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The Militiamen’s UCAV: Mohajer-6s in Iraq

August 30, 2021, 11:21 pm
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By Stijn Mitzer and Joost Oliemans
 
The profileration of unmanned combat aerial vehicles (UCAVs) has accelerated since the turn of the century, with many countries either already possessing armed drones or currently looking to acquire them. Much less common however is the acquisition of UCAVs by a non-state actor. Intriguingly, this is exactly what has happened in Iraq, where the Popular Mobilisation Units (PMU) have managed to acquire several Mohajer-6s UCAVs from Iran. Their public appearance in Iraq came several months before the delivery of Mohajer-6s to Ethiopia, which is a story we broke in early August.

The acquisition of Mohajer-6s by the PMU is especially unusual given that the Iraqi government currently has no operational UCAV systems of its own. Having acquired some twenty CH-4Bs from China in 2015, eight of these crashed within a timespan of just a few years, while the dozen remaining examples are currently languishing in a hangar due to an apparent lack of spare parts and after-sale support by the Aviation Industry Corporation of China (AVIC). [1] [2]

Evidently, the Iraqi military set the bar low for any non-state actor to overtake it in armed drone capabilities. Host country to one of the strongest militias in the world, the supply of UCAVs to the PMU could well have occurred with the displeased consent of the Iraqi government. The PMU has meanwhile grown out to a conventional military equipped with tanks, artillery, drones and MANPADS. Many of these weapons systems were supplied by Iran, and have allowed the PMU to overtake the Iraqi Army in capabilities in several areas.

The presence of Mohajer-6s in service with the PMU was first revealed during a parade held on the 26th of June 2021 to mark the seventh anniversary of its founding in 2014. First established as an infantry force, the PMU has now taken delivery of several types of UAVs. Interestingly, the PMU did not show them in footage released of the parade, presumably to avoid any unwanted international attention. [3] During the parade the Mohajer-6 was seen armed with two small munitions similar to the Ghaem-series, up to four of which are usually carried by the type.

 
PMU forces in Iraq operate several more types of UAVs, including the 'Samad' that has also been supplied to Houthi militants in Yemen as well as Hizbullah in Lebanon, and that was used over Syria by Iranian forces in addition to seeing service in Iran itself. Suffice it to say that the profileration of Iranian UAVs in the Middle East has evidently bypassed the control of governments in these countries. Although there currently is little government control to speak of in Yemen, the governments of Lebanon and Iraq likely looked on with sorrow as Iranian-backed militias quickly overtook them in drone capabilities.

 
Arguably just as interesting as the Mohajer-6s is the presence of a small type of loitering munition that also appears to have joined the ranks of the PMU. In Iraq loitering munitions have been used against U.S. forces currently still deployed in the country, and more recently during a strike on the U.S. consulate in Erbil, Iraqi Kurdistan. [4] Although this was the first sighting of this particular type, which thus can't be linked to a known Iranian design, there is in fairness little doubt of its Iranian origin.
 

With militias playing stronger roles than ever in the post-Arab Spring world, it is a surprising fact that some now even manage to operate fleets of U(C)AVs and loitering munitions. As of yet there appears little use for the Mohajer-6s however, with deployments against remaining U.S. forces in Iraq unlikely before they pull out from the country by the end of 2021. [5] One obvious raison d'être for these militiamen's combat drones would be for use against a future Islamic State resurgence or other factions that could pose a threat to the PMU; it is especially notable that the militia in question now has UCAVs but not the host nation.
 
The Iraqi military will certainly look to reestablish this capability themselves. Owing to negative experiences with the CH-4B, it might look at an entirely different country for the acquisition of such a capability together. An obvious candidate would be Turkey, whose Bayraktar TB2s have already seen significant action over northern Iraq against PKK forces entrenched here – TB2s which have an impressive serviceability rate that is sure to be a welcome change for the Iraqi Air Force. Indeed, the Iraqi defence minister Juma Inad was quoted in one piece as saying they have reached consensus with Turkey to purchase an undisclosed number of TB2 drones in late August. [6]
 
 
[1] OPERATION INHERENT RESOLVE LEAD INSPECTOR GENERAL REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS https://media.defense.gov/2021/May/04/2002633829/-1/-1/1/LEAD%20INSPECTOR%20GENERAL%20FOR%20OPERATION%20INHERENT%20RESOLVE.PDF
[5] Biden announces end of combat mission in Iraq as he shifts US foreign policy focus https://edition.cnn.com/2021/07/26/politics/joe-biden-iraq/index.html
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The Tigray Defence Forces - Documenting Its Heavy Weaponry

September 1, 2021, 5:05 am
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By Stijn Mitzer and Joost Oliemans
 
A war that broke out between the Ethiopian government and its northern Tigray region has thrown the country into turmoil. Armed conflict has been raging since November 2020, killing thousands and displacing millions. The escalation came after months of tensions between the Ethiopian government and the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF) political party. For nearly three decades, the TPLF was at the centre of power in Ethiopia after defeating the communist-socialist state that existed in Ethiopia from 1974 to 1991. Tigrayan officials were able to dominate the government despite only accounting for some five per cent of the Ethiopian population. After a wave of anti-government protests from 2014 to 2016, a new government led by Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed took office in 2018. Abiy pressed reforms that sought to curb the power of the TPLF, much to the dismay of the Tigrayans. In response, Tigray, held its own regional elections and tensions increased to the point of open hostilities. The political crisis erupted into war when TPLF forces attacked Ethiopian Army bases in Tigray in November 2020.
 
Perhaps contrary to popular expectation, Tigray forces operate a sizeable arsenal of tanks, artillery and even took possession of long-range guided rockets and ballistic missiles. Yes, you've read that right: ballistic missiles. While the capture of ballistic missiles by rebel forces is nothing new, it is less common when they also start putting them to use. Even more rare is when these are used to target another country entirely, which is exactly what Tigray forces did. Reportedly launched in response to the presence of Eritrean troops in the Tigray Region, Tigray forces fired at least three missiles at Eritrea's capital Asmara hours after it warned Eritrea that such an attack may be imminent. [1] Around the same time, Tigray forces (meanwhile morphed into the Tigray Defences Forces) also fired Chinese M20 SRBMs against Ethiopian air bases in Bahir Dar and Gondar in retaliation for Ethiopian air strikes in Tigray. [2]
 
As of September 2021, TDF forces continue to press on their offensives into Ethiopia, with control over areas going back and forth as no end to the conflict appears in sight. Undoubtedly in an attempt to change the country's fortunes, Ethiopia has begun acquiring Mohajer-6 unmanned combat aerial vehicles (UCAVs) from Iran. Whether its fleet of Iranian, Israeli and Chinese UAVs is enough to stem the TDF's seemingly unstoppable advance is uncertain, and we might well see additional drone acquisitions by Ethiopia in the near future in an effort to secure the military breakthrough the country is looking for.
 
A map of the conflict zone showing the respective areas of control can be seen here. This map is updated as the war progresses. 


A detailed list of heavy weaponry confirmed to have been operated by the Tigray Defence Forces can be viewed below. This list is constantly updated as additional footage becomes available. This list only includes vehicles and equipment of which photo or videographic evidence is available. Therefore, the amount of equipment captured and operated by Tigray forces is significantly higher than what is recorded here. Tigray was home to a significant portion of the Ethiopian Army's heavy weaponry, much of which fell in the hands of Tigray forces in November 2020. Large numbers were subsequently recaptured by Ethiopia however, and therefore could not be included in the list. Not all heavy weaponry is operated by the TDF at the same time, with some entries already lost in action. Small arms, mortars and trucks are not included in this list.

(Click on the numbers to get a picture of each individual vehicle)

Tanks (53)


Armoured personnel carriers (21)

 

Towed artillery (48)


Multiple rocket launchers (11)


Ballistic missile launcher (1)

  • 1 M20/A200 TEL: (1) (Used in the missile strike on Bahir Dar airbase in November 2020)
 

Rocket and Missile support vehicles (3)


Man-Portable Air Defence Systems (4)

 

Anti-aircraft guns (16)

 

Surface-to-air missile systems (13 launchers in 4 sites. Never used)

  • 1 S-75 ''SA-2'' site: (1)
  • 3 S-125 ''SA-3'' sites: (1)(2)(3)
     

Radars (7)

  • 1 P-18 'Spoon Rest D': (1)
  • 2 ST86U/36D6 'Tin Shield': (1)(2)
  • 1 SNR-75 'Fan Song' (for S-75): (1)
  • 3 SNR-125 'Low Blow' (for S-125): (1)(2)(3)
 
 

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Made In China: Ethiopia’s Fleet Of Chinese UAVs

September 2, 2021, 5:41 am
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By Stijn Mitzer and Joost Oliemans

In addition to operating a number of UAVs sourced from Israel and even Iran, at least one more country has delivered unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) to Ethiopia in recent years. This country is of course China, whose readily available and inexpensive UAVs have meanwhile conquered large parts of Africa. Interestingly, these more often than not have consisted of commercial models utilised for a wide variety of military and civilian tasks rather than types specifically designed for military service.

That said, the participation of Chinese Wing Loong II unmanned combat aerial vehicles (UCAV) conducting operations on behalf of Ethiopia during the Tigray War has long been speculated by many. Supposedly operated by the United Arab Emirates out of Assab air base in neighbouring Eritrea, or acquired and operated by Ethiopia according to some others, no evidence has so far been brought forward that points towards the involvement of Chinese UCAVs during the Tigray War however. [1]

The actual inventory of Chinese drones in Ethiopian service is slightly less spectacular, and perhaps even decidedly lacklustre, consisting of a number of commercially available models sourced from a number of different companies. Rather than entering service with the Ethiopian National Defence Force (ENDF), the actual recipient of these drones appears to have been the Ethiopian Federal Police (EPF). While arguably less imposing than their military brethens, the operation of medium-sized UAVs by police forces is notable, even more so when it occurs in the African contingent.
 
Prior to the drone's delivery to Ethiopia, Ethiopian police officers attended a drone piloting training course organised by the Chinese Ministry of Public Security at an aviation school in Beijing in late 2018. Besides learning how to operate and maintain the drones, the attendants were also demonstrated several applied drone usages in scenarios such as rescue, fire emergency and reconnaissance as part of their training programme. [2]
 

A Chinese instructor demonstrates the features of the a ZT-3V VTOL UAS

Undoubtedly owing to the kind of operational scenarios Ethiopian police officers are liable to find themselves in throughout the mountainous country with little existing drone infrastructure, all types acquired by the EPF are vertical take-off and landing (VTOL) models. For increased efficiency during flight, at least two of the models can switch to horizontal flight mode after taking off vertically. [3] Several smaller VTOL types were purchased as well, although little is known regarding their subsequent use in the ranks of the Ethiopian police.

Presumably prompted by a lack of more suitable drone types for use during the early stages of the Tigray War, several of the drones were transferred to the Ethiopian Air Force in November 2020. [4] Interestingly, rather than quietly accepting the systems into service, the ENDF instead presented the drones in front of a news crew as indigenously-designed systems rather than commercially obtainable models from China. [4] The exact reasoning behind this cheap propaganda stunt is unclear, but was likely aimed at the domestic audience that has little reason to doubt the regime's narrative, and could use an assurance of Ethiopian military capabilities.


Whether called 'indigenously-designed' or simply commercially obtainable, a major drawback of the drones is the quality of their camera systems. Although this is to be expected from designs that cost a fraction of the price of their military counterparts, and would likely have posed little of a problem in police service, it is more likely to pose a hindrance in service with the ENDF. Practically speaking, it allows them to cover a smaller area while operating at a lower altitude, exposing them to ground fire from TPLF forces.
 
 
Though the presence of armed Chinese drones in action over Tigray remains a point of contention to some, the reality is in fact much different,with several commercially obtained models constituting the sole contribution to Ethiopia's unmanned fleet. Currently engaged in a conflict where UCAVs could play a decisive role, it is not unthinkable that Ethiopia will look to China once again for UAVs, this time in a more offensive role. Given the current state of Ethiopia's fresh civil war, a tender for a new type of UCAV to enter service on a rapid basis might well be on the way already.
 
 
[2] Ethiopian police officers attend drone piloting training program in Beijing http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2018-11/14/c_137606105_3.htm
[4] Chief Commander of the Ethiopian Air Force, Maj. Gen. Yilma Merda.#Ethiopia #Tigray(Courtesy of EBC) https://youtu.be/leUr8ZECQd0


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List Of Aircraft And Helicopters Captured by Taliban Forces At Kabul Airport

September 2, 2021, 9:15 am
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By Stijn Mitzer and Joost Oliemans
 
This list aims to comprehensively catalogue the Afghan aircraft captured at Kabul International Airport (IAP) but rendered disabled by U.S. forces. United States forces stationed at Kabul during the withdrawal efforts from Afghanistan are reported to have rendered 73 aircraft and helicopters inoperable for future use. Although the full extent of damage the aircraft suffered remains unknown, it can be expected that U.S. forces damaged them sufficiently to prevent their use in the near future.
 

Aircraft captured at Kabul International Airport but rendered disabled by U.S. forces:

 

Aircraft (27)

 

Helicopters (43)

 
This list is constantly updated as new photos become available.
 
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From Friend To Foe: Ethiopia’s Chinese AR2 MRLs

September 3, 2021, 4:16 am
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By Stijn Mitzer and Joost Oliemans
 
The 2010s were a time of significant upheaval for the Ethiopian National Defence Force (ENDF). Within less than a decade, ageing weaponry dating from the Cold War period was progressively retired (or in some cases upgraded) and replaced by more modern equipment. While in some cases this merely replaced legacy systems, the ENDF also sought to introduce entirely new capabilities through the acquisition of large-calibre multiple rocket launchers, guided rockets and short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs).
 
While some of the acquired weapons systems were to receive plenty of coverage in news reports and at arms exhibitions to show off the ENDF's modernisation effort, other weaponry was intentionally kept out of the spotlight under strong operational security (OPSEC) rules, perhaps held back as a surprise until they could one day unleash their firepower on an unsuspecting foe. One such system is the 300mm AR2 multiple rocket launcher (MRL), a number of which were acquired by Ethiopia from China in the late 2010s.

The acquisition of AR2s along with M20 SRBMs and A200 guided rockets gave the ENDF a distinct edge over what any of its neighbouring countries could muster. The only other nations in Sub-Saharan Africa confirmed to have acquired large-calibre MRLs are Angola, which operates a number of North Korean 240mm M-1989 MRLs, Sudan, that presently operates Iranian systems and Chinese WS-1B and WS-2 MRLs, and Tanzania, which purchased the A100 MRL – a competitor of the AR2 which also uses 300mm rockets.

 
After their arrival to Ethiopia in the 2010s, the AR2s were assigned to the ENDF's Northern Command near the volatile border with Eritrea. Although still unforseeable at that time, this was a decision the Ethiopian High Command would soon regret. Upon outbreak of hostilities in the Tigray region in November 2020, the AR2s were quickly captured by separatist forces as they began to overrun ENDF bases located throughout the Tigray. It is also possible that the commanders of the units (likely to have been Tigrayans themselves) directly joined the seperatists' side, bringing with them the AR2s and the soldiers to operate them. 
 
Whatever the mechanic, the outcome was that Tigray forces were suddenly in control of large-calibre MRLs, guided rockets and ballistic missiles with a range of at least 280km. Quickly put into use against their former owners, the Ethiopian Army was now to feel the destructive power of the systems it had just purchased. After overcoming this initial shock, it then had to devote precious resources into locating and destroying the captured systems. At least one AR2 and the associated transporter with reloads was subsequently recaptured and then destroyed in the Tekeze area of Central Tigray. [1] The fate of the other systems is currently unknown.


The AR2 is an export variant of the PHL-03 MRL, which itself entered service with the People's Liberation Army Ground Force in large numbers. Based on the design of the Soviet BM-30 Smerch, the PHL-03 and AR2 maintain the same configuration as their Russian counterpart with twelve tubes for 300mm rockets now mounted on a Wanshan WS2400 8x8 heavy duy truck. The Chinese rockets have a greatly increased range over their Soviet predecessors however (130km vs 70km), and the AR2 also incorporates a digital fire control system incorporating GPS/BeiDou/GLONASS. In the absence of jamming, such guidance can vastly increase accuracy of MRLs, essentially opening up a new paradigma of pontential uses in counter-battery operations and the striking of high value targets. To date, Ethiopia and Morocco are the only known customers of the AR2 MRL.


To ensure that each launcher is never long without rockets, the AR2s are accompanied by dedicated 8x8 WS2400-based and 10x8 (or 10x10) WS2500 transporters carrying twelve reloads each. A major disadvantage of the AR2 over most contemporary modern systems is that each tube has to be loaded individually as opposed to simply replacing an entire rocket pod at once, which is much faster and thus cuts down on the time before the system can unleash another volley upon its enemy.


Stark irony rules that much of the advanced weaponry the ENDF had stockpiled in the past decade is now turned upon its former master, so that even if it manages to gain the upper hand in the conflict it will be forced to once more look for replacements. In the meantime, the country suffers, with combat casualties piling up and much of its northern regions in turmoil.
 

Ethiopian personnel along with their Chinese instructors in front of an AR2 MRL in Ethiopia

 [1] https://twitter.com/MapEthiopia/status/1352325064973189123


 

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List Of Aircraft Losses Of The Tigray War (2020-2021)

September 4, 2021, 2:59 pm
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By Stijn Mitzer and Joost Oliemans

A war that broke out between the Ethiopian government and its northern Tigray region has thrown the country into turmoil. Armed conflict has been raging since November 2020, killing thousands and displacing millions. The escalation came after months of tensions between the Ethiopian government and the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF) political party. For nearly three decades, the TPLF was at the centre of power in Ethiopia after defeating the communist-socialist state that existed in Ethiopia from 1974 to 1991. Tigrayan officials were able to dominate the government despite only accounting for some five per cent of the Ethiopian population. After a wave of anti-government protests from 2014 to 2016, a new government led by Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed took office in 2018. Abiy pressed reforms that sought to curb the power of the TPLF, much to the dismay of the Tigrayans. In response, Tigray, held its own regional elections and tensions increased to the point of open hostilities. The political crisis erupted into war when TPLF forces attacked Ethiopian Army bases in Tigray in November 2020.
 
In response, the Ethiopian Army launched an invasion of the Tigray Region. After initial successes, a TDF counterattack managed to drive Ethiopian forces out of Tigray, and the TDF currently continues to press on its offensives into Ethiopia. The Ethiopian Air Force (ETAF) has seen heavy action during all stages of the conflict, flying close air support missions with MiG-23BN fighter-bombers and Mi-35 helicopters and hauling manpower and equipment through the embattled region using transport aircraft and helicopters. The Eritrean Air Force is also frequently reported to have participated in the conflict with its MiG-29 fighter aircraft, although no evidence has ever been presented to support these claims. 
 
Tigray forces have come in the possession of several weapon systems that can be used to target aircraft, including at least three S-125 and one S-75 SAM sites, numerous Igla-1 man-portable air-defense systems (MANPADS) and more than a dozen of 23mm ZU-23 anti-aircraft guns. [1]
 

A Tigray fighter aims his 9K310 Igla-1 MANPADS. Igla-1s are claimed to have been responsible for shooting down at least three Ethiopian Air Force aircraft.

A S-125 SAM site under Tigray ownership

As witnessed in most conflicts, propaganda on both sides is rampant, with false claims of downings published by the Tigray side on a regular basis.
 

Claims like these are frequently posted with no evidence to back them up

This list aims to catalogue visually confirmed Ethiopian aircraft losses during the Tigray War. This list will be updated as new downings occur.

Lost Aircraft (3)

 

Lost Helicopters (1)

 
1x MiG-23BN fighter-bomber on the 29th of November 2020. Reportedly shot down by MANPADS. The pilot ejected and was captured alive.
 

1x MiG-23BN fighter-bomber on the 6th of December 2020. Crashed short of the runway of Shire (Indaselassie) Airport, Tigray Region, while attempting an emergency landing.


1x L-100-30 Hercules transport aircraft. Believed to have been shot down by MANPADS near Gijet, Tigray Region, on the 23rd of June 2021. The aircraft was previously in service with Ethiopian Airlines. Footage of the crash can be viewed here.


1x Mi-35 attack helicopter. Believed to have been shot down by MANPADS near Abiy Adi, Tigray Region, on the 20th of April 2021.


[1] The Tigray Defence Forces - Documenting Its Heavy Weaponry https://www.oryxspioenkop.com/2021/09/the-tigray-defence-forces-documenting.html


 
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Lifting The Veil - Pakistan’s Chinese UCAVs

September 5, 2021, 5:07 am
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By Farooq Bhai in collaboration with Stijn Mitzer and Joost Oliemans
 
The presence of Chinese unmanned aerial combat vehicles (UCAVs) in the ranks of the Pakistani Armed Forces has long been the subject of speculation in the press. No ground images have ever been released that could confirm the presence of the UCAVs on Pakistani soil, further adding to the speculation. Even though Pakistan has so far managed to keep the status of its Chinese-delivered UCAVs highly elusive, a large amount of information can be found through open-source investigations. This reveals an extensive arsenal of Chinese-made UCAVs that are currently in service with the various branches of the Pakistani Armed Forces.

Acompanying the sighting of UCAVs on satellite imagery of air bases located throughout the country have been rumours of Pakistan launching an assembly line for Chinese-made UCAVs. So far no evidence has been brought forward that points towards such a capability having been established, and current evidence instead appears to suggest that Pakistan will soon supplement its Chinese UCAVs with a number of indigenous systems. In August 2021 it was announced that Pakistan will manufacture some components for the TAI Anka UCAV and collaborate in further development of the Turkish system, possibly paving the way for more Turkish technology to be absorbed in their indigenous UAV programmes. [1]
 
Wing Loong I - Pakistan Air Force
 
The first confirmed sighting of a Chinese UCAV in Pakistan occurred in 2016, when an example crashed in the vicinity of Mianwali air base, catching the media's attention. [2] Through images of the crashed UCAV it could soon be confirmed that the Wing Loong I had indeed arrived to Pakistan. In 2017 and 2018, two Wing Loong Is were spotted on satellite imagery of Mianwali air base, indicating that multiple drones were either undergoing evaluation or more likely, were in fact already in active service.
 
Intriguingly, in 2019 both vehicles were no longer visible in satellite imagery of Mianwali air base and no news was released before both the Wing Loong Is made their reappearance two years later in February 2021. It currently remains unclear which branch of the Pakistani Armed Forces operates the Wing Loong I as no data on any official purchases has ever been released. That said, the Pakistani Air Force (PAF) is the most likely candidate as they would later also acquire the successor to the Wing Loong I, the Wing Loong II. 
 

 
Wing Loong II - Pakistan Air Force
 
In 2018 it was reported by Indian media that Pakistan was in negotiations to co-produce some 48 Wing Loong IIs at the Pakistan Aeronautical Complex (PAC). [3] No official sources from the PAF would go on to confirm the news, and a year later it was in fact revealed to have been incorrect. However, this did little to deter the PAF from actually acquiring the Wing Loong II, albeit three years later than had originally been forecast by Indian media. In early 2021 it was reported that the PAF had ordered Wing Loong IIs from the Aviation Industry Corporation of China (AVIC). Although the order appears to have been for a sizeable number of systems, there currently appears to be no intention of co-producing the Wing Loong II in Pakistan. 

A Wing Loong II was then spotted at Mianwali air base in July 2021, the same air base that had previously accommodated the Wing Loong I. The Wing Loong IIs received by Pakistan reportedly come equipped with Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR) in addition to a wide range of air-to-ground weaponry. Equipped with a total of six hardpoints to carry guided missiles and bombs, the Wing Loong II gives the PAF a distinct edge over India, which currently has no UCAVs in operational service except for two MQ-9B SeaGuardians that have been leased by the Indian Navy for maritime surveillance. 
 

CH-4B - Pakistan Army Aviation Corps and Pakistan Naval Air Arm
 
Unlike the Pakistan Air Force's Wing Loong series of UCAVs it acquired from AVIC, the Pakistan Army Aviation Corps instead chose to buy the CH-4B UCAV from China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation (CASC). A large amount of CH-4B UCAVs were reportedly ordered by the Army Aviation Corps, with the first batch of five CH-4B UCAVs arriving in Pakistan in early 2021. At least four of these were then deployed to Bahawalpur Army Aviation Corps air base in the vicinity of which a dedicated UAV training airspace zone had been setup by the Army Aviation Corps. [4]
 
 
In addition to the Pakistan Army Aviation, the Pakistani Navy (PN) was also known to be in the process of acquiring armed drones, as the PN's chief had reportedly said in his farewell speech that the PN would acquire armed UCAVs for maritime roles. [5] The UCAVs were revealed to be CH-4Bs as well by sources who were familiar with the matter and were in a position to confirm. [6] While no PN CH-4B has been spotted so far, a small rapidly deployable hangar often associated with UAVs has been built at the PN's Turbat Airbase in mid-2021 indicating that the PN either has operational CH-4B UCAVs, or is set to receive them at some point in the near future. These are likely to be equipped with a SAR radar fitted for maritime surveillance, supplementing the P-3 Orion currently used in this role.
 

To the military analyst, it is quite impressive how well Pakistan has hidden its acquisitions of Chinese UCAVs thus far – though perhaps equally impressive have been the efforts of OSINT researchers to find them. In the future, this fleet of Chinese UCAVs is to be supplemented with indigenous designs developed with Turkish assistance, though Pakistan is unlikely to make any kind of formal declaration when this occurs. Perhaps in ten years time we will be looking for these designs on satellite imagery, ensuring the lively game between OPSEC and OSINT never goes dull.

Special thanks to @detresfa_
 
[2] Chinese-Made Drone Crashes In Pakistan https://www.popsci.com/chinese-made-drone-crashes-in-pakistan/
[3] Chinese Wing Loong II drones sold to Pakistan https://www.armyrecognition.com/october_2018_global_defense_security_army_news_industry/chinese_wing_loong_ii_drones_sold_to_pakistan.html 
[4] Pakistan Takes Delivery of CH-4 Drones from China https://quwa.org/2021/01/23/pakistan-takes-delivery-of-ch-4-drones-from-china-2/
[5] Admiral Zafar Mahmood Abbasi (R) Speech | Pak Nav https://youtu.be/4veP2J6aDTY
[6] Haha like we're going to reveal our sources ;) 
 
 
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Guided Deterrence: Pakistan’s Fatah MRLs

September 8, 2021, 6:39 am
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By Stijn Mitzer and Joost Oliemans
 
Pakistan conducted a successful test of a newly-developed guided multiple rocket launcher (MRL) designated the Fatah-1 on the 24th of August 2021. [1] The test, which can be viewed here, follows an earlier successful test flight conducted in January 2021. Having proved its functioning and accuracy under realistic conditions, the latest firing might have been the final test before the system enters mass production and joins the ranks of the Pakistani Army.

The Fatah-1 is the first weapon of its kind in Pakistani service, and will greatly improve upon Pakistan's precision-strike capabilities. This was also reaffirmed by the Pakistani military, which stated that: ''The weapon system will give Pakistan Army the capability of precision target engagement deep in enemy territory''. [2] The Fatah-1 likely uses inertial terminal and GPS guidance with an estimated CEP of some 30 to 50 metres at a range of 140 kilometers.

Considering the close military ties enjoyed between Pakistan and China, one could be forgiven for thinking that the design of the Fatah-1 originated in China. Nonetheless, the rocket canisters and the claimed range of 140km do not correspond with any known Chinese system currently on offer or under development, and it is entirely possible that the Fatah-1 is a progressive development of the A-100 unguided rocket initiated by Pakistani engineers (possibly with Chinese help).
 
Having developed and introduced a large number of ballistic missiles and cruise missiles that can deliver either a conventional or a nuclear payload, the development of the Fatah-1 is a next logical step in strengthening the conventional capabilities of the Pakistani Army. While operating an abundance of unguided MRL systems that can be used to saturate enemy troop locations and bases, the targeting of smaller targets like command posts and fortified positions requires an entirely different approach.
 
 
Although the 140km range of the Fatah-1 is well below that of contemporary systems in service worldwide (which often feature ranges of at least 200km), it is still far greater than the range of India's guided rocket systems. The Indian Army currently operates the Pinaka MRL that is capable of using guided rockets with a range of up to 75km. A variant that is capable of attaining ranges of up to 95+km is also said to be under development, but still falls short of the range of the Fatah-1. [3]
 
Once in active service, the Fatah-1 will do much to increase the operational flexibility of the Pakistani Army. Operating a sizeable number of large-calibre multiple rocket launchers and short range ballistic missiles (SRBMs), the Fatah-1 positions itself between the capabilities of both weapon systems. The Pakistani Army was previously wholly reliant on cruise missiles or large volleys of unguided rockets or even ballistic missiles to small hit targets at long distances, which is as ineffective as it is uneconomical.

A Pakistani A-100 MRL. The Fatah-1 incorporates a guidance suite, allowing it to be vastly more accurate than its unguided brethen.

Tactical weapon systems like the Hatf–II Abdali feature a larger warhead but decreased accuracy compared to the Fatah-1. The presence of both systems in the ranks of the Pakistani Army hugely increases its operational flexibility.

A possible future development could be the introduction of a laser-guidance kit to transform the Fatah rockets into precision-guided munitions that can hit targets marked by Pakistani U(C)AVs. This capability already exists in Turkey and Azerbaijan through the TRLG-230 MRL, and significantly increases the capabilities of both the UAV and the MRL. It is precisely this type of synergy between reconnaissance and precision-guided munitions that proved a gamechanger during the Nagorno-Karabakh War, allowing Azerbaijan to strike Armenian targets without ever knowing what hit them.
 

The introduction of the Fatah-1 means that a portion of Pakistan's conventional rocket forces will soon outrange all Indian MRLs with great accuracy. Although this already significantly upsets the conventional balance in the region in Pakistan's favour, Pakistan could further solidify its position through the continued development of the Fatah series to increase its range. There is some indication that the development of such a system is already well underway, likely featuring a range of at least 200km.


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Iranian Loitering Munitions Used Against Militants In Iraqi Kurdistan #Shorts

September 9, 2021, 3:03 am
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A video released on the 9th of September 2021 shows an Iranian loitering munition impacting a target near Choman, Erbil Governorate, Iraqi Kurdistan, as part of an ongoing offensive by Iran in the region. The military offensive comes two days after Mohammad Pakpour, the commander of the Revolutionary Guards' Ground Forces, warned the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) against allowing groups hostile to Iran to use its territory to carry out attacks against Iran. [1] General Pakpour also threatened to attack the bases of these groups and advised civilians to stay away from their bases. Iran almost immediately made good on the threat, using artillery and loitering munitions to target these same bases just two days later. [2]
 
The use of loitering munitions in this attack once again highlights the increasing proliferation of 'suicide drones' in the region. Iran previously exported loitering munitions to Hizbullah in Lebanon, which used them during the 2006 Lebanon War, and Houthi rebels in Yemen, which have employed them against targets in Saudi Arabia and the UAE. [3] More recently, it has also supplied Iraqi Popular Mobilization Units (PMU) with loitering munitions and Iran itself used them in the attack on an Israeli-owned cargo vessel in August 2021. [4] Their most notable use came during the 2019 Abqaiq–Khurais attack, during which at least 19 drones launched out of Iran were used to attack Saudi Aramco oil processing facilities in eastern Saudi Arabia.
 

[1] Iraqi Kurdistan’s inaction over Kurdish militants angers Iran https://www.tehrantimes.com/news/464824/Iraqi-Kurdistan-s-inaction-over-Kurdish-militants-angers-Iran
[4] Israel-linked ship hit in drone attack docks in UAE https://www.timesofisrael.com/israel-linked-ship-hit-in-drone-attack-docks-in-uae/


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Israeli Arms In Ethiopia: The Thunder IMV

September 13, 2021, 2:19 pm
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By Stijn Mitzer and Joost Oliemans
 
The time when the Ethiopian National Defence Force (ENDF) almost solely relied on aging Soviet armament mixed in with some of their more modern Russian brethens is long gone. Over the past decade, Ethiopia has diversified its arms imports to include a number of other sources that presently include nations such as China, Germany, Ukraine and Belarus. Arguably more surprising is the presence of countries like Israel and the UAE in this list, which have supplied Ethiopia with a number of specialised weapon systems.

Israel has proved a popular source of armament for many African countries, supplying them with anything from small arms to drones and even naval vessels. Ethiopia first established military ties with Israel in the 1950s under Emperor Haile Sellassie I. Interestingly, Ethiopian military cooperation with Israel continued even under the communist-socialist state that existed in Ethiopia from 1974 to 1991. During this era, the government of Mengistu maintained close relationships to both Arab countries and Israel, although the latter in near secrecy so as to not upset its Arab allies.

Only in recent years the strong ties between Ethiopia and Israel also materialised in the delivery of military equipment 'Made in Israel'. One of these is the Thunder infantry mobility vehicle (IMV), which so far has entered service with Ethiopia and Cameroon. In the case of the former, it was to assemble the vehicles in-country in an effort to build up the knowledge and capabilities of Ethiopia's indigenous arms industry. Similar constructions have been put up with Ukraine and China, showing that such efforts are anything but a token effort to fortify Ethiopia's prowess in this field.
 

Between 2011 and 2013, the Israeli Gaia Automotive company was awared a contract to deliver 80 Thunder IMVs to Ethiopia. [1] The first 5 vehicles were manufactured in Israel while the materiels for the building of 75 more vehicles, as well as all the required factory equipment, were shipped to Ethiopia. Gaia assembled another five Thunder IMVs in Ethiopia, after which the Ethiopians completed the remaining 70 vehicles on their own. The valuable experience gained by the Ethiopian side in projects like these is sure to help the country in future endeavours to construct armoured vehicles of its own.
 

The Thunder IMV is based on the chassis of a commercially available Ford pickup truck. The superstructure (i.e. driver's cabin) is stripped off in its entirety, leaving only the chassis and the engine in place. Sections of the armoured body are then placed on the barren chassis and welded in place before additional equipment is fitted to the newly-fabricated vehicle. As a finishing touch, the original tires are then replaced by military-grade ones to enable the Thunder IMV to cross rough terrain.
 

The ENDF appears to be operating its Thunder IMVs in at least four different configurations, including one fitted with a dozer blade. Although this configuration appears of little use for conventional military operations, the dozer blade is well suited for clearing barricades put up by protestors during demonstrations. These have frequently occurred throughout Ethiopia's modern existence, with the anti-government protests of 2014 to 2016 arguably being the most significant such events, leading to a change of government in 2018.

The military police also operates its own dedicated variant, which appears to be fitted with a small searchlight. In addition, the Ethiopian Army operates a dedicated ambulance variant and a version equipped with a 12.7mm DShK heavy machine gun (HMG). The latter version constitutes the only variant equipped with fixed armament. Each Thunder IMV also comes equipped with a total of seven firing ports (three on each side, one on the rear) from which the crew can fire their personal weapons to fend off enemy attacks.
 

The Thunder IMV is not the only type of Israeli equipment currently in service with the ENDF. In order to equip some of its elite (at least in name) Republican Guard units, Ethiopia acquired a small number of IWI Tavor TAR-21 assault rifles from Israel as well. Perhaps more significantly, the Ethiopian Air Force operates at least two types of Israeli unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). This includes the Aerostar UAV and the WanderB mini UAS, the latter having been purchased in 2011 to form Ethiopia's first UAV regiment. [2]


Behind an arsenal of mostly Soviet, Russian and Chinese armament exotic equipment fills in the gaps. Whether it was sourced from Israel, North Korea or Germany, such equipment has typically flown under the radar, attracting little attention from analysts or the general public. With the sale of Moahjer-6s UCAVs by Iran, it appears the market for armament in this corner of Africa continues growing however, with the list of suppliers growing to meet its increased demand. With the conflict in its Tigray region continuing to rage, this exotic armament will surely be put to use here as well, if it hasn't been already.
 

[1] The Establishment of an APC Production Line in Ethiopia http://gaia-auto.com/en/the-establishment-of-an-apc-production-line-in-ethiopia/
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Tigray Defence Forces Display Surface-To-Air Missiles #Shorts

September 14, 2021, 4:18 am
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Images from a music video released in early September this year show Tigray forces handling S-75 and S-125 surface-to-air missiles (SAM) seized from Ethiopian government forces. Although captured as early as November 2020, fairly little is known about their subsequent use by Tigray forces. Still operational at the time of capture, only the defection of enough of their operators to the Tigray side could have allowed their use against the Ethiopian Air Force (ETAF). While their latest sighting did not include any of the launching systems associated with the missiles, it confirms that Tigray forces are still in control of several components of the systems.

When Tigray forces began their conquest of the region, they quickly seized control of one S-75 and three S-125 SAM sites in addition to numerous radar stations. [1] Perhaps by cobbling together enough personnel from each site, it quickly sought to use both the S-75 and S-125 SAM systems against their former owners. [2] [3] None of the launches are believed to have resulted in any successful downings, and Tigray forces are believed to have achieved more success through the use of MANPADS, possibly shooting down as many as three Ethiopian Air Force aircraft and helicopters since the beginning of hostilities in November 2020.

Interestingly, the Ethiopian Air Force made little to no attempt at destroying the SAM sites, perhaps indicating that it considered it unlikely that Tigray forces could reactivate them for future use. When Tigray forces did put them to use, the Ethiopian military still ignored the threat while at the same time flying transport aircraft over the region. Presenting easy targets even to the older S-75 and S-125 SAMs, it could be argued that only through sheer luck no aircraft was downed as a result.


Satellite imagery from the 15th of November 2020 indicates that the S-125 site located north of Mekelle (the capital of the Tigray Region) was almost immediately used following its capture by Tigray forces. [4] At least four missiles were fired off against Ethiopian Air Force aircraft flying in the area, apparently with little success as no downings related to these launches were reported by either side.
 
While attempts at shooting down Ethiopian Air Force aircraft appear to have been entirely unsuccessful, the use of surface-to-air missiles by rebel groups represents a severely escalated threat that one day might result in a successful shoot down.More surprises are certain to await in Tigray as the conflict continues to develop in unpredictable ways.
 
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Go Ballistic: Tigray’s Forgotten Missile War With Ethiopia and Eritrea

September 15, 2021, 9:22 am
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By Stijn Mitzer and Joost Oliemans
 
The shock of the Ethiopian National Defence Force (ENDF) must have been immense when a Chinese-made M20 short-range ballistic missile (SRBM) impacted the flight line of Bahir Dar air base in northwestern Ethiopia in November 2020, during the early stages of the Tigray War. Although the targetting of Bahir Dar was bound to happen sooner rather than later after the capture of several ballistic missile systems by Tigray forces, the sheer precision with which the missile impacted still must have surprised the personnel at the base. Around the same time some 450 kilometres away, several loud blasts rocked Asmara, the capital of Eritrea, which similarly came under missile fire by Tigray forces. How Ethiopia and Eritrea ended up under fire of ballistic missiles will be the subject of this article.

Looking to significantly expand on its military capabilities and give it a decisive edge over its long-time enemy of Eritrea, and likely also to establish a deterrent to Sudan and Egypt, Ethiopia embarked on an ambitious re-equipment programme in the 2010s that sought to finally alter the military balance in the region in Ethiopia's favour. At the centre of this armament shopping spree was the inception of two capabilities not yet fielded in Ethiopia before: short-range ballistic missiles and long-range (guided) rockets.

Considering the warm military ties between Ethiopia and China, it is little surprising that Ethiopia looked to China for the acquisition of such capabilities. In addition to being one of the few countries willing to supply such technology to Ethiopia, China also produces two systems that combine SRBMs and guided rockets into one modular system. One of these (which uses BP-12As SRBMs and SY-400 guided rockets) had previously already been acquired by Qatar, which has so far only displayed the BP-12As associated with the system.
 
Its direct competitor uses M20 SRBMs and A200 guided rockets, and would go on to enter service with Belarus (under the designation of Polonez), Azerbaijan (again as the Polonez) and Ethiopia. Belarus has established a production line for the rockets itself, and the improved A300 version has meanwhile entered service as the Polonez-M. It is notable that so far only Ethiopia is confirmed as an operator of the M20 SRBM, with Azerbaijan only having acquired the guided rockets and Belarus having displayed the missile, but not yet adopting it into active service.

 
The M20 SRBM is currently the most modern ballistic missile to have entered service in the African continent. It carries a 400kg HE warhead to a range of at least 280km, making it ideally suited for targeting enemy bases and troop concentrations. Incorporating not only inertial, but also BeiDou satellite guidance, the M20 also boasts a Circular Error Probable (CEP) estimated at some 30 metres. [1] The A200 guided rocket similarly uses inertial terminal and GPS guidance with a CEP of some 30 to 50 metres and can carry a 150kg warhead to a range of 200 kilometers. [2]
 

When Tigray forces launched their assault on the ENDF's northern command in November 2020, they quickly seized control over the entirety of Ethiopia's ballistic missile and guided rocket force. It appears that many of their operators defected to the Tigray side as well, giving Tigray forces the opportunity to start using the systems against their former owners. And indeed, soon Tigray forces did precisely that, launching ballistic missiles at two air bases in Ethiopia and even three missiles at the capital of Eritrea, the latter in response to Eritrea's involvement in the Tigray war. [3]

Although most of these missile and rocket strikes can't be independently verified for a lack of launch footage and imagery of the targets, one strike that was fairly well documented was the strike on Bahir Dar air base in November 2020. [4] It is unknown if this strike caused any materiel losses, and it is possible that the Ethiopian Air Force had already moved its aircraft to the nearby hardened aircraft shelters (HAS) in anticipation of a missile strike. What is certain is that the 400kg warhead of the M20 could have taken out a sizeble chunk of the MiG-23BN fighter-bombers usually positioned on the tarmac.

The impact of a M20 ballistic missile strike at Bahir Dar air base on the 2nd of December 2020.

Eight MiG-23s (with at least another two in the hangar) on the same tarmac several months earlier.

Unfortunately for Ethiopia, its military possessed few systems that could be used to find and neutralise the launchers after their capture by Tigray forces. That said, the biggest threats to the large 8x8 launchers and reloaders in Tigray service were not aircraft or armed drones lurking high in the sky above, but rather narrow roads and passageways, which soon bested at least one launcher. Apparently possessing no equipment that could recover the heavy truck, it was simply left in place together with eight A200 guided rockets.


Some time earlier, in December 2020, Ethiopian government forces regained control of one of the missile bases in Tigray. [5] Found here were several M20 SBRMs along with at least four empty A200 canisters. It is likely that these had been left behind by Tigray forces after they were ousted from the region, having had too little time or the proper equipment to attempt to bring them along. The fact that not all had been expended by the time the base was taken could also indicate that all launchers in the area had already been lost.


Also recaptured was at least one of the loading systems based on the same chassis. Equipped with a crane installed on the rear of the truck, the loader vehicle can carry either eight A200 guided rocket canisters or two M20 ballistic missiles, allowing it to swiftly reload the launching system so it can commence its next firing mission. The presence of the reloaders essentially doubles the firepower of each battery, with as much as sixteen A200 rockets or four M20 ballistic missiles at the ready for a launcher before the battery has to return to a location to stock up on munitions.
 

A second loader was recaptured around the same time after having been seemingly abandoned by Tigrayan forces in a hurry. Intriguingly, at least three of the A200's rocket canisters are empty yet appear to have been loaded back onto the loader, presumably after having been fired from the launcher. This is unlikely to have been an effort at saving the local area from pollution, and might instead have been an attempt at hiding traces of these systems being in operational use by Tigray forces. Of course, this later proved futile after the Tigray forces abandoned the entire vehicle along with the canisters.


The rest of the launchers and reloaders have at this point likely suffered a similar fate, with the advanced equipment being difficult to maintain in the harsh conditions of Ethiopia's fresh civil conflict. As a result of the Tigray War Ethiopia went from having the strongest guided rockets and ballistic missile force in Sub-Saharan Africa to having a battered and disfunctional remnant of a deterrent. Once the pride of the Ethiopian Army, the country will likely look to reintroduce this capability, perhaps while conflict is still raging or else soon after the conclusion of hostilities. Considering rumours regarding a possible acquisition of TB2s from Turkey, it might well be tempted to look at other Turkish systems the force of which is often multiplied through synergy with the TB2. Such systems could include the TRL-230 and T-300 MRLs and Bora tactically ballistic missiles, especially the first of which has a well-documented cooperative benefit from the TB2.

[1] 国产A200远程制导火箭武器射程200公里火力猛 http://mil.news.sina.com.cn/2010-11-19/1424619881.html
[2] Multiple launch rocket systems “Polonez”/missile system “Polonez-M” https://ztem.by/en/catalog/mlrs/


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List Of Coalition UAV Losses During The Yemeni Civil War

September 16, 2021, 9:31 am
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By Stijn Mitzer and Joost Oliemans

This list aims to catalogue visually confirmed Coalition unmanned aerial aircraft (UAV) losses during the Saudi Arabian-led intervention in Yemen launched in March 2015. This list only includes visually confirmed losses recorded. Thus, the actual number of UAVs lost in the theatre is likely significantly higher than what is recorded here (for example drones that crashed inside Saudi Arabia but whose wreckages were never photographed). As the conflict is still ongoing, the list will be updated as new downings occur.
 
Losses by year:
 
2015: 3
2016: 5
2017: 4
2018: 5
2019: 9
2020: 2
2021: 9
 
Losses by operator (country):
 
Saudi Arabia: 20
United Arab Emirates: 11
United States: 7

Losses by origin of the U(C)AV (country):
 
China: 14
United States: 10
Austria: 7
South Africa South Africa: 4
Turkey: 3
Italy: 1
 
(Click on the equipment to get a picture of each destroyed UAV and the date it was shot down or crashed on)

Surveillance Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (15 lost)


Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicles (24 lost)

 
 
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Forget The A-10: The Bayraktar Akıncı Flying Tank Destroyer Has Arrived

September 17, 2021, 1:55 am
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By Stijn Mitzer and Joost Oliemans
 
Bin atlı akınlarda çocuklar gibi şendik - A thousand cavaliers, we were cheerful like children during the raids (Akıncılar, by Yahya Kemal Beyatlı)
 
The A-10 Thunderbolt II was specifically developed as a close air support (CAS) aircraft, tearing up enemy tanks and providing air support against enemy ground forces with its powerful 30mm cannon. Largely designed around the GAU-8 Avenger rotary cannon, the mere presence of an A-10 over the battlefield is often enough to strike a lasting sense of fear into any foe on the ground. At a first glance, the Bayraktar Akıncı features little of the aspects that made the A-10 such a fearsome anti-tank hunter, even lacking any type of cannon armament whatsoever.
 
But war has changed. No longer do aircraft sweep in for low-level attack runs using cannons and unguided rockets as their primary means of armament all the while exposing themselves to a wide range of enemy anti-aircraft systems. Nowadays aircraft mostly rely on precision-guided muntions to take out enemy ground targets, often flying well above the ceiling of enemy air defence systems. Even aircraft like the A-10 ultimately had to adapt to this switch in tactics, employing JDAMs and the Paveway series of PGMs. Survivability made way for remaining undetected (either through stealth, or distance), wheras developments in modern munitions have meant that the raw amount of weaponry carried now outweighs aerodynamics and speed.

Employing the cheap but highly-accurate MAM-L munition, Azerbaijani TB2s neutralised at least 92 Armenian T-72 tanks during the Nagorno-Karabakh War. [1] Their success has led some to argue that the demise of the tank is finally here, with bulky armour providing little protection against top-attacks from munitions like the MAM-L. But rather than heralding the end of the tank as a fire-support platform, the Nagorno-Karabakh War actually proved the feasibility of using drones in high-intensity conflicts. It can be said that the TB2 functioned exceptionally well under these circumstances, destroying at least 548 Armenian targets at the confirmed loss of just two drones. [1]
 

The number of destroyed tanks increases even further when also including the examples neutralised in Libya and Syria in 2019 and 2020, where TB2s became responsible for the confirmed destruction of at least 30 more tanks. A list of tanks visually confirmed to have been destroyed by Bayraktar TB2s over Nagorno-Karabakh, Syria and Libya can be viewed below.

With the introduction of the first Bayraktar Akıncı into operational service in August 2021, the anti-tank capabilities of Baykar's UAV lineage only appears to be increasing. Indeed, up to 18 MAM-Ls (or MAM-Cs depending on the mission requirement) can be brought to bear by the Akıncı compared to four on the TB2. This positions the Akıncı as the perfect system to annihilate entire armoured columns in just one sortie or to support ground offensives by picking off enemy targets ahead of advancing forces.
 
The ROKETSAN MAM-L has been specifically developed for use by UAVs and light attack aircraft. The MAM series of munitions can engage both stationary and moving targets with high precision, as witnessed during the several conflicts it has meanwhile seen action in. The recent introduction of INS/GPS to the MAM-L has dramatically increased the range of the munition from 7km to upwards of 14km, allowing it to outrange most mobile (Russian) air defence systems currently in service worldwide.
 
 
Bayraktar Akıncı brings a host of novel capabilities to the field of unmanned aerial warfare, and for their novelty, a focus on just these capabilities is perhaps justified. However, the mere fact of its increased payload capacity is perhaps just as important. Though the carriage of 18 MAM-Ls is unlikely to occur during wartime, it showcases the impressive payload capabilities of the Akıncı and its potential as one of the most dreaded flying tank destroyers of our times. New munitions are being developed alongside the Akıncı at an impressive pace, ensuring drone technology is always one step ahead of enemy countermeasures. The future of unmanned aerial warfare has finally arrived, and the Akıncı could well be at the forefront of that future.

 

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Postcards From Kabul: Taliban Shows Off Captured Aircraft

September 18, 2021, 8:56 am
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By Stijn Mitzer and Joost Oliemans
 
Images from a recently released video shows additional details of now-former Afghan Air Force aircraft and helicopters that were still present at Kabul International Airport at the time of its fall to the Taliban. In addition to showing the damage caused to aircraft by U.S. forces as they sought to prevent future use of Afghan Air Force assets, the footage also reveals that three Mi-24V attack helicopters were captured intact by the Taliban. Other aircraft such as the C-208/AC-208 utility/attack aircraft and C-130 transport aircraft similarly appear to have suffered less damage than initially thought.

The flyable inventory of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan Air Force currently consists of eight MD 530F attack helicopters, around a dozen Mi-8/17s and four UH-60 'Blackhawk' transport helicopters. The activation of more Mi-8/17s and a number of UH-60s is likely, although the operational lifespan of any Blackhawk will likely be limited without access to qualified technicians. Nonetheless, the capture of at least twelve UH-60s and fourteen Mi-8/17s at Kabul will likely provide it with a steady source of spare parts for years to come. 
 

One of at least three now-former Afghan Air Force C-130s encountered at Kabul Airport.

This particular aircraft was already inoperational before the fall of Kabul. Notice that the propellers of its No.3 engine are in the feathered position.

Contrary to most other Afghan Air Force aircraft present at Kabul, this C-130 didn't have its avionics smashed.

A second C-130. The operational status of this aircraft remains unknown.

One of at least three Mi-24Vs (Mi-35) attack helicopters captured intact at Kabul. These do not appear to have suffered any damage at the hands of U.S. troops and will likely form the nucleus of the future Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan Air Force.

These helicopters were originally gifted to Afghanistan by India in October 2019. Rather than supplying its own helicopters, India contracted Belarus to overhaul and deliver the Mi-24Vs instead.

Five C-208/AC-208 utility/attack aircraft. The AC-208 in front is armed with a rocket pod for laser-guided APKWS precision-guided munitions (PGMs).

This C-208 had its engine removed and replaced with three tires to prevent it from tipping backwards.

Five C-208 utility aircraft. The middle aircraft is missing its engine, causing it to slightly tilt backwards.

A look inside one of the helicopter hangars on the military side of Kabul Airport.


This hangar mostly housed MD 530Fs and at least two UH-60s, all of which received extensive damage to their windows and instruments.

This MD 530F even had its exhaust pipe trashed.

Cockpit damage suffered by one of the UH-60s in the hangar.

One of the MD 530Fs seen with its tail broken off. It is unknown if this damage was caused by U.S. forces or if the helicopter suffered a mishap at an earlier date.







This UH-60 had the roundels cut out from its side doors, presumably by bored U.S. forces that wanted to take them home as souvenirs.

An interior shot of one of the twelve UH-60s captured at Kabul shows off some of the damage they received.

The MD 530Fs in this hangar were certainly not exempted from 'U.S. aggression' either.

The operations board of the MD 530F squadron, revealing it had at least 21 helicopters at its disposal.

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A Guide To Nigeria’s Military Drones

September 20, 2021, 1:09 am
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By Stijn Mitzer and Joost Oliemans

The goal of this list is to comprehensively catalogue Nigeria's current inventory of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). In an effort to streamline the list and avoid unnecessary confusion, this list only includes military-grade UAVs or military drones associated with Nigeria's defence industry. UAVs that underwent testing by the Nigerian military but were ultimately not acquired (such as the RQ-11 Raven and Schiebel Camcopter S-100) are not included in the list.
 
Over the past decade, Nigeria has designed several types of UAVs in collaboration with foreign companies and institutions. Most of these projects, most notably the Galma and Tsaigumi, appear to have been unsuccessful in their design or perhaps too limited in their usefulness to enter production in Nigeria. Nonetheless, they likely provided their designers with valuable experience in the design of unmanned aerial systems that one day could be used to design and produce a full-fledged Nigerian UAV.
 
In late 2020 it was reported that Nigeria would soon be receiving two Wing Loong IIs, four CH-4Bs and two additional CH-3As from China, the latter presumably to replace the examples lost in service since the type first entered service in 2014. [1] Arguably more surprisingly was the sighting of a single Emirati Yabhon Flash-20 in Nigeria in February 2021. The type was first reported to have been ordered by Nigeria in 2016, but had previously not been sighted in Nigerian service. [2]

Notes:

- If several configurations of a drone with one designation are known, they are added as such.

- The part within the apostrophes refers to other designations or an unofficial designation.

- When available, the date of inception is added.

(Click on the UAV to get a picture of them in Nigerian service)

Surveillance Unmanned Aerial Vehicles

  • Aerostar Tactical UAS [2006] (Believed to have been decommissioned due to a lack of spare parts)
  • Tekever AR3 [2021] (In service with the Nigerian Navy)
  • Gulma [2013] (Not destined to enter active service)
  • Tsaigumi [2018] (Designed in collaboration with the Portuguese company UAVision. Not destined to enter active service)


Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicles


Vertical Take-Off and Landing Unmanned Aerial Vehicles


Trainer Unmanned Aerial Vehicles

  • Mugin (Used for training drone pilots)
  •  Amebo I [2010] (Designed in collaboration with Cranfield University UK. Not destined to enter service)
  •  Amebo II [2011] (Designed in collaboration with Cranfield University UK. Not destined to enter service)
  •  Amebo III [2012] (Designed in collaboration with Cranfield University UK. Used for training drone pilots)

[1] Nigerian Air Force getting Wing Loong, CH-3 and CH-4 UAVs https://www.defenceweb.co.za/aerospace/unmanned-aerial-vehicles/nigerian-air-force-getting-wing-loong-ch-3-and-ch-4-uavs/

Recommended Articles:

The Oryx Handbook of Iranian Drones
 
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Mobilised For War: Ethiopia’s Russian 2S19 Msta SPGs

September 20, 2021, 3:51 am
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By Stijn Mitzer and Joost Oliemans
 
The Ethiopian military operates a number of Russian weapon systems that otherwise have found little success on the export market. One of these, the Su-25TK 'Tankovy Buster', has already been covered in an earlier article on this site. Another system is the 2S19 Msta self-propelled gun (SPG), around a dozen of which are currently in service with the Ethiopian National Defence Force (ENDF). Following the outbreak of hostilities in Ethiopia's northern Tigray region, they are now amongst the many systems deployed to combat against the TDF.

Ethiopia became the first export customer of the 2S19 Msta when it acquired at least twelve systems in 1999. Much like the Su-25TKs, Ethiopia's Mstas were acquired as emergency wartime purchases during the Eritrean–Ethiopian War which raged from May 1998 to June 2000. In order to speed up their delivery to Ethiopia, the 2S19s came directly from Russian Army stocks.
 
At around the same time, Eritrea too acquired its first SPGs. Rather than following Ethiopia in its quest to buy one of the most advanced SPGs available at that time, Eritrea had to settle on second-hand 122mm 2S1 Gvozdikas from Bulgaria instead. [1] These could engage targets out to ranges of 15km only, a meagre distance when compared to the 25km range of the 2S19. Having said that, neither the 2S19 nor the Su-25TK ultimately provided Ethiopia with the military breakthrough it was hoping for.
 
At the time of their delivery to Ethiopia, the 2S19s constituted the most modern SPG in service on the African continent. Once in service, the Mstas were a huge improvement over the North Korean SPGs previously in use with the ENDF. These consisted of a 122mm D-30 howitzer fitted to a tracked (APC-based) chassis, with little improvements over a towed D-30 howitzer except for increased mobility and ammunition stowage.
 

A North Korean 122mm 'M-1977' SPG in service with the Ethiopian Army during the Eritrean-Ethiopian War. These SPGs have since been retired and scrapped

A 130mm M-46 field-gun mounted on the chassis of a ATS-59 artillery tractor. Several of such DIY conversion were produced to supplement the North Korean SPGs in service and hastily put to use against the Eritreans

After seeing heavy action during the Eritrean-Ethiopian War, pounding Eritrean troop concentrations alongside North Korean SPGs and 122mm BM-21 Grad MRLs, the 2S19s were to see action once again when in November 2020 Tigrayans rebelled against the central government in Addis Ababa. Taking over bases located all throughout the Tigray region, Tigray forces quickly armed themselves with heavy weaponry, even including large-calibre MRLs, guided rockets and ballistic missiles. In response, the ENDF was deployed to quell the rebellion. This also included the 2S19s, which have been seen moving around the frontlines on flatbed trucks on several occasions.


Unlike the Ethiopian Air Force, which is almost entirely self-sufficient in the maintenance and overhaul of its aircraft but also the training of its pilots, it appears that the Ethiopian Army still relies on Russian instructors for its 2S19 SPGs to some extent. It is unknown if their presence in Ethiopia is related to training Ethiopian crews or maintenance, or perhaps a combination of the two. Russian military instructors operate all throughout Africa, and their fondness of posing for the cameras is often the reason why images of Russian equipment in service with African militaries are leaked online.

 
The purchase of at least a dozen 2S19 Mstas from Russia in the late 1990s would be the last known acquisition of SPGs by the Ethiopian Army. Rather than investing in more 2S19 SPGs, the Ethiopian artillery arsenal was to see its largest upheaval in capabilities ever through the acquisition of a number of weapon systems from China. These have so far included 155mm AH-1 towed howitzers, 300mm AR2 multiple rocket launchers (MRLs), 300mm A200 guided rockets and even M20 short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs).
 
 
In an attempt to further boost its artillery capabilities, Ethiopia also called on its indigenous weapon industry for the rehabilitation of several systems already in service and the mating of 122mm D-30 howitzers to trucks, creating a cheap but highly mobile self-propelled howitzer. Several dilapidated 122mm Grad launch systems were also given a new life by their installation onto new trucks. Yet another project entails the conversion of some BMP-1 infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs) to mortar carriers by the Bishoftu Automotive Industry. It is unknown if any of these projects have progressed beyond prototype status, and it is entirely possible that each has remained limited to the production of a few examples only.

 
The 2S19 was and remains an exotic piece of military equipment in this part of the world. Acquired at a time when Ethiopia was desperately looking for any type of modern military equipment that could give it an edge over its mortal foe of Eritrea, the Mstas have soldiered on long enough to participate in another conflict, against another enemy. Ethiopia finds itself facing a surprisingly comparable situation during the Tigray War, two decades hence.  This time the necessities of conflict have led it not to Russian but Iran, from which it acquired Mohajer-6 UCAVs. Whether this purchase will sate war's thirst for new equipment remains to be seen however, and the 2S19 Mstas might soon find themselves alongside a variety of weaponry from exotic sources.


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An International Export Success: Global Demand For The Bayraktar TB2 Reaches All Time High

September 21, 2021, 2:52 am
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By Stijn Mitzer and Joost Oliemans
 
It is not often that a type of weapon system is proving so popular that countries are waiting in line to buy it. Ironically, this appears to be the situation with the Bayraktar TB2. In a recent interview with Baykar's Chief Technical Officer (CTO) Selçuk Bayraktar it was stated that new export agreements were signed with more than 10 countries for the export of Bayraktar TB2 so far, and that Baykar Savunma currently generates more than 70 percent of its revenues from exports. [1]
 
Current operators of the TB2 are known to include Turkey, Qatar, Libya, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan, with Morocco currently in the process of receiving its first TB2s. Poland is set to receive its first examples in 2022 and will be the second NATO country to operate the type. Currently in service with (or on order by) at least seven foreign countries (excluding Turkey), the Bayraktar TB2 is the most commercially successful UCAV to this date. With new export agreements having been signed with several countries, there is little doubt that the Bayraktar TB2 will continue to expand on its lead over other UCAVs for years to come.

List of UCAVs ranked by the number of (confirmed) countries they've been exported to

 
Bayraktar TB2 = 7
CAIG Wing Loong I = 5
CAIG Wing Loong II = 5
General Atomics MQ-9 Reaper = 5 
CASC Rainbow CH-4 =4 (6 when including countries that formerly operated the type)
CASC Rainbow CH-3 = 4
General Atomics MQ-1 Predator = 3
Mohajer-6 = 1
TAI Anka = 1
Vestel Karayel = 1
CASC Rainbow CH-92A = 1
 
Although largely renowned for developing the TB2, Baykar Savunma produces several more types of UAVs that have found success in penetrating foreign markets. One of these, the Bayraktar Mini UAV, has meanwhile entered service with three countries. The novel capabilities of the Bayraktar Akıncı are also likely to turn it into a future export success.
 

Current (confirmed) operators of Baykar Savunma products


Bayraktar TB2

  • Turkey [2014]
  • Army
  • Navy
  • Gendarmerie General Command
  • General Directorate of Security (Police)
  • National Intelligence Organization
  • Qatar [2019]
  • Reconnaissance and Surveillance Center
  • Libya [2019]
  • Air Force
  • Ukraine [2019]
  • Air Force
  • Navy
  • Azerbaijan [2020]
  • Air Force
  • Turkmenistan [2021]
  • Air Force
  • Morocco [2021]
  • Air Force


Bayraktar Akıncı

  • Turkey [2021]
  • Army
  • Air Force

Bayraktar Mini UAV

  • Turkey [2007]
  • Army
  • Qatar [2012]
  • Army
  • Libya [2020]
  • Air Force


Future operators of Baykar Savunma products


Bayraktar TB2

  • Poland [2022]
  • Air Force


Bayraktar TB3

  • Turkey
  • Navy
 

MİUS (National Unmanned Aircraft System)

  • Turkey
  • Air Force
  • Navy
 

Bayraktar VTOL UAV

  • Turkey
  • Army
 
 

Prospective operators of Baykar Savunma products


Bayraktar TB2

  • Iraq
  • Kazakhstan
  • Bulgaria
  • Hungary
  • Albania
  • Latvia  
  • Oman
  • Pakistan



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Bayraktars Over Bakırköy #Teknofest

September 21, 2021, 7:04 am
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By Stijn Mitzer and Joost Oliemans
 
Spectacular footage shows Bayraktar Akıncıs and TB2s coming in to land at Istanbul Atatürk Airport in preparation of Teknofest 2021. Their approach and landing could be neatly followed thanks to the camera located in the tail section of both types of unmanned aerial combat vehicles (UCAVs). The Akıncı and TB2 are just but a few of the systems showcased during this year's iteration of Teknofest. For Baykar specifically, the Bayraktar DİHA (VTOL UAV) also made its first public appearance.

Teknofest was held for the first time at Istanbul Airport in September 2018 by the Turkish Technology Team (T3) Foundation. The goal of the event, apart from the obvious purpose of entertainment, is to increase awareness about technology and inspire future generations to choose a path in the fields of science and technology. Any advanced industry depends on inspiring young people to continue the progress today and to take on future challenges, and this situation is no different in Turkey.

Teknofest is jam-packed with technology competitions, exhibitions and displays and aviation demonstrations. The 2021 edition has already seen some technology competitions being held prior to the main event. The festival features dozens of competitions in categories such as smart transportation, helicopter design, biotechnology, robotics, flying cars, rockets and unmanned underwater vehicles. Last year, the event was organized virtually in Gaziantep Province due to limitations imposed by COVID-19. In 2019, some 1.72 million people visited the event in Istanbul. [1]
 
 
An Akıncı shortly before touching down on the runway of Atatürk Airport. Also note the blue and white Airbus A300 parked in a remote corner of the airport. The A300 is one out of three aircraft that used to belong to Bosphurus European Airways' (BEA). Unfortunately for BEA, its operations lasted for only six months (from March until August 2002) until money ran out. The disused aircraft were subsequently stored at Atatürk Airport waiting for a new owner or scrapping. You can read our coverage on BEA and its A300s here.
 
 
After a brief touch down on the runway, the Akıncı lifts off again, revealing numerous cargo ships in the Sea of Marmara. Atatürk Airport is located nearby the proposed location of the Istanbul Canal, a project for an artificial waterway that will connect the Black Sea to Mediterranean Sea. The new waterway is meant to ease traffic in the Bosphorus, where traffic congestion sometimes leaves ships queuing for days to pass through it.


A Bayraktar TB2 comes in to land at Atatürk Airport. Atatürk IAP was the main international airport serving Istanbul until April 2019 when all passenger flights were transferred to the new Istanbul Airport situated 40km northwest of the city. Since then, the airport has been open only for cargo flights, general aviation, military, business and diplomatic flights and of course, Teknofest! Atatürk Airport is also home to the Turkish Air Force's Sparrow Flight flying T-41D basic trainers, the Military Air Traffic Control Command and the Istanbul Aviation Museum. The military aspect of the area hardly ends here however, as the Air Force Academy is located just across the road.

After the transfer of operations to the new Istanbul Airport, Atatürk Airport was supposed to lose one of its two runways. The many hangers located on the northwestern side of the airport will remain open for maintenance of private and commercial aircraft however. Since May 2020, a chunk of the closed runway is occupied by the Yeşilköy Prof. Dr. Murat Dilmener Emergency Hospital. The hospital was built specifically for use in emergency situations like pandemics or earthquakes and construction started soon after the first COVID-19 case was confirmed in Turkey.
 

Safe landing!



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Italian Allure - Turkmenistan’s M-346 Combat Jets

September 22, 2021, 6:04 am
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By Stijn Mitzer and Joost Oliemans

Some 30 years after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the inventories of many post-Soviet air forces are still very much defined by the Soviet-era aircraft types they inherited. This is especially true for combat aircraft, the expensive price tag of which has dissuaded many nations from acquiring new types to replace older generations currently in service. Instead, proven types such as the MiG-29 and Su-25 undergo overhauls again and again in an attempt to not only keep them flying, but also to keep them relevant in the age of 21st century warfare.
 
While nations like Belarus and Kazakhstan have attemped to challenge this perception through the acquisition of Yak-130s and Su-30SMs in recent years, large parts of Central Asia have seen a gradual decline in jet operations. Turkmenistan is a notable exception to this rule, having strengthened its air force through the acquisition of new jet aircraft and the upgrade of MiG-29s and Su-25s already in service. One of those aircraft is the Italian M-346, which has so far been ordered by nine air forces worldwide.

In May 2020 the Italian Senate disclosed that Turkmenistan had placed a 293.1 million euros order for four M-346FAs (Fighter Attack) and two M-346FTs (Fighter Trainer) in 2019. [1] The first M-346s destined for Turkmenistan were sighted at the Leonardo facitities in Italy in July 2021 shortly before their delivery to the country. [2] The aircraft sported a total of four inert air-to-air missiles (AAMs) and two fuel tanks, a configuration they would keep during their demonstration flights in Turkmenisyan.

 
The actual armament suite acquired by Turkmenistan for its M-346s remains unknown. Based on the types of weaponry known to have been purchased for the A-29Bs, it is possible that no precision-guided armament has (yet) been acquired for the M-346s. Instead, dumb bombs, air-to-air missiles (AAMs) and external fuel tanks might be the initial standard loadout for Turkmenistan's M-346s. However, owing to their advanced weapon capabilities it seems plausible that guided air-to-ground weaponry will be acquired at some point in the future. These could include Marte Mk2 anti-ship missiles and various types of Turkish or Israeli precision-guided munitions. The supply of Western weapons such as the GBU-12 is also possible, but likely dependant on the willingness of source nations to deliver it.
 

Shortly after the arrival of the aircraft to Turkmenistan, President Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedow took a test flight in one of the M-346s over the Caspian Sea. Although the camouflage pattern worn by the aircraft appears to have been designed specifically with naval operations in mind, most Turkmen Air Force aircraft feature colourful liveries that appear to have little regard for their area of operations. Of course, in a time when radars are the primary means of detecting aircraft, the importance of camouflage patterns has somewhat diminished.


Although the M-346s have yet to show up on satellite imagery, it is expected that the aircraft will either be stationed at Ak-Tepe-Bezmain near the capital Asghabat, at Mary airbase/IAP or Mary-2 airbase, both near the city of Mary. The latter already houses five A-29B Super Tucanos that were also recently acquired by Turkmenistan. The C-27J NGs are likely to be housed at Ak-Tepe-Bezmain, which is already home to two An-74TK-200s and one An-26. These constitute the air force's only active transport aircraft (although Turkmenistan Airlines operates three Il-76s), and it is possible that the C-27J NGs are set to completely replace the An-26 in its role as a turboprop transport.
 

With the fall of the Soviet Union now far in the past and a new world with new requirements in plain view, modern Western technology has finally reached the Turkmenistan Air Force through the delivery of M-346s, C-27Js and A-29Bs. More introductions and other surprises undoubtedly await, with Turkmenistan currently believed to be leaning towards the acquistion of new unmanned combat aerial vehicles (UCAVs) and new attack helicopters to replace its aging inventory of Soviet-era Mi-24P attack helicopters. For these acquistions it will undoubtedly look at Western sources once more, firmly securing the Turkmen Air Force's position as the most modern air arm in the region.



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