find (at least to us): one disabled North Korean 122mm field-gun that was clearly inoperational already for some time. This elusive gun serves as a reminder to the close ties once enjoyed between the DPRK and Libya, more on which can be read in our book on the Armed Forces of North Korea.


Almost equally rare as the M109 in Libya is the Soviet 152mm 2S3 Akatsiya SPG, around 50 of which arrived to Libya in the early 1980s. All of these had been placed in storage before the outbreak of the 2011 revolution, likely because of a lack of available spare parts with which to keep the small fleet in working order. Nonetheless, at least three examples that appeared to be operational were captured by the GNA in Tarhuna.


It only makes sense that Libya's most numerous SPG made an appearance as well: the Italian 155mm Palmaria self-propelled howitzer, nine of which were captured by the GNA. In post-2011 Libya, the Palmarias have mostly been used in the direct-fire role, most notably by Libya Dawn against entrenched Islamic State fighters in Sirte in 2016.

Also present at Bani Walid were eleven Czechoslovak Let L-410 Turbolet utility aircraft (out of 19 originally received in 1983). [15] In Libyan service these aircraft saw use as light transport aircraft and advanced trainers before the surviving fleet was abandoned at Bani Walid once spare parts for them ran out. Stored in a dry, desert environment that helped to preserve the aircraft from corrosion, no attempts were made to reactivate the fleet after the arms embargo on Libya was lifted in 2003 however.

Another product from Dearsan Shipyard that entered service with the Serhet Gullugy is the FIB 15, a class of fast intervention boats that can travel up to speeds of 40+ knots. Though much smaller and lighter at 15 metres length, forward armament on the ten vessels that entered service consists once again consists of a 25mm STOP RWS. Its characteristics make it well-suited for maritime interdictions, coastal patrols and harbour protection duties.

A comprehensive list of the supplied weaponry, vehicles, ammunition and equipment can be viewed below. This list doesn't include (up-armoured) Toyota pickup trucks delivered en masse to the LNA, and cargo aircraft that are used to deliver equipment to Libya but otherwise are not operating there. Although deliveries of armoured vehicles are easy to track, items like ammunition are a lot more difficult to pin down and therefore underrepresented in this list. A year in square brackets after the designation refers to the year the equipment was first seen (in Libya) in, which more often than not is also the actual delivery date. When the type of equipment is operated by a party other than the LNA, the actual operator is written in italic. The origins of equipment is denoted by a little flag next to each entry (see the legend on the right) – in case of Project Opus the flag of the UAE is also used as this is where the company behind the operation (Lancaster 6) is located. When the source of the equipment is unknown the flag is in a form of a question mark. Click on the equipment to get a picture of them in Libya.

Tanks

• T-55E [2020] Delivered in three configurations: (2)(3)
• T-62M [2020]
  
• T-62MV [2020] (Some still with Russian rail transport markings)
  

• BRDM-2 [2017] [Acquired by the UAE from Ukraine]

Armoured Personnel Carriers

• Al-Mared [2019] (Some fitted with Jordanian Snake Head Turrets)
  
• Mbombe [2019] (Some fitted with Jordanian Snake Head Turrets)

Mine-Resistant Ambush Protected Vehicles (MRAPs)

• BAE Caiman [2016] Delivered in two configurations: (2)[Acquired by the UAE from the United States]
• JAIS N35 4x4 [2017] Delivered in two configurations: (2)
• Valkyrie [2020] (Operated by Wagner PMC)

Infantry Mobility Vehicles

• Streit Group Typhoon [2014]
• Streit Group/KrAZ Cougar [2017]
  
• Streit Group/KrAZ Spartan [2017]
• Streit Group/KrAZ Cobra [2020]
• MSPV Panthera T6 [2017]
  
• MSPV Panthera F9 [2018]
• INKAS Titan-S 4x4 [2020]
• INKAS Titan-S 6x6 [2020]
• Nimr II [2018]
• Igirigi Mk.II [2016] [Acquired by the UAE from Nigeria]
•  TAG Terrier LT-79 [2019]
• KADDB Al-Wahsh [2018] (Most fitted with Jordanian Snake Head Turrets)
• GAZ Tigr-M [2020] (Operated by Wagner PMC)

Towed artillery

• 122mm M-30 howitzer [2017] (Some still in original Russian livery)
• 122mm D-30 howitzer [2020] (Operated by Wagner PMC)
  
• 152mm 2A65 Msta-B howitzer [2020] (Operated by Wagner PMC)
  
• 155mm Norinco AH4 gun-howitzer [2017] (Operated by the UAE on behalf of the LNA. Associated ammunition spotted in Libya since 2017)
• 155mm G5 howitzer [2020]

Multiple rocket launchers

• 107mm Taka on Safir [2014] [Acquired by Sudan from Iran]
• 107mm and 122mm LRSVM Morava [2020] [Acquired by the UAE from Serbia]
• 122mm North Korean MRL modified to fire 122mm rockets [2020]
  

Anti-tank guided missiles

• 9M113 Konkurs [2020]
  
• 9M133 Kornet [2020] [Acquired by the UAE from Russia]
• FGM-148 Javelin [2019] (Operated by France on behalf of the LNA)
• Dehlaviyeh [2020] [Origin unknown. Likely captured by the UAE in Yemen and sent to Libya or acquired by Sudan from Iran]

Anti-aircraft guns

•  23mm ZU-23-2CP [2020] (Acquired by the UAE from Poland)

Surface-to-air missile systems

• S-125[2020] (Acquired by the UAE from Belarus)
• Pantsir-S1 [2019] (First operated by the UAE on behalf of the LNA. Now used by the LNA and Wagner PMC)
• MIM-23 Hawk [2019](Deployed by the UAE to Libya in late 2019 to protect al-Khadim airbase in Eastern Libya)
  
• MIM-104 Patriot [2020] (Deployed by the UAE to Libya in January 2020 to protect al-Khadim airbase in Eastern Libya. Returned to the UAE after U.S. pressure)
  
• Pantsir-S1M [2019] (Operated by Wagner PMC. Used to shoot down two MQ-9 Reaper UAVs, one Italian, the other US, in November 2019)
   

Radars and Jammers

• P-18 'Spoon Rest D' [2020] (Operated by Wagner PMC)
• Groza-S [2020] (Operated by Wagner PMC)

Unmanned Aerial Vehicles

• Schiebel Camcopter S-100 [2016] (Operated by the UAE on behalf of the LNA)
• Wing Loong [2016] (Operated by the UAE on behalf of the LNA)
• Wing Loong II [2019] (Operated by the UAE on behalf of the LNA)
• Yabhon [2019] Delivered in two configurations: (2)
• Orlan-10 [2016] Delivered in two configurations: (2)(Operated by Wagner PMC)
• ZALA 421-16Е [2020] (Operated by Wagner PMC)
• Mohajer-2 [2017] (Likely acquired by Sudan from Iran)
• Ababil-2 [2020] [Origin unknown. Likely acquired by Sudan from Iran or transported from Iran via Syria to Libya]

Helicopters

• Mi-8 [2014] Delivered in three configurations: (2)(3)
• Mi-8 Ambulance [2019] (Operated by Egypt on behalf of the LNA)
• Mi-24V [2015] (Acquired by the UAE from an unknown source)
• Mi-24P [2015] (Acquired by the UAE from Belarus)
• UH-60M 'Blackhawk' [2016] (Operated by the UAE for the rescue of downed pilots)
• AS332L Super Puma [2019] (Acquired by Lancaster 6 from South Africa. To have been operated by PMCs)
• SA 341 Gazelle [2019] (Acquired by Lancaster 6 from South Africa. To have been operated by PMCs)
  

Fighter Aircraft

• MiG-21MF [2014]
• MiG-23[2017] (Delivered to serve as sources of spare parts for Libyan MiG-23s)
• MiG-29S[2020] (Operated by Wagner PMC. Former Russian Air Force aircraft)
• Su-24M[2020] (Operated by Wagner PMC. Former Russian Air Force aircraft)
• AT-802i [2016] (Operated by the UAE on behalf of the LNA)
• Mirage-2000 [2019] (Operated by the UAE or Egypt, on behalf of the LNA out of Sidi Barrani airbase in Western Egypt)

ISR Aircraft

• PC-6 ISR [2019] (Operated by Lancaster 6. Used for surveillance and intelligence gathering)

 

Cargo and VIP Aircraft

• An-26 [2017] (Chartered by the UAE on behalf of the LNA)
• An-32 [2020] (Chartered by the UAE on behalf of the LNA)
• Il-18 [2016] (Chartered by the UAE from Moldova on behalf of the LNA)
• Il-18 [2020] (Chartered by the UAE on behalf of the LNA)
• Il-76 [2016] (Numerous aircraft chartered by the UAE on behalf of the LNA)
• Dassault Falcon 50EX 'P4-BAA' [2020] (Operated by UAE-based Falcon Wings on behalf of the LNA)
• Dassault Falcon 900 'P4-RMA' [2018] (Owned by UAE-based Sonnig International Private Jets and operated by UAE-based Falcon Wings on behalf of the LNA from 2018 till 2020)
• Dassault Falcon 900DX 'P4-FJA' [2020] (Owned by UAE-based Sonnig International Private Jets and operated by UAE-based Falcon Wings on behalf of the LNA)
• Gulfstream G550 'N131GA' [2020] (Operated by UAE-based Cite Aviation on behalf of the LNA)
• An-12 [2019] (Operated on behalf of the LNA)

Naval Vessels

•  Deirdre Class [2018] (Acquired by the UAE from Ireland and renamed Al-Karama)
• MRC-1250 RHIB [2019] (Chartered by Christiaan Durrant from Maltese arms dealer James Fenech)
  

Trucks, Vehicles and Jeeps

• Ural-4320 Delivered in two configurations: (2)(Operated by Wagner PMC)
• Armoured Ural-4320(Operated by Wagner PMC)
• KamAZ 6x6 Delivered in two configurations: (2)
• KamAZ 8x8
• Safir [2014] [Acquired by Sudan from Iran]
• Jeep J8 [2017]
• MAN 2V110-E maintenance vehicle (For Pantsir-S1) [2019] (First operated by the UAE. Now used by Wagner PMC)
• 19U6/03 generator (For Pantsir-S1) [2019]

Small Arms

• Type 56-1 assault rifle [2019] [Acquired by the UAE from China]
  
• Type 80 general purpose machine gun [2019] [Acquired by the UAE from China]
• W85 heavy machine gun [2019] [Acquired by the UAE from China]
• Type 69 RPG [2019] [Acquired by the UAE from China]
• SPG-9 recoilless rifle [2014]
• RPG-32 'Nashshab' [2018]
• Orsis T-5000 sniper rifle[2019] (Used by Wagner PMC)
• AK-103[2020]
• PKM general purpose machine gun [2019]

Munitions

• BA-7 'Blue Arrow' [2016] (Used by the UAE for its Wing Loong and Wing Loong II drones)
• GBU-12 Paveway II [2016] (Used by the UAE for its AT-802i light attack aircraft)
• 155mm GP1-A laser-guided artillery projectiles [2017] (Used by the UAE for its Norinco AH4 gun-howitzer)
• 155mm GP6 laser-guided artillery projectiles [2019] (Used by the UAE for its Norinco AH4 gun-howitzer)
• 120mm M62P8 HE mortar rounds [2019] [Acquired by the UAE from Serbia]
• 120mm M62P10 HE mortar rounds [2019] [Acquired by the UAE from Serbia]
• 155mm 2K25 Krasnopol [2017] (Used by Wagner PMC for its 2A65 Msta-B howitzer)
• POM-2 [2020](Used by Wagner PMC)
• PMN-2[2020](Used by Wagner PMC)
• MON-50 anti-personnel mines[2020] (Used by Wagner PBAMC)
• MON-90 anti-personnel mines[2020] (Used by Wagner PMC)
• MON-100 anti-personnel mines[2020] (Used by Wagner PMC)
• OZM-72 anti-personnel mines[2020] (Used by Wagner PMC)
• TM-62 anti-tank mines[2020] (Used by Wagner PMC)
• TM-83 anti-tank mines[2020] (Used by Wagner PMC)

Miscellaneous Items

• Fateh-4 mine-clearing line charge [2017]
• Spare parts for T-72s, T-55s, BMP-1s and 2S1 AFVs [2019]
• ML-8 Anti-Lift Initiators [2020]
• PN79-M thermal optics for 9P163 Kornet ATGM launcher [2019]
• Tumansky R-13-300 jet engines for MiG-21MF [2018] (Likely delivered by Egypt)
  

Acquisitions Still in Progress

• Mi-35M4 (To be acquired by the UAE from Brazil. Status of deal unknown)
• CH-4B (To be acquired from Jordan. Status of deal unknown)
  

Deals that fell through

• LASA T-Bird [2019] (Acquired by Lancaster 6 but forced to leave Jordan before it could deploy to Libya)
• An-26 [2019] (Acquired by Lancaster 6 but forced to leave Jordan before it could deploy to Libya)
• MD530FF [2019] (To have been acquired by Lancaster 6 from Jordan. Deal fell through)
• AH-1F 'Cobra' [2019] (To have been acquired by Lancaster 6 from Jordan. Deal fell through)
• T-72M1 [2017] (To have been acquired by Jordan from Poland. Deal fell through) 

By Stijn Mitzer and Joost Oliemans


In late 2004, the two damaged Su-25UBs were brought to Abidjan Houphouët-Boigny IAP, where they joined the two Su-25 single-seaters that had sustained minor damage as a result of French reprisals. It appears that Ivory Coast was interested in bringing the aircraft back into service, but any attempt at doing so would have required parts or entire subsections to be brought in from abroad, something the arms embargo imposed on Ivory Coast obviously prevented. As a result, the Su-25s continued to languish in the air force hangar. [1]