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Humble Beginnings - Turkish Airlines’ Ju 52s

April 5, 2021, 7:41 am
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By Stijn Mitzer and Joost Oliemans 
 
Turkish Airlines is one of the largest airlines in the world, flying to more destinations than any other carrier in the world. It operates a fleet of more than 350 Airbus and Boeing aircraft that serve some 300 destinations domestically and internationally today, a huge leap from its humble beginning of four domestic destinations in 1933, and just 103 destinations in 2003. Over the past century, Turkish Airlines has operated a wide variety of aircraft that haven't always been in the spotlight as much as their more modern brethrens. One of these aircraft is the German Ju 52, which has long remained elusive in imagery and footage during its years of service in Turkey.

The Junkers Ju 52 is one of the most famous airplanes ever built. First conceived in Germany in the early 1930s as a single-engined airliner for the civilian market, the design of the aircraft was quickly reworked to feature a trimotor arrangement that we all know as the Ju 52 today. In this configuration the aircraft would quickly become popular with airlines all over the world, operating passenger services as far as South America and Asia. As World War II loomed, large numbers of Ju 52s were introduced into the Luftwaffe as bombers and transports. 
 
The first major combat operation for the Ju 52 came as a paratroop transport during the invasion of Denmark in April 1940. Although informed that a German invasion was on hand, the Danes were caught completely off guard and surrendered after just two hours of armed resistance. Emboldened by this remarkable feat, the Luftwaffe tried to replicate this success during the invasion of the Netherlands just a month later. However, as history would have it, the skies over Holland proved particularly harmful to the Luftwaffe, which lost approximately 250 Ju 52s in the timespan of a few days. [1] [2]   
 
Although by 1940 already seriously outdated, the Ju 52 remained the workhorse of the Luftwaffe throughout the rest of Second World War, hauling troops and supplies to just about any theatre the Germans were fighting in. Despite several attempts to replace the Ju 52 with a more modern successor (these being the Ju 252 and later the Ju 352), the aircraft remained in production until 1944. After the war, production of the Ju 52 continued in France as the Amiot AAC.1 Toucan (1945-1947) and in Spain as the CASA 352 (1945-1952), seeing use as passenger aircaft and military transports until the early 1970s.
 
But for our story we have to go back a few years – to the 2nd of April 1944 to be precise – when five Ju 52s landed at Yeşilköy Airport in Istanbul. Still in their original German markings, the arrival of the aircraft left no question as to their origin. The Ju 52s subsequently entered service with the Devlet Hava Yolları (Turkish State Airlines or DHY in short), the forerunner of Turkish Airlines (Türk Hava Yolları). [3] Very little is known about their career in Turkish service afterwards, and even photos of the aircraft are difficult to come by.


Devlet Hava Yolları was established on the 20th of May 1933 as a domestic airline to connect major population centers in Turkey. Initially taking delivery of an exotic mix of aircraft, including two German Junkers F 13s, two U.S. Curtiss Model 55 Kingbirds and a Soviet Tupolev ANT-9, a growing demand for domestic air travel sparked the start of a growth in DHY's fleet that would eventually see the acquisition of several types of de Havilland aircraft from the UK, including the four-engined de Havilland D.H.86 Express, in the late 1930s and early 1940s. [4] [5] However, due to a reluctance of the Allies to provide more aircraft in the midst of World War II, Turkey turned to one of the few sources that was still willing to supply it with aircraft: Germany.

A beautiful illustration featured on the cover of the airline's April 1946 timetable depicting a DHY Ju 52 over rural Turkey

Throughout almost the entirety of World War II, Turkey managed to stay neutral as the war rapidly took hold of neighbouring Greece, Bulgaria, the Caucasus and the Middle East. Turkey's neutrality lasted until February 1945, when the country finally declared war on Germany and Japan and joined the war on the side of the Allies. Just shy of a year before, in April 1944, Turkey had already halted the export of chromite ore to Germany, later followed by a complete breakoff in diplomatic and trade relations in August 1944. Chromite ore, which is used for the production of steel, was of vital importance to keep the German war machine running. In return for guaranteeing deliveries of this valuable resource, Germany had provided Turkey with goods and war materiel which it had little chance of acquiring from the Allied powers. It thus seems plausible that the Ju 52s were acquired through this arrangement as well, possibly presenting the very last type of equipment received before relations completely broke off.
 

After the aircrafts' arrival to Turkey in April 1944, the large swastikas on the tails and other markings were hastily overpainted and replaced by a minimal livery. The previous livery of the aircraft indicates that at least some of the machines had been operated by Deutsche Luft Hansa, the national airline of Nazi Germany, rather than by the Luftwaffe. While the newly-acquired Ju 52s could only carry some 17 passengers, this was still twice the capacity of most of DHY's de Havilland aircraft that had meanwhile become the mainstay of the airline. 
 
The few photographs of the Ju 52s in Turkish service that exist show one of the aircraft 'TC-RUH' with the serial '18' and a crescent on the tail (presumably as part of the Turkish flag), while another photo shows 'Devlet Hava Yolları' stickering under the cockpit. As the Ju 52s were solely used on routes inside of Turkey during World War II, no large flags or bright identification markings indicating that the aircraft belonged to Turkey were needed. It is entirely possible that the aircraft continued operating in this bare-bone livery until eventually replaced by surplus U.S. Douglas DC-3s in the late 1940s.
 
 
Another possible livery for the aircraft comes from a more dubitable source: A commemorative postage stamp issued by the Turkish Red Crescent in 1946 depicting a Ju 52 as a medevac transport with large red cresents on the wings and fuselage. [6] It is unknown whether one of Turkey's Ju 52s ever operated in such a livery or if it was designed specifically for the stamp and thus purely fictional, though the latter theory seems more likely.
 

Aside from the Ju 52, two other types of Junkers passenger aircraft were operated in Turkey during the interwar period: the Junkers G24 and the smaller Junkers F 13. The G24 can be said to be the spiritual predecessor of Ju-52, featuring a similar tri-motor design and corrugated skin. Interestingly, the single aircraft that operated in the country was never actually owned by Turkey, but rather operated by Junkers as part of a (ultimately fruitless) marketing campaign in the mid-to-late 1920s. [7] 
 
The three F 13s on the other hand operated as passenger, liaison, aerial survey and postal aircraft before being retired in the late 1930s. [9] At one point the production of some twenty F 13s by Turkey's first aircraft manufacturing plant TOMTAŞ (Tayyare ve Motor Türk Anonim Şirketi) was planned, but financial difficulties ultimately led to the cancellation of this project and eventually the downfall of TOMTAŞ, ending what could have been a promising start of an indigenous aircraft industry. [8]

A Junkers G24 in Turkish markings. Although the aircraft was never actually owned by Turkey, it operated in the country for some two years (1925-1927)

The Ju 52's carreer in Turkish service may have been brief – spanning just a few years – the aircraft nonethless represent a unique chapter in the story of the Turkish aviation industry's humble beginnings, a story which deserves to be preserved for posterity. Though its humility would persist for a long time, some 30 years later, Turkish Airlines would be one of the first airlines to operate another tree-engined airliner: the DC-10. Nowadays, the country is a pioneer in the aerospace sector, outputting a vast variety of advanced aircraft types and prototypes, although its effort to produce domestic airliners through the TRjet project was cancelled in 2017. Nevertheless, the remarkable evolution from operating a handful of Ju 52s in a forgotten past to developments such as Baykar's Cezeri flying car (which, having to experience Istanbul's traffic congestion first hand, would be much appreciated) shows us this: Humble beginnings forebode the conception of greatness.
 

[1] Mei 1940 - de verdediging van het Nederlandse luchtruim http://www.bataafscheleeuw.nl/db/main/assortiment/index.php?book_id=514
[4] Turkish Airlines History http://www.thy-heritage.com/history/
[5] Turkish Airlines Fleet http://www.thy-heritage.com/flit/
[6] Kızılay uçak resimli pullar, Sanayi Kongresi ve ilk uçuş zarfları https://pulveposta.com/2018/02/11/kizilay-ucak-resimli-pullar-sanayi-kongresi-ve-ilk-ucus-zarflari/


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Fighting The Tide: The Islamic State’s Desperate Attempts to Combat Coalition Airpower

April 8, 2021, 3:05 am
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By Stijn Mitzer and Joost Oliemans
 
Starting in June 2014, Coalition airstrikes conducted on positions, vehicles and high-ranking members of the Islamic State have taken a heavy toll on the group. These airstrikes combined with increased bombardements conducted by the Russian Air Force (RuAF) ultimately proved to be decisive in determining the outcome of many of the offensives conducted by and against the Islamic State. The Battle for Kobanî, where Coalition airpower played a decisive role in the defence of the city, first made painfully clear the vulnerability of Islamic State forces to aircraft armed with precision-guided munitions.

Although the Islamic State had no lack of captured surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) nor launchers required to launch them, it lacked the expertise to turn these often derelict systems into operational systems capable of hitting any foe in the air. Indeed, only pickup-mounted anti-aircraft guns and the limited amount of man-portable air defence systems (MANPADS) in the hands of the Islamic State (even including some North Korean examples) proved capable of inflicting damage to or downing opposing aircraft and helicopters, most often in Iraq.
 
The capture of two fully operational S-125 (NATO designation: SA-3) batteries in between Hama and Aleppo in September 2014 and near T4 airbase in December 2016 did not help the Islamic State in any way, as it was not only incapable of operating these sophisticated systems, but unable to transport them to any of its strongholds throughout Syria in the first place. Utilisation of one of the S-75 (SA-2) missiles it managed to capture back in 2014 was in turn impeded by the fact that no launcher was captured along with it, though a lack of expertise in operating the aging system would surely have prevented its use otherwise. 


The usage of several 2P25 launch systems, part of the 2K12 Kub (SA-6) SAM complex, captured near Deir ez-Zor in 2014 was foiled by the lack of any missiles and significant damage on the launcher itself. More promising was a capture of a 2K12 Kub battery in Deir ez-Zor in January 2016, which did provide the Islamic State with an operational SURN 1S19 radar system and intact launchers. However, these systems were in such a sorry state that returning them to operational condition would have been nigh impossible, not to mention the bad condition of many of the associated missiles. [1] The whole site was said to have been bombed and destroyed by the RuAF shortly after its capture, which turned out to be a case of Russian disinformation after one of the intact launchers was later seen employed as a VBIED. [2]

 
The capture of Tabqa airbase on the 24th of August 2014 provided Islamic State with an undisclosed number of R-3S, R-13M and R-60 air-to-air missiles (AAMs) originally intended to be used with the two resident squadrons flying MiG-21 fighter jets. The terrorist group subsequently moved a batch of these missiles to Raqqa, where it attemped to convert them to the surface-to-air role. This progress was filmed by one of the project leaders, who was subsequently arrested at a rebel checkpoint. The footage was then given to SkyNews, which first reported on the conversion of R-13Ms to the surface-to-air role on the 6th of January 2016. [3]


While the project in Raqqa appears to have ended in failure, with its project leader in rebel custody, these setbacks did little to deter Islamic State from continuing its efforts to repurpose AAMs into missiles that could be succesfully launched from the ground. Looking to maximise the chances of success, it began to distribute the missiles throughout the territories it controlled, likely hoping for one of its units to succeed in turning the otherwise useless munitions into potent weapons. This not only included the several Wilayats (governorates) located throughout Syria, but also those in Iraq, which became the recipients of several batches of missiles that were originally captured in Syria.
 

Unsurprisingly, all of these efforts ended in failure as well, with most missiles left unused in IS weapon depots until found by SDF, regime forces or Iraqi forces (large stashes were encountered in Raqqa, Tabqa, Deir ez-Zor, Hama and Mosul). Other Islamic State units attemped to make the most out of them and used the AAMs as DIY (unguided) munitions, resulting in an extremely inaccurate rocket with a small warhead. Had the Islamic State actually succeeded in adapting these missiles to their new role, their age, limited range and the fact that they would quickly have ran out of stocks would have made their effect on Coalition airpower a limited one all the same.
 

 
Tadmur, captured on the 20th of May 2015, and the third airbase to fell in the hands of the Islamic State in Syria, also provided the Islamic State with large numbers of air-to-air missiles and even anti-radiation missiles (designed to be used by aircraft against ground radars). [4] Tadmur was previously home to a squadron flying MiG-25PD(S) interceptors, but as these aircraft were gradually withdrawn from service, the four remaining MiG-25s left for T4 airbase in late 2013. Their associated missiles remained however, stored away in two of Tadmur's sixteen Hardened Aircraft Shelters. When the fighters of the Islamic State overran the airbase, it not not only encountered dozens of R-40 air-to-air missiles but also large numbers of Kh-28 anti-radiation missiles, likely intended for use on Su-22s and Su-24s stationed at the nearby T4 airbase but never transported there.
 


While it was extremely unlikely that the Islamic State would be able to turn the Kh-28s and its 140kg heavy warhead into anything useful other than an IED or DIY surface-to-surface rocket, it too distributed these missiles (along with several dozen R-40 AAMs) throughout its territories in Syria and Iraq, ultimately ending up in both Raqqa and Mosul. [5] [6] [7] There was some fear that some of the missiles in Mosul were being modified to carry mustard gas, although there is no indication to suggest that this ever took place. Instead, IS likely envisaged using the huge missiles as unguided rockets, an idea that was probably quickly abandoned because of their unwieldiness and the small chance of hitting any target with even a remote degree of accuracy.
 
 
The Islamic State ultimately did find a more fitting role for some of the R-40 missiles that were left behind in Syria. Two variants of the R-40 were captured: the semi-active radar homing guided R-40RD and the infrared-guided R-40TD. As the R-40RD requires an on-board radar to lock on to the targeted aircraft, it was useless for the Islamic State in its intended role. The R-40TD on the other hand is guided by its infrared warhead, and does not require guidance by an on-board radar.
 
When regime forces entered one of the recently captured Hardened Aircraft Shelters at Tadmur in March 2017, they encountered a dump truck modified precisely for this purpose – to carry and launch a single R-40TD. The missile, installed on a specially designed platform, could be aimed by using the dump truck's tipper mechanism. As the R-40 was designed to hit large and fast flying targets, it comes with a 70kg heavy warhead, enabling the missile to destroy most targets by only exploding in the vicinity of the targeted aircraft. Although the R-40TD would appear to be mounted upside down, the attachment points that connect it with the MiG-25's pylons are located on the top of the missile, creating the false image the missile sits inverted. As no aircraft or helicopters were reported to have been shot down over Tadmur, it will likely never become known if the system was ever actually used. 
 
Several similar modifications of the R-3S, the R-13M, the R-60 and the R-73 were seen in Yugoslavia in an attempt to counter the Coalition airpower here. Similary mounted on trucks, none ever scored a hit. The SyAAF took it one step further and experimented with launching R-40TDs at ground targets back in 2014, unsurprisingly with very poor results. [8]
 

In its increasingly desperate efforts to address the threat of Coalition airpower in Iraq, the Islamic State resorted to measures such as using conventional artillery as makeshift anti-aircraft guns, praying for the remote chance of achieving a direct hit on enemy aircraft flying high in the sky to bring them down. [9] First shown off in March 2016, these truck-mounted 122mm D-30 howitzers of the Al-Farouq Platoon (of the Wilayat Ninawa Air Defence Battalion) were seen firing at U.S. Navy (E)P-3 spy planes used for signals intelligence (SIGINT) missions over Mosul. The use of this weaponry, ordinarily employed as conventional artillery against ground targets only, was highly unconventional, and highlighted the Islamic State's severe lack of means to counter the Coalition's overwhelming air assets.


The slow-flying (E)P-3s, usually moving in a circular pattern, must have been a thorn in the eye of the Islamic State, which, in contrast with fast flying jets also used in the region, appeared as though there was a chance of shooting them down in this manner. Despite the fact that the high-powered artillery is capable of reaching the altitude at which these aircraft operate, the fact that their High Explosive (HE) munition lacks any type of proximity- or anti-aircraft fuse means they have to score a direct hit on their target in order to disable it, an almost impossible feat to accomplish.

Although this practise might appear to be a waste of time and precious munition, the Islamic State is not the first to resort to such tactics. Indeed, Mujahideen are known to have employed mortar- and RPG-fire against Soviet helicopters during the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and Iranian artillery targeted low-flying Iraqi helicopters during the Iran-Iraq War as well. Of course, neither of these cases resulted in any reported aircraft losses or even minor damage being done, as the use of such desperate tactics only results in either a complete destruction of the target or a complete miss.


The Islamic State also attempted to create solutions to mitigate the targeting of Islamic State armour by Coalition aircraft. Left defenceless against fast jets and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) circling overhead, the Islamic State's only viable option was to decrease the chances of detection of its forces, leading to interesting adaptations on the battlefield. One example is the production on several types of camouflage uniforms with an aluminium lining to prevent forward-looking infrared (FLIR) targeting pods from picking up the heat source of the soldier.

While these methods are relatively straightforward and easy to implement, the camouflaging of an object as large as a tank required a wholly different approach, as clearly evidenced on the T-55 tank below. The suspended rope-like components that make up the camouflage are believed to be leather strips, and have a similar function to the camouflage uniforms mentioned above.


Unsurprisingly, nearly all of the tanks upgraded with multi-spectral camouflage would be deployed to Wilayat al-Barakah (al-Hasakah governorate), where the Islamic State was on the offensive against not only government forces but mainly the YPG. [10] The latter could count on heavy Coalition air support, which would play a vital role in stopping the Islamic State's advance in this region.

Similar to other Islamic State armour upgrades, the effectiveness of the multi-spectral camouflage at deceiving Coalition airpower remains largely unknown. However, as no tank upgraded with this type of camouflage has ever been seen targeted in footage of Coalition airstrikes, or has otherwise been spotted destroyed by a presumed airstrike on the ground in Syria, it might indeed have proved effective at deceiving Coalition aircraft and thus avoiding detection.


Another way to avoid being struck from above is by making sure that more visible decoys are on the receiving end of precision-guided munitions instead. For this purpose, the Islamic State manufactured a whole range of decoys that even included a number of fake tanks. That said, many of these were of questionable build quality, and it is likely that even with a camouflage pattern they still would have stood out as a sore thumb on the plains of Iraq and Syria, something a bearded mannequin posing as crew was unlikely to change.

 
Questionable build quality was far from the only problem hampering the successful usage of tank decoys, as it seems the designer of many of the decoys had little idea of what modern tanks are actually supposed to look like. This resulted in the deployment of several decoys around Mosul in 2017 that resembled WWII-era Maus super-heavy tanks more than any of the Soviet T-series of tanks in use by IS. Nevertheless, the continued efforts showed how much the Islamic State was still committed to exploit any strategy that could prevent its own fighters and positions from being hit even at this stage of the war.


The production and deployment of decoys was not limited to just tanks, as even M1114 'Humvees', howitzers, multiple rocket launchers and heavy machine guns were used as the basis of a range of decoys. While these might well have fooled the optical devices of older generations of Russian aircraft, it is unlikely that Coalition aircraft equipped with advanced forward-looking infrared (FLIR) cameras had much problems discerning them from their more lethal brethren.

 
As the war progressed, the production of decoys quickly became a standardised process. This was especially true in Mosul, where whole factories would be set up to assemble M1114 'Humvee'-based decoys. The fact that it was this model that was being imitated can be attributed to U.S. foreign policy, which left the region flooded with these vehicles, but no security apparatus capable of preventing the Islamic State's forces from capturing them.

 
While the Islamic State's extensive efforts to combat coalition airpower would ultimately yield little result, they still embodied the group's pragmatic attitude towards finding inventive ways to alleviate their shortcomings. Whatever the task at hand, you can be certain that IS would come up with some surprising solution in attempt to achieve it. Of course, with its Middle Eastern empire in tatters and relieved of much of its former resources, it will now be forced to do so once more in obscurity. Meanwhile, Coalition air pilots will not have lost much sleep over the Islamic State's anti-air endeavours.
 
[1] Islamic State captures Ayyash weapons depots in largest arms haul of Syrian Civil War https://www.oryxspioenkop.com/2016/03/islamic-state-captures-ayyash-weapons.html
[2] Armour in the Islamic State, the DIY works of Wilayat al-Khayr https://www.oryxspioenkop.com/2017/03/armour-in-islamic-state-diy-works-of.html
[4] Islamic State captures large numbers of radars and missiles at Tadmur (Palmyra) airbase https://www.oryxspioenkop.com/2015/06/islamic-state-captures-large-numbers-of.html
[6] Iraqi forces discover terrifying arsenal of weapons including mustard gas and dozens of ageing rockets in ISIS arms warehouse https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-4163946/Iraqi-forces-discover-mustard-gas-ISIS-warehouse.html
[7] YPG-led SDF captures Soviet-made missiles from ISIS in Raqqa https://youtu.be/HIEIFh0CaEc
[9] That Time Soviet Howitzers Were Used as Anti-Aircraft Guns by the Islamic State https://www.oryxspioenkop.com/2019/07/that-time-soviet-howitzers-were-used-as.html 
[10] Armour in the Islamic State - The Story of ’The Workshop’ https://www.oryxspioenkop.com/2017/08/armour-in-islamic-state-story-of.html

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Russian AK-12 Assault Rifles In Service With Qatar

April 13, 2021, 3:19 pm
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By Stijn Mitzer and Joost Oliemans
 
Most of the Gulf countries are generally reticent when it comes to showing off their defence capabilities and recent acquisitions of military hardware. Although a high degree of secrecy surrounding the acquisition of ballistic missile systems from North Korea and China by the UAE and Saudi Arabia is to be expected, in the Gulf region this secrecy often also applies to conventional weaponry such as artillery and even small arms. For Qatar, the situation is slightly different: while it does showcase most of its weaponry during its annual National Day parades, surprisingly little equipment gets shown during military exercises and other events. 
 
In similar vein, Qatar's acquisition of the Russian AK-12 assault rifle remains largely unreported, and imagery indicating their presence outside military parades so far appears to be nonexistent. Its relative elusiveness set aside, the delivery of the AK-12 is a testament to the increasing flow of Russian-made weaponry reaching countries in the Gulf region, which almost exclusively relied on arms sourced from Western countries in the past. Qatar is the first confirmed export customer of the new assault rifle, which only entered serial production in 2017.
 
Qatar's interest in Russian-made weaponry first came to light in 2016 and 2017, when it signed a series of agreements with Russia on military-technical cooperation during bilateral visits to Doha and Moscow. [1] [2] [3] Although what exactly these agreements entailed was at the time still unknown, the first sighting of Russian weaponry in Qatar already came a year later in December 2018, when hundreds of AK-12 rifles were seen in the hands of Qatari soldiers marching through Doha Corniche during that year's National Day parade.
 
Months before, in July 2018, the Russian envoy to Qatar confirmed reports that Qatar and Russia had signed an arms deal for small arms and anti-tank missiles. [4] Included in the deal were large numbers of AK-12s, 9M133 Kornet anti-tank guided missiles (ATGMs) and even 9K338 Igla-S (NATO designation: SA-24) MANPADS. Another type of Russian weapon system Doha showed interest in was the S-400 surface-to-air missile (SAM) system, although an actual acquisition of the S-400 by Qatar is highly unlikely due to the threat of sanctions by the U.S. [4]
 
 
Forging new friendships
 
Traditionally a customer of arms and equipment from France and later the US, the Qatar diplomatic crisis that lasted from 2017 to 2021 saw Qatar diversifying its procurement efforts to now also include Russia as a supplier of weaponry. This was a notable change in relations from the early 2010s, when fundamental differences over the course of the Syrian Civil War significantly strained Doha's relations with Moscow. Qatar's warming ties with Russia can in this respect be seen to be underlined by the acquisition of weaponry. Today Qatar and Russia are working together in a joint attempt to achieve a political solution to the conflict in Syria, showing just how swiftly relations can shift in this diplomatically competitive corner of the globe.
 
 
Familiar shapes, novel features
 
The 5.45×39mm AK-12 is the latest in the series of highly popular assault rifles designed and produced by the Kalashnikov Concern (formerly known as Izhmash). Entering production some 70 years after the inception of the original AK-47, the shape and design philosophy of the first AK can still be readily appreciated in the new design. Nonetheless, the AK-12 represents an improvement in almost every aspect versus the AK-74M it replaces. Most notably, the AK-12 has a free-floating barrel (allowing for increased accuracy), a modular design with picatinny rails and improved ergonomics compared to past iterations in the AK series.
 
Some might still know the AK-12 for its prototype design, which suffered from a number of defects and was later abandoned in favour of the more basic AK-400 design, which ultimately became the finalised model of the AK-12. As it was the prototype design that almost exclusively featured in video games, to many a casual observer the AK-12 designation will still belong to this progenitor. In addition to Qatar, Armenia has also been speculated to be a possible customer of the AK-12, potentially even setting up a production line for the type. [5] At the same time, since it is currently in the process of reequipping its military with license-produced AK-103s any large scale acquisition of AK-12s as well as the latter theory appears unlikely.
While the actual number of rifles bought by Qatar remains unknown, it is almost certain that the AK-12 isn't destined to become the new service rifle of its armed forces. This has as much to do with the fact that Qatar doesn't have a main service rifle, with units making use of the FN FNC, M4 and M16, as with a 2018 agreement with Italy for the local production of ARX160 and ARX200 assault rifles. [6] The ARX160 has enjoyed significant success in the Gulf region, with neighbouring Bahrain even adopting it as its main service rifle. In addition to the ARX-160 and AK-12, several more types of modern assault rifles are fielded by Qatar's Armed Forces, mostly with its special forces units.
 
 
Based on the parade footage alone, it appears that most of the AK-12s were distributed to the Qatar Special Operations Command (Q-SOC) and possibly the Qatar Amiri Guard as well. It is possible that the AK-12 will see limited usage by special forces units only, by which its robustness and reliability in water, sand and dusty environments should be especially treasured.
 

Though the acquisition of AK-12s from Russia is notable, it doesn't necessarily signify the start of a wholesale shift in its allegiance as an arms customer. Instead, Qatar is likely to continue to diversify its procurement efforts in the future, which could entail more arms purchases from other sources, with NATO weapons operating alongside an arrangement of weapons sourced from Russia and China as a result. As Qatar looks to expand its indigenous defence industry – most notably through Barzan Holdings  – at least a portion of such weaponry will likely be produced or assembled in Qatar as well, as is the case with the ARX160 and ARX200. To Qatar, such projects will be attractive as a means to increase its independence as much as to increase its military prowess – to which end the AK-12 will certainly not be the last means.


[2] Qatar looking for defence cooperation with Russia https://www.qatar-tribune.com/news-details/id/82421
[3] Qatar, Russia sign agreements on air defense, supplies https://www.reuters.com/article/us-russia-qatar-military-idUSKBN1CV11E
[4] Russia and Qatar discuss S-400 missile systems deal TASS https://www.reuters.com/article/us-russia-qatar-arms-idUSKBN1KB0F0
[5] Armenia will be the first country to purchase AK-12 assault rifles https://arminfo.info/full_news.php?id=54485&lang=3
 

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The Nurol Ejder 6x6: Turkey’s First Wheeled APC

April 26, 2021, 9:13 am
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By Stijn Mitzer and Joost Oliemans

From the barren deserts of Oman to the dense jungles of Malaysia: in this day and age Turkish wheeled armoured personnel carriers (APCs) operate in all corners of the world. In addition to seeing active service in these countries and Bahrain, other nations are currently in the process of selecting new 6x6 and 8x8 APCs for acquisition, with the Turkish Otokar Arma and the FNSS Pars often being serious contenders. Still, the story of Turkey's first truly successful wheeled APC project remains unknown to many. This despite the fact that the resulting vehicle was exported to Georgia, the first ever customer of a Turkish wheeled APC. Meet the Nurol Ejder 6x6.
 
The Ejder, meaning dragon in Turkish, was designed and produced by Nurol Makina, which is best known for producing the Ejder Yalçın 4x4 MRAP that so far has entered service with seven countries worldwide, as well as the NMS 4x4 infantry mobility vehicle (IMV), which is currently only in service with Qatar. The process by which the Nurol Ejder 6x6 ultimately took shape is perhaps the most interesting aspect of the vehicle, it essentially being a (very) progressive development of the Soviet BTR-series of APCs.

At the beginning of the 1990s, Nurol Makina first became involved in the defence sector through the development of the RN-94 6x6 APC, a project launched together with the Romanian company ROMARM. The latter already had extensive experience in designing APCs, most notably the TAB-series of APCs based on the Soviet BTR-60, 70 and 80. While the first RN-94 was still built in Romania, the second example was already assembled in Turkey, soon followed by five more prototypes that underwent a variety of trials by 1999. The RN-94 could be fitted with several types of (turret-mounted) weapon stations and even a mount for four Malyutka anti-tank guided missiles (ATGMs).
 

Although an order by the Turkish Ministry of Defence (MoD) was envisaged, requirements within the armed forces had shifted and by 1999 there no longer was a need for the RN-94 within the Turkish Land Forces. Bangladesh would end up as the only customer for the RN-94, purchasing nine examples outfitted as ambulances in 2005. [1] The creation of an entirely new APC by Nurol utilising the technological know-how gained by developing the RN-94 began at around the same time, the fruits of this project ultimately becoming the Ejder 6x6. [2] ROMARM would go on to use the experiences gained in the RN-94 project in the Saur series of APCs, although none of the resulting vehicles found any buyers.
 
 
Meanwhile in neighbouring Georgia, President Mikheil Saakashvili began investing large sums of money into reequipping the Georgian armed forces with modern equipment from 2004 onwards in anticipation of a possible conflict with Russia over the breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. This included anything from Israeli Spyder SAM systems and LAR-160 MRLs to Hermes-450 UAVs, but also some 100 Turkish Cobra IMVs. Nevertheless, these systems would do little to stop the onslaught as the Russian military commenced its invasion in August 2008.

Shortly after its defeat, Georgia began reequipping once more to replace the losses suffered during the 12-day war, and to expand on its capabilities to deal with future threats. The most significant acquisition of this period were some 72 Ejder 6x6 APCs from Nurol to supplement and later replace the BTR-70 and BTR-80 series of wheeled APCs in service with the Georgian Land Forces and the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Georgia. [3] The highly-mobile Ejders fitted well in the Georgian doctrine of mobile warfare, operating alongside the homegrown Didgori IMVs.


The Ejder 6x6 TTZA (Taktik Tekerlekli Zırhlı Araç - Tactical Wheeled Armored Vehicle) has a weight of 18 tonnes (compare to the BTR-80, which weighs just over 13 tonnes), a top road speed of 110km/h and an operational range of some 800km. [4] As a 6x6, only the first and second pair of wheels are steered. The Ejder's hull is constructed from hardened steel which offers all-round protection against small arms fire and artillery fragments (add-on armour for higher ballistic protection is available but wasn't acquired by Georgia). [4] A V-shaped hull protects the crew of 2 and up to 10 passengers against the blast effect of mines and IEDs. Six smoke grenade dischargers (three on each side of the hull) can be used to temporarily mask the vehicle's location, providing an additional form of protection. Additionally, the Ejder comes equipped with two water jets located at the rear of the vehicle to overcome any water obstacles at a speed of 9km/h. [4]
 

The armament of the Ejder 6x6 is relatively standard for APCs in this class, consisting of a remotely controlled 7.62mm or 12.7mm machine gun or a 40mm grenade launcher, the latter equipping the vehicles in service with Georgia. The Ejder can also be fitted with a number of other remotely controlled turret-mounted weapon stations with a calibre of up to 90mm. A dedicated IFV variant equipped with a French Dragar turret with a 25mm cannon (the same type of turret fitted to the RN-94) was also offered to clients, but received no orders.
 
Several more variants were developed, including one geared towards reconnaissance, an ATGM carrier, a mortar carrier, a fire support vehicle armed with a 90mm cannon, an ambulance version, a command vehicle and a recovery and engineering variant. Although having undergone trials in the Arabian desert in anticipation of a possible acquisition by a Middle-Eastern client, no further orders were ultimately received, and today Georgia remains the only operator of the Ejder 6x6.


Although neither the RN-94 nor the Ejder 6x6 APCs ultimately joined the ranks of the Turkish military, the experience gained by the development of both vehicles was almost certainly a major boon to the nascent Turkish defence industry, spawing wheeled APCs such as the Otokar Arma, the FNSS Pars and the BMC ZMA. Today, Turkey is set to receive its first 6x6 APCs in the form of the FNSS Pars III for its Land Forces and Special Forces Command.

Meanwhile, the Ejder 6x6 soldiers on Georgian service, easy to forget but no less capable for it. Apart from the acquisition of two Onuk MRTP-33 patrol boats for the Georgian Coast Guard in 2009, no other major acquistions from Turkey ever materialised. Still, with the threat of Russian military action ever looming over the region, Turkish military products like the Bayraktar TB2 are undoubtedly high on the Georgian Armed Forces' wishlist. Perhaps someday, an advanced sibling will then serve alongside the design where it all began: The 6x6 Edjer APC.
 

The FNSS Pars III 6x6 in IFV configuration

[1] RN-94 6×6 Armored Personnel Carrier (APC) https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/europe/rn-94.htm
[2] Armament of Georgia - Turkish wheel armored transporter EJDER https://en.topwar.ru/13147-tureckiy-kolesnyy-bronirovannyy-transporter-ejder.html
[3] With over 40 Years of Engineering Experience NUROL Makina is now in the Service of the Hungarian Armed Forces https://www.defenceturkey.com/en/content/with-over-40-years-of-engineering-experience-nurol-makina-is-now-in-the-service-of-the-hungarian-armed-forces-4047 
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Strike Me Please: Armenia’s SAM Decoys

April 28, 2021, 2:30 pm
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By Stijn Mitzer and Joost Oliemans
 
If any lessons can be drawn from the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan, they are bound to revolve around the stunning effiency of cheap but highly effective unmanned combat aerial vehicles (UCAVs) and the failure of a wide array of air defence systems, both modern and old, to stop the onslaught brought about by them. For Armenia, the failure to acknowledge its impending defeat led it to fight a costly 44-day war of attrition, suffering severe losses that included some 250 tanks and more tragically, some 5.000 soldiers and reservists, many of which still in their late teens and early twenties. [1]

Nevertheless, the Armenian military could only be expected to be acutely aware of its shortcomings in an era of drone-powered warfare, and it certainly attempted to remedy them with the limited funds it had available. This mainly manifested itself in the acquisition of Russian electronic warfare (EW) systems meant to disrupt the operations of UAVs in one way or another, Tor-M2KM SAM systems that could operate as hunter-killer systems, and 35 9K33 Osa-AKs acquired from Jordan that despite their old age enabled the Armenian military to cover large swaths of Nagorno-Karabakh. As Armenia found out the hard way however, the aforementioned systems could do little but wait in agony as Bayraktar TB2s and loitering munitions began picking them off one by one.
 
Another method utilised by Armenia entailed the placing of decoy SAM systems nearby real SAM systems in order to lure attacking drones into targeting the decoys, thus saving the real systems from certain destruction. Although this act of 'maskirovka' was highly effective during the NATO bombing of Yugoslavia in 1999, the numbers deployed by Armenia during the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh were far too sparse to distract Azerbaijani forces from targeting operational SAM systems and thus have any actual impact on the course of the war. Still, the examples utilised stood out for their realistic depiction of the SAM system they were meant to replicate, even donning detailed camouflage patterns.
 
 
As the 9K33 Osa (NATO designation: SA-8 Gecko) was the most numerous SAM system within the Armenian Armed Forces (and by extension the Artsakh Defence Force, itself a de-facto part of the Armenian Army), it should come as no surprise that most of Armenia's decoys were based on this system. The 9K33 decoys are also the only decoy types confirmed to have successfully tricked Azerbaijani drone operators into striking them, which happened on the 30th of September 2020 at a 9K33 garrison near the small village of Papravənd (known as Nor Karmiravan by Armenia), in what was then still Armenian-controlled Nagorno-Karabakh. [2]

Being almost indiscernible from real 9K33s, two decoys parked in revetments (to mimic the deployment of an operational system) were struck by Israeli IAI Harop loitering munitions, resulting in their complete destruction. Unfortunately for Armenia, the operational systems located throughout the vicinity of the base feared little better, and together with the associated 9T217 transloaders were quickly annihilated by a combination of Bayraktar TB2s and IAI Harops. In total, Armenia lost at least 18 9K33 systems (16 destroyed, 2 captured) in addition to three 9T217 transloaders (two destroyed, one captured) during the course of the war. [1]

 
Interestingly, in the case of the few Tor-M2KM decoys known to have been produced, the eleborate camouflage pattern was actually indicative of their nature as decoys, as Armenian Tor SAM systems never received any kind of camouflage pattern after their arrival to the country in 2019. Furthermore, the decoys merely comprised the container-based launch system rather than also including the truck supposed to be carrying it. That said, it is unknown to what degree Azerbaijani drone operators were made familiar with the size and shapes of the SAM systems they were meant to track down and neutralise, and an overzealous drone operator could easily have mistaken a Tor-M2KM decoy for a real system. Only a single Tor-M2KM is confirmed to have been destroyed during the 44-day war, although this was likely because of the small numbers deployed by Armenia rather than the decoys that were meant to protect them. [1]

Left: An Armenian Tor-M2KM SAM system as it operated during the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Right: An elaborate Tor-M2KM decoy featuring the standard camouflage pattern applied by Armenia on its military vehicles

Rather than placing the decoys throughout strategic locations in Nagorno-Karabakh, each posing as an operational 9K33 or Tor-M2KM system, the few decoys deployed by Armenia were positioned inside existing SAM garrisons. While this might ultimately have helped to prolong the career of a few other real 9K33 Osas by several minutes, it is almost certain that Armenia would have been better off by deploying the fake systems as standalone decoys throughout the entirety of occupied Nagorno-Karabakh, forcing Azerbaijan to spend valuable time and resources tracking and hunting those systems down while flying in the engagement envelope of a real SAM system nearby.
 
Of course, did not help that Bayraktar TB2s could fly circles above 9K33 garrisons (or any other Armenian SAM site for that matter), each containing some seven to eight launch vehicles with their radars turned on, all the while remaining unnoticed to the SAM systems below. This meant that the operators of the TB2s could keep hitting the SAM systems (and the decoys) until all systems were destroyed with no threat of being shot down, once more making painfully clear the obsolescence of the 9K33 in an era of drone-powered warfare.


Armenia's decoys may have been deployed in far too small numbers to affect the course of the war, both sides will surely study their effectiveness and use the lessons learned in potential future wars. Modern optics may have changed the way (aerial) warfare is conducted, decoys have and will continue to change alongside, and a renewed conflict could well see greater numbers deployed, equipped for instance with features such infrared heat signatures to make them even harder to discern from operational systems. Now made aware of the presence of decoys, Azerbaijan will look for ways to identify them beforehand, for example by studying satellite imagery of SAM garrisons and by training its drone operators to discern decoy systems from the real ones.

That said, with the price of MAM-L munitions for the Bayraktar TB2 being comparatively low, the question arises whether the deployment of large numbers of decoys can really have a significant impact on a future conflict. UCAVs like the Bayraktar Akinci and TAI Aksungur can carry 24 and 12 MAM-Ls each, which is sufficient to destroy several SAM sites together with their radars and any decoys. So long as Armenia, or any other nation in the world that faces a comparable threat, lacks the means to successfully counter drones like the TB2, mass deployment of decoys would yield little results but to force the opposing side to stock up on munitions. To a country like Azerbaijan, there is little to disincentivise from doing precisely so, and taking the cost of effective decoys in account and the disparity in assets available to the two parties any decoy destroyed may end up being a net positive. Of course, if they evaded destruction they would have failed their mission regardless; such is the life of a decoy.

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Claw-Lightning and Claw-Thunderbolt: Turkey Engages PKK In Iraq

April 30, 2021, 9:27 am
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By Stijn Mitzer and Joost Oliemans in cooperation with COIN_V2 
 
In a renewed effort to flush out PKK fighters from their mountain hideouts close to the border with Turkey in Northern Iraq, the Turkish Armed Forces launched Operation Claw-Lightning and Claw-Thunderbolt on Friday the 23rd of April 2021 with the ultimate goal of clearing three designated areas of the presence of the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK). Conducted under difficult operational conditions in mountainous terrain riddled with improvised explosive devices (IEDs), the operations have so far resulted in the reported deaths of 42 PKK fighters along with the destruction of several cave systems and the capture of enemy weaponry. [1]

The PKK, which is designated a terrorist organisation by the EU, the UK, the United States and Turkey among other nations, has resorted to using bases across Turkey's Southern border to shelter and plan new attacks on targets in Turkey ever since it was largely expelled from Turkish territory in 2017-2018. While their expulsion meant the end of (notable) PKK territorial presence in Turkey, armed attacks in Turkey continue to be carried out to this day. As recently as October 2020, two PKK fighters were involved in a deadly shootout with police forces in Iskenderun, Hatay, with one of them ultimately detonating his suicide vest, injuring one police officer and two civilians. 

The Turkish Army operations are carried out in the Metina (Claw-Lightning) and Avaşin-Basyan (Claw-Thunderbolt) regions in territory nominally under the control of the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG). These actions are the second major external operations conducted by Turkey in Northern Iraq this year. Earlier, from June till September 2020, Turkey launched Operations Claw-Eagle and Tiger against PKK targets, resulting in dozens of PKK fighters killed and large quantities of armament – even including Russian 9M133 Kornet ATGMs and U.S. M136 AT4 anti-tank weapons – captured. [2]
 
These operations were followed by Operation Claw-Eagle 2 in February 2021, which resulted in the killing of 48 PKK fighters but also the execution of 13 Turkish hostages and kidnapping victims held by the PKK shortly before Turkish forces could rescue them. [3] Some had been held by the PKK for as long as six years; all were executed with a bullet to the back of the head. [4] A notable occurrence during Claw-Eagle 2 was the targeting of three PKK fighters that were in the process of escaping the area by paramotor by a MAM-L munition launched from a Bayraktar TB2 UCAV.


The Claw-Lightning and Claw-Thunderbolt operations commenced with artillery and air strikes on known PKK positions in the three designated operational areas. Subsequently, Turkish forces were inserted into the region by helicopters while supported by F-4E 2020 Terminators and F-16s armed with laser-guided munitions, T129 ATAK attack helicopters, UAVs, 107mm and 122mm MRLs as well as 155mm M52T, 155mm T-155 Fırtına and 203mm M110 SPGs. [5] Nearly 400 targets including caves were engaged with artillery, and another 60 targets were hit by air strikes. In one such sortie, a cave system with three PKK fighters reportedly still inside was struck by a precision guided munition and destroyed.
 

During their advance, Turkish forces quickly discovered several more cave systems used by the PKK, each just large enough to house several fighters along with their weapons and belongings. [6] [7] [8] On the 29th of April, Turkish forces were in full control of the Zinnar and Balula mountains, the most dominant points in the Metina region and the MamReşo/Keri mountain (a strategic point in the Basyan area). [9] [10] Both operations together have so far cost the lives of six Turkish soldiers: two as a result of IEDs, two due to ATGM strikes, another in a firefight and the last through an incident involving a helicopter. [11] [12] In return, 42 PKK fighters are claimed killed, including five that were hit by Bayraktar TB2 UCAVs. [13]


The weaponry captured from the PKK serves as a testament to the diverse types of weaponry included in their inventory; much of it is sourced from both Iraq and Syria, though a few PKK homemade examples were also included. The captured weapons include expected staples such as the AKM and RPG-7, but also two U.S. M16A2/A4 assault rifles that were likely taken from Iraqi (or Kurdish) security forces or simply acquired on the black market in Iraq. Another notable captured weapon is the homemade 12.7mm Zagros anti-materiel rifle that is in service with the PKK, the YPG in Syria and several other Kurdish armed groups.

Captured weaponry:

  • 5 AKM(S): (1, 2 and 3)(4 and 5) [Along with countless rounds of ammunition]
  • 1 AKS-74: (1)
  • 1 AKS-74U: (1)
  • 2 M16A2/A4: (1 and 2)
  • 1 MG-1M GPMG: (1) [Along with 250 rounds of ammunition]
  • 1 DShK HMG RWS: (1, on tripod) [Along with 85 rounds of ammunition]
  • 1 Zagros AMR: (1)
  • 2 RPG-7: (1)(2) [Along with 14 rocket propelled grenades]
 
Among the captured weaponry was also a 12.7mm DShK remote weapon station (RWS) presumably taken from Syria or previously captured in Iraq and subsequently modified by the PKK. These, along with modified 14.5mm KPVs, are generally placed on overwatch positions high up on mountains to target incoming Turkish helicopters and the infantry disembarking from them. [2] Other favourite positions for the PKK to set up its HMGs are along the likely avenues of approach of Turkish soldiers in narrow mountain valleys, of which Northern Iraq knows all too many. 

The controls for the 12.7mm DShK remote weapon station

Captured ammunition and mortar grenades. Note that the mortar grenades are thickly wrapped in protective covers to shield them from corrosion while stored in caves and underground arms caches. As they could lie there for years on end before being dug up and put to use, wrapping them in protective material is vital to ensure their proper functioning.
 

Most large arms caches and strategic passageways are usually protected by anti-personnel mines and IEDs placed in their vicinity and straddled on avenues of approach, forcing Turkish soldiers to slow down their advance and wait for deminers to create a safe passage. The fact that two Turkish soldiers were killed by IEDs on the 24th and 26th of April proves that this is anything but an easy task.
 

Many of these IEDs present something of a wildcard during demining operations. Either remotely detonated via a radio-frequency-based mechanism or triggered by a wire (or any other type of trigger mechanism that activates as Turkish soldiers pass by), simplicity is key for PKK IEDs to avoid anti-IED jammers preventing their activation by transmitting a jamming signal. The advent of such backpack anti-IED jammers (like the example in the header image) along with Mine-Resistant Ambush Protected vehicles (MRAPs) and counter-IED equipment have translated increasingly into greater safety for Turkish soldiers in the field.


Other IEDs are carefully hidden among rock formations waiting for unsuspecting Turkish soldiers (or civilians) to pass by before detonating. The wounding of three Iraqi civilians in the town of Kani Masi, Iraqi Kurdistan, on the 27th of April as a result of an IED left behind by the PKK once again makes painfully clear the high risks associated with such indiscriminate tactics. [14]
 

Though there is little hope yet for a swift end to Turkey's conflict with the PKK, operations like Operation Claw-Lightning and Claw-Thunderbolt are instrumental in containing the perceived threat, pushing PKK fighters back to ever smaller areas. As such, they limit their effective area of control and strategic capabilities to launch new raids against targets and locations in Turkey, thus ensuring greater security at home. April's actions were conducted simultaneously with the Eren Cudi-Besta and Eren Kazan-Ogul operations aimed at neutralising any remaining PKK remnants in Turkey, as well as to prevent the transit of PKK fighters between Iraq and Turkey. 
 
Examined together, it is evident that pressure on the PKK continues to increase. In the meantime, it has slowly transitioned from a militant organisation controlling large swaths of land in Iraqi Kurdistan to a terrorist group with increasingly limited capabilities. Turkey on the other hand, seems free to conduct its operations across the region, asserting itself more dominantly than any Turkish state has in modern history.

 
[1] Terör Hedefleri Uçaklarımız ve Topçularımız Tarafından Etkili Şekilde Vuruluyor https://www.msb.gov.tr/SlaytHaber/2942021-73573  
[3] Turkey says 13 of its citizens killed by militants in N.Iraq https://apnews.com/article/turkey-iraq-kidnapping-hulusi-akar-c972f7d9ef13443718c09dd54ca0e9fd
[6] Komandolarımız Teröristlere Ait Mağaralara Teker Teker Girerek Teröristlerin İzini Sürüyor https://youtu.be/G3RuWssA8u0
[7] Komandolarımız Teröristlerin İninde! Çift Girişli Mağara Ele Geçirildi https://youtu.be/xhlOlsi2bIg
[8] Pençe-Şimşek ve Pençe-Yıldırım operasyonları ile teröristlerin inlerine girmeye devam ediyoruz https://youtu.be/qJExZmqjmYo

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Facing the Storm: The PKK’s DIY AA Guns

May 4, 2021, 4:31 am
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By Stijn Mitzer and Joost Oliemans
 
Some 8 years years after its official retreat from Turkey, the PKK continues to wage guerrilla warfare and conduct infiltrations into Turkey from their mountainous fortresses in Northern Iraq. Dead set on eliminating this threat, the Turkish Armed Forces frequently launch offensives into PKK-controlled areas to neutralise hideouts and weapons caches. In an effort to counter these heliborne incursions and the threat of attack helicopters, the PKK uses a variety of locally improved heavy machine guns and cannons to target helicopters and the personnel disembarking from them.

Often placed high up on mountains from where they have a wide field of view and can spot incoming airborne threats from afar, PKK anti-aircraft (AA) guns and their crews have achieved limited successes against Turkish helicopters over the past several years. Most of these successes entail damaging helicopters rather than outright shooting them down however, sometimes leading to emergency landings in hostile territory. Although they have been largely unsuccessful in countering or deterring Turkey's helicopter operations, they remain a potent threat that needs to be taken seriously.
 
Based on Soviet or Chinese weaponry captured from Syrian or Iraqi forces as a rule, the main requirement for AA guns used by the PKK is the ability to be broken down into several pieces for transport over rough ground and through mountainous terrain. The ubiquitous 12.7mm DShK (and its Chinese derivatives), the 14.5mm KPV and 14.5mm ZPU-1 have proven especially popular for this reason, with several other types thrown into the mix. More recently, the PKK has begun introducing remote weapon stations (RWS) that can be operated from the safety of nearby underground cave systems.
 
Little is known about the units that operate these guns. Although a formation known as the 'Şehîd Delal Amed Air Defence Units' exists within the PKK, its role until thus far appears to be limited to operating paramotors for infiltration purposes and attack drones armed with homemade munitions. It thus seems likely that the AA guns are operated by local PKK units in their respective operational sector, perhaps with a region-wide warning system to alert other sectors of incoming Turkish helicopters.
 
 
When an AA gun is brought to its intended emplacement and then assembled, it usually remains hidden until the need for its use arises. It is likely that the guns are frequently checked and maintained to ensure their continued operations under field conditions. The 14.5mm KPV seen below is such a typical example of a hidden AA gun. Positioned under a tree to reduce the chances of discovery, covering it with a cloth and tree branches makes the KPV nearly impossible to see from the sky or even at a distance on ground level. [1]

 
This KPV also shows off some of the modifications applied to most HMGs – most notably a muzzle brake, a tripod, shoulder rests and a buttstock. The distinctive muzzle brake somewhat alleviates the strong recoil associated with the KPV, although in order to maintain any sort of accuracy only short bursts can be fired. To further help the gunner improve his aim, a front gunsight was added aft of the handle bar.
 
 
Another improvised AA system is based on the 23mm 2A7/2A7M cannon taken from a ZSU-23-4 'Shilka' self-propelled anti-aircraft weapon system (SPAAG). [1] Similar to the KPV discussed above, this particular gun too received a new muzzle brake, front sight and a tripod. Owing to its larger calibre, the recoil of the 2A7 limits the gunner to firing single shots or very short bursts, in effect making it closer to an anti-materiel rifle (AMR) than an AA gun. Its 23mm rounds inflict far greater damage on helicopters however, meaning the gunner needs to get far fewer rounds on target to achieve the same (or greater) effect. Just as the modified KPV, this AA gun was captured during Turkey's Claw-Eagle and Tiger operations that took place from June till September 2020. [1]
 

While the KPV was modified by the PKK to be used as an AA gun, the ZPU-1 was designed as a lightweight AA gun from the onset. Ordinarily carried on a two-wheeled carriage, the ZPU-1 can be broken down into several 80-kilogram pieces for transport by mules or simply by persons. Firing the same type of ammunition as the KPV to a maximum range of some two kilometres, its ease of operation, dedicated AA sight and sizeable magazines are certain to be valued by the PKK. The example below, captured by Turkish forces during Operations Claw-Lightning and Claw-Thunderbolt in April and May 2021, has rust covering large parts of the gun system, perhaps indicating that not all AA guns were looked after equally well.
 

A more recent invention has been a series of remote weapon stations (RWS) usually based on the 12.7mm DShK HMGs (or on its Chinese derivatives the Type 54 and W85). The main advantage of these RWS' is that the gunner can operate the system from the safety of a cave, not having to risk exposure to its dangerous foes. Drawbacks include greatly reduced situational awareness and the need to come manually reload the gun each time after emptying its magazine – although the latter might pose less of a problem than one might imagine given the short amount of time any helicopter will fly through its engagement envelope. Like the aforementioned AA guns, the DShK RWS too has a secondary role in targeting infantry advancing through mountain valleys.

During Operations Claw-Lightning and Claw-Thunderbolt, at least three RWS' were captured by Turkish forces, seemingly all positioned in the vicinity of undergound cave systems. [2] While they were a potent deterrent against nearby infantry, their presence also immediately alerts Turkish forces that a PKK cave system is indeed in the vicinity. Taking into account the numerical and tactical superiority of Turkish forces, further backed by artillery and precision-guided munitions launched from aircraft and UCAVs, the subsequent annihilation of these cave systems is almost certain. [3]
 

For all the effort put into modifying these versatile weapons systems, the most feared armament in the hands of the PKK remains its man-portable air-defence systems (MANPADS). Undoubtedly because of the complexity of these systems and the sensitive electronics in them, these have seen very little active use, and several were captured by Turkish forces in the past before they could be used. The most notable success for the PKK was achieved in May 2016 when a 9K38 Igla (NATO designation: SA-18 Grouse) MANPADS was used to shoot down a Turkish AH-1W Super Cobra attack helicopter. [4] While the shootdown highlighted the grave threat associated with such systems, no successful downings have occurred since.

 
The PKK's attempts at using whatever means at their disposal to prevent Turkish helicopters from roaming free in Northern Iraq are undeniably resourceful, yet at the same time they epitomise the gross shortcomings they are having to deal with in the face of Turkish heliborne operations. Without suitable weaponry there is little they can hope to achieve against an enemy superior in both its assets available and innovative capabilities. Still, the threat of the PPK's DIY AA guns is powerful precisely because it is low tech and therefore difficult to counter. From the Turkish side, it would be interesting to see if any countermeasures can be enacted against the AA gun emplacements, for example by having drones scan ridgelines in the envisaged operational zone for any suspicious shapes or movement.
 
Lacking any significant influx of armament or currency, at the current rate attrition of the PKK's AA guns likely far exceeds that of the Turkish equipment they are meant to counter however. Losing HMGs faster than it can acquire new ones, their deployment and operational effectiveness might diminish before its opponent ever needs to come up with a viable counter strategy.


[2] Claw-Lightning and Claw-Thunderbolt: Turkey Engages PKK In Iraq https://www.oryxspioenkop.com/2021/04/claw-lightning-and-claw-thunderbolt.html

Header image by Abdullah Ağar. Special thanks to COIN_V2.

 
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Mean, Green, And Unseen: Saudi Arabia’s BTR-3s

May 5, 2021, 7:10 am
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By Stijn Mitzer and Joost Oliemans

Saudi Arabia is well known for operating some of the most advanced military equipment currently on offer, including the M1A2S main battle tank (MBT) and the F-15SA multirole strike fighter acquired from the U.S. But as with many a military worldwide, aging and sometimes unexpected armament operates in the second line of defence and on fronts deemed less volatile. For the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, this not only includes an assortment of older equipment such as the M60 Patton MBT and the M113 APC, but also a number of peculiar-looking BTR-3 APCs acquired from Ukraine for use as emergency rescue vehicles.

As already given away by the chartreuse livery (yes, that's the name of an actual colour) of the vehicles in question, Saudi Arabia's BTR-3s are unlikely to ever venture close to any active frontline. Instead, the BTR-3's amphibious and off-road capabilities mean it is well-suited to provide disaster relief during natural disasters such as floods and mudslides. In this role the BTR-3s act very similar to the Russian GAZ-59037 – the civilian version of the BTR-80 APC that has proven its worth in rescuing flood victims in Vietnamese service.

Although outfitted as an emergency rescue vehicle in Saudi service, the BTR-3 retains the original armour values of its APC and IFV counterparts, providing all-round protection against 7.62 mm rounds and artillery shell splinters (and by extension, hail damage). After their delivery to Saudi Arabia (the exact date of which remains unknown), the vehicles entered service with the General Directorate of Civil Defense: an agency concerned with the protection of lives and property during peacetime, disasters and conflicts.
 
 
Saudi Arabia is well known for its vast desert regions spanning the country from West to East, but perhaps contrary to popular expectations regularly has to deal with major natural disasters such as heavy rainfalls, floods and (less surprisingly) sandstorms. In an effort to better cope with such disasters, the General Directorate of Fire Fighting was first established in 1960. [1] Under the control of the Ministry of Interior (MOI), the agency subsequently underwent a name change to the General Directorate of Civil Defense (GDCD), under which title it is still known today. In addition to dealing with natural disasters, the GDCD also plays a pivotal role in ensuring the safety of pilgrims during the annual Hajj pilgrimage to Mecca.
 

In order to fit their role as emergency rescue vehicles, the BTR-3s received several modifications that included the removal of the turret, the addition of handrails and additional hatches on top of the vehicle, and numerous other safety additions. The emblem of the General Directorate of Civil Defense is usually applied to the sides, and sometimes the front of each vehicle.
 
 
Also operated by the General Directorate of Civil Defense are a wide variety of other support vehicles, comprising wheeled recovery vehicles, heavy-duty trucks and equipment such as bulldozers and excavators. Until several years ago, the agency even operated its own fleet of tandem-rotor KV-107 transport helicopters. [2] After their retirement in the late 2000s, the KV-107s were replaced by Sikorsky S-92 multi-mission helicopters operated by the MOI on behalf of the GDCD.

 
Despite their bright yellow-green livery, Saudia Arabia's BTR-3s remain some of the most obscure pieces of equipment in service with the Kingdom today. Their appearance may ordinarily be overshadowed by the grim circumstances that necessitate their deployment, but to the casual observer they serve as a reminder that surprising equipment can turn up in places you least expect. Though in this instance it concerns innocuous emergency rescue vehicles, Saudi Arabia's next deal with Ukraine would entail acquiring more potent capability: The Hrim-2 mobile short-range ballistic missile (SRBM), which is designed in Ukraine with funding provided by Saudi Arabia, and is slated to enter service in the Kingdom early this decade.
 
 
 
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Novel Capabilities: Ukraine’s Vilkha MRL

May 10, 2021, 7:39 am
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By Stijn Mitzer and Joost Oliemans
 
Ever since the takeover of Crimea by Russia and the outbreak of armed conflict in the Donbas region, Ukraine has launched an ambitious re-equipment programme to make up for the decades of neglect of its armed forces. In addition to pulling older equipment out of storage to overhaul and upgrade them, it has also begun to introduce entirely novel capabilities to its armed forces. Notable examples include the indigenous Neptune anti-ship missile (AShM) the Hrim-2 short-range ballistic missile (SRBM) and the Turkish Bayraktar TB2 unmanned aerial combat vehicle (UCAV).
 
To further expand on its growing capabilities, Ukraine has started upgrading its 300mm BM-30 'Smerch' multiple rocket launchers (MRLs) to enable the use of new guided munitions that offer both significantly increased accuracy as well as a vastly increased range over their unguided predecessors. First unveiled in 2018 as the Vilkha (Alder) MRL, the improved Vilkha-M system is set to enter mass-production in 2021 after years of testing. [1] Given the rockets' commonality with those of the proven BM-30 launch system, Ukraine will likely have little problems in incorporating these guided munitions into its armed forces.
 
For Ukraine, the mass procurement of guided munitions allows it to build up an effective deterrence against Russia at relatively little cost. Although definitely in a different class than SRBMs, the Vilkha-M could end up taking over some of the firing missions currently entrusted to Tochka-U SRBMs that make up the sole long-range ground-based missile asset of Ukraine. Offering a similar range but twelve times the number of munitions and much increased accuracy at the cost of a smaller warhead (half the size of that of the Tochha-U), the Vilkha-M presents a considerable increase in firepower and general capabilities to Ukraine. 
 

A deadly reminder
 
As the first major conventional conflict in Europe since the Yugoslav Wars of the 1990s, the war in Eastern Ukraine serves as a reminder of the massive potential of numerous weapon systems and electronic warfare assets in combat situations, and the destructive power of MRLs is certainly no exception. Suffice it to say that the conclusions drawn during the conflict not only reverberated through the Ukrainian military, but that they also served as a wake-up call to Western militaries that have retired several of the weapon systems at play (including MRLs) as a result of ever decreasing military budgets.
 
 
Elsewhere, nations such as China, Turkey, Iran and North Korea have made considerable investments in designing and producing long-range precision-guided artillery rockets. Several of these are based on unguided rockets of the Soviet-legacy 300mm calibre, as is the case with the Vilkha system. Using the existing body of a 9M55 rocket with a range of 70 kilometres and a 250kg warhead as a basis, the upgraded rocket (now known as R624) adds a new solid-fuel engine, GPS-aided inertial guidance and 90 tiny guidance thrusters to drastically reduce the circular error probable (CEP) of the rocket to some 10 metres. [2]
 
Only in the Vilkha-M system, which uses the newly-produced R624M series of rockets, do the improvements also result in a significant range increase. Sacrificing warhead size for range, the Vilkha-M can attain ranges up to 130km with a 170kg warhead, while a further improved variant known as the Vilkha-M1 can either be fitted with a 170kg warhead that allows it to reach distances up to 154km or with a 236kg warhead for a maximum range of 121km. [2] The latest variant, the Vilkha-M2, is reported to have a range of just over 200km. [2] The additional range contributes to an overall decrease in terminal accuracy however, which likely approaches some 30 metres CEP for the R624M.
 
Further improvements in range can be achieved by the use of new rocket fuel to increase the thrust by some 18% compared to when still using the old fuel. With the new fuel load, even the R624 could be able to fly for more than 100km, and the M, M1 and M2 variants could have their ranges approaching and possibly exceeding 200km. [3] Innovation hardly stops here, as another project by the Luch Design Bureau entails turning the Vilkha MRL into a common launcher for artillery rockets and a new type of surface-to-air (SAM) missile with a maximum range of 100km. [4]
 
 
The rocket's method of operation is decidedly unconventional, as its guidance is complicated by the fact that course correction by use of aerodynamics are impossible shortly after launch due to low initial speed. To mitigate these effects, 90 small rocket thrusters arranged around the guidance section of the rocket can each provide a few seconds of directed thrust in the early launch stage. This is sufficient to set the rocket on course towards the vicinity of its target; aerodynamic vanes extend during the final approach to facilitate last-minute adjustments. Like many modern MRL designs, guidance is both inertial and GNSS-enabled. Though the latter can potentially be used to achieve a CEP much smaller than attained by inertial guidance, it is potentially vulnerable to jamming practices, and some other modern designs use video guidance to match visual input with expected surroundings. 
 
 
A major advantage of the R624(M) guided rockets is that they can easily be integrated into existing BM-30 MRLs without requiring extensive modifications to the launcher. This traitmakes the Vilkha(-M) an attractive option for nations such as Azerbaijan, Algeria, Kuwait and Turkmenistan that also operate the BM-30. In April 2021, the Luch Design Bureau announced that it had signed its first contract with a foreign nation for the supply of R624M rockets. However, neither the recipient country nor any other details were reported. [5]
 

Another possible future development concerns the introduction of a laser-guidance kit to transform the R624(M) rockets into precision-guided munitions that can hit targets marked by Bayraktar TB2s UCAVs. This impressive striking capability already exists in Turkey and Azerbaijan through the TRLG-230 MRL, and significantly increases the operational capabilities of both the TB2 and the MRL. By fitting a laser guidance kit to the rocket, the need for other guidance systems are negated, allowing the system to be more electronic-warfare resistant and at the same time vastly more accurate. Though it is unknown whether development of such an offensive capability is already being pursued in Ukraine, it is precisely this type of synergy between reconnaissance/strike platforms and precision-guided munitions that has been a gamechanger on modernity's battlefields.
 

On the defensive side, the introduction of trucks with better characteristics and the uparmouring of existing ones represents a simple improvement that serves to enhance the survivability of Ukraine's Vilkha(-M) MRLs. The Vilkha-M system will likely use KrAZ-7634 trucks that also serve as the basis of the Neptune AShM coastal defence missile system instead of the original MAZ-543. This layout was first demonstrated during the IDEX exhibition held in Abu Dhabi in February 2019. In December the same year, a new concept with an armoured cabin instead of the unarmoured cabin of the earlier version was showcased. Continued introduction of new trucks also serves to improve the mobility of the Vilkha MRL, allowing for swifter relocation after firing in turn again enhancing survivability, but also expanding its flexibility in operations and deployment options.


The increased range of the Vilkha-M means that a crucial portion of Ukraine's rocket forces will soon have the potential to outrange virtually all Russian MRLs with devastating accuracy. Although this already significantly upsets the balance encountered during the previous conflict, Ukraine could further improve on this concept either through the continued development of the Vilkha series of guided rockets to incorporate laser-guidance or by purchasing the Turkish TRLG-230 that can strike targets at ranges of up to 70 kilometres with pinpoint accuracy.
 
With several partnerships that specifically aim to adress such combined development programmes between Turkey and Ukraine already in place (most notably Black Sea Shield between Baykar Savunma — designer of the Bayraktar TB2 — and Ukrspecexport), combining Turkish operational and design experience with UAVs and systems like the TRLG-230 with Ukraine's existing military industrial complex could enable the development of entirely novel capabilities.
 
 
[1]  Ukraine to Start Serial Production of Vilkha-M MRL Systems https://dfnc.ru/en/world-news/ukraine-starts-serial-production-of-vilkha-m-mrl-systems-in-2021/
[2] Про забезпечення ЗСУ боєприпасами та створення їх запасів https://www.ukrmilitary.com/2020/07/boeprypasy.html
[3] Вільха (ракетний комплекс) https://uk.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Вільха_(ракетний_комплекс) 
[4] КБ «Луч» розробило новий ЗРК на основі ракети «Вільха» https://www.ukrmilitary.com/2020/03/air-defence.html
[5] «Вільха» йде на експорт: укладено перші контракти https://mil.in.ua/uk/news/vilha-jde-na-eksport-ukladeno-pershi-kontrakty/ 

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For Eternity’s Sake: The Story of BEA’s A300s

May 12, 2021, 11:27 am
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By Stijn Mitzer and Joost Oliemans
 
For everyone that ever landed at Istanbul Atatürk International Airport while sitting on the right hand side of the plane, the aircraft featured in header image should be an all too familar sight. Three blue and white Airbus A300s standing in a remote corner of the airport, seemingly waiting for their inevitable scrapping in the near future. Ever since landing at Atatürk Airport for the first time, I've taken an interest in the three aircraft. Why were they parked there? How long did they operate in this livery before eventually being retired?
 
These questions would plague me until recently I decided to gather as much information as I could to eternalise these A300s in an article before one day they're scrapped and forgotten. To the average reader looking for their daily piece of military analysis perhaps this isn't quite what they craved, but for those who take an active interest in civilian aviation, and the harsh fate of some of the airlines and airliners operating in a business known for its stiff competition, you should feel right at home with this one. This is the story of Bosphurus European Airways' (BEA) three Airbus A300s.
 

BEA was originally founded as a charter airline in 2001 and commenced its first flights in March 2002 with a fleet of three Airbus A300B4 passenger aircraft, each with a seating capacity of 298 and a cargo capacity of some ten tonnes. [1] The three aircraft, TC-COA, TC-OIM 'Kaan' and TC-OYC 'Hakan', were some twenty years old at the time of their acquisition by BEA in December 2001. All three had originally been delivered to Scandinavian Airlines (SAS) in the early 1980s before being passed on to Danish charter airlines Scanair, Conair and Premiair (and leased to several other airlines in between). [2]

It may be assumed that the months following the A300's delivery were spent training the crews in gaining familiarity with the aircraft in anticipation of the start of the 2002 holiday season. As a charter airline, BEA's most important clientele would be tourists visiting holiday resorts on the Turkish coast, soccer fans attending matches throughout Europe and Turkish citizens working in Europe. Throughout its short existence, BEA operated flights to several destinations in Europe and the Middle East, including Germany, the Netherlands, Switzerland, France, England, Cyprus, Iran and Iraq. [1] [3]
 
Unfortunately for BEA, the average lifespan of a Turkish charter airline was exceptionally short during the 1990s and early 2000s. For example, just seven years earlier (1995), Akdeniz Airlines too attempted to break into the charter airline business with three Airbus A300s. Although services began in June 1995 with high anticipations, they would cease again by December 1995, operating for just six months. [4] BEA's fate was to be no different, and its operations too lasted for only six months (from March until August 2002) until money ran out. BEA's achievements thus amount to little more than the curious feat of having its aircraft photographed more while standing abandoned on the ground than when they were operational and in the air.

A300 'TC-COA' at Frankfurt Airport. Note the massive U.S. C-5 Galaxy transport planes in the background at what was then still the USAF's Rhein-Main Air Base

A300 'TC-OIM''Kaan' coming in to land at Manchester International Airport

As the 2002 summer holiday season drew to a close, so did the flying operations of BEA. Its aircraft were placed in long-term storage at Istanbul Atatürk Airport, and BEA officially ceased operations in 2004, likely waiting so long to give the remote possibility of a relaunch with new investors a chance. But as months turned into years, this prospect began to appear increasingly unlikely. Initially stored in front of the maintenance halls at Atatürk Airport along with several other abandoned aircraft, the fate and general condition of the A300s looked progressively bleak as time passed.
 
 
At first stored in a manner that could quickly allow their reactivation in the case of a relaunch of BEA or acquisition by another airline, eventually even the covers protecting the engines were removed from the aircraft, fully leaving the A300s to the mercy of the weather and Turkish climate. Note that the engine covers still had 'SAS' written on them during this period, even though the aircraft had only operated for SAS from 1981 to 1983/1984. [2]
 
 
Interestingly, one aircraft TC-OYC 'Hakan' was saved from its fate of storage and leased to another Turkish charter airline Fly Air for two months in August 2003, and then to Sudan Airways for a few weeks(!) in October 2003. [2] In service to the latter, the plane received Sudan Airways titles while retaining the BEA livery and lettering on the tail. This would be the only respite from the slow march towards oblivion any of our aircraft would receive, and it soon rejoined the two others in storage at Atatürk Airport. All three A300s were eventually moved to their current location in 2015 so the space in front of the maintenance halls could be used.


TC-OYC 'Hakan in 2017 with its nose cone removed. Also note the An-12 cargo aircraft (TC-KET, formerly operated by CAT Cargo) parked under its right wing

Sometime during the past years, the familiar blue colouring and BEA lettering on the tail of two of the A300s was removed. Although the exact reasoning behind this move remains unknown, in January 2021 it became known that all three aircraft were being auctioned off for a price of $73.954 per aircraft. [5]


These days Atatürk Airport is closed for commercial passenger flights, with only cargo, business and VIP flights still making use of its facilities. Still, driving past the airport one can't miss the tails of the aircraft standing high, pride unbroken by years of negligence. Abandoned and forgotten, it is certain that none of the aircraft will ever fly again, and a second lease of life as a quirky köfte restaurant doesn't seem to be in the books either. But now that they have been eternalised in an article, the claws of the scrap yard excavator may do their worst; BEA's A300 aircraft will not be forgotten.


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The Strazh BMPT - An Ukrainian Terminator

May 16, 2021, 12:36 pm
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By Stijn Mitzer and Joost Oliemans 
 
The turn of the 21st century marked the start of a period of decay for Ukraine's military, with masses of military hardware facing early retirement while replacements for its surviving inventory were nowhere in sight. The 2014 annexation of Crimea by Russia and the war in Donbas brought about a dramatatic reversal of this policy, and factory yards previously filled with surplus tanks began to be emptied to reinforce the ranks of the battered Ukrainian military. This has so far resulted in the reactivation of hundreds of T-64, T-72 and T-80 main battle tanks (MBTs) and BMP infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs).
 
Not long ago, these same yards were the scene of armoured fighting vehicle (AFV) concepts that were only limited in creativity by the imagination of their creators. The peculiarity of several of these projects can hardly be overstated, including designs such as the BMT-72 infantry fighting tank, a wheeled T-64-based APC design known as the BMPT-K-64 and even a British Centurion tank turned IFV designated as AB-13. Rather unsurprisingly, none of these designs ever succeeded in achieving any export orders, with most clients merely being interested in overhauled tanks and BMPs instead.
 
Even those designs with a more conventional approach at armoured warfare failed to compete with cheaper alternatives such as the T-72AV and T-72B, in excess of 500 of which found their way to various countries in Africa and Asia. This possibly had as much to do with the stiff competition in the AFV market as with the fact that many of these projects were based on the T-64 MBT, which was never exported outside of the Soviet Union and likely proved an operational and maintenance risk many countries were unwilling to take (Angola and DR Congo would end up as the only non-Soviet states to purchase T-64s). 
 

While slick in design, concepts like the BMPV-64 (left) and T-64E (right) were essentially doomed from the onset

Adjusting priorities
 
As hostilities in Eastern Ukraine began to escalate to the point of conventional warfare in 2014, Ukraine's military industry shifted much of its attention away from developing projects for export in favour of serving the needs of its own military. No longer did it invest precious resources into yet another T-64 modification project no country was ever likely to purchase, instead focusing on more simple projects such as the T-64BV type 2017 that improves upon the original capabilities of the tank with thermal imaging and a new communications suite. Both affordable and effective, it is likely that all of Ukraine's T-64BVs will eventually be modernised to this standard. [1]

Another project that is relatively modest in its scope is the Strazh BMPT. By mating the chassis of a T-64BV MBT to an existing turret originally designed to be fitted to an IFV, the Strazh is a simple yet effective way of introducing new capabilities without having to develop entirely new components. As heavily armoured as it is armed with two rapid-firing cannons, four anti-tank guided missiles (ATGMs) and an automatic grenade launcher, the Strazh ("Sentinel") will be a daunting sight for all those who encounter it on the battlefield.
 

Ukraine is the third country in the world after Russia and China to develop its own BMPT (Tank Support Fighting Vehicle), although only Russia, Algeria and Kazakhstan are currently operators of such designs. Much like the Russian and Chinese designs, the Strazh BMPT is based on an existing tank chassis, the T-64 in this case. Born out of experiences gained during the Soviet–Afghan War and the First Chechen War, the BMPT is meant to keep up with mechanised forces and provide protection in urban combat, but also to engage infantry and AFVs in open terrain with its rapid-firing dual cannons and long-range ATGMs.

 
Instead of a turret armed with a 125mm 2A46 cannon, the Strazh BMPT comes equipped with a Doublet combat module developed by the Zhytomyr Armoured Plant. Arguably its most distinctive features are the two 30mm ZTM-2 (the Ukrainian version of the 2A42 cannon that's fitted to the BMP-2) rapid-firing cannons protruding from the turret. These can be independently fired from each other, allowing the Strazh to maintain longer periods of fire than could be achieved with a single example, and also enabling it to fire different shell types from each cannon.
 
The Strazh's truly heavy armament – and potentially its knockout punch – are the 2x2 ATGMs mounted on either side of the turret. Although still of the 9M113 Konkurs type during its unveiling, these can bereplaced by R-2 Baryer (Barrier) ATGMs with a range of up five kilometres. The ATGMs are guided by a fire-control system (FCS) placed above the 30mm cannons, which houses (infrared) imaging devices and a laser rangefinder. [2] Bulky and filled with sensitive optics, this FCS is perhaps the Strazh's weakest point as even light armament may be used to disable it. On top of the turret a 30mm KBA-117 automatic grenade launcher has been fitted for anti-personnel use. Additionally, two 7.62mm machine guns are fitted in between the 30mm cannons. A total of six smoke-grenade launchers complete the turret's armament suite.
 
In addition to the aforementioned vulnerability of the FCS, the light armour of the turret, likely providing protection against small-arms fire and shell fragments only, and the exposed placement of its ATGMs are significant weak spots that could knock out vital functions of the Strazh even before it enters battle. The original Russian BMPT featured several of the same weak spots, which have since been remedied on later variants of the vehicle. On the Strazh, protective covers around its FCS, ATGMs and base of its 30mm cannons would do much to decrease its vulnerability to light weaponry or shrapnel.
 

The Doublet combat module is the latest in a series of Ukrainian modular turret systems originally designed for the BMP-series of IFVs. It is operated by a crew of two (compared to just one for the regular BMP-1 and BMP-2 turrets) that enter the combat module via two large hatches situated under the ZTM-2 cannons. Two additional smaller hatches are fitted to the rear of the turret for the reloading of the 30mm ammunition for the ZTM-2 cannons. Although the heavy armament makes any IFV equipped with the Doublet capable of tackling most (armoured) threats, it also does much to increase the tasks and complexity of an IFV, and many militaries might simply deem such armament excessive to their needs.
 

Although the prototype of the Strazh is still based on the hull of a T-64BV, production variants could make use of the more readily available T-64B(1) variant instead, which unlike the Strazh doesn't come equipped with Kontakt-1 explosive reactive armour (ERA) and has less advanced features than the T-64BV. That said, with hundreds of T-64BVs still laying in storage their supply almost certainly outlasts the needs of the Ukrainian military over the next decade.

 
Although it seems promising both in its capabilities and pragmatic design, it is as of yet uncertain whether it will actually enter service or enjoy any export orders. Given the fact that it was unveiled in 2017, both have slowly become increasingly unlikely, despite the fact that the Strazh BMPT represents perhaps one of the more realistic approaches at fulfilling the needs of a modern day army. With most Western nations even struggling to operate a small fleet of tanks, the BMPT concept has so far remained exclusive to a very select group of nations, having yet to be properly validated in actual combat. Whether Ukraine is set to join this select group depends on its evaluation of the BMPT concept as well as its immediate operational requirements – though of course funding remains the ultimate limiting factor.


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Gaza Conflict: Hamas’ North Korean Arms

May 18, 2021, 3:35 am
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By Joost Oliemans and Stijn Mitzer
 
On the 6th of May 2021, protests erupted in Jerusalem over a decision to evict Palestinian residents in favour of Israeli settlers in Sheikh Jarrah, a neighbourhood of East Jerusalem that under international law is a part of Palestine. Israeli authorities violently cracked down on the protests, injuring scores of Palestinians and bringing both camps closer to the brink of armed confrontation. As protests continued with many more wounded, Hamas issued an ultimatum under which Israel was required to pull back its forces from Jerusalem's religiously sensitive Al-Aqsa mosque by the 10th of May. Following Israel's failure to adhere to the ultimatum, Hamas then commenced rocket fire at Israeli settlements from the Gaza Strip, which has been the scene of many comparable clashes in the past decades.

In response to the rocket attacks, Israel began striking a large number of targets of Hamas inside the Gaza Strip using artillery and precision-guided munitions launched from fighter aircraft and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), starting on the same day. These strikes are so far believed to have resulted in the deaths of close to 200 Palestinians, including several high-ranking Hamas members but also many civilians, reportedly including at least 58 children. [1] On the side of Israel, ten casualties have so far been reported, most of which died after having been struck by Hamas rocket fire. [1]
 
Hamas' weapons of choice – wielded through its military wing the Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades – have so far mainly taken the form of indigenously produced unguided rockets, fired off in large simultaneous volleys in an effort to saturate and overwhelm the Israeli Iron Dome air defence system tasked with intercepting them. As the violence escalated further, Hamas also premiered several other weapons systems including anti-tank guided missiles (ATGMs) and loitering munitions, both of which have been widely publicised as their use intensified.
 
Especially the use of ATGMs by Hamas poses a threat that is not to be underestimated. Capable of penetrating the armour of most vehicles in service with the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) with high accuracy, the successful use of one ATGM has the potential of causing more casualties than days' worth of rocket barrages. During the latest round of fighting, Hamas has used ATGMs on at least two occasions to strike vehicles along the Gaza border, resulting in the killing of one Israeli soldier and the wounding of three others. [2] In turn, the IDF has been dead set on eliminating ATGM teams before they can fire off their missiles, reportedly so far resulting in the targeting of seven of such cells. [3] 
 

While Hamas has mastered the indigenous production of unguided rockets, RPGs and even drones (albeit with some components smuggled in from abroad), it is solely reliant on its vast smuggling network and military aid from Iran for the acquisition of ATGMs. Its current inventory of ATGMs consists of systems like the 9M14 Malyutka, 9M111 Fagot, 9M113 Konkurs and the dreaded 9M133 Kornet which Hamas managed to smuggle in from war-torn Libya and Iran, but also includes a limited number of North Korean Bulsae-2 ATGMs. These ATGMs serve alongside the equally elusive North Korean F-7 rocket propelled grenade, small numbers of which found their way to the Gaza Strip as well.


The al-Qassam Brigades is likely to have received its North Korean armament from Iran through an elaborate network of smugglers and backdoor channels ranging from Sudan to the Gaza Strip. This presumably happened in a similar fashion to how this is done with other transports: after delivery to Sudan, the weaponry is transported overland to Egypt, from where its smuggled into the Gaza Strip via tunnels. This theory is further supported by an incident in December 2009, wherein a North Korean arms shipment aboard an Ilyushin Il-76 cargo plane was discovered and seized by the Thai authorities immediately after landing in Bangkok. [4] The cargo, which was marked as consisting of oil-drilling equipment, contained thirty-five tons worth of rockets, surface-to-air missiles (MANPADS), explosives, rocket-propelled grenades and other weaponry. Another similar shipment was impounded in the United Arab Emirates a few months earlier (July 2009). [4] A large quantity of shipments to both Hamas and Hizbullah (in Lebanon) is believed to have been transferred unnoticed. 
 
 
 
North Korea's role in this scheme thus seems to be limited to being the manufacturer of the armament. Yet, it can be assumed North Korea has full knowledge of their eventual destination. However, with the regime's sole interest in such deals being the hard currency they generate, and increasing desperation driving them to ever more unlikely customers, that should hardly present a problem. Of course, on the customer side, this rather esotheric choice of arms supplier may be surprising as well, with Hamas having no particular prior affiliations with Pyongyang (though the latter has consistently condemned Israeli actions in the region). 
 
In fact, it is possible Iran sought to obscure its involvement by contracting the North Koreans to supply materiel, enabling them to maintain plausible deniability when the armamanent in question would be spotted in service with Hamas' military forces. The North Koreans themselves aren't too keen on having the origin of their weaponry uncovered either, and they often market weaponry in English using the names of comparable foreign equipment. In Libya, launchers and missiles have been spotted with the inscriptions PLA-017 and PLA-197 respectively, perhaps to give the false impression they originated in China.

More Bulsae-2 launchers and missiles have popped up in the inventory of the al-Nasser Salah al-Deen Brigades, which seceded from Hamas after political infighting

Another type of North Korean munition in service with the al-Qassam Brigades is the F-7 rocket propelled grenade, a domestic copy of the Soviet PG-7 round for use with the RPG-7 (and possibly compatible with Hamas' locally produced variants as well). The F-7 is easily discernible from other PG-7 copies by the red band around the warhead. These rounds have shown up throughout the world, including in Syria and Egypt, the latter of which seized 30.000 rounds in 2017 after a tip-off by the United States that a North Korean freighter nearing the Suez Canal could be carrying illicit cargo. In an embarrassing turn of events, the destination of the illicit cargo was revealed to be the country that originally seized it: Egypt. [5]

 
In its original design, the 9M111 wire-guided missile uses semi-automatic command to line of sight (SACLOS) to make its way to the target and can penetrate some 460mm of rolled homogeneous armour (RHA), though upgraded missiles can generally by fired by the same launcher. The DPRK is known to have received the 9K111 system from the Soviet Union in the mid-to-late 1980s.

The North Korean system differs in a few key areas. Most notably, whereas the original missile was wire-guided and thus risked its wire getting severed or short circuited when flying over water, the Bulsae-2 is instead laser-guided. Laser guidance also potentially results in a greater accuracy, as an operator has merely to keep a reticule on target to correct the missile's flight. Aside from this, the standard Bulsae-2 does not offer increased range, warhead penetration or a different operating mode, although in North Korean service further upgraded missiles are known to exist. North Korea also appears to manufacture their own distinctly shaped thermal batteries, which likely does not affect the quality of the system.

To Hamas, especially the compact, highly portable design of this ATGM system will be appreciated, which allows for a single soldier to carry the entire launcher while his fellow servicemen carry two launch tubes each.

 
In the past, North Korea has relied on its foreign relations to provide currency through weapons sales that help the regime maintain control over the country. As a result, exports of ballistic missile and even nuclear technology to countries such as Egypt, Syria, Iran and Myanmar have been oft reported, drawing a lot of attention from international observers. However, as its customer base narrows its qualms about dealing with non-state actors have diminished accordingly, and if the DPRK could secure a new deal with Hamas (presumably through Iran) it almost certainly would do so.
 
For Hamas, their benefit of North Korean ATGMs and rocket propelled grenades will last only as long as their stocks last, which given the relatively small numbers involved and the continuity of conflict in the Gaza Strip might not be very long. With smuggle routes continually evolving, and Iran now producing ATGMs in several categories which it has been prepared to export to proxy forces in Yemen and Iraq, it seems more likely that the next batches of ATGMs and RPGs to reach Gaza will consist of Iranian examples. This could include the Dehlavieh ATGM (a copy of the 9M133 Kornet), but also the simplified Iranian RPG-29 copies specifically designed for use with proxy forces. In the face of these much more capable systems, that could even pose a threat to Israel's newest armour, Hamas' North Korean arms may seem like a mere historical relic. Yet they serve as a deadly reminder to the ways in which illicit arms traverse the globe, and sometimes pop up where they are least expected.
 
 
[2] Jeep hit by anti-tank missile in deadly attack was parked in open view of Gaza https://www.timesofisrael.com/jeep-hit-by-anti-tank-missile-in-deadly-attack-was-parked-in-open-view-of-gaza/ 
[4] North Korean plane carrying smuggled arms seized in Thailand https://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/dec/13/north-korea-arms-smuggling-plane
 
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From Nu.D.40 to Bayraktar Akıncı: Demirağ’s Legacy

May 19, 2021, 1:15 am
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By Stijn Mitzer and Joost Oliemans
 
Benden bu millet için bir șey istiyorsanız, en mükemmelini istemelisiniz. Madem ki bir millet tayyaresiz yaşayamaz, öyleyse bu yaşama vasıtasını başkalarının lütfundan beklememeliyiz. Ben bu uçakların fabrikasını yapmaya talibim - If you want something from me for this nation, you should ask for the most splendid. Seeing that a nation cannot live without a plane, we shouldn't expect this means of living from the grace of others. I aspire to build the factory for these planes. (By Nuri Demirağ)
 
Turkey's ascension as a global aviation giant has in modern history been unrivalled in the scale, scope and speed of its achievements. This accomplishment is in no small part due to the country's determined endeavours towards attaining near self-sufficiency in the defence sector, in turn becoming less dependent on foreign suppliers and countries that have sanctioned Turkey on more than one occasion. Although the fruits of this policy are already in active service in most sections of the Turkish Armed Forces, arguably the most ambitious attempts at achieving self-sufficiency are the development of the Hürjet advanced jet trainer and the TF-X stealth air superiority fighter, both of which are slated to make their first test flights this decade.
 
Yet Turkey's efforts at designing and producing combat aircraft are not limited to manned systems alone. There are currently at least two active programmes for the development of unmanned combat aircraft in Turkey. The first of these is set to enter service later this year: The Bayraktar Akıncı developed by Baykar Savunma. The Akıncı brings novel capabilities to the field, including the ability to launch cruise missiles and beyond-visual-range air-to-air missiles (BVRAAMs), making the Akıncı the first unmanned platform in the world that can do so. The Akıncı drastically expands the scope of Turkey's drone warfare capabilities to now also target enemy aircraft, UAVs and helicopters at ranges as far as 100 kilometres away.
 
As the production of the new Akıncı is eagerly pushed ahead, one more unmanned combat aircraft type is currently under development: the MİUS (Muharip İnsansız Uçak Sistemi) project, again by Baykar Savunma. Slated to make its first test flight by 2023, this supersonic combat drone is designed to carry out precision bombings, close air support (CAS) missions and suppression of enemy air defences (SEAD) in contested airspace. Although currently still confined to the drawing boards, the MİUS project shows that the Turkish defence industry is thriving, with new designs being introduced rapidly thanks to an impressive ability to overcome challenges with indigenous solutions, putting Turkey at the front of innovation in multiple defence categories.

Unbeknownst to many however is the fact that neither the TF-X nor the unmanned systems currently in development are Turkey's first attempts at designing a homegrown combat aircraft. Its first try at realising such an aircraft can actually be traced back to the 1930s, when Turkish aircraft manufacturer Nuri Demirağ (1886-1957) set out to design a twin-engined single-seat fighter aircraft that was as revolutionary as it was unconventional. Unfortunately, the efforts of Nuri Demirağ have received little attention outside of Turkey, and even in the country itself his novel design was until recently completely unknown.

 
But before going into detail on the efforts of Nuri Demirağ and the Nu.D.40 itself, it is insightful to give a brief history of Turkey's aviation industry prior to the outbreak of the Second World War. While most nations in Europe had some form of aircraft industry during the 1930s, Turkey's initial attempt at establishing an aviation industry already occurred in February 1925, when it founded the Turkish Aeronautical Association (Türk Hava Kurumu - THK) in anticipation of the rapidly expanding role of air power in conflicts and (civilian) transport. [1] Seeking to team up with a foreign partner to provide initial support and expertise, an agreement was signed with the German Junkers company, and in August 1925 Tayyare and Motor Türk Anonim Şirketi (TOMTAŞ) was established. [1]

The agreement with Junkers called for the establishment of a factory in Eskişehir for the production and overhaul of smaller aircraft and a more expansive facility in Kayseri to produce and maintain larger aircraft. Although at first mainly a German-run affair, German involvement was to slowly wind down and be replaced by indigenously manufactured parts and workers, ultimately becoming a truly indigenous effort. [1] The first planes produced at TOMTAŞ were the Junkers A 20 reconnaissance aircraft and Junkers F-13 transport aircraft, of which some 30 and three examples were produced respectively. [1] TOMTAŞ was intended to ultimately produce some 250 aircraft per year, showing that its establishment was more than just a token effort at setting up an indigenous aircraft industry.
 
But already soon after its establishment, problems started to emerge that would eventually lead to the downfall of the entire project, mainly brought on by financial difficulties on the side of Junkers. [1] After the German government withdrew its support for Junkers, which already was on the verge of bankruptcy, the company officially terminated the partnership with Turkey in June 1928, followed by the closure of TOMTAŞ several months later. The factory continued its maintenance and repair activities after its transfer to the Turkish Ministry of Defence before being renamed the Kayseri Aircraft Factory in 1931, continuing to assemble aircraft until 1942. [2] Today, the former grounds of TOMTAŞ in Kayseri are home to the main tactical transport air base of the Turkish Air Force (Erkilet Air Base), housing A400M, C-130 and CN-235 transport aircraft.
 

License production of Polish PZL P.24s at the Kayseri Aircraft Factory in the 1930s

With the role of the Turkish indigenous aircraft industry now limited to assembling aircraft rather than the original goal of one day designing and producing them, Turkish industrialist Nuri Demirağ began to float around the idea of reinitiating Turkey's efforts in this field. Demirağ was certainly no stranger to innovation and major construction projects, his companies having laid some 1.250 kilometres of railway throughout Turkey during the 1920s. [3] In honour of his contribution to the development of the Turkish railways, President Mustafa Kemal Atatürk awarded him the surname Demirağ (meaning iron web) in 1934. Demirağ's next project would be of an even more ambitious scale, and with his own funds he established an aircraft factory in the Beşiktaş district of Istanbul in 1936.
 
Already in the same year, the first aircraft designed by Demirağ and his team of engineers began to take shape. The Nu.D.36 was a two-seater basic training aircraft, of which 24 examples were eventually produced. [3] It was soon followed by a more ambitious design in the form of the Nu.D.38 twin-engined passenger aircraft, prototype construction of which lasted well into World War II, followed by its first test flight in 1944. To better facilitate growth and flying operations, Demirağ purchased a plot of land in the Yeşilköy area of Istanbul for the establishment of an airfield and flight school (which trained some 290 pilots until 1943) on what is nowadays the location of Istanbul Atatürk Airport. [3] His broad-ranging ambitions and extensive efforts across the field should be sufficient to prove Demirağ's goals were not limited to designing and producing aircraft alone, but also aimed to kickstart a process of increasing public participation and interest in aviation-related activities in Turkey in general.
 

A row of Nu.D.36s at Yeşilköy Airport in 1942

The prototype of the Nu.D.38 undergoing construction in the early 1940s

Despite Demirağ's selfless efforts, he would soon be confronted with a government that not only failed to provide the necessary ecosystem for an indigenous aviation industry to flourish, but also one that actively worked against its very survival. Although the THK placed an order for 24 Nu.D.36s, a crash landing (leading to the death of pilot Selahattin Reşit Alan) after a test flight from Istanbul to Eskişehir led it to cancel its entire order for the aircraft. [3] In response, Demirağ started a lawsuit that dragged on for years, yet despite several expert reports attesting that nothing was at fault with the aircraft, the court ultimately ruled in favour of THK. [3]
 
In similar vein, the much-anticipated Nu.D.38 failed to attract any orders from the Turkish State Airlines (forerunner of Turkish Airlines), or any other government agency for that matter. To add insult to injury, a law was enacted that prohibited Demirağ from exporting his aircraft to other countries, halting negotiations with several nations that had shown interest in the Nu.D.36, including Spain. [4] This, combined with a lack of orders from the Turkish Air Force, forced the factory to close its doors in 1943. In an effort to overturn the situation, Demirağ made numerous appeals to government officials, including the president İsmet İnönü, ultimately to no avail. [3] Through no fault of his own, Demirağ's extensive efforts proved fruitless, ending what could have been a promising start of an indigenous aircraft industry. In commemoration of his services to Turkish aviation, in 2010 Sivas airport was named after him. Though recognition had better come late than never, it is safe to say that Demirağ remains an underappreciated figure in Turkish history.


This is where the story of Nuri Demirağ and his aircraft factory was thought to have ended. That is until researcher Emir Öngüner discovered the existence of another aircraft project by Demirağ and his engineering team in official Turkish and German archive documents several years ago: The Nu.D.40. By virtue of its unconventional design and the fact that a model of the aircraft underwent wind tunnel tests in Germany, it is perhaps all the more surprising that this aircraft was relegated to obscurity for so long.
 
Much of the information concerning the Nu.D.40 comes from the wind tunnel tests conducted by the Aerodynamische Versuchsanstalt (AVA) in Göttingen, Germany in 1938. After the conclusion of the tests, the AVA sent Demirağ a comprehensive 110-page report detailing the findings unearthed during the tests. [5] Due to a series of miscommunications, the AVA only managed to collect only a portion of the money it had originally requested however, and in 1940 gave away the confidential report on Nu.D.40 to two German aviation firms. [6]

Little is known about the configuration, engine types and proposed armament of the Nu.D.40. Designed during the run-up to World War II, any parts that couldn't be indigenously produced (most notably the engines and armament) would need to have been acquired from abroad, a nigh on impossible feat as war was raging through Europe. Ignoring this fact for the sake of what-might-have-been, two German aircraft engines and an armament suite of two cannons or heavy machine guns and two light machine guns appears to have been a plausible configuration.
 

Eventually, Emir Öngüner shared his discoveries with Turkish Aerospace (TAI) President and CEO Temel Kotil, who excitedly told him ''We should definitely build this aircraft!'' [7] A team was created and made a 3D digital model, after which production of a 1:24 scale model followed suit. The next steps include assembly of two UAV models of the Nu.D.40 in 1:8 and 1:5 scales. [7] Ultimately, a full-scale 1:1 replica model will be created, finally realising Demirağ's dream to see the Nu.D.40 flying.


In its proposed 1:1 replica configuration, the Nu.D.40 will be a remarkably similar sight to the Dutch D.23 single-seat fighter designed by Fokker during the same era (so much so that the header image is in fact a D.23 modified to resemble the Nu.D.40 in WWII Turkish Air Force livery). The D.23 project was first conceived in 1937 as an interceptor with a top speed of some 535km/h and an armament of two 13.2mm and two 7.9mm machine guns. A full-size mock-up of the aircraft was first presented at the 1938 Paris Air Saloon, followed by the completion of the prototype in March 1939. [8] The D.23 took to the sky for the first time two months later, but during its eleventh test flight in April 1940 it received damage to its nosewheel that had to be disassembled and shipped for repair. [8]
 
When the Germans invaded the Netherlands in May 1940, the nosewheel hadn't yet been repaired and the D.23 survived the invasion largely unscathed, stored in a hangar. Just two weeks after the conquest of the country, the Luftwaffe came to inspect the aircraft and prepare it for shipping to Germany. Not prepared to relinquish its promising project to the enemy that easily, Fokker pointed out to the German delegation that the D.23 was the possession of Fokker rather than the Royal Netherlands Air Force, and that if the Germans wanted it they would have to pay a hefty acquisition price, promptly ending German interest. [8] Ultimately, the aircraft was slowly taken apart by souvenir hunters and later destroyed in an allied air raid on Schiphol. Had the D.23 entered service, it would have been one of the most interesting aircraft of its era, but the outbreak of World War II prevented the aircraft from living up to the high hopes invested in it.
 

After years of painstaking research, Emir Öngüner collected all of his findings regarding the Nu.D.40 in the book 'Bir Avcı Tayyaresi Yapmaya Karar Verdim'. The book focuses on the design history of the aircraft using official documents collected from archives in Germany and Turkey. Although currently only available in Turkish, hopefully one day an English version will be available as well. Bir Avcı Tayyaresi Yapmaya Karar Verdim can be ordered for ₺40.00 at TÜBİTAK or at other any popular online bookstores in Turkey.
 
Turkey's first (unmanned) indigenous combat aircraft is set to enter service in 2021, some 83 years after the design of the Nu.D.40. As innovative as the Nu.D.40 was then, so innovative the Akıncı is now. Though Nuri Demirağ has nowadays been largely forgotten, others have picked up the thread of his visions for a modern indigenous aviation industry. Companies like Baykar Savunma demonstrate what a team of highly dedicated people can achieve; much like Demirağ they are risk takers, putting their country and a love of engineering first and the desire to make a lot of profit second. As Demirağ knew close to 100 years ago, generating public interest is key to these goals, and through its technology workshops and festivals such as Deneyap and Teknofest Baykar is sure to attract a host of likeminded spirits to its factory and other Turkish technology firms. With their eyes on the future, companies like these are transforming not just their country's destiny in the skies, but also in the minds of its people.

Bu Hikaye;


[2] TOMTAS - Tayyare Otomobil ve Motor Türk Anonim Sirketi http://hugojunkers.bplaced.net/tomtas.html
[3] Aviation Facilities of Nuri Demirağ in Beşiktaş and Yeşilköy https://dergipark.org.tr/tr/download/article-file/404341
[4] The 24 Nu.D.36s that had been produced for the THK were donated by to the local flight school and later scrapped.
[5] Nuri Demirağ’ın Almanya’da kaybolan avcı uçağı: Nu.D.40 https://haber.aero/sivil-havacilik/nuri-demiragin-cok-az-bilinen-ucagi-nu-d-40/
[6] Nuri Demirağ’ın Bilinmeyen Uçağı: Nu.D.40 https://www.havayolu101.com/2019/01/10/nuri-demiragin-bilinmeyen-ucagi-nu-d-40/
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A Winged Oryx - Bayraktar TB2s Over Qatar

May 19, 2021, 5:24 am
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By Stijn Mitzer and Joost Oliemans
 
The Bayraktar TB2 has gained a formidable reputation for its role in deciding the fate of nations and enemy offensives from the skies of Libya, Nagorno-Karabakh and Syria. The TB2's consistent successes are unmatched by any other type of unmanned aerial combat vehicle (UCAV) in the world, attracting considerable attention and the interest of several countries across the globe. While the acquisition of significant numbers of TB2s by Ukraine and Azerbaijan has meanwhile become widely known, it is nearly not as well-established that half a dozen examples are also operated by Qatar, which is in fact the first foreign country to have purchased the type.
 
But while for Azerbaijan the TB2 proved to be the revered asset that ultimately secured the country's sweeping victory over Armenia, Qatar appears to have purchased its TB2s with the more humble initial aim of gaining operational and technical experience in the operation of unmanned aerial vehicles. In this area Qatar had lagged somewhat behind neighbouring countries, and it appears the Bayraktar TB2 was the designated system to propel Qatar into the era of drone-powered warfare. However, their use extends far beyond merely gaining experience in drone operations, and the TB2's capabilities as a reconnaissance and strike asset will likely be highly appreciated.
 
Before deciding on the Bayraktar TB2, Qatar reportedly looked at UAVs from Europe, the U.S. and China to fulfill its long-standing requirement. [1] An order for six TB2s, three ground control stations and a simulator was subsequently announced during the DIMDEX exhibition held in Doha in March 2018 (some two years before the type rose to fame for its involvement in Operation Spring Shield in Syria in early 2020). In addition, Baykar also set up a UAV operation center, as well as network-based data tracing and archiving software for Qatar's Armed Forces. Following their delivery the next year, the TB2s entered service with the Reconnaissance and Surveillance Center (RCS). The RCS, which is part of the Ministry of Defense, is tasked with protecting Qatar's borders with a fleet of UAVs and sensor-based systems.
 

The six Bayraktar TB2s along with three ground control stations pictured shortly before their delivery to Qatar

The TB2 made its public debute in Qatar during the 'Al-Adheed' exercise conducted annually by the Qatar Armed Forces and Amiri Guard in March 2020. Although none of the Bayraktar TB2s could be seen carrying munitions in the limited amount of footage of the exercise that was released to the public, it was implied that one of them carried out a precision strike against a stationary target using a MAM-L munition. During the 2021 iteration of the 'Al-Adheed' exercise, the Bayraktar TB2s were sighted again, this time exclusively in the reconnaissance role. [2]

While this was the first footage of a Turkish drone in Qatari service, the TB2 is in fact the second Turkish drone type to enter service with Qatar. In March 2012 it was announced that Qatar had become the first export customer of the Bayraktar Mini UAV that is also designed and produced by Baykar Savunma. A total of ten Bayraktar Mini UAVs were delivered under an agreement signed during the 2011 International Defense Fair (IDEF) in Istanbul, although the type has yet to make its first public appearance in Qatar. [3] [4]
 

Despite the scarcity of footage of the TB2 in Qatari service, it is known that all six examples are based out of a newly-constructed airbase situated in the Northern area of Qatar believed to be designated as Al-Shamal. [5] This airbase, construction of which started in 2018, appears to have been built specifically for the operations of unmanned aerial vehicles, and is located next to an enormous military complex that was also recently erected. Satellite imagery taken of the airbase consistently shows the three ground control stations associated with the Bayraktar TB2 located next to the runway, confirming that operations are ongoing and very much active.
 

In addition to its role in technology evaluation/acquintance, the reconnaissance and strike capabilities of the TB2 are surely not forgotten. For Qatar, the introduction of large numbers of cheap UCAVs like the TB2 could be a game changer in its efforts to patrol the Persian Gulf when its waters turn hostile. In particular, swarms of fast attack craft and missile boats employed by Iran represent a growing threat, for which the highly maneuverable MAM-L munition would be a highly suitable counter. Affordable and with a range far exceeding the altitude of deployment of air defence systems such as AA guns and MANPADS, the MAM-L represents a ubiquitous and cost-effective solution to swarm attacks. 
 
Another application of the TB2 is the replacement of fast jets on combat missions such as those conducted on Houthi targets during the Saudi Arabian-led intervention in Yemen. Operating at significantly less cost and without the risk of losing the pilot deep into enemy territory, TB2s can be utilised to replicate Turkey's successes in small-footprint interventions that maximise military impact at low financial and humanitarian cost (a doctrine dubbed Bayraktar Diplomacy).
 
 
The Bayraktar TB2 is not the only type of drone Qatar had showed interest in however, as Qatar's 2019 National Day parade revealed the presence of two more types of UAVs in Qatar: The Textron Aerosonde and Shadow M2 Nightwarden. On static display during the parade, it was at the time unknown if both were already in service with the RCS or were undergoing trials pending a possible acquisition by Qatar. Sighted on several occasions during defense exhibitions since, it was ultimately revealed in April 2021 that Barzan Aeronautical eyes Charleston in South Carolina, the US, to set up a manufacturing facility to produce these drones. [6]

 
A third type of UAV under consideration by Qatar is the Q01 intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) platform designed by the German company Reiner Stemme Utility Air Systems with Qatari funding. The Q01 can either be piloted by a crew of two or be remotely operated from the ground as a UAV to provide surveillance for up to 48 hours at only 500 dollars an hour, which is considerably cheaper than what can be achieved by any other (manned) aircraft. [7] It is capable of carrying a variety of electro-optical sensors and a multirole surveillance radar mounted in a fairing under the fuselage. Although the signing of a contract for seventeen aircraft was envisaged by the end of 2017, no subsequent information has become public since, and the current status of the project is unknown. [7]

The Textron Aerosonde (left) and Shadow M2 Nightwarden (right) on parade in Doha, December 2019

The Reiner Stemme Q01

To Qatar, investments in drone technology like the Bayraktar TB2 and Akıncı systems allow it to introduce currently unrivalled capabilities to the Gulf region, providing it with a distinct edge over its direct neighbours in this respect. Aside from the hardware, it is imperative to note that such acquisitions also provide experience in drone operations that other nations lack. In fact, knowledge gained about drone tactics and operations in Libya, Syria and Nagorno-Karabakh could be shared, including the methodology for successfully countering a range of modern Russian air defense systems that are in use throughout the Middle East.

Clearly aspiring to establish a local technology base for the development and production of weaponry, including drones, Qatar could further this goal by securing a lucrative deal with Baykar. [8] In the future, this might not only include the TB2 but also the newer variant of the Bayraktar mini UAV, the VTOL UAV, Akıncı and soon Baykar's first jet-powered UCAV. Producing drones in almost every class, Baykar's knowledge and technology base, political neutrality and attractive prices are sure to make it one of the most competitive options for meeting the ever-surging demand for modern UAV capabilities.

Qatar's Armed Forces Chief of Staff Air Marshal Ghanem bin Shaheen al-Ghanem poses with Özdemir Bayraktar, who with his sons managed to transform Baykar from an automotive technology company to the drone tech giant it is today.

Due to its rising popularity and attractive characteristics, the TB2 will be certainly be under consideration by many nations formerly in the market for Chinese drones, such as Pakistan, Indonesia, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. Indeed, there is evidence to suggest that a certain Central Asian country is currently in the process of acquiring TB2s, as such constituting Baykar's fourth (known) export client. In the meantime, markets of Europe and North Africa are by no means exempt from a surge in interest, with Bulgaria and Morocco reportedly showing interest in six and twelve Bayraktar TB2s respectively. [9] Other nations that can't buy the TB2 for political reasons are certain to follow Baykar's developments with interest, as nations around the world struggle to produce or otherwise acquire advanced and above all cost-effective drones.
 
[2] That is not to say that Bayraktar TB2s didn't use munitions in the exercise, but rather that no footage was released of them doing so
[8] Texas A&M at Qatar, Reconnaissance and Surveillance Center sign agreement to explore drone technology research and training https://www.qatar.tamu.edu/news-and-events/news/Texas-A-M-at-Qatar-Reconnaissance-and-Surveillance-Center-sign-agreement-to-explore-drone-technology-research-and-training

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Back From the Dead: Ukraine’s Tor SAMs

May 19, 2021, 11:44 pm
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By Stijn Mitzer and Joost Oliemans
 
As Ukraine continues to build up its military forces to face the ever present threat of Russian interference in its Eastern regions, it has gradually managed to rejuvenate its battered inventories thanks to much increased funding. This has resulted in acquisitions such as those of Bayraktar TB2 UCAVs and Ada-class corvettes from Turkey, but also in the introduction of numerous indigenous weapon systems and upgrades for equipment already in active service. Together, these introductions have enabled Ukraine to restore the combat readiness of its embattled military to a point where capability gaps with Russia are swiftly decreasing, and actually allow it to outperform its foe in some areas.

These feats are in no small part due to Ukraine's military-industrial complex, which after decades of dedicating itself to improving and selling Ukraine's surplus military equipment abroad, has now shifted focus to restoring various weapon systems that had been decommissioned by the Ukrainian military prior to the 2014 Russo-Ukrainian War. Chronic underfunding had forced the Ukrainian military to retire revered equipment like the T-80 main battle tank (MBT) and 203mm 2S7 Pion self-propelled howitzer (SPH), with acquisitions of newer equipment to replace aging equipment in service a faraway dream.

Evidently, the situation for Ukraine's air defence units was little different from that of the rest of the military. Within the timespan of a mere decade, the Ukrainian Army and Ukrainian Air Force were forced to retire all of their S-125, S-200, S-300V, 2K12 Kub and 9K330 Tor SAM systems, with additional systems such as the S-300PT joining them in storage. As many of them were kept in relatively good condition in the hopes of a sale to a foreign customer – or in the case of the S-300Vs, had only recently been retired – it comes as no surprise that Ukraine looked to these systems to strengthen the ranks of the Ukrainian military once more.
 
Considering the age of some of these SAMs, and the scarcity of active-duty personnel that still had experience with systems like the 2K12 and 9K330, their refurbishment was certainly no easy task. Furthermore, other equipment like radar systems and the missiles themselves would need to be overhauled as well, provided enough of them were still available. All things considered, one regiment of 9K330s, two 2K12 regiments, two regiments of S-125s and a S-300V1 brigade could be reactivated. [1] The rejuvenation of three S-200 SAM sites was also envisaged, but significant damage caused to the sites' infrastructure during their deactivation in 2013 so far appears to have prevented their return to service. [1]
 
 
The 9K330 Tor SAM, the oldest variant in the Tor-lineage of SAM systems, was originally developed in the late 1970s to engage low-flying fast targets with a small radar cross-section such as cruise missiles. First entering service in 1986, the 9M330 missiles of the 9K330 system are capable of destroying targets at ranges of up to 12km, providing ground forces with a highly mobile means of air defence against enemy aircraft. To enable targeting of enemy aircraft and cruise missiles in the face of electronic warfare measures directed against the 9K330's radar, an electro-optical tracker is fitted just right of the engagement radar.
 
The Tor was also the first system in the world to have its (eight) missiles vertically stored inside the launcher rather than placed on the outside as on contemporary systems, as such offering better protection against shell fragments and allowing for a larger missile load to be carried. Continuous improvements and technological advances have meanwhile led to the Tor-M1 and Tor-M2 variants. During the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war the Tor(-M2KM) system took active part in an armed conflict for the first time, during which the few systems operated by Armenia proved completely unable to effectively counter the UAV threat overhead.


Prior to their re-emergence in 2017, Ukraine's 9K330 Tor SAM systems had only been sighted once before: During the 10th anniversary of the independence of Ukraine parade in August 2001. [2] A total of six 9K330s took part in that parade, likely constituting the entirety of Ukraine's inventory of these systems. During their years of active service in Ukraine, the 9K330s were operated by the 257th Guards Anti-Aircraft Artillery Regiment stationed in Yaroviv, near the border with Poland. Likely owing to the considerable expenses that operating such a small number of systems brings with it, all six systems were phased out in the early 2000s. [3]

Three of the six 9K330 systems on parade in Kiev in 2001

The three exact same 9K330s during parade practice in 2018 shortly after their reactivation

After their retirement in the early 2000s, the 9K330s were placed in long-term storage, awaiting better times that would either allow for their return to active service or, alternatively, their sale to a foreign customer. Ultimately, a decision was made for reactivation somewhere in the mid-2010s, after which they were moved to a military depot in the town of Horodok, Radomyshl district. Here, a contract serviceman placed the overhaul of at least one 9K330 system in peril by dismantling several of its electronic boards with the intention of selling the precious metals they contained in June 2018. [4] The stolen parts were later found and subsequently reinstalled.

 
Just short of a year before, in August 2017, the first overhauled 9K330 was already showcased during an exhibition in Kiev. Later that month, on the 24th of August 2017, the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine recorded five SAM systems, reportedly including two 9K330s, near the Ukrainian-controlled village of Kasyanivka in the Donetsk Region, possibly representing their first operational deployment. [4] Their sighting came some 3.5 years after the first sighting of Tor SAM systems in Eastern Ukraine, which had involved Russian Tor-M1s that were deployed to the Lugansk region in support of pro-Russian separatist forces. [5]
 
 
Despite the reports of the Ukrainian deployment of 9K330s to Donbas in August 2017, it would only be in February 2019 when the verification of the rejuvenated 9K330s finally took place at the Yahorlyk missile range in Kherson Oblast. [6] During the live firing exercise, overhauled systems like the S-125, 2K12, 9K330 and upgraded ZSU-23-4M-A self-propelled anti-aicraft guns (SPAAGs) were put to the test before they officially entered service with the Ukrainian military.
 
 
The overhaul of the 9K330 systems was carried out indigenously by the Lviv Radio Repair Plant and NPP Aerotechnika-MLT, both specialised in the overhaul of various types of SAM and radar systems. [6] In addition to bringing the systems back to operational condition, a limited number of improvements were carried out, most notably the implementation of new algorithms for processing and displaying information. [3] Future improvements could include the replacement of the analog radio-electronic equipment with digital equivalents, significantly improving the operators' capability to effectively use the equipment at hand.

 
Although the reactivation of six 9K330 Tor SAM systems is certainly no game-changing capability in and of itself, the significant numbers of rejuvenated military equipment entering service, including numerous SAM systems, do much to increase the capabilities of the Ukrainian military as a whole. Furthermore, the valuable experience gained during the overhaul of these systems could be put to good use for a deeper modernisation project in future, and might be applied to other systems such as the 9K37 Buk and 9K22 Tunguska as well. 
 
Beyond directly expanding on air defence capabilities though, the 9K330s also hold significant value in potential OPFOR training, during which they could be used as representative examples of enemy air defence systems. Knowledge of enemy air defences is imperative in finding ways of countering them, and access to such systems as the 9K330 is not just of interest to Ukraine, but all parties that may encounter them on the battlefield. For instance, given existing partnerships in place between Turkey and Ukraine (such as Black Sea Shield, between Baykar Savunma and Ukrspecexport) an OPFOR training centre aimed at improving drone operations is not unthinkable; it was after all the same (though more advanced) Tor-M2KM that was touted as the Bayraktar TB2's greatest foe during the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war. 
 
As the two countries between them share nearly every type of Russian air defence system that could be encountered in future conflicts, including the ZSU-23, 2K22 Tunguska, Pantsir-S1 (captured in Libya and delivered to Turkey), Strela-10, 9K33 Osa, 9K330 Tor, 2K12 Kub, S-125 and 9K37 Buk mobile air defence systems and the S-300V1, S-300PT, S-300PS and S-400 strategic SAM systems, the potential for mutually beneficial cooperation is truly unlimited. In such a capacity, the reactivation of a mere six launchers could be far more consequential than anyone could have imagined, aiding to turn Ukraine's fledgling UAV capabilities into a threat that is currently unrivalled by any of its neighbours.
 

[1] На Украине планируются к возвращению в строй шесть типов зенитных ракетных систем https://www.belvpo.com/93234.html/
[2] Техника ПВО Украины 24 августа 2001г. на параде в честь 10-й годовщины независимости Украины, улица Крещатик, г.Киев http://pvo.guns.ru/other/ukraine/index332.htm
[3] “Тор” та “Куб” повертаються до бойового складу ЗСУ https://mil.in.ua/uk/tor-ta-kub-povertayutsya-do-bojovogo-s/
[4] На Житомирщині затримали контрактника, який викрав дорогоцінні елементи із ЗРК “Тор”. ФОТО https://novynarnia.com/2018/06/28/na-zhitomirshhini-zatrimali-kontraktnika-zsu-yakiy-vikrav-dorogotsinni-elementi-iz-zrk-tor-foto/
[5] Tor series surface-to-air missile systems in Ukraine https://armamentresearch.com/torsam-ukraine/
[6] Завершальний етап випробувань зенітних ракетних комплексів протиповітряної оборони https://youtu.be/pxPb4gLqzGs

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A Rare Species: Cuban David Infantry Mobility Vehicles In Service With Angola

May 25, 2021, 8:57 am
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By Stijn Mitzer and Joost Oliemans

Cuba is widely known for its former leader Fidel Castro, a surprisingly enduring devotion to communism and its world-renowned cigars, exporting the latter two to numerous countries across the globe. By contrast, its role as an exporter of arms remains much more obscure. While Cuba has begun converting and manufacturing a wide range of arms-related equipment in recent times, this industry has so far mostly been serving the needs of Cuba's own Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias (FAR). The presence of Cuban 'David' infantry mobility vehicles (IMVs) in service with the Forças Armadas Angolanas is thus highly notable.
 
The strong relationship between Cuba and Angola, established during the latter's freedom struggle against Portuguese colonial rule of the country, has had a significant influence on Angola and its armed forces, but was not known to have materialised in the delivery of military equipment to Angola over the past decades. The continuation of this bond between the countries even in the 21st century was once more affirmed by meetings of Angolan and Cuban officials, where ministers stated their willingness to continue and even strengthen cooperation in the military field. [1]

The David IMV, also known as 'Iguana' (for the species of lizard native to Cuba), was first spotted in service with the Angolan Army during the Southern African Development Community's (SADC) multinational exercise 'Vale do Keve 2014', where it carried out simulated missions alongside Namibian Casspir MRAP (Mine-Resistant Ambush Protected) vehicles. The David had first been sighted in Cuba several years earlier, taking part in the 50th Anniversary of Playa Giron's Victory parade in 2011 in commemoration of the failed 1961 Bay of Pigs invasion by U.S. proxy forces.
 

Two Namibian Casspir MRAPs lead a convoy of David IMVs

Although sometimes designated as an MRAP, the David can best be classified as an infantry mobility vehicle (IMV). Owing to the Do-It-Yourself nature of the project, the vehicle represents an interesting mix of parts mostly cannibalised from different types of military vehicles. The chassis is that of a Soviet GAZ-66 truck, on which an armoured body was installed. Although the armour values of the vehicle are unknown, the all-round protection is likely sufficient to shield against small arms fire and shrapnel.

The armament of the vehicle consists of a single 7.62mm PKT vehicle machine gun taken from the turrets of BTR-60 APCs or BRDM-2 patrol cars that had been converted to serve in different roles, having lost their turret in the process. These vehicles are also the source of the roof hatches, up to four of which are present on the David. Two IMV variants are known to exist, one with no such hatches and one with four of them, which is the variant in service with Angola. Three viewing ports with associated firing ports (also taken from BTR-60s) are located on each side of the vehicle.


Another variant serves the role of command vehicle for BM-21 multiple rocket launcher (MRL) battalions, replacing the GAZ-66 and UAZ-469 previously used for this purpose. In turn, several of these UAZ-469s were converted to fast attack vehicles for use with Cuba's special forces, showing that few systems are ever truly retired until they're completely worn out in this country where scarcity is inescapable. [2]
 
 
Still more specialised variants exist, including a communications vehicle donning large antennas and a satellite dish on the roof of the vehicle, replacing the hatches and PKT gunner's position. These vehicles are to ensure effective communications between the three different army regions guarding Cuba's vast land mass, the length of which covers the same distance as from Kyiv to Berlin.
 

Prior to the production of the David IMV, Cuba already had limited experience in the manufacturing and conversion of several types of vehicles by replacing weaponry or adding additional armour for increased protection on the battlefield. At least some of these vehicles were subsequently used in Angola, where elements of the Cuban Army and Air Force were fighting in support of the MPLA against UNITA, the FNLA, the FLEC and the South African Defence Force (SADF) in the 1970s and 1980s.
 

While the Cuban contingent deployed to Angola mostly served as advisors or in counter-insurgency operations, they frequently engaged in direct combat with the SADF as well. Although often credited for defeating the SADF, causing the latter to pull out of the Angolan conflict and grant South West Africa independence (becoming Namibia in 1990), the Cubans suffered a string of defeats at the hands of the SADF. However, their resilience ultimately convinced the SADF that this conflict could not be won without a significant increase in commitment and resources, thus essentially gaining the Cubans a strategic victory in Angola through their presence rather than a military one.
 

A David IMV acting as a command vehicle for the Bandera-VI-M 'Remulgadas' coastal defence system complex. Also note the PKT machine gun.

While the returning Cuban contingent was hailed as victor over Apartheid South Africa, Cuba would soon find itself facing major problems at home. Largely reliant on the Soviet Union for its trade and income, the dissolution of the Soviet Union had a devastating effect on the Cuban economy. The Cuban military was also hit hard, and soon faced a shortage of fuel and spare parts. As a result, large numbers of armoured fighting vehicles and aircraft were put into storage and large naval vessels and submarines were laid off.

In more recent years several types of otherwise redundant vehicles and equipment were taken out of storage for conversion to new roles in an effort to increase the Cuban military's fighting capabilities, sometimes leading to dubious contraptions with little fighting value in case of war, but also leading to more realistic projects such as the David IMV. Other examples of these conversions include the mating of surface-to-air (SAM) launchers onto the chassis of T-55 tanks, and the installation of anti-tank guns, anti-aircraft guns, and artillery on the chassis of BMP-1s, T-55s and even World War II-era T-34/85s.

 
While the prospect of more Cuban weaponry showing up in countries throughout the world is not very likely, the sighting of such an exotic vehicle in Africa once again showcases the complexity and opaqueness of the international arms market, necessitating accurate analysis to keep track of the way armament proliferates. This particular vehicle serves as an excellent illustration of this fact, adding to 
Angola's armed forces' arsenal of extremely diverse fighting vehicles, many of which originated from unconventional sources – even including North Korea.
 
[2] The Oryx Handbook of Cuban Fighting Vehicles https://www.oryxspioenkop.com/2019/08/cuban-fighting-vehicles.html

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Dragons In The Caucasus: Chinese WM-80 MRLs Of Armenia

May 28, 2021, 6:27 am
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By Stijn Mitzer and Joost Oliemans 

The casual reader may be forgiven for thinking that Armenia's armed forces operate solely Soviet-legacy weaponry inherited from the USSR, or armament received from Russia in recent years. In reality, operating alongside familiar types such as the T-72 MBT, BM-21 MRL and 9K33 Osa SAM are several types of equipment acquired from more surprising sources. This includes Sako TRG-42 sniper rifles bought from Finland, Swathi artillery-locating radars acquired from India and also 273mm WM-80 multiple rocket launchers (MRLs) sourced from China.
 
Especially the latter system was often touted as an asset that could very well end up playing a major role in a flare-up of hostilities between Armenia and Azerbaijan over the disputed territory of Nagorno-Karabakh. For a long time constituting the longest-ranged and heaviest weapons system that wasn't a ballistic missile in Armenian service, the WM-80 enabled the country to outrange virtually the entire Azerbaijani Army until Azerbaijani military modernisation ultimately caught up with Armenian capabilities in the mid-2000s.

Years before, in 1999, Armenia was one of the first countries in the world to acquire large-calibre multiple rocket launchers from China. While modern Chinese guided large-calibre MRLs are nowadays plentiful in the inventories of numerous militaries worldwide, the original design of the WM-80 (known as the Type 83) actually dates back to the 1970s. Although it was subsequently upgraded to achievea longer range and increased accuracy in the 1980s (becoming the WM-80), the system lacks any guidance suite and becomes progressively more inaccurate at longer ranges.
 
This in turn makes the WM-80 broadly similar to the Russian 300mm BM-30 MRL, the rockets of which however have a larger warhead (243kg vs 150kg), slightly shorter range (70km vs 80km) and more warhead options compared to the WM-80. The Chinese system is mostly lacking in the types of warheads available, with a high-explosive (HE) warhead and a cluster warhead designed to burst into 380 high-explosive anti-tank (HEAT) bomblets being the only types available. Most of these shortfalls would eventually be remedied with the introduction of the guided WM-120 MRL, which entered service with Jordan in 2010.
 
An area in which the WM-80 does have a major advantage over the BM-30 is that its eight 273mm rockets are located in two rocket pods, allowing a dedicated reloading truck (which comes equipped with two such pods and a hydraulic crane) to quickly replenish the launcher after it fired a full volley of rockets. By contrast, each of the BM-30's launch tubes has to be individually reloaded, costing valuable time before it can reengage and making it vulnerable to counter-battery fire or enemy drones lurking overhead.
 
 
 
In an era during which Armenia was almost solely reliant on the generosity of Russia to provide it with arms and equipment, the decision to acquire Chinese MRLs is perhaps all the more surprising. While one could argue that the supply of surplus BM-30 MRLs from Russian stocks to Armenia could have challenged the status quo with Azerbaijan and thus be undesirable, Russia had little qualms with providing Armenia with Scud ballistic missile systems during the same decade. Instead, it seems plausible that unlike the Scuds – which had already been retired from Russian service by the late 1990s – the BM-30s had to be purchased with hard currency, which Armenia at the time lacked. 
 
Eager to secure more export contracts for its MRLs, China likely offered a favourable price for the systems. A lack of funds on the side of Armenia could also explain the small numbers of WM-80s acquired, purchasing just four launchers along with four dedicated reloaders. No additional support vehicles were received, with Armenia simply opting to use Soviet GAZ-66 and ZiL-131 trucks as command and staff vehicles. The minimalistic nature of a WM-80 battery is likely what attracted Armenia to the system in the first place, allowing it to acquire an at that time impressive military capability at greatly reduced costs.
 
 
Perhaps for reasons of secrecy, it would take until 2006 before Armenia first publically showcased its WM-80s during the 15th anniversary of independence parade in the capital Yerevan, followed by a participation in every major Armenian military parade since. Notably, this also included a parade in Stepanakert, Nagorno-Karabakh in 2012. [2] Although their presence here might led one to believe that at least two of the launchers entered service with the military of Artsakh (which in reality is an inherent part of the Armenian Army) these were actually Armenian systems that were brought to Stepanakert specifically for the parade.
 
 
The WM-80s are not believed to have seen action prior to the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, likely to prevent artillery duels and larger skirmishes from escalating into full-out war through the use of such heavy weaponry. But as the Armenian military scrambled to halt the Azerbaijani onslaught brought on by drone warfare and precision guided munitions in September 2020, the WM-80s were soon moved closer to the area of conflict as well. They were not spared the onslaught of Armenian military equipment during the conflict, and two WM-80s (and/or their reloaders) are believed to have been destroyed by a loitering munition on their way to their deployment zone. [3] 
 
Despite a lack of (public) information regarding the system's further combat use during the 2020 conflict, one source claims that ''Chinese WM-80 MLRS – Armenia's most failed weapon in the battle for Karabakh: Only one fact of using these MLRS is known, but the missiles fell, as they say, in an open field, and the scattered cluster submunitions did not work. Apparently, the expired storage period affected.'' [4] Whether these claims have any basis in reality is unknown, and they should be taken with a grain of salt as there is no corroborating evidence to confirm them.

A WM-80 is being readied to fire. Also note the effect of the camouflage pattern against the rock formation in the rear

With at least two launchers and/or loaders confirmed to have been destroyed, Armenia's WM-80 force is sure to have taken a beating during last year's conflict. While their combat efficacy during the war remains unknown, it is almost certain that experiences gained during the operations of the system in wartime conditions gave rise to additional requirements for 21st century warfare. This might very well include guided MRLs, which when paired with counter-battery radars and long range rockets like those of the WM-80 could be devastating against enemy artillery and positions. Should the WM-80's performance indeed have been unimpressive, it is possible that additional BM-30s will be purchased both to replace their losses (four total) and to replace the remaining WM-80s. Despite their modest contribution to the war effort, Armenia's WM-80s nevertheless present a fascinating chapter of 21st century European warfare as one of the few Chinese weapons systems ever to be used on the continent.

 
[1] РСЗО WM-80 Армянской Армии/Armenian Army. MLRS WM-80 https://youtu.be/7U5SzHleSAg
[2] Военный парад в Карабахе. Զորահանդես ԼՂՀ 09.05.2012 FULL https://youtu.be/kBpWDNr0_jU?t=4237
[3] The Fight For Nagorno-Karabakh: Documenting Losses On The Sides Of Armenia And Azerbaijan https://www.oryxspioenkop.com/2020/09/the-fight-for-nagorno-karabakh.html
[4] Chinese WM-80 MLRS – Armenia's most failed weapon in the battle for Karabakh https://vpk.name/en/465776_chinese-wm-80-mlrs-armenias-most-failed-weapon-in-the-battle-for-karabakh.html

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The Writing Of: The Armed Forces of North Korea, On The Path Of Songun

February 18, 2021, 4:45 am
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By Joost Oliemans and Stijn Mitzer 
 
When the Cold War ended, and the Iron Curtain was lifted, an era commenced of which the unprecedented spread of information is perhaps its most defining characteristic. The proliferation of media (primarily through the advent of the global internet), increased transparency of nations across the world, and what amounts to the commercialisation of the arms trade have all caused a wealth of knowledge to become accessible even to those with limited resources. This has caused the area of open-source intelligence (OSINT) to bloom like never before, with a vast variety of high quality works on pretty much every imaginable topic suddenly becoming available.
 
Of course, exceptions remained. Some regions were left stuck in a vacuum from which information seeped only slowly due to tight security, poor connectivity or mere neglectfulness. Nevertheless – or perhaps precisely because of this reason – it is often these regions that play a pivotal role in today’s conflict areas. Perhaps the most fragrant such case is the one we have chosen to address in On the Path of Songun. As quite unambiguously the most militarised nation in existence today, the topic of North Korea’s armed forces for a long time resembled an ocean of inaccessible knowledge, surrounded by the impenetrable dyke* that is the DPRK’s (mostly) self-imposed isolation and pathological secrecy.
 
But then, this dyke sprung a leak. In fact, a major rent has since appeared, aiding the aspiring OSINT analyst and allowing him to begin navigating the unknown waters that make up the obscure area of North Korean military matters. The two most important developments that contributed to this change include the increasing availability of commercial satellite imagery, and the fact that North Koreans have eagerly taken advantage of the internet themselves to spread propaganda videos glorifying the leadership and their armed forces. Combining these two sources of information and cross-checking them with more conventional written publications and, of course, copious amounts of our own research, has provided an effective way of essentially rewriting the book on the DPRK’s armed forces and its equipment. 
 
Roughly six years ago, we were not entirely aware of the fact that this was what we were about to set out to do. We were even less aware of the fact that it would take until 2020 to definitively put this thing together. As it happened, two factors would ultimately conspire to keep us one step away from the finish line at all times: 
Factor 1: The North Koreans are surprisingly busy bees when it comes to military innovation. 
Factor 2: The authors of this book are surprisingly bad at deciding when it is time to stop including new material. 
 
The first factor was exacerbated by Kim Jong Un’s renewed dedication to the creation of a credible strategic deterrent for his nation, in the form of his oft-promoted Byungjin Line. The confrontational attitudes between the DPRK, ROK and the USA during the period of writing ever seemed to further egg on the North’s military machine, at times leaving the intelligence community scrambling to keep up with the latest developments. In the end, the (now failed) period of diplomatic rapprochement in 2018/2019 and the implicit cessation of military posturing finally allowed us to catch up, in spite of factor 2, and put a conclusion to what has become an unintentionally complete accounting of all matters related to North Korea’s armed forces, from the Korean War until now. 
 
* Forgive the awkward analogy – both of us are after all Dutch by birth. 

The Armed Forces of North Korea, On The Path Of Songun can be ordered for £45.00 at Helion or at Amazon.

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Monsters Of Desperation: The YPG’s Sturmpanzers

June 7, 2021, 4:12 am
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By Stijn Mitzer and Joost Oliemans 
 
Relegated to the annals of history by the most of the world since roughly 1918, the YPG on the other hand remains an active user of so-called Sturmpanzers: uparmoured infantry support platforms that hearken back to their Second World War namesakes. Bulky and monstrous in appearance, these vehicles have begun to symbolise the YPG's resistance against Islamic State and Free Syrian Army forces that sought to dislodge the YPG from the territory it holds in Northern Syria on numerous occasions. While the presence of these DIY monstrosities in the ranks of the YPG is well-acknowledged, little attempts have been made at inventorising the types of Sturmpanzers in servicec. Thus, this article is long overdue.

Compared to other major factions involved in the Syrian Civil War, the YPG (Yekîneyên Parastina Gel: People's Protection Units, itself the primary faction in the Syrian Democratic Forces alliance) has operated little in the way of armoured fighting vehicles (AFVs). To compensate for the resulting gap in capabilities, the YPG became very active in the production of DIY armoured vehicles, usually based on tracked loaders, bulldozers or large trucks. At first consisting of boxy structures on tracks – almost resembling mobile pillboxes – the YPG would eventually incorporate several advancements in their designs. The resulting vehicles, although limited in effectiveness in an uncountable number of ways, could actually be of some use in certain situations.
 
Undoubtedly as a result of a wider lack of information concerning YPG armour operations, fairly little is known about the combat effectiveness of the Sturmpanzers. Although often present in propaganda footage and photographs taken of YPG positions situated away from the frontline, footage of the vehicles in action appears almost non-existent. Even the Islamic State (IS), which waged war on the SDF from 2013 to 2017, only ever managed to capture one example that was damaged and subsequently abandoned by the YPG after its forces were routed in al-Hasakah Governorate in 2015.
 
 
'Humble' beginnings
 
Early Sturmpanzers were often based on a wheeled chassis, for which the dump truck proved an ideal basis. Although a wheeled chassis might be associated with a decrease in mobility in the field compared to their tracked counterparts, tracked loaders were never designed with speed in mind, and combined with the newly added armour plating, it is plausible that some of the larger tracked models are limited to driving on hardened surfaces only. This puts severe restraints on their operational capabilities,
and gives wheeled platforms an edge in retaining some off-road capability.
 
The image below shows a typically modified dump truck, which has been lavishly adorned with a paintjob that achieves little but to make it stand out from its surroundings (unless one wishes to argue that it instills fear in the hearts of its enemies). In place of sand or construction waste, an armoured structure was placed inside the open-box bed, providing shelter to several infantrymen that can fire their personal weapons out of one of the three firing ports on each side. A 12.7mm DShK heavy machine gun (HMG) in an armoured cupola was fitted to the top of the cabin, which likewise has been entirely covered in metal plating. 


The concept of a mobile bunker would be continued with the first tracked versions of the Sturmpanzer. Clearly paying (unintentional) homage to the German A7V heavy tank deployed on the battlefields of France in World War I, this particular example was armed with a forward-firing 14.5mm KPV in addition to crew-served weapons that can be fired out of the vehicle's 10(!) firing ports. Although these provide almost 360 degrees coverage of the vehicle, the weapons fired out of them would only be useful against enemies that have already ventured in RPG range of the Sturmpanzer. With its light armour providing protection against small-arms fire and shrapnel only, an RPG would almost certainly cause catastrophic damage to its interior, killing its occupants and thus stopping the Sturmpanzer dead in its tracks.
 
 
Perhaps for this very reason, later iterations almost always featured two turrets at the front of the Sturmpanzer, which can turn to provide a wider degree of coverag. The example seen below illustrates such designs nicely, which appears to be armed with a 14.5mm KPV heavy machine gun in its left turret (from our perspective) and a 12.7mm in the turret located on the right. Aditionally, a gunshield is placed on top of the left turret for a crewmember to fire another weapon while remaining in cover.

 
Entering battle as if in a bygone age, three Sturmpanzers 'charge' forward closer to the enemy. The vehicle closest to the camera appears to be the same example as seen in the image above, hinting that despite the frequent appearances of these vehicles on propaganda footage, the production of these monstrosities was actually quite limited.

 
A row of YPG armour clearly shows off the humongous size of the larger type of Sturmpanzer parked in the rear. Almost twice the height of the MT-LB multi-purpose armoured vehicles parked in front of it, the Sturmpanzers do little to expand on the capabilities of the MT-LB, or any other type of AFV for that matter. While born out of necessity, the career of most Sturmpanzers was surprisingly long, continuing to operate long after more suitable replacements vehicles such as mine-resistant ambush protected vehicles (MRAPs) readily became available to the YPG/SDF.


A Sturmpanzer that was captured by IS near Tel Tamir in 2015, which surprisingly is the only recorded loss of one of these vehicles. That said, their low loss rate could also be explained by the small numbers produced and the conservative deployment of these vehicles, mainly utilising them in mopping up operations in which enough infantry support was available. Contrary to popular belief, the Sturmpanzers were never used as heavily armoured breakthrough vehicles in heated battles with either IS or the FSA.
 
 
 
The capture of the above example also highlights the inherent weakness of the design: its low mobility. With a speed that is likely well under 10km/h and mostly limited to moving on paved roads, any Sturmpanzer finding itself under concentrated enemy fire would have trouble making a successful retreat, especially when it has to traverse backwards out of harm's way. In such situations, abandoning the vehicle altogether could end up being the best option, for which the large back door and escape hatches on the side(s) provide ample opportunity.
 
 
A subset of Sturmpanzers retained their dozer blade for use as heavily armoured engineering vehicles (AEVs), clearing rubble and other obstructions to allow friendly forces to continue their advance. Incidentally, the dozer blade also acts as an additional layer of armour when facing the enemy from the front. Although this example was unarmed (it however does come equipped with two firing ports on each side), others featured a machine gun turret to fend off possible attacks by enemy stragglers.
 
 
One of these Sturmpanzer AEVs was struck by an improvised munition dropped from an IS quadcopter drone in Raqqa in August 2017, resulting in unknown damage to the armoured superstructure. Amusingly, this example was misidentified as a BMP infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) by the IS media department responsible for the photo release.


In addition to the larger designs, the YPG constructed several smaller examples that after several design iterations would eventually end up as the most capable Sturmpanzers constructed. This claim has little relevance to the first example in the series though, which although now equipped with a camera system for better situational awareness, has its dual armament installed in a fixed position at the front. This means that the vehicle would have to move its tracks to align itself with the target, likely resulting in being wildly inaccurate and unwieldy. Another curious feature of this example is a fixed cannister containing four unguided rocket launchers attached to the left side of the vehicle.
 
 
For the benefit of the YPG, this concept quickly evolved into a significantly more useful design, this time featuring a turret armed with a 12.7mm Type 54 HMG (a Chinese version of the ubiquitous Soviet DShK) and a total of seven firing ports. Conversely, the small size of the vehicle and the operators' close proximity to the engine potentially makes it a nightmare to operate in Syria's often hot and dry climate. Also note the small door on the right-rear side of the vehicle, one of two points the crew can enter and exit the vehicle from.
 
 
A second iteration (named Soendil) was clearly built around the same design but with an open-topped turret (which although providing less protection to the gunner greatly increases his situational awareness) and other minor differences. This particular vehicle is also one of the few Sturmpanzers to have been spotted in action, providing overwatch and suppressive fire during street battles as the SDF began to clear Northern Syria from Islamic State presence in 2016.

 
Yet another version of the same design features a larger turret somewhat reminiscent of that of the North Korean 323 APC. Its actual origin is less exotic however, as similar looking turrets were already seen on earlier DIY AFVs produced by the YPG. The new turrets now boosts two machine guns instead of one, which can be interchanged depending on the operational requirements or weapons on the hand. In the case of the second image, this consists of a 14.5mm KPV HMG and a 7.62mm PK GPMG while on the vehicle in the third image two KPVs are mounted.
 
 
The ultimate Sturmpanzer design is also the one that comes closest to a full-fledged AFV. Equipped with the turret of a BMP-1 infantry fighting vehicle and a ball mounted frontal 12.7mm W85 HMG, it is both well-armoured and and heavily armed whilst retaining some situational awareness. Cage armour has been added to reduce the effectiveness of shaped-charge warheads, thus attempting to protect against more than just small arms and shrapnel, but the close spacing to the hull means it is unlikely to be effective. Its superior firepower and mobility over previous designs means it could actually have some worth as a fire-support vehicle, clearly showing the benefits of years of incremental design improvements.
 
 
Born out of sheer desperation, the YPG's Sturmpanzers have sticked around for far longer than one would initially have thought in the incredibly harsh conditions of Syria's never-ending conflict, even when better alternatives in the form of U.S. delivered MRAPs became readily available. Perhaps the reason for their hardiness lies in little more than their propaganda value or the need to keep YPG engineers at work, but in the absence of reliable data tis author chooses to believe it is the sheer spirit of resilience that keeps YPG's Sturmpanzers alive and kicking.
 

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Queen Of The Skies: Turkey’s Boeing 747-8I BBJ Presidential Transport

June 12, 2021, 1:26 am
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By Stijn Mitzer and Joost Oliemans
 
Turkey is emerging as an increasingly important actor in world politics, taking on an assertive international role and with it a growing political weight. Accompanying the country's rise as an emerging power has been a vast expansion of its fleet of VIP aircraft for use by government officials. These often majestic-looking aircraft are a symbol of status that is meant to signify Turkish power and prestige home and abroad. Undoubtedly the most imposing aircraft is the single Boeing 747-8I Boeing Business Jet (BBJ) that has been in service with the Turkish Presidential Fleet since September 2018.

But contrary to the other aircraft in service with the Turkish Presidential Fleet, which were purchased outright as either brand-new or second-hand aircraft, the Boeing 747-8I BBJ was in fact received as a gift from Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad al-Thani, the current Amir of Qatar. The generous donation came after the Amir (having heard of Erdoğan's interest in purchasing the aircraft) is said to have stated "I won't take money from Turkey" according to President Erdoğan, who further stated that ''costs are not to be considered when it comes to the prestige of the Turkish state.'' [1]

The gifting of the Boeing 747-8I by Qatar may have been in recognition for Turkey's support to Doha after several Arab nations severed diplomatic relations and imposed a blockade on Qatar in June 2017. In response to the blockade, Turkey sent 197 cargo planes full of food and other commodities to Doha in the first month of the blockade alone, and also increased the size of its military garrison stationed in Qatar. [2] [3] As Qatar was largely reliant on imports that entered the country via the border with Saudi Arabia, Turkish support for Doha during the early days of the crisis was vital in keeping the country stocked with enough food and other crucial supplies.
 
 
The aircraft gifted to Turkey was one of four Boeing 747-8Is operated on behalf of the House of Al Thani and Qatari government officials. The plane was previously registered in Bermuda as VQ-BSK, but changed registration after its arrival in Turkey, becoming TC-TRK. The former paint scheme of the aircraft still donning the large coat of arms of Qatar on the tail can be seen in the image below. The Qatar Amiri Flight has since adopted a more modest livery devoid of any national markings.

TC-TRK had originally rolled off Boeing's Everett assembly line in 2012 and was subsequently painted and fitted with a VIP interior. The aircraft eventually entered service in late 2015 or early 2016, and had only clocked 436 flight hours prior to its gifting to Turkey, meaning it was basically brand new despite nearly six years of service at the time of its donation. [4] However, along with a Boeing 747SP that was also put up for sale by Qatar, the Boeing 747-8I was actually not officially part of the Qatar Amiri Flight, making it likely that the sale and subsequent gifting of the Boeing 747-8I was part of a larger restructuring process.
 
 
While Qatar is part of a only small group of nations operating the Boeing 747 as the air transport of the head of state and government, the gifting of a Boeing 747-8I is unlikely to affect the transportation capacity of the House of Al Thani and government of Qatar. Even after the donation of the 747-8I to Turkey, the Qatar Amiri Flight can still call upon three more Boeing 747-8Is, three Airbus A340s, two A330s, three A320s and three A319s in addition to several cargo planes (C-17) and smaller VIP aircraft operated for but not by the Qatar Amiri Flight. 


Similarly, the Turkish government currently operates one Airbus A318CJ, two A319CJs (one of which is currently leased to the Albanian government), one A330-200 Prestige, one ultra long-haul Airbus A340-500, three Gulfstream G550s, three Gulfstream IVs and three Sikorsky S-92 helicopters in VIP configuration. On some occasions, Turkish Air Force A400Ms are also used to transport the presidential motorcade and other equipment during certain state visits.
 

One of three Sikorsy S-92 VIP helicopters in service with the Turkish Presidential Fleet

Constituting the longest range airliner in the world until the introduction of the A350-900ULR in 2018, Turkey's A340-500 has a longer range than even the Boeing 747-8I (16.020km vs 15.000km)

After its arrival in Turkey from Basel, Switserland on the 15th of September 2018, the Boeing 747-8I was brought to a special section of the Turkish Airlines maintenance facilities located at Sabiha Gökçen International Airport in Istanbul for servicing and repainting. It may be assumed that the aircraft received additional upgrades and modifications to its interior along the same standard previously installed in the A330 and A340. The aircraft made its first flight in Turkish service on the 5th of October 2018, flying from Istanbul to Antalya and then to Izmir before heading to the capital Ankara. [5]
 
 
The original interior of the aircraft was designed for the seating of 76 passengers in what can only be described as extreme luxury. It is unknown to what extent the original interior (seen below) was changed after Turkey took possession of the aircaft. What is certain is that the aircraft comes equipped with a host of security systems and of course, its own in-flight entertainment system. A large bedroom, bathrooms, staterooms, lounges and first class seating areas complete the aircraft.

 
Another highly interesting feature of the aircraft is the presence of a well-equipped medical facility for emergency medical procedures, negating the demand to immediately land at the nearest airport if the medical ailment is less than catastrophic.
 

Whether in service with Qatar, South Korea, Brunei or Turkey, the Boeing 747-8I BBJ is an unmistakable status symbol meant to show off power and influence throughout all corners of the world. In contrast to aircraft such as the Dutch government Boeing 737-700 BBJ (arguably one of the world's ugliest transports of a head of state), it actually achieves this goal whilst being quite aesthetically pleasing. The imposing though majestic design is now fated to grace not just Turkish air space but wherever its head of state may direct it. Given the long range not just of its engines but also of Turkey's diplomatic arm, this may include countries the world over – though Qatar is sure to receive a friendly visit or two as well.
 
 
[1] Qatar's emir 'gives $500m private jet to Turkey'https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-45550537
[2] Turkey sent some 200 cargo planes to Qatar since dispute began: minister https://www.reuters.com/article/cnews-us-gulf-qatar-turkey-idCAKBN19X0Q2-OCATP
[5] Devlet Filosunun yeni uçağı B747-8 "TC-TRK" Antalya Havalimanı'na yaklaşmada.. https://youtu.be/r7Y5_YX5p24
 
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