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Welcome To The Jungle: Ukrainian T-64B1M Tanks In DR Congo

June 14, 2021, 2:19 am
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By Stijn Mitzer and Joost Oliemans
 
Ukrainian-delivered armament is prevalent in the inventories of numerous militaries across the world, and the country remains a go-to source for nations that seek to revitalise their militaries on a budget. Having inherited vast numbers of surplus armoured fighting vehicles (AFVs), aircraft and naval vessels, and equally important, a military industry to support this equipment with overhauls and upgrades, Ukrainian weaponry has proved especially popular with nations in Africa and Asia. For these reasons, the Ukrainian military-industrial complex has concentrated much of its efforts on catering specifically to this export market.
 
But as Ukraine was to quickly find out, much of the foreign interest was in overhauled second-hand equipment rather than in newly-produced weaponry and elaborate upgrade projects for equipment such as tanks. Apparently still seeing enough of a market for its products, numerous upgrade projects for AFVs were launched in the slim hope of finding an export customer, most of which in vain. One of the rare success stories entailed a deal concluded with the Democratic Republic of Congo (DR Congo) for the delivery of 50 T-64 tanks in 2013. Before their delivery, the tanks were to undergo a major overhaul and upgrade to T-64B1M standard.
 
The T-64B1M is an upgrade of the T-64B1 that mainly focuses on increasing the protection of the tank through the installation of Nozh explosive reactive armour (ERA) on the turret, with additional ERA tiles fitted to the side skirts and the top of the turret to protect the tank against the threat of top-down ATGMs. Additionally, a turret bustle added to the rear of the turret makes for increased stowage area. Otherwise little improvements are apparent, and the 1970s-era fire-control system remains unchanged. The resulting specifications makes the T-64B1M broadly similar to the T-64BM Bulat in use with the Ukrainian Army but with a more rudimentary fire-control system and lacking the capability to launch gun-launched anti-tank guided missiles (GLATGMs).
 
 
The reason why the DR Congo decided on acquiring the mechanically complex T-64 rather than additional T-72(AVs) that were already in service with the country's military is unknown, and it is in fact an outright curious choice for a country with a military that isn't known exactly known for its technical prowess. The introduction of an entirely new type of MBT with a different engine design and incompatible parts does much to complicate the already fragile logistical system of the country and its military, especially in harsh jungle conditions where attrition is high and sufficient spare parts might not always be available.

However, their logistical drawbacks were to be compensated by an acquisition price that seemed almost too good to be true. Indeed, DR Congo paid just 200.000 USD for each upgraded tank – thereby paying a meagre 10 million USD for the total order of 50 tanks. [1] By comparison, when the Japanese Self-Defence Force placed an order for thirteen (brand-new) Type 10 tanks in 2010, it paid a whopping 8.7 million USD for each tank. [2] Unfortunately for the DR Congo, the outbreak of armed conflict in Eastern Ukraine prompted the Ukrainian military to requisition the first batch of upgraded tanks and transfer them to the National Guard of Ukraine. At a price of 10 million USD for zero tanks, the Ukrainian deal must all of a sudden have seemed like much less of a bargain. [1]


When the first 25 T-64B1Ms were finally ready to be shipped to DR Congo in 2016, their supply was not without its controversies. The Estonian company TransLogistic Group OU in charge of the shipment was found to have done so illegally. [3] The problems back in Ukraine weren't less significant, and already in October of the same year, the Office of the Prosecutor General of Ukraine opened an investigation regarding the underestimation of the cost of T-64 tanks taken from the inventory of the Ministry of Defence of Ukraine as surplus military property. [3] According to investigators, the sale led to budget damages in excess of USD 2.7 million. [3]Given these complications, it is no surprise that there is some uncertainty about whether the full order of 50 tanks was eventually honoured, or if Ukraine simply kept the remaining 25 vehicles.

A DRC Republican Guard soldier poses next to a 107mm Type-63 MRL with two T-64B1Ms in the background. Also visible are T-72AVs and Yugoslav 105mm M-56A1 howitzers

Meanwhile in the DR Congo it is likely that the military was simply relieved that some tanks finally arrived three years after it placed the order for them. After their arrival to the country, the T-64B1Ms entered service with the Republican Guard (Garde Républicaine), as does most of the modern equipment acquired by the country. This includes weaponry such as the T-72AV and the EE-9 AFV, but also 2S1 SPGs and RM-70 MRLs. Older equipment such as T-55Ms (also acquired from Ukraine) and Chinese Type-62 light tanks are in use with the regular army. As with most Sub-Saharan militaries, the DR Congo's army is largely lacking in any type of guided weaponry, with large numbers of MRLs and AA guns filling in the gaps.
 

A Republican Guard T-72AV on parade in Kinshasa. Note the non-standard 12.7mm DShK HMG and the lack of side skirts

The Congolese crews for the T-64B1Ms underwent training in Ukraine in 2014, only to later return to the DRC without the tanks they had trained on. After these finally arrived in 2016, the T-64B1Ms were quickly deployed to the Kasaï region in Central Congo to quell the Kamwina Nsapu rebellion, which is still ongoing as of the writing of this article. This deployment marked the fourth time the T-64 was used in combat after earlier seeing action in Transnistria, during the Angolan Civil War and in Eastern Ukraine.
 

Although it is currently the 11th biggest country in the world, by virtue of its vast jungles and large areas inaccessible by means other than aircraft, the actual inhabitable area of DR Congo is significantly smaller. Naturally, this poses a problem for the use of armoured fighting vehicles as well, with most parts of the country completely unsuitable for the deployment of heavy weaponry. To at least enable the deployment of armour in the few places suitable for tank warfare, the Republican Guard operates a fleet of Ukrainian KrAZ tank transporters while the DR Congo's rail network can transport AFVs to the few places it links up with.
 

The Congolese T-64B1Ms represent an interesting exception to the type of materiel Ukraine usually delivers to its clients in Africa and Asia. Nevertheless, Ukraine's exports are anything if not diverse. Offering a range of vehicles from overhauled T-55s to upgraded T-64s and T-72s as well as brand-new designs such as the T-84 Oplot, it is certain that nations in the market for a new tank fleet have plenty to choose from. Closer to home, increasing numbers of overhauled tanks are joining the ranks of the Ukrainian military, with other projects such the Strazh BMPT perhaps one day finding their way into service as well.
 

[1] Экспорт танков Т-64: Конголезский контракт. https://andrei-bt.livejournal.com/470361.html
[3] Некоторые финансовые аспекты несостоявшейся продажи украинских Т-64 в ДРК https://diana-mihailova.livejournal.com/24476.html
 
 
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Business In The Baltics: Latvia Expresses Interest In The Bayraktar TB2

June 19, 2021, 9:40 am
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By Stijn Mitzer and Joost Oliemans

Baykar Savunma recently drew attention after a Latvian delegation headed by Minister of Defence Artis Pabriks paid an official visit to the producer of the Bayraktar TB2 and Akıncı UCAVs. With Latvia and the two other Baltic states of Estonia and Lithuania continuing to build up a deterrent capacity and viable wartime capabilities against possible future Russian (military) interference in the Baltic region of Europe, interest in a low-cost unmanned combat aerial vehicle (UCAV) capability spurred on by the huge successes obtained by the TB2 over Syria, Libya and Nagorno-Karabakh is perhaps little surprising.

Especially over Nagorno-Karabakh did the TB2 attain successes that can not have gone unnoticed in NATO member states. In a matter of weeks, a handful of Azerbaijani TB2s broke the back of the Armenian military, destroying a confirmed total of 127 armoured fighting vehicles (including 93 T-72 tanks), 147 artillery pieces, 59 multiple rocket launchers, 22 surface-to-air missile (SAM) systems, six radar systems and 184 vehicles at a loss of just two TB2s (one shot down, the other crashed). [1] These results not only serve as a testimony to the survivability of the TB2 in the face of a wide range of SAM and EW assets specifically designed to counter it, but also of its impressive serviceability rate, allowing the small fleet of TB2s to maintain a high tempo of operations.
 
While some analysts cast doubt on whether these successes can be replicated against countries such as Russia or Belarus, it can be argued that past engagements over Syria, Libya and Nagorno-Karabakh already demonstrate an ability to take on many of the integrated air defence systems (IADS) such nations might muster, having successfully combatted systems such as the S-300PS, Buk-M2, Tor-M2 and Pantsir-S1 with little losses in return (especially when used in conjuction with friendly EW and electronic support measures). Modern Russian EW systems like the Avtobaza-M, Repellent-1, Borisoglebsk-2 and Groza-S, all of which are meant to disrupt the operations of UAVs in one way or another, fared little better than those SAM systems. This casts serious doubt on the ability of modern IADS to counter or even significantly hinder operations of drones such as the Bayraktar TB2. 


The performance of Armenia's IADS has understandably become the subject of inquiries into its actual capabilities and modernity following the 2020 conflict. Nevertheless, the acquisition of modern SAM systems like the Buk and Tor as well as years of investments in a host of brand-new Russian EW systems and electro-optical equipment acquired from various sources had turned Nagorno-Karabakh into one of the most densely covered areas of air defence in the world. Although still lacking in some aspects, this IADS incorporated a variety of both older and modern systems in every range category, backed up by modern MANPADS, SPAAGs, anti-aircraft guns, radars and EW systems. The fact that every layer of Armenia's air defence umbrella in Armenia was soundly defeated at the hands of drones is likely more indicative of some structural deficiency of IADS against such modern threats than of the need to tweak the concept, or simply bolster the ranks with some vaunted new system.

These feats were of course much to the dismay of Armenia, the Prime Minister of which, Nikol Pashinyan, voiced sharp criticism on the combat value of an EW system that had just been acquired from Russia – likely to have been the Repellent-1 – stating that ''it simply did not work''. [2] Having diverted considerable funds towards the modernisation of its air defences to cope with aerial threats such as drones, their ineffectiveness must have surprised not only their Armenian crews, but also the Russian companies that designed them. The CEO of Baykar Savunma Haluk Bayraktar further stated that Russian EW systems proved incapable of interfering with the operations of the TB2: ''Russian electronic warfare systems will not be able to interfere with the work of Bayraktar TB2 even for one hour. Turkish drones will always be able to stay in the air''. [2]

The charred remains of an Armenian Repellent-1 EW system after its destruction during the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh War. Although designed to disrupt the operations of UAVs from far behind the frontlines, Azerbaijani drones struck at least two Repellent-1s, potentially constituting the entirety of Armenia's inventory of these systems.

Although one would be forgiven for initially thinking otherwise, Latvia's small but highly proficient and well-equipped military appears well suited to replicate many of the successes obtained by Azerbaijan during the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh War. Much like Azerbaijan, Latvia has invested heavily in the procurement of self-propelled artillery and long-range Spike anti-tank guided missiles (ATGMs). It was precisely the synergy between Bayraktar TB2s and artillery and ATGMs (as well as MRLs and precision-guided munitions) that proved a decisive game changer during the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh War. Most notably, TB2s continued to engage Armenian ground targets well after having expended their own weapon load of four MAM-L munitions by directing ground-based munitions and Su-25 aircraft against additional targets.
 

An Armenian T-72A as viewed by the camera of the Spike ATGM fired at it moments before it got completely destroyed. This T-72 was part of a larger convoy of AFVs that was spotted by TB2s and subsequently wiped out with the aid of Spike ATGMs.

In addition to operating a number of static S-300 SAM sites, one of Armenia's S-300PS batteries quietly set up shop at a position in a field near the border with Karabakh in mid-October 2020. A TB2 shortly afterwards directed a ground-launched precision-guided munition to its position, destroying the battery.

Of course, these results were achieved in a situation in which Armenia made little attempt to contest the airspace over the battlefield. Possessing no fighter aircraft of their own, the Baltic states are currently reliant on NATO's Air Policing mission to guard their airspace. Although entirely sufficient in peacetime, more aircraft will have to be directed towards the Baltics for their defence during wartime, not mention to achieve air superiority. This is not to say that the Baltic states can not play a role in bringing this about themselves however. In addition to a plethora of MANPADS systems (including the Swedish RBS-70, French Mistral, U.S. FIM-92 Stinger and Polish Grom) already in Baltic service, Lithuania currently operates the Norwegian NASAMS 3 medium-to-long range SAM system that uses the AIM-120 missile. Estonia is poised to acquire the same system for its own military, and Latvia has a similar requirement for a ground-based air defence system. [3] 
 
Combined with a vast network of modern radar systems as part of the Baltic Air Surveillance Network currently in place, modern SAM systems like the NASAMS 3 would do much to complicate Russian attempts at achieving air superiority over the Baltics. Cheap, plentiful and relatively poorly observable drones like the Bayraktar TB2 could greatly enhance striking capabilities (simultaneously freeing up conventional aerial assets) during the early stages of such a war, whilst evading unacceptable losses that could be encountered during a conflict of lesser complexity. Of course, as control of the airspace is slowly wrested from the adversary, drones like the TB2 become all the more effective at monitoring the battlefield and striking formations wherever they move.
 

Once in action, Bayraktar TB2s boast a number of significant improvements (aside from the obvious ability to carry weaponry) over legacy systems like the U.S. RQ-20A Puma and the Latvian Penguin C UAS currently in use with the Latvian Armed Forces. This mainly manifests itself in a vastly superior EO/IR sensor suite, a greatly increased range, endurance and service ceiling and vastly more resistance against EW systems. A lesser-known component of the TB2 is the BSI-101 signal intelligence system, which was developed in-house by Baykar. This small high-performance radio receiver can be used for airborne monitoring of the radio frequency spectrum, locating and identifying enemy radar systems (and their associated SAMs) well before visual identification is possible. Simultaneously, the system can be used for communications intelligence, performing the same tasks of locating and identifying whilst also allowing the operator to listen in on enemy communication systems.
 
After detecting enemy positions or troop concentrations either through signal intelligence or the long range of its EO/IR sensor (the latter believed to be over 75km against targets such as vehicles), these targets can then be engaged by Latvia's arsenal of heavy mortars, 23 field-guns and 53 self-propelled guns (SPGs). The latter consists of the proven M109A5 type firing a variety of 155mm shells out to an effective range of some 23km (or 30km with rocket assisted projectiles). This is roughly comparable to the range of artillery and smaller calibre MRL assets of Azerbaijan, with the exception of long-range precision guided rockets and ballistic missiles. Latvia acquired its first 35 M109A5Ö SPGs along with ten command vehicles in 2017 in a 6 million euros deal with Austria, which had extensively upgraded the 1960s-era SPGs in the mid-2000s. [4] In 2021, a second (2 million euros) deal for eighteen more 'Pašgājējhaubice M109s' was announced, bringing the total number of SPGs to 53. [5]
 
Although the M109A5Ös constitute the least modern type of SPG currently in Baltic service, their low acquisition price and large numbers enables Latvia to punch well above its weight in terms of firepower. In this regard, 53 M109s offer vastly superior fire support capabilities to the sixteen PzH-2000s and eighteen K9 SPGs currently in service with Lithuania and Estonia. Additional systems in Latvian service such as 120mm GrW 86 heavy mortars that can lob shells over a range of 8km and 100mm vz. 53 field-guns with a range of 21km do much to further increase the total payload that can be brought to bear. Efficient integration of TB2s with these artillery systems would maximise their effect on target; the TB2 thus constitutes something of a force multiplier for a myriad of weapons systems currently available to the Latvian Armed Forces.
 
 
The parallels between the Latvian situation on Azerbijan's hardly stops here however, as like Azerbaijan, Latvia also is a prolific user of the Israeli Spike ATGM. Save for the ultra long-range Spike NLOS deployed from Azerbaijani Mi-17 helicopters during the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh War, Latvia fields the exact same variants as employed by Azerbaijan during the conflict. This includes the Spike-SR, Spike-LR, Spike-LR2 and-Spike ER2, the latter four of which were purchased in a deal worth 108 million euros signed in 2018. [6] These long-range ATGMs are reliant on other assets to locate the targets for their missiles to hit. Although this is less of a requirement for the Spike-SR that has a range of just 1.500 metres, to utilise the full potential of the 10km range of the Spike-ER2 an auxiliary targeting system is practically a requirement.

Latvia currently deploys its Spike ATGMs in its single Mechanised Infantry Brigade and Combat Support Battalion. Mobility is key to these pivotal units, which are built around the British CVR(T) family of armoured fighting vehicles (AFVs). Although lightly armoured, these highly nimble AFVs are ideally suited for hit-and-run tactics. In the near future, Latvia also plans to integrate Spike ATGMs on some of its CVR(T) AFVs. [7] The resulting threat to armour formations is hard to overstate, with both the AFVs and the infantry in them capable of using Spikes to strike enemy vehicles wherever they are spotted.


Through both its direct combat abilities and its merit as a force multiplier, the TB2 might enable Latvia to expand on its deterrent capability at a relatively low costs. Taking into account the TB2's repeated successes in the face of an array of modern Russian air defence and EW systems over Libya, Syria and Nagorno-Karbakh, this deterrent translates into a potent wartime capability for Latvia as well. Their use could further extend to more mundane duties during peacetime, patrolling Latvia's territorial waters to carry out fishery and environmental inspections and detecting wildfires that frequently plague the country. In the latter role, the TB2 has already seen successful use by Turkey. The acquisition of enough TB2s would also enable Latvia to participate in NATO missions with a minimal footprint, carrying out aerial surveillance and airstrikes. With Lithuania and Estonia eager to expand their military capabilities in close cooperation with Latvia, a joint procurement of the TB2 system is not unthinkable, potentially saving cost while expanding capabilities through greater integration and information sharing.


Infrastructure

Possessing little in the way of a conventional air fleet, the Latvian Air Force currently makes use of just one air base: Lielvārde. To better accommodate NATO operations, Lielvārde was completely renovated in 2014 and features plenty of space for future expansion. In addition to housing the entirety of Latvia's Air Force (which currently consists of four Mi-17s and several An-2s), Lielvārde has also seen regular deployments of NATO aircraft (including U.S. Predator and Reaper UCAVs) and ground forces during their respective deployments to Latvia. As the targeting of Lielvārde Air Base could well lay within an opponent's plan for hostilities with Latvia, the usage of pre-prepared highway strips could be an additional means to increase the number of locations for the TB2 to operate from, for which Latvia's excellent road system offers plenty of options.


Future capabilities

In May 2021 it was announced that the Baltic states plan on further expanding their fire-support capabilities through a joint procurement of an MRL system. [10] Considering their proven capabilities and presumably low acquisition costs, the U.S. M270 MLRS appears the most likely candidate. Yet with an acquisition of Bayraktar TB2 drones now not a far-fetched consideration, another suitable option is perhaps even more cost effective. The Turkish 230mm TRLG-230 guided rocket can hit targets designated by Bayraktar TB2s UCAVs; by fitting a laser guidance kit to the rocket, the need for other guidance systems are negated, allowing the system to be more electronic-warfare resistant and at the same time vastly more accurate. This impressive capability already exists in the inventories of Turkey and Azerbaijan (which successfully used the TRLG-230 in the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh War), and significantly increases the operational capabilities of the TB2.

The potential benefits of selecting a Turkish system go beyond merely the synergy between the TB2 and the TRLG-230 MRL however. As the launching vehicle for the TRLG-230 guided rocket is modular, the same launcher can also be used to launch 122mm and 300mm rockets by simply swapping the rocket pods or launch tubes. This does much to increase the operational flexibility of the system, and could potentially allow the selecting of suitable munitions directly after target acquisition, providing precisely tailored artillery strikes in real time. This capability is notably absent in the M270 and its light wheeled version the HIMARS, which are limited to using either 227mm rockets or MGM-140 ATACMS tactical ballistic missiles; a Baltic acquisition of the latter appears unlikely.
 

Cooperation with Latvia's defence industry
 
Latvia's defence industry busies itself with the design and production of UAVs and small patrol vessels. There currently exists a single manufacturer of unmanned aerial systems in Latvia: established in 2009 as 'UAV Factory' (yes – that is the actual name of the company), it had reportedly already produced 300 of its Penguin UAVs by 2020 for over 50 clients worldwide, including the Latvian Armed Forces and the United States Special Operations Command. [9] The company additionally produces EO/IR ISR payloads, airframes, engines and other UAV related components. The involvement of Latvian subcontractors in major defence projects inked with foreign companies is stated to be a requirement in future procurements. [10] For a deal with Baykar specifically, this could translate into the establishment of a local maintenance facility to perform overhauls and rebuilds. Furthermore, Turkey could purchase EO/IR ISR payloads from 'UAV Factory' in an offset agreement and the modularity of the TB2 enables companies like 'UAV Factory' to integrate their own payloads into the UAV. In all, this would result in a significant boost to Latvia's defence industry and technology base.
 

Latvia appears poised to enter the new paradigm of 21st century warfare. In this paradigm, the 20th century mechanised armour columns give way to a synergetic interplay of highly mobile ground forces, ATGMs, (guided) artillery and of course, UAVs. With the Spike ATGMs and 53 self-propelled guns already in service, as well as the planned acquisition of MRL systems and the potential for a (joint Baltic) procurement of TB2 UCAVs, Latvia is well on the way of realising this new doctrine.
 
The fact that these technologies can be bought from fellow NATO members will also be appreciated, providing an additional degree of security as well as a guarantee of quality that might be lacking from other providers. One example of this is evidenced by Baykar's CEO Haluk Bayraktar statement that the TB2 receives almost daily software updates and improvements. [11] These incremental improvements are not limited to the TB2 itself however. The introduction of INS/GPS to the MAM-L has dramatically increased the range of the munition from 7km to upwards of 14km, allowing it to outrange Russian air defence systems such as the Tor-M2, 9M337 Sosna-R and 2K22M1 Tunguska. 
 
In this respect UAV-related developments appear to outpace that of the systems designed to counter them, displaying greater flexibility in adjusting their operations than any systems of the past. With two new UCAV systems, the Akıncı and the TB3, as wel as Baykar's unmanned MİUS combat aircraft project currently in the works, Baykar's rapid R&D and production capacity will allow it to increase its edge over competitors, while launching a family of UCAVs with novel capabilities. This sets the scene for this formerly automotive company to firmly establish itself as one of the world's foremost drone providers, a role through which it could soon play decisive factor in Baltic military capabilities.

Latvia's Minister of Defence Artis Pabriks holds a TB2 model together with Baykar Savunma CEO Haluk Bayraktar

[1] The Fight For Nagorno-Karabakh: Documenting Losses On The Sides Of Armenia And Azerbaijan https://www.oryxspioenkop.com/2020/09/the-fight-for-nagorno-karabakh.html
[3] Baltic Air Defence: Addressing a Critical Military Capability Gap https://icds.ee/en/baltic-air-defence-addressing-a-critical-military-capability-gap/
[5] Latvia buys the second batch of American self-propelled howitzers M-109A5OE https://en.topwar.ru/183126-latvija-zakupaet-vtoruju-partiju-amerikanskih-samohodnyh-gaubic-m-109a5oe.html
[6] Latvia takes delivery of new Spike missile variants https://www.politicallore.com/latvia-takes-delivery-of-new-spike-missile-variants/21553 
[7] Latvia to buy Israeli Spike guided missiles for CVR-T vehicles for €108 million https://www.thedefensepost.com/2018/02/12/latvia-israel-spike-missiles-vehicles/
[10] Ministry of Defence strengthens cooperation with domestic military industry https://labsoflatvia.com/en/news/ministry-of-defence-strengthens-cooperation-with-domestic-military-industry
[11] HALUK BAYRAKTAR İNGİLİZ DÜŞÜNCE KURULUŞU RUSI'NIN PANELİNDE KONUŞTU https://youtu.be/jKj-FOMQlNw?t=462 


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Disaster At Hand: Documenting Afghan Military Equipment Losses Since June 2021

June 23, 2021, 4:40 am
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By Stijn Mitzer and Joost Oliemans in collaboration with COIN andJakub Janovsky. 
 
The United States' controversial withdrawal from Afghanistan has left it teetering at the edge of an abyss as the country is facing a nationwide Taliban resurgence. Amidst an increasingly deteriorating security situation throughout large parts of the country, fears that Taliban forces could soon overrun the entirety of Afghanistan have become all too real, possibly reverting the situation on the ground back to that before the 2001 U.S. invasion in the long term. While the withdrawal of U.S. troops and their NATO allies has been praised by some and heavily criticised by others, there is one thing seemingly everyone can agree on: the 20-year U.S.-led mission to defeat the Taliban has been an utter failure.
 
In the absence of U.S. and NATO forces, it remains to be seen how long the Afghan government can hold its ground against an enemy that continues to take control of ever more parts of the country, their confidence bolstered by a lack of response from the Biden administration. With direct U.S. air support, intelligence assets and logistical support soon unavailable to the Afghan military, its forces will have immense difficulty in confining Taliban forces to their current areas of control. The possible withdrawal of U.S. contractors still attached to the Afghan military can only exacerbate the situation, and would likely ground much of the Afghan Air Force within weeks after their departure.

Similar to its withdrawal from Iraq in 2011, the U.S. leaves behind a broken military apparatus that despite the investment of tens of billions of dollars is ill-prepared to face the tasks assigned to it. The immense amount of equipment provided to Afghan security forces over the past two decades is hard to overstate, numbering some 25.000 HMMWVs 'Humvees' alone. Although an impressive number in and of itself, a lack of protection against improvised explosive devices (IEDs) means that these vehicles offer little of the protective capabilities of MRAPs available to NATO forces in Afghanistan. Astonishingly, while such MRAPs were made readily available to police departments all over the U.S., Afghan security forces have to make do without them.

The situation Afghanistan faces after the U.S. withdrawal is scarcely an isolated incident in modern U.S. history however. After effectively abandoning its ally South Vietnam in the 1970s, leaving behind a paralysed Iraq in 2011 and now withdrawing from Afghanistan, homecoming celebrations will be tainted by the grim prospects of those suffering the consequences of the War in Afghanistan for decades to come. The zealousness with which these military interventions are begun is only matched by the degree of subsequent indifference to the fate of the country when the realities of conflict become too uncomfortable, settting the stage for an endless repeating tragedy of interventionist disasters. Meanwhile, the local population is for generations to come unwillingly indebted to the whims of U.S. politics, a debt ironically incurred by the equally unwilling investment of trillions in American taxpayer dollars in the industry of war.
 
The haphazardness with which the U.S. is leaving Afghanistan is further illustrated by a lack of any agreement on who will run Kabul International Airport (IAP), with Afghan security forces currently not up to the task of doing so themselves. One of the countries designated to pick up the pieces is Turkey, which has been running operations at Kabul IAP since 2015 and has offered to run and protect the airport in the future as well if provided with enough logistic and financial assistance. Securing Kabul IAP and its immediate surroundings is vital to maintain flight operations in and out of the country, with diplomatic missions and development organisations otherwise shunning the embattled country.
 
For Turkey, increasing its involvement in Afghanistan could be tied to the easing or removal of U.S. sanctions in place on the country over its purchase of the S-400 missile system. As the only Muslim, Middle Eastern member of NATO, Turkey is perhaps best positioned to encourage all political actors to garner consensus for a durable Afghan peace to finally come to fruition. Turkish support will be vital in keeping Afghanistan open for business and at the same time send a strong signal to the Taliban that the Kabul area is not theirs for the taking.

One of the possible ways it can do is through its Turkey's highly efficient use of drones that has meanwhile shaped an entirely new foreign policy: that of Bayraktar Diplomacy. Based around small-footprint interventions that seek to maximise both political and military impact at low financial and humanitarian cost, Bayraktar Diplomacy essentially constitutes a new type of warfare that is uniquely suited to the characteristics of modern-day conflicts. Although the Bayraktar TB2 drones through which it is typically effected are relatively cheap, and in fact expendable, Bayraktar Diplomacy is in fact so effective that it can be said to have decided the fate of nations: without the TB2 the internationally recognised government of Libya could well have been wiped out in 2019 or 2020. Though picking up the slack where the might of the U.S. military apparatus sustained the Afghan government will be a tough challenge, Bayraktar Diplomacy could in the least be deployed in an effort to guarantee the security of the capital Kabul and its surroundings.
 

A detailed list of destroyed and captured equipment of the Afghan National Army and National Police since June 2021 can be seen below. This list is constantly updated as additional footage becomes available. 
 
The list only includes destroyed and captured vehicles and equipment of which photographic or videographic evidence is available. Most Taliban fighters do not have high-end cell phones, and its propaganda department does not publish photo or video reports on equipment captures. Therefore, the amount of equipment destroyed is undoubtedly higher than recorded here. Not all equipment captured intact might be operational at the time of capture, with many HMMWVs used as a source of spare parts to keep other vehicles running. Such equipment is referred to as 'damaged and captured' in this list. The number of vehicles captured by the Taliban thus doesn't translate into an operational fleet of similar size. Small arms, ammunition, trailers, civilian vehicles and derelict trucks are not included in this list.
 
(Click on the numbers to get a picture of each individual destroyed or captured vehicle)
 

Afghan National Army / Afghan National Police


Armoured fighting vehicles (15, of which destroyed: 3, captured: 12)

 

Artillery and Mortars (19, of which captured: 19)


Anti-aircraft guns (2, of which captured: 2)

 

Aircraft and Helicopters (4, of which destroyed: 4)

 

Trucks, Vehicles and Jeeps (432, of which destroyed: 37, captured: 395)



Special thanks to Farooq Bhai,Higurashi, Calibre Obscura and Dan.
 
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Arsenal of the Future: The Akıncı And Its Loadout

June 30, 2021, 2:32 am
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By Stijn Mitzer and Joost Oliemans 

The Bayraktar Akıncı is set to introduce a number of novel capabilities to the field of unmanned aerial warfare when it enters service with the Turkish Air Force later this year. These include several features not seen on any other type of UAV in the world before, most notably the ability to launch 250+km-ranged high-precision cruise missiles and beyond-visual-range air-to-air missiles (BVRAAMs) at targets as far as 100 kilometres away. These capabilities in practice turn the Akıncı into the first production multi-role unmanned combat aircraft in the world, and set the stage for increasingly effective replication of legacy aerial assets by unmanned counterparts.
 
Apart from debuting this unique set of abilities, the Akıncı also significantly expands on Turkey's existing unmanned warfare capabilities through a massive increase in payload capacity compared to systems such as the Bayraktar TB2 and TAI Anka. In addition to enabling the carriage of guided bombs that were too heavy to be carried by these UAVs, the Akıncı's increased payload capacity also allows for a far greater number of smaller munitions such as the MAM-L to be carried. Indeed, up to 24 MAM-Ls can be brought to bear by the Akıncı compared to four on the TB2, positioning the Akıncı as the perfect system to annihilate entire armoured columns in just one sortie or to support friendly offensives by picking off enemy targets in support of advancing ground forces. In the latter role its 24(+)-hour endurance make it a particularly patient lurking threat.

As Baykar continues weapons systems integration on the Akıncı prior to its operational debut, several types of guided munitions are currently being tested to verify their use from the new platform. This already included a new member of the MAM family of smart munitions that was first tested in April 2021: The MAM-T with a range of just under 40km (compared to upwards of 14km on the MAM-L). The MAM-T will serve alongside the Teber, LGK, KGK and (L)HGK family of precision-guided munitions also destined for use on the Akıncı. These munitions consist of indigenously designed guidance kits mated to locally produced Mark-82, Mark-83 and Mark-84 iron bombs. As is evidenced by this rapidly growing family of ordnance, Turkish precision-guided munitions are being introduced as swiftly as the drones destined to carry them.
 
Especially the 900kg weighing Mark-84 is a daunting piece of armament, and also the heaviest bomb ever to be integrated on a drone. When fitted with a GPS/INS guidance kit, the bomb is known as the HGK-84. The HGK-84 can attain ranges of up to 28km (or 22km when launched from lower altitude), while a different variant known as the LHGK-84 is fitted with a laser-guidance kit for increased accuracy. [1] Yet another variant, the NEB-84, is a (guided) penetrator bomb designed for use against hardened surface and underground targets such as bridges and bunkers. The only other operational drone in the world capable of carrying the Mark-84 (through its U.S. guided variant the GBU-31) is the jet-powered General Atomics Avenger, a number of which operate on behalf of the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).
 

To accommodate the seemingly endless variety of munitions, the Akıncı features up to eight underwing hardpoints and another one under its fuselage for a total of nine hardpoints. The latter is set to carry the heaviest ordnance cleared for carriage on the Akıncı, comprising the HGK-84 and the SOM-series of cruise missiles. A typical loadout could consist of two KGK-82 glide bombs with wing kits on the inboard pylons, two Teber-82 precision-guided bombs and eight MAM-Ls, as shown in the rendering below. This allows the Akıncı to set out to engage some high-value hardened target at long range, come across a convoy of enemy vehicles along the way and promptly destroy it, and then continue on to complete its mission.
 
Although already an unusually diverse platform, the Akıncı's huge payload capacity of 1.350kg, the variety of its weapon loadouts and its 24+-hour endurance mean that it is also well suited to take over many of the ground attack missions currently assigned to Turkey's 240-strong F-16 fleet. Replacing the F-16 in at least some of these roles frees up precious airframes which can then be used for air-to-air combat roles, at least partiallly decreasing the gap left now that Turkey has been excluded from the F-35 project as a result of its decision to purchase the Russian S-400 surface-to-air missile (SAM) system.


Arguably the most innovative aspect of the Akıncı is its capability to use air-to-air missiles (AAMs), consisting of the indigenous Bozdoğan IR-guided AAM and the (fire-and-forget) Gökdoğan BVRAAM, which uses an active solid-state radar to guide itself towards its target. The Akıncı's AESA radar should enable it to autonomously pick out its targets at great range, and then engage them with either to hunt enemy slow-flying aircraft, drones and helicopters and to guard other drones. Though BVRAAM-armed Akıncıs would present a greater challenge than most air forces could hope to face, medium-range AAMs like the Bozdoğan could present a threat even to opposing fighter aircraft, being fast, very manoeuvrable (having off-boresight capabilities) as well as highly resistant to electronic countermeasures. Both of these missiles are currently still in development, and will likely take several years before complete integration on the Akıncı platform.
 
Another feature is the ability to carry several variants of the SOM family of cruise missiles designed to be used against enemy command posts, SAM sites, ships or any other target that requires a precision hit with a 230kg heavy explosive warhead. Though two variants of this family were designed specifically to be used against naval vessels, the range of the much smaller MAM-T already exceeds the air defence systems on all but four of the Greek navy's ships. Though those are unlikely to be used in that role, this fact shows how swiftly the capabilities UCAVs and the precision-guided munitions they can carry have grown in the past decades.
 

Once in active service, the Bayraktar Akıncı will herald a new chapter in unmanned warfare – whether by firing cruise missiles at enemy targets from well within friendly airspace, destroying underground bunkers with NEB-84 penetrator bombs, bringing armoured columns to a grinding halt with up to 24 MAM-L munitions, targeting enemy air defence systems well outside of their range or by shooting down enemy aircraft, UAVs and helicopters. The variety in weapon loadouts means the Akıncı can easily be repurposed to carry out other tasks during the same (day-long) mission, allowing greater flexibility in operations than any drone of the past.

For countries interested in buying the Akıncı the fact that all the munitions (and their guidance kits) used for these tasks can be sourced directly from Turkey will surely be appreciated as well. Furthermore, the fact that the new UCAV adheres to the NATO standards for munitions means that NATO countries can integrate other or local manufactured munitions on the Akıncı. This does not extend to NATO countries only, and countries that are currently developing their own precision-guided munitions such as Azerbaijan and Pakistan can expect relatively simple integration (or even Turkish support with doing so) with the Akıncı. Its attractiveness to foreign customers might be precisely what ensures the Akıncı's success, escaping the fate of a number of promising UCAV designs the world over that were ultimately only produced in scarce numbers. As such, it may well soon secure its role as one of the most significant upheavals in the annals of unmanned warfare.


[1] Precision Guidance Kit (HGK) - TÜBİTAK https://www.sage.tubitak.gov.tr/en/urunler/precision-guidance-kit-hgk 


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Blast From The Past: North Korea’s Whacky 1930s Japanese Railcars

July 29, 2021, 2:19 pm
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By Stijn Mitzer and Joost Oliemans

North Korea's State Railway regularly flaunts its modernisation efforts by the unveiling of modernised rolling stock and revitalised train lines. In reality, billions (of dollars) will be needed to fix North Korea's crumbling rail system after decades of underinvestment and neglect. Today, most lines have speed limits that force trains to drive at just 30km/h on battered stretches of tracks and frequent power outrages bring services to a grinding halt. The situation is little better when it comes to the state of the DPRK's rolling stock, with dilapidated trains from the 1960s having become the norm rather than the exception. Perhaps most stunning is the fact that even in the 21st century, a number of 1930s-era Japanese railcars still see regular passenger service in North Korea.

The Keha class railcars are a group of diesel-powered railcars that were produced for the Chosen Government Railway (Sentetsu) from 1930 to 1942. After Japan's rule over Korea came to an end in 1945, the railcars were inherited by the Korean State Railway in North Korea and by the Korean National Railroad (nowadays known as Korea Railroad Corporation; KORAIL) in South Korea. In South Korea the Keha railcars were retired between 1957 and 1963 and subsequently scrapped. [1] Due to North Korea's reluctance to retire anything before it is properly irreparable, the North Korean railcars ironically were only at the beginning of their service lives at the time the examples in South Korea were scrapped.

Only little is known about the Keha class' post-war career in North Korea, but at least two were seen in service on the electrified Pukbunaeryuk Line that runs along the border with China in 2009 at Simridong Station and in 2012 at Rimto Station. [2] [3] Thorough examination of satellite imagery shows Keha class diesel railcars of the same type in service on this line in more recent years as well. Nonetheless, most of the trains serving this line are ex-East German Berlin subway rolling stock that have been converted to electric multiple units (EMUs) rather than diesel trains or railcars, which require fuel that the DPRK has difficulty obtaining in sufficient quantities to address its nationwide needs.


Six Keha1 and Keha2 class railcars were first built for Sentetsu in 1930 by Maruyama Sharyō and Nippon Sharyō in Japan respectively. [4] Following the success of the first six railcars, Sentetsu accepted another 21 into service in the next two years. In 1934, a single railcar built by Nippon Sharyō was put into service and in 1936 the Gyeongseong Works built a single railcar for VIP use (this would be the only railcar of the class that was built in Korea). [1] Then in 1938, Nippon Sharyō delivered five newly-designed 100-passenger railcars intended for use on mountainous lines. Finally, in 1942, an uncertain number (but believed to be seven) of railcars of another Keha design were built by Nippon Sharyō for Sentetsu. [4] The Korean State Railway (Kukch'ŏl) eventually inherited a total of 29 Keha class diesel railcars from Sentetsu in 1945, with the remainder going to South Korea's National Railroad.


Little details are available regarding the classification and numbering of these railcars in State Railway service, although the two sets of railcars seen in the above images appear to have numbered in the 900s series. Another set appeared in a North Korean image showing children of mountain villages using the railcars to commute to school in the late 1990s, also on the Pukbunaeryuk Line. In this case, the railcars were pulled by a Saebyŏl-class diesel-hydraulic shunting locomotive (although some have been converted to electric operations). By towing the railcars with an electric locomotive, they effectively become regular passenger cars, albeit ones originally designed around 1930s comfort standards.


To an outsider, the decision to maintain these ancient relics in operational capacity may seem odd, with costs associated with keeping the outdated technology working potentially outweighing their benefit. However, in North Korea both labour and spare parts are vastly cheaper resources than completely new railcars, considering the stifling requirement of autarky in the North Korean economy. In fact, given a dearth of actual resources and an abundancy of essentially free labour, perpetual maintenance is almost always preferable over investment in new systems. Additionally, the railcars' low standard of technology may be deemed acceptable due to the correspondingly poor state of the railroads on which they operate.
 
Although it could be framed as a testimony to North Korean engineering, the continued usage of trains like these show that North Korea is far removed from getting its rail network to an acceptable level of operations, let alone catching up with South Korea, which has a robust transport system with modern KTX high speed trains. Over time, the gap between these two nations will continue to grow more absurd, while the Keha class railcars steadily approach a century of service. Perhaps one day their marginal use will be insufficient to warrant further operation in the face of their slowly appreciating value as museum pieces, but knowing North Korea, that day will not soon come.
 
 
[1] Byeon, Seong-u (1999). 한국철도차량 100년사 [Korean Railways Rolling Stock Centennial] (in Korean). Seoul: Korea Rolling Stock Technical Corp.
[2] https://www.flickr.com/photos/nberger/3606886889
[3] https://www.flickr.com/photos/bg2axk/8734124393/in/album-72157633485385620/
[4] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sentetsu_Keha_class_railcars 
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Shoot-And-Scoot: Armenia Designs New Lightweight MRL

July 30, 2021, 1:09 pm
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By Stijn Mitzer and Joost Oliemans
 
Certainly no branch of Armenia's military suffered as severe materiel losses during the 2020 Nagorno-Karbakh War as its artillery and rocket forces. With the air defence umbrella that was supposed to protect them proving incapable of neutralising the drone threat overhead, howitzers and multiple rocket launchers (MRLs) situated in open revetments were left to the mercy of Bayraktar TB2s flying overhead, resulting in the visually confirmed destruction of 152 artillery pieces and 71 MRLs. [1] Combined with the loss of a further 105 artillery pieces that were left behind by Armenian forces and subsequently captured by Azerbaijan, Armenia lost most of its artillery assets during the conflict, amounting to roughly two-thirds of its inventory of MRLs alone. [1]

Although there is reason to suggest that Russia has at least partially replenished Armenia's badly-depleted inventory of MRLs through the delivery of replacement systems, any future conflict would undoubtedly see a repetition of the events that took place during the 2020 War, and thus entirely new tactics are required to mitigate at least some of the effects of unmitigated drone-powered warfare. Potentially one of the first signs of such a shift in tactics was sighted on a road in Armenia in late June 2021. [2] Consisting of an 8-round 122mm MRL fitted to a Toyota Hilux pickup truck, this new MRL exchanges firepower for increased mobility and a smaller footprint, potentially decreasing its vulnerability to armed drones.
 
Although the design of such an MRL is hardly a novel feat, with several countries around the globe opting for similar systems to give their forces the ability to strike distant targets while keeping the MRL small and mobile, it seems that Armenian interest in such a system only came after witnessing the vulnerability of larger MRLs first-hand. Many of Armenia's MRLs were targeted while conducting firing missions out of their revetments situated behind the front lines. While these revetments provided plentiful protection against counter-battery fire, they provided no defence whatsoever against armed drones. And even as Armenian soldiers began camouflaging some of their BM-21s with branches, these stuck out like a sore thumb once they drove out of their hiding spots to commence firing.
 

An Armenian BM-21 is pictured seconds before it gets taken out by a MAM-L munition fired by a Bayraktar TB2

A camouflaged Armenian BM-21 and the bush it operated from to the right. Even when parked under a tree or bush, the heat signature of the MRL's heavy engine could still reveal the location of the system to any Bayraktar TB2 flying overhead

Although equipped with a significantly smaller number of 122mm rocket tubes compared to the BM-21 (8 vs 40), the new Toyota Hilux-based MRL has the benefit of being able to conduct shoot-and-scoot tactics. Rather than statically deployed in revetments like the BM-21s during the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh War, the Toyota Hilux-based MRLs would fire off their rockets and swifly relocate to a new firing position, a reloading location or to a hiding spot in a garage or small structure away from the lurking eyes of drones flying overhead. Even when caught out in the open, its more modest size and heat signature might allow it to evade immediate detection, especially when efforts are taken to conceal the launcher. The Toyota Hilux's speed, impressive off-road capabilities and small size make it an ideal candidate for such tactics.

Measures like these do much to complicate the enemy's efforts to neutralise your inventory of artillery and MRLs, and while the amount of rockets each system can bear on the enemy is much smaller than with a regular BM-21, each Toyota Hilux-based MRL can potentially remain in action longer as more of them manage to survive the onslaught brought on by drone warfare. This type of tactic de-emphasises the costly massed artillery tactics that, though potentially having a large effect on target, are highly vulnerable to aerial threats and arguably become ineffective in highly assymmetric combat scenarios.

 
The popularity of MRL designs like this one has already been proven by the extensive use in locations like Libya, Syria, Yemen and Sudan. Their arrival to the Armenian theatre could perhaps have been predicted, given previous Armenian efforts to make the best of the limited military resources currently at their disposal. Yet it remains to be seen if the design will also find its way to active service – as with so many other promising Armenian indigenous defence products the new MRL might fall victim to a lack of funds, limiting production to just the prototype. Nevertheless, the production of such weaponry is sensible given Armenian requirements, and it might well play a significant role in a future conflict, potentially forcing Azerbaijan to increase its investment in UAV technology to ensure it maintains an edge in detecting and neutralising the MRLs.
 

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An Unmanned Firefighter: The Bayraktar TB2 Joins The Call

August 2, 2021, 11:16 pm
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By Stijn Mitzer and Joost Oliemans
 
Turkey is currently battling a series of deadly forest fires that are raging through the southern part of the country. With high temperatures and strong winds plaguing the region, the wildfires have so far proven difficult to put under control, with new fires quickly spreading to other provinces. The relentless fires also put several tourist areas along the Mediterranean Sea under threat, leaving behind a path of destruction as the flames slowly crawled closer to the coast. The wildfires have so far resulted in the death of eight people with hundreds more evacuated as houses go up in flames and precious lifestock is lost to smoke and heat. [1]

Fighting this natural disaster are more than Turkish 10.000 firefighters along with more than 40 aircraft and helicopters. [2] These have been joined by additional firefighters from Azerbaijan, Spain and Qatar. [3] Other countries such as Ukraine, Iran, Spain and Croatia and Russia have also offered their support to Turkey, allocating two An-32s (Ukraine), one Il-76 (Iran), two CL-215s (Spain), one CL-415 (Croatia) as well as five firefighting aircraft and three helicopters (Russia) to combat the flames. [4] [5] These operate in addition to several Russian helicopters and Be-200 firefighting aircraft that are already deployed in Turkey, although those operate on a contractual basis rather than as Russian aid in battling the infernos.
 
To help spot newly-started fires and to coordinate the force of firefighting assets, Turkey deploys a number of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) that provide 24/7 overwatch over the affected areas. Although the UAVs are incapable of directly fighting the fires themselves, they have proven invaluable in stemming new wildfires by detecting their heat source, allowing authorities to quickly direct firefighting assets to their location. In this way new fires can be extinguished before they rapidly grow out of control.

Perhaps to no surprise, Bayraktar TB2s are at the forefront of the UAV battle against wildfires in Turkey. Along with several TAI Ankas and TAI Aksungurs, TB2s belonging to the General Directorate of Security (Police), the Turkish Naval Forces and Baykar Savunma (the designer and producer of the TB2) currently operate in support of the fire services and the Orman Genel Müdürlüğü OGM (General Directorate of Forestry). Although the continued usage of these high-tech unmanned assets might sound expensive, the opposite is true, with each flight hour costing the equivalent of just 925 USD dollars, a fraction of the costs of manned aircraft. [6]


Although countries like the United States have also been using UAVs to monitor wildfires in the past, the scale on which this is done in Turkey is unique in the world. This is both a testament to the pioneering role in unmanned developments Turkey has secured for itself in the past several years as well as to the functionality of Baykar's UAVs and their low acquisition price and operating costs. These were undoubtedly precisely the reasons why Turkey began using Bayraktar TB2s in its efforts to combat wildfires throughout the country starting in 2020, leading to the detection of 345 fires in the same year and 86 fires in the past two months alone. [7]

 
An advantage of using larger UAVs like the TB2 and TAI Anka is the altitude from which they operate (18.000 to 30.000 feet). As such, they are capable of surveying large areas with their forward-looking infrared (FLIR) cameras. If a fire is heading towards a residential area, its occupants can be warned in advance whereas ground-based teams monitoring the fire would have difficulty in judging the exact scope and the path of the fire. On the 1st of August, a TAI Aksungur detected the presence of three workers at a location right in the path of an incoming wildfire. Seemingly yet unaware of the impending danger, it was only because of the drone's observant eye that they could be warned before being entirely surrounded by flames. [8] 
 

Once a new fire has been located by UAVs and all information has been carefully evaluated, appropriate assets can then be directed to the area to combat the flames. In Turkey, this doesn't only include a large number of firefighting trucks, but also a fleet of dedicated firefighting aircraft. Although this once included some nine CL-215 and eleven Dromader PZL M18 'water bombers', these have all been retired over the past years, leaving a fleet of chartered Russian Be-200 amphibious firefighting aircraft and Mi-17 and Ka-32 helicopters to take over their valuable work.


With Turkish firefighters and their international colleagues engaged in a continuous battle with the seemingly unstoppable heat infernos, Turkish drones like the Bayraktar TB2 will be their eyes in the skies. Though less visibly active than the so-called waterbombers, their work is valuable and a testament to the wide applicability of large and affordable UAVs. With wildfires sure to remain a looming threat in the region, the Turkish government will be seriously evaluating the UAV's performance for consideration in future firefighting planning. This could not only see the purchase of new firefighting aircraft rather than leasing them, but also the acquisition of for instance TB2s by the relevant institutions.
 
Whether such acquisitions are really near at hand or not, the experience gained during these firefighting operations is certain only to become more relevant in the near future, especially as other countries might look to acquire such a capability. With a myriad of new UAV designs currently under way from Turkish companies like Baykar, even more advanced unmanned developments in the firefighting field may one day soon be conceived.

 
 
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Esoteric Armour: Turkmenistan’s T-72UMG Tanks

August 7, 2021, 6:50 am
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By Stijn Mitzer and Joost Oliemans
 
Like many Central Asian countries, Turkmenistan operates an exotic fleet of armoured fighting vehicles (AFVs) it inherited from the Soviet Union or purchased from other nations in the past decades. The latter acquisitions manifested themselves in the sourcing of modern AFVs like the T-90S, BMP-3 and BTR-80A from Russia, and large numbers of infantry mobility vehicles (IMVs) from countries such as Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Israel, the UAE and China. Other sources of AFVs include the United States, Austria and Belarus, together culminating in a highly diverse arsenal of military vehicles.

In addition to these newly-acquired AFVs, Turkmenistan has launched a number of upgrade programmes for several of its Soviet-era types of AFVs. Today, many Turkmen BTR-80 APCs sport Ukrainian and Turkish designed remote weapon stations (RWS) that significantly enchance their effectiveness on the battlefield. These developments were preceded by Turkmenistan contracting Ukraine to modernise a number of its T-72 tanks and BMP-1 infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs) to T-72UMG and BMP-1U 'Shkval' standards in the 2000s.
 
The upgrade of Turkmenistan's T-72s to UMG standard would be one of the few succesful tank upgrade contracts concluded by Ukraine during this period. This certainly wasn't for the lack of projects however, with Ukraine's arms industry churning out one upgrade programme after the other in the hopes of finding an export customer. However, most countries showed significantly more interest in second-hand T-55s and T-72AVs rather than elaborate upgrade schemes for these same types, likely (correctly) estimating the cost/benefit ratio to be more favourable, not to speak of the difficulties Ukraine faced actually mass producing fancy upgrades.
 

The Turkmen Ground Forces currently operates a diverse fleet of T-72 variants, consisting of both early and late versions of the T-72 'Ural' and T-72A as well as a limited number of T-72AVs. Unlike neigbouring Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan had to make do with an older assortment of tanks stationed on its territory and is thus lacking in more advanced types such as the T-72B or even the T-80. That said, Turkmenistan is the only country in the region to have purchased more modern MBTs since the dissolution of the Soviet Union, and currently is the only operator of the T-90S in this part of Asia.
 

Turkmen T-90S' (front) and T-72UMGs (rear) driving through Ashgabat during the 20th year of independence parade in 2011

Sometime before acquiring the T-90S, Turkmenistan was already looking to boost the capabilities of its tank forces through the deep modernisation of a number of its T-72s. At the same time, Ukraine was offering a number of upgrade programmes for the T-72, of which the T-72UMG is possibly the least well known. [1] Nonetheless, the UMG upgrade sought to significantly expand on nearly all of the T-72's capabilities through the installation of new armour, new day and night sighting devices, smoke grenade launchers, a remote-controlled 12.7mm NSV HMG and a new V-84 engine. The most notable feature of the T-72UMG is arguably the installation of Kontakt-5 ERA on its turret. It is thought that the UMG upgrade was initially aimed at North African and Middle Eastern clients. A deal with any countries in these regions however failed to materialise, and Turkmenistan was to become the only nation to buy the upgrade package.
 
 
In Turkmenistan, the UMG upgrade appears to have been performed on T-72As (seen in the header image) as well as on a number of earlier T-72 'Urals' (as seen below). Although it may be assumed that Ukraine eyed a far larger upgrade contract, perhaps including most of the Turkmen Ground Forces' inventory of T-72s, it appears that the ultimate number of upgraded tanks was limited to as much as a few dozen. When Turkmenistan began acquiring T-90s from Russia around 2010, the upgrade of more T-72s was essentially ruled out for the time being.
 
 

To the average armour fanatic, Turkmenistan perhaps won't soon come to mind when looking for esoteric types. The T-72UMG along with a host of other AFVs are a testament to the fact that this preconception is mistaken. Though the numbers involved were unimpressive, a future requirement to upgrade Turkmenistan's T-72s as a cheaper alternative to replacing Turkmen's fleet of T-72s with a new type altogether might once again see the involvement of Ukrainian companies in the bidding process. Nowadays however they will be facing stiff competition from companies from Turkey, Israel, Serbia and Russia, all of which are eager to take their share of this corner of the arms market. No matter the outcome of such a programme though, when another round of modernisation is pursued the resulting AFV will only add to the list of exotic armour already in use – a testament to the diversity of designs found precisely in those places where you least expect them.




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Turkmen Tucanos: Turkmenistan Unveils A-29B Attack Aircraft

August 9, 2021, 4:10 am
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By Stijn Mitzer and Joost Oliemans
 
Turkmenistan has embarked on an ambitious re-equipment programme with the aim of modernising its air force through the acquisition of various types of new combat and transport aircraft. This acquisition drive has included types like the M-346 combat jet aircraft and the C-27J NG transport aircraft that have both been ordered from Italy. Another introduction that had been anticipated is the Brazilian A-29B Super Tucano turboprop light attack aircraft, which has so far been bought by more than fifteen countries around the globe. Turkmenistan was long rumoured to have been eying the acquisition of the popular attack aircraft, and one Super Tucano was even tested in the country for a short period in 2019.

The purchase of five A-29Bs comes with Turkmenistan currently facing a deteriorating security situation along its 804km long eastern border with Afghanistan. As countries in the region scramble to safeguard their borders after the US withdrawal from Afghanistan, Turkmenistan already heavily invested in increasing the capabilities of its armed forces since the early 2010s. Apart from greatly expanding its inventory of modern equipment and increasing training to deal with both domestic and foreign threats, these efforts have also materialised in the acquisition of several types of unmanned combat aerial vehicles (UCAVs) from China and the overhaul of most of its existing fleet of Su-25 combat aircraft.

Although it is as of yet difficult to predict how the situation in Afghanistan will continue to evolve for the foreseeable future, it may be argued that Turkmenistan is currently best prepared to deal with a possible escalation of conflict along the Turkmen border, with a sizeable border force standing ready in case conflict threatens to spoils over into Turkmenistan itself. Most notably, the Turkmen military has heavily focused on counterinsurgency (COIN) tactics and is one of the few countries in the region that has the ability of using modern precision guided munitions (PGMs) against ground targets. In addition to being able to use a variety of gun pods, unguided rockets and general purpose bombs, the A-29B too can deliver a wide arsenal of PGMs and likely will do much to further strengthen Turkmenistan's future capabilities in this field.
 

Before arriving in Turkmenistan, the five aircraft were extensively photographed on their delivery flight as they flew to the country via Cape Verde, the Spanish Canary Islands, Portugal, Malta and Turkey in May and June 2021. [1] [2] Although any markings indicating that the aircraft belonged to Turkmenistan were carefully taped over, plane spotters armed with digital cameras with large lenses easily revealed the roundel of the Turkmenistan Air Force located on the A-29B's tails during one of their stopovers in Luqa, Malta. [3]

The five aircraft come in a camouflage pattern that looks to have been based on the one also used by the Philippine Air Force's A-29Bs. Although the countries feature completely different climates, the Turkmenistan Air Force is known for adorning most of its aircraft with colourful liveries. This trend has seemingly now also carried over to the A-29Bs and to the country's new M-346s and C-27J NGs. The five A-29Bs are serialed 01, 02, 03, 04 and 05 Blue and were first showcased in a broadcasted inspection tour by Turkmen president Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedow at Turkmenbashi International Airport on the 1st of August 2021.

Turkmen president Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedow completes his inspection of A-29B '02 Blue'

In June 2019, Embraer's EMB 314 Super Tucano demonstration aircraft 'PT-ZTU' was put through its paces in Turkmenistan. At that time the Turkmen Air Force was looking at a number of Western aircraft designs for its re-equipment programme. All of these types were deployed to the country by their manufacturers in an effort to convince local authorities to acquire the aircraft. Of the types deployed, only the C-295 does not appear to have been purchased. It remains unknown whether an acquisition of this type is still planned or if the C-295 ultimately lost out against the Italian C-27JNG.
 

Acquired along with the A-29Bs were a number of different armament types. This includes one 12.7mm M3 heavy machine gun installed in each wing, rocket pods for 70mm rockets, SUU-20 munition dispensers for BDU-33 training bombs, 500lb Mk-82 dumb bombs, fuel tanks and chaff and flare dispensers. In Turkmen service the A-29Bs are also fitted with a EO/IR FLIR sensor, allowing the aircraft to find and designate its own targets before engaging them (with precision-guided munitions). Although PGMs for the A-29B so far appear to be missing in the Turkmen arsenal, they may well be acquired at some point in the future – potentially from Turkey, which manufactures a range of PGMs and has supplied Turkmenistan with numerous weapon types in the past.

 
In Turkmenistan the five A-29Bs are based at Mary-2 airbase located north of the city of Mary. Mary-2 is one of three military airports located in or around Mary; nearby Mary airbase/IAP is home to MiG-29s and Su-25s and a helicopter base in the city itself is used by Mi-17s and Mi-24s. Two more airbases in the country permanently house combat aircraft, with two others seeing detachments of Su-25s. Several more airbases are kept in operational condition, and could see deployment of combat aircraft if the need arises. In case of a deteriorating security situation along the border with Afghanistan, this could for instance see the A-29Bs being deployed to Galaýmor - Turkmenkaraku that is currently also home to a detachment of two Su-25s.
 

Five EMB 314 Super Tucanos along with six Su-25s at Mary-2 airbase. Also note the rows of retired Su-17s, Mi-8 helicopters and La-17 target drones

The same five EMB 314s shown in more detail

The acquisition of A-26Bs, M-346 light combat jet aircraft and C-27J transports propel the Turkmenistan Air Force to the forefront of modern air forces in the region, with many of its neighbours operating ageing designs facing heavy attrition. Further introductions such as that of precision-guided munitions for its A-29Bs will do much to fortify this position, making the Turkmen Air Force relatively well-equipped to accomplish the type of operations likely to be required of it. It is certain that this will not be the last development we will be presented with to further its goals, and another expansion of its capabilities for instance through the acquisition of Bayraktar TB2s from Turkey is anything but unlikely.


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Iranian Mohajer-6 Drones Spotted In Ethiopia

August 11, 2021, 11:13 am
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By Stijn Mitzer and Joost Oliemans

A sudden violent outbreak of civil war in Ethiopia's northern Tigray region has thrown the nation into turmoil. After years of uneasy peace with its northern neighbour, Ethiopia suddenly finds itself at war with an unexpected foe equipped with the very same armament it stockpiled in preparation for a conventional war with Eritrea. With the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF) making steady gains and government forces seemingly unable to stem the tide, the country is now frantically looking for anything to change its fortunes. In so doing, it has found support in more than one unlikely ally of opportunity. Most recently, it appears Ethiopia has managed to secure a hasty contract with Iran for the delivery of a number of Mohajer-6 unmanned combat aerial vehicles (UCAVs).

The apparent delivery of Iranian UCAVs to Ethiopia is highly notable, as the country also maintains a close relationship with Israel and is a frequent importer of Israeli armament and other military services such as training. In fact, Ethiopia's inventory of unmanned aerial vehicles previously consisted almost entirely of Israeli systems like the Aerostar UAS and WanderB mini-UAS. [1] The current service status of these UAVs is unclear however, and the fact that none of these can be armed likely caused Ethiopia to look for other sources for the acquisitions of UCAVs. Contrary to popular expectations, this source appears to have been Iran rather than Turkey or China.

After seemingly having arrived at Ethiopia's Semara airport in north-eastern Ethiopia on the 1st of August, the drones' Ground Control Station (GCS) was then pictured as prime minister Abiy Ahmed visited the base not more than two days later. [2] [3] Satellite imagery revealed that at least two UAVs and an associated GCS were delivered, potentially for evaluation before making a larger purchase. [4] Alternatively, the small numbers seen so far could be the result of the short notice on which the delivery has taken place and the relatively small numbers of Mohajer-6 UAVs readily available. Of course, the possibility remains that more UAVs have already been delivered, but that they have simply been distributed over several airbases.


Identification of the UAVs in question posed something of a challenge. Though initial reports suggested the Chinese Harrier Hawk II Air Sniper (Yaoying II) or the Wing Loong II, potentially the same examples that have been deployed in neighbouring Eritrea by the UAE, the dimensions and distinctive shape of the drone on satellite imagery significantly narrowed the field and decisively eliminated this possibility. Complicating matters however, is the fact that no usable ground imagery is as of yet available, and the market of possible providers has become wide and diverse. Though the satellite imagery confirms the Mohajer-6 to be a very likely candidate, the identifying factor thus became the associated GCS, which was imaged more clearly. 
 
 
Externally, the vehicle forms a clear (if not exact, presumably due to iterative improvements) match to other Iranian GCS both in its layout and its antenna set. Its mobility stems from a distinctively coloured Mercedes-Benz truck, staple of the Iranian military, and two doors each leading to their own separate control rooms are also a familiar sight. Externally, the distinctive white antenna featured on all Iranian GCS is perhaps the most significant point of recognition, with the communications dish apparently of a new type. 
 

Inside, the Iranian origin of the vehicle becomes even more obvious. One screen appears to show the view from one of the drone's FLIR cameras, and the layout and precise display of the information is nearly identical to that known from modern Iranian UAVs. Two indicators showing the orientation of the vehicle are a particularly unmistakable match.


What is more, LCD screens are placed in control pannels that feature the same buttons and dials known from Iranian footage of the Mohajer-6's GCS. Though the computer screens might seem somewhat different because of their thick housing in the image below, other Iranian GCS in fact feature that very same housing. Even the rather stunning fact that the computers appear to run Windows 7 is a clue pointing in the direction of Iran, which is known have similarly used Windows XP in the Mohajer-4's GCS computers. [5]
 

Though the clear parallels with Iranian technology rule out various countries that have been suggested as suppliers, one might note that some Iranian drone technology was developed from Chinese drones, thus leaving the Chinese as a possibility. While many of the facts (including the desert camoed Mercedes truck) point in another direction, perhaps the most decisive reasons why this option is eliminated are because from what is known of Chinese GCS they are actually arranged quite differently, and in fact no Chinese drone matches both the dimensions and shape of the satellite imagery of the UAVs in question.
 

Drone left, image overlay right. Image by Planet Labs.

The Mohajer-6 UCAV is itself the latest design in the Mohajer-series of UAVs. First unveiled in 2017, the Mohajer-6 entered mass production a year later and has meanwhile entered service with the three branches of Iran's Revolutionary Guards', with several even having been given to Iraq's Popular Mobilisation Forces (PMF). [6] The manufacturer of the system claims an operating range of 200km and an effective payload of up to 40kg of ordnance, which would consist of two to four Ghaem-1, 5 or 9 precision-guided munitions (PGMs) respectively. It couples these lightweight capabilities with an endurance of 12 hours and a maximum flight altitude of around 5.500 metres. [7] For its target acquisition and reconnaissance capabilities, the Mohajer-6 uses an EOAS-I-18A FLIR turret. [8]

 
Given the large variety of UCAV platforms available nowadays, the decision to opt for the Mohajer-6 is a curious one. With its low flight ceiling the type is vulnerable to ground fire, whereas the low quality of its FLIR turret and the fact that the drone itself is largely unproven in combat could result in poor efficacy. What is more, with the low numbers known to have been produced so far it remains to be seen if they can be delivered in large enough quantities to turn the tide in Ethiopia's worsening conflict. 
 
Competing options which lack these downsides are a UCAV systems like the Turkish Bayraktar TB2. Known to have turned the tide in more than one conflict of the recent past, most notably during Operation Spring Shield in Syria in February 2020, against the Russian and UAE-backed Libyan National Army in Libya and during the Nagorno-Karabakh War of 2020. If the Mohajer-6s spotted on Semara airbase turn out to have been for evaluation, or even if the total number received is indeed limited, such an acquisition may well still be an option. 

Special thanks to Wim Zwijnenburg.
 
[1] Ethiopia army buys UAVs from BlueBird https://bluebird-uav.com/ethiopia-army-buys-uavs-from-bluebird/
[5] Look inside the control point of the Iranian drone Mohajer-4 https://en.topwar.ru/84078-punkt-upravleniya-iranskim-bespilotnikom-mohajer-4.html
 
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An Analyst’s Perspective: Cicilline and Bilirakis’ Turkish Drone Letter Rebuked

August 13, 2021, 9:12 am
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By Stijn Mitzer and Joost Oliemans
 
Much attention has been devoted to Turkey's rise to a global drone power in the past several years. While some argue that Turkish developments in this field have been highly beneficial to NATO and several individual member states in particular, others view Turkey's drone industry and profileration as a threat that should be contained through suspending exports of drone technology or even by imposing further sanctions on Turkey. The subject is frequently covered by political spectactors, which has given rise to arguments of highly politicised character on more than one occasion.

In the latest of such back-and-forths, two Members of the United States Congress called for an investigation into Turkey's deployment of unmanned aerial combat vehicles (UCAVs) in a letter to U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken. The stated purpose was to uncover whether they constitute a ''violation of NATO rules and bylaws'' while also urging for an immediate suspension of export permits for drone technology in the meantime. In doing so, the authors and the 25 Members of Congress that signed the letter placed themselves in the camp of political spectactors with little understanding of the way Turkish drones have been deployed, apparently politicising the debate to support their own political agenda.
 
The letter, which can be read in its entirety here, is characterised by a clear lack of neutrality and a seemingly deliberate misinterpretation of Turkish drone use and profileration worldwide. Although opinions usually tend to vary wildly when it comes to analysing Turkey's military endeavours (as perhaps they should on any such topic) for a variety of reasons, the apparent bias in this letter might well stem from the fact that its authors, David Cicilline and Gus Bilirakis, have personal views that closely allign with two of the nations that have both historically and recently been at odds with Turkey: Armenia and Greece. 
 

David Cicilline is awarded the Medal of Gratitude by the President of the self-proclaimed Republic of Artsakh in 2018

As we've frequently analysed the deployment and combat history of the Bayraktar TB2 in the past, including in Libya, Syria and Nagorno-Karabakh, we are in a uniquely informed position to examine the claims in Bilirakis' and Cicilinne's letter.
Despite the (unsourced) claim brought forward in the letter, there is no evidence that suggests that any Armenian civilians were deliberately targeted or even accidentially killed by Azerbaijani drones, either by Turkish Bayraktar TB2s or Israeli loitering munitions. Not even Armenia has brought substantiated claims of any of its citizens being killed by Azerbaijani drone strikes in Nagorno-Karabakh (Artsakh), although it certainly had incentive to do so during the 44-day long war. The fact that U.S. Members of Congress include such a claim without even feeling the need to justify it suggests that no serious attempt was made at verifying the authors' preconceptions, thereby exacerbating the spread of misinformation about the conflict. 

In Syria, Turkish drones have occassionally carried out targetted assassinations of Kurdish military commanders (it's often impossible to find out whether these belonged to the PKK or YPG). In early 2018, Turkish Bayraktar TB2s flew strikes against YPG (itself the primary faction in the Syrian Democratic Forces alliance) positions in Afrin, although the Kurdish forces entrenched there took no part in fighting Islamic State (ISIS). Despite the claim that suggests the contrary, no major aerial drone campaign has been launched against YPG forces in Syria.

In Libya, Turkish drones proved instrumential in preventing Russia from gaining definite military foothold on the southern border of NATO. Turkey's highly efficient use of drones in Libya boosted its growing foreign policy assertiveness to shape an entirely new foreign policy: that of Bayraktar Diplomacy. Based around small-footprint interventions that seek to maximise both political and military impact at low financial and humanitarian cost, Bayraktar Diplomacy is in fact so effective that without it the internationally-recognised government could well have been wiped out in Libya. There seems to have been no serious attempt at grasping the geopolitical context of this conflict, with the author instead defaulting to a hard-line anti-Turkish stance.

The notion that Turkey is currently discussing joint production of UCAVs with Russia similarly has no basis in truth. The future deployment of indigenous UCAVs from Turkish amphibious assault ships is correct (a welcome change of pace in a letter otherwise riddled with inaccuracies), but the real significance of this development appears lost on the authors.
Bayraktar Diplomacy eventually forced the LNA to the negotation table, stabilising the situation in Libya. This in stark contrast to U.S. policies, with the current tragedy unfolding in Afghanistan just the latest in a line of ineffectual and destructive attempts at nation building through armed conflict. In that respect, a fresh approach to handling crises nowadays rampant across the Middle East and Africa should be more than welcome, especially since it originated from within NATO itself rather than a geopolitical adversary. What is more, within the rest of NATO and Europe the delivery of TB2 drones to Poland and Ukraine has allowed these countries to build up a viable deterrent and realistic wartime capabilities at little costs, staving off Russian interventionism and strengthening the NATO alliance.


Everyone is entitled to their own personal opinion, and this is perhaps most importantly so when it comes to political matters. However, one of the fundamental problems of our time seems to be that the wild growth of information devaluates facts, and that opinions have even come to be valued over facts ― in this case influencing foreign policy on a false basis. In this instance specifically, David Cicilline has frequently lobbied on behalf of Armenia and has called for the recognition of the Republic of Artsakh by the U.S. while Gus Bilirakis is of Greek descent and also is an outspoken supporter for Armenia and critic of Turkey. [1] [2] Bilirakis has also boasted about urging former U.S. President Donald Trump to impose sanctions and tariffs against Turkey and the presence of the Greek flag in his campaign poster leaves little doubt with regards to his political allegiance. [3] [4]
 

A further question arises with respect to why neither David Cicilline or Gus Bilirakis have called for an investigation into the use of Israeli drones and ballistic missiles among a host of other weaponry during the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh War, the same conflict that is the source of many allegations against Turkish drones in this letter. The answer to this question could perhaps be answered by the fact that Bilirakis is the founding Co-Chair of the Congressional Hellenic Israel Alliance while the page of Cicilline’s website about U.S.-Israel relations is an explicit expression of his warm feelings towards the country. While good relations with Israel are in no respect a vice in and of themselves, no country has a monopoly on violence or arms exports, and the matter reeks of preferential treatment. 
 

An Azerbaijani Lora quasi-ballistic missile system of Israeli manufacture. These were used with great effect against Armenian targets during the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh War

Turkey's rise as a major drone-producing power can be handled from a number of widely different approaches. Castigation and isolation could drive a wedge in NATO at a crucial time in history, whereas the benefits of closer cooperation have increased now that Turkey can offer a valuable in contribution new armament. Disregarding personal bias, there has likely been few developments in the past years that have benefited NATO as much as the proliferation of cheap but highly-capable Turkish drones like the Bayraktar TB2. Apart from preventing Russia from gaining definite military foothold on the southern border of NATO, the TB2 has also strengthened the alliance through Poland's (and arguably also Ukraine's) acquisition. Countries like Latvia and Bulgaria seem poised to follow these countries in their footsteps, indicating that future NATO cooperation with Turkey on UAV operations is only to increase in the nearby future.
 

With several European NATO-member states showing interest in the Bayraktar TB2, photos like this one might become more common in the near future

[1] Congressman David Cicilline calls on U.S. to recognize Artsakh https://en.armradio.am/2020/10/23/congressman-david-cicilline-calls-on-u-s-to-recognize-artsakh/
[2] Congressman Gus Bilirakis Pledges to Bring Armenia Closer to Greece, Cyprus, and Israel as New Armenian Caucus Vice Chair https://hellenicnews.com/congressman-gus-bilirakis-pledges-to-bring-armenia-closer-to-greece-cyprus-and-israel-as-new-armenian-caucus-vice-chair/

 
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Eyes Over Bulgarian Skies: From MiG-25s To Bayraktar TB2s

August 16, 2021, 2:00 am
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By Stijn Mitzer and Joost Oliemans
 
Military analysis circles have lately been abuzz with speculation suggesting that Bulgaria is eying the acquisition of at least six Bayraktar TB2 unmanned combat aerial vehicles (UCAVs) from Turkey. If this procurement goes through, it would reintroduce capabilities long lost to Bulgaria and simultaneously add to a rapidly growing list of countries interested in acquiring the TB2 or currently already in the process of doing so. Bulgaria is said to have kickstarted its attempt at purchasing TB2s in 2020, but postponed the decision because of the COVID-19 pandemic. [1] If the TB2 does eventually arrive to Bulgaria, it will be the second country (or third pending Latvia's acquisition) in the European Union to purchase the system after Poland acquired 24 TB2s in May 2021.

The Central and Eastern European interest in the Bayraktar TB2 is undoubtedly a result of its repeated successes over Libya, Syria and more recently Nagorno-Karabakh. Another obvious factor at play is the system's low initial price and operating costs, which actually for the first time makes the cost-benefit analysis of operating modern U(C)AVs a favourable one to countries like Bulgaria, with contemporary systems such as the MQ-9B Reaper simply being too expensive. The fact that the TB2 can be bought from a fellow NATO member will surely also be appreciated, providing an additional degree of security as well as a guarantee of quality that might be lacking from other providers.

It is little known that Bulgaria once operated a significant fleet of reconnaisance aircraft that at one point even included a number of MiG-25RBT 'Foxbats'. Bulgaria was the only Warsaw Pact country to operate the mighty Foxbat, the highly specialised nature of which and prohibitive operating costs were apparently enough to dissuade all other Warsaw Pact members from acquiring the aircraft. Bulgaria itself would only purchase four MiG-25s, which likely did little to improve the operations and maintenance costs per unit while they were in operational service.

Presumably for this reason, but also the drastically changed post-cold war security climate, the remaining MiG-25s were retired already within ten years of entering service and exchanged for five MiG-23MLD fighter-aircraft with Russia in 1991. Although this marked the end of 'Foxbat' operations in Bulgaria, Ukraine would continue to operate its MiG-25PD(S) interceptors and MiG-25RBTs until 1996 while Russia only retired its last MiG-25RB(T)s in November 2013, some 50 years after the type first entered service.


Two decades earlier, in November 1982, three MiG-25RBTs (serials: 731, 736 and 754) and a single MiG-25RU two-seat conversion trainer (serial: 51) arrived at Dobrich Air Base in northeastern Bulgaria. The aircraft subsequently entered service with the 26th Reconnaissance Air Regiment for photo reconnaissance and electronic signals intelligence (ELINT) duties. Tragedy struck on the 12th of April 1984 when a MiG-25RBT was lost after running out of fuel in bad weather, forcing the pilot to eject. Luckily the pilot was unharmed, and this would be the only loss of a MiG-25 in Bulgarian service. In May 1991, the three remaining aircraft roamed through Bulgarian airspace for the last time as they departed for an uncertain future in a crumbling USSR. After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the aircraft were taken over by the Russian Air Force and flown from Lipetsk and later from Shatalovo, later even seeing action during the Chechen Wars. [2]

 
During the 1950s the 26th Reconnaissance Air Regiment was initially equipped with a hodgepodge of aircraft that weren't particularly well-suited to the reconnaissance role, mostly comprising bomber aircraft that were flown in their original configuration. But in the decades that followed, the unit eventually grew out to become the best-equipped aerial reconnaissance unit in the Warsaw Pact.

In the course of the 1950s, it received fourteen Il-28R (and one Il-28U trainer) aircraft, supplemented by some twelve MiG-15bisR at the start of the 1960s. Though their service in Bulgaria wouldn't be exceptionally longlasting, it bears mentioning that such aircraft have elsewhere weathered the ages and found use even in today's day and age, with North Korea still maintaining them in operational condition. [3]

The Il-28Rs and MiG-15bisRs were later supplemented and replaced by MiG-21R combat-capable reconnaissance aircraft and MiG-21MFs modified for the same role. The 1980s would see the unit's golden decade with the delivery of the MiG-25RBTs as well as Su-22M-4s. [4] [5] As the last remaining MiG-21R and MiG-21MF-R aircraft were retired from service, Dobrich Air Base closed its doors in 2002, followed by the retirement of the Su-22M-4s two years later. Since then, no dedicated reconnaissance aircraft are operated by the Bulgarian Air Force.
 

A Bulgarian MiG-25 is flanked by two MiG-21s, clearly showcasing its massive size

When equipped with multiple ejector racks (MERs), the reconnaissance-configured MiG-25RBT could be turned into a high-speed bomber armed with up to eight 500kg FAB-500Ts. There is no evidence to suggest Bulgaria ever received MERs for its MiG-25s or had any interest in deploying its aircraft as bombers in the first place however. [6] This was likely the case because of the terrible accuracy associated with using MiG-25s as bombers, which were originally supposed to deliver nuclear weapons only, so that accuracy wasn't of too great importance. 


The days of Bulgaria operating dedicated reconnaissance aircraft are long gone, with the air force struggling to maintain and eventually completely replace its other Soviet-era air assets like the MiG-29 and Su-25 with more modern Western aircraft. In this respect, a UCAV like the TB2 could present not only a valuable reconnaissance asset, but also form a cost-effective option to take over at least some the roles of the Su-25s and Mi-24s currently still in service, propelling Bulgaria into the age drone-powered warfare at a price more compatible with its current expenditures.

Whether an acquisition ultimately materialises or not, the odds that Baykar's TB2 has seen its last sale in the European Union are slim indeed. In fact, current interest in the type seems to indicate a virtual wave of exports spanning more than just the European subcontinent is at hand. At present, Bulgaria could well be among the first EU nations to ride this wave, ensuring the continuation of its rich history of operating reconnaissance aircraft.
 

[4] Bulgarian Air Defence and Air Force’s Tactical Air Units in January 1, 1983 http://www.easternorbat.com/html/bulgarian_tactical_air_force_8.html
[5] Bulgarian Air Defence and Air Force’s Tactical Air Units in January 1, 1988 http://www.easternorbat.com/html/bulgarian_tactical_air_force_81.html
 

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The Taliban Air Force - An Inventory Assessment

August 16, 2021, 12:00 pm
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By Stijn Mitzer and Joost Oliemans

 
The list only includes captured Afghan aircraft of which photographic or videographic evidence is available. Therefore, the amount of aircraft captured is undoubtedly higher than what is listed here. Not all aircraft captured in intact condition are operational at the time of capture. Thus, the number of aircraft captured by the Taliban thus doesn't translate into an operational fleet of similar size.
 

Aircraft (2)

  • 1 A-29B: (1)
  • 1 Cessna 208: (1)
 

Helicopters (24)

 

Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (7)

 
 This list will be updated as new footage becomes available.

 1x A-29B Light Attack Aircraft:
 

Mazar-i-Sharif, captured on the 15th of August 2021

1x Cessna 208:
 

Kandahar, captured on the 15th of August 2021

4x UH-60A Blackhawk:

Ghazni, captured on the 13th of August 2021

Ghazni, captured on the 13th of August 2021

Kandahar, captured on the 14th of August 2021

Kandahar, captured on the 14th of August 2021

 1x Mi-35 Hind

Kunduz, captured on the 11th of August 2021

11x Mi-8/17 Hip

Unknown, captured on the 14th of August 2021

Unknown, captured on the 14th of August 2021

Shindand, captured on the 13th of August 2021

Shindand, captured on the 13th of August 2021

Herat, captured on the 14th of August 2021

Herat, captured on the 14th of August 2021

Kandahar, captured on the 14th of August 2021

Unknown, captured on the 6th of July 2021

Kandahar, captured on the 14th of August 2021

Kandahar, captured on the 14th of August 2021

 7x MD 530F Attack Helicopter:

Mazar-i-Sharif, captured on the 15th of August 2021

Mazar-i-Sharif, captured on the 15th of August 2021

Kandahar, captured on the 15th of August 2021

Ghazni, captured on the 13th of August 2021

Bolan, captured on the 13th of August 2021

Unknown, captured on the 15th of August 2021

 7x ScanEagle UAV
 

Kunduz, captured on the 12th of August 2021

Unknown, captured on the 12th of August 2021

Unknown, captured on the 12th of August 2021

Unknown, captured on the 12th of August 2021


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Missed Opportunities: Ethiopia’s MALE UAV Programme

August 20, 2021, 12:03 pm
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By Stijn Mitzer and Joost Oliemans
 
As new information on the delivery of Iranian Mohajer-6 UCAVs to Ethiopia continues to come to light, their deployment to the country has yet to bring about a reversal of fortunes for the Ethiopian National Defence Force (ENDF). Largely unproven and equipped with subsystems (including its FLIR camera and munitions) of inferior quality than found on contemporary UCAVs from China and Turkey, it seems unlikely the Mohajer-6 will end up as the crucial asset that could finally turn the Tigray War into Ethiopia's favour.
 
Owing to the significant successes obtained by the Bayraktar TB2 over Syria, Libya and Nagorno-Karabakh, Turkey was considered to be the most likely supplier of UCAVs to Ethiopia prior to the delivery of the Mohajer-6s. Turkey has historically enjoyed warm ties with the country, which were once again reaffirmed by Prime Minister Abiy's visit to Ankara in mid-August 2021. Even though these strong ties have never resulted in any arms purchases from Turkey, it is a little known fact that a Turkish company is believed to have once played an instrumental role in Ethiopia's own indigenous medium-altitude long-endurance (MALE) UAV programme.

Launched around 2010, this highly promising project, which was known under the name of Negash, has managed to evade the attention of most military analysts worldwide. This is not in the least part due to the project's cancellation some five years after its inception, essentially relegating the endeavour to the annals of obscure arms history. As a result, many details surrounding the project remain largely unknown even to this day. The little information that is available unfortunately does much to further complicate the overall picture.

The Turkish company responsible for its design is believed to have been called 'Milyaz', which appears just as elusive as the drone itself. The few photos of the system reveal a sleek design somewhat reminiscent of the Russian Kronstadt Orion UAV, albeit designed some ten years before the latter's inception. A large FLIR turret of unknown origin occupies the front section of the fuselage and only the nose gear appears retractible, as is also the case on the Bayraktar TB2.


Similarly unknown is whether the drone was purely meant as a reconnaissance UAV or if a weaponised variant was also planned at some point. In the latter capacity it could possibly have carried one reasonably hefty munition under each wing, though the scarcity of real information on the topic means that the prospective payload capacity cannot be determined. Similarly, without access to details on its propulsion and takeoff weight its operational range and flight ceiling can only be guessed at.
 

While the Negash project ultimately went nowhere, DAVI continued with the design of small unmanned systems for reconnaissance purposes on its own accord. Most of these designs had more in the way of DIY (Do-it-yourself) hobby projects rather than systems fit for military service and had little chance of adoption by the Ethiopian Air Force. Perhaps unsurprisingly, nearly all UAVs ultimately suffered the same fate as their more realistic brethen: project cancellation.
 

Though Ethiopia from time to time calims breakthroughs in drone production, any realistic aspirations of building up an indigenous UAV production capability appear to have died with the Negash project. Nevertheless, the Turkish link may prove valuable once more after Prime Minister Abiy's visit to Turkey in August. With the ENDF desperately looking for an asset to stem the TPLF's advance, Turkish drones such as the TB2 might be the perfect candidate due to its rapid availability and attractive pricing. All the same, there's little doubt that the missed chance at gaining an indigenous capability in this field must sting to some, especially as Ethiopia's fresh civil war continues to turn further against government forces.

 
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Tried and Trusted: Kazakhstan Acquires The Y-8

August 22, 2021, 3:15 am
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By Stijn Mitzer and Joost Oliemans
 
The Chinese Y-8 transport aircraft is unlikely to receive an award for the originality of its design – it being a 1970s reverse engineered variant of the Soviet An-12 with marginal changes to suit Chinese requirements. From the 1970s onwards, the Shaanxi Aircraft Factory set out to improve on the proven design, building on experiences gained with the serial production of the Y-8 but also taking advantage of foreign expertise through Lockeed Martin as well as Antonov, the original designer of the An-12. The resulting aircraft, the Y-8F-600 and Y-9, still have a clear outward resemblance to the earlier Y-8 variants but feature a stretched and redesigned fuselage, a glass cockpit and the ability to use Pratt & Whitney turboprop engines.
 
First introduced in 2006, the Y-8F-600 and Y-9 have since then formed the basis of several specialised variants that are currently in service with the People's Liberation Army Air Force and Navy Air Force, and an AWACS version (the ZDK-03) has also been exported to Pakistan. For these reasons, it is perhaps all the more surprising that other countries instead of acquiring these aircraft have continued to purchase newly-built older variants of the Y-8 for their air arms. Offering a look that is distinctively reminiscent of the early Cold War period, these older generation aircraft are nonetheless well appreciated for their ruggedness, ability to operate from unpaved airstrips and ease of maintenance. 

The Y-8 also comes at a much reduced pricetag compared to similar aircraft like the C-130 or Il-76, owing both to its relative simplicity and the flexibility and loans of Chinese funding. This was likely an convincing factor for the Venezuelan Air Force to purchase eight Y-8s in 2012 after years of eying the acquisition of Il-76s and Il-78s from Russia. Several years later, Kazakhstan would follow in Venezuela's footsteps with an order for eight Y-8F-200Ws. This time the order would not be for its air force, but for the National Guard. The arrival of the first Y-8 in September 2018 marked the inauguration of the first aviation assets of the National Guard.

 
The National Guard (and its predecessor, the Internal Troops) was previously wholly reliant on the transport capabilities of the Kazakhstan Air Force since its founding in 2014. As the 9th largest country in the world, a long operational range and the ability to carry a lot of troops are surely appreciated; the Kazakhstan Border Guard operates a fleet of An-74s and newly-acquired CASA C295Ws for similar reasons. The National Guard's choice for a Chinese aircraft could in turn well be related to the speed with which the Y-8s were able to be delivered. After signing the contract on the 21st of April 2018, the first aircraft already arrive to the country in September the same year, with the complete order for eight aircraft delivered in the first quarter of 2019. [1]
 

Kazakhstan is certainly no stranger to the design and layout of the Y-8, having previously operated a number of An-12s until the last example was retired at the end of the previous decade. These rugged transport aircraft were well suited to the country's needs due to their payload capacity and endurance, and it is likely that it were precisely these feats aside from the benefits of familiarity that attracted Kazakhstan to acquire the highly similar Y-8. During their operational career in Kazakh service, the An-12s were based out of Almaty international airport (IAP), Astana IAP and Zhetigen airbase, with frequent deployments to other airbases located throughout the country. These are also likely to be the airbases for the Y-8.
 

A Kazakh An-12 on its take-off run.

A Kazakh Y-8. Note the National Guard roundel on the tail.

Khazakhstan's eight Y-8s represent a significant boost to the transport capabilities of the National Guard around the country. Despite this, they are one of only a handful of Chinese military products to have found solid ground in the country, with the Wing Loong I UCAVs believed to have been less successful in Kazakh service. Whether the Y-8s are a harbinger of more Chinese involvement thus remains to be seen, with other parties such as Turkey, South Africa and Israel also becoming potentially interesting suppliers as Khazakhstan continues its trend towards industrial participation and a corresponding modernisation of its armed forces. In the meantime, the trusty Y-8 is likely to serve its operators well, providing Khazakhstan with a robust aircraft with a good track record of safety.
 

[1] Kazakhstan’s first Y-8 transport aircraft makes maiden flight in China https://defence-blog.com/kazakhstans-first-y-8-transport-aircraft-makes-maiden-flight-china/
 
Header image by Maxim Morozov.
 
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The Israel Connection - Ethiopia’s Other UAVs

August 23, 2021, 2:44 am
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By Stijn Mitzer and Joost Oliemans
 
Ethiopia recently caught headlines for its acquisition of Mohajer-6 unmanned combat aerial vehicles (UCAVs) from Iran. Historically a close ally of Israel and the United Arab Emirates, the choice for an Iranian system is remarkable to say the least, and might have been motivated more by sheer desperation for an UCAV capability to change its fortunes in the ongoing Tigray War rather than a true preference for the Iranian Mohajer-6 over contemporary UCAVs from China or Turkey.
 
Whatever Ethiopia's reasoning may have been, the choice to go with the Mohajer-6 is especially striking as the Ethiopian National Defense Force (ENDF) was previously wholly reliant on Israeli UAVs for unmanned aerial reconnaissance. For the Tigray War specifically, this could for instance mean that Israeli UAVs will be tasked with locating targets for Iranian Mohajer-6s. Consequently, the Tigray War might go down in history as the first conflict in which Israeli and Iranian UAVs operate together on the same side.

Exactly what Israeli unmanned systems Ethiopia previously acquired for its armed forces has long remained a mystery. Contrary to its manned aircraft, which frequently feature in documentaries and news videos, surprisingly little is known about the acquisition and operation of UAVs by Ethiopia. The limited information that is available reveals a diverse inventory of Israeli UAVs and (commercial) UAVs purchased from China mixed in with a number of unsuccessful indigenous designs. 


Undoubtedly its most modern Israeli UAV type is also the rarest one to feature in publicly available imagery. Just twice has the Aerostar Tactical UAS been photographed in Ethiopian service, including once when it was undergoing depot-level maintenance at the Dejen Aviation Engineering Industry (DAVI) facilities at Bishoftu air base. Apart from this sighting and two videos released in 2020, next to nothing is known about their service history in Ethiopia and it is unclear if any of the systems remain operational.

Another Israeli type that was acquired is the WanderB mini UAS from BlueBird Aerosystems. These were purchased in 2011 to form Ethiopia's first UAV regiment, and arrived to Ethiopia along with the necessary infrastructure to maintain the systems. [1] [2] Interestingly, the WanderB was acquired in both the UAV and RC training variant (which can be discerned by the lack of a camera on the latter). In the latter role they are designated as MDAV-1 in Ethiopian service, and it is possible that the RC variant has entered local production as well. However, much like the Aerostar UAV very little is known about their past usage and current service status.
 

Ethiopia's urgent requirements seem to have driven it to make purchases of questionable political sensibility. However, sometimes the realities of conflict will leave little choice to combatants, which has now resulted in Ethiopia finding itself in the unique position of operating Israeli and Iranian UAVs at the same tim. Whether Ethiopia is to feel the political ramifications of its deal with Iran remains to be seen – a ban on the further purchase or support of Israeli products could only serve to worsen Ethiopia's position. Similarly, whether its fleet of Israeli and Iranian UAVs is enough to stem the TPLF's seemingly unstoppable advance is uncertain, and we might well see additional drone acquisitions in the near future in an attempt to change the country's fortunes.
 

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Black Sea Hunters: Bayraktar TB2s In Ukrainian Navy Service

August 24, 2021, 3:20 am
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By Stijn Mitzer and Joost Oliemans
 
Having proved itself in combat thrice over, the Bayraktar TB2 is quickly becoming an international export success. In addition to entering service with a number of countries worldwide, the Bayraktar TB2 has also been acquired by several different military branches of these nations. In Turkey, the TB2 has entered service with the Land Forces, Naval Forces, Gendarmerie General Command, General Directorate of Security (Police) and the National Intelligence Organization. This distribition ensures that each branch of the military and other state institutions can use its TB2s for the respective tasks required by them, for example to conduct surveillance in the Aegean Sea or to monitor wildfires in southern Turkey.

This careful balancing of assets does not apply to Turkey alone. One other TB2 operator that has acquired the system for more than one of its military branches is Ukraine, which after first purchasing six Bayraktar TB2s for its air force in 2019 (out of 54 to be ordered in total) acquired six TB2s for its naval aviation in 2021. The arrival of the first navy TB2 in July 2021 marked the first introduction of a novel capability since the service's founding in 1992. In fact, its sole 'new' asset in some 30 years was a second-hand Ka-226 utility helicopter that entered service 2018. [1] The significance of the acquisition of TB2s for the navy is thus hard to overstate, and constitutes one of the highlights of the rearmament programme launched by Ukraine after the breakout of the Russo-Ukrainian War in 2014.

As unmanned combat aerial vehicles (UCAVs) like the Bayraktar TB2 cost only a fraction of the price of manned combat aircraft, it is unsurprising that cash-stricken Ukraine relies heavily on the TB2 to press on its modernisation efforts. Although some have suggested that Ukraine is wise to invest in F-15 fighter aircraft, E-2 Hawkeye airborne early warning (AEW) aircraft and KC-135 tankers along with associated munitions and targeting equipment to deter Russia, continued investments in platforms such as the TB2, loitering munitions and the Bayraktar Akıncı are almost certain to provide Ukraine with a more economical and realistic deterrent along with actual wartime capabilities. [2]


A concrete example through which the TB2 in naval service can serve as a force multiplier is by locating enemy ships in the Black Sea and relaying their location to ground-based assets such as coastal defence missile systems (CDS). CDS are a relatively new capability for Ukraine's Armed Forces, and the country has focused on building up such a capability through the introduction of the RK-360MT Neptune anti-ship cruise missiles with a range of 280km. Instead of constructing small missile boats, production of large numbers of such land-based anti-ship missile systems could serve to enhance survivability of Ukraine's CDS assets, maintaining its newly wrought deterrent for longer should war erupt. Achieving this goal appears well underway, and Ukraine hopes to have three divisions equipped with the Neptune CDS operational by 2025. [3]
 

The Bayraktar TB2 can also use its own weapon load of four MAM-L munitions against enemy ships or any other target that requires a precision strike. The 7km range of the MAM-L already exceeds that of the air defence systems on all but four of the Russian Navy's Black Sea fleet naval ships. The introduction of INS/GPS to the MAM-L has increased the range of the munition even further to upwards of 14km, although this is not enough outrange those remaining four ships.


Besides being equipped with a number of proven systems such as the WESCAM MX-15D FLIR turret and MAM-series of munitions, the navy's TB2s feature a number of improvements over the examples acquired by the Ukrainian Air Force in 2019. Most notably, they have an increased communications range of up to 300km compared to 150km on the previous version. The associated ground control stations also appear to have undergone small modifications, and the new container-based systems enable greater mobility. The navy's TB2s will be used by the 10th Naval Aviation Brigade stationed at Mykolaiv-Kulbakino airbase that is jointly operated with the air force. [4] Mykolaiv-Kulbakino became the sole operational airbase of the Ukrainian Naval Aviation after it had to evacuate the Crimean peninsula after Russia's takeover in early 2014.


Although Ukraine inherited a vast navy that even included an aircraft carrier, a guided-missile cruiser, five frigates, several Zubr-class hovercraft and a single submarine, the country was hit hard by the financial turmoil of the 1990s and 2000s. While Ukraine's Navy could not realistically be expected to operate capital ships such as an aircraft carrier or a cruiser (nor did it have a requirement for such massive ships in the first place) even the operation of frigates, corvettes and missile boats soon became financially impossible. Within a matter of years, the Ukrainian Navy retired nearly all of its larger ships, leaving a small flotilla of ageing ships that continues to form the nucleus of the Ukrainian Navy to this day.

The Ukrainian Naval Aviation faced similar hardship. It too inherited an impressive arsenal including Su-17s, Su-27s and MiG-29s, with heavy bombers like the Tu-22s and Tu-22Ms of the Soviet Naval Aviation passed on to Ukrainian Long Range Aviation. Like the navy, it was to lose these assets within a matter of years. Instead, the former inventory of the Ukrainian Navy became crucial in the establishment of China's carrier force. Apart from selling the Kuznetsov-class aircraft carrier, which was eventually refurbished and put into service as the Liaoning in 2012, Ukraine also sold two Su-33 and one Su-25UTG carrier-born aircraft to China, the extensive studying of which would eventually culminate in the creation of the J-15. Were it not for the lack of Chinese interest, other naval aircraft Ukraine inherited such as Tu-142 MPAs and Yak-38M VTOL fighters would have undoubtedly found their way to China as well.
 

An ex-Ukrainian Su-33 prototype under new Chinese ownership

The TB2's success in the inventory of two naval aviation services is notable for a platform that wasn't designed as a maritime platform. Other operators of the Bayraktar TB2 might look to acquire a similar capability, with Poland potentially having use for a platform to conduct maritime patrols in the Baltic Sea. Qatar on the other hand could in wartime face swarms of fast attack craft employed by Iran, for which the highly maneuverable MAM munition would be a very suitable counter.
 
For the Ukrainian Naval Aviation, the fact that it now operates its own dedicated TB2s presents it with its first offensive capabilities since its founding. Although these offensive operations will have to take place in a hostile environment in a region riddled with SAM systems and the prospect of heavy electronic warfare, past experience with the platform gained over Libya, Nagorno-Karabakh and Syria have shown that the TB2 performs exceptionally well in such environments. Ukrainian capabilities in the Black Sea in the meantime are set to continue growing rapidly; with more TB2s on the way and also two Turkish Ada class corvettes on order, the Ukrainian Navy's best years are yet to come.
 
 
[1] Ukrainian Naval Aviation returns Ka-226 helicopter to service https://defence-blog.com/ukrainian-naval-aviation-returns-ka-226-helicopter-to-service/
[3] Ukraine will form three divisions of Neptune missiles by 2025 https://en.ukrmilitary.com/2020/09/neptun-2025.html
[4] Ukrainian Navy has Received First Unit of Turkish-Produced Bayraktar TB2 UCAV system https://en.defence-ua.com/news/ukrainian_navy_has_received_first_unit_of_turkish_produced_bayraktar_tb2_ucav_system-1942.html
 

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Tankovy Busters: Russian Su-25TK Attack Aircraft In Ethiopian Service

August 26, 2021, 1:02 am
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By Stijn Mitzer and Joost Oliemans
 
The Su-25 has earned its stripes as a rugged close air support aircraft capable of delivering a wide variety of ordnance while withstanding a significant beating from AA guns and MANPADS. From the onset designed with a limited guided weaponry capability in mind, Soviet designers would eventually expand on these capabilities through the development of the Su-25T dedicated anti-tank hunter version. Although offering a number of highly advanced features for its time, its inception during the final years of the USSR ultimately prevented the aircraft from entering into service.
 
While Russia would later deploy several of the experimental Su-25Ts that were produced with some success during the Chechen Wars, arguably its most interesting combat deployment didn't take place in the skies over the northern Caucasus, but rather under the heat of the sub-Saharan African sun. Just two Su-25Ts were exported to Ethiopia in a deal that remains largely unknown to many seasoned military analysts to this day. This article will attempt to set the record straight and salvage the Su-25s from their tomb of obscurity. This is the story of Ethiopia's elusive Su-25TK 'Tankovy Busters'.
 
Before going into detail on the history and specifications of the Su-25TK deal itself, it is insightful to consider the background behind Ethiopia's decision to acquire the Su-25TK. Engaged in a number of wars and border skirmishes with Eritrea throughout the 1990s, unsolved border disputes led to the Eritrean–Ethiopian War that took place from May 1998 to June 2000. The Ethiopian Air Force (ETAF) was heavily engaged in the conflict, intercepting Eritrean MiG-29s with Su-27s and striking Eritrean ground positions using MiG-21bis and MiG-23BN fighter-bombers. Although the latter type was capable of using the Kh-23M air-to-surface missile, the ETAF was looking for more advanced weaponry to enable the breakthrough it had been looking for.

Interestingly, rather than settling on the MiG-27 or Su-24, both of which capable of deploying a wide assortment of guided weaponry and readily available in Ukraine and Russia at relatively low costs, Ethiopia instead purchased two Su-25T (serial: 2252 and unknown) along with two Su-25UB trainers (serial: 2201 and 2202) from Russian Air Force stocks. Ordered in late 1999, the second-hand aircraft arrived to Ethiopia in January 2000 after undergoing revision at the 121st Aircraft Repair Plant in Kubinka, which warranted a new (export) designation: Su-25TK (Tankovy Kommercheskiy).
 
 
The experimental Su-25Ts were acquired to give Ethiopia the ability to conduct night-time precision strikes against high-value strikes such as command posts and supply depots. The aircraft entered service with No. 4 Squadron (or No.4 Flight) staffed by former MiG-23BN pilots and were foremost engaged in precision-bombings against high-value strikes such as command posts and supply depots. [1] [2] Following brief service during the war, during which one Su-25T was involved in an incident and decommissioned, the other three aircraft (i.e. including the two Su-25UBs) were withdrawn from service and placed in storage after just one year of service. [1] [2] This likely had as much to do with the swift loss of one aircraft as with the considerable costs associated with maintaining the Su-25T's specialised systems.


Rather than designing a completely new aircraft, the Su-25T uses the airframe of the Su-25UB dual-seater as its basis. The space formerly occupied by the rear seat was used to install additional avionics while the nose was enlarged to house the Shkval electro-optical targeting system equipped with the Prichal laser-rangefinder/designator (the Shkval was also installed on the Ka-50 attack helicopter). For night-time operations, a Merkuriy navigation pod could be carried under the fuselage. Its night-time abilities are what leant the aircraft the distinctive camouflage seen in the header image: two all-seeing eyes observing the battlefield for potential prey.
 
The most impressive feature of the Su-25T is undoubtedly its armament. In addition to the double-barreled 30mm cannon installed under the fuselage, the Su-25T is capable of using sixteen 9K121 Vikhr laser-guided anti-tank missiles for tank hunting missions. Unfortunately, it is unknown if the Vikhr was ever delivered to Ethiopia, and available evidence suggests that KAB-500Kr TV-guided bombs, Kh-29T TV-guided missiles and laser-guided Kh-25MLs in addition to unguided weaponry such as the massive S-25 unguided rocket, KMGU munition dispensers, unguided bombs and B-8 rocket pods made up the type's primary armament in Ethiopian service.

 
After languishing in storage at Bishoftu for about a dozen years, a decision was made for their reactivation somewhere around the turn of the last decade. Their subsequent overhaul must have proven difficult even for the experienced engineers of DAVI, as the aircraft were only in active service for roughly a year. The few technicians that serviced the Su-25s during this period might well already have been retired, making even less of the required expertise available. The specialised systems installed on the Su-25TK such as the Shkval targeting system must have proven a particular headache, with limited spare parts and expertise available for their maintenance and repair. Still, the Su-25s were sighted again for the first time in 2013, when all three aircraft were shown on the tarmac of Bishoftu. In the following years, usually one aircraft was visible on the tarmac until 2020, when the three aircraft were regularly sighted together on satellite imagery.
 
 
As Ethiopia currently finds itself at war with the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF), which is making steady gains as government forces so far appear unable to stem their advance, the country is now anxiously on the lookout for anything to change its fortunes. As the only aircraft currently known to employ precision-guided munitions in Ethiopian service, the Su-25T (and also the Su-25UBs) can be expected to have seen action already, for example by neutralising the ballistic missile and guided rocket systems that were captured by the TPLF from the Ethiopian Army and then used to strike Bahir Dar air base, the home of Ethiopia's MiG-23BN fleet. Curiously they have not been sighted on satellite imagery of airbases located closer to frontline so far. Still, as even the air force's Su-27s have been seen carrying dumb bombs, the combat debut of the Su-25s in the Tigray War might happen sooner rather than later if they haven't seen action over the breakaway region already.

The three remaining Su-25s along with numerous Su-27s at Bishoftu air base

The fate of the single Su-25TK that was involved in an accident was even less glamorous than that of its brethens placed in long-time storage. Soon after the accident in May 2000, the damaged aircraft was retired to a quiet corner of Bishoftu air base and subsequently used as a source for spare parts, a role it likely continues to fullfil today. The location where the aircraft was dumped couldn't have been more symbolic, as the adjacent tarmac is used by the air force's fleet of Grob G 120TP training aircraft. Stripped of parts and dignity, in its new role it has found a purpose in reminding aspirant pilots of the dangers they'll face in their future career.


Though they are perhaps some of the most interesting aircraft to have graced the skies of Africa, Ethiopia's Su-25Ts were retired almost as quickly as they were acquired. The fact that one aircraft was damaged beyond repair quickly after the delivery, effectively cutting the Su-25TK fleet in half, probably did much to cut its inglorious carreer short. The subsequent retirement marked the end of operations involving guided weaponry by the Ethiopian Air Force, which would only be reinstated after their reactivation as well as the acquisition of Mohajer-6s from Iran during the ongoing Tigray War.
 
Whether this limited reintroduction of precision-guided capabilities is enough to turn the tide is unknown, but seems unlikely. The purchase of Mohajer-6s could therefore soon be followed by further procurements of UCAVs. Unlike the acquisition of Su-25Ts two decades ago however, these are likely to be cheap, functional and less experimental in nature. Though this is the simple nature of today's warfare, hopefully the saga of Ethiopia's 'Tankovy Busters' will now not soon be forgotten.


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Ship Lore: The Story of Bangladesh’s Castle Class Corvettes

August 28, 2021, 5:01 am
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By Stijn Mitzer and Joost Oliemans
 
Images of the devastating explosions in Beirut in August 2020 shocked the world as stunning incompetence and negligence in the storage of 2.750 tonnes of ammonium nitrate killed 207 and caused in excess of 15 billion USD in damages. Also struck was the BNS Bijoy, a Bangladesh Navy vessel stationed in Beirut during its deployment to the Mediterranean as part of the Maritime Task Force of the United Nations mission in Lebanon. Largely spared from the most extreme effects of the explosion thanks to the nearby grain elevators that absorbed much of the blast, the crew still suffered 21 wounded and the vessel had to undergo repairs in Turkey before it could safely make the journey back home. [1]
 
The BNS Bijoy (meaning: Victory) is one of two ships in a class of corvettes serving the Bangladesh Navy since early 2011. The career of both two ships started in Great Britain in the early 1980s, where they were commissioned as Castle-class patrol vessels. Their primary mission was to carry out patrols and fishery protection in the North Sea. The vessels could also be used for impromptu minelaying operations, and their accommodations for additional troops and a large fight deck made the vessels ideally suited for a number of additional auxilary tasks.

After the 1982 Falklands War, the ships assumed the role of guard ship in the Falkland Islands on a three-yearly rotational basis. By the mid-2000s they were finally slated for replacement in this role by the River-class offshore patrol vessel HMS Clyde, and both vessels of the class were decommissioned by the Royal Navy in 2005 and 2007. Originally due to be transferred to the Pakistan Maritime Security Agency in 2007, the deal fell through and both ships were eventually sold to the Bangladesh Navy in April 2010.
 
From May 2010 onwards, both ship underwent a major refit at the A&P Tyne Shipyard in Tyneside that included an overhaul of the vessels' engines, the installation of new diesel generators and deck cranes and a thorough upgrade of the crew accommodations, which lasted until December 2010. [2] After their arrival to Bangladesh in early 2011, both ships were commissioned in the Bangladesh Navy as the BNS Dhaleshwari (the name of a river) and the BNS Bijoy. [3] Arguably the most interesting part of their career would be under this new Bangladeshi ownership, which saw them converted to guided missile corvettes.

 
The ship configuration that resulted is unique in the world, consisting of a British-designed patrol vessel armed with four Chinese anti-ship missiles and a Chinese copy of the Soviet AK-176 76mm gun (H/PJ-26). Their new armament is a notable upgrade from what they brought to bear in British service, during which the ships were only armed with a single 40mm cannon (later replaced by a 30mm cannon) and several 7.62mm general-purpose machine guns (GPMGs) for close-in defence against small vessels. The new weaponry is further reinforced by two manned 20mm cannons at the rear of the bridge and an extensive radar and guidance suite for target acquisition and engagement.

Wounded sailors from the BNS Bijoy walk away from the stricken vessel after the Beirut explosion on the 4th of August 2020

The Bangladesh Navy is a regular participant in United Nations missions ever since its first deployment to Mozambique in 1993. In some 30 years, over 5.000 personnel of the Bangladesh Navy have completed UN missions in Africa, the Middle East, South America and Asia. [4] In 2010 the navy deployed the two patrol vessels BNS Osman and BNS Madhumati as part of the UN Interim Forces in Lebanon (UNIFIL). BNS Bijoy was tasked with patrolling of the Mediterranean Sea, maritime interdictions, air surveillance and training of Lebanese Navy personnel until the faithful blast on August 4, 2020, after which it was replaced by the BNS Sangram. [5]

Internal destruction on the BNS Bijoy after the explosion

Despite the vessels' large flight deck, no hangar is present and neither the Royal Navy nor the Bangladesh Navy ever assigned any helicopters to the class during operational deployments. Instead, the flight deck is used for the stowage of RHIBs and also doubles as a training and leasure area, providing some much needed space that is lacking in the cramped interior of the ships. In the future, the abundant deck space could be utilised for the deployment of VTOL UAVs to significantly increase the effective patrol range of the corvettes. These are significantly cheaper to operate than helicopters and have the added benefit that they can stored inside the ship or in a small structure located on the free space of the deck.
 

The BNS Dhaleshwari and the BNS Bijoy during a firefighting exercise in 2017

The Bangladesh Navy is well accustomed to operating (renovated) second-hand vessels. Despite their age, the two ships are likely to serve the Bangladesh Navy well in the future, either on UN deployments in the Mediterranean or in defending Bangladesh's territorial waters. While they may belacking in modern capabilities such as air defence missile systems and close-in weapons systems (CIWS) especially when compared to other corvettes in the world, a massive modernisation and expansion undertaking currently ongoing (Forces Goal 2030) will likely see new ships with such capabilities being acquired. Together with the acquisition of Type-035 submarines from China, the Bangladesh Navy thus has a bright future to look forward to.


Special thanks to Rahbar Al Haq.
 
[4] Role of Bangladesh navy in UN peacekeeping mission https://m.theindependentbd.com/printversion/details/201462

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A New Chapter In Unmanned Warfare: The Bayraktar Akıncı Enters Active Service

August 29, 2021, 6:58 am
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By Stijn Mitzer and Joost Oliemans
 
İstikbal göklerdedir. Göklerini koruyamayan uluslar, yarınlarından asla emin olamazlar  - The future is in the skies. Because nations that cannot protect their skies, can never be sure of their future. (By Mustafa Kemal Atatürk)
 
The Bayraktar Akıncı unmanned combat aerial vehicle (UCAV) introduces a number of novel capabilities to the field of unmanned aerial warfare. These include several features not seen on any other type of UAV in the world before, most notably the ability to launch 250+km-ranged high-precision cruise missiles and beyond-visual-range air-to-air missiles (BVRAAMs) at targets as far as 100 kilometres away. These capabilities in practice turn the Akıncı into the first production multi-role unmanned combat aircraft in the world.
 
In a ceremony attended by Turkish President Erdoğan, the first four Bayraktar Akıncı UCAVs were officially handed over to the Turkish Armed Forces on the 29th of August 2021. Of these four, two Akıncıs are destined for the Land Forces Command, 2nd Army UAV Battalion Command while the other two will join the 341st Shadow (Gölge) Squadron of the Air Force Command. [1]
 
Although already an unusually diverse platform, the Akıncı's huge payload capacity of 1.500kg, the variety of its weapon loadouts and its 24+-hour endurance mean that it is also well suited to take over many of the ground attack missions currently assigned to Turkey's 240-strong F-16 fleet. [2] Replacing the F-16 in at least some of these roles frees up precious airframes which can then be used for air-to-air combat roles, at least partiallly decreasing the gap left now that Turkey has been excluded from the F-35 project.
 
Apart from debuting a unique set of abilities, the Akıncı also significantly expands on Turkey's existing unmanned warfare capabilities through a massive increase in payload capacity compared to systems such as the Bayraktar TB2 and TAI Anka. In addition to enabling the carriage of guided bombs that were too heavy to be carried by these UAVs, the Akıncı's increased payload capacity also allows for a far greater number of smaller munitions such as the MAM-L to be carried. Indeed, up to 24 MAM-Ls can be brought to bear by the Akıncı compared to just four on the TB2.
 

As Baykar continues weapons systems integration on the Akıncı, several types of guided munitions are currently being tested to verify their use from the new platform. This already included the MAM-T with a range of just under 40km (compared to upwards of 14km on the MAM-L). The MAM-T will serve alongside the Teber, LGK, KGK and (L)HGK family of precision-guided munitions also destined for use on the Akıncı. These munitions consist of indigenously designed guidance kits mated to locally produced Mark-82, Mark-83 and Mark-84 iron bombs.
 
Especially the 900kg weighing Mark-84 is a daunting piece of armament, and also the heaviest bomb ever to be integrated on a drone. When fitted with a GPS/INS guidance kit, the bomb is known as the HGK-84. The HGK-84 can attain ranges of up to 28km (or 22km when launched from lower altitude), while a different variant known as the LHGK-84 is fitted with a laser-guidance kit for increased accuracy. [3] Yet another variant, the NEB-84, is a (guided) penetrator bomb designed for use against hardened surface and underground targets such as bridges and bunkers.
 

To accommodate the seemingly endless variety of munitions, the Akıncı features up to eight underwing hardpoints and another one under its fuselage for a total of nine hardpoints. The latter is set to carry the heaviest ordnance cleared for carriage on the Akıncı, comprising the HGK-84 and the SOM-series of cruise missiles. A typical loadout could consist of two KGK-82 glide bombs with wing kits on the inboard pylons, two Teber-82 precision-guided bombs and eight MAM-Ls, as shown in the rendering below. This allows the Akıncı to set out to engage some high-value hardened target at long range, come across a convoy of enemy vehicles along the way and promptly destroy it, and then continue on to complete its mission.


Arguably the most innovative aspect of the Akıncı is its future capability to use air-to-air missiles (AAMs), consisting of the indigenous Bozdoğan IR-guided AAM and the (fire-and-forget) Gökdoğan BVRAAM, which uses an active solid-state radar to guide itself towards its target. The Akıncı's AESA radar should enable it to autonomously pick out its targets at great range, and then engage them to hunt enemy slow-flying aircraft, drones and helicopters and to guard other drones. Though BVRAAM-armed Akıncıs would present a greater challenge than most air forces could hope to face, medium-range AAMs like the Bozdoğan could present a threat even to opposing fighter aircraft, being fast, very manoeuvrable (having off-boresight capabilities) as well as highly resistant to electronic countermeasures.
 
Another feature is the ability to carry several variants of the SOM family of cruise missiles designed to be used against enemy command posts, SAM sites, ships or any other target that requires a precision hit with a 230kg heavy explosive warhead. Though two variants of this family were designed specifically to be used against naval vessels, the range of the much smaller MAM-T already exceeds the air defence systems on all but four of the Greek navy's ships. Though those are unlikely to be used in that role, this fact shows how swiftly the capabilities UCAVs and the precision-guided munitions they can carry have grown in the past decades.


Once in active service, the Bayraktar Akıncı will herald a new chapter in unmanned warfare – whether by firing cruise missiles at enemy targets from well within friendly airspace, destroying underground bunkers with NEB-84 penetrator bombs, bringing armoured columns to a grinding halt with up to 24 MAM-L munitions, targeting enemy air defence systems well outside of their range or by shooting down enemy aircraft, UAVs and helicopters. The variety in weapon loadouts means the Akıncı can easily be repurposed to carry out other tasks during the same (day-long) mission, allowing greater flexibility in operations than any drone of the past.

For countries interested in buying the Akıncı the fact that all the munitions (and their guidance kits) used for these tasks can be sourced directly from Turkey will surely be appreciated as well. Furthermore, the fact that the new UCAV adheres to the NATO standards for munitions means that NATO countries can integrate other or local manufactured munitions on the Akıncı. This does not extend to NATO countries only, and countries that are currently developing their own precision-guided munitions can expect relatively simple integration with the Akıncı. Its attractiveness to foreign customers might be precisely what ensures the Akıncı's success, escaping the fate of a number of promising UCAV designs the world over that were ultimately only produced in scarce numbers. As such, it may well soon secure its role as one of the most significant upheavals in the annals of unmanned warfare.


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